DUE PROCESS

Q Panfilo Villaruel Jr. is the former Assistant Secretary of the ATO ordered the detail of three (3) employees to another office. Despite pleas for their return, he refused, hence, they filed a petition for mandamus to recall them to their mother unit. He was represented by counsel, the OSG, but no answer was filed, hence, a motion to declare him in default. Judgment was rendered. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed. It became final and executory. He contended that the judgment was void for lack of due process as he was not given the opportunity to be heard. Is his contention correct? Why?

Answer:

No. Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard

but this opportunity was not denied Villaruel. Throughout the proceedings, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, gave him the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. His former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, binds him, but the negligence of the OSG could not relieve him of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory. (Producers Bank of the Phils. vs. CA. et. al., G.R. No. 126670, April 17, 2002). It is the duty of a party litigant to make inquiries to his counsel on matters concerning his case. A party litigant bears the responsibility of contacting his lawyer periodically to apprise himself of the progress of the case. A lawyers negligence binds a party litigant who must suffer the consequences of such negligence. (Panfilo Villaruel, Jr. vs. Fernando, et. al., G.R. No. 136726 September 24, 2003).

RULE 39 Q - A judgment was rendered holding Panfilo Villaruel, Jr. liable for damages for failure to heed the order recalling employees whom he detailed to another office. It became trial and executory. In the meantime, the Ombudsman issued a resolution declaring that such employees were guilty of serious misconduct. He invoked the resolution as a supervening event to prevent the judgment ordering him to pay damages. Is his contention correct? Why?

Answer:

No. Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality

becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. True, this rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. (Cabrias vs. Hon. Midpantao, et. al., 220 Phil. 41 (1985). The Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of the trial courts decision. Therefore, the resolution of the Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of the trial court. Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding the employee guilty of violating Section 7 (d) of RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court holding Villaruel liable for damages. The action filed by Villaruel before the Ombudsman is completely different from the action instituted by the employees before the trial court. The two actions, which are clearly separate and distinct from each other, presented two different causes of action. Villaruels cause of action arose from the employees cause of action which resulted from Villaruels refusal to recall respondents to their mother unit at

CATC. In the administrative case before the Ombudsman, the issue was whether the employees were guilty of violating RA 6713. In contrast, the issue in the civil action before the trial court was whether the employees were entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandamus and damages. The findings of the Ombudman did not render of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable. (Villaruel, Jr. vs. Fernando, et. al., G.R. NO. 136726, September 24, 2003).

Q The Mayor of Caloocan City abolished the positions of certain officials. It was questioned as illegal. Judgment was rendered declaring the abolition illegal, hence, there was an order to pay their back wages. In fact, there has been payment. An ordinance was passed signed by the Mayor appropriating funds to answer for the wages. The amount was deposited with the PNB, but there was refusal to pay an employee. A writ of execution was issued, hence, the sheriff garnished the amount deposited with the PNB. It was contended that such funds were public funds, hence, exempt from garnishment. Is the contention correct? Why?

Answer:

No, because the funds have already been appropriated for the

purpose of paying the back salaries, hence, it ceased to be part of the mass of public funds. A valid appropriation of public funds lifts its exemption from execution. The rule is that public funds are exempt from garnishment. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In

such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. (City of Caloocan, et. al. vs. Hon. Mauro Allarde, et. al., G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003).

Q Are funds deposited with the PNB and other official depository funds of the government subject to garnishment? Explain.

Answer:

As a rule, no. The rule is and has always been that all government

funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depository of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. (Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego, 31 SCRA 616). Even though the rule as to immunity of State from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the State is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the State. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for the satisfaction thereof. The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. (Providence Washington Insurance Company

vs. Republic, 29 SCRA 598; City of Caloocan, et al. vs. Hon. Allarde, et al., G. R. No. 10721, September 10, 2003).

ELECTION LAWS Q Florentino Baustista, a candidate for Mayor of Kawit, Cavite charged Mayor Federico Poblete with violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code, otherwise known as vote-buying. The Law Department of the Comelec filed the information. The judge ordered a re-investigation invoking Lozano vs. Yorac, 203 SCRA 270 and Nolasco vs. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 780. In the meantime, Gerardo Macapagal and Inocencio Rodelas filed a complaint for violation of Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code for vote-selling against Florentino Bautista. The Provincial prosecutor conducted the investigation in his capacity as deputy of the COMELEC. The informations were filed for vote-selling. The resolution was appealed to the COMELEC which referred to the Law Department. The latter recommended to the COMELEC the nullification of the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor for the reason that the appellants are exempt under Section 28 (4) of RA 6646, from prosecution under 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC nullified the resolution hence, a Motion to Dismiss was filed which was denied by the court. The issue was brought to the Supreme Court. (1) Are the accused exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to Section 28 (4) of RA 6646? It was contended that as witness in the vote-buying case, they should be exempted from prosecution under Section 28 (4) of RA 6848. On the other hand, the COMELEC contended that the witness in the vote-selling case should be exempted from criminal liability, hence, they should not be charged with the offense. The RTC ruled that Section 265 of the Omnibus

Election Code penalizes both the vote-buyer and vote-seller under Section 261 (a) and (b) of RA 6648 as provided for in Section 28 of RA 6698. She cited the ruling of the Court in Lozano vs. Yorac, et. al., to support her stand. She ruled that vote-buyers cannot be exempt from criminal liability for votebuying because there can be no vote-buying without someone selling his vote. Preliminary investigations of the charges for vote-buying and vote-selling must be jointly conducted. This is to enable the COMELECs Law Department to determine whether the witnesses had voluntarily presented themselves to give information on the vote-buying of the accused. Whose contention is correct? Why?

Answer:

The contention of the COMELEC is correct.

Section 261 (a) (b) of the Omnibus Election Code penalizes vote-buying and vote-selling and conspiracy to bribe voters. (a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value, gives, or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or community in order to induce or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar election process of a political party. (b) Conspiracy to bribe voter. Two or more persons, whether candidates or not, who come to an agreement concerning the commission of any violation of paragraph (a) of this section and decide to commit it.

Not only principals but also accomplices and accessories are criminally liable for election offenses. (Section 263, Omnibus Election Code). Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648 governs the prosecution of the crimes of vote-buying and vote-selling, thus: SECTION 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-Selling. the presentation of a complaint for violation of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voters acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized legal officers, under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Under the last paragraph of the said provision, any person guilty of votebuying and vote-selling who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on violations of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offense with reference to which their information and testimony were given, without prejudice to their liability for perjury and false testimony, thus: Section 265. Prosecution. _ The giver, offerer and promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals; provided, that any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given: Provided,

further, that nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony. (COMELEC vs. Judge Dolores Espaol, G. R. No. 149164-73, December 10, 2003, Callejo, Jr.)

Q What agency has the power to conduct investigation of violations of the Omnibus Election Code and state the extent of its powers? Explain.

Answer:

The COMELEC is endowed with such power.

Under the Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is mandated to conduct a preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same. The general rule is that the petitioner must investigate, charge and prosecute all those committing election offenses without any discrimination to ensure a clean, orderly and speedy elections. A joint preliminary investigation thereof must be conducted and the appropriate Information filed in court against all the offenders. To enable the COMELEC to comply with its mandate to investigate and prosecute those committing election offenses, it has been vested with authority under the last paragraph of Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648 to exempt those who have committed election offenses on any violation of said law in any official investigation or proceeding with reference to which his information and testimony is given. The law is an immunity statute which grants transactional immunity to volunteers from investigation and prosecution for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. (COMELEC vs. Judge Espaol, G. r. No. 1496164-73, December 10, 2003).

Q Under what law are immunity statutes provided for?

Answer:

Immunities are provided under the following laws:

(1) Article XIII, Section 18(8) of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Commission of Human Rights shall have the power to grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority. (2) Presidential Decree No. 749, granting immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts to their accomplices in bribery and other graft cases against public officers. (3) Presidential Decree No. 1731, October 8, 1980, providing for rewards and incentives to government witnesses and informants and other purposes. (4) Presidential Decree No. 1732, October 8, 1980, providing immunity from criminal prosecution to government witnesses and for other purposes. (5) Repiblic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the Witness Protection Security and Benefit Act. Section 3. Admission into the program. Any person who has witnessed? (6) Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (Discharge of State Witness). (7) Section 17, Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon? (COMELEC vs. Judge Espaol, G. R. No. 149164-73, December 10, 2003).

Q Give the reason behind the grant of immunity statute. Explain.

Answer:

The immunity statute seeks a rational accommodation between the

imperatives of the privilege against self-incrimination and the legitimate demands

of government to encourage citizens, including law violators themselves, to testify against law violators. The statute operates as a complete pardon for the offenses to which the information was given. The execution of those statutes reflects the importance of the testimony therefore, and the fact that many offenses are of such character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crimes. Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses and their primary use has been to investigate and prosecute such offenses. (Kastigan s. U. S., 33 L. ed. 2d. 596 (1978). Immunity from suit is the only consequence flowing from a violation of ones constitutional right to be protected from unreasonable search and seizure, his right to counsel and his right not to be coerced into confessing. By voluntarily offering to give information on violations of Section 261 (a) and (b) and testify against the culprits, one opens himself to investigation and prosecution if he himself is a party to any violation of the law. In exchange for his testimony, the law gives him immunity from investigation and prosecution for any offense in Section 261 (a) and (b) with reference to which his information is given. He is, therefore, assured that his testimony cannot be used by the prosecutors and any authorities in any respect, and that his testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on him. The testimonies of a voluntary witness in accord with his sworn statement operates as a pardon for the criminal charges to which it relates. (Piccirillo vs. New York State, 27 L. ed. 596 (1978); COMELEC vs. Judge

Espapl, G. R. No. 149164-73, December 10, 2003).

Q What is the effect if the witness who was granted an immunity statute later on refuses to testify? Explain.

Answer:

If such witness later refuses to testify or testifies but contrary to his

affidavit, he loses his immunity from suit, and may be prosecuted for violations of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code, perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, or false testimony under Article 180 of the same Code. The reason is that the immunity is in consideration of his testimony.

Q Who grants the immunity statute or exemption?

Answer:

The power to grant exemptions is vested solely on the COMELEC.

This power is concomitant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute those committing the same. The exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial court. Neither may courts interfere with the Comelecs exercise of its direction in denying or granting exemptions under the law, unless it commits a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. (Comelec vs. Judge Espaol, G.R. No. 149164 73, December 10, 2003).

Q What agency has the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses? Explain.

Answer:

Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the Comelec is

empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the Comelec to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election. (Bay Tan vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003). Under Section 265 of the

Omnibus Election Code, the Comelec, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The Comelec may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government. In Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, all Provincial and City Prosecutors and/or their respective assistants are given continuing authority as its deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under election laws and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them by the Comelec or its duly authorized representatives. Until revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial or City Prosecutors stays.

Q What is the rationalize for the deputation by the Comelec of the Provincial or City Prosecutors? Explain.

Answer:

The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is

necessitated by the need for prompt investigation and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable part of the task of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the Comelec does not have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases. The prosecutors deputized by the Comelec are subject to its authority, control and supervision in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the Comelec itself. (People vs. Basilla, 179 SCRA 87). Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the Comelec, either

expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by it. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the Comelec, provincial or prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders of the Comelec in relation to election cases such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute. Otherwise, the only option of such provincial or city prosecutor is to seek relief from the Comelec as its deputy.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE Q What is the purpose of the constitutional prescription against unreasonable searches and seizures?

Answer:

The purpose of the constitutional proscription against unreasonable

searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. (Silva vs. Presiding Judge of Negros Occidental, 203 SCRA 140; Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637). (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the person and place to be searched and the things to be seized.

(Paper Industries Corp. of the Phil. Vs. Asuncion, 366 Phil. 717 (1999; People vs. Estrada, 357 Phil. 377; Nala vs. Judge Jesus Barroso, Jr., G.R. No. 153087, August 7, 2003).

Q The search warrant did not state correctly the name of the person to be searched. It was contended that it was void. Is the contention correct? Why?

Answer:

No. The failure to correctly state in the search warrant the first

name of the person to be search does not invalidable the warrant because additional description of his alias sufficiently enables the police officers to locate and identify him. What is prohibited is a search warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which contains a description personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused with difficulty. (People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 1697; Nala vs. Judge Jesus Barroso, Jr., G.R. No. 153087, August 7, 2003).

Q In the application for a search warrant, the police officer testified that the firearms in the possession of the accused were not licensed but there was no certification presented. It was also an on the spot surveillance but in the application, it was stated that there was a long range surveillance. The judge issued the warrant and weapons were seized on the basis of the search warrant. Is the search warrant valid? Why?

Answer:

No, because the applicant for a search warrant did not have

personal knowledge of the lack of license to possess the same. There was no evidence to prove the existence of probable cause that accused did not have the

license to possess a firearm. (Nala vs. Judge Barroso, Jr., G.R. No. 153087, August 7, 2003).

Q Can the accused be charged with illegal possession of firearms and explosively allegedly seized from his house? He contended that said articles are inadmissible as evidence against him because they were not the same items specifically listed in the warrant. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, on the other hand, claimed that petitioner should be held liable because the items seized bear a direct relation to the offense of illegal possession of firearms. Rule on the contentions. Explain.

Answer:

The contention of the accused is correct. At any rate the argument

becomes immaterial in view of the nullity of the search warrant. The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by virtues of a void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in the course of the search are inadmissible in evidence. Conformably, the articles allegedly seized in the house of the accused cannot be used as evidence against him because access therein was gained by the police officer using a void search and seizure warrant. It is as if they entered petitioners house without a warrant, making their entry therein illegal, and the items seized, inadmissible. (Nala vs. Judge Barroso, Jr., G.R. No. 153087, August 7, 2003).

Q Cannot the evidence seized be admissible under the plain view doctrine? Explain.

Answer:

Admissibility of the items seized cannot be justified under the plain

view doctrine. It is true that, as an exception, the police officer may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm, or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, said officer must have a prior right to be in the position to have that view of the objects to be seized. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. No presumption of regularity may be invoked in aid of the process when the officer undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In this case, the firearms and explosive were found at the rear portion of the accused house but the records do not show how exactly were these items discovered. Clearly, therefore, the plain view doctrine finds no application here not only because the police officers had no justification to search the house of petitioner (their search warrant being void for lack of probable cause), but also because said officers failed to discharge the burden of proving that subject articles were inadvertently found in petitioners house. (Nala vs. Judge Barroso, Jr., G.R. No. 153087, August 7, 2003).

Considering that the search and seizure warrant in this case was prosecured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the items seized in petitioners house, being fruits of the poisonous tree, are inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

SEARCH WARRANT Q The police officers conducted a test by operation at the residence of the accused where they bought P1,500.00 worth of shabu but they did not arrest the accused at that time. Instead, they applied for a search warrant based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity of illegal drugs in his house. When they arrived at the residence of the accused, they sideswept a car of the accused parked outside his house. When the son opened their gate and went out, the police officers introduced themselves, informed him that they had a search warrant entered the house and handcuffed the son of the accused to a chair. They summoned two (2) barangay kagawads to witness the search. They were able to seize the following: (a) one plastic bag containing yellowish substance, (b) a weighing scale, (c) assorted documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a check writer; (i) several dry seals and (j) stamp pads; (k) Chinese and Philippine Currency. An inventory was made signed by the police officers the kagawads and the son of the accused. There was likewise an affidavit of orderly search but not under oath. Accused was charged with illegal possession of shabu. One of the kagawads testified that shabu was not even one of the items seized and inventoried. What originally appeared was merely Chinese Medicine, but replaced with shabu. After trial, accused was convicted. He questioned the validity of the search.

(1) In convicting the accused, the trial court ruled that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of police officers. Is the ruling correct? Why?

Answer:

No, because while the power to search and seize is necessary for

the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens. Since no presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution, (People vs. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 702 (2001)) courts must cautiously weight the evidence before them. In People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, it was held that a search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it is issued, otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants, it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrant will always be constructed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (People vs. Benny Go, G.R. No. 144639, September 12, 2003).

(2) The police officers testified that to gain entry into the house of the accused, they side swept his car and when the son opened the gate, they were able to enter the house and conducted the search but before that, they handcuffed the son of the accused. Was the search valid? Why?

Answer:

No. Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the

residence of their intention and authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to believe that prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of appellants car was unreasonable and unjustified. The handcuffing of the son of the accused was unjustified as there was no showing of any provocation by him. Considering the degree of intimidation, alarm and fear produced in one suddenly confronted under such circumstances, the forcible restraint was unjustified, hence, the search was not legal. (People vs. Go, supra).

ELECTION LAWS Q Section 14 of RA 9006 (The Fair Election Act) repealed Section 6 of BP No. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code). The latter provided that any elective official, whether national or local, running in any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Petitioners questioned the validity of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, as unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. They contended that the inclusion of Section 14 repealing section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act. No. 9006 constituted a proscribed rider. They pointed out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election

propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject mater of RA 9006. Rule on the contention? Explain.

Answer:

The contention is not correct. The title of RA 9006 states: An Act to

Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices. Section 2 of the law provides for its declarations and objectives, one of which is that the State shall ensure bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. The title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act. No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election proraganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. It has always been held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying

out the general subject. (Farias, et.al. vs. The Executive Secretary, et.al., G.R. No. 147387; Salapuddin vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 152161, December 10, 2003).

Q It was contended that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. Is the contention proper? Why?

Answer:

The contention is not proper. Policy matters are not the concern of

the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo vs. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved. (Farias, et.al. vs. Executive Secretary, et.al.) Q What is the purpose of the constitutional provision that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title? Explain.

Answer:

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject

of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators. In enacting the repealing law, there is evidence to show that the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. (Farias, et.al. vs. Executive Secretary, et.al.)

Q It was contended that the repeal of the law pertaining to elective officials gave undue benefit to such officials as against the opposite ones and violated the equal protection clause of the constitution. Is the contention correct? Explain.

Answer:

No. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not

absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner and said that the equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and

liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of heir designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service,, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take electoral activities. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office by the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those. part in political and

Q The petitioners contended that the law is null and void as there were irregularities in the passage of the law. In short, they wanted the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. Decide.

Answer:

The contention is not proper. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the

signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. There is no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd and 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. The Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act. No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. In Arroyo v. De Venecia, it was held: But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts

have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. (277 SCRA 268; Farias, et. al., vs. Executive Secretary, et. al..).

Q It was contended that the effectivity land of RA 9006 provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval; hence, the same is defective and renders the law invalid. Rule on the contention? Explain.

Answer:

The contention is not correct. The law cannot take effect without

publication. In Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, it was ruled that the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislators may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended. (Farias, et.al. vs. Executive Secretary, et.al.)

Q What is the nature if coconut levy funds? Explain.

Answer:

They are public funds because of the following reasons:

1. Coconut levy funds are raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State.

2. They are levies imposed by the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers. 3. Respondents have judicially admitted that the sequestered shares were purchased with public funds. 4. The Commission on Audit (COA) reviews the use of coconut levy funds. 5. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), with the acquiescence of of private respondents, has treated them as public funds. 6. The very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character. (Rep. vs. Cocofed, et al., supra.)

Q State the concept of public funds.

Answer:

Public funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any

political subdivision of the State; more particularly, taxes, customs, duties and movies raised by operation of law for the support of the government or for the discharge of its obligations. (Republic vs. Cocofed, et al., G. R. No. 147062-64, December 14, 2001 citing Beckner vs. Commonwealth, 5 SE2d 525, November 20, 1939). Coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes which, in general, are enforced proportional contributions from persons and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs. Based on this definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is am enforced proportional contribution from persons and properties; (b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and (c) it is levied for the support of the

government. The coconut levy funds fall squarely into these elements for the following reasons: (a) They were generated by virtue of statutory enactments imposed on the coconut farmers requiring the payment of prescribed amounts. (Sec PD Nos. 276; 961; 1468) Like other taxes measures, they were voluntary payments or donations by the people. They were enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions, as provided under PD No. 276:

(b) The coconut levies were imposed pursuant to the laws enacted by the proper legislative authorities of the State. Indeed, the CCSF was coolected under PD No. 276, issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then exercising legislative powers.

(c) They were clearly imposed for a public purpose. There is absolutely no question that they were collected to advance the governments avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry. The coconut industry is one of the great economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading position among the countrys export products; that it gives employment to thousands of Filipinos; that it is a great source of the States wealth; and that it is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our country and, thus, pivotal in the plans of a government committed to a policy of currency stability. Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power

of the State, as held in Caltex Philippines vs. COA, 208 SCRA 726; and Osmea vs. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703. (Republic vs. Cocofed,et al., G. R. No. 147062-64, December 14, 2001).

Q Does it mean that even if the coconut levy funds are allocated for special purpose, they are still public in character? Explain.

Answer:

Yes. Even if the money allocated for a special purpose and raised

by special means, it is still public in character. The funds were even used to organize and finance State offices. In Cococfed vs. PCGG, the Court observed that certain agencies or enterprises were organized and financed with revenues derived from coconut levies imposed under a succession of laws of the late dictatorship x x x x with deposed Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies as the suspected authors and chief beneficiaries of the resulting coconut industry monopoly. It cannot be denied that the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national economy. It is, therefore, the States concern to make it strong and secure source not only of the livelihood of a significant segment of the population, but also of export earnings the sustained growth of which is one of the imperatives of economic stability. (Recpublic vs. Cocofed, et al., supra, citing Gaston vs. Republic Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626; Lutoz and Araneta, 98 Phil. 148).