Supplemental Report of Survey Deepwater Horizon: Prepared

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF SURVEY
DEEPWATER HORIZON
Prepared for
TRANSOCEAN
United States
Customer Reference: P7751 02
ModuSpec Reference: US 1364.2
By
ModuSpec USA, Inc.
Inspection dates: 17-31 October 2005
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 0 000471
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................. 2
2.0 INTRODUCTION ....... .................................................................. 3
3.0 IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES ........ ............................ ....... 4
Table 3.1 Improvement Opportunity Recommendations ............ .. ............... 4
[Note: Item descriptions followed by and asterisk* are defined as Downtime Risk Equipment]
CH-209 Thrusters Unit. ............................................................... ....... ....... 6
EA-300 Drawworks* ......................................... ... ... .. ............. ... ................ 7
LR-370 HiTech ............... ........................... .. ............................................. 8
LA-607 Air compressor I Air System HP air ............................................. 8
4.0 MAINTENANCE ISSUES .................. .. ....................................... 9
Table 4.1 Maintenance Issue Recommendations ............... ........................ 9
[Note: Item descriptions followed by and asterisk* are defined as Downtime Risk Equipment]
EA-300 Drawworks* ........ ...... .................................... ....... ........ .............. 13
EK-913 Casing Stabbing Basket.. .......................................................... 14
LA-948 PRS-6i* ............ .. ....................................................................... 14
Report of Survey- DEEPWATER HORIZON
Reference: US1364.2-Supplemental
2
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this supplemental report was to capture ideas of merit and other
subjective recommendations resulting from the survey of the DEEPWATER HORIZON.
Some would be easily implemented for little cost while others have major budget
implications. All recommendations having a direct effect on the current state of the
assets were already submitted with the main report.
This supplemental report is divided into two main sections:
Improvement Opportunities
Maintenance Issues
Each section contains a table with recommendations sorted by PSS code. There was
no priority given for these recommendations as that can be assigned by Transocean
staff.
The improvement opportunity recommendations could be reviewed by rig management
who then decide on ideas of merit. Many of these ideas were already known by rig
management or they may have been partially aware of some circumstances.
The maintenance issues recommendations may apply to corporate, regional or be rig
specific. These recommendations could ultimately help the thoroughness or level of PM
implementation on the rig and throughout the company.
CONFIDENTIAL
3
MODUSI 01 0 000473
3.0 IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Some discussion is made below this table to add clarity if required for the
recommendations given. These recommendations are mainly subjective in nature and
reflect the opinion(s) of individuals attending the survey. These could be considered by
rig management for future budgeting purposes for instance.
Table 3.1- Subjective Recommendations for Rig Improvement
Ref PSS
Code
201 AN-050
202 CH-209
203 CW-
904
204 EA-300
205 EA-300
206 EA-300
207 EA-300
Asset Asset Recommendation
Description
EM PAC Assign an experienced EM PAC Optimizer do a full
system review and make the necessary corrections for
compliance with the requirements in the Maintenance
Manual. In addition, the Optimizer can review Standard
PM Tasks with the crews and attach rig-specific tasks
where deemed necessary.
Azimuth Provide a CJC filtration package for each thruster.
thruster (Currently two available; six more required). The
increased H
2
0 content in the gear oil of several
thrusters is likely not to reduce over time. Proper oil
filtration with CJC filters will likely maintain H
2
0 levels
for extended periods below OEM maximum allowable
limits, thus reducing risk to damage or removal
requirement.
Bilge Drains Provide a drain connection from the auxiliary machinery
room aft side of the engine room with the dirty water
collecting tank system. Currently no drain system is in
place for this technical space.
Drawworks Review if having two sets of brake calipers spare and
ready for use is useful. The current set up will not allow
for maintenance under OEM and EM PAC guidelines
without prolonged shutdown. Spare sets be changed
out with the calipers in use at 365 days WO, dissembled
and inspected. This way only limited "equipment not
available time" is required and one can comply with
EM PAC WO and OEM maintenance quidelines.
Drawworks Consider the installation of a third MRU with
(AHD) comparison function. This will enhance the reliability of
the active heave function since a faulty MRU will be
recognized and rejected. Two MRUs will not be able to
distinguish a faulty MRU by comparing when error is
minor. Note that all recent manufactured active heave
drawworks are all outfitted with three MRUs. Consult
with HiTech for options.
Drawworks* Brake hydraulics: Consider installing a duplex filter to
improve maintenance availability. (*See Note 1)
Drawworks* Brake hydraulics: Consider a cost-versus-risk based
analysis to verify if it is desirable to install a pressure
transmitter on each pump outlet and to add the software
logic for positive failure detection or logic to confirm that
Reference: US 1364.2-Supplemental
Severity
Minor
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Minor
Minor
4
Ref PSS
Code
208 EA-300
209 FF-326
210 GA-327
235 MF-627
236 NA-607
237 OB-904
238 PC-600
239 SC-805
Description
positive pressure change is achieved when the pumps
are operating. (*Note 1) This item is linked to a single-
point failure that would result in a set of calipers being
applied during operation unnoticed. The result can be
cracking or fracture of the brake disc within one minute
(speed of drum 50 rpm) thus incapacitating the Active
Heave mode with very little notice)
Drawworks* Brake hydraulics: Consider a cost-verses-risk based
analysis to verify if the installation is desirable of a
caliper position indication system (proximity switches)
and implementation of software logic to detect
unwanted caliper movement. (*See Note 1 ).
Mud Mixing Improve the air extraction system around surge tank fed
Hoppers hoppers. Current air extraction capacity is insufficient in
any way for task and present health hazard for hopper
operator and damage to nearby equipment.
Recommend to purchase dedicated hopper dust
extraction system. Sufficient space is available for such
an installation.
Mud Pump The PRV outlet I bleed line of No. 1 and No. 4 pump are
connected in a combined enclosed vessel. This
presents a risk for the rig crew working on one of the
PRVs or bleed off HP valves while the other pump is in
operation. PRV outlets should be independently and
directly routed to the pi t with a sloped line. See outlet
mud pump No. 2 and No. 3 as example.
Generator Return the failed heat exchanger of Gen No. 1 to a work
Heat shop to determine exact leak location. The suspected
Exchanger root cause of intermediate tube supports cutting into the
tubes can be detenmined and consequently the fact
used in new type heat exchanger allocation.
HP Air Raise an REA to determine if the current HP
Compressors compressor installation has sufficient capacity and
enough redundancy to limit the risk of failure to an
acceptably low level for this critical path system.
Seawater Review if an ICCP (Impressed Current Cathodic
Service Protection) system installed in each pump room
Piping seawater service lines would protect against corrosion
in this system. This in turn should reduce the failure
rate of the seawater service lines located in the pump
rooms. Also consider installing marine growth anodes
with the same system so that use of marine growth
control chemicals can be avoided.
Liebherr Provide additional protection for boom chords and
Cranes Both lattices at boom tip against clashing of main block and
PS and boom (root cause boom damage) (WO # 3112, ER #
Starboard 1120, PO# P830900/0 and PO# P830900/1)
Laundry This rig is approved for 146 POB and therefore should
consider installing an additional washing machine and
Severity
Minor
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Minor
Major
Minor
5
Ref PSS Asset Asset Recommendation Severity
Code Description
dryer to keep up with demand. At the present time,
there are only three washing machines and three
dryers. One washer was down during the assessment
and the laundry was unable to keep up with demand.
Clothes put out at 6 PM were very often not ready until
9 or 10 AM the following day.
240 TH-802 Watermakers Water production is not nearly high enough to match Minor
consumption due to the low load the engines. Average
production over the past six months has been around
21 metric tons per day while the consumption has
averaged about 55 metric tons. Consider adding a
modem 30-ton reverse-osmosis watermaker to bring
the production up to the point where the rig is self
sufficient.
CH-209 Thruster Unit
An increase of H
2
0 content was observed in the gear box oil of several of the eight
azimuth thrusters.
Values in Red require attention
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
Values in indicate an H20 reduction after the gear oil has been
circulated over a JCJ filter.
The OEM recommends maintaining H20 levels below 0.5% in the gearbox oil. The two
available CJC Jensen filters have proven to be capable of reducing the H20 levels
below OEM maximum allowable levels. By maintaining H20 levels below the 0.5%
level, operational time will be increased. An improvement is an additional six CJC
filtration packages (or similar brand; however CJC Jensen is well known and proven
world wide for exactly this function). All thrusters could then be outfitted with one
permanent installed CJC filtration package and hard piped into the thruster piping. The
estimated budget would be approximately US $60,000 for six units with installation by
the crew.
Experience on other rigs indicated that even with the worst leaking shaft seals, water
content can be maintained within acceptable levels and thus ensuring continuous
operation of the thrusters of several years beyond the five-year designed unattended
CONFIDENTIAL
6
MODUSI 01 0 000476
service life.
EA-300 Drawworks AHD1 000
A total system review performed in 2003 on a similar AHD1 000 but on a different MODU
had revealed some of the following issues described below. These issues are as well
applicable to the AHD1 000 on this rig and should be reviewed against a cost I risk base
to verify if improvements can be made. The issues are related to the hydraulic brake
release system. The brake release system was regarded critical due to the requirement
of continuing in active heave mode. Caliper brakes are spring applied, hydraulic
pressure released. Loss of hydraulic pressure will result in the brake calipers being
applied and consequently active heave operation will be impossible.
Note that the disc brake manufacturer indicated in an estimated calculation that was
based on a drum speed of 50 rpm. If a set of calipers would be applied unintentionally,
the disc would heat up in a time frame of approximately one minute to a level that the
thermal stresses would become so high that the disc brake will most likely crack and
possibly fracture. A fracture is likely to result in damage to hydraulic lines which in turn
would apply all calipers thus the block would come to a stop. However, the damage
would be such that major NPT is ensured and likely no possibilities would remain to
raise the BHA to a safe position within a reasonable period.
Check valves (AH)
If one of the check valves fails, the hydraulic oil will either circulate to the tank and heat
up the oil or give a reverse leak over the stand by pump resulting in loss of redundancy
of the hydraulic pumps. There are no provisions in place to detect a reverse flow. A
possible improvement is:
Consider a cost I risk based analysis to verify if it is desirable to install a
pressure transmitter on each pump outlet and add the software logic for positive
failure detection or logic to confirm that positive pressure change is achieved
when the pumps are operating.
Hydraulic filters:
The system contains only a single hydraulic filter with bypass.
Consider installing a duplex filter to improve maintenance availability.
The risk of a set of calipers being applied is low due to a relative low quantity of
components that upon failure will result in a set of calipers being applied. However, the
result of a set of calipers being applied during operation can be significant with high
NPT implications.
CONFIDENTIAL
7
MODUSI 01 0 000477
D03 Solenoid Valves (C) and Pressure reducing I relieving valve (K) are realistically the
only items that have some risk potential for unintentional caliper applying. We
generated maintenance recommendations for these items in the maintenance section of
this report.
One way to remove the risk of unintentionally calipers application is to install hardware
(proximity switches) and a software logic that can detect if the calipers are slowly being
engaged (due to internal leakages in the caliper valves or solenoid valve). Consequently
an alarm can be given to the operator who would immediately have to go to a safe
condition. The downside however is the increased risk for failures during operation due
to the increased quantity of items installed. Proximity switches on brake calipers would
be vulnerable and could be stepped on during maintenance or cut and slip action.
Consider a cost I risk based analysis to verify if the installation is desirable of a
caliper position system (proximity switches) and implementation of software
logic to detect unwanted caliper movement.
LR-370 HiTech
MRU
The active heave mode of the AHD1 000 gains the heave signal through two MRUs.
Recent AHD1 000 installations are outfitted with three MRUs which have proved to be
more reliable. If when outfitted with two MRUs a minor permanent error occurs in one
of the two MRUs, the software will not be able to distinguish this error since it will have
no comparing value and the systems continuous with an error which will be visible
between the MRU curve (heave height) and block height. With three MRUs installed,
verification of the signal is possible. If an MRU fails and its signals move outside an
acceptable deviation from the calculated average, the erroneous MRU will be taken out
of the average calculation. Consider to upgrade from the existing two MRU
configuration to a three MRU configuration.
NA-607 Air Compressors/Air System- High Pressure
The installed Hamworthy KSE HP air compressor capacity consisted of:
Two HP air compressors rated for an Free Air Delivery (FAD) of 35-75 cfm
Displacement of 53-100 cfm at 100% duty
Maximum rated pressure: 4,500 psi
System working pressure: 3,000 psi
Running hours of No. 1: 2493
Running hours of No. 2: 3,019
A review of the history files indicated that the majority of breakdown and PM tasks
showed work involved on the either the Jabs co cooling water pumps or the inlet I outlet
valves in the cylinder heads. Both of these failures are common for compressors
Report of SuNey- DEEPWATER HORIZON
Reference: US 1364.2-Supplemental
CONFIDENTIAL
8
MODUSI 01 0 000478
operating at the high end of their capacity curve. Reportedly both HP air compressors
had been rebuilt in 2005 by the rig crew.
The installed APV capacity was thirty APVs with a total capacity of 2,747 fe.
4.0 MAINTENANCE ISSUES
Some discussion was made below this table to add clarity if required for the
recommendations given. These recommendations sometimes apply to improvements
that should be made at the rig level, while others might require regional or corporate
involvement. No distinction between which party might be responsible for these
recommendations is given in this table.
Table 4.1 - Maintenance Issues Recommendations
Ref PSS
Code
301 AN-050
304 AN-050
305 AN-050
306 AN-050
307 AN-050
308 AN-050
309 AN-050
Description
Central Library/ Rig equipment paper files, equipment manuals and
Technical Files electronic files must be arranged alphabetically by PSS
code as per the Maintenance Manual Section 3,
Subsection 7.
EM PAC Create an asset for "Potable Water lnline Filters" and enter
all pot water filters as asset positions for all drinking
fountains, ice machines and coffee pots. Schedule and
perform the standard PM task to this asset (filters are
changed every six months).
EM PAC Create assets for drilling drive motor VFD Line-Up No. 1
for the drawworks drive motor No. 1, mud pump drive
motor 1A and mud pump drive motor 2A.
EM PAC Create the asset registers (with asset positions for each
device) as recommended in the Maintenance Manual and
schedule the standard PM tasks where available.
Examples are ESD, Gas Detection, Fire Detection,
Portable Extinguishers, Fire Dampers and Anti-Fall
Devices.
EM PAC Delete all unscheduled PM tasks as per the maintenance
manual. There are over 400 obsolete rig specific PMs still
attached to assets and not scheduled. This causes
confusion when trying to review and plan active PMs.
EM PAC In the future, ensure that more detailed information for
each task is entered into the history in the EM PAC system,
including megger readings, temperatures and amp
readings for the following equipment AC drive motors,
transformers and HV switchboards.
EM PAC Low megger readings were recorded in PM notes for the
aux drawworks drive motor and others, but no remedial
action was taken. In the future, ensure that a CM Work
Order is created and that action is taken to correct the
problem.
Severity
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Major
9
Ref PSS
Code
310 AN-050
311 AN-050
312 AN-050
313 AN-050
314 AN-050
315 AN-050
316 AN-050
317 AN-050
318 AN-050
Description
EM PAC
EM PAC
EM PAC
EM PAC
EM PAC
EM PAC
EM PAC
EM PAC
EM PAC
Review the "Relief Valve Register" asset positions and
ensure that all PRVs are listed, such as the one for the
BOP triplex pumps and the three for the diverter panel.
Also add the three individual relief valve assets to the
register and then make these assets inactive so that their
history is retained, but no work orders can be written
against them.
Review the "Routine Task" Asset PMs and make sure the
daily and weekly tasks are up-to-date. Some appear to be
lacking. In addition, some "Associate Assets" links are
missing from the PM Tasks and need to be added.
Runtime PM scheduling for the main engines is incorrectly
setup in several places. As per the maintenance manual ,
change the following PMs from "Date Closed" to "Date
Scheduled" configuration: Engine No. 1: 99004, 99006,
99007, 99008. Engine No. 3: 99007. Engine No. 4:
99006. (Completed)
Step 1 of the 90-day PM for the main drawworks AC drive
motors calls for an internal inspection and the work orders
are being closed out without completing this step. In the
future, ensure that this step is completed.
Submitted by rig: Rig-specific tasks attached to standard
PM tasks do not show up on online work orders. They are
present only on printed work orders or on a work order
report. Therefore the craft overlook these rig-specific tasks
on a regular basis because they are taught to be efficient
by working online. The crew feels that the rig-specific
tasks should appear on the online work orders as well as
the printed versions.
Submitted by rig: The field "Asset Location" has been
removed from work orders. Previously much time and
effort was expended in entering this data so that the craft
will know the exact location of the equipment that the work
order is referring to. Now they do not have access to that
information and would like to see it reinstated.
Submitted by rig: The field "Work Order Asset Status"
has been removed from work orders. The input choices for
this field were "Failed", "Out of Service", "Running" and
"Will Fail". The crew had been able to run a query or
report on this data that showed them what equipment was
"Out of Service". Now that function is unavailable and they
would like to see it reinstated.
The 180-day Standard PM Task (99004) to blow out the
drawworks AC drive motors should be deleted. This task
serves no purpose and should be eliminated because the
motors are constantly being cooled with a high volume air
flow. The rig has generated change request DWH-015 to
eliminate this task.
The standard PM Task report indicated that several of the
Standard Tasks available were not being utilized. Review
Severity
Minor
Minor
Major
Major
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
10
Ref PSS
Code
319 EA-300
320 EA-300
321 EA-300
322 EA-300
323 EF-315
324 EF-315
325 EK-913
326 EK-948
Description
this report and schedule the standard tasks where
appropriate.
Orawworks The 365-Day PM Task, Step 1, calls for NOT inspection of
the load-bearing areas. Step 4 calls for bearing clearance
measurement. Neither step was completed in 2004. At
the time of the assessment there was an open PM Work
Order to do this PM in 2005, but it had not been completed
yet. OEM service manual EPL-1424 indicates the areas
that require NOE (all on caliper disc brake system). Step 1
(NOT) should be completed. Step 4 should be reviewed
for feasibility instead of just entering the comment: "no
access to any bearings". (ModuSpec does not support the
measurement of bearing clearance by means of feeler
gauges due to the possibility of damaging the shaft seal.
The feasibility of measuring bearing clearance should
focus on a reliable shaft lift method (which, however, is
difficult due to AC drives and gearbox installation).
Drawworks* 003 solenoid valves for the brake hydraulics: Add a
standard PM task to evaluate the condition of these valves.
Verify OEM requirements for testing. (*See Note 1)
Drawworks* 003 solenoid valves for the brake hydraulics: Perform
a cost-verses-risk based analysis to verify if it is desirable
to change out these solenoids at predetermined intervals
(possible 1825 days) (*See Note 1)
Drawworks* Pressure Reducing I Relieving valve for t he brake
hydraulics: Add a standard PM task to test both the
relieving and reducing function of this valve. (*Note 1) This
item is linked to a single-point failure that would result in a
set of calipers being applied during operation unnoticed.
The result can be cracking or fracture of the brake disc
within one minute (speed of drum 50 rpm) thus
incapacitating the Active Heave mode wi th very little
notice).
TDS Measure and record the gear backlash annually to aid in
determining the gear and main bearing condition. This in
conjunction with an borescope review of the gear box will
be an important value for the five year condition evaluation.
Currently no evaluation methods other then oil samples are
available.
TDS IBOP Verify if upper and lower I BOP have been replaced
following the 180-day WO in September 2005 (Reportedly
I BOPs have been replaced, though not recorded in
EM PAC.)
Stabbing Ensure the upper and lower hinge pin connections are
Basket NDE at the next lifting gear inspections. Linear indications
have been found on a variety of similar baskets on other
rigs.
Lower Ensure the lower fingerboard currently not in use and
Fingerboard raised in the vertical position is fully serviced prior to
reinstatinq. A variety of damaqed I sheared latches were
Severity
Major
Major
Major
Major
Major
Major
Major
Minor
11
Ref PSS
Code
327 EL-309
328 EM-311
329 E0-312
330 GA-327
331 GA-327
356 LA-948
357 MA-625
358 PD-626
Description
observed on this board. A variety of latches have been
removed presumably for part usage.
Crown Block The 1 ,825-day WO task completed in September 2005
calls for a complete inspection including NOT. Instead, the
work performed was only a visual on all welds and a
straight beam ultrasonic test (UT) on the main shaft and
fast line shaft. Review if further NOT is required to satisfy
the intent of the 1 ,825-Day PM task. Note that if the
sheaves are disassembled, they could be turned around
and thus increase the useful life.
Travelling Block The 1 ,825-day PM task completed in September 2005
calls for a complete disassembly of the travelling block
followed by NDE on the load bearings areas and the
sheaves (Step 3). Step 6 calls for bearing renewal. Step 7
calls for a turnaround of the sheaves during assembly to
prolong sheave wear. The only work performed was a
visual inspection on the sheaves, followed by straight
beam ultrasonic testing (UT) on the main shaft and the
becket pin. (Post discussion revealed that WO was
possibly confused with the 365-day WO and
unintentionally closed. 1,825-day WO was reopened
after discussion.)
Counterbalance Schedule standard PM tasks, none were scheduled at the
Rotating Hook time of our survey
Mud Pump 1-2- Ensure silicon-type sealants are not used at openings due
3-4 to the inherent risk for oil line blockages. The excessive
quantities of silicon sealant observed should be removed
from the power end internals. Dry gaskets or liquid gasket
material such as Locktite dry sealant should be used only .
Mud Pumps Request a standard PM task for an annual NDE of the mud
pump crankshaft. The history of the No.4 pump
crankshaft cracks warrants this PM task.
PRS Fwd and PRS gripper arm assembly: Pull one load pin for condition
Aft evaluation (see supplemental report for pin location). If pin
or bore bushings are worn extensively, more pins will have
to be pulled. Pre-greased bearing bushings have caused
worn pins and elongated bores after several years of
operation on PRS units, resulting in extensive rework of
arm and bores.
Main Engines Perform the outstanding maintenance based on running
hours on main engine No. 2 (1 ,000 hr), 3 (2,000, 4,000,
16,000 hr) and 6 (2,000, 4,000, 16,000 hr) when
switchboard configuration allows.
Deck crane Verify and ensure that rig crew responsible for the deck
engine crane engine maintenance are trained or are familiar with
the Caterpillar electronic injection system and condition
evaluation through Caterpillar-supplied software on laptop.
The high occurrences of injector failures suggest possible
incorrect setti ngs. These engines are generally well
accepted in the land drilling industry and perform generally
Severity
Major
Major
Major
Major
Major
Minor
Minor
Major
12
Ref PSS Asset Asset Recommendation Severity
Code Description
well.
359 TD-956 Hazardous Create an asset for hazardous area vent fans, schedule Minor
Area Vent Fans the standard PM tasks to it and complete the maintenance
as soon as possible.
360 TX-694 Hazardous Identify all the electrical devices in the hazardous areas, Minor
Areas attach an I. D. Tag to each one and enter into a hazardous
area register.
361 TX-694 Hazardous Schedule the standard PM tasks to the hazardous area Major
Areas register and complete the EX maintenance program as
soon as possible.
362 UD-654 UPS System Ensure all the UPS systems on the rig are identified for Minor
use, including the AC power source for each system.
363 UD-654 UPS System Ensure that load tests are performed frequently to monitor Major
the condition of the UPS units. Multiple failures have
occurred in the past and caused downtime, so these units
need to be watched carefully.
364 US-713 Gas Detection At present the combustible gas levels are set at 20% LEL Major
System (High) and 60% LEL (High-High), but with only 50% gas on
the rig these pre-set levels are unobtainable; therefore,
recommend the LEL values in the Simrad system be set up
to alarm at 20% LEL (High) and 40% LEL (High-High).
(Submitted MOC MD 4S)
EA-300 Drawworks AHD1 000
Several things can be done to improve the reliability of the drawworks. The areas that
we focused on are items that upon failure would directly result in either loss of Active
Heave capability or direct NPT due to other reasons.
Pressure reducing I relieving valve (K)
If a failure occurs in this valve preventing it from opening, it will eventually result in an
inability to release the brakes. An internal leakage will eventually engage the brakes. A
premature open situation might overpressure the brake calipers and might lead to an
external leakage. All actions will eventually result in a loss of Active Heave capability.
Add a PM standard task to test both the relieving and reducing function of this
valve.
D03 Solenoid Valves (C)
If an internal leak occurs during operation, a maximum of two calipers might
unintentionally be set and consequently will incapacitate the active heave mode. There
are no possibilities to remove this risk; however, proper maintenance will reduce the
possibility of failure.
CONFIDENTIAL
13
MODUSI 01 0 000483
Add a PM standard task to evaluate the condition of these valves at possible
730-day to 1,095-day intervals.
Consider a cost I risk based analysis to verify if it is desirable to change out
these solenoids at predetermined intervals (possibly 1,825 days).
EK-913 Casing Stabbing Board
Crack-like indications were found in the knees supporting the upper and lower main
hinge points caused by the force applied by the hydraulic cylinder that swings the
assembly.
Similar areas where cracks have been found were upgraded by adding heavier knees
and web plates at the hinge pin connection. The next annual inspection should include
an NDE of the knees supporting the main frame connection.
LA-948 Pipe-Racking System*
An 1,825-day PM standard task should include the task to pull at least two pins from the
lower gripper arm assembly. This will allow an inspection of the pin, bore and bushings.
Inspections on similar arm assemblies after three years of operation revealed worn
bushings to the extent that the pin had worn out the bore, resulting in time-consuming
reworking of the bore. If worn bushings are found, then it should be verified if
greaseable pins are installed. If pre-greased bushings are used with no grease options
in the pin, an upgrade should be considered. The upgrade would consist of changing
the non-greaseable pins out for greaseable pins. See pictures below of worn bushings
and worn bores and the new pin upgrade. Note that the damage visible in the pictures
below were observed on a non-TOI rig. These are not actual pictures from the
DEEPWATER HORIZON. The picture at bottom indicates the upgraded pin version
with grease bores.
CONFIDENTIAL
14
MODUSI 01 0 000484

CONFIDENTIAL
15
MODUSI 01 0 000485
CONFIDENTIAL
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MODUSI 01 0 000486

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