Do Harsher Punishments Deter Crime?

Perceptions and Behavior Around the Age of Criminal Majority Randi Hjalmarsson+ University of Maryland December 2006 PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE Abstract This paper uses individual survey data (NLSY97) to assess: (i) whether perceived punishment severity varies discontinuously at the age of criminal majority and (ii) whether changes in perceptions at the age of criminal majority deter crime. For the sample of males, I find that the perceived chance of jail increases by approximately six percentage points, on average, when the individual becomes an adult in the eyes of the courts: note that this effect is over and above the effect of ageing in general. Using whether or not the individual has reached the age of criminal majority as an instrument for perceived punishment severity yields evidence of deterrence for auto thefts, thefts of goods worth more than $50, and drug sales. Changes in perceptions at the age of criminal majority reduce a males propensity to steal a car by 50 percent and his propensity to commit a theft of more than $50 or to sell drugs by approximately 20 percent. In contrast, evidence of deterrence is not observed when considering assaults or arrests rather than crimes.

Any remaining errors are my own. I can be contacted at the following address. Email: rhjalmar@umd.edu, Cell: 203-435-2954, Office: 301-405-4390, Mailing Address: University of Maryland, School of Public Policy, 4131 Van Munching Hall, College Park, Maryland 20742.

I. Introduction The economics of crime literature is based on the premise that an individual will commit a crime if the expected benefits or rewards from that crime are greater than the expected costs (Becker, 1968). Thus, individuals should be deterred from crime as the expected probability or severity of punishment increases. Papers in the economics literature that test this hypothesis typically use official measures of arrest, conviction, and incarceration rates as well as sentence lengths to measure the probability or severity of punishment.1 Underlying these papers, therefore, is the assumption that individuals are knowledgeable both of these official measures as well as any changes in laws that may affect them. Perhaps the more relevant measure, however, is the individuals perception of the certainty and severity of punishment; for instance, an individual cannot be deterred by an increase in the severity of punishment if he is not aware of it. Lochner (2005) brought this issue, one commonly considered by criminologists, to the attention of the economics literature. Using two individual surveys, he assessed (i) the

determinants of an individuals perceived probability of arrest and (ii) whether the perceived probability of arrest has a deterrent effect on criminal activity. He finds that the heterogeneity in beliefs are not well explained by individual background or neighborhood characteristics, but that perceptions do respond to changes in an individuals own criminal and arrest history as well as to that of their siblings. In addition, Lochner finds that youth with a lower perceived probability of arrest are significantly more likely to commit a crime, consistent with deterrence theory. In this paper, I extend the literature in two ways. First, I analyze the determinants of individual perceptions of punishment severity; Lochner (2005) limits his analysis to perceptions of arrest. In particular, I focus on how perceptions of punishment severity respond to an

A vast and continually growing number of papers are included in this literature. See, for instance, Grogger (1991), Levitt (1997, 1998), Myers (1983), Tauchen, Witte and Griesinger (1994), and Witte (1980).

individual reaching the age of criminal majority.2 Objectively speaking, punishments are much harsher for individuals tried as adults compared to juveniles. For example, Lee and McCrary (2005) estimate that adult incarceration lengths are 3.1 to 7.4 times as long as juvenile incarceration lengths in Florida. Thus, the first question studied in this paper is whether

individual perceptions of sentence severity reflect the increased propensity to be incarcerated and the longer sentence lengths faced by adults. Do individuals update their beliefs, and by how much, when they become adults in the eyes of the courts? Anecdotal evidence of such belief updating is provided in a 1983 paper by Glassner et. al. One interviewee said: I try to be as careful as much as I can these days. Cause you know, I know I can go to jail, cause they changed the law. You can go to jail at sixteen. In fact, more than 60% of subjects being interviewed in a medium sized city in New York State indicated that there are big differences in their perceptions of how criminals are treated by the adult and juvenile justice systems. Second, this paper studies whether increased perceptions of punishment severity at the age of majority deter crime. This question is similar in concept to that studied by both Lee and McCrary (2005) and Levitt (1998). Lee and McCrary utilize the discontinuity in expected punishment that occurs when juveniles reach the age of majority in Florida and detailed administrative arrest data to test for a deterrence effect of punishment severity. They find no evidence of a systematic drop in arrest rates at an individuals eighteenth birthday. One would only expect to find such a drop in arrest rates, however, if individuals perceptions of sanction severity also change discontinuously at the age of majority. Changes in perceptions cannot be directly observed by Lee and McCrary; rather, they must rely on changes in individual arrest
2

The age at which individuals are processed in the adult criminal justice system rather than the juvenile justice system is the age of criminal majority and is determined independently by each state. In 38 states, the age of criminal majority is 18; an 18-year old will be tried in the criminal courts. The age of criminal majority is 17 in ten states and 16 in three states.

behavior to make inference about perceptions.

Likewise, Levitt (1998) also does not directly

observe whether perceptions change at the age of criminal majority. But, in contrast to Lee and McCrary, Levitt (1998) finds evidence of deterrence. He concludes that crime rates change significantly at the age of criminal majority. 3 There is a fairly extensive criminology literature that is concerned with the role of perceptions; i.e. how perceptions of the criminal justice system are formed and how such perceptions affect crime rates. This literature includes studies of the deterrent effects of both the perceived certainty and perceived severity of punishment.4 Recent papers also address the determinants of changes in perceptions (Pogarsky, Piquero, and Paternoster, 2004; Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga, 2006). But, to the best of my knowledge, neither the economics literature nor the criminology literature has previously assessed whether perceptions change discontinuously at the age of criminal majority and whether this change in perceptions deters crime. This study ueses self-reported survey data, specifically the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). Using survey data of this sort yields a number of advantages. Respondents are surveyed in multiple rounds about their perceptions of punishment severity as well as self-reported criminal activity, allowing for the identification of within individual changes in perceptions and behavior. In contrast to both Lee and McCrary (2005) and Levitt

(1998), I can directly observe whether perceptions change at the age of criminal majority and I can test for a deterrence effect on criminal behavior, i.e. rather than arrest behavior.
3

Note that while both Lee and McCrary (2005) and Levitt (1998) are looking for changes in behavior around the age of criminal majority, they use very different identification strategies and data sets. As described in the text, Lee and McCrary look for discontinuities in an individuals arrest behavior immediately after he turns 18. Levitt (1998) uses state level panel data and examines how cohort specific arrest rates change at the age of criminal majority. For instance, see Klepper and Nagin (1989), Paternoster (1987), and Horney and Marhsall (1992).

The empirical analysis is conducted in two stages. I first assess how an individuals perceptions of punishment severity change at the age of criminal majority. Basically, an

individuals perceived chance of being sent to jail if they are arrested for stealing a car is regressed on his age and whether he has reached the age of adult jurisdiction; individual fixed effects are also included to control for unobservable heterogeneity. A discontinuous change in perceptions is observed for the entire sample and for males. For males, the perceived chance of jail increases by six percentage points, on average, when the individual becomes an adult in the eyes of the courts, over and above the effect of ageing in general. This estimate is not sensitive to the inclusion of a large set of controls. In addition, evidence that this change in perceived punishment severity can really be attributed to reaching the age of criminal majority is provided in a number of falsification tests; for instance, I consider whether there is a discontinuity in perceptions at an age other than the age of criminal majority. The second stage of the empirical analysis tests whether changes in perceived punishment severity at the age of criminal majority deter crime. Specifically, criminal activity in period t+1 is regressed on perceived punishment severity and individual fixed effects; whether or not the individual has reached the age of criminal majority is used to instrument for perceived punishment severity. Evidence of deterrence is seen for auto thefts, thefts of goods worth more than $50, and drug sales. Changes in perceptions at the age of criminal majority reduce a males propensity to steal a car by 50 percent and his propensity to commit a theft of more than $50 or to sell drugs by approximately 20 percent. In contrast, evidence of deterrence is not observed when considering assaults or arrests rather than crimes. Thus, this paper finds evidence that increases in perceived punishment severity at the age of criminal majority deter some types of criminal activity. What are the policy implications of

such a result? These findings do not imply that handing out more severe punishments, e.g. more and longer jail sentences, will decrease crime. Deterrence would only occur if individuals update their beliefs regarding punishment severity. Rather, it seems to me that the relevant policy

implication is to increase the dispersion of information about the justice system to the population. These results indicate that we could potentially deter crime by making the

population more aware of the differences in punishment severity across the juvenile and adult justice systems. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the empirical design and Section III describes the data, focusing on the measurement of perceived punishment severity. Section IV analyzes whether perceived punishment severity varies discontinuously at the age of criminal majority and Section V tests whether these changes in perceptions deter crime. Section VI concludes.

II. Empirical Methodology The empirical analysis is conducted in two stages. The first stage assesses how an individuals perceptions change at the age of criminal majority. The basic specification that is taken to the data is presented in equation (1), where i, s, and t represent the individual, state of current residence, and survey round, respectively.

(1)

Pist = + 0 Ageist + 1 Adult _ Jurist + X ist + i + ist

Perceived punishment severity, P, is regressed on an individuals age at the time of each survey round as well as a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has reached the age of adult

jurisdiction, Adult_Jur, in his state of residence. For instance, consider a state where the age of criminal majority is 18. For an individual who is 17 at the time of the survey and living in such a state, Adult_Jur would equal zero. However, when the individual is 18 (i.e. in the following survey round), Adult_Jur equals one. Thus, 1, the coefficient on this dummy variable, captures the effect of becoming an adult in the eyes of the courts on an individuals perception of punishment severity, over and above the effect of ageing in general. Individual fixed effects, , are included and control for individual characteristics that are fixed over time. Moreover, including fixed effects implies that the identification of 1 is based on within individual changes in perceptions. In contrast, cross sectional data would identify 1 by comparing perceived punishment severity across individuals, some who have reached the age of criminal majority and some who have not. Lastly, some specifications also control for observed time-varying individual characteristics, X. The second stage of the analysis tests whether changes in perceived punishment severity at the age of criminal majority deter crime. As depicted in equation (2), self-reported criminal activity, C, in period t + 1 is regressed on perceived punishment severity in period t.

(2)

Cist +1 = 0 + 1 Pist + Z ist + i + ist

Crime in period t + 1 is used both to eliminate the issue of simultaneity, i.e. that criminal activity determines perceived punishment severity, and to ensure that we are studying criminal activity after the individual has reached the age of criminal majority. Once again, individual fixed effects are included as well as a vector of time-varying individual characteristics, Z. The individual fixed effects control for fixed unobservable characteristics that are correlated with

both an individuals perceptions of punishment severity as well as his self-reported criminal activity. Whether or not the individual has reached the age of criminal majority, Adult_Jur, is used to instrument for perceived punishment severity, P. Thus, equation (1) is essentially the first-stage equation. Using such an instrumental variables approach only identifies a local treatment effect; specifically, it captures the effects of changes in perceptions at the age of majority on criminal activity.

III. Data The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) consists of 8,984 individuals who were between the ages of 12 and 16 as of December 31, 1996. This paper focuses on survey questions concerned with an individuals perceptions of the criminal justice system as well as his self-reported criminal activity. An individuals perception of punishment severity, the primary variable of interest in this paper, is measured by the following survey question. Suppose you were arrested for stealing a car, what is the percent chance that you would serve time in jail?5 Because this question is only asked during the first five survey rounds, a panel data set of five years is created. Additionally, the created data set includes measures of: (i) individual demographic characteristics, (ii) individual interactions with the justice system, such as arrest and incarceration, (iii) family background, and (iv) geographic characteristics. This last category includes the respondents state of residence, which was

obtained from the NLSY97 Geocoded data. This variable is essential to the analysis, as it allows the appropriate age of criminal majority to be merged into the data. Recall that the age of

Respondents are also asked the percent chance that they would be arrested if they stole a car, the chance that they would be arrested and released without charge, and the chance that they would be arrested and released after paying a fine.

criminal majority is not 18 in all states. During the first survey round, 59 percent of respondents lived in a state where the age of criminal majority is 18; but, approximately 29 percent and 12 percent, respectively, resided in states with ages of criminal majority equal to 16 and 15. Table 1 provides selected summary statistics for each of the five survey rounds; Panel I is for the entire sample and Panel II is restricted to the sample of males. The average age in the sample is 14.3 years in the 1997 survey round and increases to 19.0 in 2001. Thus, just 5.1 percent of the sample has reached the age of criminal majority in 1997 while 87.3 percent would be tried as adults in 2001. These statistics are quite comparable when looking at the sample of males. In contrast, much higher rates of arrest and incarceration are seen for males relative to the entire sample. 10 percent of males were arrested at least once prior to the first survey round while more than 30 percent were arrested prior to the 2001 round; for the entire sample, the comparable numbers are 7.5 and 22, respectively. Likewise, 6.4 percent of males were

incarcerated prior to 2001 but just 4.1 percent of the entire sample. According to self-reports, by the time of the 2001 survey round, almost 5 percent of males stole a car, 25 percent sold drugs, 40 percent committed an assault, and 21 percent stole something worth more than $50. The shaded rows in Panels I and II of Table 1 indicate the average perceived chance of going to jail conditional on being arrested for stealing a car. In the first survey round, the sample believes that there is a 45 percent chance, on average, of going to jail. The average belief for males is slightly higher. The perceived chance of jail increases in each year for both samples. By 2001, the entire sample perceives the chance of jail to be 52.7 percent while the male sample believes the chance of jail is 56.6 percent. Thus, for males, the average perceived chance of jail increases by more than 10 percentage points during these five years. In contrast, there is little change over time in both the perceived chance of arrest and the perceived chance of arrest and

release; for males, both decrease by about one percentage point from the first to last year. While perceptions of punishment severity increase over time, i.e. as the sample ages, one cannot identify from the statistics presented thus far whether this increase is being driven by individuals reaching the age of criminal majority. Figure 1 depicts a histogram of the perceived chance of jail. There are three mass points. Approximately 20 percent of the sample reports that there is no chance of going to jail while another 20 percent thinks that the chance of jail is certain. Lastly, slightly more than 20 percent of the sample believes that there is a fifty-fifty chance of jail. Table 2 begins to explore whether the perceived chance of jail varies with whether the respondents are considered juveniles or adults by the criminal justice system. The first column of the table presents the average perceived chance of jail when looking at all survey rounds simultaneously; each row presents a different sub-sample. On average, males believe that the chance of jail when stealing a car is 51.7 percent. However, juvenile males believe that the chance is 47.9 percent while adult males believe there to be a 56.1 percent chance; this represents an approximately eight percentage point difference between juveniles and adults. Males who have interacted with the justice system believe the chance of jail to be greater. Arrested males believe there to be a 58.3 percent chance of jail while incarcerated males believe there to be a 70 percent chance. Within these groups, however, one can still observe an approximately eight percentage point difference in perceptions between juveniles and adults.

IV. Do Perceptions Vary Discontinuously at the Age of Majority? Graphical Analysis

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Before estimating equation (1), I graphically assess how perceptions change at the age of criminal majority. Figure 2 plots the average perceived chance of jail if arrested for stealing a car versus an individuals age relative to the age of criminal majority. An individuals relative age is zero when it is the individuals first year in the adult criminal justice system; this is depicted by the vertical line in Figure 2. Depending on the individuals state of residence, a

relative age of zero corresponds to individuals who are actually 18, 17, or 16. Average perceived chance of jail is plotted for both the entire sample and just the sample of males. First, one can observe that males perceive the chance of jail to be slightly higher than the entire sample at all relative ages. One can also observe a discontinuity in perceptions when both samples reach the age of criminal majority. Average perceived chance of jail increases by 3.9 percentage points for the entire sample and by 5.5 percentage points for males. Males who are one year younger than the age of criminal majority, on average, perceive the chance of jail to be 49.4 percent; the perceived chance of jail jumps to 54.9 at the age of majority. Note that the average perceived chance of jail for males who were five years younger than the age of majority is 48.1 percent (as compared to 49.4 percent just one year prior to the age of majority). Figure 3 plots the average perceived chance of arrest for stealing a car versus relative age for the sample of males. However, in contrast to the perceived chance of jail, a discontinuity in the perceived chance of arrest is not observed.

Regression Analysis Though the remainder of the analysis is restricted to the sample of males, results are qualitatively similar when using the entire sample, as has already been observed in Figure 2. Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (1) for the sample of males. Additional

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controls, X, are included in each column; all specifications presented in Table 3 include individual fixed effects. The first column of Table 3 controls only for the individuals age and whether he is an adult in the eyes of the courts. On average, the perceived chance of jail increases by 1.2 percentage points per year as the sample gets older. Over and above that, however, the perceived chance of jail for stealing a car is approximately 6.0 percentage points higher for males who have reached the age of criminal majority relative to males who are still juveniles. Column 2 adds in controls for self-reported criminal activity (i.e. thefts of less than $50, thefts of more than $50, assault, and selling drugs) and column 3 controls for interactions with the justice system (i.e. arrest, charge, conviction, and incarceration). The inclusion of these variables has virtually no effect on the coefficient corresponding to Adult_Jur. Likewise, controlling for state fixed effects and time varying individual characteristics, such as whether the individual lives in a metropolitan statistical area or in a two parent household, has no effect on the coefficient of interest. Adult males still believe that the chance of jail if arrested for stealing a car is, on average, six percentage points greater than that perceived by juvenile males.6

Robustness: Falsification Tests Table 4 provides some evidence that this change in perceptions is really attributable to individuals reaching the age of criminal majority. Specifically, Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (1) for a number of sub-samples when using false age of majority dummy variables; each specification includes individual fixed effects and the full set of controls. For
6

It is not surprising that controlling for state fixed effects has no impact on the coefficient corresponding to whether the individual has reached the age of criminal majority. When individual fixed effects are included, there is little variation left in the state dummies; i.e. the only variation is for individuals who move. But, one should note that state fixed effects are quite important when individual fixed effects are omitted and identification comes from across individuals. States that set the age of criminal majority to 16 may also have a number of other laws or policies that affect an individuals perception of punishment severity.

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instance, columns (1) through (4) restrict the analysis to the sample of 1,451 males from states where the age of criminal majority is 17. The first column presents the results when age and Adult_Jur are included; note that in this case, Adult_Jur is equivalent to a dummy variable indicating if the individual is 17 years old or older. Thus, as seen in column (1), the perceived chance of jail significantly increases by 4.5 percentage points when the actual age of criminal majority is reached. The next three columns present the results of using false age of majorities. Column (2) assumes that the age of majority is 16 and tests for a significant change in perceptions at the age of 16 (i.e. one year before such a change should theoretically be observed). However, the perceived chance of jail does not significantly change around this false age of majority. Likewise, a change in perceptions is not observed when treating both 18 and 19 as the age of majority in states where the age of criminal majority is actually 17. Columns (5) through (7) of Table 4 repeat this analysis for individuals from states where the age of majority is 18. Using the appropriate age of majority, in column (5), one observes a 6.5 percentage point increase in the perceived chance of jail. Using 17 or 19 as the age of criminal majority, in columns (6) and (7) respectively, yields just a 2 percentage point increase in the perceived chance of jail; these coefficients are however significant. Lastly, column (8) uses the entire sample and acts if the age of majority is equal to 19 years old. In this case, no significant change in the perceived chance of jail is observed; in fact, the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is 19 or older is equal to 0.11. Thus, there is evidence that one really can attribute the change in the perceived chance of jail to an individual having reached the age of criminal majority.

Heterogeneity

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Before turning to the question of whether this increase in perceived punishment severity at the age of criminal majority deters crime, I explore the change in perceptions a bit more closely. Does the magnitude of the change vary across different sub-samples of the data? Each row of Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (1) for a different sub-sample of males; only the coefficient on whether the individual has reached the age of criminal majority is displayed. The first row corresponds to the entire sample of males, i.e. the baseline results, and indicates a 6 percentage point increase in the perceived chance of jail at the age of criminal majority. Rows (2) through (5) assess whether this effect varies with criminal experience. Two measures of criminal experience are considered: whether an individual reports being arrested and whether an individual reports committing any crimes in a survey round prior to reaching the age of criminal majority. Becoming an adult in the eyes of the court does not affect perceived punishment severity for individuals who were previously arrested, but increases the perceived chance of jail by 6.4 percentage points for individuals who were not arrested. When considering criminal activity rather than arrest, becoming an adult significantly increases perceived punishment severity for both criminals and non-criminals; the point estimates, however, are larger for the non-criminals. Why does reaching the age of adult jurisdiction have less of an influence on the criminally experienced than the non-criminally experienced? This is perhaps counterintuitive, as one might figure experienced criminals to be more knowledgeable of the justice system. One possible explanation is that individuals who are criminally experienced, and particularly those who have been arrested, become eligible for the adult courts at a younger age than the age of criminal majority. For instance, in many states, juveniles who commit serious enough crimes can be transferred to the adult courts. A number of states also have a policy that says once an adult, always an adult.

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Rows (6) through (8) address the role played by an individuals initial level of perceptions.7 Row (6) considers the 1,264 males who believe the chance of jail to be less than 50 percent in the survey round immediately prior to reaching the age of criminal majority. For these individuals, becoming an adult increases the perceived chance of jail by approximately 37 percentage points on average. In contrast, the perceived chance of jail decreases 24 percentage points upon becoming an adult for individuals who initially believe the chance to be greater than 50 percent. In some sense, these individuals have no where to go but down; it is, however, somewhat surprising that this decrease is observed rather than a stagnation in perceptions. Lastly, becoming an adult results in a 6.1 percentage point increase in the perceived chance of jail for the 667 males who initially believe the chance of jail to be 50 percent. Rows (9) through (11) display the results when grouping states according to the age of criminal majority. The coefficients on Adult_Jur are 6.4, 4.4, and 8.7 in states where the age of majority is equal to 18, 17, and 16, respectively. Thus, the point estimate is largest in those states with the lowest age of criminal majority, i.e. 16. One possible explanation is that states with lower ages of majority also have harsher punishments, which are better known to the public. This story is not completely supported by the data, however, as the estimated effect is larger in the age 18 states than the age 17 states. Lastly, rows (12) through (15) consider how the relative punitiveness of the adult justice system to the juvenile system affects the relationship between becoming an adult and perceived punishment severity. Similar to Levitt (1998), I measure relative punitiveness of the adult

For instance, Pogarsky, Piquero, and Paternoster (2004) find that the manner in which new information affects the perceived certainty of punishment depends on the initial level of perceived certainty, i.e. before the new information is received.

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system to the juvenile system by calculating the ratio of adult incarceration rates to juvenile incarceration rates, as depicted in equation (3), for the initial year of the survey.8

(3)

Relative Punitivenesss =

# Incar Adultss # Arrested Adultss # Incar Juveniless # Arrested Juveniless

A high measure of relative punitiveness indicates that the adult system is quite harsh relative to the juvenile system. Thus, one would expect that reaching the age of criminal majority has a larger impact on the perceived chance of jail in states with a high relative punitiveness measure. I create four groups of states that are defined by the quartiles of the relative punitiveness measure. Somewhat surprisingly, the estimated effect of becoming an adult in the eyes of the courts on the perceived chance of jail is fairly homogeneous across these four groups of states.

V. Do Changes in Perceptions Around the Age of Majority Deter Crime?

Deterrence of Auto Theft?

The previous section provides evidence that males, on average, update their beliefs regarding the chance of jail if arrested for stealing a car when they reach the age of criminal majority. Does this change in the perceived chance of jail deter criminal behavior? I first address this question for auto thefts, as this is the crime category to which the survey question regarding perceptions specifically refers. Table 6 presents the results of estimating equation (2) when the dependent variable is whether the respondent reports stealing a car in period t + 1; all

Adult and juvenile arrest counts come from the FBIs annual publication, Crime in the United States 1997. However, arrest data in 1997 (or in an adjacent year) were not found in this publication for the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, New Hampshire and Vermont. Adult incarceration statistics are found in the Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 1997 Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin. The 1997 number of juveniles incarcerated comes from the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook.

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specifications include individual fixed effects. When instrumenting for the perceived chance of jail with whether the individual has reached the age of criminal majority, the estimated coefficient on the perceived chance of jail is significant and equal to -0.001. That is, if the perceived chance of jail increases by one percentage point upon reaching the age of criminal majority, then the individual is 0.1 percentage point less likely to steal a car in the next period. As can be seen in columns (1) though (6), this estimate is not sensitive to the inclusion of a vector of controls. Column (7), however, indicates that the deterrence effect is not observed when the perceived chance of jail is not instrumented for with having reached the age of criminal majority. That is, there is only evidence of a local effect, i.e. that the change in perceptions at the age of majority deters auto theft. How big is this deterrence effect? On average, the perceived chance of jail increases by six percentage points at the age of criminal majority: thus, this translates into a 0.6 percentage point decrease in an individuals propensity to steal a car. Given that 1.2 percent of males report stealing a car, this deterrence effect is actually quite large.9 Changes in perceptions at the age of criminal majority reduce an individuals propensity to steal a car by 50 percent.

Deterrence of Other Crimes?

NLSY97 only asks the respondents perceived chance of jail if arrested for stealing a car, as opposed to being arrested for committing other crimes. However, it is possible that an individuals perceived chance of jail changes at the age of criminal majority for other crimes in a manner similar to that for auto theft. Table 7 estimates equation (2) for three additional crime categories: thefts worth more than $50, drug sales, and assaults. Odd numbered columns

instrument for the perceived chance of jail while even numbered specifications do not.
9

This estimate is calculated by looking at observations for all males in all survey rounds.

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Columns (1) and (3) indicate that increases in the perceived chance of jail at the age of criminal majority deter thefts and drug sales, with significant point estimates of -0.002 and 0.003, respectively. Once again, evidence of deterrence is not observed when using all of the variation in perceptions rather than just the variation at the age of majority. In addition, evidence of deterrence is not found for assaults. The deterrence effects estimated for thefts and drug sales are sizeable, though not as large as that seen for auto thefts. Specifically, the six percentage point increase in the perceived chance of jail at the age of majority decreases an individuals propensity to commit a theft of more than $50 by 1.2 percentage points and an individuals propensity to sell drugs by 1.8 percentage points. The average propensities of a male to commit a theft worth more than $50 and to sell drugs are 6.1 and 8.5 percent, respectively. Thus, reaching the age of majority reduces an individuals propensity to commit such a theft or sell drugs by approximately 20 percent. While this deterrence effect is lower than that observed for auto thefts, this could be due to the fact that the survey questions specifically targeted auto thefts.

Heterogeneity in Deterrent Effects

The results presented thus far indicate that the increased perceived chance of jail at the age of criminal majority deters auto thefts, thefts of more than $50, and drug sales. These findings however are based on the entire sample of males, including individuals who have never participated in any kind of criminal activity. Table 8 presents the results for the four categories of crimes when considering sub-samples of males who are more or less criminally experienced. The first row presents the baseline deterrent effects estimated for the entire sample in each of the four crime categories. The next two rows restrict the sample to males who were and were not

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arrested prior to the age of criminal majority. The last two rows consider males who do and do not report committing any types of crime prior to the age of criminal majority. Though the point estimates are larger in the arrested than the non-arrested sample, they are also more imprecise as the sample size is much smaller. However, when looking at selfreported criminal activity (of any type), the deterrent effects are approximately double those seen for the baseline specification. Of course, no evidence of deterrence is seen when looking at the sample of individuals who report no criminal activity prior to the age of criminal majority. Thus, it appears to be individuals who report criminal activity, but who are not arrested, who are driving the estimated deterrent effects.

Can These Results Be Reconciled with Lee and McCrary (2005)?

To isolate the deterrence impact of more severe sentences, Lee and McCrary (2005) use administrative felony arrest data in Florida, where the age of criminal majority is 18. They do not find a significant drop in arrests when individuals turn 18. That is, they do not find evidence that more severe punishments deter crime. In contrast, I find that reaching the age of criminal majority significantly deters auto theft, thefts of more than $50, and drug sales. Can these two sets of findings be reconciled? One factor to note is that Lee and McCrary restrict their analysis to the study of index crimes. Thus, the crime categories studied in both papers are not completely comparable; nonindex crimes, such as drug sales and petty theft, are included in the NLSY97 analysis. Thus, it may simply be the case that increased punishment severity deters only relatively minor crimes. Another potential explanation of the differential results may be that Lee and McCrary study arrests while I study self-reported criminal activity. It could be the case that increased

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punishment severity deters crime, but that this deterrence effect is not reflected in arrests. The relationship between self-reported criminal activities and arrest in the NLSY97 sample is perhaps not as strong as one would expect. For instance, the proportions of individuals who report committing any crime or a serious crime decrease in every survey round.10 For instance, as can be seen in Table 1, the proportion of males who report committing any crime since the date of the last interview decreases monotonically from 56.8 percent to 22.8 percent. Likewise, the proportion who report committing a serious crime decreases from 29.7 percent to 16.4 percent. In contrast, the proportion of individuals who are arrested decreases slightly from the first period to the last (10 to 9.4 percent), but this does not occur in a monotonic manner. For the most part, the same proportion of individuals is arrested in each survey round. In addition, the correlation coefficient between arrest and whether the individual reports any crime is just 0.25. To assess whether the change in perceptions deters arrests, I estimate equation (2) when the dependent variable is whether the individual is arrested in period t + 1, rather than whether he commits a crime. As can be seen in Table 8, there is no evidence that increases in perceived punishment severity at the age of criminal majority impact arrests. Thus, looking at just arrests would lead one to conclude that increased punishment severity does not deter crime, while one would reach the opposite conclusion when studying criminal activity directly.

Robustness: Distinguishing Deterrence from Incapacitation

A challenge commonly encountered in the economics of crime literature is the ability to distinguish between deterrence and incapacitation, i.e. the decrease in crime that results from

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The any crime category includes destruction of property, thefts of less than $50, thefts of more than $50, other property crimes, assault, drug sales, and car theft. The any serious crime category is restricted to include thefts of more than $50, assault, drug sales, and car theft. Note that for the first survey round, these variables capture whether the individual committed these crimes at any time prior to the date of the first survey (i.e. not just in the last year).

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isolating offenders from society (National Research Council, 1978). The results presented thus far in this paper indicate that increases in the perceived chance of jail at the age of criminal majority deter auto thefts, thefts of more than $50, and selling drugs. Is it possible that these estimated deterrence effects are actually capturing incapacitation? That is, are individuals committing less crime just after reaching the age of majority because they are incarcerated and unable to commit crimes in society? Table 10 presents evidence that incapacitation is not driving the estimated deterrence effects. The first three columns consider the case of auto theft. Column (1) presents the results of estimating equation (2), yielding a significant coefficient of -.001 on the perceived chance of jail. Included in this initial specification is whether the individual is incarcerated in period t. Controlling for such incarceration would not, however, capture incapacitation in period t+1, i.e. when criminal activity is being measured. Column (2) adds in a control for whether the individual is incarcerated at the time of the interview. This coefficient is negative and However, its

significant, suggesting that incarceration does have an incapacitation effect.

inclusion does not impact the estimated coefficient on the perceived chance of jail. Column (3) controls for whether the individual is incarcerated at all during period t+1. The resulting coefficient is actually significant and positive, perhaps capturing the fact that individuals who report auto thefts in t+1 are also more likely to be incarcerated in that period. But, once again, controlling for this measure does not impact the estimated deterrence effect of increasing perceived punishment severity. Thus, one can infer from these results that incarceration at the time of the interview or during the next period does not vary discontinuously at the age of criminal majority.

21

The remaining columns of Table 10 replicate this analysis for the other crime categories: thefts of more than $50, selling drugs, and committing an assault. Incarceration at the time of the interview has a negative coefficient associated with it in all specifications, though it is not always significant. So, there does appear to be some incapacitation. However, controlling for such incarceration or incarceration in period t+1 does not impact the estimated deterrent effects of changes in perceptions at the age of criminal majority for any of the crime categories.

VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications This paper studies the effects of reaching the age of criminal majority on both perceptions of punishment severity and criminal activity. On average, males believe that the chance of going to jail if arrested for stealing a car increases by approximately six percentage points at the age of criminal majority. Does this increase in perceived punishment severity deter crime? Evidence of deterrence is seen for auto theft, thefts of more than $50, and drug sales. However, such evidence is not observed when considering assaults or looking at arrests rather than criminal activity. Likewise, Lee and McCrary (2005) find no evidence that harsher punishments deter crime when looking at arrests. Finding that individuals are deterred from crime when they reach the age of criminal majority does not imply that handing out more severe punishments, e.g. more and longer jail sentences, will decrease crime. Such deterrence would only occur if individuals update their beliefs regarding punishment severity. Rather, the more relevant policy implication may be to provide the population of potential criminals with more knowledge of the differences in punishment severity across the juvenile and adult justice systems.

22

References: Becker, Gary. (1968) Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of Political Economy, 76: 169-217. Glassner, Barry, Margret Ksander, Bruce Berg, and Bruce Johnson. (1983) A Note on the Deterrent Effect of Juvenile vs. Adult Jurisdiction, Social Problems, 31(2). Grogger, Jeffrey (1991) Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, Economic Inquiry, 29: 297-301. Horney, Julie and Ineke Marshall (1992) Risk Perceptions Among Serious Offenders: The Role of Crime and Punishment, Criminology, 30(4). Klepper, Steven and Daniel Nagin (1989) The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, Criminology, 27(4). Lee, David and Justin McCrary (2005) Crime, Punishment, and Myopia, NBER Working Paper 11491. Levitt, Steven (1997) Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, American Economic Review, 87(3). Levitt, Steven (1998) Juvenile Crime and Punishment, The Journal of Political Economy, 106(6). Lochner, Lance (2005) Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System, NBER Working Paper #9474. Forthcoming American Economic Review. Matsueda, Ross, Derek Kreager, and David Huizinga (2006) Deterring Delinquents: A Rational Choice Model of Theft and Violence, American Sociological Review, 71: 95-122. Myers, Samuel (1983) Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Punishment vs. Deterrent Effects, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98: 157-66. The National Research Council. (1978) Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates Eds. Alfred Blumstein et. al., National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. Paternoster, Raymond (1987) The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, Justice Quarterly, 4(2). Pogarsky, Greg, Alex Piquero, and Ray Paternoster (2004) Modeling Change in Perceptions about Sanction Threats: The Neglected Linkage in Deterrence Theory, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 20(4). Tauchen, Helen, Ann Dryden Witte, and Harriet Griesinger (1994) Criminal Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort, Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(3). 23

Trumbull, William (1989) Estimations of the Economic Model of Crime Using Aggregate and Individual Level Data, Southern Economic Journal, 94: 423-4369. Witte, Ann Dryden (1980) Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94(1).

24

Table 1. Selected Summary Statistics 1997 Survey Round Mean Panel I: Entire Sample % Chance Arrest % Chance Arrest and Release % Chance Arrest and Jail Age % in Adult Jurisdiction % Male % Black % Hispanic % Ever Arrested % Ever Incarcerated % Ever Steal Car % Ever Sell Drugs % Ever Assault % Ever Steal > $50 % Any Crime % Any Major Crime % Any Arrest

1998 Mean

1999 Mean

2000 Mean

2001 Mean

58.7 32.8 45.0 14.3 5.1 51.2 25.9 21.0 7.5 0.5 1.3 6.6 18.3 7.5 48.7 23.8 7.5

57.5 31.4 46.5 16.0 29.2 51.2 26.3 21.2 12.9 1.7 2.2 11.1 25.2 10.9 29.9 18.8 7.0

61.3 33.7 50.0 16.9 48.1 51.1 25.9 21.0 15.9 2.4 2.6 14.2 28.9 13.2 24.7 16.1 6.3

59.7 33.5 51.8 18.0 69.4 51.1 26.2 20.9 19.4 3.4 2.8 16.9 31.1 14.9 21.3 14.6 6.9

58.3 34.0 52.7 19.0 87.3 50.7 25.7 21.2 22.1 4.1 3.2 19.0 32.6 15.9 18.0 12.7 6.3

Panel II: Males % Chance Arrest % Chance Arrest and Release % Chance Arrest and Jail Age % in Adult Jurisdiction % Black % Hispanic % Ever Arrested % Ever Incarcerated % Ever Steal Car % Ever Sell Drugs % Ever Assault % Ever Steal > $50 % Any Crime % Any Major Crime % Any Arrest

58.8 30.5 46.4 14.3 5.0 25.3 21.0 10.0 0.7 1.7 8.5 23.5 9.9 56.8 29.7 10.0

56.4 28.9 48.4 15.9 29.0 25.8 21.1 17.0 2.6 3.1 13.8 31.2 14.3 35.9 23.1 9.8

60.4 30.3 52.2 16.9 47.6 25.4 20.9 21.7 3.6 3.8 18.3 35.5 17.5 29.3 20.0 9.3

58.6 29.3 55.5 18.0 69.7 25.5 20.9 26.4 5.3 4.1 22.0 38.1 19.4 27.1 19.0 10.3

57.8 29.6 56.6 18.9 87.7 24.8 21.2 30.1 6.4 4.6 24.5 40.2 20.6 22.8 16.4 9.4

Summary statistics are presented for those individuals for whom % chance of arrest and jail is not missing. Variables beginning % Ever indicate the percentage of the sample that was ever arrested, for instance; i.e. prior to the relevant survey round. Variables beginning % Any indicate the percentage of the sample that was arrested, for instance, at least once since the date of the last interview.

25

Table 2. Average Perceived Chance of Jail for Different Sub-Samples of Males

All Rounds All Males Juvenile Jurisdiction Adult Jurisdiction Ever Arrested Males Juvenile Jurisdiction Adult Jurisdiction Ever Incarcerated Males Juvenile Jurisdiction Adult Jurisdiction Males Who Ever Stole a Car Juvenile Jurisdiction Adult Jurisdiction 51.7 % 47.9 56.1 58.3 53.7 61.1 70.0 63.6 72.4 58.7 54.5 61.7 1998 Round 48.4 % 46.5 53.2 54.0 51.1 59.2 68.9 62.0 78.1 55.6 55.6 55.6 2000 Round 55.5 % 51.7 57.3 61.7 60.1 62.2 71.5 64.9 72.8 65.4 63.5 65.9

26

Table 3. The Determinants of Perceived Chance of Jail for Males

(1) Age Adult_Jur any_stlls50 1.227** (0.196) 5.978** (0.797) (2) 1.195** (0.203) 6.051** (0.798) -0.568 (0.826) -0.425 (1.229) 0.786 (0.843) -1.602 (1.081) (3) 1.123** (0.203) 6.013** (0.798) -0.830 (0.828) -1.643 (1.246) 0.516 (0.846) -2.204* (1.089) 1.756 (1.516) 1.180 (2.113) 4.587* (2.204) 3.554 (2.625) (4) 1.100** (0.204) 6.017** (0.801) -0.775 (0.829) -1.566 (1.247) 0.412 (0.848) -2.149* (1.091) 1.834 (1.519) 1.135 (2.117) 4.702* (2.209) 3.614 (2.629) (5) 1.108** (0.205) 5.978** (0.803) -0.848 (0.832) -1.464 (1.251) 0.382 (0.851) -2.122 (1.095) 1.801 (1.525) 1.138 (2.126) 4.552* (2.216) 3.802 (2.638) 0.331 (1.843) 0.150 (0.951) YES NO 20205 4589 YES NO 20160 4589 YES NO 20126 4589 YES YES 20126 4589 YES YES 20043 4589

any_stlmor50

any_assault

any_sdrug

any_arrest

any_charge

any_conv

any_incar

msa

live_2parents Individual Fixed Effects State Fixed Effects Observations # of individuals

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Individual fixed effects are included in all specifications.

27

Table 4. Robustness Check Is There a Discontinuity in Perceived Chance of Jail at False Age Cutoffs? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) States in which the Age of Criminal States in which the Age of Criminal Majority is 17 Majority is 18
Age Age >= 16? 1.671** (0.405) 2.061** (0.378) 2.961 (1.525) 4.542** (1.521) 2.161 (1.471) -1.176 (1.519) 5977 1451 5977 1451 5977 1451 5977 1451 11765 2756 11765 2756 6.459** (1.037) 2.420* (1.065) 11765 2756 2.142* (1.076) 2.214** (0.365) 2.720** (0.329) 0.956** (0.260) 1.615** (0.289) 1.739** (0.234)

(8)

All States
2.156** (0.178)

Age >= 17? Age >= 18?

Age >= 19? Observations Number of Individuals

0.111 (0.814) 20126 4589

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% The dependent variable in each specification is the perceived chance of a jail if arrested for stealing a car. All specifications include individual fixed effects, the full set of varying individual controls, and state fixed effects. For states in which the age of criminal majority is 17, Age >= 17? is equivalent to Adult_Jur. Likewise, for states where the age of criminal majority is 18, Age >= 18? is equivalent to Adult_Jur.

28

Table 5. Heterogeneity in the Effect of Age of Criminal Majority on Perceived Punishment Severity
Row (1) Sample All Males (Baseline) Coefficient on Adult_Jur 5.978** Standard Error 0.803 Number of Individuals 4589 Number of Observations 20043

Heterogeneity by Criminal Experience (2) Arrested Prior to Age of Criminal Majority (3) (4) (5) Not Arrested Prior to Age of Criminal Majority Report Crime Prior to Age of Criminal Majority Dont Report Crime Prior to Age of Criminal Majority

3.732 6.430** 5.621** 7.042**

2.096 0.906 1.005 1.455

817 3543 2896 1464

3568 15564 12872 6260

Heterogeneity by Initial Perceptions (6) (7) (8) Perceived Chance Jail Less than 50% in Year Prior to Age of Majority Perceived Chance Jail Equal to 50% in Year Prior to Age of Majority Perceived Chance Jail Greater than 50% in Year Prior to Age of Majority 36.771** 6.114** -24.152** 1.399 1.728 1.386 1264 667 1278 5806 3055 5937

Heterogeneity by State Age of Criminal Majority (9) (10) (11) States with Age of Criminal Majority = 18 States with Age of Criminal Majority = 17 States with Age of Criminal Majority = 16 6.419** 4.426** 8.730** 1.040 1.529 2.450 2755 1451 601 11722 5940 2381

Heterogeneity by Relative Punitiveness of Juvenile to Adult Systems (12) (13) Low (Quartile 1) ratio of adult to juvenile incarceration rates Moderate (Quartile 2) ratio of adult to juvenile incarceration rates Medium (Quartile 3) ratio of adult to juvenile incarceration rates High (Quartile 4) ratio of adult to juvenile incarceration rates 5.877** 6.999** 1.538 1.787 1335 1074 5492 4273

(14)

4.687**

1.707

1071

4394

(15)

6.384**

1.544

1383

5634

All specifications included the full set of controls and individual fixed effects. The dependent variable is perceived chance of jail if arrested for stealing a car. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Relative punitiveness of juvenile to adult justice systems is measured as the ratio of adult incarceration rates to juvenile incarceration rates. The 25th percentile ratio is 1.66, the median ratio is 2.47, and the 75th percentile ratio is 3.22. Note that the higher the ratio, the more drastically punishment differs between the juvenile and adult systems.

29

Table 6. Do Changes in the Perceived Chance of Jail Around the Age of Criminal Majority Deter Auto Thefts? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Perceived Chance of Jail -0.001** (0.000) Age Any_assault Any_stlmor50 Any_Sell Drugs Any_arrest Any_charge Any_conv Any_incar MSA Live With 2 Parents Enrolled

-0.001* (0.000) -0.000 (0.001)

-0.001* (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) -0.017** (0.004) -0.001 (0.004)

-0.001* (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) -0.017** (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) 0.007 (0.006) -0.010 (0.008) 0.028** (0.009) -0.037** (0.011)

-0.001* (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.003) -0.017** (0.005) -0.001 (0.004) 0.007 (0.006) -0.010 (0.008) 0.028** (0.009) -0.036** (0.011)

-0.001* (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.003) -0.017** (0.005) -0.001 (0.004) 0.008 (0.006) -0.011 (0.008) 0.028** (0.009) -0.030** (0.011) 0.007 (0.008) 0.002 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003)

-0.000 (0.000) -0.002** (0.001) -0.001 (0.003) -0.016** (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.005 (0.005) -0.011 (0.008) 0.021* (0.008) -0.034** (0.010) 0.008 (0.007) 0.002 (0.004) 0.005 (0.003)

State FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 2SLS YES YES YES YES YES YES NO Observations 15361 15361 15326 15296 15296 15182 15182 Number of 4401 4401 4400 4397 4397 4395 4395 individuals Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The sample is restricted to males. All specifications except for the last column instrument for the perceived chance of jail with whether the individual has reached the age of criminal majority. The dependent variable in each specification is whether the individual self-reports committing an auto theft in period t+1. 30

Table 7. Do Changes in the Perceived Chance of Jail Around the Age of Criminal Majority Deter Thefts of Items of More than $50, Drug Sales, and Assaults? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dependent Variable: Steal > $50 Drug Sales Assaults
Perceived Chance of Jail -0.002* (0.001) -0.004 (0.003) 0.010 (0.007) -0.166** (0.009) 0.029** (0.009) 0.013 (0.012) -0.023 (0.017) 0.061** (0.019) -0.039 (0.022) 0.010 (0.016) -0.005 (0.008) 0.009 (0.007) YES YES 15115 4386 -0.000* (0.000) -0.008** (0.001) 0.010 (0.006) -0.163** (0.009) 0.034** (0.008) 0.008 (0.011) -0.024 (0.016) 0.047** (0.017) -0.047* (0.020) 0.010 (0.015) -0.005 (0.007) 0.013* (0.006) YES NO 15115 4386 -0.003** (0.001) 0.011** (0.003) 0.016* (0.008) 0.060** (0.012) -0.161** (0.011) 0.036* (0.015) -0.025 (0.021) 0.030 (0.024) -0.007 (0.027) -0.001 (0.020) -0.003 (0.010) 0.027** (0.009) YES YES 15107 4384 -0.000 (0.000) 0.004** (0.002) 0.017* (0.007) 0.064** (0.010) -0.153** (0.010) 0.029* (0.013) -0.027 (0.019) 0.010 (0.021) -0.019 (0.025) -0.000 (0.018) -0.002 (0.009) 0.032** (0.008) YES NO 15107 4384 0.000 (0.001) -0.020** (0.003) -0.162** (0.009) 0.041** (0.012) -0.005 (0.012) 0.003 (0.016) 0.015 (0.023) 0.024 (0.026) -0.073* (0.029) 0.038 (0.022) 0.000 (0.011) 0.024** (0.009) YES YES 15118 4386 -0.000 (0.000) -0.020** (0.002) -0.162** (0.009) 0.041** (0.012) -0.005 (0.011) 0.003 (0.016) 0.015 (0.023) 0.025 (0.024) -0.073* (0.029) 0.038 (0.022) 0.000 (0.011) 0.024** (0.009) YES NO 15118 4386

Age Any_assault Any_stlmor50 Any_Sell Drugs Any_arrest Any_charge Any_conv Any_incar MSA Live With 2 Parents Enrolled State FE 2SLS Observations Number of individuals

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The sample is restricted to males. Odd numbered columns instrument for the perceived chance of jail with whether the individual has reached the age of criminal majority. Even numbered columns are estimated using OLS. The dependent variable in each specification is listed at the top of the relevant column and is measured as of period t+1.

31

Table 8. Heterogeneity: Coefficient on Perceived Chance of Jail for Selected Subsamples Characterizing Criminal Experience (1) (2) (3) (4) Auto Steal > Drug Dependent Variable = Theft $50 Sales Assault
Baseline Entire Sample Arrested Prior to Age of Criminal Majority -0.001* (0.000) -0.016 (0.021) -0.002* (0.001) -0.025 (0.028) -0.003** (0.001) -0.028 (0.032) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.013)

# obs. 15,361

2,695

Not Arrested Prior to Age of Criminal Majority

-0.001* (0.000)

-0.002* (0.001)

-0.002 (0.001)

-0.001 (0.001)

11,823

Report Crime Prior to Age of Criminal Majority

-0.002* (0.001)

-0.004* (0.002)

-0.006** (0.002)

0.000 (0.002)

9,790

Dont Report Crime Prior to Age of Criminal Majority

-0.000 (0.000)

0.001 (0.001)

-0.000 (0.001)

-0.001 (0.002)

4,728

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The sample is restricted to males. Each cell presents the coefficient that corresponds to the perceived chance of jail variable in separate regressions. In each specification, the perceived chance of jail is instrumented for with whether the individual has reached the age of criminal majority. The dependent variable in each specification is listed at the top of the relevant column and is measured as of period t+1. The full set of controls, including individual fixed effects, are included in each specification. The regressions only differ by the sub-sample included and the dependent variable.

32

Table 9. Is Evidence of Deterrence Observed When Looking at Arrest Rather than Crime? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Perceived Chance of Jail

-0.001 -0.001 (0.001) (0.001) 0.002 (0.003)

-0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 0.010 (0.008) 0.005 (0.011) 0.008 (0.011)

-0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.003) 0.022** (0.008) 0.036** (0.012) 0.028* (0.011) -0.167** (0.015) 0.015 (0.021) 0.012 (0.024) -0.108** (0.027)

-0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 0.022** (0.008) 0.035** (0.012) 0.028* (0.011) -0.169** (0.015) 0.015 (0.021) 0.012 (0.024) -0.111** (0.027)

-0.000 (0.001) 0.003 (0.003) 0.022** (0.008) 0.038** (0.012) 0.027* (0.011) -0.173** (0.015) 0.024 (0.021) 0.003 (0.024) -0.108** (0.027) -0.002 (0.020) 0.013 (0.010)

-0.000 (0.000) 0.003 (0.002) 0.022** (0.008) 0.039** (0.011) 0.027* (0.011) -0.173** (0.015) 0.023 (0.021) 0.001 (0.023) -0.109** (0.027) -0.002 (0.020) 0.013 (0.010) 0.015 (0.008) YES NO 15118 4386

Age Any_assault Any_stlmor50 Any_Sell Drugs Any_arrest Any_charge Any_conv Any_incar MSA Live With 2 Parents Enrolled State FE 2SLS Observations Number of individuals NO YES 15295 4394

0.014 (0.009) NO YES 15295 4394 NO YES 15261 4392 NO YES 15231 4389 YES YES 15231 4389 YES YES 15118 4386

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The sample is restricted to males. All specifications except for the last column instrument for the perceived chance of jail with whether the individual has reached the age of criminal majority. The dependent variable in each specification is whether the individual self-reports being arrested in period t+1.

33

Table 10. Can Deterrence be Distinguished from Incapacitation?

(1) (2) Auto Theft Perceived Chance of Jail (3) (4) (5) Steal > $50 (6) (7) (8) Drug Sales (9) (10) (11) Assault (12)

-0.001* (0.000)

-0.001* (0.000)

-0.001* (0.000)

-0.002* (0.001)

-0.002* (0.001)

-0.002* (0.001)

-0.003** (0.001)

-0.003** (0.001)

-0.003** (0.001)

0.000 (0.001)

0.000 (0.001)

0.000 (0.001)

Any_Incar t

-0.030** (0.011)

-0.019 (0.012)

0.017 (0.012)

-0.039 (0.022)

-0.025 (0.024)

0.029 (0.024)

-0.007 (0.027)

0.018 (0.030)

0.044 (0.030)

-0.073* (0.029)

-0.048 (0.032)

-0.011 (0.033)

Incarcerated at Time of Interview

-0.040* (0.017)

-0.043* (0.017) 0.139** (0.008)

-0.050 (0.036)

-0.054 (0.035) 0.213** (0.016)

-0.088* (0.044)

-0.089* (0.044) 0.105** (0.020)

-0.088 (0.047)

-0.091 (0.047) 0.149** (0.022)

Any_Incar t + 1

State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 2SLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Observations 15182 15182 15182 15115 15115 15115 15107 15107 15107 15118 15118 15118 # Individuals 4395 4395 4395 4386 4386 4386 4384 4384 4384 4386 4386 4386 Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The analysis is restricted to the sample of males. Each specification presented above includes the full set of controls as well as individual and state fixed effects. The dependent variable in each specification is listed at the top of the relevant column and is measured as of period t+1.

34

Figure 1. Distribution of Beliefs about the Chance of Going to Jail when Arrested for Stealing a Car

g
.2

.15
Fraction

.1

.05

0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

% Chance of Jail

Note Figure is based on observations from all survey rounds.

35

Figure 2. Perceived Chance of Jail If Arrested for Stealing a Car Relative to the Age of Criminal Majority

% chance of jail when steal car

60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4

Relative Age Entire Sample Males

Note - Relative Age of 0 indicates first year individual is in adult system

36

Figure 3. Males Perceived Chance of Arrest for Stealing a Car Relative to the Age of Criminal Majority
60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4

% chance of arrest when steal car

Relative Age Note - Relative Age of 0 indicates first year individual is in adult system

37