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WISDOM / PRACTICALITY OF LAW 1 RCBC VS IAC WISDOM / PRACTICALITY OF LAW 2 LACSON VS. ROQUE, ETC. ET AL. (1953) I. Facts: a.) original action in the SC for prohibition with preliminary injunction b.) petitioner Lacson, Mayor of the City of Manila against Executive Sec., Chief of Police, and Vice-Mayor who assumed office as mayor to prohibit the execution of the suspension c.) in a radio broadcast from the city hall, petitioner criticized Judge Montesa for the acquittal of the Deputy Chief of Police in a criminal prosecution for malversation of public property instituted by petitioner d.) Sec. of Justice ordered the OSG to assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the complaint of Judge Montesa for libel and contempt against petitioner e.) OSG docketed the complaint in the CFI without the necessary cooperation of Assistant Fiscals f.) President suspended petitioner following his policy of suspension of local elective officials who have pending cases involving moral turpitude II. Issues: a.) w/n the suspension was valid III. Held: a.) petition is granted without costs IV. Reasons: a.) removal and suspension of public officers are controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations: i.) sec. 9 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (RA 409): the Mayor shall hold office for years unless sooner removed - does not contain provisions for removal or suspension of the Mayor - power in the appointing authority (President) to remove a public officer may be implied by unless sooner removed - rights, duties and privileges of municipal officers may be regulated by provisions of general application; ii.) sec. 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) confers upon the President the power to remove officers for disloyalty to the Republic - fixity of tenure destroys power of removal at pleasure otherwise incident to appointing power - Art. VII, sec. 10 (1) of Consti: presidents power of general supervision over local governments does not include control, and only for cause; recognized by law and sound public policy; must relate to and affect administration of office, directly affecting the rights and interest of the public as may be provided by law: not self-executing but requires legislative implementation - express mention of one or several causes for removal or suspension excludes other causes; iii.) (Dissent): similar importance allows analogy of the causes for removal and suspension between provincial executives and the Mayor of Manila - sec. 2078 of RAC: dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office - Misconduct in office: affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private person o Cornejo vs. Naval: Municipal President of Pasay was convicted of falsification of a private document and suspended as such by the Governor but the courts found the suspension illegal since the charge does not affect the official integrity of the officer in question. o Case at bar: the radio broadcast was not done as official function or duty as Mayor but as a private individual and must be made to answer in his private capacity; libel does not fall under any of said reasons iv.) Strict construction of law relating to suspension and removal is the universal rule (Expressio unius est exclusio alterius) - remedy by removal is a drastic one and penal in nature
1-B STATCON 2009-2010 E.Aguila K.Aguila Alvarez Chua Cuneta De La Paz Lim Magno Mendoza Robles Roxas San Pedro Ty
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evils resulting from restricted authority to suspend or remove must be weighed against the injustices and harms to the public interest which would emerge from an unrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove - Legislative branch alone may correct shortcomings by appropriate enactment - Power to remove and to suspend are only one degree apart and must be based on the same grounds b.) temporary or preventive suspension presupposes an administrative charge - suspension: a qualified expulsion, either temporary or permanent disenfranchisement, and may amount to a virtual removal if continuing until the end of the trial - to prevent the accused from hampering with the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses, and presupposed an administrative charge - otherwise, courts can take care of their own administration of the law o Case at bar: no administrative charges c.) administrative policy not predicated on constitutional or statutory authority are binding only in purely political or governmental matters; individual rights, honor and reputation must be protected - tenure of office and the incumbents rights could easily be defeated if power rested in any authority to suspends the officer on mere filing or pendency of a criminal accusation - repugnant to the principles of due process, speedy trial and simple justice - public good demands that the man it has elevated to office be, within the shortest time possible, separated from office if proven unfit and restored if found innocent d.) sec. 2188 of RAC protects local elective officials against abuses of the power of suspension hearings are to occur within 10 days of receipt of charges and preventive suspension should not exceed 30 days final conviction as ground for proceeding administratively against the convicted officer but does not operate as automatic removal without administrative hearing o Case at bar: same protection must be afforded to the Mayor of Manila because of importance of his seat V. Concurring: A.) Paras - The President has the power to remove and suspend the petitioner conformably to law under sec. 64 (b) of the RAC in conjunction with sec. 2078 of RAC - For cause means legal cause directly affecting the administration of office - Grounds for suspension of a provincial governor may apply to a city mayor: disloyalty , dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office; libel is not included - The law, in requiring final conviction, intends to forestall any fabricated criminal prosecution as a political maneuver or revenge, and the constitutional presumption of innocence B.) Padilla - the power to remove is lodged in the framework of the government: o Competent court if the mayor is convicted of a crime or misdemeanor with a penalty of disqualification or suspension from holding public office o President, if he commits a malfeasance in the exercise of his powers not amounting to a crime or misdemeanor - removal may also be upon pendency of administrative or judicial investigation based on charges in sec. 2078 of RAC, which the President may order to be instituted o Disloyalty: may be committed independently of exercise of powers and performance of duties o Dishonesty: may be committed in and out of official function o Acts of oppression: in connection with official functions o Misconduct in office: in connection with official functions - Case at bar: the case for libel was an offshoot of petitioners performance of duties as mayor his connection ceased upon the presentation of the complaint and evidence in the fiscals office; libelous utterance was thus unrelated to performance of his duties VI. Dissent (Bautista Angelo) a.) Power of President to remove officials under sec. 64 (b) of RAC for disloyalty includes appointive and elective officials, supported by sec. 9 of RA 409 which states unless sooner removed b.) Such power is limited by for cause 1-B STATCON 2009-2010 E.Aguila K.Aguila Alvarez Chua Cuneta De La Paz Lim Magno Mendoza Robles Roxas San Pedro Ty
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Cornejo vs. Naval cannot be invoked since it involved only an interpretation of corruption under other form of maladministration in office The importance of the Mayor of Manilas seat, given that he deals with domestic and national problems which require tact, ability and circumspection, require that be removed based on law and public policy, regardless of whether it relates to his office or not If strict construction of law is followed, sec. 64 (b) of RAC bars application of sec. 2078 of RAC, and the Mayor may be removed for other causes in the RAC subject to the discretion of the President; and such power to remove includes the power to suspend In cases of differences in opinion, the court must respect the opinion of the president absent of abuse of discretion, as respect for a co-equal power; the officer vested with the power of removal is the sole judge of the existence of the sufficiency of cause o Case at bar: The libelous utterances of the petitioner was done in his capacity as mayor; tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the administration of justice and contrary to the elementary respect owed to the courts and to judges Suspension does not need administrative charges since the evil sought to be avoided is even more present in criminal cases as they involve both position and liberty of the officer o Case at bar: charges against petitioner are serious and involve moral turpitude and the presidents policy regarding such flows from his power of supervision o
c.) d.) e.)
f.)
WISDOM / PRACTICALITY OF LAW 3 Quintos v. Lacson 97 SCRA 290 (1955) Facts: Jose Quintos was appointed patrolman in the Manila Police Department and was later promoted to the position of detective to the same police department. On July 2, 1952, Mayor Arsenio A. Lacson of Manila dismissed five detectives, including Quintos, supposedly for lack or loss of confidence. Quintos then filed a complaint against Mayor Lacson and Chief of Police Dionisio Ojeda in the Court of First Instance of Manila in order to annul this order of dismissal and to prevent its execution. During the pendency of the trial for said complaint, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants not to carry out the order of dismissal. After hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff in accordance with Republic Act 557*, enjoining defendants to reinstate Quintos to his former position and pay him whatever amount has been withheld from his salary during the period of his suspension at a rate of P1,560 per annum. Mayor Lacson and Chief of Police Ojeda appealed from that judgment questioning the validity of a summary dismissal of a Manila city detective under the provisions of Executive Order 264 in view of RA 557. The Court ruled that city detectives are members of the police force and the manner of their dismissal is governed by the provisions of RA 557. The Court decision also had reference to Oscar Olegario v. Arsenio Lacson which ruled that: the lower court held that the dismissal was illegal under RA 557. It is contended that (1) the position of detective is confidential in nature having been declared by EO 264 and that RA 557 did not repeal EO264 and (2) Olegario was not a civil service eligible, so his appointment was merely temporary and was not subject to summary dismissal at the expiration of three months. Issue: Whether or not a summary dismissal of Manila city detective under E0 264 and RA 557 is valid. Held: Invalid. A Manila city detective may only be dismissed in accordance with RA 557; an unjustified summary dismissal is invalid. Ratio: Unless a detectives appointment was temporary, he may not be dismissed except in accordance with RA 557. Previous rulings of the court in cases such as Uy v. Rodriguez, Palamine, et al. v. Zagado, Mission, et al. v. Del Rosario, Abella v. Rodriguez, reinstate the fact that there is no need to review or revise the previous decision of the court.
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Additional Notes: *Republic Act 557 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SUSPENSION OR REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE PROVINCIAL GUARDS, CITY POLICE AND MUNICIPAL POLICE BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, CITY MAYOR OR MUNICIPAL MAYOR SECTION 1-Members of the provincial guards, city police and municipal police shall not be removed and, except in cases of resignation, shall not be discharged except for misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Philippine Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law or duty WISDOM / PRACTICALITY OF LAW 4 Victoria v Comelec Issue: ranking of the members of the sangguniang panlalawigan of the province of Albay for purposes of succession Facts: Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima, Vice-governor Danilo Azana atomatically assumed the governors office, leaving the vice-governor position vacant. Under the law, Azanas seat should be assumed by the highestranking Sanggunian member Jesus James Calisin has the most votes in the 1 district with 28,355 votes nd Petitioner Juan D. Victoria has most votes in 2 district with32,918 votes COMELEC issued a resolution certifying Calisin as highest ranking member, with Juan Victoria as 2 highest. COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, hence this petition. Petitioner claims that the ranking should be based not only on the number of votes in relation to total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted. (i.e. # who voted, divided by registered voters, multiplied by the number of votes obtained). This is because the voters turnout per district would affect the percentages of each candidate. Decision: Petition is dismissed Ratio The local government code provides: For purposes of succession ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election. It does not mention anything about factoring the number of voters who actually voted. Plain-meaning rule or Verba Legis, derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of the intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the courts from construing it differently. Verbal egis non est recendum or from the words of a statute there should be no departure EXECUTIVE / ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION 5 Enrique v. CA FACTS: -Petition for Certiorari on CA decision in Pacheco et al v CSC which dismissed several CSC employees for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Being Notoriously undesirable etc. -Plaintiffs are Rodolfo Enrique and Jesus Basilio (facts found by CA are as follows) -Sometime before and during November 1983, plaintiffs were caught in corrupt practices. (assisting examinees in their tests for a fee)
nd st
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CSC then took cognizance of the case and these ensued: *An order for their preventive suspension was issued *Petitioners denied the allegations and moved for immediate dismissal of the case and lifting of the suspension. In lieu thereof, they request a formal hearing. *CSC denied request. In accordance with Sec 40 PD 807, they asked for submission of evidence * Petitioners filed an MR( which was later on denied by CSC) alleging that Sec 40 PD 807 is inapplicable And that their constitutional rights would be violated with a summary Proceeding. +Enrique, Basilio, Pacheco, Valencia then appealed to the IAC +IAC reversed the decision of the CSC and reinstated Pacheco and Valencia. +Enrique and Basilio filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this petition ISSUES *W/N CSC had original jurisdiction of their case *W/N petitioners were denied due process *W/N dismissal thru summary proceedings by CSC was proper. -Petitioners urge that MSPB has orig. jurisdiction of their case -Petitioners claim that Sec 37(b) of PD 807 has been impliedly repealed by PD 1409 DECISION *PETITION IS DEVOID OF MERIT. WE AFFIRM APPEALED DECISION RATIO: *Repeals by implication are not favored. We must go to great lengths to reconcile conflicting provisions. Only when the repugnancy is irreconcilable then we can say that the earlier law was repealed by the later law *PD 807 and 1409 vest concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and MSPB * Due process is not denied where petitioners were duly informed of the charges against them and were given the chance to present their side. EXECUTIVE / ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION 6 Salaria v Buenviaje
Facts: Salaria had been staying on the land of Eduardo Cailao as a lessee since 1930, when the former bought the house of Rufino Llagas constructed on the land of Cailao. Salaria and Cailao agreed to fix the monthly rate at Php 6.00 (later raised to php10.00), but had no agreement as regards to its duration. In December 1972, Cailao advised Salaria not to pay anymore and to vacate said land for he was selling it to Ceferina Flores, wife of Antonio Mendiola (private respondent). The land was eventually sold to the latter on June of 1974 (as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale). After December 1972, no rentals were collected anymore by either Cailao or Mendiola hence Salaria deposited with the Clerk of Court the amount of Php 200. Mendiola filed a complaint of unlawful detainer against Salaria, due to the latters refusal to vacate the premises despite the latters receipt of the letter advising him to vacate the lot before July 1974 given to him by the new owner of the land. Salaria, in response, filed a motion to dismiss the case stating in his petition that theres no cause of action as P.D. # 20 suspends the provision of paragraph 1 of Art. 1673 of the Civil Code and that the need of leaser of the premises for his own use does not fall within the exception provided by the said decree. Moreover, Salaria claimed that the rent was not on a monthly basis, but on a yearly one. City court ruled in favor of Mendiola. Court ordered Salaria to vacate premises, pay costs of the suit, and excused him from paying back rentals due to his financial infirmity, and for which reason, the clerk of court was directed to deliver the sum consigned to him upon demand of the consignee (Salaria). Upon appeal, CFI of Camarines Sur, affirmed the decision with modification. Salaria was ordered to vacate premises and Mendiola was granted authority to withdraw the Php 200 that Salaria previously deposited to the Clerk of Court. Thus, Salaria (petitioner herein) filed a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of CFI of Camarines Sur.
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ISSUES:
1)W/N Under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20, the private respondent can eject the petitioner from the lot in question on the ground that he needs it for personal use; and
2)W/N this case is covered by P.D. no. 20
HELD: Construing, Sec. 4 of P.D. no. 20 in relation to art 1673 par.1 and Art. 1687 of the Civil Code, it is clear and explicit that P.D. no. 20 suspends par. 1 of Art. 1673. Thus, Salaria cannot be ejected at the expiration of the period provided under Art. 1687.
Sec.4 of P.D. no. 20 states that: Except when the lease is for a definite period, provisions in paragraph 1 of Art.1673 of the Civil Code insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which anothers dwelling is located shall be suspended until otherwise provided.
Par.1 of Art.1673, for that matter, enumerates circumstances which may allow lessor to judicially eject the lessee: when the period agreed upon has expired, lack of payment of the price, stipulated, violation of any of the conditions agreed upon and when lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or service not stipulated in the agreement; or if he does not observe the requirements of no.2 of art. 1657 as regards the use thereof.
It appearing that no fixed period has been agreed upon for the duration of he lease bet. Original owner and Salaria, the case comes under the provisions of art. 1687 of the Civil Code as well.
Art. 1687 states that if the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year if rent agreed upon is annually; from month to month, if its is monthlyhowever even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for one year
Hence, it is clear that P.D. no. 20 in relation to par.1 Art. 1673 and Art. 1687 of the Civil Code, suspends par.1 of Art. 1673.
The ground relied upon by Mendiola, in this case the personal use of the property by the owners/lessors, is not one of the circumstances mentioned in Art. 1673, in relation to P.D. no 20, regarding judicial ejectment. Moreover, Salaria cites Memorandum Circular no. 970, clarifying P.D. no. 20, Whereas, to allow eviction of lessess for the reason alone that
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premises are needed by owners/lessors or their families will open the floodgates for abuse and circumventtion of P.D. no. 20, thereby setting to naught the intent of the President to protect and assist the low-income familiesWherefore, it is hereby made clear for the benefit of all concerned that except for cases of judicial ejectment enumerated in Art. 1673 of the Civil Code, as amended by P.D. no. 20, bona fide tenants of dwelling placs covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if the only cause of action thereof is personal use of the property by owners. The construction of the office charged with implementing/enforcing a statute (executive branch), although not in itself binding upon courts, must be given controlling weight as it comes from that branch of government called upon to implement the law. Hence, P.D. no 20 as clarified by Memorandum Circular no.970, in relation to par.1 Art.1673 and Art.1687 of the Civil Code must be given substantive weight insofar as it ascertains facts necessary to the correct implementation of the legislators intent behind said laws and the Presidents intent to safeguard the rights of the disadvantaged. EXECUTIVE / ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION 7 Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs FACTS -ASC is engaged in production and milling of sugar for export. The sugar is place in containers known as jute bags. st nd -ASC imported these bags in 1957 twice. 1 shipment:44,800 2 shipment:75,200 st nd Only 8,467 bags from the 1 shipment were used and only 25,000 bags from the 2 shipment were used. Total:33,647 bags used, 86,363 were exported after the expiration of the one year period w/in 3 years from date of importation -Thru Theo H. Davies and Co., the ASCs agent, it requested for an extension citing typhoons and severe floods, picketing,delay of arrival of the vessel which petitioner was to use in exporting his sugar. This petition was denied. -Petitioner was ordered to pay php28,269.42 as customs duties which it paid under protest. -Petitioner demands a refund in the form of a drawback under section 106(b) in relation to 105(x) of the tariff and Customs Code ISSUE: (A) W/N Force Majeure is an excuse (B)W/N the Commissioner of Customs is vested under Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the then applicable law, with discretion to extend the period of one year provided in Sec.23 of the said Act (C)W/N Petitioner is entitled to a refund by way of drawback under the provisions of Sec 106(b) of the Tariff and Customs Code DECISION: Sec 23 of said Act is non extendible and compliance therewith is mandatory. RATIO: (A) These were not of such magnitude as to prevent the exportation of the jute bags w/in the one year period (B)-Judicial Respect for Administrative Construction -Respect due to the governmental agencies charge with the administration, their competence, expertise, experience and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret. The Legislature relies on their advise as to the practical working of a statute. -It is the intention of the legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containers to one year without extension from the date of importation. -Considering that the BoC is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight -Exemptions from taxation are not favored. Tax statutes are to be interpreted liberally in favour of the taxing authority (C)-The petitioner having opted to take advantage of the provisions of Sec 105 may not after having failed to comply with the conditions imposed thereby, avoid the consequences of such failure by being allowed a drawback under section 106 (b) of the same act without having complied with the conditions of the latter section -It is not to supposed that the legislature intended to defeat compliance with sec 105 thru a refuge under 106. a construction should be avoided which affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with the terms of a statute. Courts should proceed with the theory that parts of a statute may be harmonized with each other.
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EXECUTIVE / ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION 8 Cemco Holdings Inc. v National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc. 529 SCRA 355 Facts: Action: Petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision which affirmed the judgment finding that the acquisition of Cemco was covered by the Mandatory Offer Rule under Section 19 of RA 8799. Union Cement Corporation (UCHC) has two major stockholders: UCHC, a non-listed company with shares of 60.51% and Cemco with 17.03%. Majority of UCHCs stocks were owned by Bacnotan Consolidated Industries (BCI) and Atlas Cement Corporation (ACC). Cemco owned 9% of UCHC stocks. BCI informed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that UCHC and ACC had passed resolutions to sell BCI and ACCs stocks in UCHC. As a result of Cemcos acquisition of ACC and BCIs stocks, the total shares of Cemco would increase by 36%, amounting to 53% shares of UCC. PSE then inquired as to whether the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of the Implementing Rules of the SEC is not applicable to the purchase by Cemco of the majority shares of UCC. As a response, Director Callangan confirmed that Cemco transaction was not covered by the Tender Offer Rule. National Life filed a complaint with the SEC asking the Court to reverse the resolution and to declare Cemcos purchase void. SEC then ruled in favor of respondent and directed Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares to respondent and other holders. Cemco filed a petition challenging SECs jurisdiction, but such jurisdiction was affirmed by the CA. A motion for reconsideration filed by the CA was also denied. Issues: 1. Whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction over Cemcos complaint and to require Cemco to make a tender offer for respondents UCC shares. 2. Whether or not the rule on mandatory tender offer applies to the indirect acquisition of shares in a listed company, in this case, the indirect acquisition by Cemco of 36% of UCC, a publicly-listed company through its purchases of shares in UCHC, a non-listed company. 3. Whether or not the questioned ruling of SEC can be applied retroactively to the SECs prior resolution. 4. SEC decision dated 14 February 2005 is incomplete and produces no effect. Held: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. 1. SEC has jurisdiction over Cemcos complaint. Petitioner is barred from questioning the jurisdiction of the SEC. 2. No. the mandatory offer applies not only to direct acquisition but also to indirect acquisition. 3. This argument is not persuasive. The latter of SEC was nothing but an approval of the draft letter of Director Callanga. Said letter was merely advisory. 4. This contention is baseless. Ratio: 1. 2. 3. 4. Petitioners contention that the SECs authority is purely administrative fails to persuade. Rule 19 of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code implies that the SEC has power and authority to regulate, investigate, or supervise the activities of persons to ensure compliance. Under existing SEC rules, the 15% and 30% threshold acquisition of shares under the foregoing provision was increased to 35%. Mandatory offer applies even if the acquisition is less than 35% when the purchase would result in ownership of over 51% of the total outstanding equity securities of the public company. The action of the SEC on the PSE request cannot be construed as passing merits or giving approval to the questioned transaction. It is merely advisory in nature. The SEC decision actually reversed and set aside the letter of the Commission signed by Director Callangan. The implementing rules and regulations of the Code are sufficient to inform and guide the parties on how to proceed with the mandatory tender offer. 8
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Additional Notes: Tender Offer - an offer legally required to be made by a person or group of persons acting in concert to the shareholders of a corporation when there is an intent to acquire at least 15% of any class of securities in a listed corporation with assets of at least P50 million and with 200 or more stockholders owning at least 100 shares each, or it the intent is to acquire at least 30% of such equity over a period of 12 months. Section 19, RA 8799 (Securities Regulation Code) | A publicly announced intention by a person acting alone or in concert with other persons to acquire equity securities of a public company. LITERAL INTERPRETATION 9 BELLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (1974) I. Facts: a.) petition for review from a decision of the COA b.) petitioner spouses were convicted of estafa in the City Court of Pasay for allegedly misappropriating a ladys ring from Atty. De Guzman for sale on commission basis c.) petitioners filed for appeal in the CFI of Pasay and prayed for application to CFI of Rule 50 sec. 3 directing COA to certify erroneously brought cases to proper courts d) CFI dismissed appeal and remanded records to city court for execution of judgment; petitioners were not notified of the order f.) petitioners filed in the city court a motion to elevate appeal to COA but was denied for being erroneously addressed to it g.) petitioners filed petition for prohibition and mandamus against the People and respondent city court to prohibit execution of judgment and elevate their appeal to the COA; OSG did not object h.) COA dismissed the petition because it did not implead the CFI as principal party i.) reconsideration upon merits was denied II. Issues: a.) w/n the COA erred in dismissing the petition for said procedural error b.) w/n the CFI erred in dismissing the appeal instead of elevating it to the COA III. Held: a.) decision of COA is set aside b.) petition for prohibition against respondent city court is granted and is commanded to elevate the appeal to the COA IV. Reasons: a.) COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in not granting relief because the CFI was not impleaded as a principal party: Torre vs. Ericta: a respondent judge is merely a nominal party in special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus Real party in interest: those interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court and are charged with the duty of appearing and defending the challenged act both in their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings Case at bar: real party of interest was the People, represented by the OSG, who was impleaded; formal impleading of the CFI was not indispensable Tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality b.) CFI acted with grave abuse of discretion in not elevating the case to the COA sec. 44 (f) and 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act states that appeals for criminal cases from city or municipal courts be brought to the COA; judgments of ordinary municipal courts are appealed to the CFI under sec. 45 of the Judiciary Act c.) Court cautions against narrow interpretation of statutes as to defeat the purpose of the legislator or lead to unjust and absurd results; liberal construction to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void to eliminate repugnancy and inconsistency V. Dissenting (Esguerra) a.) neither legislature nor the Rules of the Court has provided for rules for erroneous appeal to the CFI from city or municipal courts and the SC cannot, by judicial fiat, supply such deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule b.) sec. 3, Rule 50 of Rules of the Court cannot be applied by analogy to CFI;
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the proper court to be commanded by the SC is the CFI but it was not impleaded and thus not bound by any judgment in this case the People cannot be compelled to perform the act of the Ju VALID IN PART, VOID IN PART 10 Barrameda v. Moir *take note of the following: (1) Use of the word all and exclusive (2) Statute void and valid in part Petitioner: Juan Barameda Respondent : Percy M. Moir et.al (Judge of First Instance) FACTS: 1. Original case: Petitioner was a defendant in a suit brought before a Justice of Peace to try a title to a parcel of land, he lost. 2. Appeal: Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. The case was dismissed with directions to the justice of peace to execute judgment. 3. Current case: Original application for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner also requested for a preliminary injunction be issued to stay the execution of judgment and that Moir be ordered to proceed the case on appeal. ISSUE: Was Moir correct in dismissing Barramedas case? ARGUMENTS Respondent (Judge Moir) Complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action Petitioner (Barameda) The basis of the demurrer is that Acts no. 2041 and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real estate, are inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 therefore there was no basis in dismissing the case. Act No. 2041 Sec 3 Justice of Peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the justice of peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First instance Act no. 2131, Sec1, amended Act No. 2041 by substituting exclusive original jurisdiction for exclusive jurisdiction Sec 9 of the Philippine Bill on jurisdiction of CFI all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or of any interest therein except in forcible entry and detainer cases *demurrer- a claim by the defendant in a legal action that the plaintiff does not have sufficient grounds to proceed *Understanding ART 2041 and Sec 9 Sec 9 uses the word ALL which means that there is no case involving real estate which Courts of First Instance are not authorized to hear and determine under the Organic Law, and that being supreme, any Act of the Philippine Legislature which attempts in any manner to curtail such jurisdiction must be held void. Art 2041 and 2131 three parts (1) confer original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real estate (2) it shall be exclusive in cases where the value of the property in litigation does not exceed 200 pesos (3) when more than two hundred but less than 600 it shall have concurrent jurisdiction with Court of First Instance DECISION: Writ denied, injunction made permanent The preliminary injunction granted by this court, staying the execution of the judgment, will be made permanent, and the writ of mandamus prayed for must be denied. RATIO:
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1. Jurisprudence: In Weigall v Shuster it was held that the Jurisdiction of the SC and the Court of First Instance, as fixed by Section 9 of the Philippines Bill, may be added to but not diminished by the Philippines Legislature. Therefore, there will be sufficient reasons for declaring Acts No 2041 and 2131 contrary to the Philippine Bill and void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where the title to realty is involved. Acts 2041 and 2131 deprives CFI of their original jurisdiction to try cases where the title to realty value at not more than 200 is involved. Therefore, inconsistent with Sec9, Philippine bill HOW? ART 2041 grants Original Exclusive Jurisdiction to Justice of Peace. Exclusivity means that all other courts must be barred from exercising jurisdiction in such cases. In such a way that hold another court has jurisdiction also in such cases is to destroy the grant of exclusive jurisdiction given to the other court. It is no longer exclusive when shared by another court, but merely concurrent. The second part of Art 2041 is also void (that part of concurrent jurisdiction). Why? The second part was only supplemental and ancillary to the exclusive jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. It is therefore inseparable from and absolutely dependent upon the exercise of that exclusive jurisdiction which has already been declared void. (Based on statcon principle explained in next number) STATCON PRINCIPLE: The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presumed that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. Independent means that enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute which carries legislative intent and removal of void would not affect the effectiveness of the valid part. The judgment of the justice of the peace which it is desired to have the respondent judge in this action review is an absolute nullity. The respondent judge acquired jurisdiction of the case only for the purpose of dismissing it and directing justice of the peace to proceed with execution of the void judgment, Moir was in error.
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VALID IN PART, VOID IN PART 11 Tatad v. Sec. of the DOE FACTS -Assailed in this case are three provisions of RA 8180 specifically the 4% tariff differential, the minimum inventory requirement and the predatory pricing -The public respondents and the intervenors filed an MR contending that The total nullification of RA 8180 restores the disproportionate advantage of the three big oil firms--- Caltex, Shell, and Petron over the small oil firms The total nullification of RA 8180 disarms the new entrants and seriously cripples their capacity to compete and grow Ultimately, the total nullification of RA 8180 removes substantial, albeit imperfect, barriers to monopolistic practices and unfair competition and trade practices harmful not only to movant-intervenors but also to the public in general. -petitioner Garcia, in his partial MR, prays that only the provisions of RA8180 pertaining to the 4% differential, predatory pricing and minimum inventory be struck down as unconstitutional citing the pernicious effects of a total nullification of RA 8180 and adding further that it would be problematic if Congress can fast track an entirely new law ISSUES I)W/N the three assailed provisions (a) 4% tariff differential,(b)predatory pricing, (c)minimum inventory requirement should be declared unconstitutional and therefore, meriting nullification. II)W/N the whole of RA 8180 should be declared null and void DECISION All the three provisions are UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The WHOLE OF RA8180 should be STRUCK DOWN RATIO
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I)(a) the 4% gives a decisive edge (.20 per liter advantage) to the existing oil companies over the new players. The said tariff differential also serves as a protective shield for the Big 3. (b)the lack of real competition will allow the present oil oligopolists to dictate prices and can entice them to engage in predatory pricing for the purpose of eliminating their competitiors. (c)Requiring this is to aggravate the costs to be incurred by the new players. It would be truly disadvantageous to them. The Big 3 have no problem with this requirement but the opposite is true for the small oil companies. This would in effect enhance the monopolistic trade of the oil industry. II) The whole of RA 8180 must be struck down. The reason for this is that the three assailed provisions are the very essence or the meat of the law. If they are declared unconstitutional, it should follow that the whole law should be declared unconstitutional. (note the dissent of Justice Kapunan saying that the nullity of one provision does not necessarily mean invalidation of other provisions as well. In the case at bar, even if the three assailed provisions are declared unconstitutional, the remaining parts of RA 8180 remain whole and complete in itself, sensible and capable of being executed independent of those which are rejected because the three assailed provisions are severable from the statute) VALID IN PART, VOID IN PART 12 Dumlao vs. Comelec Issue: Constitutionality of certain provision of Bp 51,52,53 (note: bp 52 lang yung talagang diniscuss, so im not really sure bakit na mention pa yung 51 and 53) Facts: joint petition seeking to enjoin COMELEC from implementing certain provisions of BP 51, 52, 53 for being unconstitutional. Dumlao claims that sec. 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the constitution. He alleges that the provision is directed against him, and that the classification is purely arbitrary. Said section provides: any retired provincial, city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office Persons who have committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, etc, are disqualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered in this act. Igot and Salapantan, jr. assail the validity of a provision which states, the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes shall be prima facie evidence of such fact Decision: portion of BP 52 which disqualifies retirees is held valid, while portion regarding filing of case as prima facie evidence is declared null and void Ratio: First off, procedurally, the petition should be invalid. The petition of Dumlao as compared to that of Igot and Salapantan are quite different, so there is no reason why they should not file separate cases. They also do not meet certain requirements for judicial review: Requirement Petitioners Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the provision, no petition seeking his DQ has been filed. He is clearly within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, and should only later appeal to the SC after a decision is made
Actual case and controversy
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Neither Igot nor Salapantan have been charged with the crimes involved, so they do not have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that sustained or will sustain direct injury The fact that they filed a taxpayers suit is not an excuse because the provision does not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. Unavoidability of constitutional question Issue of constitutionality raised at earliest opportunity The petitioners are actually without cause of action, therefore this issue does not need to be determined Only requirement met by the petitioners
Proper Party
However due to (1)paramount public interest, and (2)proximity of the election which will be held within a few days, the SC still decided to rule. First off, the equal protection clause is subject to valid classification. For purposes of public service, employees of 65 years of age or older have been previously validly classified. It bears reiteration that the equal protection clause proscribes a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. Also, in the case of a 65 year old elective official who has retired previously, it is evident that he is tired of government work, but by virtue of change of mind, he would like to assume the same position again. Inequality will not result from the application of the challenged provision. As to the second provision in question, it is in violation of the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Although the filing of the charges is only considered as prima facie evidence which may still be rebutted, there is a clear and present danger that time constraints will prevent one charged from offering proof to overcome the prima facie evidence due to the proximity of the elections. 12 DUMLAO vs. COMELEC Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent from implementing certain provisions of BP 51 to 53 for being unconstitutional. Petioners are Patricio Dumlao (candidate for Governor of Nueva Vizcaya); Romeo Igot (taxpayer) and Alfredo Salapantan Jr ( taxpayer). Dumlao seek to declare unconstitutional Sec 4 of PB 52 because it us discriminatory and was purely based on arbitrary grounds (class legislation): Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired Igot and Salapantan assails the validity of 2nd par. Of sec 4 providing for disqualifications of certain candidates who have cases against them which are filed but have not yet been decided. Issue: Whether or not section 4 of BP blg 52 is unconstitutional
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Held: Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only the objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion which can stand by itself. The first par of sec 4 of BP 52 is VALID The portion of the second part of sec 4 of BP 52 providing that the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact is declared NULL and VOID Ratio: 1. Procedural Aspect There is a misjoinder of parties and actions. The respective petitioners does not join each other on their burden of complaint. Also they fell short on three out of four criteria for judicial review: a. actual case: Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the provision. No petition seeking his disqualification has been filed. He is raising a hypothetical issue and his case is within the jurisdiction of Comelec. b. interest/standing: in the case of Igot and Salapantan, neither one has been convicted nor charged with disloyalty to the Sate nor disqualified. Neither alleged that they have been adversely affected. Petitioners do not seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds c. lis mota: Petitioners are without cause of action. The necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent and procedural regularity would require that the suit be dismissed. However, the courts decided to resolve the matter because of paramount public interest. 2. Substantive Viewpoint (1st par of sec 4) The constitutional guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification. In the case of a 65 year old elective official who has retired from office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present and has already declared himself tired and unavailable. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification but only those which are arbitrary and unreasonable. Laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict is clear beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, it is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for a candidate provided it is reasonable, as in this case. ( 2nd par of sec 4)The petition of Igot and Salapantan: Judgment of conviction for any of the listed crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact. This proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence as a candidate is disqualified from running only on the ground that charges have been filed against him. Also that a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to substitute a judicial one. AMBIGUITY, CONSTRUED AGAINST PARTY WHO CAUSED IT 13 Reyes vs De la Cruz Issue: Whether the contract for services referred to the assessed value or to the market value of the properties adjudicated to the 4 heirs Facts:
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Marcial, Asuncion, Eugenio, Lucia, and Alfonso de la Cruz are some of the heirs of the deceased Anselmo S. Hilario. The 5 heirs entered into a contract of services with Atty. Arsenio Reyes, which states that we will pay you 5 per cent of the amount adjudicated to us. At the time, the probate court had already ordered partition, but there was delay in its execution and the main purpose of hiring Atty. Reyes was to speed up the process. After said project, plaintiff filed action to recover 5 per cent of the market value of said properties, plus damages and attorneys fees. Held: We agree with the trial court that the 5 per cent refers to the assessed value Ratio: The 5 per cent could only refer to the assessed value, for that was the only value then known by the parties to the contract, said value appearing in the inventory of the estate of the decedent. The market value of a property is too speculative. Moreover, if following the theory of the plaintiff, the contract referred to said market value, at what time was said market value to be ascertained, considering that real estate values fluctuate from time to time. This, aside from the consideration that since real estate values tend to rise, a lawyer might be tempted to agree or actually work for the delay of proceedings if said market value is to be determined upon termination of the partition. Also, it was the plaintiff-appellant who prepared the contract for services. Being a lawyer, he knew the meaning and value of every word or phrase used in the contract. If the parties really had in mind the market value, it would have been so easy for him to state so in order to avoid ambiguity and uncertainty. The claim of plaintiff is also exorbitant and unconscionable. The lawyer who handled the administration of properties not only to the defendants herein but to the whole estate was paid only about P30,000. Plaintiff-appellant whose legal services were relatively much less may not claim higher fees. AMBIGUITY, CONSTRUED AGAINST PARTY WHO CAUSED IT 14 Idelfonso (plaintiff-appellant) vs Sibal (defendant-appellee) FACTS: - a direct appeal taken by plaintiff from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing his complaint and ordering him to pay defendant P500.00 as attorney fees plus costs. - Idelfonso and Sibal reached a compromise agreement and a joint motion to dismiss the case. The compromise agreement conditioned that: 1. Plaintiff agrees to dismiss above case on the ground of amicable settlement 2. Defendant promises to a) pay plaintiff P1,000.00, b) within 2 years from date of agreement, he shall course through plaintiff as realtor the defendants real estate purchases or transactions and failure to do so, to make such real estate purchase and course them to the plaintiff as said realtor, the defendant will be liable to pay plaintiff an additional P2,000.00. 3. Defendant agrees to dismiss his counter claim in the above case. - Defendant, during the stipulated 2 year period, commissioned plaintiff to sell some of his real properties in QC, however not sold by plaintiff but by defendant himself sometime after the lapse of the 2 year period and at a higher price quoted to plaintiff. - During 2 year period, plaintiff looked for real properties for sale in Manila, and offered to sell to defendant at various times during the stipulated period. Defendant told plaintiff that he could not buy any of the properties, not only being beyond his means but also inappropriate and inadequate to his business. - Claiming that defendant Sibal has failed and neglected to make the purchase of real estate as promised in the compromise agreement within the 2 year period stipulated therein, plaintiff Idelfonso instituted present action for the recovery of the penalty in paragraph 2 with legal interests plus attorney fees and costs. - Defendant denied liability, alleging that in said agreement, his liability may arise only in the event that he buys or sells real estate without coursing the same through the plaintiff and that his failure to buy or sell real estate in accordance to agreement was entirely due to plaintiffs inability to sell the lands he offered for sale. - After trial, the lower court rendered judgment absolving defendant from the complaint and ordering plaintiff to pay the former the amount of P500.00 as attorneys fees.
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ISSUE: - Whether or not defendant has, upon the undisputed facts narrated above, violated the obligation imposed on him by the compromise agreement. HELD: It is appellants contention that under paragraph 2 of the compromise agreement, defendant-appellee was under obligation to make a real estate purchase through appellant as realtor within a period of two years when the agreement was signed in October 15, 1953 and his failure to make such purchase made him liable to pay the penalty of P2,000.00. The contention cannot be sustained. RATIO DECIDENDI: - there is nothing in the disputed paragraph of the compromise agreement thaty can be construed to mean that appellee bound himself to purchase real property and to pay the penalty of P2,000.00 in case he failed to do so. - It was evident that appellees principal undertaking was to course or make his real estate purchases and sales through appellant for a period of two years and should appellee fail to do that obligation, he is liable to pay the penalty. - As aptly stated by appellee in his brief, he has constituted appellant for two years as his exclusive agent in the purchase or sale of real property with liability in case of breach. His intention to buy real estate, appellee expressed was for the expansion of his business and suggested that he could course the transaction through appellant. - Following appellants contention, it is hard to believe that a man of appellees business acumen and stature would give his consent to an agreement wherein he is under compulsion to buy real estate which may, as in this case, be not only adequate or inappropriate for his business but also beyond his means. - There being no dispute that appellee has in fact during the 2 year period provided in the compromise agreement, coursed through appellant his real estate transactions. - There is ambiguity in the provision of the compromise agreement in question as a result of the explanatory cause (to make such real estate purchase and to course the same to the plaintiff as realtor). Following the rule that ambiguities or obscure clauses in contracts cannot favor the one who has caused them and it appearing that the compromise agreement was drawn by appellant through his counsel, with the paragraph in dispute creating an obligation in his favor, the ambiguity found therein must be construed in favor of appellee. - Decision appealed from is affirmed, costs against appellant.
AMBIGUITY, CONSTRUED AGAINST PARTY WHO CAUSED IT 15 Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd. Facts:
Qua Chee Gan instituted an action seeking to recover the proceeds of certain fire insurance policies issued by the Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., upon certain bodegas and merchandise of the insured that were burned The insurance company is barred by waiver (or rather by estoppel) to claim violation of the so-called fire hydrants warranty, for the reason that knowing fully all that the number of hydrants demanded therein never existed from the very beginning, the company nevertheless issued the policies in question subject to the warranty, and received the corresponding premiums Taking into account the well known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them, the memo of warranty invoked by the insurance company bars the latter from premises, since its initial expression, the undernoted appliances for the extinction of fire being kept on the premises insured thereby, it is hereby warranted, admits of interpretation as an admission of the existence of such appliances which the company can now contradict, should the parol evidence rule apply Doctrine: Ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them
Statement of Facts: - Qua Chee Gan, the Plaintiff-Appellee, instituted an action in 1940, seeking to recover the proceeds of certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., the defendant-appellant
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- Court of First Instance rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with Section 91 (b) of the Insurance Act from Sept. 26, 1940 - Thereafter, the defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court Decision - Court find no reversible error in the judgment appealed from Reasons: 1) Appellant is contrary to the dictates of honesty and fair dealing and so closely related to positive fraud, as to the abhorrent to fair-minded men - Memo of Warranty goes that the Hydrants in the compound, not less in number than one for each 150 feet of external wall... protected, with no t less than 100 feet of hose piping and nozzles for every 2 hydrants... - Argued that since the bodegas insured had an external wall perimeter of 500 meters or 1640 ft., Qua Chee Gan should have 11 fire hydrants instead of only 2 - However, court agreed that Law Union is barred by waiver (or rather estoppel) to claim violation thereof - the insurance company was aware, even before the policies were issued, that in the premises insured there were only 2 fire hydrants installed by Qua Chee Gan - usually held that where the insurer, at the time of the issuance of a policy insurance, has knowledge of existing facts which, if insisted on, would invalidate the contract from its very inception - such knowledge constitutes a waiver of conditions in the contract inconsistent with the facts - Moreover, the insurer is stopped from claiming a breach of such conditions 2) Parol Evidence is not applicable - it is not a question here whether or not the parties may vary a written contract by oral evidence; but whether testimony is receivable so that a party may be, by reason of inequitable conduct shown estopped from enforcing forfeitures in its favor, in order to forestall fraud or imposition on the insured - Moreover, taking into account the well known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them, the memo warranty invoked by appellant bars the latter from questioning the existence of the appliance called for in the insured premises, since its initial expression, the undernoted appliances for the extinction of fire being kept on the premises insured hereby... it is hereby warranted ... admits of interpretation as as admission of the existence of such appliances which appellant cannot now contradict, should the parol evidence apply 2) Ambiguity construed in favor of the insured - Insurance is, in its nature, complex and difficult for the layman to understand - Policies are prepared by experts who know and can anticipate the hearing and possible complications of every contingency - In cases of ambiguity, the courts must, in fairness to those who purchase insurance, construe every ambiguity in favor of the insured - an insurer should not be allowed, by the use of obscure phrases and exceptions, to defeat the very purpose for which the policy was procured - Example of ambiguous phrases: - The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer speaks of oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products having a flash point below 300 Fahrenheit, and is decidedly ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, Oils mean lubricants and not gasoline or kerosene. By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. 4) Incidental to Business doesnt violate the prohibition by policy - Gasoline in Bodega No. 2 was only incidental to his business for the motor vehicles used for transport AMBIGUITY, CONSTRUED AGAINST PARTY WHO CAUSED IT 16 VILLACORTA VS. INSURANCE COMMISSION 100 SCRA 467 (1980)
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I. Facts: a.) Petition from the decision of the Insurance Commission b.)Complainant is owner of a Colt Lancer, insured by respondent Empire Insurance Company under the Private Car Policy for P 35,000 against loss or damage under own damage, theft, or third party liability c.) Vehicle was brought to Sunday Machine Works, Inc. for general check-up and repairs, and was taken by 6 persons, including employee Benito Mabasa, and was driven out to Montalban, Rizal where it was wrecked in an accident d.)Claim for total loss was denied by respondent because accident did not fall under Own Damage or Theft coverage, invoking the policy of Authorized driver Clause e.)Authorized Driver Clause: if the person driving is other than the insured, he must have been duly authorized by the insured to make the insurance company liable for the drivers negligence Respondent: Benito Mabasa was not an authorized driver f.) Theft Clause: Art. 308 of RPC states taking as the act of depriving another of the possession and dominion of a movable thing coupled with the intention of withholding it permanently Respondent: Car was taken by a resident of the Sunday Machine Works for a joy ride; temporary in nature II. Issues: a.) w/n the insurance commission erred in dismissing the complaint III. Held: a.) appealed decision is set aside b.) private respondent must pay petitioner P 35,000 with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until full payment, and cost of suit IV. Reasons: a.) Insurance contracts, as contracts of adhesion, calls for greater strictness and vigilance from the courts to protect the weaker party from abuse and imposition b.) Purpose of Authorized driver clause was to ensure that a person other than the insured owner is a duly licensed driver and has no disqualification to drive c.) Authorized driver clause is not a bar to the complaint: entrusting a car to an established car service and repair shop implies permission for the employees to drive the car for legitimate purposes d.) Theft Clause must apply: theft under Art. 308 RPC applies where a car is unlawfully and wrongfully taken without the owners consent or knowledge Evidence proves it was not a joy ride: one Cal. 45 Colt and apple type grenade with Mabasa The taking proved permanent as the car was never returned in a serviceable and useful condition Intent to gain is evident since Mabasa derived utility and satisfaction from it AMBIGUITY, CONSTRUED AGAINST PARTY WHO CAUSED IT 17 Baylon v. Court of Appeals Facts: Action: Petition for review certiorari. This case is an appeal by Baylon regarding the CAs decision affirming the judgment of the RTC of Quezon City and CAs denial of Baylons motion for reconsideration. In 1986, Pacionaria C. Baylon introduced Leonila Tomacruz to Rosita B. Luanzon. After Baylon told Tomacruz about Luanzons business, Tomacruz agreed to lend money to Luanzon in the amount of P150,000, payable on or before August 22, 1987. Luanzon issued a promissory note, to which Baylon affixed her signature under the word guarantor. In addition to the promissory note, Luanzon issued a postdated check dated August 22, 1987 payable to Leonila Tomacruz in the amount of P150,000. Luanzon replaced this check with another postdated Solidbank check. Several checks of the amount of P7,500 each were also issued by Luanzon and made payable to Tomacruz. Not having received payment, Tomacruz filed a case for the collection of a sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against Luanzon and Baylon.The lower court ruled in favor of Tomacruz, stating that the between the plaintiff (Tomacruz) and the defendants (Baylon and Luanzon) was a loan with a monthly interest of 5%, and not an investment.
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Issues: CA erred in holding that private respondent Tomacruz was a creditor of Luanzon and not an investor in the construction business of Art Enterprises and Construction, Inc. II. CA erred in ruling that Baylon (guarantor) is liable to Tomacruz because the latter has not taken steps to exhaust Luanzons property as a principal debtor and has not resorted to all the legal remedies provided by law against the debtor, Luanzon. III. CA erred in resolving that Baylon was not released from her guaranty by the subsequent transactions between Tomacruz and Luanzon Held: The petition is GRANTED and questioned Decision is SET ASIDE. I. The transaction is a loan, not an investment. II. It is premature for the Court to determine whether or not Baylon is liable as a guarantor. III. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the principal debtor. Ratio: I. II. The clear terms of the promissory note establish a creditor-debtor relationship between Luanzon and Tomacruz. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. The transaction is therefore a loan, not an investment. It is premature for the Court to determine whether or not Baylon is liable as a guarantor, and whether she is entitled to the concomitant rights, because there is wanting in the judgment against Luanzon. Petitioner is invoking the benefit of excussion, pursuant to article 2058 of the Civil Code. The creditor may hold the guarantor liable only AFTER the judgment has been obtained against the principal debtor and the latter is unable to pay. It is useless to speak of a guarantor when no debtor has been held liable for the obligations which is allegedly secured by such guarantee. Tomacruz must first obtain a judgment against the principal debtor before assuming to run after the alleged guarantor. I.
III.
LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH 18 Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co. et al FACTS Nov. 28, 1956 ZCM Co. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Jose Robles in the Justice of the Peace Court of Sta. Cruz Zamblaes alleging that (a)Robles and the Co. entered into a contract whereby the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it had control to Robles who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said properties upon payment of certain royalties, (b) Robles had violated the terms of the contract (c) that ZCM Co served him a notice to vacate premises (d) Robles failed to comply with said demand Robles filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the Justice of the Peace did not have jurisdiction which the latter denied. Robles thereafter filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI of Zambales. The CFI ruled against Robles holding that the provisions of Sec1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court are sufficiently broad to cover any kind of land including mineral land. Robles appealed. ISSUE W/N the land in RoC contemplates mineral land? DECISION YES RATIO Appeal is w/o merit. Any land spoken of in the provisions of said rules obviously includes all kinds of land whether agricultural, residential or mineral. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish
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LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH 19 Colgate Palmolive v. Gimenez, 1 SCRA 267, January 28, 1961 UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUIRE DEBEMOS "Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish" FACTS: The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. March 14, 1956 Petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99 (according to section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." ) Applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of the Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that of the total sum of P113,343.99 claimed by petitioner for refund, P23,958.13 representing the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had been approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law. December 4, 1958 Auditor General denied the appeal of petitioners and affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. ISSUE: W/N foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof HELD: Yes. RATIO: - under, RA 814 amending RA 601, "industrial starch" (does not always refer to food for human consumption) was added among the items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors" - on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products - "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish" - law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream - one is not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense - IMPORTANT: The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is
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intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.
LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH 20 Guevara vs. Inocente Facts: Petitioner was extendem an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive. He argues that his appointment is valid and permanent and may only become ineffective either upon express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments of upon the adjournment of the regular session of Congress. He also says that the phrase until the next adjournment of Congress must be related with the phrase until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments so that the adjournment contemplated should refer to a regular session during which the Commission may be organized and allowed to discharge its functions as such. Issue: Validity of petitioners ad interim appointment Held: The ad interim appointment extended to petitioner lapsed when the special session of congress adjourned sine die. Ratio: The important provision is Article VII Section 10 of the consti: The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that when the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of the stature that there can be no question as to its meaning there is no room for construction. Hence, the above provision contemplates 2 modes of termination of an ad interim appointment. The 2 modes of termination are completely separate from and independent of each other. If the framers of the constitution had intended to make the operation of the second clause dependent upon the prior constitution of the Commission on Appointments they should have so stated in clear terms. It is true that the provsision of the Constitution in speaking of the mode of termination does not make any reference to any specific session of congress whether regular or special but such silence is of no moment, for it is a well-knkown maxim in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEX NOS DISTINGUIRE DEBEMUS LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH 21 Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court 150 SCRA 520 Facts: Action: Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court granting private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Incs motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by petitioner.
In the Resolution of September 25, 1985, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of. Sycwin filed a complaint for a collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the RTC. During the pendency of the suit, Sycwin attached some of the properties of Varian International Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. Trial court rendered the decision granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and ordered Varian Industrial to pay plaintiff:
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. the amount of P1,401,468.00 with 12% interest per annum 5% of the principal as liquidated damages P30,000 as exemplary damages 15% of P1,401,468 for attorneys fees pay costs of the suit.
Varian appealed this decision. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian. Court ordered the execution pending appeal but this was not met because Varian failed to deliver the personal properties. Sycwin then prayed that the surety (Philippine British Assurance Co) be ordered to pay the value of its bond. Court again granted Sycwins appeal.
Issue: Whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on said bond.
Held: Yes, an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on bond. Counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with Section 5 Rules of Court shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit and restraining order issued is hereby DISSOLVED.
Ratio: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, courts could not distinguish. Thus, this Court held that the phrase any judgment which may be charged against the counterbond refers not only to a final and executory judgment but also to a judgment pending appeal. Additional Notes: Counterbond - in old practice, a bond to secure one who has given bond for another. Supersedeas bond - a bond given by a party appealing from a judgment to stay its execution pending appeal, intended to insure the performance of the judgment or order appeal from in case it is affirmed wholly or in part. Surety - the insurer of the debt who obligates himself to pay in case the debtor does not pay. LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH 22 BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) VS. ZAMORA FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the US made the Military Bases Agreement, which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel. On August 30, 1951, The Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty to further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, which would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. The US and the Philippines discussed the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). After a series of conferences and negotiations, President Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
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On October 5, 1998, President Estrada, through the respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs ratified the VFA. The next day, President Estrada, acting through Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora officially transmitted to the Philippine Senate the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the WFA for concurrence pursuant to Sec 21, Art VII of the Constitution. The Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on National Defense and Security submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443, recommending the concurrence to the VFA. On May 27, 1999, The Senate Resolution was approved by the Senate, by a 2/3s (18) votes of its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed by the petitioners as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the VFA. Petitioners argue that Sec. 25, Art.XVIII is applicable because the VFA involves the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Thus, the following conditions must first be met: 1) it must be a treaty, 2) it must be duly concurred by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if required by Congress, c) recognized as such by the contracting state. Respondents, on the other hand, say that Sec. 21, Art VII should apply because the VFA is not a basing agreement but an agreement, involving merely temporary visits of the US personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
ISSUES: a) Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA? b) Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Sec. 21, Art. VII or Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the Constitution? c) Was there a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in ratifying the agreement? RULING: Petition should be DISMISSED. The VFA is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. RATIO: a) Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, they have failed to show that the VFA directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. As legislators, they have not established that they have the requisite legal standing and the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring the suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present action. However, the Court resolves to take cognizance of the case because of transcendental importance. b) Lex specialis derogant generali. A special provision or law prevails over a general one. Thus, Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities should apply in the instant case. However, must not be treated in isolation to Sec. 21, Art. VII, which should apply to all treaties and international agreements in general and requires the concurrence of at least 2/3s of all the members of the Senate. Since the Congress did not require the ratification by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum, having met the concurrence requirement was enough. It is wrong to say that Sec. 25, Art XVIII is inapplicable to temporary agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. There is nothing in the provision requiring foreign troops or facilities be stationed permanently in the Philippines. When the law does not distinguish, the Court should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Also, to say that Sec. 25, Art XVIII is not applicable because there are no foreign military bases involved but only troops and facilities is also wrong. The use of comma and the word or in the clause foreign military bases, troops, or facilities show that they should not be treated collectively but as separate and independent subjects. Thus, any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of the said section. The third requirement in Sec. 25, Art XVIII is that it must be recognized as a treaty by the other state. Petitioners argue that the VFA should have the advice and consent of the US Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process and should not be considered merely as an executive agreement by the US. The Court ruled in favor of the respondents, saying that the phrase recognized as a treaty means the other contracting accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. The words in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Moreover, under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon
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states. Thus, for as long as the US acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there was compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President in ratifying the VFA and referring it to the Senate pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. VII of the Constitution. The power to enter into treaties or international agreements is vested by the Constitution in the President. The negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification are exclusive acts which solely pertain to the President, in the same way that the Constitution lodges the power to concur with treaties to the Senate alone. Both the President, in ratifying the VFA and submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, and the Senate, in concurring, acted within the limits of the powers vested in them by the Constitution. DISSENTING OPINION PUNO: The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to avoid the asymmetry in the legal treatment of the Military Bases Agreement by the two contracting parties RP treating such as a treaty, while the US treating it merely as an executive agreement. Thus, the recognition of the US of the VFA should be by the US President with the advice and consent of the US Senate. Based on the exchanges of the Constitutional Commissioners, in ascertaining the VFAs compliance with the constitutional requirement, the yardstick should be US Constitutional law. The Court will be standing on unstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the same level as a treaty. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: Section 21, Article VII: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3s of all the Members of the Senate. Section 25, Article XVIII: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH 23 ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM Facts: Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur. He filed several petitions for exemption of certain properties from Operation Land Transfer under PD27. Two of these were denied. He appealed and sought exemptions from the lands registered in the name of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres. He contends that even if the lands are registered in his name, he hold the lands in trust for the benefit of his followers. He argues that he is not the landowner contemplated by law but merely a trustee and as such is entitled to as many rights of retention on behalf of the beneficiaries. As Archbishop claims to be merely an administrator of the properties, he argues that these subject properties should have been exempt from OLT Issues: Whether or not the properties in question are exempt from OLT Held: The petition has no merit Ratio: The laws simply speak of the landowner without qualification as to under what title the land is held or what rights he may exercise. There is no distinction made whether he holds naked title only or can exercise all the rights of ownership. To do so would be to frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law which is the redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit of landless farmers and farm workers. Archbishop claims exemption form the coverage of agrarian reform because he is a mere administrator does not appear under the exclusive list of exemptions under RA6657. His claim does not create another class exempt from such coverage. It is axiomatic that where a general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, the Court will not curtail nor add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others.
c)
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MANDATORY and DIRECTORY 24 Pimentel v Aguirre
Facts: In 1997, Pres. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 372 w/c caught the ire of Sen. Aquilino Pimentel because of 2 provisions contained therein, first of which is the provision nwhich reads: 1)All govt departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation for non-personal service items, along the ff. suggested areasand 2) pending the assessment and evaluation of the Devt Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment (IRA) to LGUs shall be witheld. Pimentel claims that both provisions do not comply with Sec.284 of Local Govt Code (LGC) w/c provides for the 4 requisites before the president may interfere in local fiscal matters 1)an unmanaged public sector deficit of the Natl govt 2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the HRET and the presidents of the various local leagues 3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the DOF, DILG, and DBM and 4) any adjustment in the allotment shall rd in no case be less than 30% of the collection of the national internal revenue taxes of the 3 fiscal year preceding the current one. Pimentel claims that there was no showing that there was actually an unmanaged public sector deficit and that there were no consultations conducted with the diff. leagues of local governments. Issues:1) W/N the President committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUs to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGUs fiscal autonomy. 2)W/N the President committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA. In sum, the main issue is whether 1) Sec.1 of A0 372 insofar as it directs the LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25%; and 2) Sec 4 of the same AO, which withholds 10% of their IRA, are valid exercises of the Presidents power of general supervision over local governments. Held: Petition is partly meritorious. 1) The Supreme Court is prepared to believe the Solicitor Generals assurance that the st 1 provision above stated is merely an advisory or guiding policy for local executives to follow, thus local autonomy is not encroached upon. 2) The second provision is violative of the LGUs fiscal autonomy because it goes against the provisions laid down in Sec 286 of the LGC and of Sec.6 of Art X of the Constitution regarding LGUs fiscal autonomy, which provides for the automatic release to each of the LGUs its share in the national internal revenue. This automatic release of the shares of the LGUs is a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy granted by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Sec. 286 of the LGC specifically provides that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned w/in 5 days after every quarter of the year & shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national govt for whatever purpose. The withholding of 10% of the IRA enroaches on the local fiscal autonomy of LGUs, making the AO unconstitutional, hence invalidating it. Concededly, the President had only the best intentions in his issuance of said AO, however the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Hence, petition is granted. Respondents and their successors are permanently prohibited from implementing AO 372 (and 43) insofar as LGUs are concerned. MANDATORY and DIRECTORY 25 Marcelino v. Cruz Jr. FACTS This is a petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent Judge Fernando Cruz Jr. from promulgating his decision in criminal case entitled Peeps vs. Bernardino Marcelino and for release from detention of petitioner, the
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accused who was charged with the crime of rape in said case on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the case for failure to decide the same within the period of ninety days from submission thereof On November 28, 1975 respondent judge filed with the Deputy clerk of court his decision is said case for promulgation. Said decision was also dated November 28, 1975. Counsel for the accused moved for postponement on alleged loss of jurisdiction of the court for failure to decide the case within ninety days from submission thereof for decision Petitioner contends that the 3month period prescribed by Section 11(1) of Art X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that the non observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case ISSUE W/N the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the unresolved case HELD NO RATIO Respondent judge rendered his decision WITHIN the three month period prescribed by the Constitution (September 4 to November 28 is 85 days) Rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision of the clerk of court. This is the date that should be considered in deteremining whether or nopt respondent judge had resolved the case within the allotted period The constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to rendition of judgment and NOT the promulgation thereof. The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on the ground of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law Constitutional provisions are directory and not mandatory where they refer to matters merely procedural Oil and Gas Co. v. Morris MANDATORY and DIRECTORY 26 Brehm v. Republic Case: On Oct. 9, 1958 Gilbert Brehm, an American citizen serving in the U.S Navy assigned in the Philippines married Ester Mira, a Filipina who had a minor daughter from another Navy man who left the Philippines in 1952 and never returned. This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic relations court regarding the joint petition for the adoption of Elizabeth Mira, the minor daughter of Ester Mira filed on January 28, 1959 by Ester Mira and Gilbert Brehm. The Juvenile and Domestic court granted the petition reasoning that it would be in the best interest of the child if she was to be adopted by her natural mother and step-father and that the intentions and actions of Brehm to permanently reside in the Philippines are enough to fill in the defect of him being a non-resident alien, from adopting Elizabeth. Albeit the decision of the court, the Solicitor General however opposed this, thus this petition. Issue: Whether or not Gilbert Brehm, an alien non-resident should be allowed to adopt Elizabeth Mira as provided for by Art.338 (3) of the civil code in relation to Art. 335(4) of the same code. Decision: No, Gilbert Brehm is prohibited from adopting Elizabeth Mira as explicitly stated in Art.335 (4) of the Civil code. The decision of the lower court is reversed. Reason: Art. 335 (4) of the civil code explicitly provides that the following cannot adopt: Xxxx 4. Non- resident aliens Xxxx The court explained that although Art. 338 (3) of the civil code allows step-parents to adopt their step-children, this provision should be read in accordance with Art. 335 (4). That the reason for the prohibition provided by Art. 335 is the intention of the state to protect and safeguard the welfare of the minor child with safety parameters that can secure his well-being. To allow non-resident aliens to adopt minor Filipino children would provide for a possibility of the non-resident alien bringing the minor child in his country of origin or any other country which the state no longer has the power and jurisdiction to impose these safety parameters, thus would defeat the purpose of the state in guaranteeing the safety and welfare of minor adoptees. MANDATORY and DIRECTORY 27 Don Tino Realty and Development Corp. vs. Florentino Facts:
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An appeal seeking to set aside the decision of the Cort of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP no. 45162) ordering the admission of a late and defective answer in an ejectment case Feb. 6, 1997 petitioner (Don Tino) filed against Julian Florentino an ejectment suit alleging that petitioner is the owner and in peaceful possession of a parcel of land covered by TCT no. 32422, which was occupied and was built a house with by respondent by means of force, strategy and stealth. Feb. 13, 1997 summons were served to respondent requiring him to answer within 10 days from receipt thereof. Feb. 24,1997 respondent filed his answer through Roel G. Alvear (president of the Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng RMP, San Juan, Balgtas, Bulacan). The answer was not verified. The trial court set the case for preliminary conference on April 13, 1997. March 21, 1997 petitioner filed a motion for rendition of judgment and motion to cancel the preliminary conference on the ground that the answer of the respondent was defective and filed out of time. March 26, 1997 trial court granted the motion declaring that respondent failed to comply with section 3 (b) and section 5 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and that Roel G. Alvear has no authority to represent as there is no special power of attorney executed in his favor. April 8, 1997 trial court rendered its decision ordering respondent to: 1) vacate the premises and deliver its possession to petitioner, 2) 2,000 Php was to be paid as rent from March 25, 1996 until the time he vacates the same, and 3) to remove further improvements on the land. It held: o Answer of defendant was one day late. Defendant cannot claim deprivation of due process for he was given an opportunity to be heard. o Sec 6. of the Rules on Summary Procedure should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged. o Assuming arguendo that the answer was filed on time, it is still untenable for reasons: 1) the anwer was not verified, 2) the person who filed had no authority April 11, 1997 respondent filed a Manifestation With Motion to Lift Order dated March 26, 1997 alleging that his answer was filed and by a non-lawyer on that ground that he is economically destitute. The trial court admitted the motion and set it for resolution on April 24, 1997. April 25, 1997 his motion was still unresolved, respondent filed a notice of appeal to the Municipal Trial Court which was approved in April 30, 1997 On appeal, as aforesaid, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It held: o The Case at bar should be subject to liberal construction in order to assist parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case. o That suits are to be decided on merits and not on technicalities. o The liberal construction rule should be applied for the following reasons: 1) the answer was late for one day only and the non-lawyer who filed was not conscious of such o Pragmatically, the inferior court already took cognizance of the anwer by setting a preliminary conference. o The lack of verification of the answer is a mere formal defect, not jurisdictional. W/O/N under the facts of the case, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be liberally interpreted in order to allow the admission of an answer filed one day late
Issue: Ratio:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for expeditious means. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a time procedure designed to remedy the situation. Gachon vs. Devera, Jr., the word shall in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscored their mandatory character. No satisfactory explanation was offered by respondent why he was not able to file his answer on time. His allegation of being economically destitute fails to convince as he did not even wait for the Municipal Trial Court to resolve his motion. Thus, the Municipal Trial Court acted correctly Decision: The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 45162) is reversed and ser aside and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Malolos, Bulacan is reinstated.
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MANDATORY and DIRECTORY 28 Escribano v Avila Petitioner: Jose Escribano Respondents: Hon. David P. Avila, as presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato and Salapida K. Pendatun A case about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation to a complaint for written defamation FACTS: 1. Original case: Congressman Pendatun of Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of First Instance of that province a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tecurung Cotabato. The complaint was subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge Avila and supported by the affidavit of Acting Governor Simeon Datumanong. Escribano was complained for saying on a radio show that Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live (lived) in this province 2. Escribano questioned Avilas authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the offense. In Avilas order he ruled that he had the power to conduct PI. He received complainants evidence. 3. Current Case: Escribano filed against Aguila and Pendatun the instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition. 4. Escribano also filed a supplemental petition to annul Avilas order. In that order he found that Pendatuns evidence had established a probable cause to believe that libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano probably committed the same. Avila ordered for Escribanos arrest. The court issued a resolution restraining Avila from proceeding with the arraignment of Escribano. ISSUE: The issue is whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. DECISION: Petition is dismissed with costs against Escribano ARGUMENTS: Petitioner (Escribano) In support of his contention that the city fiscal of Cotabato is the only functionary empowered to conduct the Preliminary Investigation of the libel charge, invokes: a. provisions of the charter of Cotabato City RA 2364 as amended by 3332 Sec 23 (f) city attorney shall investigate all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city ordinance (g) in charge of all prosecution of all crimestriable in CFI of cotabato b. Cites Jurisprudence that in chartered cities of the city fiscal has the executive authority to conduct preliminary investigations c. Provisions of Article 360 of the revised penal code, which were inserted by RA No 4363, approved on June 19, 1965 and which do not empower the CFI to conduct preliminary investigation of written defamations Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in this chapter shall be conducted by the province or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such action may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article Respondent: Pendatun and Avila rely on Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court to support their view that the Court of First Instance of Cotabato could conduct the preliminary investigation: RATIO: a. Art 2364, the power granted to city attorney is not exclusive. b. In Sayo, Montelibano and Guerrero cases, it was held that city court could not conduct preliminary investigations. c. The silence of Article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal action for written defamation does not preclude a judge of that court from holding such investigation.
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The power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional provision that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. (Implicity grant of power) In order to prove its point, the court explained a general rule in construction and explained the inapplicability of a maxim that is related to the case. RULE The rule is that construing a statute the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes which induced the enactment of law are important factors to be considered in its construction. In this case, the enumeration in the amendatory law was designed to divest the original ordinary municipal court of the power but not to deprive the proper CPI of the same power. The purpose of the amendment had nothing to do with the power of the CFI to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases cognizable by it. PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT Before the amendment, a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where article was published or circulated and irrespective of where it was written or printed. Experience had shown that under this rule, offended party could harass the accused by instituting the case in a remote place. This was the evil RA 4363 sought to avoid. MAXIM The fact that CFI is not mentioned in Art 360 seems to suggest that it cant conduct such preliminary investigation following the maxim INCLUSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another or the enumeration of particular things excludes the idea of something else not mentioned. The maxim is inapplicable if there is some special reason for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another which is otherwise within the statute, so that the absence of any mention of such other will not exclude it. INAPPLICABILITY OF MAXIM Maxim cant be applied in this case because the fact the CFI is not mentioned in the amendment, has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment. In construing a law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved. Dissenting Opinion: The absence of a statutory grant, CFI cant exercise preliminary investigation. Concurring Opinion: The mere non-mention cant be construed as withdrawal of the constitutional and statutory power of CFI. RA 5181 reaffrims it as well. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERUIS 29 City Government of San Pablo v Reyes FACTS 1. Act No. 3648 granted the Escuedero Electric Service Company a legislative franchise to maintain and operate an electric light and power system in the City of San Pablo and nearby municipalities. 2. RA 2340 Escuderos franchise was transferred to the plaintiff MERALCO 3. PD No. 551 franchise tax (2% gross) to be paid to the commissioner of Internal revenue in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current. 4. RA 7160( LGC OF 1991): authorizing LGU to impose tax on businesses enjoying a franchise at a rate not exceeding 50% fo 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year within its jurisdiction. 5. Ordinance no 56 (revenue code of San Pablo) section 2.09 Article D reiterated above provision of LGC. Pursuant to this, city treasurer sought payment from Meralco P1,857,711.67 which the latter paid under protest 6. MERALCO filed THIS action before the RTC to declare Ordinance No. 56 null and void insofar as it imposes the franchise tax upon private respondent MERALCO and claim for a refund. The court ruled in favor of MEralco, upheld argumed that LGC didnt expressly or impliedly repeal the tax exemption/incentive enjoyed by it under its charter
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Motion for reconsideration denied by RTC Current case: petition raising questions of law on three grounds: a. Respondent judge erred in holding that Act no 3648, RA 2340, PD 551, as amended, insofar as they grant tax incentives, privilege and immunities to private respondent, have not be repealed by RA 7160 b. R. Judge erred in ruling Sec 193 of RA 7160 has not withdrawn the tax incentives, privileges and immunities being enjoyed by the private respondent under Act no 3648, RA 2340 and PD 551, as amended c. R. Judge erred in holding that the franchise tax in question constitutes an impairment of the contract between the government and private respondent ARGUMENTS: Petitioner a. RA 7160 expressly repealed Act no 3648, RA 2340 and PD 551 and that pursuant to provision of sections 137 and 193 fo the LGC, the province or city now has power to impose a franchise tax on a business enjoying a franchise. Relies on ruling of Mactan Cebu International Airport v Marcos where SC held that the exemption from real property tax granted to MCIA under its charter has been withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC b. Cites memorandum date Dec 8, 1997 an administrative interpretation made by the Bureau of Local Government of Finance of the DOF to the effect that the earlier ruling of DOF that holders of franchise which contain the phrase in lieu of all taxes provision are exempt from the payment of any kind of tax is no logner applicable upon effectivity of LGC in view of the withdrawal as provided in Sec 193 and 234 ISSUE: Whether city of San Pablo may impose a local franchise tax pursuant to the LGC upon Manila Electric Company which pays a tax equal to two percent of its gross receipts in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on savings or income? 7. 8.
DECISION: Reverse the court a quo. Petition is granted. The decision of RTC of San Pablo City, appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and complaint of Meralco is hereby dismissed RATIO: 1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE of 1991 Sec 137: province may impose tax on business enjoying franchise xxx 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts Sec 151: city may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose Sec 193: UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS CODE, xxx tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn. Sec 534: General repeal. All thats inconsistent with any of the provisions of this code are repealed by the provisions of this code. EFFECT OF LGC of 1991 Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of the extant tax exemption privileges. By stating unless otherwise provided by this code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons whether natural or juridical, including GOCC, excluding some exemptions, were withdrawn. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS (the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Applying such maxim, MERALCO was not mentioned in any exemption so any existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under existing law is withdrawn. GENERAL REPEALING CLAUSE: is not commonly favored unless two laws are so repugnant to each other and cant co-exist. Also, it would be tedious to enumerate all existing grants of tax exemptions or incentives. 2. Jurisprudence: MCIAA v MARCOS, this court held that Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., the tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons are withdrawn upon
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the effectivity of the LGC except with respect to those entities expressly enumerated. In the same vein, We must hold that the express withdrawal upon effectivity of the LGC of all exemptions except only as provided therein, can no longer be invoked by Meralco to diclaim liability for local tax. 3. 4. In lieu of contained in PD 551, Act no 3648, RA 2340 is an exemption and not commutative tax. Art X, Section 5 of Constitution grants direct authority to LGC the power to tax.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERUIS 30 People v Macarandang Facts: Defendant Moro Macarandang was charged with illegal possesion of firearms, having in his custody and control (1) Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-942131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions w/o the proper license/ permit therefore from competent authority. In his defense, Macarandang invokes as his legal excuse/ authority therefore, the appointment issued him by Gov. Dimakuta as secret agent.
Issues:1) W/N permit issued by Gov. Dimakuta is valid; and 2)W/N defendant, as secret agent, can be included in the term peace officers who are exempt from the requirements relating to issuance of license to possess firearms by Sec.879 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Held: Although Gov. Dimakuta has no authority to issue a valid firearms license, defendant is exempt from the requirements therefrom because his appointment as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer who are, according to Sec. 879 of the Revised Administrative Code, exempt from the firearm license requirements.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERUIS 31 PEOPLE vs. MAPA Facts: The accused was indicted for the offense of illegal possession of firearm. The petition only involves a question of law as the accused has already admitted the authenticity of the evidence. Issue: Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition Held: No Ratio: The law is explicit that it shall be unlawful for any person to..possess any firearm, detached parts thereof, or any instrument used in the manufacture of firearms and that firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailor or marines, the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," ARE NOT COVERED "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." The law is clear. It does not mention a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. The first duty of the court is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
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without them.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERUIS 32 People v. Santayana GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25) FACTS: 19 February 1962 9 March 1962 Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as Special Agent by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. Col. Maristela issued an undated certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection Santayana was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.
29 October 1962
ISSUE: (1) W/N the subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC pursuant to RA 2613 (2) W/N the appointment of appellant Santayana as special agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto HELD: (1) No. The offense does not fall under the original jurisdiction of the MTC, instead the Court of First Instance (CFI) has concurrent jurisdiction since criminal cases relating to possession of firearms with which the appellant is charged with is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than 1 year and 1 day or more than 5 years or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than P1,000 or more than P5,000. (For MTC penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than 6 months or fine of not more than P200 or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said courts) (2) Yes. Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Note: The appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v. Macarandang). Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, which was after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellants appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERUIS 33 Malina vs. Comelec Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Malinias and Pilandos complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for alleged violation of: Section 25 of RA6646 right to be present and to counsel during the canvass Section 232 of BP881 persons not allowed inside the canvassing room barangay tanod
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Section 261 of BP881 prohibition on public officers and employees from participating in partisan political activity
Facts: Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor, Pilando was a candidate for congressional representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections. They alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint blocked their supporters and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Bldg. Also, policemen allegedly prevented their supporters from entering the Provincial Capitol Bldg. when these eventually found their way there. Several supporters of the candidates executed mass affidavits supporting these claims. In response, respondents admit ordering the set up of checkpoints but said that these were to enforce the COMELEC gun ban and other COMELEC rules. They also said that policemen were posted at the Capitol grounds in response to information that some groups were out to disrupt the canvass proceedings. Second, Malinias maintains that respondents entered the canvassing room in blatant violation of section 232, BP881. His sole basis is the affidavit of his supporters who expressly stated that they saw respondents enter the room. He also says that respondents impliedly admitted this because they mentioned the names of persons in the canvassing room in their counter-affidavit. Finally, Malinias asserts that private respondents should be held liable for allegedly violating section 261, BP881. He asserts that, in setting up a checkpoint, respondents unduly interfered with his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing. This interference allegedly favored the other candidate. Held: Issue is dismissed and resolution of COMELEC is affirmed Ratio: There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic menner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law 1 charge: Malinias failed to substantiate his claim the respondents denied him his right to be present during canvassing. There was no showing that he was even near the Provincial Capitol Bldg. at the time. Pilando was present and even participated in the canvassing. Assuming that Pilando only entered by evading policemen surrounding the Capitol grounds, then why did he not raise this issue with the board of canvassers? Also, COMELEC and respondents failed to highlight the fact that section 25 RA6646 is not punishable by law as a criminal offence. It merely highlights the right of a political candidate/party 2 charge: Again, COMELEC and respondents failed to note that section 232, BP 881 is not explicitly enumerated in sections 261 and 261 of BP881 as election offenses. While it states that it is unlawful for said persons to enter the canvassing room, this act is not criminally punishable under sections 261 and 262 of BP881. However, the violations may still give rise to administrative penalties after proper hearing Under the rule of expression unius est exclusio alterius there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecture private respondents precisely because this is a non-criminal act. The rule of expression unius est exclusion alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressum facit cassare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressedly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. 3 Charge:
rd nd st
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While respondents admit ordering the set up of the checkpoint, they did so to enforce the COMELEC gun ban, among others. There was no clear indication that these police officers, in ordering the setting up of checkpoint, intended to favor the other candidates. There was also no showing that the alleged closure of the Capitol grounds favored the election of the other candidates. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERUIS 34 Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision affirming the decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals holding that the lot owned by the petitioner and its hospital building constructed thereon are subject to assessment for purposes of real property tax. Petitioner is a non-stock and non-profit entity established on Jan, 16, 1981 by virtue of P.D. 1823 Aside from its income from payin patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government. June 7, 1993 bothe the land and the building of the petitioner were assessed for real property taxes in the amount of 4,,554,860 php by the City Assessor of Q.C. Aug.25, 1993 petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property taxes due to its claim of being a charitable institution. Petitioners request was denied and a petition was, thereafter, filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Q.C. (QC-LBAA). Petitioner alleged that under sec28 par 3 art 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients QC-LBAA rendered a judgment dismissing the petition and holding the petitioner liable for real property taxes, which was then affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Q.C. (CBAA) that ruled petitioner was not a charitable institution and that its properties were not actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes Whether petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of P.D.1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and sec 234(b) of RA 7160 Whether the real properties of petitioner are exempt from real property taxes.
Issue:
Ratio: First issue Petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The test of charity and charitable organization are in law the same. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage. Under P.D. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation based on the decree and its Articles of Incorporation As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies (as a form of donation or gift) from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve. Second issue Portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes. The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. Claim for exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Under the decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building.
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It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all other. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear nad unequivocal proof that a) it is a charitable institution, and b) its real properties are actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes. Petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes. Portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospitals leased to private individuals are not exempt. On the other hand, the protions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes. Decision: Petition is partially granted
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERUIS 35 GOMEZ VS. VENTURA I. Facts: - appeal of judgment from the CFI of Manila which dismissed the complaint against the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands, revoking the plaintiffs license to practice medicine and surgery II. Issues: a.) w/n the charges against the plaintiff were valid b.) w/n sec 9 of Act No. 2381 (Opium Law) is null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality, in violation of sec 3 of the Jones Law (1 subject-1 title-1 bill) c.) w/n sec 9 of Act No. 2381 was repealed by Act No. 2493 and later by section 780 of the Administrative Code III. Held: a.) judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. IV. Reasons: a.) (Sec. 12, Act No. 3111): procedure to revoke a certificate of registration shall be begun by filing a written charge or charges against the accused. These charges may be preferred by any person or persons, firm or corporation, or the Board of Medical Examiners itself may direct its executive officer to prepare said charges. The law does not require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by any specified person. The fact that the charges were filed by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, does not deprive the Board of Medical Examiners of jurisdiction to hear said charges and to take the proper action according to law.
b.) Sec. 9 Act no. 2381 is not foreign to the subject of said Act since it details means conducive to the ultimate purpose of said Act The penalty provided in said section for the physician or dentist who prescribes opium for a patient whose physical condition does not require the use of said drug, is the means employed by the Legislature to attain the purpose of Act No. 2381, which is, to prohibit unnecessary use of opium 35
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Legislature merely exercised the police power expressly granted by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, for the protection of the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the Philippine Islands The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details of the act. Any provisions that are germane to the subject expressed in the title may properly be included in the act. (I Sutherland on Stat. Const., par. 118.) To hold that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is unconstitutional on the alleged ground, the violation of the constitutional provision must be substantial and manifest. It is not so in the case at bar.
c.) there is no express repeal of section 9 of Act No. 2381, neither was it impliedly repealed provisions of sec 9, Act No. 2381, are neither contrary to, nor incompatible with, the provisions of section 780 of the Administrative Code, as amended. Act No. 310 provided that the Board of medical Examiners could revoke licenses for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the term Act No. 2493 provides that certificates of physicians are revocable for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the phrase. In so far as revocation of licenses is concerned, Act No. 2493 is mere reenactment of Act No. 310. Act No. 1761 (the Opium Law) provided that illegally prescribing opium should be cause for revocation of medical licenses. Act No. 2381 only repeated the provision as to doctors and dentists and did not repeal Act No. 310. Act No. 3111, amends Act No. 2493 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), by an addition after the words "unprofessional conduct" of immoral, or dishonorable conduct" It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified in Act. No. 3111 there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed "unprofessional" conduct, as grounds for revocation licenses. Expressio unius est exclussio alterius should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example, or to remove doubts. The criminal use of opium should thus remain a specific cause for revocation of license.
EJUSDEM GENERIS 36 Go Tiaco y Hermanos vs. Union Ins. Society of Canton Facts: Cargo of rice belonging to Go Tiaco Brothers were being transported in the steamship Hondagua from Saigon port to Cebu. Upon discharging the rice from one of the compartments upon arrival at Cebu, it was discovered that 1,473 sacks had been damaged by sea water. Loss amounted to 3,875.25 Php Trial court found that the inflow of the sea water during the voyage was due to the defect in one of the drain pipes of the ship and concluded that the loss was not covered by the insurance policy. Court found that the opening in the ship was due to wear & tear and not from straining of the ship in rough weather on that voyage. Court also found that the repairs that had been made on the pipe were defective and because of this ship was not properly equipped to receive the rice during the start of the voyage; therefore, the ship was unseaworthy. Insurance policy of the cargo: o Perils of the sea, mean, of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, barratry of the masters and marines and all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that shall come to the hurt, detriment or damage of the said goods and merchandise and any part thereof.
Issue:
W/O/N Insurer was liable for the loss in such stated manner? No 36
Held:
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Ratio: The words all other perils, losses and misfortunes are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind (ejusdem generic) with the particular risks that were enumerated in the preceding part of the same clause of the contract. A loss which in the ordinary course of events, results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea or from the negligent failure of the ships owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under ordinary conditions is not a peril of the sea. The insurer undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils; not against perils of the ship. The owners of the damaged rice must look to the ship-owner for redress and not from the insurer.
EJUSDEM GENERIS 37 ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION Facts: The petitioner filed a request with the respondent a request that they would be exempted from coverage of RA No. 1161 otherwise known as the Social Security Law because said act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions. Respondent denied the request. Said act provides: in the System shall be compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees Employer is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign who carries in the Phil any trade, business, of activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders except the Government. Employee refers to any person who performs services for an employer and who receives compensation for such services. Employment covers any service performed by an employer except for the Government. Issue: Whether or not the term employer following the principle of ejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on activities for gain. Held: No Ratio: The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. The term employer is sufficiently comprehensive to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit. Also, the law explicitly states those which are not covered by the contribution. The petitioner is not among those cited. EJUSDEM GENERIS 38 Mutuc v COMELEC Petitioner: Amelito R. Mutuc Respondent: COMELEC FACTS 1. 2. Mutuc was a candidate to be a delegate of the constitutional convention. Comelec through a telegram informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers 3. Amelito Mutuc invoked his right to free speech. He filed a special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Comelec and preliminary injunction. 4. Comelec didnt deny and premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act. CCA made it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether domestic or foreign origin. 1-B STATCON 2009-2010 E.Aguila K.Aguila Alvarez Chua Cuneta De La Paz Lim Magno Mendoza Robles Roxas San Pedro Ty 37
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5. Comelec argued that the jingle proposed to be used by the petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the statute and subject to confiscation
ISSUE: Can Comelec impose such ban? DECISION: the court issued a minute resolution granting the prohibition prayed for RATIO: 1. Comelec had not authority on the part of respondent to impose such band in the light of the doctrine of EJUSDEM GENERIS as well as the principle that construction placed on the statute by Comelec would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner a. CCA didnt grant Comelec such power to ban. COmelec argued that and the like at the end of the statute justified its order. This is without merit because of the principle of ejusdem generis, it is clear that what was referred to in the Act was the distribution of gadgets or means to induce favorable vote for the candidate. EJUSDEM GENERIS- the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. b. Comelec also failed to apply the cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. Free speech should be upheld against the censorship imposed by Comelec through the ban. c. Comelec cant exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, there is no higher law than the Constitution. Concurring (J. Teehankee): Jingle (recorded disc or tape) is not similar to a streamer or poster. Using recorded tape is an efficient way of disseminating information than the candidate repeating and singing his jingle every time. Such ban violate basic freedom of speech and expression and cant pass constitutional test of reasonableness (they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary). EJUSDEM GENERIS 39 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs Court of Appeals FACTS: - A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. To recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount therof. Claimant id duty bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. - A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages as well as hearsay or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect. Such are the jurisprudential precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the instant petition. - The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). - After investigation, the Philippine Coast Guard rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault, and based on finding, private respondent prayed sued the LSC and the Petroparcel Captain Edgardo Doruelo and prayed for an award of P692, 680.00 allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes with legal interests and attorney fees after paying the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City the repecstive docket fee. - During pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transportation Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of Petroparcel. - Private respondent later sought amendment of complaint on the ground that the original complaint failed to plead the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In the amended complaint, the actual value of the sunken vessel was averred at P800, 000.00 and the amount of P600,000.00 should also be claimed after the deduction of the insurance payment of P200,000.00. - The amended complaint alleged inflation effects on the value of the hull as well as the incurrence of unrealized profits and lost business opportunities.
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Judgment in 1989 on the complaint was rendered by the lower court in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant PNOC Shippining and Transportation Corporation with the payment of P6, 438, 048.00 as the value of the fishing boat with interest from date of filing of complaint, P50, 000.00 for attorney fees and costs of suit. - In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence cited by the private respondent consisting of testimony of general manager del Rosario as well as price quotations requested by him to present as evidence the amount of money lost from the collision of the sea vessels. - Lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro as sole witness and did not bother at all to offer any documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations submitted were excessive as against his own estimates which he failed to prove. - Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14, 1992. On petitioner's assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel. Considering the documentary evidence presented as in the nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, the Court of Appeals held, thus: Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence, the reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted with evidence which appears to be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should declare in favor of admissibility rather than of non-admissibility. Trial courts are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement of the rules of evidence which crystallized through constant use and practice and are very useful and effective aids in the search for truth and for the effective administration of justice. But in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding or ignoring them. - Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily rebutted by appellant's own sole witness in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate court found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an "inconsistent posture by the fact that its own witness, admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence (price quotations) appellant has so vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence." Hence, it concluded: The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the basis of appellee's documentary exhibits (price quotations) which stood uncontroverted, and which already included the amount by way of adjustment as prayed for in the amended complaint. There was therefore no need for appellee to amend the second amended complaint in so far as to the claim for damages is concerned to conform with the evidence presented at the trial. The amount of P6,438,048.00 awarded is clearly within the relief prayed for in appellee's second amended complaint. ISSUE: - In assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner posits the view that the award of P6,438,048 as actual damages should have been in light of these considerations, namely: (1) the trial court did not base such award on the actual value of the vessel and its equipment at the time of loss in 1977 (2) there was no evidence on extraordinary inflation that would warrant an adjustment of the replacement cost of the lost vessel, equipment and cargo (3) the value of the lost cargo and the prices quoted in respondent's documentary evidence only amount to P4,336,215.00 (4) private respondent's failure to adduce evidence to support its claim for unrealized profit and business opportunities; and (5) private respondent's failure to prove the extent and actual value of damages sustained as a result of the 1977 collision of the vessels. HELD: Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair 24 the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or 39
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omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would 26 have pertained to him (lucro cesante). Thus: Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements - In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondent's general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. The pieces of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with respect to items and equipment lost show similar items and equipment with corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10) years after the collision. Noticeably, petitioner did not object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost goods and equipment. In objecting to the same pieces of evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof. Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits, the lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight to arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00 as actual damages. - Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge. - The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. - The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation." - the same pieces of evidence, however, should not have been given probative weight. This is a distinction we wish to point out. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. - nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages. - This Court believes that such allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims. - participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. - The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two decades, we believe that 59 an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) in favor of private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order. - No pronouncement as to costs.
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UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT 40 JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT INC vs. NLRC Facts: Petitioner contends that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the rules to decisions by the POEA because an appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment as they are already required under sec 4 rule II book II of the POEA. Issue: Whether or not the order of respondent NLRC dismissing the petitioners appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond is valid Held: Valid Ratio: The POEA rules are clear and shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond is required to perfect an appeal. It is intended to further insure payment in favor of the employee. It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT 41 Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs FACTS -ASC is engaged in production and milling of sugar for export. The sugar is place in containers known as jute bags. st nd -ASC imported these bags in 1957 twice. 1 shipment:44,800 2 shipment:75,200 st nd Only 8,467 bags from the 1 shipment were used and only 25,000 bags from the 2 shipment were used. Total:33,647 bags used, 86,363 were exported after the expiration of the one year period w/in 3 years from date of importation -Thru Theo H. Davies and Co., the ASCs agent, it requested for an extension citing typhoons and severe floods, picketing,delay of arrival of the vessel which petitioner was to use in exporting his sugar. This petition was denied. -Petitioner was ordered to pay php28,269.42 as customs duties which it paid under protest. -Petitioner demands a refund in the form of a drawback under section 106(b) in relation to 105(x) of the tariff and Customs Code ISSUE: (A) W/N Force Majeure is an excuse (B)W/N the Commissioner of Customs is vested under Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the then applicable law, with discretion to extend the period of one year provided in Sec.23 of the said Act (C)W/N Petitioner is entitled to a refund by way of drawback under the provisions of Sec 106(b) of the Tariff and Customs Code DECISION: Sec 23 of said Act is non extendible and compliance therewith is mandatory. RATIO: (A) These were not of such magnitude as to prevent the exportation of the jute bags w/in the one year period (B)-Judicial Respect for Administrative Construction -Respect due to the governmental agencies charge with the administration, their competence, expertise, experience and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret. The Legislature relies on their advise as to the practical working of a statute. -It is the intention of the legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containers to one year without extension from the date of importation. -Considering that the BoC is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight -Exemptions from taxation are not favored. Tax statutes are to be interpreted liberally in favour of the taxing authority
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(C)-The petitioner having opted to take advantage of the provisions of Sec 105 may not after having failed to comply with the conditions imposed thereby, avoid the consequences of such failure by being allowed a drawback under section 106 (b) of the same act without having complied with the conditions of the latter section -It is not to supposed that the legislature intended to defeat compliance with sec 105 thru a refuge under 106. a construction should be avoided which affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with the terms of a statute. Courts should proceed with the theory that parts of a statute may be harmonized with each other. STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATOR 42 Casco vs Philippine Chemical Company Issue: Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of margin fee. Facts: Congress passed RA2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law. The pertinent portion of Sec. 2 of said law states that urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users is exempt from the margin imposed on the sale of foreign exchange. Petitioner maintains that the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. The National Institute of Science and Technology, through its commissioner, expressed that Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde. Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in congress contains the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and formaldehyde, and that the members of congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately, citing statements made on the floor during the consideration of the bill before the Senate by the members thereof. Held: The decision appealed is hereby affirmed Ratio: Individual statements of Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate, much less the intent of the House of Representatives. Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill, which uses the term urea formaldehyde, is conclusive upon the courts. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of congress and approved by the executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATOR 43 MANILA JOCKEY CLUB Inc. Vs GAMES AND AMUSEMENT Facts: This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioner Manila Jockey Club, Inc., in the Court of First Instance Manila praying that judgment be rendered against respondents Games and Amusements Board (GAB), Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon. Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No. 983, by express terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO, and 12 Saturdays to the President for other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days can not be disposed of by the GAB without authority of law. Issue: W/N the placement of the six (6) additional racing days given to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502, is proper Held: No.
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Ratio: At the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1502 in June, 1956, the long, continuous, and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays and during the whole day. - when Congress chose not to specify in express terms how the additional sweepstakes draws and races would be held, it is safe to conclude that it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing situation and practice. Appellants have no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except, perhaps, on the holidays), because their holding of races on these days is merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races, but without specifying the days for holding them - GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, from among the only available racing days unreserved by any law the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination by the GAB. In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute (unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document) - it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors - but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity The purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The legal act is made up of two elements an (1) internal and an (2) external one - it originates in intention and is perfected by expression - failure of the latter may defeat the former Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides - It may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body - It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof - Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS 44 Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Court of Appeals Case: Oil and Natural Gas Commission (petitioner) is a government owned company under the government of India, it entered a contract with the Pacific Cement Company (private respondent), a privately owned company registered under the Philippines. The contract contained the agreement of both parties to the delivery of 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement by the private respondent to Bombay and Calcutta India which would be paid by the petitioner with the amount of $477,300. The oil well cement was to be boarded on the MV SURUTANA NAVA (boat operator) at the port of Surigao. During the course of the fulfillment of the contract, a dispute arose between private respondent and the boat operator which resulted to the delay of the delivery because the goods were caught up in Bangkok. Albeit the fact that private respondent already received the payment from the petitioner and notwithstanding the several requests of petitioner for the delivery of the goods, private respondent failed to do so. Thereinafter, negations between the parties took place and private respondent offered to replace the undelivered good of petitioner with class G cement, upon inspection of petitioner however, such class G cement did not meet the standards and specifications of petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner informed private respondent that it will bring the matter before an arbitrator pursuant to clause 16 of their contract which provided for the settlement of disputes arising from all questions, designs, drawing and instructions to the quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or in relation to the supply order/ contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during stipulated/ extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof by an arbitrator appointed by the commission (of the petitioner only) from its employees. The dispute was then brought under the arbitration of a Shri N.N Malhotra who decided the case in favor of the petitioner and ordered the private respondent to pay petitioner a sum of (in total) $899,603.77 for damages and costs. For this
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judgment of the arbitrator to take effect, it was brought before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun, India (foreign court). The foreign court then issued notices to the private respondent with regards to the filing of their objection and the settlement of the filing fees. Private respondent filed the said objections however, with regards to the settlement of the filing fees, it made instead a communication with the foreign court that it (the foreign court) has not specified the exact amount for the filing fees, the foreign court made no reply. After a year, without private respondent settling the filing fee, the foreign court rejected its objections and made a final decision declaring the enforcement of the findings and decision of the arbitrator. Even with the decision of the foreign court, private respondent refused to pay petitioner, thus petitioner filed a case in the RTC of Surigao city for the enforcement of the decision of the foreign court. Private respondent moved for the dismissal of the case on the basis of: 1. Petitioners lack of legal capacity to sue, 2. Lack of cause of action, 3. Plaintiffs claim or demand has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished. The RTC ruled that the plaintiff had legal capacity to sue and dismissed the claim of lack of cause of action. However, the RTC ruled that the referral of the dispute to an arbitrator pursuant to clause 16 of their contract was erroneous. The court claimed that the issue regarding the failure of the delivery of goods was not covered by clause 16 which referred to all questions and disputes relating to the meaning and specification of the designs, drawings and instructions and the quality of the workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever qualified to in any way arising or relating to the supply order/contract, design, drawing specification but instead was covered by clause 15 which provided that all questions, disputes and differences arising under out of or in connection with this supply order shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order is situated. The RTC dismissed the case on the following grounds: 1. The decision made by the arbitrator, not having jurisdiction over the dispute of the parties, is a mistake of law or fact amounting to want of jurisdiction resulting to the invalidity of it decision, thus the foreign court cannot validly adopt its decision. 2. The full text of the foreign courts judgment only contained a dispositive portion and fails to indicate the findings of fact and law in which it based its judgment which violates Sec.14 of Art.VIII of the constitution stating that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law where it is based. 3. The dismissal of the case by the foreign court based on the private respondents failure to settle the filing fees which it failed to specify in its notice is a violation on due process. Petitioner appealed to higher court but the Court of appeals sustained the decision of the lower court, thus this petition based on certiorari by the CA citing the following in support: 1. The non-delivery of the cargo was a matter properly covered by the provisions of clause 16 of the contract 2. The judgment of the foreign court was an affirmation of the factual and legal findings of the arbitrator and therefore enforceable in its jurisdiction 3. Evidence must be received to repel the effect of a presumptive right under foreign judgment. Issues: 1. Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under clause 16 of the contract 2. Whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction in view of the private respondents allegation that it is bereft of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of petitioner was based
Decision: The judgment of the CA is reversed with the enforcement of the decision of the foreign court ordered. Reason: 1. The court explained that the origin of the dispute is the failure of private respondent to deliver the agreed 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement to the specific places settled. This the court reasoned was not covered by the provisions of clause 16 of the contract which the petitioner shrewdly edited with the insertion of a comma (,) between the words supply order/contract and design which should have properly read supply order/contract design instead of supply contract/order, design. The reason for this important distinction is that without the comma it is clear that what is being referred to by
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Clause 16 are disputes and ambiguities with regards to the SUPPLY CONTRACT/ORDER taking its design, drawings and instructions as other descriptions that could have ambiguities. The court also furthered that to interpret clause 16 as including all other questions related to the supply contract/order would make clause 15 superfluous. The court ruled that clause 15 is the proper clause to be applied. Notwithstanding this however, petitioner argued that although it be assumed that such failure to carry out the contract was not under the provisions of clause 16, the attempt of private respondent to replace the undelivered goods with a certain class G cement which did not meet the specifications of petitioner was clearly covered by the said clause. This argument was affirmed by the court. Public respondent however argued that its resolution to replace the undelivered cement was not covered by the said clause because such decision by the private respondent was not part of the contract, but instead of its good faith in maintaining good business relationship with petitioner. Private respondent claims that it was not part of its duty to replace such goods but offered in good faith. The court rejected this claim saying that their failure to deliver the goods albeit the fact that they had already received payment already obliged them to make compensations for their breach of the contract to deliver the goods agreed upon. 2. The court ruled that the CA was erroneous in its interpretation of the due process provision and of Sec. 14 of Art. VIII. It explained that in decisions asserting the findings of a lower court, the mere citation of the paper number which contained the facts and law in which the decision was based is enough because it avoids the repetition of lengthy and extensive discussions provided by the decision of the lower court. It furthered that such decisions like that done by the foreign court was also the practice in Philippine jurisprudence with regards to memorandum decisions. On the issue of the violation of due process, what this provision avoids is the denial of actual opportunity to be heard notwithstanding if there was a hearing or not. No violation is made even if there is no hearing so long as opportunity was given to defend or explain oneself. Lastly, it was not the duty of the foreign court to reply to the communication of private respondent. Private respondent should have exercised due diligence in ascertaining the exact payment for the filing fees. The court finds that although the decision of the foreign court was not based on the observation of the Rules for Philippine courts, this does not make it invalid. So long as a decision by a foreign court was promulgated in accordance with its own rules and is valid, it should be taken as valid the Philippine courts. Such matters are governed by the principle of lex fori or the internal law of the forum. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS 45 MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines (the constitutionality of the decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gambling Corporation). Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16. Its Sangguniang Panglungsod derives its powers, duties and functions under Section 458 of said Code. In 1992, following its success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. - To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. - The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7 December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation therefore). Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. - The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 45
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On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of the decision was denied on 13 July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro can prohibit the establishment of a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.
Held: No. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. - This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance - it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos - these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void - The power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired - P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law. The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. - While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. - It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. - This Court has no authority to review, much less reverse Questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. - Decisions can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts; no such contravention is found in this case Further, there are two kinds of gambling, the illegal and those authorized by law. - Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling - The suggestion that the Local Government Code (LGC) authorize Local Government Units (LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of legislature. - Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated - since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. Ordinances should not contravene a statute as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. - Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. - The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter - This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law Note: The tests of a valid ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy 6) It must not be unreasonable.
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AND/OR 46 Romulo, Mabanta, Bueneventura, Sayoc and Delos Angeles v Home Development Mutual Fund Facts 1. 2. Persuant to PD 1752, the petitioners (law firm) were exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 from the Pag-ibig fund coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior retirement plan 1 Sep 1995, HDMF pursuant to Section 5 of RA 7742, issued Board resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing 7742. for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement AND housing benefits superior to those provided under the pag-ibig fund. 16 Nov 1995, petitioners filed with the respondent an application for a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage because of its superior retirement plan. In support of application, petitioner also submitted to HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the rules are invalid. HDMF disapproved petitioner application on the ground that the requirement that there should be BOTH a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase and/or and that 7742 didnt amend nor repeal 1752 but merely implemented the law. Petitioners appeal was denied by HDMF board of trustees for being moot and academic by a resolution no 1208, series of 1996, removing the availment of waiver of the mandatory coverage of the Pag-ibig fund, except for distressed employees COURT OF APPEALS: petitioner filed a petition for review before CA. On motion by HDMF, CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the coverage of employers and employees under HDMF is mandatory in character as clearly worded in Sec 4 of PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742. There is no allegation that petitioner is distressed employee, amendments are valid because the Board of Trustees are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and public requirement was also met. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied. CURRENT CASE: petitioner filed a petition before this court assailing that the 1995 and 1996 amendments to R&R Implementing RA 7742 for being contrary to law.
3. 4. 5. 6.
7. 8.
ARGUMENTS Petitioner 1. 1995 amendments are inconsistent with enabling law 1752 as amended by RA 742 which merely requires as a precondition for exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior provident/retirement plan or superior housing plan, and not concurrence of both plans 2. 1996 amendments are also void as it abolished exemption granted by Sec 19 PD 1752 as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cant be delegated to HMDF. 3. Cites two more reasons: on lack of public hearing and publication. Respondent 1. It had the option to use and only instead of or in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-ibig fund law. By choosing and the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use of and/or in section 19 of PD 1752 as amended. 2. HDMF was exercising its rule making power when it made the amendments 3. Public hearing is required only when the rules require it and if not only when it is practicable. It is optional and discretionary. It filed with UP Law center as shown by a certification from the office of the National Administrative Register of the UP Law Center ISSUE: What does the provision require and is it a valid exercise of delegated power? DECISION: Petition Granted RATIO: 1. Jurisprudence: The issue of validity of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7742 on waiver and suspension, has been squarely resolved in CHINA BANK CORP v THE MEMBERS OF TRUSTEES OF THE HDMF. It was held that Sec 1 Rule VII of the amendments and HDMF circular no 124-B are null and void insofar as
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they require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage. The law contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption. THE CONTROVERSY LIES ON THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANC OF THE WORDS AND/OR Butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs The term and/or means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive And and the disjunctive or or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will be effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive or alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive And will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone 2. A department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by the statute. The amendments as well as the repeal made by the Board members are both invalid because HDMF in the exercise of rule making power cant override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.
RETROACTIVITY 47 Espiritu vs. Cipriano Facts:
Issue: Ratio:
Petition for certiorari having petitioner seek the review and nullification of two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XV, dated Aug. 4, 1970, sustaining respondent Ricardo Ciprianos motion to dismiss on the authority of RA 6126, and the Oct. 16, 1970 denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order. The case originated as one for unlawful detainer against respondent for the failure to pay rentals. Stipulation of facts as follows: o Plaintiff as the owner of the property leased to defendant o House of defendant was built on the property with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of lease o Before 1969, lease of property was on a year-to-year basis o Rates of rental: 1954- 1957 12 php/ year 1958- 1959 13.20 php/year 1960- 1961 14 php/year 1962-1963 16 php/year 1963-1965 24.70 php/year 1967-1968 48 php/year o Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a monthly basis and rental was increased to 30 php/month o Defendant has remained in possession of the property up to the present and has not paid rental since January 1969. o Formal notice to vacate (March 22,1969) was sent by registered mail July 13, 1970 respondent moved to dismiss petitioners complaint invoking the prohibitory provision of RA 6126 AN Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Anothers Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof. Respondent judge issued an order on Aug. 4, 1970 that sustained the motion for dismissal by the defendant Hence, the petition Wheter RA 6126 may be held applicable to the case at bar. RA 6126 48
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Sec. 1 No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which anothers dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from March 31,1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three hundred pesos/month o Sec. 6 This Act shall take effect upon its approval ( Approved June 17,1970) Established is the fact that the increase in rental was effected January 1969 while the law in question took effect June 17, 1970 Private respondents contention of not perfecting the contract (with regard to the rental increase) as he did not give his consent thereto is untenable The lessor was free to fix a higher amount than that previously paid by lessee and if the latter did not agree to the increased amount, he could have vacated the premises and thus rendered himself free from liability. The statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear. RA 6126 is a temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation (during the period of one year from March 31, 1970). Hence, the prohibition against the increase was effective only from March 1970 to March 1971. The said law did not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive effect as well as the deliberations of such by its authors. It is equally true that statues are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. Decision: The assailed orders of Aug.4 and Oct. 16, 1970 are hereby nullified and set aside o RETROACTIVITY 49 Tamayo vs Manila Hotel Facts: 265 employees of the Manila Hotel who had to be dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave brought the present action to recover from the company an additional amount alleged to be due them under the administrative code, as amended by RA1081, approved on June 15, 1954 or 15 days before they were separated from the service. Issue: Is RA1081 retroactive? Held: We find the appeal to be without merit Ratio: Plaintiffs have already been paid the value of their accrued leave. However, they claim that they were entitled to ten months accrued leave because the aforementioned section of the Administrative code was amended by RA1081 several days before their dismissal (as opposed to 5 months only under the old rule) The question to determine is whether this amendment applies retroactively to employees whose length of service prior to its approval would give them an accumulated leave in excess of five months, which is the limit fixed by law before the last amendment. Article 4 of the new Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. As RA1081 does not provide that it is to have retroactive effect, it can only be given effect from the date of its approval. As a matter of fact, this is the construction that has been placed upon that Act by the dept of the Govt charged with its enforcement. Thus the Commissioner of Civil Service ruled that the accumulation of extra sick leave should only begin from June 15, 1954. It is a rule of statutory construction that courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty it is to enforce it and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.
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But it is not only the executive branch that construed RA 1081 as having only a prospective effect, when it approved a bill that sought to give RA 1081 retroactive effect (this later bill, however, did not become a law due to lack because it was vetoed for lack of funds) CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST 49 People v Manatan Facts: This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of CFI of Pangasinan to dismiss the information against defendant. Defendant, Guillermo Manatan, was charged with a violation of Sec. 54 of the Revised Election Code, which reads: No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote , if entitled thereto Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in Sec.54 of the Revised Election Code. The rule of casus omisus pro omisso habendas est is invoked by defendant-appellee. Under said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
Issue: W/N a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Sec. 54 of he Revised Election Code
Held: Yes. A justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Sec.54 of the Revised Election Code (REC). The abovementioned legal maxim is not applicable to the case at bar. It can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In this case, justices of the peace were merely called by another term. They were to be considered under the more commonly used term judges. They were thus considered to be covered under the umbrella term judge, which is defined by Bouvier Law Dictionary as a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions. Hence, in that capacity, justices of the peace are judges as well. Furthermore a review of the history (and the pertinent phraseology used therein) of Sec. 54 of the REC shows that whenever the word judge was qualified by the phrase of the first instance, the words justice of the peace would follow ; however if the law simply said judge, the words justice of the peace were omitted. Hence The conclusion that justice of the peace is comprehended in the broader term judge where judge is not qualified by any word or phrase. COMPUTATION OF TIME 50 Viray v. CA G.R. No. L-25290 FACTS: Oct 25, 1965 Petitioner received notice that her motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the Courts of Appeals (CA) was denied. Admittedly, the 15 day period allotted her by the Rules to appeal the decision to the SC expired on Nov 9, 1965 (since Oct has 31 days). Upon petition by her counsel, it (an extension of only 15 days from the expiration of the reglementary period) was granted. Expiration of the period to file the petition for certiorari Petition for certiorari was filed (however, the period for so doing expired 2 days ago) CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time
March 18, 1966
Nov 24, 1965 Nov 26, 1965 Feb 8, 1966
Petitioner-appellant now moves for reconsideration claiming that her first fifteen days that should be counted from and after Oct 25, 1965 (which ended on Nov 9 but was a holiday =Election Day) should be th considered as expiring on the 10 of Nov; while the 15-day extension granted to her should therefore 1-B STATCON 2009-2010 E.Aguila K.Aguila Alvarez Chua Cuneta De La Paz Lim Magno Mendoza Robles Roxas San Pedro Ty 50
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counted from Nov 10 (terminating on Nov 25 but was a holiday =Thanksgiving Day) should be considered until the next day, Nov 26 to file her petition for review. ISSUE: W/N the petitioners motion for reconsideration is tenable HELD: No. The extension of 15-days granted attached to the original 15 days granted by the Rules of Court, gave petitioner a 30day period, from Oct 25 to Nov 24, 1965, not Nov 26. The rule that excludes the last day of the period, should the same be a holiday refers to the performance of the act prescribed or required. But it does not apply where at the end of the period no such act is to be done. American jurisprudence provides: Rules of Court in respect to the time for the doing of an act in a judicial proceeding relating to a matter of practice are usually construed where the last day for the doing of an act falls on Sunday, to allow the whole day for the next day for the purpose; and in many states this construction has been adopted by statute or rule of court. The principle announced however, is subject to an exception where there is nothing to be done on the last day in which case Sunday is NOT to be excluded in the computation of time. The refusal of the trial court to admit an amended answer that would withdraw previous admissions and change the theory of the case, adopted in the answer originally filed, cannot constitute a grave abuse of discretion given that (1) No adequate excuse was offered for the delay in tendering the alleged correct facts and theory (2) The unauthorized abandonment of her certificate of public convenience, averred by petitioner Viray in the proposed amended answer, was in violation of law and cannot be used by her to avoid her statutory obligations
COMPUTATION OF TIME 51 NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION v. TECSON, ET AL G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969 FACTS: Nov 14, 1955 Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila rendered judgment entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc." Copy of this decision was served upon the defendants National Marketing Corporation (NAMARCO), as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint against the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered on Nov 14. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription.
Nov 21, 1955 Dec 21, 1965
Feb 14, 1966
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As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted As for prescription, Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court became final on Dec 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on Dec 21, 1965 - but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late. The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having prescribed.
Mar 20, 1969
CA certified NAMARCOs appeal from such order on the ground that the only question therein raised is one of law.
ISSUE: W/N the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations HELD: No. Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code provide that: an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues Art. 1152 of the same Code states: "commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final" which took place on Dec 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment - which was received by the defendants herein on Nov 21, 1955 - no appeal having been taken therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10) years from December 21, 1955 expired. Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year." The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" - as the term is used in our laws - to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month.
Note: Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.
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COMPUTATION OF TIME 52 YAPDIANGCO v. BUENCAMINO G.R. No. L-28841 June 24, 1983 FACTS: Feb 1, 1965 City Fiscal of QC filed before the City Court information for slight physical injuries allegedly committed by the petitioner-appellant on December 2, 1964 against Mr. Ang Cho Ching Yapdiangco, petitioner-appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that the st information having been filed on the 61 day following the commission of the offense, the sixty days prescriptive period had lapsed City Court of QC denied the motion to quash stating that the 60th day fell on a Sunday - considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed on the next succeeding business day, thus, the action had not prescribed
Sept 10, 1965
Sept 14, 1965
After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the City Court, the petitioner-appellant filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. July 11, 1966 Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: (1) W/N the lower court erred in finding that Sunday is a legal efficient cause to interrupt prescription of an offense (2) W/N the lower court erred in finding that the period fixed by law within which to commence criminal prosecution may legally be extended with the intervention of a Sunday or legal holiday (3) W/N the lower court erred in denying the petition for mandamus and preliminary injunction HELD: Yes to all. The petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted. The questioned order of the respondent court is set aside. The motion to quash is granted.
The case is not a simple issue of when to do an act but the prescription of a criminal action. Under unquestioned authorities, the question to be resolved is when the State is deemed to have lost or waived its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. In People v. Moran the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal actions elucidates: A mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary presumptions of construction are to be made. But it is otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from 53
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henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant not one because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs and innocence has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filing of tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint, taking an appeal, etc which does not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the information on the last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.
Dissenting Opinion: RELOVA Sec. 31 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "where the day, or the last day, for doing an act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding day." In the case at bar, since the last day within which to file the complaint or information in court fell on a Sunday, the filing thereof may be done on the next succeeding business day.
Danie San Pedro: 2,9,16 Kat Aguila: 3,8,17,21 LA De la Paz: 14, ,39, Paola Alvarez: 44 26 Mark Magno: 15 Ernest Aguila: 15,27,34,47,36 Rahlee Lim: 10,28,29,38, 46 Mikko Mendoza: 4,13,20,33,42,48 Desa Roxas: 5,7,11,18,25 Jormae Chua: 19,32,43,45,50,51,52 Ginger Cuneta: 6,24,30,49 Janna Robles: 22 Cathy Ty: 12,23,31,37, 40
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c.) d.) e.)

2)W/N this case is covered by P.D. no. 20

Actual case and controversy

MANDATORY and DIRECTORY 24 Pimentel v Aguirre

RETROACTIVITY 47 Espiritu vs. Cipriano Facts:

March 18, 1966

Nov 24, 1965 Nov 26, 1965 Feb 8, 1966

Nov 21, 1955 Dec 21, 1965

Feb 14, 1966

Mar 20, 1969

Sept 10, 1965

Sept 14, 1965

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