Torts Doctrines AMONOY v. SPS. GUTIERREZ (G.R. No.

140420, February 15, 2001) "Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible xxx." Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents; house. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. CECILIO PE, ET AL., vs. ALFONSO PE, G.R. No. L-17396; May 30, 1962 Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. Buag, Jr. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. Capuno vs. Pepsi-Cola MakalintalL-19331, Ap ril 30, 1965 The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death (Dyogi v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957, 22 L.J. 175). In other words, the civil action for

damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years. In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No. L10542,promulgated July 31, 1958, this Court held that an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was commi tted. The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without having made it they could file as in fact they did a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case (Pacheco v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25,1960; Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962); and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasidelict." Mamba vs. Garcia A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not only impropriety but even the appearance of impropriety in all their conduct. This includes not taking an undue interest in the settlement of criminal cases pending before them as this may compromise the integrity and impartiality of their office. As the visible representation of the law and of justice, their conduct must be above reproach and suspicion. By acting as an accomplice to P/Sr. Inspector Salvador, respondent judge violated not only the law but also the Code of Judicial Conduct. In the case at bar, it is clear that the crime of bribery was committed. Although the evidence may not be sufficient to support a conviction in a criminal case, it is adequate for the purpose of these proceedings. The standards of integrity required of members of the Bench are not 11 satisfied by conduct which merely allows one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. In an administrative proceeding, such as this case, only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Corpus vs. Paje G.R. No. L-26737 July 31, 1969 Although in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, et al., G.R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957, this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in article 33 of the Civil Code includes 1 homicide, it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries. In the case of People vs. Buan, G.R. No. L-25366, March 29, 1968, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Supreme Court, said that the "offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense." It is, therefore, clear that the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered by two other persons. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or

criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved 2 his right to institute a separate civil action (Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra). In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon the same act. FORTICH-CELDRAN v. CA Presented as evidence of ratification in the civil action is the motion to withdraw; its authenticity is assailed in the same civil action. The resolution of this point in the civil case will in a sense be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal suit pending in another tribunal. As such, it is a prejudicial question, which should first be decided before the prosecution can proceed in the criminal case. It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court against respondent Catane, upon the same charge was held also in abeyance. Garcia v. Salvador G.R. No. 168512

March 20, 2007

Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that 20 degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action 21 caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence. GF EQUITY, INC. vs. ARTURO VALENZONA [G.R. No. 156841. June 30, 2005.] Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give every one his due; and observe honesty and good faith.

Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary to law, and GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, e.g. that Valenzona breached the contract by failing to discharge his duties thereunder, GF Equity failed to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona to thus entitle him to damages under Art. 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code. Under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, an action upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. Since the action filed by Valenzona is an action for breach upon a written contract, his filing of the case 6 years from the date his cause of action arose was well within the prescriptive period, hence, the defense of laches would not, under the circumstances, lie.

Consequently, Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages his salary which he should have received from the time his services were terminated up to the time the employment contract expired. Lim v. De Leon Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his hands of the incident by claiming that "he was in good faith, without malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting injury to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha" 19 when he ordered the seizure of the motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith. Meralco v. Team We, however, deem it proper to delete the award of moral damages. TEC's claim was premised allegedly on the damage to its goodwill and reputation. 50 As a rule, a corporation is not entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or sentiments like wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and moral shock. The only exception to this rule is when the corporation has a reputation that is 51 debased, resulting in its humiliation in the business realm. But in such a case, it is imperative for the claimant to present proof to justify the award. It is essential to prove the 52 existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to petitioner's acts. In the present case, the records are bereft of any evidence that the name or reputation of TEC/TPC has been debased as a result of petitioner's acts. Besides, the trial court simply awarded moral damages in the dispositive portion of its decision without stating the basis thereof. Mansion Biscuit v. CA The stare decisis in these cases is where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not the drawer is not criminally liable for either Estafa or Violation of BP Blg. 22. In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their criminal and civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting them that the issuance of the checks in question did not constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Consequently, no civil liability arising from the alleged delict may be awarded. Manuel v. Pano It is true that the matters mentioned in Article 354 (LIBEL) as exceptions to the general rule are not absolutely privileged and are still actionable. However, since what is presumed is not malice but in fact lack of malice, it is for the prosecution to overcome that presumption by proof that the accused was actually motivated by malice. Absent such proof, the charge must fail. Saudi Arabian Airline v. CA Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of and the place having the most interest in the problem, we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioners insistence that [s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter.i[64] As aptly said by private respondent, she has no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case.ii[65] And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court, considering that it was the petitioner who was

invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is SEA COMMERCIAL CO. v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122823, November 25, 1999 Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive basis, SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code above-quoted. This provision, together with the succeeding article on human relation, was intended to embody certain basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order. What is sought to be written into the law is the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism. TANJANCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966 Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. Villegas v. Court of Appeals GR 82562, April 11, 1997 Did the death of the accused before final judgement extinguish his civil liability? Corollarily the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission Rule 87 Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against or executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal may be commenced against him. ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs. FABIAN VER, et al. L-69866

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

Borjal v. CA, 301 SCRA 1 G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999

The Court cited the public official doctrine laid down in New York Times v. Sullivan, and deemed the private respondent a public figure within the purview of the New York Times case. (This holding is also consistent with the definition of public figure in Ayers v. Capulong.) The New York Times doctrine states that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of actual malice on the part of the person making the defamatory statement. To prevail, the private respondent must prove actual malice. (Note: New York Times was a civil case.) [D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the government and public officials. Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. A public official must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts.
UE vs Jader 327 SCRA 804, GR 132344, February 17, 2000 The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

United States vs. Buenaventura Sarmiento

Hence, where the deceit alleged is a promise of marriage, it must appear that the woman was induced to yield her body to the seducer by means of such promise, and that she surrendered her virtue in reliance upon its fulfillment. Manifestly a promise of marriage made after sexual intercourse has taken place, or after the woman has yielded her body to the man's illicit embraces, cannot be held to have induced the woman to surrender her virtue. Nor can a promise of marriage made by a married man, where the woman knows that he is married before she surrenders herself, be said to have induced her so to do; for in such a case it is clear that there was no reliance on the promise.

United States vs Bustos GR No. 12592, March 8, 1918 As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. In the present case, charges were predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus, qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution . Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in the office is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable.

Velayo vs. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands Ltd. G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956 The Court held that the Defendant schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States, where CALI s plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent s property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane. Though no specific law was violated by the defendant, the court cited Article 19 and Article 21 of the Civil Code dealing on Human Relations as the basis of the Plaintiff to recover damages. The makers of the Civil Code have discussed that such rules would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. Every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. If this premises is admitted, then the proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damages. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Thus the court held the Defendant liable to pay to the Plaintiff, for the benefit of the insolvent CALI and its creditors, as compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time aforementioned and another equal sum as exemplary damages.