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SECTION C DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS/WORK STATEMENT STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTIONS (CBPS) APPROACH FOR THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY

IN SUPPORT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN THE PORTS OF ENTRY This Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT) system procurement is one element of a broader CBP strategy to rapidly acquire non-developmental (and ideally commercially available) systems to support border enforcement efforts. Technology is combined with other CBP resources and capabilities; notably personnel, infrastructure, and intelligence; to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of our border enforcement efforts. The current strategy for the acquisition and deployment of technology derives from lessons learned from past experience. Most notably, the recent effort to develop and deploy a system known as the Secure Border Initiative-network (SBInet) provided key insights about technology capabilities and CBPs past approaches to employ them. Among other things, the SBInet experience taught us: Industry (often in response to military needs) appears to have many already available systems that could provide the type of capabilities offered by portions of SBInet, although they may not meet all of the aspirations for SBInet. Quantitative analysis on the benefits of technology for border enforcement is extremely limited. Nonetheless, Border Patrol experience to date provides compelling evidence that technology is useful in (1) detecting incursions across the border, (2) identifying or classifying those incursions, (3) providing more efficient application of personnel to respond to incursions, and (4) enhancing agent safety through increased awareness of each tactical situation. Technology also offers opportunities to measure the amount of cross-border traffic and changes in that traffic over time. The Border Patrol primarily uses technology for detection and surveillance between ports of entry, enabling CBP to maximize its effectiveness in responding to and disrupting illicit activity. In other words, technology enhances situational awareness of the amount and types of illegal activity at the border, enabling officers to spend more of their time responding to incursions and less of their time detecting them.

The IFT systems that are the subject of this procurement are part of the overall Arizona plan. Offerors should understand this solicitation within the overall context of CBPs plan for technology. First and foremost, CBP is NOT interested in any kind of a system development. CBP understands it is unlikely that there are existing (non-developmental) systems that meet ALL of its aspirations and desires. Instead, CBP is interested in selecting a non-

developmental (and preferably commercially available) system that represents the best mix of capabilities at a reasonable price. This RFP contains capability interests that include both thresholds and objectives for a variety of performance parameters. CBP is providing this information so that offerors may have a better understanding of the totality of characteristics that CBP values in a system. There will be a few Key Performance Parameters that the system must meet. However, except as described elsewhere in this solicitation, CBP is willing to forego lower priority parameter performance (even at the threshold level) where the overall value of the total system outweighs the compromise of those lower priority parameters. Offerors who cannot meet some lower priority parameters, but otherwise offer good performance and high confidence at an attractive price, should expect to compete favorably in this procurement. Offerors who offer higher performance at a higher price should also expect to compete favorably if the increased performance is worth the marginal increase in price. CBP is interested in selecting from among a wide range of offerings, trading combinations of performance against price. CBP also values the participation of small businesses and will give consideration to offerors who make extensive use of small businesses, assuming those small businesses have the capacity to succeed with low risk to the government. In all cases, CBP will seek strong confirmation that each offerors system is truly non-developmental. Offerors must provide strong assurance that the proposed system is now ready, deployable and will not require additional engineering development effort if they hope to receive favorable consideration. The Government has conducted extensive market research and has high confidence that there are currently existing, non-developmental systems that will warrant an eventual contract award under this solicitation. However, if the Government concludes there are no offerors who provide adequate confidence in the non-developmental nature of their system, or no offerors who provide enough performance at reasonable cost, CBP will cancel the solicitation rather than procure an ineffective or high risk offering. The ultimate contract requirements will be the specifications, capabilities and performance proposed by the successful offeror. Offerors who fail to meet the performance levels they themselves propose should not expect tolerance from the Government. All offerors are on notice that the Government will be ready, willing, and able to terminate for default any successful offeror who fails to meet the performance characteristics asserted and presented in the offerors proposal. Offerors should be aware that CBP expects to gain important experience through deployment and operation of its technology systems. Instant procurements of nondevelopmental systems will provide a sort of technology baseline which CBP can use to assess the value of potential enhancements in the future. Operation of the nondevelopmental systems will also enable CBP to collect data about the effectiveness of technology. These data, in turn, will assist CBP in building quantitative models to advise future technology procurement strategies. Put another way, CBP has not forsaken technology development and improvement. CBP remains very interested in gaining increased capability and value from technology in the

future. But technology development is NOT an interest for the systems which are the subject of this solicitation. Instead, the IFT procurement, along with the other technology elements of our Arizona plan, will form the comprehensive technology baseline CBP will use to establish the requirements and relative values for future technology. That future technology will be a concern for future procurement activitiesnot this one. C.1 Mission Need The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) has the responsibility of securing the Nations borders against the illegal entry of people and goods between ports of entry (POE). To accomplish this, USBP uses a mix of infrastructure, technology, and personnel to manage the land borders. These three resources are used to execute the mission elements of predicting illicit activity, detecting and tracking illegal border crossings, identifying and classifying the incursions, and responding to and resolving those incursions. The Integrated Fixed Towers (IFT) Program contributes towards fulfillment of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 2014 Strategic Plan, Objective 1.1: Establish and maintain effective control of air, land, and maritime borders through the use of the appropriate mix of infrastructure, technology, and personnel. In addition, the IFT Program supports the DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review of February 2010 Mission: Securing and Managing Our Borders, Goal 2.1: Effectively control U.S. Air, Land and Sea Borders. In this acquisition, CBP is seeking non-developmental (and ideally commercial) sensor systems that provide long range persistent surveillance to enable the detection, tracking, identification, and classification of items of interest (IoI) in rural and remote areas along our Nations borders. The system will consist of a tailored deployment of stand-alone capability within an Area of Responsibility (AOR). There is no initial effort intended to integrate or network any of the individual systems across AORs. Over time, as personnel become more familiar with the operations and potential of these systems, their experience may provide a basis for future enhancements and increased performance. However, for now, the intent is to avoid over-shooting mission needs at all costs by delivering low-risk systems that can give immediate support to the overall border security mission. C.1.1 Key Mission Elements CBPs key mission elements are defined below in Table C-1. The mission elements directly supported through IFT capability are predict, detect, track, identify/classify, and respond.

Table C-1. CBP Mission Elements

Mission Element Predict Deter Detect Track Identify Classify Respond

Definition To anticipate illegal traffic actions prior to illegal activity To dissuade illegal cross border activity into and out of the United States by creating and conveying a certainty of detection and apprehension To discover possible illegal traffic To follow the progress/movements of possible illegal traffic To determine what the detected entity is (human, animal, conveyance, unknown) To determine the level of threat or intent of the detected entity To employ the appropriate level of law enforcement resources to successfully address illegal traffic To take final CBP action, whether criminally, administratively, or other, against apprehended illegal traffic. [This includes capture data, process information, etc. This may also include the release of legitimate traffic with no law enforcement action.]

Resolve

To successfully execute these mission elements, the USBP requires a number of operational capabilities that include: Persistent Surveillance Capability: the ability to continuously detect, track, identify and classify border incursions 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (24/7) in targeted areas under all weather, terrain, vegetation and lighting conditions Command, Control, Communication, Coordination and Intelligence (C4I) Capability: the ability to collect and analyze information, exchange information and intelligence, allocate and control resources according to operational needs, and make informed operational command decisions in support of the mission. Sustainment and Support Capability: the ability to maintain and sustain the surveillance systems in accordance with mission needs and operational capabilities. 4

These capabilities enhance overall situational awareness and coupled with the right mix of manpower and tactical infrastructure enhance operational effectiveness to counter a dynamic and evolving Border threat. Long range persistent surveillance, coupled with C4I capabilities, enables USBP to efficiently and effectively manage rural and remote areas of interest (AoI). How the AOI relates to other significant IFT coverage definitions is shown below in Figure C-1.

Figure C-1. Surveillance Coverage Definitions

C.1.2 Operational Background The IFT system will enable an operator to continuously monitor an area of coverage (AoC) within an AoI, to enable the detection and tracking, identification, and classification of IoIs as follows: Without operator intervention, detect and track the following IoIs within an AoC: any humans traveling on foot (alone and in groups), humans traveling on animals (alone and in groups), and moving ground conveyances (such as ATVs, motorcycles, automobiles, and trucks). Report detections of IoI to a designated Human Machine Interface (HMI operator workstation) in near real-time. Provide near real-time video of any operator-selected IoI within the AoC to enable the operator to remotely identify, classify, and direct responders to detected IoI activity.

Geospatially display IoI information on one or more operator workstations in a manner that enables the operator to effectively manage multiple, simultaneous IoI events within an AoC. Perform these mission critical tasks under typical and adverse weather conditions; in rural and remote locations where site access, power and communications are limited; and in terrain ranging from flat and open, to rugged (mountainous) and foliated. Store, retrieve and export IoI data (to include detection, tracking and video data) to facilitate on-going operations, post-event intelligence activities, law enforcement activities, and legal proceedings.

The IFT system provides a long range persistent surveillance capability in areas where other solutions have been deemed impractical or not feasible. As such, the IFT must ensure a high probability of apprehension in areas that are otherwise problematic and difficult to manage effectively. Consequently, the high probability of apprehension will dissuade incursions within a systems AoC, thereby reducing activity levels, mitigating threat potential and resulting in a more effective and efficient border management strategy. The interests articulated above are high level operational interest descriptions. Specific IFT operational interests that support these needs are articulated, tabulated, and prioritized in the IFT Capability Interest Matrix in Section J-2. Because the operational needs, tactics and geographical constraints vary widely across the AoIs where IFT systems will be used, several of the effectiveness interests focus on the level of performance expected from a single Fixed Surveillance Tower Unit (FSTU), rather than defining the overall installed AoC of a group of FSTUs, recognizing that the latter will be a function of FSTU locations, surrounding terrain, vegetation, foliage, and other factors. C.1.3 System/Operational Concept IFT Fixed Surveillance Towers (FST) together with associated Fixed Surveillance Tower Subsystems (FSTS) form a Fixed Surveillance Tower Unit (FSTU) that provides a long range surveillance capability with beneficial height that enables better coverage of a surveillance area. When multiple FSTUs are integrated with operator workstations at a Command and Control Center (C2CEN) facility, the result is an IFT system that enables USBP to monitor very large AoCs within an AoI. IFT systems contribute to situational awareness, agent safety and are a preferred solution in certain rural and remote areas that are difficult to access and/or where USBP has a need for longer term/permanent persistent surveillance because of a persistent threat. As one part of a multi-layered approach to border surveillance, IFT systems will contribute to both the persistent surveillance and C4I capabilities needed by USBP.

An IFT system operational concept (displayed notionally in Figure C-2) consists of operator workstations located in a C2CEN that integrates and displays data from all FSTUs deployed within the AoC, and supporting power and communications (as necessary). Each FSTU will consist of a tower equipped with a suite of sensors. The suite of sensors will continuously detect and track IoIs across a targeted AoC, and provide that information to operator workstations. The system will also provide the operator(s) (referred to hereafter as the operator) with near real time video of operatorselected IoIs of sufficient quality to enable a trained operator to identify and classify the IoI. IoI data from one or more FSTUs across the AoC will be shown geospatially on one or more operator workstations that also display the video of operator-selected IoIs. The operators will be responsible for monitoring the operator workstations, managing and prioritizing the IoIs and coordinating interdiction with field agents.

Figure C-2. IFT System High Level Operational Concept

The IFT system will accomplish the following tasks: Detect any IoI that enters the AoC Track all detected IoIs as they move within the AoC Provide video to enable the operator to identify and classify the IoI Provide a geospatial display of IoI data that enables the operator to effectively monitor and manage multiple FSTUs within an AoC

Provide video of operator-selected IoIs in near real time as they move through the AoC Provide real-time control over the IFT subsystems and components to facilitate operations Provide the capability for the operator to designate/illuminate the location of a selected IoI Provide IoI location, speed and heading of operator-selected IoIs in near real time Determine the distance and bearing to an IoI from an operator-selected location on the geospatial display Provide the capability to add, edit, remove and display entities of interest, such as landmarks, on the geospatial display Provide the capability to add, edit, remove and display areas of special interest (e.g. hot zones), as well as, areas of no interest or known nuisance traffic (exclusion zones) Provide real-time component/system Health and Status data to the operator workstations to support status monitoring and troubleshooting Provide system security status reporting Record IoI data including video and images for later retrieval to support shift changes, intelligence activities, law enforcement activities, and legal proceedings. The IFT operator will accomplish the following tasks: Monitor and manage up to three operator selectable FSTUs within an AoC Monitor IoIs as they move throughout the AoC Prioritize IoIs for investigation Direct and adjust the sensors as necessary to obtain video Use the video to investigate IoIs Identify IoIs as human, animal, conveyance or unknown Classify IoIs to determine: number in group, items they are carrying or backpacking, and whether they appear to be migrant workers, smugglers, or potential terrorists, and identify weapons if possible Communicate threat data to field agents for situational awarenessvia legacy land mobile radio (LMR) voice communications Direct field agents to IoI locations during response activities Designate/illuminate the IoI, where appropriate, during response activities Assign current and final status of IoIs Add, edit and/or remove entities of interest, such as landmarks, on the geospatial display Add, edit and/or remove areas of special interest and areas of no interest on the geospatial display Save and retrieve video, images or other IoI data to facilitate the transfer of unresolved IoI events that span shift changes or other follow-on law enforcement or intelligence activities.

In addition to the high level operational CONOPS for IFT in Figure C-2, the following scenario describes a step-by-step intended use of the system in a typical border security situation. The scenario is general in nature and is intended to provide an understanding or concept of the systems utility in any given operational environment. Scenario-Failure to Yield A Border Patrol Agent (BPA) assigned to monitor an operator workstation receives a detection notification (sighting) as shown in Figure C-3. The operator clicks to slew the system to the location and verifies using the system video that the source of activation is a vehicle which has illegally crossed the U.S/Mexico International Boundary. The operator relays this information via service radio communication to agents patrolling within the zone and marks the IoI as high priority on the workstation geospatial display, which turns the symbol red (according to the operators preference) and differentiates it from other IoIs. The IFT system is set to automatically and continuously track the movement of the vehicle within the video scene. Figure C-3. Notional Scenario

As the vehicle travels a dirt road north, the operator is able to provide location, speed and direction of the IoI as it nears a paved highway using the workstation geospatial display. The operator provides coordinates and heading of the suspect vehicle to the BPAs as the system tracks it on the workstation geospatial display. BPAs who respond and appear on the workstation geospatial display are marked as blue IoI symbols (according to the operators preference). The workstation geospatial display enables the operator to determine distances between the red and blue symbols which assists with vectoring the BPAs. The workstation operator continues to relay the IoI direction of travel based on the data provided by the system.

The BPAs position themselves at the safest interdiction point and have the vehicle IoI in sight. They attempt a vehicle stop and the vehicle IoI fails to yield to emergency lights and siren. Agents following this vehicle radio ahead to agents who will set up a Controlled Tire Deflation Device (CTDD). As the suspect vehicle travels beyond one IFT towers surveillance area and enters the adjacent IFT tower surveillance area, the workstation geospatial display maintains a single, constant track on it. The vehicle IoI symbol remains red and is easily differentiated from two other conveyance IoIs moving along the same road. The workstation operator advises agents of upcoming traffic flow and the location of the vehicle IoI, which helps coordinate the CTDD deployment. The suspect vehicle slows to a stop after striking the CTDD and the vehicles two occupants exit the vehicle and abscond into the desert. As the occupants flee in different directions, the IFT system detects and tracks their movement and the workstation operator marks these suspects, now on foot, as red IoI symbols on the geospatial display. The workstation operator merges these new tracks with the previous vehicle IoI track for future trend analysis purposes. As agents arrive, they follow the two fleeing suspects through the desert; the system detects the agents and automatically marks them as blue symbol IoI on the geospatial display after correlating this data with P25 Blue Force Tracking (BFT) system inputs. The workstation operator notifies agents of one fleeing suspect who has stopped running and has found cover in the brush. The workstation operator uses the systems motion detection capability option to locate the hiding IoIs subtle movements within the video scene. The agents request the assistance of IoI illumination to identify where the suspect IoI is hiding. This illumination cannot be seen by the IoIs and the field agents coordinate their response. The field agents follow the illumination using their Night Vision Goggles (NVG) to the bush where the suspect is hiding and apprehend the suspect. The second suspect has continued to run through the desert and agents are no longer able to track the shoe prints through the hard caliche surface. The workstation operator directs the system to the second IoI marked red on the geospatial screen and advises the agents to prepare for illumination. The agents utilize their NVGs and the workstation operator illuminates the suspect hiding in a nearby bush which guides field agents toward the suspect who is apprehended shortly thereafter. Video evidence stored by the IFT system is retrieved the following day and utilized to prosecute the two individuals in legal proceedings. Exported video is later utilized for training purposes, as the video represents the proper techniques to deploy a CTDD. C.1.4 Key Performance Parameters Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) are those system capabilities or characteristics considered essential for successful mission accomplishment. The IFT KPPs are defined in Table C-2.

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Table C-2. IFT KPPs

Parameter Detection Range: A single IFT unit (FSTU) shall be able to detect a single, walking, average-sized adult at a range of 5 miles (Threshold (T)) / 7.5 miles (Objective (O)) under the following conditions: daylight and darkness; line of sight (LoS) ranging from clear LoS to partial obstruction (50% to 95% blockage of the individual for periods of 1-3 seconds); sustained wind speeds up to 10 MPH with gusts up to 15 MPH. Identification Range: The system shall provide video of sufficient quality and resolution to enable an operator to determine that a single, walking, average-sized adult is a human at a range of 5 miles (T) / 7.5 miles (O) under the following conditions: daylight and darkness; LoS ranging from clear LoS to partial obstruction (50% to 95% blockage of the individual for periods of 1-3 seconds); sustained wind speeds up to 10 MPH, with gusts up to 15 MPH; moderate atmospheric turbulence. IFT System Availability Metric (SAM): OCI 055: Within an Area of Coverage (AoC), the System Availability Metric (SAM) shall be defined as the product of AO_C2CEN and the average of all AO_FSTU within the AoC. Stated as a formula: SAM = AO_C2CEN x Average{All AO_FSTU within the AoC}. Within an Area of Coverage, the System Availability Metric shall be equal to or greater than 90% (T) or 99% (O). (KPP). OCIs 55a and 55b are designed to allow for trade space between C2CEN and FSTU subsystem availability.

Threshold 5 miles

Objective 7.5 miles

5 miles

7.5 miles

90%

99%

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Parameter Operational Availability of FSTU (AO_FSTU): OCI 055a: Each Fixed Surveillance Tower Unit (FSTU) together with all communications capabilities between the FSTU and the associated Command and Control Center (C2CEN) facility shall provide and sustain an operational availability (AO_FSTU) of equal to or greater than 90% (T) or 99% (O), using the definition of AO provided in the Glossary and Acronyms (Section J-10). All elements of the IFT system shall be accounted for under either OCI 055a or OCI 055b. (KPP) Operational Availability of C2CEN (AO_C2CEN): OCI 055b: Each Command and Control Center (C2CEN) facility shall provide and sustain an operational availability (AO_C2CEN) of equal to or greater than 90% (T) or 99% (O), using the definition of AO provided in the Glossary and Acronyms (Section J-10). All elements of the IFT system shall be accounted for under either OCI 055a or OCI 055b. (KPP). C.1.5 IFT System Architecture

Threshold

Objective

90%

99%

90%

99%

CBP expects that the threat to the US borders will evolve and change over time, which makes the systems ability to allow changes highly desirable. CBP also expects that there will be a future desire to integrate CBP surveillance systems to gain operational benefits. Therefore, CBP is interested in systems that employed a system architecture approach with the following characteristics: a. Open Architecture The system architecture incorporates appropriate considerations for re-configurability, portability, maintainability, technology insertion, vendor independence, reusability, scalability, interoperability, upgradeability, and long-term supportability. b. Modular, Open Design The system was developed with an architecture that is layered and modular and uses standards-based COTS/NDI hardware, operating systems, and middleware that all utilize either non-proprietary or non-vendorunique key module or component interfaces. c. Inter-component Dependencies The system design is a layered system design, maximizing software independence from the hardware, thereby facilitating technology refresh. The design is optimized at the lowest component level to minimize inter-component dependencies. The layered design also isolates the application software layers from the infrastructure software (such as the operating system) to enhance portability and to facilitate technology refresh. Each system

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d.

e.

f.

g.

h. i.

component is designed to survive a change to the computing infrastructure with minimal or no changes required to the application logic. Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) The system design emphasizes modularization, with described rationale for the choices made to generate the design. The system consists of hierarchical collections of software and hardware components. These components are of a size that supports competitive acquisition as well as reuse. The systems design modules are compatible with components that are available commercially or within the Government, to avoid the need to redevelop products that already exist and that can be reused. MOSA Objectives The system design is one that enables adaptation to evolving requirements and threats; facilitates systems reconfiguration and integration; and mitigates the risks associated with: (1) technology obsolescence, (2) being locked into proprietary or vendor-unique technology, and (3) reliance on a single source of supply over the life of the system. Technology Insertion The systems architectural approach supports the rapid and affordable insertion and refreshment of technology through modular design, the use of open standards and open interfaces. Functional partitioning and the physical modularity of the system are defined to facilitate future replacement of specific subsystems and components without impacting other parts of the system and to encourage third-party vendors participation. Description of Proprietary or Vendor-Unique Elements The use of proprietary, vendor-unique or closed components or interfaces are explained. When interfaces, hardware, firmware, or modules that are proprietary or vendor-unique are included, the system should demonstrate that those proprietary elements do not preclude or hinder other component developers from interfacing with or otherwise developing, replacing, or upgrading open parts of the system. Open Business Practices The modularity of the system design promotes the identification of multiple sources of supply and/or repair, and supports flexible competitive business strategies. Life Cycle Management and Open Systems There is a defined plan or process for the logistical support of COTS, reusable NDI, and other components throughout the life cycle. The availability of commercial repair parts and repair services, facilities, and manpower required for life cycle support is well understood and adequate to ensure long term support for COTS or NDI products. There is a mechanism for pass-through of COTS warranties to the Government.

C.2 Scope of Work C.2.1 IFT System The contractor shall provide all management, supervision, engineering services, personnel, labor, materials, and equipment (except for government furnished items) required to build, install, and test the IFT system in each Border Patrol Station (BPS) area of responsibility (AoR) identified in the contract. The contractor shall build, install, and test the IFT system in each BPS AoR no later than 12 months after contract award (for the base quantity) and no later than 12 months after exercising an Option for all AOR

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Option quantities (CLINs 0002 through 0006). Following Government acceptance of the system within each BPS AoR, Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) will commence. The IFT System will be deployed in BPS Nogales AoR (base quantity) and may be deployed in five additional AoRs, for a maximum of six BPS AoRs within the State of Arizona as follows: BPS Nogales AoR (Base quantity) BPS Sonoita AoR (Option quantity) BPS Douglas AoR (Option quantity) BPS Casa Grande AoR (Option quantity) BPS Ajo-2 AoR (Option quantity) BPS Wellton AoR (Option quantity)

C.2.2 IFT CLS The contractor shall provide all management, supervision, engineering services, personnel, labor, materials, and equipment (except for government furnished items) required to maintain the IFT system in each BPS AoR identified in the contract line item options, when these options are added to the IFT contract. Equipment and materials include consumables, spare parts, support equipment, and replacement components of the IFT system necessary to attain and maintain the required operational availability of the system [END OF SECTION C]

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