correct in themselves, and equally false in their incapacity . . . to produce the event that took place (trans.

Richard Pevear and Larisa Volokhonsky, 2007, p. 604). For Tolstoy, the isolation of variables in the search for causality can only lead to a parsing of the whole. The only means by which a historian or analyst can understand the outcome of historical events is by accepting that an innitesimal unit of observation must be taken into account, within the context of an innite number of such observations. Of course, such a thing cannot be done. What can be done, however, is the conceptualization of the uniform strivings of people as the sum of the innite number of innitesimal events surrounding any particular event. To many analysts of Russian politics, it makes a great deal of sense that Tolstoys rejection of the social scientic paradigm actually freed him to concentrate more effectively upon observing things as they really were (i.e., by examining the dependent variable alone). At the very least, such pure observation seems to have freed him from casting a potentially biased perspective onto his subject based upon preconceived theoretical notions. It is for this reason that I think Baranys theoretical weakness is actually a strength, for he has not allowed his theory to drive his observations. Just like Tolstoy, Barany was able to accurately understand Russian civilmilitary relations because his theorys incompleteness gave him the freedom to observe things as they really are. In other words, he was not chained to any preconceived notions of what to expect in his analysis because his theory has no general explanatory variable. It is perhaps the ultimate compliment to suggest that Russias greatest writer would very much have agreed with Baranys depiction of the Russian militaryand that his approach is a superior one for understanding Russian military politics.
Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme. Edited by Duncan Bell. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 288p. $100.00
doi:10.1017/S1537592710001891

Jonathan Havercroft, University of Oklahoma

The contributors to this volume straddle the divide between the subelds of political theory and international relations through an engagement with political realism. As editor, Duncan Bell states in his introduction, Realism is a term with multiple meanings (p. 1). The volume is at its best when showing readers the many different aspects of realist political thought. Some pieces make compelling cases for including new thinkers such as Hannah Arendt in the realist canon, while others reveal hidden aspects of the thought of classical realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau. Yet, because realism is an essentially contested term, I occasionally felt that contributors were stretching

the meaning of the term in ways that no self-identied realist would ever recognize. The most compelling chapters are by political theorists who offer interpretations of classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau. One of the great tragedies of the high disciplinary walls between political theory and international relations is that theoretically sophisticated thinkers such as Morgenthau and E. H. Carr are rarely read in contemporary political theory. William Scheuerman, Stephen Turner, and Sen Molloy consider various aspects of Morgenthaus thought. Scheuerman argues that prior to World War II, Morgenthau engaged in a period of theoretical experimentalism where he tried many different approaches to make sense of world politics. One of these underdeveloped strands in Morgenthaus thought was his engagement with critical realism. Scheuermans piece is a model of this volume at its best. It combines a rigorous history of political thought with a persuasive argument about how we can recover a distinct critical realist understanding of international politics that would complement the classical realist and neorealist traditions that dominate the discipline today. In a similar vein, Molloy discusses the role of ethics in the writings of Morgenthau and Carr. Contra the commonplace assumption that realism is an amoral theory, Molloy argues that at the core of Morgenthaus project was an ethical commitment to the lesser evil. He contrasts Morgenthaus view that the statesman must occasionally use evil in order to prevent the greater evil to Carrs more pragmatic view that there is a specic morality to the modern state system based upon sovereignty and recognition. Finally, Turner offers a different interpretation of Morgenthau as a consistent Weberian. In particular, Turner maintains that Morgenthaus focus on leadership was inuenced by his reliance upon a Weberian conception of politics. Each of these pieces makes a compelling case that Morgenthaus work deserves sustained engagement by political theorists, and each proposes interesting areas for future research. A second group of chapters consider classical political philosophers who inuenced twentieth-century realism. Richard Ned Lebow argues that the conventional interpretations of the Ancients in contemporary IR theory miss the most important lessons that the Ancients might provide us about power, persuasion, and community. Lebow recovers two ancient Greek concepts: persuasion by deceit (dolos) and persuasion by strengthening friendships ( peith). In terms of international politics, Lebow contends that peith is a more effective strategy for states because it fosters community, whereas states that used dolos to augment their foreign policies tend toward hegemony and empire. The author then uses this analysis to consider the consequences of rhetorical deceit by the Bush administration for the structure of the international community. Lebows work should be of considerable interest to constructivist scholars who
September 2010 | Vol. 8/No. 3 981

Book Reviews

International Relations
politics of enmity that it vanquished. The Enlightenment project of critique must disentangle itself from the politics of disenchantment by authentic forms of meaningfulness that can grapple with contemporary political ambiguity. Each of these chapters offers compelling arguments for why contemporary political theorists should engage in the questions with which classical realists grappled. This volume is an important contribution for the number of conversations in both international relations and political theory that it will begin. The contributors demonstrate the variety of different political philosophies that t under the rubric of realism. This should, it is hoped, push realist IR scholars to question both their relation to the tradition that they claim as their own and to interrogate some of their core assumptions about the role of enmity, ethics, law, and persuasion. Yet, the volumes ability to stretch the bounds of what ts under the heading of realism stretches that notion so far in certain places that I am concerned that many realists will not recognize their theory within this work. From the perspective of political theory, Political Thought and International Relations makes the compelling case that the IR tradition of realism deserves to be taken seriously as a variety of political theory. Engaging in conversations across subelds can be tricky. Many of the fundamental debates and commitments in one eld can be at cross-purposes with the commitments and debates in other elds. This volume, however, manages to stake out a space that will engage scholars in both IR and political theory.
Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment. By Risa A. Brooks. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 320p. $29.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592710001908

focus on the power of moral argumentation in world politics. Nicholas Rengger considers the hidden dialogue between Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt on the relationship between war and politics. Whereas Schmitt felt that the friend/enemy distinction was decisive for the political, Strauss argued that the character of political regimes accounts for the permanent possibility of war in the world. While Rengger dissents from Strausss view that war is a fundamental feature of world politics, he does think that Strausss analysis of the liberal regime is useful for contemporary analysis of how states will behave in war. Renggers chapter offers an important intervention into recent debates over the inuence of Strausss political philosophy on neoconservative foreign policy, and makes the surprising (yet compelling case) that Strausss work contributes to current debates over the democratic peace. A less successful attempt to bring traditional philosophers into the realist conversation is Roger Spegeles chapter. Spegele begins with a premise that I do not accept: In international political theory as currently conceived each contending discourse . . . insists that it is the only valid conception of international relations, leading to inevitable despair at the self-evident unreasonableness of any such claim (p. 122). This interpretation of IR theory ignores the many important ways in which different traditions borrow from each other and share fundamental assumptions. He then proceeds to engage in a textual exegesis of Martin Heideggers work, and concludes that Heideggers philosophy could formulate a version of realism [that] makes space for poetry (in the larger sense), classical political thought, history, and commonsense (p. 123). While these are all things that I would heartily endorse, I was unclear how his exegesis of Heidegger on questions of technology and poetry could help make sense of world politics in ways that the existing traditions of IR do not. The chapter would have been strengthened by grounding the argument in a phenomenon in world politics, or an illustration of what international relations that did have space for poetry would look like. A third set of chapters draw upon nonrealist political theories to make arguments about what realism should be. Patricia Owen argues that an ethic of reality guided Arendts normative commitments. Owen contends that it was this ethic that led Arendt to conclude that wars of annihilation are crimes against humanity because they do not acknowledge the reality of human plurality. Similarly, Joshua Foa Dienstags chapter makes the case for the importance of pessimistic thinkingwhich he denes as linear temporality, without the assumption of natural progress (p. 161)as a useful corrective to Whiggish interpretations of international politics. Finally, Vibeke Schou Tjalve argues that while the secular politics of the Enlightenment won the battle against totalitarian ideologies in the twentieth century, this ideology is now vulnerable to the very
982 Perspectives on Politics

Todd S. Sechser, University of Virginia

An increasingly common refrain in international relations scholarship is that democracies enjoy special advantages in international security affairs. Over the past several years, scholars have argued that democratic states are better at signaling resolve during crises, making credible alliance commitments, nancing wars, overcoming distrust, and even ghting battles. One recent claim along these lines holds that democracies make smarter strategic choices about when to ght wars. In this view, free and open debate within democratic governments helps ensure that crucial information makes its way into the strategic assessment process, thereby minimizing serious misjudgments in decisions about war and peace. Yet, at times, democracies have exhibited very poor strategic judgment, while the decisions of autocracies are sometimes quite wise. What explains this variation? Risa Brooks argues that a more reliable guide to the quality of a states strategic assessmentthat is, its ability to evaluate, select, and coordinate political-military