Policy Coherence and Incoherence: The Domestic Politics of American Democracy Promotion By: Matthew Spence

Introduction departments and independent agencies of the U.S government created programs administered by USAID or American diplomats overseas to promote political and economic change in the Soviet Union The U.S. government is unified bureaucratic actors promoting democracy through using different strategies, resources, tools and levels of coordination to create a democracy promotion policy/policies. The paper argues the following questions: Which actors within the U.S. government are involved in promoting political and economic change abroad? What strategies and conceptual models guide them? What tools and resources do they bring to bear? How does the interaction of American bureaucratic politics affect the impact of American democracy promotion? These questions were formed by the U.S. governments past democracy promotion efforts:1990s attempt to become democratic allies with past Soviet enemies - to avoid threat to the West - Policymakers obstacles: a. domestic political constraints in mobilizing resources for the task b. competing policy goals c. conceptual uncertainty about the meaning of democracy promotion The principles responsible for unifying American democracy promotion in the Soviet Union were to defeat the old regime, hold elections on time and undertake economic reform first BUT this was still an incomplete model of democratization Tools of promoting democracy, like foreign aid, often had less influence than expected The U.S. government having so many complex policies (with separate goals) from different implementers (the White House, State Department and U.S. Embassies, USAID, the Pentagon, Treasury Department, and Congress) caused limited bureaucratic coordination. The Soviet Union had weak resources devoted to the task, a policy driven by personality and American domestic politics, a reactive policy, and unresolved tensions between policy goals.

The Uncertainty of How to Promote Democracy Competing goals and limited resources are familiar domestic constraints in policymaking due to no consensus about how democratization occurs and not knowing how to measure democratic change, lack of common intellectual language American policymakers had optimistic theories with internal logic but there was little actual historical or theoretical evidence to support it American policymakers and scholars were still learning democratization was not very established or directing for external actors therefore policymakers had no guidance

Exporting America: The Unifying Principles of U.S. Democracy Promotion Shared several core beliefs about how to promote democracy: 1. defeat the old regime and support reformers (in the 1990s, it was bury communists) - defeating communism - but the U.S. policymakers didnt have any democratic appealing candidates to gain support in Russia - Yeltsin was their support of democracy in elections 2. hold elections on time - unified the bureaucracy - U.S. policymakers lobbied governments of different countries that considered canceling or postponing national presidential elections - 1996 pushed Yeltsin to obey this rule even though they believed the communists could win 3. undertake rapid market reform first - One quarter of U.S. obligations to the former U.S.S.R went to private sector development, economic restructuring, and market reform - economic reforms: downsize labor, cut government budgets, and rollback government services - U.S. policymakers believed markets were a precondition for democracy - Russians wanted economic reform over political - U.S. assisted in liberalizing post-Soviet markets (in return for American business opportunities) ... The U.S knew the former Soviet Union need an uncensored press, a large number of civic groups, political parties, religious freedom, and other familiar features of American democracy but didnt know implement this which caused for so many conflicting ideas ...these ideas unified the American bureaucracy produced efforts with intense resources, and specific requests which could result in potential power for the U.S.

Incoherence in Implementation: One Government, Many Democracy Promotion Policies disagreement about tactics and approach six different democracy promotion policies from: the White House, State Department and Embassies, Treasury Department, USAID, Pentagon, and Congress. each agency had different mandates and bureaucratic interests, different tools, and different approaches to influencing democratization USAID and the State Department had limited funds and other tools to change behavior and didnt take interest in their host countries domestic politics but could be effective at promoting democracy if they had the power the Pentagon and Treasury Department had the most powerful tools with their host countries and bureaucratic pull within the U.S. government their strategy was less direct and their primary bureaucratic mandate was to focus on security and economic issues first Congress had the most powerful voice but the most inconsistent, episodic, and incoherent efforts to promote democracy Why Democracy Promotion Saw Weak Coordination how to promote democracy was a issue engaged in too many agencies to be able to coordinate Clinton administrations tendency for informal policy coordination - only 1 meeting was held from 1994-1996 to evaluate policy towards Russia (driven by NATO expansion) - decisions for major reform policies (EX: supporting an IMF loan) - Battles over what to emphasize in speeches and visits with foreign leaders forced policy choices Informal coordination often hurt democracy promotion in two ways: a. the bureaucracy was used to traditional security and economic foreign policy priorities so it was not made aware of the new policy initiative b. Overlooked democracy issues next to U.S. concerns White House distinct actor of its own right in promoting democracy reflected its own particular understanding of democracy promotion Bill Clinton believed promoting democracy meant leveraging personal relationships with democratic reformers in other countries but critics said this was not a habit of Democrats EX: Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush relied on their personal connection with Mikhail Gorbachev and Vladimir Putin this is due to their main tools of diplomacy: summit meetings, and other personal relationship with politicians of foreign nations EX: Clintons relationship with Yeltsin

Summit meetings= conduct diplomacy, signal of support or disapproval, opportunity to breed familiarity between each side, and a deadline to force bureaucratic movement on a policy in both governments - BUT NOT a main part of the discussion (exception of: elections, defeating the communists, or other key elements of the US model of democratization) - Main components were short-term issues of economic or security seen as long-term goals Yet there was still conflict in the policymaking in the White House because Clinton and his advisors had different views

The State Department and the Embassies more hesitant about trying to influence internal political change in foreign countries felt they had fewer tools to do so effectively uncomfortable about exerting diplomatic pressure to influence domestic reforms, securing cooperation in traditional foreign policy issues (EX: arms control, NATO expansion, or troop withdrawals) felt their diplomatic toolkitmoney, international organizations, private diplomacy, and public criticism was ineffective in democratization American domestic politics highlighted foreign aid for promoting democracy but really it was a weak motivator lack of money control lack of freedom to change the budget allocations Congress set little input over the IMF and World Bank loans their funds were inadequate incentive for the former Soviet governments little power to influence changes on how to spend foreign aid big believers in foreign aid (not directed towards U.S. benefit democracy programs or technical assistance) relied primarily on a default democracy promotion toolkit private diplomacy and public criticism to influence a governments behavior - LACKED material support to the country Bureaucratic confusion diluted the impact of public statements (Americas mixed signals = weak commitment to democracy promotion) USAID weakest democracy promoter in the U.S. government had responsibility but not authority for building democracy in the former Soviet Union role: strengthening political parties, training independent journalists, and funding NGOs had little experience, money, bureaucratic power, or tools to address the deeper obstacles foreign aid budget was much less than other agencies (44% of their budget was given to to other agencies)

EX: USAIDs FY2001 budget to Russia was only $91.4 million, compared to the Department of Energys funds for Russia of $335.5 million early 1990s turf wars took place between USAID and other agencies for funding of personal projects although a host government could rid of USAID at any time, USAID democracy programs challenged the excessive government control over political life gave host government little incentive to change their behavior 78% of funds for USAID programs are spent on U.S. good and services ineffective therefore was restricted by Congress provided technical assistance (advisors or training programs) pursued a strategy of democracy promotion the privatization of U.S. foreign policy- giving limited funds to the NGOs and for-profit democracy contractors who tried to build support for reform and technical assistance - flawed

Pentagon The Defense Department had a strong influence and was active preferred to privately encourage countries they had good relationships with to democratize and work closely with militaries to model how they needed to function in a democracy 1991-2003 the Pentagon never actually cut its security assistance programs to the post-Soviet governments found it ineffective and counterproductive to publicly criticize democratic backsliding stressed reform privately but was more interested in security than democracy Treasury Department strongest bureaucratic player in influencing U.S. policy toward reform in the former Soviet Union This was because of their 3 assets: knowledge of how reform worked, money from the IMF, and the personality of an effective bureaucratic fighter Larry Summers highly involved in countries domestic politics spent much energy working toward building democracy and considering how economic reform would support democratization had a Marxist approach to democratization (economic change must occur first) resulting in issues of economic reform macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, deregulation, and privatization became central elements of U.S. efforts to promote internal political change in the former Soviet Union had the ability to turn on or off the spigot of billions of dollars in IMF loans (the most powerful tool in the U.S. government) IMF money went directly to the other countries central government Congress didnt have much power over the Treasurys actions 1992 to 2002 the IMF loaned $22 billion to Russia (basically free cash because they never intended the loans to come due)

told foreign leaders in the former Soviet Union what specific legislation they wanted to see passed and when to fulfill IMF programs supported presidents in bypassing their legislatures to enact controversial economic reform by decree but some decrees were almost abusing the law their economic policy may have accidentally, short-termly harmed democratization Congress controlled the purse strings had rhetoric that became more important when tied to money used the threat of Congressional cutbacks in funding to try to encourage more democratic behavior EX: when a former Soviet government did not approve to U.S. security demands, Congress cut completely unrelated programs targeted specifically for democracy 535 Congressmen each had their own constituencies and agendas, and were able to talk about whatever they wanted, whenever they wanted, often with little of the necessary knowledge of the situation abroad imposed tight restrictions on how funds could be spent, which limited the use of foreign aid as a carrot or stick budgeted funds at least six months before they could actually be spent, typically required the money be disbursed within a year, and earmarked funds in rigid line items if an executive branch didnt spend all they were assigned to the Congress would no longer assist them when more money would be needed in the future catering to U.S. interest groups helped sustain a domestic constituency for funding democracy promotion programs U.S. foreign aid policies reflected American ethnic politics (increasing aid to countries with vocal diasporas), interest group constituencies (continuing the funding of well-connected NGOs over the objections of their nominal supervisors in USAID), and attempts to win over American farmers sometimes critics labelled U.S. assistance projects as the U.S. full employment program

The Consequences of U.S. Policy Incoherence 4 main problems: 1. weak resources devoted to the task democracy promotion received weaker resources than other American foreign policy goals Many in the U.S. government felt promoting democracy was in Americas long- term interest, but the agencies most directly responsible for implementing the policyUSAID and the State Departmenthad the weakest bureaucratic resources

Whereas privatization and economic reform found a powerful patron in Larry Summers, democracy promotion was often an orphan in the American bureaucracy USAID could not stand up to the Defense or Treasury Departments The State Departments Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor had less bureaucratic influence than States regional bureaus the U.S. government only focused on short-term forming of policies EX: on summit agendas political reform often lost to the security and economic issues

Democracy also lost in the allocation of foreign aid - 2.8% of USAIDs total assistance to Russia went to programs directly aimed at promoting democracy

2.

a unique policy driven by personalities and American domestic politics determined what features of democracy to promote, or what specific requests of the governments of democratizing states to make These factors mattered because, in contrast to economic reform or arms control, a coherent intellectual guide for democracy promotion was not readily available a reactive policy the consequence of U.S. policymakers struggling to pursue competing foreign policy goals and manage multiple crises, all with limited time and resources high ranking U.S. policymakers could typically only give serious attention to democracy issues in two circumstances: a. a government did something blatantly undemocratic b. a senior official was about to give a major speech or attend summit meeting U.S. policymakers defined democracy as the absence of undemocratic behavior which did not address the real sources of political change in these countries unresolved tensions between policy goals policymakers saw each goal as mutually reinforcing therefore it wasnt a choice of one over the other

3.

4.

policymakers believed that goals conflicted with each other in practice, the limited policy coordination meant that tradeoffs had a special purpose

Conclusion disagreement about what democracy promotion meant in practice, American domestic political constraints, and tensions between policy goals produced belief in different policies big ideas and simplistic idea,unified American efforts American officials didnt know how to effectively practice promoting democracy in the longterm This resulted in the U.S. government often had no single democracy promotion plan or strategy, but instead several overlapping, disjointed, and incoherent policies Understanding the different types of American democracy promotion helps explain why these policies produced different impacts on their intended targets, and helps inform how to target policy recommendations for improvements.