Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN

IN

RE

OIL SPILL by the OIL RIG

DEEPWATER

HORIZON

in

the

GULF OF MEXICO on APRIL20 2010

Applies

MDL No

2179

SectionJ to
The Honorable Judge
Barbier

ALL CASES and

210-cv-02771

Mag

Judge Shushan

____________________________________________________________________________

AMENDED EXPERT REPORT OF GLEN STEVICK Ph.D

P.E

II

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

TABLE OF CONTENTS
FINDINGS
II

THE

BLOWOUT PREVENTER STRUCTURE AND DESIGN

The

PURPOSE

BOP

Purpose

BOP BOP

Structure Control the 10

Communicating
Activating

with

BOP

10

the

BSR

11

BOP
Ill

Design

13

THE
IT

BOP DESIGN WAS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE RELIED ON SINGLE BSR

The BSR was
Single Point
of Failure
for

15

the 15

DWHBOP
The
Well
Potential for

Off-Center

Drill

Pipe

was
16

Known

to

BP and Transocean

IV

TRANSOCEAN

USED

FLAWED

CONDITION17 the

BASED MAINTENANCE
Transocean
3-5
Failed to Recertify

BOP

Every 17

Years as Specified by API and Cameron

Condition-Based

Transoceans
is

Maintenance
With
or

Flawed

Because Problems

Only

Equipment

Measured Replaced

or Failures

Gets Fixed

19

Problems

that

cannot be measured

are 19

not considered

Need

for

improved

equipment

is

not

considered

20

21

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

Implementing

BAST

is

discouraged
IN

21

BP FAILED TO IMPLEMENT BP
Failed to

BAST BAST

THE BOP
the

21 21 the

Implement

for

BSR

BP and

Transocean

Failed

to

Upgrade

BOP

to Include

Second

BSR
to

24

BP and Transocean Failed to Upgrade Camerons Mark BOP Control Pod

Ill

24

BP

Failed

to

Implement Cables
for

Solely

on

MUX

BAST EDS
to of

by

Relying

25 Implement

BP and BAST by
VI

Transocean
Using

Failed

EDS-1

Instead

EDS-2

25

THE UNDERCHARGED BLUE CONTROL POD BATTERIES AND INCORRECTLY WIRED YELLOW CONTROL POD SOLENOID 103Y MAY HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTING CAUSES OF THE BOPS INABILITY TO STOP THE BLOWOUT
Undercharged
Incorrectly

26 27

Blue Control Pod

Batteries

Wired Yellow Control Pod Solenoid 27

Failed to

103Y The
the

AMF/Deadman Likely BSR because of Low

Incorrectly

Actuate
Battery

Blue

Pod

and the

Wired Yellow

Pod Solenoid
Completely
if

28

The
the Pipe

BSR
the

Likely
Drill

Would
Pipe and

Have

Sheared

Sealed the Well

BSR

had

been

Activated

when

the

Drill

was Centered

28

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

LIST

OF FIGURES
the position the
of annulars

Figure

The

DWH BOP

showing

and valves

Figure Figure

The Cameron BSR used

Model
of the

in

DWH BOP

DWH BOP BSR DWH

BOP

from the Det Norske Veritas

DNV
Model

report

Figure

of the

and

from the

DNV

report

41

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

INTRODUCTION
Berkeley Engineering

And Research
to

Inc

was
of

retained the

by

Halliburton

Energy

BOP

Services used
at

Inc the

assess

the

design

Deepwater blowout
the

Horizon
fire in

DWH
and
spill

blowout

preventer the

and on

BOPs

contribution

to the well

explosion

April

20 2010
depth
of of

At the time of the

incident

DWH
ft

was

the

process
seafloor

of temporarily

abandoning Mexico

BPs Macondo deepwater

18360
ft

well

after

reaching
in

approximately

G0M
my
and and

12360

below

the

the

Gulf

My

opinions

are

based

upon
of
in

the

materials

and

information

have
training
failure

reviewed
experience analysis

analysis

that

information
of

my

education

knowledge and

the areas

mechanical engineering and

design

material

behavior

my knowledge

of oilfield
drill

and

offshore equipment

e.g

offshore

platforms

BOPs

casings and

strings

My

opinions

are

also

based

upon and

the

engineering regulations

standard relevant

of

standards
offshore
oil

recommended
and gas been asked
to

practices

and

care to

exploration

drilling

and

production nor

activities

have any and

not

make any assumptions

are cited as material

have upon
in

presumed
this

facts
its

beyond those which

relied

Report

attachments

FINDINGS
upon and controls and
of

Based

my education
offshore
forensic testing

training

experience

in

hydraulics review

electronic of

mechanical

engineering

design
of the

Phase
review the
report

Phase

II

and examination
testimony

DWH BOP my
shown
in

supporting

documents
in

and

other

evidence

including
this

materials

identified

Appendix have found

and the

calculations to

and

its

appendixes
British

the following

be true Resources and

Inc

Petroleum

BP
was

and

Vastar the

Vastar
of the

which

BP acquired

specified

design by

configuration

DWH
Corp The
to

BOP
BOP

which

constructed

Cameron

International

Cameron
relied
drill

shear

upon pipe and

single seal

blind

shear ram
in

BSR
of

to

be able

the well

the case

an emergency

51

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

made the BSR which BP was aware

This

single

point

of failure

for the

entire

BOP

of

Transocean system account

with that
for

implemented
did not
identify

flawed the

condition-based
for technology

maintenance upgrades
to

need

past
in

design

deficiencies

and

the

issues

associated

drilling

deeper and

deeper water

This

condition-based

maintenance maintenance

to ensure proper program did not allow Transocean and certification of the BOP and its existing

components

BP and
safest

Transocean
technology
failed

failed

to
in

implement
the

the

best

available

and

BAST
to

BOP

Specifically

BP and

Transocean

use
Shear
drill

BSR
sealed

Double
off-center to

rams

that

would

have

sheared

and

pipe
to seal

two BSRs--one

shear the pipe and the other

the well the

an Emergency Disconnect Casing

activating

Sequence

Shear
the

Rams CSR5 to BSR to shear and seal

EDS
center

that activated

the

pipe

before

an Acoustic

Control System the

ACS
DWH
and
rig

the pipe as redundant

means

of

communication between

and the
that

BOP

and

Camerons Mark

Ill

control batteries

pod system

used rechargeable
levels to

BOP

control

pod

enabled

battery

be

monitored

remotely

The

undercharged
wired

batteries

in

the

blue the

BOP
result

control of

pod

and

incorrectly

solenoid

103Y were
implement
wired blowout
if

Transoceans
the
failure

flawed

condition-based

maintenance
to

program

and

of

BP and
batteries

Transocean and

BAST
solenoid they

The

undercharged have been

the Automatic the

incorrectly of the

may

contributing

causes

prevented
activating

Mode
time

Function

AMF/Deadman
drill

from

BSR
have

at

when

the

pipe

was

centered

and

could

been

sheared and closed

by the

BSR

61

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

II

THE BLOWOUT DESIGN

The

PREVENTER

PURPOSE

STRUCTURE

AND

BOP Purpose
of the

The primary purpose

reaching
drilling

BOP

is

to prevent

uncontrolled

oil

and gas from

the

unit

MODU
Blowout
against
fatalities

DWH

i.e

to

prevent

blowout
is

As

the

DWH BOP

critical drilling

any mobile offshore subsea component used

in

to seal

control and

monitor the well during

operations

As

stated

in

BPs

internal

documents
equipment
is

the event

final

line

of

defense
include

catastrophic
uncontrollable

which
oil

may

release of

and gas and

evacuation

of entire communities.1

Indeed
that

BPs CEO
the

considered
line

BOP
as

to

be

fail-safe

piece

of equipment
Similarly

was

last

of

defense

against

blowout.2

Transocean

recognized

the

BOP

critical piece

of equipment.3

BP-Wells

Engineer

OJT Module

BP-HZN-2179MDL01342044-01342052

Exhibit

2096
Deposition of Tony

Hayward

June

and
April

2011 23510-19 2036-9

Deposition of William

Stringfellow

11-12 2011

71

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

BOP
As shown
the
to the

Structure

right

in

figure

BOP

on the
parts

DWH

consists of

two

main

an Lower

upper Marine
Upper Annular

portion

called

the

till

Riser Package

LMRP
Stack

and below

Lower
the

BOP

sitting

LMRP
package

The

LMPR

Lower

Annular

contains lower
single variable

two

annulars

while

the

BOP

includes

BSR
shear

single

CSR

two and

rams

VBR5

Test
to
resist

H_Lower

________

BOP

Stack

Ram an

inverted

VBR

downward pressure

Fig

The
in

DWH BOP
the

showing the
of particular

position

of annulars

and
the

valves.4

The BSR used

the device
well
in

BOP

is

importance
the
drill in

because
pipe and the

BSR
was

is

ultimately

responsible for shearing

sealing

the

the case of an shearing

emergency

Cameron

blind

ram

as

The single BSR shown below

DWH BOP

Perkin

CS

Expert

Report

August

26

2011

Cited

image source

Engineering

Partners International

LLC

81

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

SF-E4A11Q

FLIND

FA
in

Fig

The Cameron
ram includes shaped
within of

BSR

used

the

DWH

BOP
blade
is

The

shearing
with

blind

lower

ram

with

straight blind seal

and an
to

upper ram shear

drill

blade

The
and

shearing blades
the

ram

designed

pipe located bore

the cutting inches

and

the wellbore
are only

The
17-7/8

BOP
inches blade

has
for the

18-3/4

cutting

blades
for the

lower

straight

blade and

15-1/4

inches

upper

V-shaped
area

This

leaves gaps within the wellbore

that are outside

of the cutting

of the shearing blind

ram blades as shown

below

in

figure

Fig

Model

of the

DWH BOP BSR

DNV

from the Det Norske Veritas

report.6

Cameron elements

EB 852D

Exhibit

7001

The shaded

areas

represent elastomeric

sealing

91

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

BOP

Control the

Communicating

with

BOP
Cameron Mark
II

The

DWH BOP

was

controlled

by

electro-hydraulic

multiplex

UX
in

control

system.7

As shown
version
right of

the

modified
to

figure

the
of

Yellow

Coritol

Pod

the

the LMRP portion BOP contains two

control

iue

Control

redundant
referred

pods
4-Ipp
.nriuia

to as the

blue and
control control

yellow

pods

The

pods

provided

Lwr

AnrijIa

functionality

and between

communication
the
via ran

BOP
wired from

and the

DWH

rig

MUX
the the

cables

that Lor
BOF

control

pods up
to

through the

water the the

DWH

where

crew

could using

control control

BOP
panels
control

Because

commands
could
via

from

the

DWH

only

be transmitted

the
of

ability

MUX cables the the DWH crew to

control

directly

the

BOP

was
upon

completely properly

contingent
functioning

MUX
Det
of

cables

Norske

Veritas

Final

Report

for United

States Department

of the

Interior

Bureau
of

and Enforcement Energy Management Regulation Contract Award No Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer
Final

Ocean

Forensic Examination

M10PX00335

Volume 132

Report

Report

No EP030842
Erwin

20 March 2011

DNV

Report Vol

Figure

Deposition of Jack

June 6-7 2011

36715-17

101

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

Fig

The

DWH BOP

including

identification

of the blue and

yellow

control

pods.8

Figure
identification

below
of

shows
various provide

model

of

the

DWH
to

rig

and

BOP

components
pressure
of

the

BOP including MUX cables the

the

accumulators

that

hydraulic

activate

BOP rams
pod

images

of

BOP

control

panels and an image

BOP

control

LMAP

4- i1
M.tI

li.W

Fig

Model

of the

DWH
BSR

and

BOP

from the

DNV

report.9

Activating

the

There were several

the

different

methods

of controlling

the

BOP and

activating

BSR

including

Perkin Partners

CS

Expert

Report

August

26

2011
to

Cited
identify

International

LLC

Image modified

the

image source Engineering blue and yellow control

pods

DNV

Report

Vol

Appendix

Figure

III

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

Activation either of

of the

BOP

high panels
line

pressure
located

BSR
on
the
to

function

from This

two

control

DWH

method
control

requires

MUX

communication

an operational

pod
of

Activation

the
is

EDS
panels
is

Emergency
activated requires

Disconnect

Sequence
to

which

also

from either of the two control

on the

DWH
rig

and

MUX

line

communication
of the

an operational
to allow the

control
to

pod The

primary function from the

rig in

EDS

disconnect

BOP

if

the dynamic

positioning

system
of

that holds the

position

fails

Activation

the

AMF/Deadman
Modules

circuits

located
either

in

the

Subsea

Electronic

SEM5
on

within

of the blue

or yellow control

pods mounted

the

LMRP

The

AMF

is

designed
initiation electrical

to

activate

automatically

i.e

without

requiring

by

user when the

or electronic

BOP

loses hydraulic
with

pressure
the

power

communication

DWH
AMF

Remotely Operated Vehicle

by cutting the

ROy

initiation

of the

MUX

and

hydraulic

lines

on the

BOP
by severing
to the

ROV
stack

initiation

of the
rod

Autoshear

function

the

autoshear

activation to

that connects
if

intended

activate

the

LMRP LMRP and

the

BOP
are

BOP

separated

ROV ROV

hot stab connection can use onboard

to

the

BOP

hydraulics
to

The

hydraulic

pumping

power

the

BOP

hydraulics

The

AMF
the

is

based

on

Cameron
requires

circuit

board

that

implements the
control

AMF
i.e

functionality either

The

AMF
the

at

least

one

functional

pod

blue or yellow control

to activate

pod
Each

to initiate of

including

BSR
SEM

and complete its sequence the two control pods contains two

SEMs i.e SEM

power the one
total

and cards
for

and each

SEM

contains

an

AMF

card

To

AMF

each each

SEM
of the control

contains blue and

dedicated yellow control

volt

battery

i.e
four

per
for

SEM
the

two

pods and
27
volt

BOP
to

Each
the

pod

also contains
in

single

DC
also

battery

pack

power

two

SEMs

that

pod

Each

control

pod

12

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

contains pressure
for

high-pressure

shear

circuit

that

activates

the
in

BSR
pod

The

high-

shear
blue

circuit

is

energized
for

by solenoid yellow

103

that

i.e
two

103B
for

the

pod
the

and

103Y
is

the

pod
and

which

activates

30

seconds
with

when
coil

AMF

triggered

Each

solenoid 103 contains

coils

one

connected
of the

to

each

of

SEM
is

SEM
27

in

that

solenoids

pod
from
its

Each

103 solenoids

powered

by the

volt

battery

pack

respective pod.11

BOP
According
to

Design
reviewed by

information for the of

BPs

Vice

President

of

Engineering
in

and

Quality

Drilling

Systems

Division12

BP

was
and

involved

the

configuration active role

in

DWH
2000

BOP

from

the beginning13 stack.14

BP

played

an

specifying

DWH BOP
at the

The
for

DWH
and

was
for

built

in

Hyundai $350

Heavy

Industries
It

Shipyard

in

South Korea

cost of approximately by Falcon

million

was

originally

built later

commissioned
part of
later

Drilling

Co Falcon
first

which

became
1998 Under and
to

Transocean
acquired Contract by

which was

DWH was originally contracted to Vastar BP The DWH BOP was contemplated
The
Vastar

in

Drilling

between

and

Falcon

Drilling Contract.5

the

Drilling

Contract the

Falcon

was
and

to furnish

and

pay

for the

B0P16
in

ensure as

that

BOP was
continuous

adequately
efficient

maintained operation.7

and

such

condition

to permit

10

Deposition of Edward Deposition of William

Gaude September 19 2011 LeNormand

June 20-21 2011 7-8 2011 7-8 2011 7-8 2011

12414-25 15822

1593

12

Deposition of David Deposition of David Deposition of David

McWhorter McWhorter McWhorter

July

1316-18

13

July

5919-11 33023-3313

14

July

15

BP-HZN-21 BP-HZN-2

79MDL00056656-936 79MDL00056656-936
to at

16

BP-HZN-21 79MDL00056768

Blowout under

preventers are
Exhibit
17

be furnished
.20

and

paid

for by the

CONTRACTOR

i.e Falcon

B-3 paragraph

of the

Drilling

Contract

BP-HZN-21
of the

79MDL00056656-936
Drilling

at

BP-HZN-21

79MDL00056674
agrees
includes

Under
to

section
all

14.1.1

Contract

equipment noted
in

and

materials

CONTRACTOR i.e Falcon furnished which by CONTRACTOR

.20 of the
Drilling

maintain
the

BOP

as

Exhibit

B-3 paragraph

Contract

131

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

Although by

the

BOP was
was

manufactured and
heavily

sold
in

by

Cameron and purchased

design
configuration the configuration the routing
of

Falcon
of

Vastar

involved

the

BOP
chose

choice
of the

components
Stack
lines20

and

controls.18 of

Vastar
for

BOP

and the type

that there

rams

each

cavity19

the

MUX

would

be no acoustic

communications21 and
the

factory

adjustments

by
23

Cameron

prior to

acceptance22

EDS

program

mode EDS-1
for
will

Furthermore
configuration

BOP
be

designs

BP
of

decides
its

what

the

BOP

stack

and

instructs

drilling

contractors

including

Transocean rams
the
will

regarding what
located
its in in

types

rams should

be used and where

the configuration

the
of

be
in

the BOP.24
contract

Here BP
with
in

specified

BOP
the

original

Transocean

and

re-specified

the

configuration of

September
well of site

2009

contract amendment.25
ultimately

As
the

Operator

Macondo
the

BP

is

also

responsible

for the

BOP

under

Code
Institute

Federal

Regulations

Petroleum

API

CFR5
Practices

and

American

Recommended

RP26

18

Exhibit

5094 BP-HZNBLYOO294O35 4112

deposition of Michael

19

Exhibit

Byrd

July

13-14 2011

48812-49418

20

BP-HZNBLY00294826 BP-HZNBLYOO29435O BP-HZNBLY00294352 BP-HZNCECO30029

the other available
this

21

22

23

As

discussed

further

below
first

EDS-1

closes

only

the the

whereas Had

EDS mode EDS-2

it

closes the
the the

CSR
drill

and then
pipe

BSR BSR

mode been
to

selected pipe

likely

would

have

centered sealed

before attempt

attempting
24

shear the

which

likely

would

have

well

Deposition of Tony

Hayward
Contract

June

and

2011 5731-14
September 28 2009

25

Amendment

38

to

No

980249

BP-HZN-CECO4 1476

Exhibit
26

1488
of Federal Regulations Continental
Title

Code

30 Part 250

Oil

and Gas and Sulphur

Operations
et

in

the

Outer

Shelf
Institution

Subpart

30

CFR

250
53
Wells

Section

250.400

seq

American
for Blowout

Petroleum Prevention

Recommended

Practice

Recommended

Practices

Equipment Systems

for Drilling

API RP

53

141

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

Ill

THE BOP DESIGN WAS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE SINGLE BSR

the

IT

RELIED ON

After

Macondo
that

blowout

BP acknowledged
in

that

it

had

relied

on the

BOP
also well
its

as

the

ultimate

form
in

of containment

the

event

of

blowout.27

BP
critical

recognized
control crucial

the case of the BOP.28

blowout the
Despite

BSR was

the most
of the

device
role
in

within

the importance
well

the operation of the

within

design
drill

and

implement

the

BOP and overall BOP BSR that

safety

BSR and BP failed

to

could

reliably

shear the

pipe and seal

the well under foreseeable

operating conditions

The
Although there

BSR was
are several
relied

Single

Point of Failure for the

DWH BOP
of

ways
the
in

to

activate

the

BSR
BSR
to

all

the
to

DWH
shear
the
of

emergency
the
drill

systems and

upon
well
for

BOPs
case
entire seal entire

single of

be able

pipe
single

seal

the

the

an emergency
safety

making
Failure

BSR
the

point

of failure
drill

the

BOP
the

system
perform
its

BSR

to

shear the
in

pipe
of

and
the

well
to

for

whatever

reason
intended
of the with

would
function

result

total

failure

BOP
2001

of preventing

blowout

Indeed

Risk Assessment stack configuration

DWH BOP identified single BSR

The

the risks inherent to the

BOP

major
selected

contributor with

to

the

failure

likelihood results from

associated
the

the

BOP
of

control

system
the

stack capable
to

configuration sealing
all

With
well

only in

one
it

shear

ram

is

extremely

difficult

remove

of the single

failure

points from the system.29

27

Deposition of Tony Deposition of Tony Risk

Hayward Hayward
of the

June June

and and

820112351-92777-103017-10 820112897-14
Blowout Preventer

28

29

Assessment
Final

System 0019070

Report

April at

Deepwater Horizon 2000 CAM-CIV-0019032

BOP
at

Control

CAM-CIV-0019076

CAM-CIV

Exhibit 4120

37

151

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

The

Risk Assessment

further noted

that the to

valve that supplies hydraulic

failure

pressure

BSR including the BSR accounts

its

the
for

final

shuttle of the

56%

likelihood

of the

system

to successfully perform

EDS

operation.3

The

Potential for Off-Center

Drill

Pipe

was Well Known

to

BP and Transocean

BOP
situations

with

single

when As

the

BSR EDS
Wells

is

particularly

deficient activation that

For

example

in

system

requires

BPs
pipe
is for

VP
use

of

Technology
off center.31

for Global

Organization

noted
is

EDS

always
in

discussed

above
of the
its

EDS
rigs

primarily

designed

scenarios
failed

where
rig

some
has

aspect

dynamic

positioning

system has

and the

drifted

from

intended

location

those

scenarios the pipe

for

which
to

EDS
pipe.32

has

been

designed
of the huge

is likely is

be

off center

because

tension that

on the

Potential

causes

of off-center

drill

pipe

include

pipe

distortion

or

bowing

from

internal

off-center

pressure loss of rig control and drift debris pushing the pipe ram pushing the drill pipe off-center multiple pipes in the riser Of the
drill

and

elastic to

buckling.33

potential

causes
that not of

elastic

buckling

is

the most buckling

for

likely
is

have

forced type

the

pipe off-center.34 buckling

It

Additionally well

helical

particular
in

of elastic context.35 testing

has been appear

the

known
to

years ever

the

drilling

does

that

Transocean
ability

or

many BP
off-

conducted
drill

any

or

analysis

BSRs

shear

center

pipe

30

Risk

Assessment
Final

of

the

System 0019072
31

Report

April at

Deepwater Horizon 2000 CAM-CIV-0019032

Blowout

Preventer

BOP
at

Control

CAM-CIV-0019076

CAM-CIV

Exhibit 4120

39
Abbassian Abbassian p.6-8

Deposition of Fereidoun Deposition of Fereidoun

May 3-4 2011 502-3 May 3-4 2011 5010-13

2.2.1 2.2

32

DNV DNV

Report

Addendum Addendum
Althouse

section

Report

6-11

section

Lubinski

Packers

JPT 655-70

and Logan June 1962

W.S

J.L

Helical

Buckling

of

Tubing

Sealed

in

161

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

IV

TRANSOCEAN MAINTENANCE
noted

USED

FLAWED

CONDITION-BASED

As

above

under the and

Drilling

Contract

between
its

BP through

its

predecessor Transocean

Vastar

Transocean

through

had primary

responsibility for

maintenance
the

predecessor Falcon of the BOP.36 Every 3-5 Years as

Transocean
Specified

Failed to Recertify

BOP

by API and
to follow

Cameron
testing

Transocean
specified
in

failed

the

and

maintenance
In

guidelines

30

CFR

250
that 3-5

and

API

RP 5337

particular

Transocean

ignored the requirement

After

every

years

of sen/ice

the

BOP

stack

should be manifold and diverter components disassembled and inspected in accordance with the choke manufacturers
guidellnes.38

36

BP-HZN-21
of the

79MDL00056656-936
Drilling

at

BP-HZN-21

79MDL00056674
agrees
includes

Under
to

section
all

14.1.1

Contract

equipment noted
in

and

materials

CONTRACTOR i.e Falcon furnished which by CONTRACTOR

.20 of the
Drilling

maintain
the

BOP

as

Exhibit

B-3 paragraph

Contract

See 30
38

CFR
53

250

et

seq API
17.10.3

RP 53
see
also or

API

RP

section

30

CFR
the

250.446
provisions

requiring

that

BOP
in

maintenance

and

inspections

must meet

exceed

described

API

RP

53
171

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

The
API

recurring

disassembly and
at the surface

inspection

of the

entire

BOP

as outlined

in

RP 53

occurs

and
of

is

important to maintaining

safe and are

effective

BOP

The advantages

regularly

scheduled

recertification

as follows

Advantages

of

API/Cameron

BOP
examine

Recertification Provides
individual periodic opportunities for to

BOP

components

corrosion

and other flaws and necessary

Provides
periodic

to replace

components

wear when
the

opportunities

to

evaluate
or

BOP

design

and
with

replace

deficient

outdated

components
technology

BAST
the

components

and

Ensures components

that

entire at

BOP
least

and
often

its

are

inspected

as

as

every 3-5 years

Consistent

with that

the the

API

the stack

BOP
be
of

manufacturer every

Cameron
3-5
years.39

also
In

recommends
contrast found
that that
for

BOP

recertified

an independent
the the date
is

inspection

DWH
of

two weeks

before the blowout

it

BOP upon
beyond

review

certification certification

documentation

was

noted

of last manufacturers the Although

was

13

2000
API

and

this

yearly inspection

overhaul

December and re
and

certification

requirement.4

Transocean

recognized

that both the

and

Cameron
of

recommended

disassembly
3-5

inspection

recertification

the

entire

BOP

every

years

Transocean

knowingly

chose

not to follow

this

recommendation.41

Deposition of Mark
40

Hay June 29-30 2011 1197-12011

MODU

Condition Assessment

DEEPWATER HORIZON ModuSpec USA

Inc

4/1-

14/2010

TRN-USCG_

MMS-00038652
41

Deposition of William

Stringfellow

April

11-12 2011 21625-21713

181

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

Transoceans Because

Condition-Based

Maintenance

is

Flawed
or

Only Equipment With Failures Gets Fixed or Replaced

Measured

Problems

When
repairs

the piece
to
it.42

of equipment

falls

we

replace

it

or

make

Instead
for

of complying

with

the API and followed

its

Camerons maintenance
own condition-based
maintenance
from

guidelines

the

BOP

Transocean Under
are
not
this

maintenance

program.43

condition-based

components
every 3-5

automatically

removed

BOP program operation and inspected

would
take piece of equipment
it.46

years.44

Rather

Transocean

personnel

measurements
started to

and

test

BOP

equipment45
or
is

and when
fixed

create

problems

fail

Transocean

This

type

of

condition-based

maintenance

subject to numerous

flaws

Problems

with

Transoceans
Maintenance

Condition-Based

Equipment measured
is

deterioration

that

cannot

be

not considered

Need
flaws

for

improved equipment based on design

industry

new

more

difficult

experience or operation environment is not considered

of
is

in

Replacement equipment
with

otherwise discouraged

functioning

BAST

Problems Transoceans
several

that cannot

be measured

are not considered detect blue

condition-based
with

maintenance
including

program
the

failed

to

problems

the

DWH

low charge on the

42

Deposition of Mark Deposition of Mark Deposition of Mark

Hay June 29-30 2011 12018-19 Hay June 29-30 2011 1146-11522 Hay June 29-30 2011 1216-9 2011 2011
157-1

Deposition of Pharr Smith June 27-28

46

Deposition

of Pharr

Smith June 27-28 12117-19

157-13

deposition

of

Mark Hay June

29-30 2011

12018-1

191

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

pod
the

batteries

and These

the

incorrect of

wiring

on yellow pod solenoid 103Y

in

DWH BOP
pod

types

equipment problems are undetectable

the

by
that

condition-based
indicated

maintenance
battery levels

because and

BOP

did

not

have and

sensors
testing

physical

inspection

was

needed

to evaluate that to

the wiring

on yellow pod solenoid pod

batteries of

103Y

But

it

cannot
highly

be debated
important
therefore

properly

functioning

and solenoids are

the

the

safe

and

effective

operation evaluated

BOP
any
flawed

and

should

be

regularly

tested

and

under
is

maintenance because
it

program
fails

Transoceans
consider
is

condition-based
that

maintenance be

to

equipment

cannot

measured
process

whereas
found
in

such

equipment

evaluated

under the

recertification

API and

Camerons
As

guidelines

discussed

further

below pod

the

undercharged

blue

pod
of

batteries

and
the

incorrectly

wired

yellow

solenoid the

103Y
at

may have
time

prevented the
incident battery

AMF/Deadman
ultimately lead

from
to the

activating

BSR

the

and and

blowout

But regardless of whether these

solenoid
highlight

problems were
flaws
in

direct

cause

of the

blowout

these

problems do

Transoceans
of
critical

condition-based

maintenance

program
by

The

working

condition

components

was

not

evaluated

Transocean

because

it

could

not

be measured
not

Need
Another
that
it

for

improved equipment

is

considered maintenance program

that
is is

flaw

with not

Transoceans
detect the

condition-based
to

does

need

improve

existing

equipment

otherwise

functioning

properly are

Equipment
not

measurements
to
identify

during flaws

condition-based

maintenance
in

going

design

improvements
requirements condition-based expectations

industry to

knowledge
in

and

practices
difficult

or

increased

system Under
line

due

operation
if

more
not be

environment
are
for
in

maintenance
that

equipment measurements
considered

with

equipment
For

will

further

potentially

necessary
inspected engineering

upgrades
the

example

had

Transocean and
at

disassembled

and

DWH
review

BOP
or

for recertification

performed

perfunctory since

industry

comparison

Transocean up
to

would

have

found

that the

DWH

did

not

any have
as

time

2006 Camerons most

below
for the

date

BOP

control safety

system
benefits

Mark

Ill

which Mark
II

described

provides

numerous

over the

system used
that involves
is

DWH

BOP

recurring inspection

BOP
as

recertification part of

process

BOP
to

disassembly and

an engineering

review

superior

20

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

Transoceans
provides
that
is

condition-based opportunity
in

process

because

recurring

recertification

an

to

identify

changing
order

requirements

for

equipment

otherwise

perfect

working

Implementing

BAST

is

discouraged program on
replacing

Transoceans
implementation the event
of

condition-based
of

maintenance
it

discourages

the
in

BAST because
improved
existing further

focuses

equipment only
to

measurable

problems

or failures

as

opposed
that

periodically

evaluating otherwise

whether
functional

equipment

exists

should

replace

equipment
discourages
to

Transoceans
the

condition-based
of

maintenance
failing

program
the

implementation

BAST

by

to

provide

opportunity

implement
at

BAST
surface

equipment
In

and

technology maintenance
the surface

which

typically

must

occur

the

contrast
at

programs based on engineering encourage

to

review
of

the

implementation
for
all

i.e recertification BAST by providing

and
to
in

the
to
in

opportunity

evaluate

BAST
available

equipment

the

opportunity

implement
the

BAST when

The many failures

are unsurprising

implement
light

BAST

DWH BOP

discussed

below

of the

flaws of

Transoceans

condition-based

maintenance

program
IN

BP FAILED TO IMPLEMENT
The CFR
the
requires that

BAST

THE BOP
Macondo
well site

BP

as Operator
technology

of the

must use
on
all

best available

and

safest

BAST
BOP

whenever

practical

exploration

development

and

production areas
of the
its

operations.47
including function

But

BP

failed

to

implement
that
drill

BAST

in

numerous
unable

the single
of severing

BSR
the

was

ultimately

to perform

intended

pipe and sealing

the well

BP
Implementing

Failed to

Implement BAST
single

for the

BSR
critical

BAST
single

in

the

BSR was

particularly that

due

to the

BSR
upon
the

being
to seal

point of failure
in

and the device

the well

the case of an
of

emergency

was ultimately relied BP knew the BSR was

blowout48

most important piece

still

equipment
in

for preventing

and

yet

BP

failed

to

implement

BAST

the

BSR

and

preferably

add

second

30 C.F.R
48

250.107c
Hayward June and

Deposition of Tony

820112897-14

211

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

BSR.49 the
rig

Indeed the

BSRs on
in

the

DWH BOP

had

not

been

upgraded

since

was
with

first

ordered

ggg50

BSRs

double the

shaped

cutting

blades For

and

wider

blades

were

available

when
lower

BOP was

designed
double

example Camerons Double

cutting

Shear upper and

DVS

Rams
blocks.51

featured

shaped

blades

on

both

the
of

The

design

provided
also

the

benefits

helping to center
efficiency

the

drill

pipe during activation

and

improving Accordingly
for

shearing using
in

by reducing block
instead

the necessary shearing

of the

force.52

DVS ram
with

shearing the

blind to

ram block shear

the

BSR

the

DWH BOP
the

would

have

allowed
psi

BSR

greater range system.53

of pipe

maximum 4000
shearing by testing double

available

to the

emergency

The
that

improved

efficiency

of

double Services
required factor of

rams
in

was

further for

demonstrated

by

West

Engineering lower the

2004

MMS
and

showed

blades

shear

force

therefore

required
to

hydraulic

pressure by

approximately

20%

BSRs with blade and For single straight blade.54 the DWH BOP Camerons DVS was also superior to the shearing blind ram because the DVS blade length was maximized to increase shearing BP must have known about these advantages of the DVS capabilities.55
when compared
over the shearing as
blind

ram which Cameron

touted

in

its

product

literature

shown

below.56

BP-HZN-BLY00294352-59
50

Deposition of Jack

Erwin

June 6-7 2011 6524

Exhibit

661

51

Cameron Cameron

EB 852D EB 852D

7001 7001
deposition of Jack

52

Exhibit

Erwin

June 6-7 2011

4616-19
Deposition of David

McWhorter
Services

July

7-8 2011

1108-12 Study
for

West

Engineering Service

Shear

Ram

Capabilities

U.S

Minerals

Management
Cameron
56

Requisition Exhibit

No

3-4025-1001

page 3-5 September

2004

EB 852D

7001

Cameron EB 852D

13 Exhibit

7001

22

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

5Rs
5hearin
BLind

-vs-

DYS
Shear Rams

Rams

Dcuble

Longer

packer

fatigue

Life

Require CapabLe

Less

shear force
Larger

of shearing

diameters

No Fig

toss

of fatigue

life

Comparison

of Shearing

Blind

Ram

versus

DVS rams from

Cameron Product DVS

which rams and
could blades
for

Literature.57

an

18-3/4
in

inch

wellbore

15000
were

psi

TL

BOP
from

have

been

used

the

DWH

BOP
was
to

available

Cameron
than the

at least

as early as 2002.58 by

Cameron

sales representative also

acknowledged

that

2009

or

2010

DVS

much

more

used
in

ram

SBR

and the

DVS ram was

considered

be the best

practice

at that time.59

BP

also did

not

implement

Camerons tandem
shearing
force

boosters

which

feature

two-part piston packers.6

that increases

without additional
at least

wear on the

The tandem
of

boosters

were

available

as early as 199861

and

use on

tandem

boosters

would
If

have

increased

the

shear

force

of the that

BSR

the

DWH
off

BOP
bore

covered sheared blowout

the entire well the center

the

BP had used DVS rams with BSR most likely would have
and
sealed the well

blades

successfully the

drill

pipe

preventing

Cameron EB 852D
58

13 Exhibit

7001
Parts

Cameron BLY0036641
Deposition

2002

Replacement

Catalog

pg

108

BP-HZN

of

Jack Erwin June 6-7

10 Exhibit 10 Exhibit

2011 6220-25

60

Cameron EB 852D Cameron EB 852D

7001 7001

61

23

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

BP and Transocean Second BSR

second

Failed to

Upgrade

the

BOP

to Include

BSR
well

installed

below

the

CSR
both

would

provide pipe

redundancy
in

and and
the
fall

significantly sealing

improve
If

the

reliability

of

shearing

the
first

BOP
with

the

drill

string

is

suspended

and
the

sheared
drill

CSR i.e
clearing to

Super

Shears
located

during an

emergency

pipe

should

the

BSR

below the casing

pipe

ram

This allows the lower

in its

BSR
of the

close

and

seal

without

interference that

bore
or

Moreover

Cameron
rigs

sales representative BSRs.62

testified

by 2009

2010 most

had double

BP and Transocean
Ill

Failed to

Upgrade

to

Camerons

Mark

BOP

Control

Pod
II

The
could

DWH BOP
not

used Cameron Mark

that

BOP

control

pods63

with

double
of

coil

solenoids and

batteries

were

not

rechargeable
rig.64

and the charge

which

be

monitored

from

the

As
for
Ill

discussed are

above

properly

functioning

control

pod solenoids and

critical

batteries

needed

to operate

the

AMF
and

system and are Transocean

failed

components
to

safe and
control

effective that

BOP BP
have been

to

upgrade

Mark

pods

available

since 2006.65

62

Deposition of Jack Deposition of Jack Deposition of David Deposition of David

Erwin Erwin

June 6-7 2011 622-14 June 6-7 2011

July

63

36715-17

64

McWhorter McWhorter

7-8 2011 2901-4 7-8 2011 28917-20

65

July

24

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

Mark

Ill

control

pods have

rechargeable from the

rig.67

batteries66

and

the charge on the

batteries

can

be monitored
coil

Mark

Ill

control

pods

also

have

improved
the

single

solenoids with
wiring

higher pulling force68 which

of

eliminates

potential
II

incorrect

problem
in

the

dual

coil

solenoids

used

in

Mark

control

pods and

found

yellow pod

solenoid

103Y
has
Ill

of the
testified

DWH
that
its

BOP

Moreover
its

Cameron
customers
II

corporate

representative the

Cameron made
the Mark

aware

of

new Mark
that

system and

improvements over the Mark

Ill

system and

Transocean

was aware

of

system

in

2006.69

BP

Failed

to

Implement

BAST

by

Relying Solely

on

MUX

Cables for
All

EDS
the from

methods
by

of

activating

DWH
the
rig

EDS
down

relied

on

communications

transmitted

MUX

cables

to the

BOP
failed

DWH

rig

crew

members
to physical

testified

that they

attempted

to activate

the

EDS system

after the

explosion but were unsuccessful

The EDS may have

cables

to activate

due

damage
been
rig

to the

MUX

caused

by the explosion
of

An

ACS

could the

have

used as
the

redundant

means

communication

between

DWH
being

and

BOP
control

Cameron had
redundant
in

was

configured.7

ACS available when the DWH ACS system could provide BOP
of

communications
cables

and

the

case

an

emergency

even

if

MUX

were

damaged BP and Transocean

EDS-1
Instead of Failed to

Implement

BAST

by

Using

EDS-2

Cameron
depending

could

program various on what was requested an

EDS
by

into the sequences Transocean.71 BP and

DWH
The
that

BOP DWH
if

BOP

implemented

EDS
of

program

called

EDS-1

that

specifies

predetermined
66

sequence
Erwin

emergency

disconnect

events

such

the

Deposition of Jack Deposition of David Deposition of Jack Deposition of David Deposition of David Deposition of David

June 6-7 2011

July

36718-22

67

McWhorter
Erwin

7-8 2011 28921-25

68

June 6-7 2011

July

37014

3716 3606

69

McWhorter McWhorter McWhorter

7-8 2011 7-8 2011

3587

70

July

1286-16

71

July

7-8 2011 2248-12

25

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

EDSIoccur.72

button

is

pushed
the

the

predetermined

sequence
to close

of

events

will

EDS-1
the

for

DWH
the

was programmed
closed

the

BSR and
on

then

disconnect
called

LMRP.73

Another

EDS sequence
before the

was

available closed.74

DWH
not
seal

EDS-2 whereby
first

CSR

BSR

Because does

EDS-2
the

applies

the
is

CSR
the

which

has

capabilities

the

BSR
the
for

activation
well.75

of

EDS-2

more

likely

to successfully
is

shear the pipe and

to seal

Although
of the

CSR
would
that

not

designed
the

wellbore the

activation

CSR

first

have
the

centered

drill

pipe

BSR
drill

making pipe and

having

it

much more
seal

likely

BSR would
sequence

completely
to

shear the

the well

BP and Transocean
the EDS-1 instead of

failed

implement

BAST
likely

by

Cameron program
for the seal

as the

primary disconnect
to

sequence

DWH BOP
the well
if

EDS-2 which was more

successfully

activated

VI

THE UNDERCHARGED BLUE CONTROL POD BATTERIES AND INCORRECTLY WIRED YELLOW CONTROL POD SOLENOID 103Y MAY HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTING CAUSES OF THE BOPS INABILITY TO STOP THE BLOWOUT
discussed
to fire control

As
the

above
But the
is

BSR

AMF/Deadman AMF/Deadman can only be

when
the properly

is

activated
if

it

causes one

the
of

activated requires

at least

pods

functioning

which

charged

batteries testing of

and working
the true

solenoids
related

Based

on

my

review

of the
it

post-incident that

BOP

and

deposition

testimony76

appears

neither

was

72

Deposition of Jack Deposition of Jack Deposition of David Deposition of David

Erwin

June 6-7 2011 2714 June 6-7 2011

July

-2810

Erwin

301-9

McWhorter McWhorter
Turlak

7-8 2011 22513-24 7-8 2011 22610-25

July

76

Deposition

of Robert

Gaude September 19 2011

are

28-29 2011 22817 13011-22 testifying that

July the valve
will

2295
if

deposition
in

of

Edward
solenoid other
if

two

coils

single

wired

in

opposite
out

directions solenoid
it

electromagnetic would
not

fields

would

oppose

each

and cancel
solenoid
is

and

the

operate

2103-8

testifying

that

not

wired correctly

not function

correctly

26

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

Undercharged Blue
During
batteries

Control

Pod
by

Batteries

post

incident
volt

forensic battery

testing

DNV

of

the

blue

control below.77

pod

the 27

registered

low charge

as shown

Blue P01 BattenTest

8.9 8.7 1.1

VoLts
Test
8.9 8.7 1.0

Yellow Pod Test

3.7 8.4

Volts
Test
8.7

SEMA9V SEMB9V
Solenoid

8.4 28.2

TransclucerC7V
Control

2S.2

Fig

BOP

Pod

Battery

Measurements

from the

DNV

report.78

Due
blue

these

to

low charge

in

the

27

volt

battery
sufficient

it

is

very

unlikely to

that

the the

control

pod

would

have

had

power

activate

AMF/Deadman

at the time of the incident

Incorrectly Wired Post incident

forensic

Yellow Control
by

Pod Solenoid 103Y

that

testing

DNV

also

showed

one

of the

two

coils

from yellow control

failed

pod solenoid

03Y had been

pod

incorrectly

wired and
testing.79

03Y As

to activate of

either

yellow control
incorrectly

SEM

during bench

result polarities

103Y
each

being

wired

the

two

coils

had

opposite

and

the electromagnetic other out and

fields

generated prevent

by the two

coils

would

largely cancel

could
in

03Y

actuating the

BSR

in

response

to the

AMF/Deadman

circuit

the yellow

pod

DNV
78

Report Vol Report Vol Report

page 42
Table

DNV DNV

page 42 The
results of solenoid
to

Vol

page 44
properly
in

103Y

testing

are inconclusive and

because
as would

03Y worked
have Exhibit

when

connected

and operated
Notes from

by

SEM

SEM
of

occurred

the

field

Laboratory

DNV

testing

103Y

016862

3130

27

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

The

AMF/Deadman Failed to Actuate the BSR Likely because of Low Blue Pod Battery and the Incorrectly Wired
Pod Solenoid
had redundant

Yellow Even though the response 27

to

BOP

mechanisms
it

for actuating
likely

the

BSR

in

the
failed

AMF/Deadman
The
suggest
the
that

conditions

appears

that

both

mechanisms
volt

low battery
it

charge measurements
did

for the

blue pod
to

battery

pack

not

have

enough

the two blue pod blue

SEMs

at the time of the

incident
incorrect

power which would prevent the on solenoid 103Y and the two

charge

pod from
that

activating

BSR
coil

The

wiring

suggests
coils

because

each

received

the

same

voltage80

were

activated

simultaneously
fields

as
pod

is

the normal

operation during cancel the

AMF
other
It

activation81 out

the magnetic prevent

that

from the two coils would from

failed

each

and

would
likely

the

yellow

activating to

BSR.82

is

therefore

the

AMF/Deadman
volt

activate

the

BSR

as

result of the

low charge on the 27

wired yellow pod solenoid

O3Y
the

blue pod

battery

and the

incorrectly

The

BSR
the

Likely

Would Have Completely Sheared

Well
if

the

Drill

Pipe and Sealed

the

BSR

had

been

Activated

when

Drill

Pipe

was Centered
and
incorrectly

The undercharged

blue

pod

batteries

wired

solenoid

03Y
at the

may have
at the

prevented

the

AMF/Deadman and
did not

from
If

properly

functioning

time of the incident

and

activating

the BSR.84

the

drill

pipe

was

centered

time of the incident the

become

off-center

until

later then
drill

activating

BSR

probably

would

have

completely

sheared the

pipe

and sealed the well preventing

the blowout

80

Deposition of Edward Deposition of Edward Deposition of Edward

Gaude September 19 2011 Gaude September 19 2011 Gaude September 19 2011

there but
is

1387-12
131 131

81

9-16 23

82

1323
function did
is

83

As discussed
activate the

above

evidence
the

that

suggests
is

the

AMF/Deadman
on
this

not also
84
It

BSR

overall the

evidence

inconclusive

point

There

evidence

that suggests

AMF/Deadman
the

may have
activated
at

activated

the

BSR ROy

is

possible

for

example

that

BSR was

later

time by the

28

Expert Report

of Glen

Stevick

Ph.D

P.E

As

discussed
if

above
that

undercharged had

blue

pod

batteries

would

have
Ill

been

avoided
control

BP and Transocean
of battery

implemented
control rig

Camerons Mark
pod
batteries

BOP

system

uses rechargeable

and

allows

remote monitoring based on

to recurring

charge from the

maintenance

program have
also

disassembly inspection

and

recertification

as opposed
provided

Transoceans

condition-based

maintenance
batteries

probably

would have

detected

the undercharged blue pod

and would
functional

an

opportunity to replace

them

will

fully

charge and

batteries

Similarly single
coil

implementation solenoids would as found

in

of

Camerons Mark
prevented
recurring

Ill

BOP

control

system

with

have

the problem of incorrectly

wired

solenoids

03Y
have an

recertification

based maintenance
incorrectly with

program probably and would provided

functioning

would

detected
to

that

opportunity

103Y was 103Y replace

wired
properly

solenoid

reserve
additional

the

right

to modify

this

report

and
in

to

supplement
to

my

opinions served

if

data

becomes

available

and

response

reports

by

other parties

Dated January

17 2012

Dr Glen

St

vick

P.E

29

APPENDIX

MDL NO
2179
in

In

re by the
Oil

Oil Spill

Rig
April

Deepwater Horizon
the Gulf of

Mexico on

20 2010

DR
GLEN STEVICK SOURCE
RELIANCE APPENDIX

BP-HZN-21 79MDL00056656-56936

BP-HZN-BLYOO1

24026

BP-HZN-BLYOO1

24588-124698

ProDerties

of Part

01366513

of

65

Pages

BP-HZN-BLYOO1
Properties of Part Collar
to

78528-178530
Float Transcripts

01366516
re re

BP-HZN-BLY00294035-294036
5/31/2010
email to

Wong
Abbassian Assignment/Paul Abbasian
Investigation Investigation
---

MBI Hearing
Dias systems

BP-HZN-BLY00294350-294351
6/8/2010 5/27/2010 Questions 7/1/2010 from Fereidoun Dias email Abbassian

BOP
Float Factual
Critical

BP-HZN-BLY00294352-294359 May 27th CF1-NTF1O

Collar Preliminary

BP-HZN-BLY00346210-346212 Deepwater Deepwater Form Cameron 2002 Replacement

Parts

Horizon Incident Horizon Incident

Failure

Factor Outcome

BP-HZN-BLYOO35O1
5/13/2010 00/00/2002 Catalog

58-350159

BP-HZN-BLY00366307-366448

BP-HZN-CECO1
Float Collar

1425 Drawing Conversion

of
to

7M45AP
10/11/2004
Letter

BP-HZN-CEC030029-30030 Agreement
re

for

VBR
Test

Ram

between

Transocean

and

BP

BP-HZN-CEC030137
Spreadsheet 4/14/2009 Mooring Morel
re

Casing Thread Analysis Report for

Actual

Damage BP
in

BP-HZN-MBI00061
Intermoor
Paikattu to email

305-61 4/16/2010
9-7/8

403

MODU
vs model
Revised

BP-HZN-MB100128436-128438
4/17/2010 Gagliano
re

liner

run

BP-HZN-MBIOO1
email to

28489-128490
Morel Notes
--

et

al

OptiCem

Report with

additional

Centralizers

BP-HZN-MB10012961
4/28/2010
Interview

6-1

29619 Deepwater
of

Bob Kaluza
Horizon

BP-HZN-MBIOO1
4/20/2010
Halliburton
1/1

34806-134834

HAZOP
Foamed

Well Control Production Well

Parts
re

Systems
Casing Post Job Report

BP-HZN-MBIOO1
4/2010
Application
Drilling for

37364-137377

9.875
Revised

BP-HZN-MB100294826-294833
00/00/2006 6/28/2006 Engineering
Bulletin Errata

BP
Cameron 2006

New
Sheet
re

CAM_CIV_001

9664-19819

Replacement

Catalog Shearing Capabilities Shearing

Capabilities of of

CAM_CIV_0370157-370165
7/9/2010 1/21/2008 1/27/2004 Engineering Engineering 3/23/2007
Bulletin Bulletin

Cameron Shear Cameron Shear

CAM_DIV_03701 Cameron Engineering

00-3701

16

Cameron Engineering

Bulletin Bulletin

DECO77-006509-6528

re

Shearing
Errata Errata

Capabilities

of

Cameron Shear
Sheet Sheet
re re

Rams Rams Rams

Shearing Capabilities Shearing Capabilities
of of

1M5054-016139-16143

Cameron Shear Cameron Shear

TRN-INV-00580489-580497

Rams Rams
Summary
of

TRN-INV-03489834-3489863
Temperture 3/31/2009 8/6/2007 Transocean

NASA/DNV

Test Preparation and Pressure Well Control

Sheet

BOP-Ol

Test Solenoid

at

Deep Hand book

Bulletin

Sea

TRN-MDL-00286767

TRN-MDL00607699-607707

Cameron Engineering

Revision 257

Ex
02/00/2011

Chief Counsels Report to National

Final

Commission on
Report to the Offshore
Drilling

the

BP Deepwater
President
re

Horizon

Oil

Spill

01/00/2011 11/16/2010

Deepwater

The Gulf

Oil

Disaster

and

the

Future of

National

Academy

of

Sciences Republic of the Marshall Marine Casualtylnvestigaton

Interim

Report on Islands Office Report

of the

Causes
Maritime

of

Blowout Administrator Deepwater Horizon

of

65

Pages

The Bureau
of

Ocean
Energy
of the April

9/14/2011 Regarding
United
into

Management
Regulation Well blowout JIT Report
the the

and Report

Enforcement--

the

Causes
Coast Report of Investigation and
of
April in

20 2010 Macondo
Circumstances

States Fire Sinking the

Guard
Loss Gulf of Mexico Eleven

Surrounding
Mobil

4/22/2011
the

Explosion
Unit

Crew Members Aboard 20-22 2010

Offshore

Drill

Deepwater Horizon
for
II

3/20/2011 6/22/2011
Investigation
II

DNV
Report EP030842 and Report
Investigation Draft

BOEMRE
Volumes
and

Transocean

Volumes

9/8/2010
6/8/2011

BP Deepwater
Horizon Accident

Report Bly Report

Transoceans Response
Report Carter Deposition
Transcript Transcript Transcript to

USCG

6/6/20

Erwin Erwin Jack David

Deposition Transcript Transcript Transcript Transcript Transcript Transcript Transcript Transcript Deposition Deposition Transcript Transcript Deposition Transcript Transcript Transcript Deposition William Deposition Deposition Deposition Deposition Deposition Deposition William

Jack Carter Deposition

6/7/20

6/29/2011
7/6/2011

Hay Mark
Kenney
Gary

6/20/2011

LeNormand LeNormand
McWtiorter McWtiorter Pleasant Pleasant Christopher
Neil Deposition

6/21/2011
7/7/2011 7/8/2011

David David Christopher

3/14/2011 3/15/2011
7/5/2011

Thompson
McWtiorter McWtiorter

7/20/2011 7/21/2011 7/18/2011

James Owen James Owen

Deposition Deposition

Whitby Melvy Whitby Melvy

7/19/2011 6/30/2011

Hay Mark Ex 7043 Ex 7044 Ex 7045

7046 7000 7001 7002 7003 7004 7005 7006

David

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

of

65

Pages

Ex
7007 7008 7009 7010 7011 7012 7013 7014 7015 7016 7017 7018 7019 7020 7021 7022 7023 7024 7025 7026 7027 7028 7029 7030 7031 7032 7033 7034 7035 7036 7037 7038 7039 7040 7041 7042 3626

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

of

65

Pages

Ex
3627 3628 3601 3602 3603 3604 3605 3606 3607 3608 3609 3610 3611 3612 3613 3614 3615 3616 3617 3618 3619 3620 3621 3622 3623 3624 3625 592 593 594 580 581 582 583 584 585 586

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

of

65

Pages

Ex
587 588 589 590

Ex Ex Ex
Force Expansion 04182011 through
daily Calculation

Ex 591 HBRA Flow and HBRA Thermal

Calculation-Odmund

BOP
Data
Files laser

06232011

DNV

notebook

entries

testing

spreadsheets

scanning throough through 06222011 06212011

data

BOP
Image Video
file

files

04182011 04182011

DNV

daily pictures

taken

of investigation

BOP
listing

DNV

inventoryof

video

files

taken

of

investigation

8/27/2010 between
offshore
drilling

DNV
Report
regulations
in

No
201 0-1220
Practice Practices
for

G0M
63
Third Edition

vs Norway from OLF/NOFO Norway and

March

Summary U.S Gulf

of

of differences

Mexico

API 9/1/2004

Recommended Recommended

1997 Reaffirmed
Prevention Equipment

September Systems
for
Drilling

2004
Wells

Blowout

3/1/2011

DHSG
Final

Report

9/1/2010 Report
re

BP
3342 3343 3344 3286 3287 3288 3289 3290 3291 3292 3293 3294 3295 3296 3297 3298 3299

Deepwater Horizon Containment

and

Response and

Lessons

Learned

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

of

65

Pages

Ex
3300 3301 3302 3303 3304 3305 3306 3307 3308 3309 3310 3311 3312 3313 3314 3315 3316 3317 3318 3319 3320 3321 3322 3323 3324 3325 3326 3327 3328 3329 3330 3331 3332 3333 3334 3335 3336

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

of

65

Pages

Ex
3337 3338 3339 3340 3341 3147 3148 3129 3130
131

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 3140 3141 3142 3143 3144 3145 3146 3184 3185 186 187 166 167 168 169 170
171

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

172 3173

of

65

Pages

Ex
3174 3175 3176 3177 3178 3179 3180 3181 3182 3183 3797 3798 3799 3779 3780 3781 3782 3783 3784 3785 3786 3787 3788 3789 3790 3791 3792 3793 3794 3795 3796 3986 3987 3979 3980 3981 3982

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

of

65

Pages

Ex
3983 3984 3985 705 706 707 700 701 702 703

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex 04 Ex 195 Ex 196
197 198 199 158 159 160
161

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170
171

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
172 173 174 175 176 177 1178

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

10

of

65

Pages

Ex
1179 1180
181

Ex Ex Ex
182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 192 193 194 1300 3121 3122 3123 3124 3125 3126 3127 3128 Expert Report
Birch Hurst Perkin Pritchard

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
8/26/2011 8/26/20 Bea-Gale

Pis
Expert Report Expert Report Expert Report

George Andrew Gregg

David

8/26/2011 8/26/2011 8/26/2011 8/26/2011

Pis P15 P15

Expert Report Expert Report
Plot

Geoff Webster

P15 Pis
Range
Review.xls

BP Macondo Bypass Sec Surface Data

West
12/00/2002 8/31/2011 8/31/2011 8/31/2011 Engineering
Requisition

4-19-1250

to

4-20

2200

Services

Inc Mini

Shear

Study

for

U.S

Minerals

Management

Service

No
Benge
Davis Glen

2-1011-1003 Expert Report

Dr Rory Expert Report

Heenan

Richard Expert

USA USA Report USA

11

of

65

Pages

8/31/2011

Huffman Cowie
Deposition Deposition Transcript Transcript Transcript Transcript Transcript

Dr Alan Expert Report

USA

6/29/2011 6/30/2011

James James
Kal Deposition Deposition Deposition

Cowie
Kasal

7/21/2011
4/6/2011 4/7/2011

Sims David Sims David

Ex
1488

Ex 2223
Casing Run Torque
Deposition Transcript

Data

9/19/2011 738 1260

Deposition Deposition Deposition Deposition Deposition Transcript Transcript Transcript Transcript Transcript

Gaude Ed Ex Ex

3/30/20 3/31/2011 4/21/2011

Vargo Richard Vargo Richard Walz

Gregory Gregory Jesse

4/22/20

Walz
Gagliano Childs Greg 5768 5769

5/11/2011 9/27/2011

Expert Report Transocean

Ex Ex Ex 5770 Ex 5771 Ex 4000 Ex 4001 Ex 4002 Ex 4003 Ex 4004 Ex 4005 Ex 4006 Ex 4007 Ex 4008 Ex 4009 Ex 4010 Ex 4011 Ex 4012 Ex 4013 Ex 4014

12

of

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Pages

Ex 4015 Ex 4016 Ex 4017 Ex 4018 Ex 4019 Ex 4020 Ex 4021 Ex 4022 Ex 4023 Ex 4024 Ex 4025 Ex 4026 Ex 4027 Ex 4028 Ex 4029 Ex 4030 Ex 4031 Ex 4032 Ex 4033 Ex 4034 Ex 4035 Ex 4036 Ex 4037 Ex 4038 Ex 4039 Ex 4040 Ex 4041 Ex 4042 Ex 4043 Ex 4044 Ex 4045 Ex 4046 Ex 4047 Ex 4048 Ex 4049 Ex 4050 Ex 4051

13

of

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Pages

Ex 4052 Ex 4053 Ex 4054 Ex 4055 Ex 4056 Ex 4057 Ex 4058 Ex 4059 Ex 4060 Ex 4061 Ex 4062 Ex 4063 Ex 4064 Ex 4065 Ex 4066 Ex 4067 Ex 4068 Ex 4069 Ex 4070 Ex 4071 Ex 4072 Ex 4073 Ex 4074 Ex 4075 Ex 4076 Ex 4077 Ex 4078 Ex 4079 Ex 4080 Ex 4081 Ex 4082 Ex 4083 Ex 4084 Ex 4085 Ex 4086 Ex 4087 Ex 4088

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of

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Ex 4089 Ex 4090 Ex 4091 Ex 4092 Ex 4093 Ex 4094 Ex 4095 Ex 4096 Ex 4097 Ex 4098 Ex 4099
Ex

400
4101

Ex Ex 4102 Ex 4103 Ex 4104 Ex 4105 Ex 4106 Ex 4107 Ex 4108 Ex 4109 Ex 4110 Ex 4111 Ex 4112 Ex 4113 Ex 4114 Ex 4115 Ex 4116 Ex 4117 Ex 4118 Ex 4119 Ex 4120 Ex 4121 Ex 4122 Ex 4123 Ex 4124 Ex 4125

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Ex 4126 Ex 4127 Ex 128 Ex 129

130
131

Ex Ex Ex
132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140
141

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150
151

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

Ex 161 Ex 4162

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Ex 4163 Ex 4164 Ex 165 Ex 166

167 168 169 170
171

Ex Ex Ex

Ex Ex Ex
172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180
181

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190
191

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
192 193 194 195 196 197

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

Ex 198 Ex 4199

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5710 5711 5712 5713 5714 5715 5716 5717 5718 5719 5720 5721 5722 5723 5724 5725 5726 5727 5728 5729 5730 5731 5732 5733 5734 5735 5736 5737 5738 5739 5740 5741 5742 5743 5744 5745 5746

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5747 5748 5749 5750 5751 5752 5753 5754 5755 5756 5757 5758 5759 5760 5761 5762 5763 5764 5765 5766 5767 Robert Deposition Robert Deposition
Transcript Transcript

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
4/11/2011

Bodek Bodek
1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1048 1049 1050

4/12/2011

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

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1051 1052 053 1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087

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Ex
1088 1089 090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124

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Ex
1125 1126 127 128 129 130
131

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132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140
141

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142 143 144 146 147 148 149 150
151

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152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160
161

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1162

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1163 1164 1165 166 167 168 169 170
171

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Ex Ex Ex
172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180
181

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182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 1200

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex

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Ex
1201 1202 203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241

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Ex
1242 1243

243A
1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 3783 3784 3785 3786 3787 3788 3789 3790 3779 3780 3781 3782 3983 3984 3985 3986

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Ex
3987 3791 3792 3793 3794 3795 3796 3797 3798 3799 3979 3980 3981 3982 1869
\Nilliam

Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
6/21/2011

LeNormand
Depositon
Transcript Transcript Transcript

7/18/2011

Whitby Melvyn
Deposition Deposition

7/19/2011

Whitby Melvyn

Ex
1455
of Deposition

10/7/2010 Testimony
Lirette Brent 6/7/2011

John

Guide

before

oint

USCG-Boem

Investigation

Transcript

Ex
3375
Jeff

9/23/2010

Wolfe

Expert Report Transocean

Ex 2096
6/6/20 6/8/20

Hayward Hayward
Perkin

Tony Tony

Deposition Deposition

Transcript Transcript

8/26/2011 7/13/2011 7/14/2011 API 9/1/2004

G.S

Expert Report
Deposition Transcript Transcript

Byrd Michael

Byrd Michael Deposition Recommended

Practice

53 Third

Edition

March

1997 Reaffirmed

September

12004
Recommended
Code
of practices for

Blowout

Prevention

Equipment Federal Regulations Outer Continental

Title

Systems
30 Shelf Subpart
Part

for

Drilling

Wells

250

Oil

and

Gas and

Sulphur Operations

in

the

30

CFR

250

64

of

65

Pages

DNVAddendumto
Final

Reportforthe Regulation Preventer 30

April Transcript Transcript

United

States

Departmentofthe Forensic Examination

lnteriorBureau of
of Final

Ocean
4/30/2011 Energy Horizon Blowout Contract Award 2011

Management
Enforcement

and

Deepwater
Report
5/3/2011 Deposition Deposition 5/4/2011

No
Ml 0PX00335

Volume

Report

No
EP030842

Abbassian Fereidoun Abbassian Fereidoun

Lubinski Althouse 962

06/00/1

W.S
and

Logan

J.L
Helical

Buckling of Tubing

Sealed

in

Packers
1962 6/27/20
Deposition Deposition Transcript Transcript

JPT 655-70 June

Smith Pharr Smith Pharr West

Engineering
Capabilities Requisition

6/28/20 09/00/2004 Service page Services

Shear

Ram

Study

for

U.S Minerals Management 2004

No
3-4025-1001

3-5 September

65

of

65

Pages

APPENDIX

1VIDLNo
In re

2179
by the Oil Rig

Oil Spill

Deepwater Horizon
Appendix

in

the

Guif of Mexico

on April 20 2010

Expert report of

Dr

Glen Stevick

Appendix

BSR
The

Capacity

Calculations

subject

BSR

was
rig

underrated

for

the

drill

pipe
to

sizes

being

used

on the

DWH
to

BP

engineers

and

DWH
grade

crew

members had

access

and shared
of that

Cameron

shear

capacity high

chart based strength

on 2005

2006
drill

and 2007
is

emails The

portion

chart pertaining

S135

pipe

shown below

Required Hyd Pressure psi

Mm
Size

Well I.D Wall

Well
Pressure

Well
Pressure

Weight

in
3.5 3.5

Grade

Yield

iwO
12.95 13.3 19.5

psi
S135 S135 S135 S135 135000 135000 135000 135000

in
2.750 2.764 4.276 5.345

in
0.375 0.368 0.362 0.640

Pressure

Ambient

5000

psi

10000

psi

1412
1388

2i59
2135 2769

2905
2882 3516

2022 4614

6.625

40.9

Table

C-i

Cameron
in in

chart

of required

SR

hydraulic shear intended

pressure

green and

red

areas.2
limit

Pressures

Green

are within the charts the

5000

psi operating

system

Pressures

Red
the

are outside

system operating

or

geometry

capacity

At

the

time of the incident

BSR

pressure

was

limited

to

4000 psi

Table being factor blade

shows used
in

that

the

BSR

did not

have

the

capability

to

shear
to

all

of the

pipe

sizes

that

were
safety

on the
data

DWH
given
in

Furthermore
Table
to

there account

does not
for

appear the

be an

adequate of

design

the

friction

variation

material

strengths

sharpness

etc

Using shear data

than

in

the open

literature

the pressure

values

in

Table

can be reproduced with

is

less

1.5% error with two

simple

equations

The

calculated

shear load

0.62Ad
where

Gf

SF
and
is

Ad

is

the

drill

pipe

cross plus

sectional 10 ksi

area

the

flow
the

stress

equal

to

the

specified
tensile in

minimum
strength

yield 145 ksi

stress
in this

This

happens

to

equal

specified
is

minimum

case

An

additional

safety factor
to

Sf

for

design

also included
ratio

the

formula

The

shear

constant

was assumed

equal

0.62

based

on the

average

of

shear

BP-HZN-BLY00
Exhibit

10345-61

No

7046

1VIDLNo
In re

2179
by the Oil Rig

Oil Spill

Deepwater Horizon
Appendix

in

the

Guif of Mexico

on April 20 2010

Expert report of

Dr

Glen Stevick

ultimate

stress

to

tensile

ultimate there

stress
is

in

tests

of

high

strength
local

steels

in

fixtures.3 in stress

In

shear

strength measurement therefore the shear

testing
is

always some bending and

as the average the
literature

variations across shear

present This
tensile

stress

best characterized of the

as

shear stress reporting

section.4 to

may

also account

for

some
as

older 0.75

data in

ultimate

ultimate

strength ratios

high

for steels.56

With
in

an

Equation

for

required

shear load

the

corresponding

required

hydraulic

pressure

needed

the

BSR

Phyd can be determined with Equation

Phyci

Pw/Cr SF

where
to

is

the effective outside the

cross

sectional area of the

BSR

pistons Table

is

the well

pressure

relative

the pressure

BSR

and Cr by

is

the

closure

ratio

below
ratio

gives 0.62

required

BSR
stress

hydraulic equal
to

pressure

determined

BEAR

assuming
plus 10 ksi

shear/tensile

of

flow
in2

the specified

minimum

yield stress

and

BSR

piston

area of 238

Required Hyd Pressure psi Flow

Size

Weight

in
3.5 3.5

pt
12.95 13.3 19.5

Grade

I.D

Wall

Well
Pressure

Well
Pressure

Well
Pressure

Stress

psi
S135 S135 S135 145000 145000 145000

in
2.750 2.764 4.276 4.778 5.345

in
0.375 0.368 0.362 0.361 0.640

Ambient

T7 2i38
1368 1992 2115

5000

psi

10000
2885 2863 3487

psi

2740 2949

5.5

21.9 40.9

S135
S135

145000
145000

2202

3696

6.625

Table

C-2
S-135

Required

BSR
As

hydraulic

pressure

yellow area
drill

to

shear in the built

drill

pipe at the

made

of

API
the

pipe determined
is

by
in

calculation there

The
is

pipe

size factor

BSR
into

time of

accident

bolded

Table
the

no

safety psi

this data

SF

1.0
above

Yellow
the

values are above

psi

normal

3000

operating

pressure

Red

values are

4000

emergency

pressure

Guide
Fisher

to

Design

Criteria

for Bolted

and Riveted

Joints

2nd Edition

9780471837916

Geoffrey

Kulak

John

John

Struik

Wiley-Interscience

1987

Machine

Design

Theory

and Pmctice

Aaron

Deutschman

Author

Walter

Michels

Author

Charles

Wilson Prentice Hall Machine

edition

April 11

1975
Deutschman

design

Theory

and Practice

A.D
Para

W.A
Shear

Michels

C.E Wilson MacMillan

Allowable
Stress

Publishing

1975

Stevick the

GR

Proposed Revision Code Mechanical

to

302.3.1b Committee

and Bearing

Basis Correspondence

to

ASME

Piping

Design

Members August

2011

1VIDLNo
In re

2179
by the Oil Rig

Oil Spill

Deepwater Horizon
Appendix

in

the

Gulf of Mexico

on April 20 2010

Expert report of

Dr

Glen Stevick

In

the

authors

experience

it

is

customary
to

for

oil

company
Table
if

engineers

to

perform verification
calculations additional while are

calculations

for shear
to

rams as was done

capacity In fact
ratings

produce

C-2
is

Verification

performed margin
or

check

the

and access
has

there

need

for

an

design
at

safety

factor

the

author

performed

such

calculations

working

Chevron

With

an

internal

well

pressure

in

the

9000
drill

to

10000
pipe

psi range

at 5000

ft

of water
if
it

depth

the

BSR

would

probably

have

sheared

the
to

with

emergency depth
range

pressure

were
well

centered pressure

Subtracting gives calculated

2670

psi corresponding well pressure

in in

5000 6500

ft of water
to

from the
for

internal

relative

the
are

7500
later to

psi

use

with

the

chart
to

The upper

values

given

Table should

shown

approximately

correspond
is

the

bound

of shear forces without

This

be the case

as shear test data in the literature

representative

of shearing

the aid of sharp blades

However
ultimate applied

considering
tensile

that

the

drill

string

shear
dull

strength

could

vary

as high

as

0.75

times should

the

strength and blades for an

can be

or

damaged
reasonably
at least

reasonable accurate should

safety factor calculations

be

to

account force

unknown
additional

variations
safety

With
of

of an upper
in

bound design

shear

factor

13

be included

proper

Required Hyd Pressure Well

Pressure

psi
Well

Size

Weight

in
3.5 3.5

Grade

Typ Tensile
Stress

I.D

ppt
12.95 13.3 19.5

psi

in

Wall

Well
Pressure Pressure

in
0.375 0.368 0.362 0.361 0.640

S135 S135 S135

145000 145000 145000

2.750 2.764 4.276 4.778 5.345

L_
1778

Ambient

5000

10000
psi psi

2779
2750
3562 3--

3751

2590

5.5

21.9 40.9

S135
S135

145000
145000

6.625

Table

C-3

Required

BSR

hydraulic

pressure

yellow area

to

shear

drill

pipe

made

of

API S-135 pipe determined by

flow stress of 145
ksi

calculation factor

assuming of 1.3

0.62 shear-to-tensile

strength

ratio

and

safety

To maintain
psi of

reasonable

design

margin

or safety factor

engineers the

should
drill

have demanded 8000

in

equivalent
to

hydraulic

pressure
results

be available
in

for shearing should

pipe

Table

C-3
and

The

calculations

produce

the

Table

have

been

performed

by

TO

BP

Norton

R.L

Machine

Design

an Integrated

Approach

Prentice-Hall

1998

1VIDLNo
In

2179
by the Oil Rig

re

Oil Spill

Deepwater Horizon
Appendix

in

the

Guif of Mexico

on April20

2010

Expert report of

Dr

Glen Stevick

engineers

as

system design
of
drill

check

and as

basis for deciding

after

which

BOP
than with

components
necessary

to

choose

and what review

clearly

types

pipe

are acceptable

the

BOP

is

in

operation
less

The

literature

and calculations
indicates of

would

have taken
should

competent

engineer

days work

Table hydraulic

shear ram boosters psi giving

have been used for

of roughly

BOP

maximum

pressure

4000

the equivalent

8000 psi

Additional

margin could
Services
in

have 2004

easily for

been gained
indicates pressure hydraulic

by

installing

double-V
blades

blades

Testing

by West
shear

Engineering

IVIIMS

that

double-V

lower the required 20%.8

to

force and therefore required hydraulic have lowered the

by

factor of approximately
in

This

would

maximum
margin

required
at
little

pressure

Table

from 7852 psi

6282 psi

providing

additional

cost

Actual

test

data

should

also have

been West

collected

and used
report

to

perform

second

quick

check

of

required

shear

load

capacity

The

Engineering

provides

large collection

of such
testing

data
over

relatively

large amount

of data could

also have

been collected from qualification

the years from the

DWH

and other rigs

Plotting

the

West
using

Engineering Equation
load

test
is

data

against
in

the

calculated

shear

force

for each load

is

test

of

high along
to

strength pipe the X-axis

given

Fig C-i below

The

measured measured

test

given
is

and calculated
the calculated 100

along

the

Y-axis
point

The

actual

tensile

stress

used

determine

shear load

for each

ana4sna7
isa sasM ail
.bst.t4M
441 4Mhk

650

SilA4ti
t44

al

600

cu
la te

550

40

500

SF1.O
re

450

SF1.O
400 Design
SF
1.3

ui re

350

SF1.3

sh ea

300

250

//___
200 300 anear 400 itam uapaournes 500 600 100 ivianagemenr aervzce
icequisition services

200

8West

Engineermg

aruayjor u.a ivnnerais

No

3-4025-1001

September2004

1VIDLNo
In re

2179
by the Oil Rig

Oil Spill

Deepwater Horizon
Appendix

in

the

Guif of Mexico

on April 20 2010

Expert report of

Dr

Glen Stevick

Measured

shear load

kips
relative to the

Fig C-i
the

Calculated

required

shear

load plotted
red

measured

shear loads Equation

line

for

S135

West Engineering
factor

test

data

points
stress
1.3

The
of

red

line represents

with

safety

equal

to

1.0

and

flow

145

ksi

The

green ksi

represents

Equation
points

with

safety

factor

equal to with

and
1.3

flow stress

of 145

The

green

data

are the

same

as the red

points

multiplier

applied

to the

calculated

stress

Fig

C-i shows
load
test

that

Equation
Points

provides

very

good

approximation of the upper bound

safety

for the the

shear

data
safety

along

the red line have

to

factor
to

equal

to

1.0

Points

along

red line higher

have

factor equal

1.3

Points

above and

the left of these lines

have an even

safety factor

Based
drill

on the data on the

safety

in

Fig

C-i and Tables C-i through and lacked

of
1.3
is

C-3

the

BSR

was

clearly

undersized important of 3-4

is

for the

pipe

DWH
factor

appropriate not excessive

safety

margin

for such safety

an

function typically

Requiring used
in

considering pipes

factor

engineering

design
to

codes

for pressure

containing

and vessels on the

These same
itself

codes

would have been used

design

the pressure

vessels

and piping

DWH

Almost

identical

calculations

could

have been performed

subject.9

using the

the formulas equations

given required Further

in

Camerons

most recent Engineering

in

Bulletin

on the

However
Design
as

are available responsible

any

standard

text

on Mechanical
use

Engineering

shown above

engineering

review should

calculation

method

independent of the manufacturer

It

should

be noted were

that

tandem and

boosters specified

were

available

for the

subject

BSR
Shear
psi

at

the time

the

BOP
Line

components
Bulletin.0 appear
in

chosen

based
the

on

Camerons
18-3/4
until

1998

Ram

Product
device

Double-V
available
earlier

rams and blades

product

for line

subject

15000

TL BOP
they

do not

Cameron

literature

200211

however

may have been

the

available hydraulic

based on testimony
to

by Camerons
available
in

Mr

McWhorter.2

Increasing

BOP

base

pressure

5000

psi

was

2005

Shearing

Capabilities of

Cameron

Shear

Rams Ram

Engineering

Bulletin

EB-702-D
October

January

21 2008

10

Cameron

Engineering

EB 852D

Shear

Product

Line Approved

30 1998

Cameron
12

2002

Replacement David

Parts

Catalog pg

108

BP-HZN-BLY00366414

Deposition

of

McWhorter
July

July

7-8 2011 2351-9

13

Deposition

of Jack

Erwin

6-7 2011 50917-5105

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

WITHDRAWN

APPENDIX

Glen Stevick

Ph.D P.E
Vitae

Curriculum

Areas of Specialization

Failure

Analysis and
electrical offshore

Design

of Stmctures

Consumer Products
and

Industrial

and

Medical

Equipment
and
aircraft

mechanical-

systems

implants turbines
drilling

reciprocating pressure

engines

automotive

components breakaway

platforms and heat exchangers

equipment

vessels/piping/containers

blowout
analysis

and

devices

and

combustion

analysis
causation

Testing

and

mathematical
stmctural

of

hydraulic systems
electronic control

fire

causation

and

spread behavior

explosion
heat

and

prevention

dynamics
specialties

systems

material

transfer

and

stmcture/fluid

interaction

are

Background

and Professional Experience

Consultant and design of consumer from assessing products
the failure

1/86

Present Mechanical
consultation in the

Engineering
areas Failure

Provide and

of failure analysis
analysis

medical devices of cranes medical

propane/natural

industrial

equipment
fractures

work has

varied

implants bone gas equipment systems and

variable

ladders
to

chairs industrial
the analysis

presses aircraft turbine

safety

engines

and

and
fire

electronics

of defective have

devices on

compressor/heat

exchanger

investigation hospital

Design
for

projects

included the redesign of an electro-hydraulic implants spine

that

position fatigue

bed
the

burn victims

medical

rod

heart

valve

aorta

insert

and

pacemaker
positions design of
bridges

design
and

design of

powered

wheelchair

provides

standing

and

sitting

the analysis
fire

redesign of high temperature/high

vaults for electronic

pressure

piping and

pressure
tall

vessels

the

safe storage to

media dynamic damping

redesign of pistons
health

devices for valves

for

stmctures and

subject

wind earthquake
and

loading

the

and

high pressure

hydrogen

compressors

electronic

sensors

for structural

monitoring

Fire investigation

electrical

and

combustion
natural refinery

analysis

cases

have

included

the evaluation

of over 200 heaters

plant
fires

home

fires

dozens

of propane

and

gas

fired

equipment plant

fires

including

barbecues

furnaces and and

cooking and

appliances
the evaluation

chemical

power

plant

and

coal

processing

explosions

of fuel containers
gallon

including containers

propane
to

tanks

charcoal

lighter fluid

cans and
gallons hundreds
evaluation

gasoline

containers

from
fire

consumer

tanks containing conducted have

at

thousands
as

of

More than 200

of magnetic

gasoline

and

explosion and

tests

have

been

BEAR

well as design and valves flame

forceps heat

field

electric

field

spark tests

Design tanks

projects

included

the

of hydrocarbon and

handling

equipment

towers

pumps

compressors
for

piping tanks and

exchangers
arrestors for for

furnaces
relief

burner and and vapor

flow modeling recovery

leak

detection

methods

storage

systems

and

burn/spark/fire

resistant cauterizing

surgery

8/90

1/9

Mechanical

Engineering
senior

Instructoi

UC

Berkeley

Instmctor for the Departments Conduct

other

design course

ME-102B

Mechanical

Engineering

Design
and

Lectures on the design of bolted

joints springs gears bearings through major

chain drives wire ropes

mechanical

components

and

guide students
808

design project
510-549-3300

Berkeley

Engineering

And Research

Inc

Gilman St Berkeley

CA

94710

glen@bearinc.com

3/82 Handle
failure

1/89

Engineering

Mechanics
projects

Specialist

Chevron
technical the

Corporation
consultation to field

highly technical analysis and

and

provide have

engineers in the areas and degrees

turbine

of

design

Projects

included

redesign of compressor above

stmctural

components

and

the

design of processing
varied

equipment

for service

temperatures

1400

Fahrenheit crack

Consultation growth
rates

from

giving

design advise
in the

on

how

to

avoid

vibration

to calculating

for offshore

platforms

North

Sea

9/81-3/82

Project Engineei

Chevron

USA
and and

Production

Responsibilities

included the design

plants in the Bakersfield

constmction Colinga
oil

management of
fields

oil/water

separation

plants

and

gas recovery

Professional Affiliations

Registered Mechanical

Engineer

State

of California 1983

American

Society

of Mechanical

Engineers

Vibration Institute

Education

5/93

Ph.D

Mechanical

Engineering

University

of California Berkeley

Major

Mechanical Analysis

Engineering
Dissertation

Design
title

and

Material Behavior of welds

at

Minors

Dynamics

and

Controls

and

Stmctural

Failure

Elevated Temperatures

6/81

MS Mechanical
Design and Fellowship

Engineering and Materials

University

of California Berkeley Research Project Three

Concentration Regents

GPA

4.0/4.0

Body Abrasive Wear

U.C

Research

Assistant

6/80

B.S Mechanical
Solid

Engineering

Michigan Technological
3.85/4.0 Marathon

University

Concentration

Mechanics

GPA

Electric

Company

Scholarship

Patents

Thermo-electric

Container

for heating

and

cooling

liquids

G.R

Stevick

and

Sherback

Method

and

Apparatus

for

Dynamic

Space-Time

Imaging

System G.R

Stevick

Singer

and

Rondinone

Publications

and Selected Reports

Cheng
Engineering

Finnie
at

Stevick

G.R
Vol

Prediction

of

Stress the

Intensity

Factor

for

an

Internal

Circumferential Crack Materials

Butt-Weld

Between

Cylinders Using 1-24

Plane

Strain

Solution

Journal

of

and Technology

106 pp

1984

Stevick

G.R

Soemantri

Finnie

An

Analysis of the Loaded Abrasive

Column type Wear Tester

Wear Vol 101 pp 77- 80 1985

Berkeley

Engineering

And Research

Inc

808

Gilman St Berkeley

CA

94710

510-549-3300

glen@bearinc.com

Stevick

G.R

Burke
Tall

B.G An
Stack

Experimental Proceedings

Assessment

of

The

Damping

Provided

By
April

Chain

Dampers on London

Slender

of the International

Chimney Conference

1988

England

Marsili Pipeline

Stevick Proceedings Orleans

G.R
of
the

Ductile
65th

Fracture

Protection

of

the

Canyon

Reef

Carrier

Natural

Gas

annual

Society

of Petroleum

Engineering

Conference

September

1990

New

Louisiana

Stevick Elevated

G.R

Finnie

Stress Creep

Concentrations
in Structures

Resulting

from

Longitudinal

Butt-Welds

in

Piping

at

Temperatures

Zyczkowski

ed

pp 629-636

Springer-Verlag

Berlin 1991

Stevick Behavior

G.R

Finnie

Failure

Assessment Jnoue

of Weldments

at

Elevated

Temperatures
Press

Mechanical

ofMaterials-VI

Jono and

eds

Vol

pp 149-154 Pergamon
Angle on
the

1991

Finnie

Stevick

G.R

Ridgley

JR

Influence

of Impingement

Erosion

of Ductile

Materials

Wear Vol 152 pp 91-98 January 1992

Failure of Welds
April

Stevick Welding

G.R

at

Elevated

Temperatures

Welding

Research

Council

Bulletin

390

Research

Council

1994

Stevick

G.R

Rondinone

Sagle

Zicherman
Engineers and

Portable
Scientists

Gasoline

Container

Explosions

and

Their Prevention

Society of Forensic

Winter

Seminar March 19-21

2010

Stevick
Plastic

G.R

Rondinone
Containers

Sagle

Zicherman

Fire

Incidents

and

Explosions

Involving

Portable

Gasoline

And

Their Prevention

Failure Analysis and Prevention

Aug 2011

Platform Hidalgo March 1984

Gas

Pipeline

Dutile

Fracture

Chevron Engineering

Department by G.R Stevick

20

inch

Casing

Connector

Fatigue April

Life

Evaluation

for

the

Manteo

Block

Chevron

Engineering

Department by G.R Stevick Platform Grace

April

1984

Gas

Pipeline

Ductile

Fracture

Chevron

Engineering

Department by G.R Stevick

1984

Tension Leg Platform Production

Riser Crack

Growth Analysis

Chevron Engineering

Department by

G.R

Stevick

and

B.G Burke May 1984

Piping
Taft

Vapor
1984

Recovery

Sec

36B

Chevron Engineering

Department by G.R Stevick

August

Gaviota
Chevron

CA

Fatigue Analysis

and

Redesign

of the

40.5

inch

Diameter

Gas Compressor

Pistons

Engineering

Department by G.R

Stevick

January

1985

Heber

Geothermal

Pump Seals Chevron

Isomax
Plant

Engineering

Department by G.R Stevick

January 1985

Richmond
Engineering

CA

Compressor

Valve

Failure

and

Redesign

K-950

K-960

Chevron

Department by G.R Stevick

April

1986

Berkeley

Engineering

And Research

Inc

808

Gilman St Berkeley

CA

94710

510-549-3300

glen@bearinc.com

El Paso TX

Failure

Analysis and and

Design Ebert

of

New FCCU
1986

Flue

Gas Cooler Chevron

Engineering

Department by G.R

Stevick

W.A

May

Fiberglass Underground

Storage Tank

Design

Methodology

for

External

Loads

Chevron

Engineering

Department by G.R Stevick

November 1986
Failure by G.R
Stevick
for

DNL
Hawaii

Constmction

Crane

George

Ashford

Associates

Honolulu

May 1987

Gaviota

CA

Onshore

Pipelines

Weld 1987

Flaw Acceptance

Criteria

Chevron Engineering

Technology

Department by G.R Stevick

June

Diffusion

of

Gasoline

Vapors

Within

the

Annulus 1987

of Double-Wall

Underground

Storage

Tanks

Chevron Engineering

Department November

Recommended
by G.R
Stevick

Practice and

RP-33
Ebert

Vibration Guidelines

Chevron

Engineering

Technology

Department

W.A

December

1987

El Segundo
Engineering

CA

Buckling

Integrity

of Column Stevick

C-6

for

Wind

and

Earthquake

Loads

Chevron

Technology

Department by G.R

June

1988

Crane
June

Turrett

Bolt Failure Analysis

by G.R Stevick

for

Daves

Mobile

Crane

Service

Los

Altos

CA

1988

Whitney
Technology

Canyon/Carter

Creek

WY

Gathering

System

H25

Risk

Assessment

Engineering

Department by G.R Stevick

Toxic

November Design

1988

High

Pressure

Filter/Pressure

Vessel

by G.R

Stevick

for

Filterdyne

Systems Inc

January 17

1990

Stmctural

Analysis of Fluidized

Catalytic

Cracking

Unit Regenerator

Internals

by G.R

Stevick

for

Chevron

USA

El

Segundo Refinery

June

22 1990
Bolted

Redesign

of an

8000

psi

Test

Vessel using September

Constmction 12 1990

reports

by G.R

Stevick

for

SAIC

Rock Mechanics

Laboratory

1990 December

Stress

Analysis
July

of Hospital Bed

Frame Components

by G.R

Stevick

for

American

Life

Support

Technology

1991

Batch-Reactor Chevron

Heater-Coil Thermal and Technology

Fatigue

Analysis

by G.R

Stevick

and

B.R

Cuzzillo

for

Research

Company Inc Richmond

River

CA

August

25 1993
Service

Stmctural Engineering

Servicability

of the Inc

Salcha

Crossing
Engineering

for

Alyeska

Pipeline

Company by SSD
17 1993

Consultants

and

Berkeley

And
for

Research

Inc November
Service July

Fracture

Evaluation

of

Fillet

Welded
and

Pipe

Sleeves

Alyeska

Pipeline

Company by SSD
1994

Engineering

Consultants

Inc

Berkeley

Engineering

And

Research

Inc

Coke

Drum

Material

Crack

Growth

Tests
August

for

Chevron

Research

Technology

Company by

Berkeley
Berkeley

Engineering
Engineering

And

Research
Inc

Inc
808

1995

And Research

Gilman St Berkeley

CA

94710

510-549-3300

glen@bearinc.com

An
1995

Independent
for

Review

of Stmctural
Service

Methods

Used

to

Evaluate

the

Integrity

of the Research

Trans-Alaska

Pipeline

Alyeska

Pipeline

Company by

Berkeley

Engineering

And

Inc

July

Excel
of

Spreadsheet-Based

Fitness

For Service Research

Model

Providing

Inspection

Interval

and

Remaining

Life

Coke

Drums

for

Chevron

Technology

Company

by Berkeley

Engineering

And

Research

Inc January 12 1996

of the Stresses Research
in Shaft

Computation
Engineering

Due

to

Torsion

for

EC

Engine

Components

Inc by

Berkeley

And

Inc

August

19 1996

Study
Alyeska

of Effects
Pipeline

of Vibrations
Service

Due

to

Pressure

Pulses on the Integrity Associates

of the Trans-Alaska Engineering

Pipeline
Inc

for

Company by J.A Maple

Research

SSD

Consultants

and

Berkeley

Engineering

And

Inc

January

26 1997
Gear
Failure

Main Propulsion Unit Aft Gmmman and the US Navy

Engineering Department

Second

Reduction Paul Warner Prof

Bearing

Assessment

for

Northrup Berkeley

by

Mr
and
April

Northrup

Gmmman
Massachusetts

Dr

Glen

Stevick of

And

Research

Inc

Thomas

Eager

Institute

Technology

of Materials

Science

1999

Effect

of the Windshield Engineering

on

Roof

Strength

and

Displacement 2000

for

James

Collins

and

Associates

by

Berkeley

And
and

Research

Inc

October

Rolling

Mill

Stmcture

Mandrel

Finite

Element

Analysis

for

USS-POSCO

Industries

by Berkeley

Engineering

And

Research

Inc
II

August

20 2002
Retrofit Calibration

Golden

Gate

Bridge Phase

Seismic

Testing

of Pylons

51

and

S2

Fort

Point

Arch Longitudinal and

Berkeley Engineering

Transverse

Energy

Dissipation July

Devices

for the

Golden Gate
the

Bridge

District

by

And
award

Research
for the

Inc

2005
civil

This project engineering

won

American Society of

Civil

Engineers 2007 Opal

most outstanding Welds

2004

achievement

Fracture

Analysis for Pipeline of Pacific and

Girth Electric

in

High

Strain

Applications
Pipeline

Stevick

Hart 2006

Lee
issue

and of

Dauby
PipeLine

Gas

International

Conference

January

Gas Technology

magazine

Cmde Engineering And

Marine

Oil

Transfer

Breakaway
Stevick

Hawaii
for

Single

Point

Mooring

Terminal

by

Berkeley

Research

Inc G.R

Tesoro

Corporation

May 19th 2008 Review May

18th

Olympic
Research

Spirit

Vapor

Recovery and

System

Fire

Investigation for

and

System

Inc

Rondinone

G.R

Stevick

Tesoro

Corporation

by Berkeley Eng And 2009

API

Aboveground

Tank

Leak by

Detection

Liquid

Level Sagle

Measurement
and

Technique

Evaluation 2009

for

the

American Petroleum

Institute

Rondinone

G.R

Stevick

November

References

Available upon request

Berkeley

Engineering

And Research

Inc

808

Gilman St Berkeley

CA

94710

510-549-3300

glen@bearinc.com

Fees and Terms

$375/hour

$450/hour

for

deposition arbitration

and

court

appearances

$1500

retainer

required to be applied per month due

is

toward final invoice balances

unit
is

Net 25 days

2%

on past due

collection 1/4

costs

after

months

Minimum
Forwarding

fee

per case

$500 minimum time

implies

hour terms

of case

material

acceptance

of fees and

Berkeley

Engineering

And Research

Inc

808

Gilman St Berkeley

CA

94710

510-549-3300

glen@bearinc.com

APPENDIX

nTs
Glen Stevick

Ph.D P.E

Testimony

List

deposition

court testimony

arbitration

10/12/0

01-1088G Walsh
Cause of

KFX Fuel

Partners

Sixth Judicial

District

of

Wyoming

County

of Campbell

fire in fluid

heat transfer

system

10/24/01

00-862G Weld

Garcia
failure

Central Coast analysis

Towing

Superior

Court of

CA

San Benito

County 9925738

10/26/01

01-1004 Hancock

U-Haul

Superior

Court of

CA

Sacramento

County

00A500059

Ramp

load

analysis

10/29/01

01-l070GDinkelbach Swing

Gold Oak
seat

School

District

Superior

Court of

CA

El

Dorado

County PC20000391

fracture

2/15/02

00-669G Chamberlain
Pipe threading

Rigid

Tool

Superior

Court of

CA

Alameda County

8251404

wrench

redesign

2/22/02 Interlock

01-912G Republic
design

Indemnity

Hans

Leffer

US

Northern

District

of

CA

2/26/02

01-1177G Demas
Sand
blast

Schmidt

Superior

Court of

CA

San Diego County

G1C762790

vessel

design

3/1/02

02-1241G
Bicycle

Moeder

Harville

Superior

Court of

CA

Santa

Clara

County

CV90017
4/24/02

track collision

01-1072G
Excavator

Powers

State

of

CA

Superior

Court of

CA

Humboldt County

PR000S9O

rollover

6/10/02 Evaluation

02-1360G OBrien
of motorcycle carburetor

Yamaha
failure

Circuit Court of

Cook County IL 98L04707

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300

6/27/02

01-1160G
Fall

Giampapa v.Granger

Superior

Court of

CA

Contra Costa County

C00-02052

onto

rebar

7/18/02 Evaluate

02-1393G
electron

Bilstad

Wakalopulos
patent

US

PTO

Board of Patent Appeals

104832

beam

sterilization

claims

8/12/02

00-879G
Evaluate

Carter

EZ

Environmental machine

Superior patents

Court of

CA

Santa

Clara

County

CV79072

high

pressure

cleaning

8/19/02 193

02-1408G
Milk carton

Nielson

Smurfit-Stone
tipover

Superior

Court of

CA

Tulare

County

00-

794

stacking

machine

9/30/02

01-1127G Shane
Metal

Singh-

Damiano

Steelcase

Superior

Court of

CA

Placer

County SCV1 16447

cabinet

failure

analysis

11/8/02

02-1309G Robert Young

Evaluate
signal

City of failure

Fremont

Superior

Court of

CA

Alameda

County H206293-6
11/11/02

pole

02-1404G Gordon
Chair failure

Rees-Caudle
analysis

Costco

Superior

Court of

CA

Alameda

County H825598-3

12/12/02

01-1043G Mallory
Evaluate

Prod Chemical explosion

Superior

Court of

CA

San Joanquin

County CV11758

propane tank

1/7/03

02-1293G
Determine

Venditti cause

Stevens

Superior

Court of

CA

Sacramento

County

01A506582

of rollover accident

2/5/03

02-1368G Avdalas
Evaluate ladder

Werner

Ladders

Superior

Court of

CA

San Francisco

County 400200

leg extensions

and tipover

2/27/03

02-1483G Kuebler
fracture analysis

R.H

Phillips

Superior

Court of

CA

San Francisco

County

Wine

bottle

3/18/03

00-803GRombauer
37323-2 Gas
regulator

Cellars
fire

American

Meter

Superior

Court of

CA

Napa

County

analysis

3/24/03

02-1345G Roof hanger

Current collapse

Hagman

Group

Superior

Court of

CA

Santa

Clara

County

CV775 113

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300

5/6/03 of

02-1495L

Equilon Enterprises

LLC

Kiewit Pacific
failure

Company

Superior

Court

CA

Kern County 244357

Power

line

umbrella

analysis

5/23/03

03-l57lGDeSouzav H220607-1
Propane
valve

Engineered Controls
redesign

Superior

Court of

CA

County

of

Alameda

6/5/03 163

02-1506G George Lee

Aircraft

Marshall

Superior

Court of

CA Napa

County 2C-

82

hangerjack

system support

failure

analysis

6/30/03 Helicopter

03-1599G Lawrence
solar cell

Haase

Superior

Court of

CA

Tehama

County 50039

panel

lift

accident

7/16/03

00-864G Valdovinos
Evaluation

United Rental

Superior

Court of

CA

San Joanquin

County CVO 11900

of stump grinder

drive

and controls

8/21/03 Evaluate pipe

01-932G

Garcia

Hayward
and

Superior

Court of

CA CA

Madera County CV03909

flow rates pressure

strainer

explosion

9/12/03

03-173 1G England
Evaluation of construction

SIVIIE site

Superior

Court of

San Francisco

County

414440

decking

accident

10/3/03

03-1754G Andersen
Water
filter

Manufacturing

Superior

Court of

CA

Stanislaus

County 310749
10/9/03

explosion

02-1541

Radcliff

Tn-City Fence design

Superior

Court of

CA

Alameda County

H218752-9

Fence gate mechanical

10/13/03

03-1715G

Pizatelli

Fleetwood

Aluminum

Superior

Court of

CA

Santa

Barbara

County 01094498
4/11/03

Window

collapse

02-1428G
Gasoline

Kvaerner
storage

Mammoth
tank

Mtn

Superior

Court of

CA

Mono County

12928

and

diesel

and piping

design

3/11/03

01-1019G Twin

Hills

School

District

Doupnik

Mfg

Superior

Court of

CA

Sanoma County 230901

Building

Fire

HVAC

testing

1/27/04

01-1108G Thames Dick

Pipeline

DeZURIK US

District

Court for the

District

of Puerto

Rico 01-1483

and valve

surge analysis

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300

7/24/04

01-1175G
Tractor

Farias

vNoble

Tractor

Superior

Court of

CA

Solano County

FCS 18596
2/27/04
District

ignition

wiring

evaluation

02-1391G
of

Livingston

Montana

CV-03 -1

6-BLG-RWA

Champion Home Builders US Motorhome fire

District

Court for the

5/7/05

03-1627G

Riley

California Crane Testing

Superior

Court of

CA

Sonoma

County SCV-23 1808

Crane hydraulic

pump

failure

4/21/05

03-l633GMillsaps and valve

failure

Doehrman

Superior

Court of

CA

County

of Butte

124942

Compressor piping

3/17/05

03-l69lGBhamra Lug
torque

Sunrise
tire set

Superior

Court of

CA

San Joanquin County

CVO 19608
5/27/04

and dual

coming

off Semi

in transit

03-l693GHolliday
crush evaluation

FORD

Court of

Common

Pleas Cuyahoga

County

OH

CV-01-454330 Roof

9/14/04

03-1796G

Southeast

Wisconsin

Professionall

Baseball

Park

District

Mitshubishi
stadium

Circuit Court of Milwaukee

County

WI

02-CV-60

Evaluation

of retractable

roof drive

system and seals

6/6/05 Building
fire

04-l863GReyes

Allstate

Superior

Court of

CA

County of Stanislaus

311987

8/11/04
interior

04-1933G
failure

Martinelli

Franciscan

Superior

Court of

CA

Sonoma County Tank

ladder

2/24/05

04-1976G
Fuel

Shastri

Walbro
to

Chrysler Circuit Court of Cook County IL

stall

02L9 174

pump

failure

leading

engine

and severe accident

1/20/05

04-1988G

Richards

HB Equipment
and tipover Mercury
slippage Frontier

Superior

Court of

CA CA

Kern County

250267-SPC

Drilling rig loading

12/21/04

04-2023G St

Paul

Superior

Court of

San Diego County

729662

450 ton crane

failure clutch

8/2/05

05-2095G Abraham Bench

Perez

24 Hour Fitness

Superior

Court of

CA

Riverside

County RIC3 74478

failure instrument

calculate peak

loads

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300

8/4/05

05-2095G Abraham
California

Perez

24 Hour Fitness

Superior

Court of Riverside

County

RI 374478

Bench

Failure

2/16/06

05-2327G Rudy Wilson

got caught
in

Crary

Co

et.al

Superior

Court of chipper

CA

Walnut

Creek C04-00677 Hand 04-1853G

98-29348

discharge

chute

of

wood

6/15/06

Florida

West
Fuel

Signature

11th Judicial at

Circuit Court of Airport

Miami-Dade

County Florida

CA13

Truck Fire

the

Miami

7/10/06

04-1893G

Cooper

Delgado

ABC

Superior

Court of

CA

Alameda County

HGO3 128280
10/06/06 Hospital

Fire hose

Collision

06-2435G Devine Bed

Failure

KMV
Inc

Superior

Court of

CA

Alameda County 2002076057

11/22/06 65 181

06-24 14 Horton 00320

NSK

Corporation Inc

American

Arbitration Assocation

05 Bearing

failure

2/20/07

Alameda

05-2102G Casper Meadows RG052 12004 Greenlee Voltage

Doug
Detector

Gustafson
Failure

Superior

Court of

CA

County

of

07-2664G
Sacramento

Construction

Placer

County

Superior

Court of California

County of

04 AS 05135

Polystyrene

5/15/07

06-2409G

Perez

Morbark Inc Northern

chipper

District

of

CA

San Francisco

Division

C06-SO31CW Wood
6-2549G SCV-23 7890 6-2495G
Harris Russell

7/13/07

Fineline

Industries

Superior

Court of

CA

County of Sonoma

Case

No

8/24/07

LBL
Baler
Johnston

Harris

Case

Superior

Court of

CA

County

of San Francisco

CGC-02-404058

9/5/07

6-2536G 05A500856

Trench
Plate

Plate

Superior

Court of California

County of

Sacramento

Trench

10/31/07

5-2250 Alexander Gate

AMPCO

Superior

Court of California

County of

Alameda

G0S-192462

Arm Head

Injury

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300

12/19/07

07-2691G

Olin

CV-05-042B Heat exchanger

Onebeacon Circuit Court tube rolling weld

of Washington

County Alabama

8/28/08

08-2756G Oscar Valdez Your

File

Leipelt

TiSport

Santa

Cruz Superior

Court Case

No

CV157001

No

0300-03 837 wheelchair

9/17/08

08-2794G Doolin
crane
tip

PA

Radocy

District

Court of Clark County Nevada

No

A524 182

9/24/08

08-2776G Hector
Compactor

del

Valle

Rammax

Los Angeles County

Superior

Court Case

NO

TCO2 1339

Rollover

1/6/2009
District

07-2659G Galindo
Case

Baltimore Aircoil

United

States

District

Court Eastern

Court of California

No

07-C V-00798-LJO-GSA

2/23/2009

09-2907G

Berthet

Giles Superior

Court of California

County of San Francisco

No

CGCO7-461585

2/26/2009 San Francisco

07-2654G

Lisa Ferrara

Umili America

Superior

Court of California

County

of

No CGC-07-460579
09-2932GKalinjukv Case Costco Court of the
State

4/6/9

Superior

of California

Counte

of

Los Angeles

No

BC388441

4/28/9

06-2421 Conner
of Sacramento

County

Case

No

Western Power 05A200857

Superior

Coourt of the

State

of California

5/20/9

08-2852G Hass
Case

Porter

Superior

Court of the

State

of California

County

of

Mann
6/23/9

No

CVO8-0099

08-2894G
Case

Enayati

Chevron

Superior

Court of the

State

of California

County

of

Los Angeles

No BC

400 729

7/15/9

09-2933GFreyer

Blitz

United

States

District

Court

South Carolina Florence

Division

No

408-CV-02412-TLW

7/21/9

Los Angeles

09-2938G Tracey Jacobs Superior Court South West District Case No YC055723

of the

State

of California

County of

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300

8/6/9

08-2864G PLS Restaurant

Corporation Superior

Inc

Lake

Tahoe

Plumbing

Heating

Inc

Southwest Gas

Court of the

State

of California

County of El Dorado

No

SC 20080140

8/18/9

09-2933 Freyer

Blitz

United

States

District

Court

South Carolina Florence

Division

No

408-CV-02412-TLW

10/5/9 California

09-2986G Gilmore
County of Fresno

San Francisco

Ladder

Company

Superior

Court of

No

07CECG03086

12/17/09

09-2996GHarv

Storquest

Superior

Coutr of California

County

of

Alameda

No

RG05236587

01/13/10

09-2950G Thornton
Division

Blitz

District

Court of the Southern

District

of Georgia

Waycross

No 509-C V-00003-LGW-JEG
Bullet Freight

01/26/10

09-3029G Buckingham

Superior

Cour of California

County of

Sacramento

No

34-2008-00029020

3/9/10

09-2984G
Division
in

Schenkenfelder

Blitz

District

Court Eastern

District

of Tennessee

Northern

Knoxville

No 306-cv-452
Emerson
08-04850 United Court Northern

3/23/10
District

09-3033G Dahl
of California

Electric

States

District

Case

No

JCS
Court of California County of San Bernardino

3/29/10

07-2673 Rivera

JLG

Superior

Case

No

C1V55709571

5/4/10

09-2958G

Calder

Blitz

United

States District

Court

District

of

Utah Northern

Division Case

No

207-cv387

TC M.V Public Transportation No SCV 24149

Crotty Superior

6/2/10 California

08-2816G Avery
Place

Court of the

State

of

County Case

6/10/10

09-3044G

Christopher

James RainboltState

of Indiana County

of

Lake

Case

No

45C01-0805-CT-00075

6/14/10 of California

09-2921G
for

Luis

Juarez

Franks

Welding

Service

Inc

Superior

Court of the

state

the county

of San

Diego

Central District

Case

No

G1C879529

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300

7/14/10 Metropolitan

10-3106G
Division

Tinoco

Garcia

Superior

Court of California

County of Kern

Unlimited Civil

Case

No

S-1500-CV-266667-WDP

7/20/10 California

09-2938G David Tracey

County of Los Angeles

Jacobs

Engineering

Group Inc

Superior

Court of

Southwest District Case

No YC055723
Court of California

9/8/10

07-2683 Robert Donesky Ladder Failure

Werner

Superior

Nevada County

Case

No 74035

10/12/10

10-3149G

ACM

Bi-State

Propane

Superior

Court of California

Nevada

County Case No T09-3479C

08-2902 Calpine

Propane

Explosion

12/08/10

Electrican

Maintenance

Superior

Court of California

San

Mateo County Case No M08-3479

02/22/11

Power Generator

Failure

10-3140 Boling

Blitz

United

States

District

Court Western
gas can

District

of

Kentucky Bowling

Green Division

Case

No

109-CV-67-M

explosion

03/01/11

10-3213 Campbell

Les
Trailer

Schwab Wheel

Superior Failure

Court of California

Sacramento

County
03/30/11

No

34-2009-00035911

10-3125 Dennis Thornton Case

Blitz

Circuit Court of Mobile

County

State

of

Alabama

No

CV-09-092481

Gasoline

Can Explosion
American Golf Cars

04/19/11 Riverside

11-3265 Travis

A-A

Great

mc

Superior

Court of State

County Case
10-3 092 Southern

No

R1C506836

Modified Golf Cart Accident

05/23/11

Cook

Scepter

United

States District

Court Eastern

District

of

Tennessee

Division Case

No

109-CV-00006

Gasoline

Can Explosion Alameda County

06/21/11

11-3252 Mehdavi 09 460732

Skylight

Fremont
Fall

Superior

Court of California

Case

No HG

07/21/11

11-3156 Funchess Case

Blitz

State

of South Carolina Court of

Gasoline

Common

Pleas

County

of Orangeburg

No

2009-CP-38-1257

Can Explosion

8/03/11 Atlanta

11-33

11

Puckettv

Wedco US

District

Court Northern

District

of Georgia

Division Case

No

11-C V-01120-TCB

Gasoline

Can Explosion

2/12/02

01-1088G Walsh

KFX Fuel

Partners

Sixth Judicial

District

of

Wyoming

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300

County coal

of

Campbell Judge Dan

Price II

Cause of

fire in

fluid

heat transfer

system

for

drying

8/29/02

01-1070G

Dinkelbach

Gold Oak

School

District
seat

Superior

Court of

CA

El

Dorado

County PC20000391
02-1495L

Judge Patrick Riley

Swing

fracture

5/22/03 of

Equilon Enterprises Judge

Clarence

LLC
Westra

Kiewit Pacific
Jr

Company
umbrella

Superior
failure

Court

CA

Kern County 244357

Power

line

analysis

5/28/03

02-1498G
Judge Gordon

Lloyds of London

Rexius
fire

Superior

Court of

CA

Alameda County

834046-3

Barango

Soil

truck

10/29/03

03-1715G

Pizatelli

Fleetwood

Aluminum

Superior

Court of

CA

Santa

Barbara County 01094498

Judge William McLaughlin

Window
Meter
fire

collapse

3/18/03

00-803G
Judge

Rombauer
Scott

Cellars

American

Superior

Court of

CA

Napa

County 37323-2

Snowden

Gas regulator

analysis

7/27/04

01-1175G 18596 Judge 03-1599G

Farias Scott

vNoble

Tractor

Superior

Court of

CA

Solano

CountyFCS
2/27/04

Kays

Tractor

ignition wiring

evaluation

Lawrence
solar

Haase
cell

Superior
lift

Court of

CA

Tehama County 50039

Judge John Letton

Helicopter

panel

accident

1/6/05

04-2023G

St Paul Mercury

Frontier

Superior

Court of

CA

San Diego

County 729662

Judge William Pate

450 ton crane

failure clutch

slippage

5/14/05

03-1627G

Riley

California Crane Testing

Superior

Court of

CA

Sanoma

County SCV-23 1808 Judge Raymond

8/23/06

Giordano

Crane hydraulic

pump

failure

04-1853 98-29348

Florida

West
Fuel

Signature

11th Judicial at

Circuit Court of Airport

Miami-Dade

County Florida

CA13

Truck Fire

the

Miami

9/26/06

03-163

Millsaps

Doehrman
Pipe Failure

Co

Butte

County

Superior

Court Case

No

124942 Judge Thomas

Kelley

5/14/07 of Calgary

07-2584 Syncrude 0401-01794

Piping

Court of the Queens Bench of Alberta

Judicial

District

11/20/07

07-2664G

FH

Construction

Placer

County

Superior

Court of California

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300

Sacramento

County Case No 04 AS 05135

08-2759 Ebo

Filter

Fire

7/11/08

Manitex US

District

Court Easter

District

of California

NO

207-

cv-00763

DFL-DAD

Crane tip

1/26/2009

07-2637G
Fiel

Jah

Ford

Michelin

et

al

Superior

Court of California

County

of

Contra Costa

No

C05-0 1194 Bearings

6/7/09 Insurance

08-2854G Nova

Chemicals

sEnergy Insurance

Arbitration

Act Canada

Claim on Turbine Failures during

Comissioning Process

10/28/09

09-2986G Gilmore

San Francisco

Ladder Fresno County

Superior

Court

No O7CECGO3 086 DSB

4/19/10 of California

Ladder Failure

07-2673G Ettleman
San Bernardino

OEM

Controls

JLG

Industries

Superior Failure

Court of the

State

County Case No CIVSS 805379 Crane

9/23/10

08-28 16 Avery

MV Public
Wheelchair

Transportation

Superior

Court of California

Placer

County Case
9/30/09

No 5CV24 149
08-2900 Ringel

Heritage

Operating

LP

Idaho

District

Court

Southern

Valley

County Case

No

2008cv00438

Propane

Gas Explosion

4/29/11

10-3213 Campbell

Les
Trailer

County

No

34-2009-00035911

Schwab Superior Wheel Failure

Court of California

Sacramento

5/2/11 Metropolitan

10-3106G
Division

Tinoco

Garcia

Superior

Court of California

County of Kern

Unlimited Civil

Case

No

S-1500-CV-266667-WDP

3/20/07

06-2414G Horton
Failure

Inc

NSK

Corporation Inc

AAA

Case

No

65

181

00320

05 Bearing

1/8/08

07-2699G Chevron 08-2791G

Lake

Power Engineers

piping

stress

analysis

12/3/08
State

Fire Insurance

Exchange

Vernon
Fire

Thompson

Superior

Court of the

of California

County

No

CV 404696

Berkeley

Engineering 2216 Berkeley Tel

5th

And Research
Street

Inc

CA

94710

510-549-3300