INDEX

Ser No 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. CHAPTER: I CHAPTER: II CHAPTER: III CHAPTER: IV CHAPTER : V

Contents Prologue Chronology of Events Background to the Conflict Period from 1950-1960 Forward Post Policy The Conflict Begins Deployment of Forces

Page No 4 5 11 21 28 32 36

IMPORTANT BATTLES: EASTERN THEATRE

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

CHAPTER : VI CHAPTER : VII CHAPTER : VIII CHAPTER : IX CHAPTER : X

China Attacks Thag La Battle of Walong Battle of Namka Chu Battle of Bumla Battle at Lagyala Gompa

39 46 56 71 73

IMPORTANT BATTLES: NORTHERN THEATRE

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

CHAPTER : XI CHAPTER : XII CHAPTER : XIII CHAPTER : XIV CHAPTER : V

Battle of Chushul Battle of Rezang La Withdrawal from Daulat Beg Oldi Limited Role of the IAF US Intervention & International Reaction

80 90 97 99 104

Ser No No

Chapter

Contents

Page

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

CHAPTER : XVI CHAPTER : XVII CHAPTER : XVIII CHAPTER : XIX CHAPTER : XX Roll of Honour

Implications of Chinese Aggression Sino - Indian Relations Post 1962 Strategic Lessons of the Conflict Analysis of Chinese Mil Tac & Strat Acts of Bravery : Gallantry Awards

108 111 116 123 135 138 144

Notes & Bibliography

PROLOGUE

1. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the effective border between India and China. The LAC is 4,057 km long and traverses three areas of northern Indian states: western (Ladakh, Kashmir), middle (Uttarakhand, Himachal) and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal) sectors. 2. The Sino Indian Conflict of 1962 erupted primarily due to territorial disputes. India pursued a forward post policy and did not try and resolve the border issue at the bilateral or international level assuming passive acceptance by China and non-interference by the PLA in its militaristic designs. The disputed areas along the Indo-China border are loc in three geographical areas. (a) Eastern Sector: 90,000 Sq Km under Indian control then called the North-East Frontier Agency, or NEFA. (b) Middle Sector: 20,000 Sq Km on either side of the Himalayan watershed and passes. (c) Western Sector: 30,000 Sq Km of high plateau country known as the Aksai Chin in the district of Ladakh of Jammu and Kashmir state bordering Tibet and Xinjiang province of China. 3. On 08 September 1962, the Chinese crossed the Mc Mohan Line and came near Thag La and attempted to encircle the Indian Posts at the Tri-junction of NEFA, Bhutan and Tibet. 4. As an answer to Indias growing militaristic adventure through its Forward Posts policy on 20 Oct 1962, the Chinese assaulted the Indian positions with a heavy barrage of artillery and mortar fire in the Western and Eastern Sectors. In the Western Sector, Chinese attacked the Indian posts in the Chip Chap, Galwan, and Pangang Tso areas. Wave after wave of Chinese troops in a massive two pronged sweep came close to encircling 50,000 square miles of India in the Himalayan territory. 5. On 24 Oct 1962, China made a peace offer but India rejected it because China demanded a withdrawal of 20 km from the Line of Actual Control which they had created by aggression since the beginning of 20 September 1962. The Chinese were in overwhelming strength and attacked in all the sectors. In the Western Sector, the Chinese attacked South of the Karakoram pass at the Northwest extremity of the Aksai-Chin and in Pangong Lake, an area of 100 miles to the southeast. Owing to poor performance of logistics and communication gap, Indian forces were ejected from eleven posts in the vicinity of Karakoram Pass and from several posts near Pangong Lake. Daulat-Beg-Oldi

4 and Chushul were attacked. In spite of the difficult situation, Indian troops entrenched in strong positions put up a very gallant defence. They beat the Chinese,at Chushul and accepted heavy casualties. The heroic deeds of the Indian troops compelled the Chinese to give up the idea of capturing Chushul and they turned their attention towards Demchok and Jara La area on 27 Oct 1962. The outlying posts of Rezangla and Gurung Hill and four posts in Spanggur area were overwhelmed by Chinese. Incidentally, Chinese realised that they had been confined only to the arid and inhospitable region of Ladakh. They also found difficulty in maintaining communication and faced severe problems in terms of logistics and transportation. Therefore, they turned their attention to the more vulnerable and comparatively populous area of NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh). 6. Boder conflicts in the Eastern region were all along the Thagla and Namka Chu sectors. The PLA moved using human wave tactics and gradually swept into India, passing through Tawang, Bumla, Sela, Bomdilla and reached as far as Tezpur. 7. The humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese brought out the ineptitude and lack of foresight of our politicians and the short comings of our military leaders. It brought into focus the gross under preparedness of the defence forces and ushered in a phase of introspection and consequent change in the mindset of the political and military leaders. The border still remains undemarcated and both countries stake claims over the expanse all along the disputed areas in the Eastern, Middle and the Western sectors.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1. In 1846 and upto 1847, the British commissioners drew boundaries to the north of the Pangong Lake and stopped at the Karakoram Pass but could not correctly define the northwest boundaries of Tibet. 2. In the early 1880s, China and India agreed on the Karakoram Pass as the fixed point of boundary, while leaving both sides of the pass indefinite. 3. In the mid-1890s, China claimed Aksai Chin as its territory, and voiced the claim to McCartney in 1896, who drew part of the British boundary in the Himalayas. McCartney presented the claim to the British who agreed with his comment that part of Aksai Chin was in China and part in the British territory. 4. 1899, the British proposed a boundary demarcation with the Mcartney McDonald line, which gave China the whole of the Karakash Valley, and almost all of Aksai Chin proper while pushing the British boundary forward on the Karakoram range. 5. The Simla Convention in 1914 placed Aksai Chin as part of Tibet.

6. In October 1947 Chinese army entered Tibet, and the Indian government headed by Prime Minister Nehru issued an angry protest, deploring the "invasion" of Tibet. 7. In 1949, India sent troops during an uprising in Sikkim and brought the state under its governance as a protectorate. 8. In 1950, India increased its control over Nepal and consolidated the "chain of protectorates" in the Himalayan states. Towards Tibet, the new Indian Government followed the British mission in encouraging Tibetan separatism. In its strategic and geopolitical thinking inherited from the British, the Indian Government continued the policy of exclusion of Chinas authority from Tibet and attempted to increase the Indian influence. 9. In 1950, after its failed attempt to have some degrees of Tibetan independence and buffer, the Indian government adopted a pragmatic policy of pursuing friendship with China. 10. As China confirmed its authority in Tibet, India did not support the appeal of Tibet to the UN.

6 11. In November 1950, the Indian Government unilaterally declared the McMahon Line as their boundary. 12. In 1954, The Sino Indian agreement was signed which stated the famous "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence," or "Panch Sheel" 13. In 1954 India categorically claimed Aksai Chin as part of the northern border. The Indian posts were established in Ladakh, far short of Aksai Chin. In September 1954, it was decided that border posts should be advanced. 14. The forward move into the middle sector brought prompt Chinese protests.

15. The civilian leadership placed the soldiers into a disadvantaged position. Menon became the Defence Minister in 1957, he was perceived as being energetic and politically relevant. 16. In Oct 1958, India discovered the Aksai Chin road built by the Chinese.

17. In 1959, the Tibetan armed uprising failed in Lhasa and the Dalai Lama fled through the old trade route across the McMahon Line to Tawang, where the Indian Government took him under the wing. 18. On 25 August 1959, Indian troops intruded south of the Migyitun and fired on Chinese. New Delhi protested the next day that China moved into Indian Territory and forced Indians out of Longju, accusing China of "deliberate aggression". 19. Delhi protested to Peking on 11 August 1959, claiming that Khinzemane was in Indian territory and that Thag La ridge was the boundary "traditionally as well as by treaty map." 20. China protested back claiming that Khinzemane was "undoubtedly part of Chinese territory", warning India of serious consequences if the Indians posts were not withdrawn. 21. India modified a proposal requesting China to leave the status quo at Khinzemane undisturbed, while India would undertake no further change. 22. The Indian post at Khinzemane was unmolested for the next three years, until India broke its implicit undertaking by setting up another post in the area. 23. In September 1959, Nehru rejected Chou En-lais letter in which China complained that the Indians were overstepping the McMahon Line.

7 24. In August 1959, the "bluster against China" picked up volume and the opposition criticisms attacked the governments China policy over the border dispute.

25. Nehru tasked Dr. Gopal, the director of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, to London to review materials on Indias northern borders. Gopal reported in November 1959 that Indias claim to the Aksai Chin area was clearly stronger than Chinas. 26. 19 April 1960, Chou En-lai arrived in New Delhi, accompanied by Marshall Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister, and a large delegation. 27. India began to vigorously pursue Forward Post policy. The forward policy sprang from the conclusion that there was nothing else India could do. It was based on the fundamental premise that the Chinese would not physically interfere no matter how many Indians posts and patrols were set up, provided that the Indians did not attack any Chinese positions. 28. It never occurred to New Delhi that war might arise from Chinese reaction to or anticipation of Indian moves. Nehru and his colleagues were unwavering in their faith that whatever India did along the borders, China would not attack. This basic assumption was the basis of the forward policy, a military challenge to a militarily far superior neighbor. 29. The Indian Government stressed on development to come first. Military aid from abroad was considered unacceptable since it would impair Indias aura of non-alignment and be unreliable. 30. In the autumn of 1960, Russia opened a new and deeply provocative chapter by providing a major military assistance to India, including Anthnov-12 heavy transport aircraft and then "Hound" helicopter suited to operate at 1617,000 feet altitudes in Ladakh. The Indians also purchased MiG jet fighters from Russia. 31. China offered Burma the whole Sino-Burmese boundary along McMahon Line, an agreement converted to a treaty in October 1960. China settled the boundaries with other neighbors equably and equitably shaded an adverse light on Indias position, and brought out more sharply the deadlock between India and China. 32. In the autumn of 1961, when the Indian military activity increased in the western sector as purposeful and coordinated, China recognised the Indian "attempt to realise territorial claims unilaterally and by force."

33. India reiterated that its boundary could not be a matter of negotiation, and denied "the necessity of further or formal delimitation." 34. By the spring of 1961, Nehru found the Chinese position unchanged. China was still ready, indeed eager, to negotiate a boundary settlement with India, while indicating that China would agree to the McMahon Line.

35. In the fall of 1961, Nehru Government gave categorical orders for immediate implementation of the forward policy. China protested about forward moves by Indian forces. 36. The forward policy continued as small Indian posts were being established overlooking Chinese positions and sometimes astride the tracks or roads behind them. 37. Nehru dismissed the increasingly emphatic Chinese warnings of "grave consequences," and explained to Parliament that the Chinese became "rather annoyed" as the Indian posts were set up. 38. Indians in the Ladakh were outnumbered by the Chinese by more than five to one. The strength disparity was beyond the numbers. The Chinese were concentrated where the Indians were scattered. 39. In early 1961, the Chinese began to react vigorously on the ground. As the Indians set up a post overlooking a Chinese position, the Chinese promptly took up more positions around it. 40. On July 8, the Chinese first made diplomatically "strongest protest" asking for immediate withdrawal of the Indian troops and warning that China would not "give up its right to self-defence when unwarrantedly attacked." 41. After Kongka Pass incident on July 21, 1962, China protested. "China is not willing to fight with India, and the Sino-Indian boundary question can be settled only through routine negotiations." China had exercised self-restraint, but could not stand idle while the "frontier guards are being encircled and annihilated by aggressors. 42. At the beginning of September, in the Chip Chap valley, the Indians put into effect the orders they had been given since the Galwan confrontation, firing into and killing several Chinese who advanced close to one of the Indian posts. By the end of August, the Indians had placed nearly forty posts in Chineseclaimed territory, most staffed between a dozen to thirty and fifty men.

9 43. In December 1961, Eastern Command was ordered to move forward to the closest practicable posts to the McMahon Line. To reach the Line, it took weeks of trekking, and supply became an acute problem, often placing the remote garrisons in real danger of starvation. 44. Menons interference rose steadily in promoting Lt Gen BM Kaul, who played a central and disastrous role in the border war. 45. In February 1962, General Kaul went to Assam to personally deal with the protests, and in the first half of 1962, the Army set up twenty-four posts along the McMahon Line. 46. However, the Indians set off the border war by establishing a new post at the disputed territory at the western extremity of the McMahon Line. The Line terminated on the boundary with Bhutan at the latitude of 27 o44'30''N on the map signed by the British and the Tibetans in New Delhi on March 24, 1914. When the Line was transported to the coordinates to the ground, it did not lie along the highest ridge in the vicinity, which in fact was located three to four miles north of where McMahon drew the line, at Thag La ridge. 47. Indians set up a post north of the McMahon Line at Khinzemane, by which Indians claimed to and moved into an area of about twenty-five square miles north of the map-marked McMahon Line. This brought instant Chinese reaction. 48. In the middle of 1962, the Peoples Daily a Chinese newspaper warned that it would be "very erroneous and dangerous should the Indian Government take Chinas attitude of restraint and tolerance as an expression of weakness." 49. In May 1962, the ban on patrolling to the west of Khinzemane was lifted and XXXIII Corps was ordered to set up several posts, including one at the trijunction of India, China and Bhutan. India disregarded the McMahon Line and treated the Thag La ridge as the boundary and set up a post there on 04 June overlooking the Tibetan village of Le, but there was no sign of the Chinese who still observed the 1959 no patrol agreement. 50. Dhola Post was est in the Khinzemane area, which the Ministry of External Affairs approved and marked the point of no return. The Chinese did not surround or attack Dhola Post. They settled into nearby positions and dominated the post. 51. On 16 September, China followed up with diplomatic protest that Indians were intruding further. On 09 September a meeting was held in the Defence Ministry, which decided that the Chinese must be evicted immediately. 52. Nehru left for a Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference in London on 08 September 1962.

10

53. A meeting was conducted by Menon. It was decided to eject the Chinese from Thag La ridge. The officers at the Defence Ministry meeting raised the issue that Dhola Post was in Chinese territory in their own maps, but they were told to disregard the maps and treat the crest of Thag La ridge as the boundary. 54. General Thapar accepted the eviction order, which was code-named Leghorn, and XXXIII Corps was ordered to move to Dhola Post immediately, without considering the difficulties in supplying the troops in an extremely difficult and little-known country. 55. On 14 September, 9 PUNJAB battalion marched out for Dhola Post.

56. The Chinese attacked in the NEFA sector. Tsang Dar fell on 22 October, Bum La on 23 October, and Tawang, the headquarters of the Seventh Infantry Brigade, on 24 October. 57. The Chinese made an offer to negotiate on 24 October by offering a three point peace proposal the terms of which virtually amounted to surrender by India. 58. On 27 October 1962, Prime Minister Nehru rejected the proposal.

59. A Divisional HQ was established in Leh; On 04 November, the Indian military decided that the post at Daulat-Beg-Oldi was untenable, and its defenders were withdrawn over the 5,300-mtr-high Sasar Brangsa Pass. 60. In the Eastern Sector, Indian forces counterattacked on 13 November and captured a hill northwest of the town of Walong, of the Kameng Frontier Division Area of Responsibility. Six Chinese brigades attacked across the Tawang Chu near Jang. They attacked Indian positions at Nurang, near Se La. 61. On 17 November, the Indian forces attempted to regroup their forces.

62. At Se La, Chinese continued their onslaught, wiping out virtually all Indian resistance in Kameng. 63. On November 18, the Chinese penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur in Assam. 64. Chinese did not advance any further and on 21 November declared a unilateral cease-fire.

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CHAPTER I BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

1. The immediate catalyst which caused the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 to erupt can be traced back to the Chinese annexation of Tibet wherein the first seeds of war were sown. 2. After Indians independence in 1947, India had maintained missions in Lhasa and Gyangtse. Due to the close relations that existed between India and Tibet - going back centuries beyond the British trade treaties - and also because of the unsettled conditions of a China entrapped in a bitter civil war, Tibets transactions with the outside world were conducted mainly through India. Well into 1950, Tibet was regarded as a free country. China also had a mission in Lhasa, underlining the fact that Tibet was nominally independant. 3. On 08 July 1949, following the defeat of Chiang Kai Sheks Nationalist Government in the Chinese civil war, the Tibetan Government asked the Chinese mission to "vacate", calling upon its rights as an independent country to request the expulsion of diplomats. 4. The Chinese were engaged in the systematic devastation of the Tibetan people and culture with an aim to change the demography of Tibet. This took both Tibet and India completely by surprise. The Chinese declared that they would settle the future of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct negotiation with the representatives of Tibet. Soon thereafter the PLA was ordered to invade into independent Tibet. 5. Prior to Indias independence, the British had earmarked Tibet as a neutral buffer zone in view of British India's defence environment vis--vis the similar imperialistic leanings of China and Russia. Barring a few people with acute perception, most Indian politicians, along with the common man, failed to anticipate the strategic ramifications of the Chinese aggression and the loss of this buffer. Political Mindset 6. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of the newly independent India, following his foreign policy of trying to establish its mutual, nonaligned relations on the international scene, held the view that India could ill afford a confrontation over Tibet at a nascent point in India's history. On 18 November 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Home Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, saying, "We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very attempt to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet

12 for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively. It may be possible, however, that might be able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy." Map of Pre Occupation Tibet 7. India under Nehru's leadership, went to great lengths to ensure and assure that friendship with China was the keystone of India's foreign policy, and that India along with China could mutually hold the non-aligned balance of power in Asia. While high-minded, this impractical view was to result in disastrous, unforeseen consequences for India.

13 8. Nehru's two closest advisors at the time were the socialist-leaning Krishna Menon and India's then Ambassador to China during the Communist Revolution, K M Panikkar. They were largely responsible for Nehru's decision to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Panikkar had strong Communist leanings - so much so that he successfully wished his daughter's marriage to a leading Communist labor leader. Panikkar, when called upon by Nehru, went so far as to fabricate that there was a "lack of confirmation" of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and argued that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an "interference to Indias efforts on behalf of China in the UN." It seems that Panikkar was more interested in protecting Chinese interests in the UN than Indias own interests on the Tibetan border. Amazingly, Nehru concurred with his Ambassador. 9. Sardar Patel, however, wanted a strong line to be adopted against the Chinese aggression. He told to Nehru that "even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as friends." India moreover had international support to this matter, with world opinion strongly against Chinese aggression in Tibet. The world, in fact, was looking to India to take the lead. 10. The Economist a US based newspaper echoed the Western viewpoint when it wrote, "Having maintained complete independence of China since 1912, Tibet had a strong claim to be regarded as an independent state. If India decides to support independence of Tibet as a buffer state between itself and China, Britain and U.S.A. will do well to extend formal diplomatic recognition to it." It was a testament to Patel's vision that his prophecies of increasingly aggressive China, evident from his letters to Nehru at the time, were to be unfortunately proven correct in a decade's time. Sadly, instead of hardening its attitude towards China, India supplied 10,000 mounds of rice to Tibet under China, a year after its occupation, following reports of famine there. China made the demand to this effect and India obliged. Chinese Claims on Tibet 11. The dispute over the "McMahon Line" that demarcated the border between India and China owes its origins to these claims. When the PLA entered Tibet the reasons given by China were, to "liberate three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression, to complete the unification of the whole of China, and to safeguard the frontier regions of the country". It is generally surmised that the reason behind China's invasion was to gain control of the highly strategic crossroads of Tibet that lead to the heart of Western, Central, South and South East Asia, and can be used as a springboard for engaging the countries in this area.

14

A Buddhist Monastery in Aksai Chin Region, J & K, India

Boundary Alignment: Northern Sector 12. In 1842, the autonomous Tibetans and the Dogra rulers of the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir signed a non-aggression pact on respecting the "old, established frontiers." The boundary was not specified. To clarify this, in 1847 the British delineated a boundary from the Spiti River up to the Pangong Lake. The area further north up to the Karakoram Pass was left out. Johnson Line 13. The first boundary alignment here was recorded in 1865 when W. H. Johnson of the Survey of India trekked across the Aksai Chin and drew a map including this in Jammu and Kashmir. Johnson was soon appointed Kashmir's commissioner in Ladakh. The Foreign Office came to be of the view that the border should be pushed further to the Kuen Lun range to absorb Aksai Chin and to put a British controlled buffer in between to forestall the presumed Russian advance, as the British did with Afghanistan. 14. In 1892 the Chinese put a boundary marker at the Karakoram Pass and told the British officer and adventurer, Capt. Young, that Chinese territory began there and that the boundary ran along the Karakoram Range. The reasons given for this was that Aksai Chin is an "integral" and "sacred" part of Tibet, which the Chinese claim. In 1998, Chinese ambassador to India, Zhou Gang, quoted verbatim the Chinese government statement given to the British on this matter when he stated that "there exists no issue of China's evacuation from Aksai Chin because Aksai Chin has been China's territory since ancient times and ever since under the effective administration and jurisdiction of China." Sadly, the claim has no credible historical, or legal, backing; while Tibet has always had varying degrees of freedom historically, and at various times it was autonomous, at other times it was integrated into a larger China, or allied with Indian kingdoms. Tibet was also a tributary to the Mughal Empire in the subcontinent. Regardless, it was noted by both the British and the Chinese, even then, that the

15 boundary marker could not be regarded as having any legal value in international law because the boundary was not demarcated jointly.

16 Anglo Tibetan Treaty 15. In 1904, a British military expedition was sent to China under the leadership of Colonel Young to prevent China from falling under the influence of "foreign" powers. An Anglo-Tibetan treaty was signed with China that granted Britain trading rights and marked the origin of direct British influence in Tibet. An Anglo-Chinese treaty of 1906 followed up the previous treaty. Treaties not withstanding, the Chinese tried to capture Tibet many times till 1913, but failed to make headway against the British. In 1913, Tibet declared independence, and a conference was held in 1914 in Simla regarding Tibetan independence.

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Simla Conference, 1914 16. The Simla Conference was agreed to be a tripartite one, in which the Tibetans were an equal partner in the talks with the Chinese and British. Tibet demanded recognition of their de facto sovereignty - a proposal intolerable to the Chinese, as China did not wish to give up their claim to Tibet, though they did not actually control it. It was decided that Tibet was to be divided into an Inner- and an Outer-Tibet. Eventually it was agreed that Outer-Tibet would accept Chinese "suzerainty" if its autonomous status were recognized, but in the end China refused to sign the treaty because of disagreements over the China- "Inner Tibet" border. 17. When this happened, China lost the opportunity to be recognised as suzerain over Tibet in international law. Tibet was at the time functionally independent, as its government's participation in the border talks shows - and by no treaty had it agreed to accept Chinese suzerainty. In the end, the only legally binding outcome of the 1914 conference was that Britain and Tibet, represented by Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Shastra respectively, reached an agreement of a border settlement binding between themselves, bringing McMahon Line into being. To this meeting, the Chinese delegate was not invited, as the McMahon line was the agreement on the official demarcation of the border between Tibet and India; this highlights the fact that all the parties -China included- recognized that Tibet had full authority to negotiate its boundary with India. It is of crucial importance to note that the McMahon line legally had nothing to do with China. Mc Mahon Line 18. The Chinese claim to the Indian areas is based upon the non-recognition of the McMahon Line, regardless of the recognition of Tibetan autonomy and Tibet's acceptance of the McMahon Line, which is based on Chinas illegal claim to Tibet. Seizing the opportunity to expand in the late 50s, the Chinese played upon logic of self convenience that would've been legally binding, had Tibet been part of China: 19. China maintains that the Tibetans, as a province of China, could not legally be signatories to the Simla Convention. Though during signing of the agreement, a Tibetan delegate was present, and Chou Enlai himself had assured Nehru of Tibetan autonomy when the Chinese Prime Minister visited India in 1954. In fact, the Chinese were never actual signatories to the Simla Convention, which was agreed to between the Tibetans and the British. Because a unilateral agreement on a border demarcation is not valid, the whole McMahon line demarcation, which India inherited, comes into question.

18

Satellite view of Aksai Chin region, Jammu and Kashmir, India

20. Had these historical facts been put proactively forward by the Indian government during the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, rather than dismissed out of apprehension of the geo-political situation, the world would have been appraised of the situation and the Indian locus standi would have been strengthened. Instead Mr. Nehru preferred a policy of appeasement and surrenders to China and accepted this mammoth change in status quo. Regardless of vehement public outcry and hurt, the Indian government went so far as opposing the discussion of Tibet's appeal to the UN General Assembly on 23 Nov 1950. Thus, the prescient in policy established was to cultivate Chinese friendship by buying it off. As events were to prove later, this was most disastrous. Nehru had failed to take into account that China had always tried to expand its territories at the expense of its neighbours, and a time would come when "Indian territory would have to be defended against the Chinese dragon." Territories Under Dispute 21. The territories that came in dispute between India and China are listed as follows: (a) Eastern Sector. 90,000 Sq. Km under Indian control then called the North-East Frontier Agency, (NEFA). (b) Middle Sector. 20,000 Sq. Km on either side of the Himalayan watershed and passes.

19 (c) Western Sector. 30,000 Sq. Km of high plateau country known as the Aksai Chin in the district of Ladakh of Jammu and Kashmir State bordering Tibet and Xinjiang province of China PROBABLE QUESTIONS Question No1 Describe the foreign policy being followed by the Nehru government towards China in 1950s. Question No 2 Question No 3 Question No 4 Write a short note on Johnson line. Write a short note on Mc Mahon line. Write a short note on Simla Conference of 1914.

Question No 5 List out the disputed territories between India & China. Support your answer with a sketch.

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21 CHAPTER II PERIOD FROM 1950 - 1960 Sino Indian Agreement, 1954 22. On 29 April 1954, India and China signed an agreement. Under the SinoIndian Agreement of 1954, otherwise known as the Panchsheel, or the "Five Principles" agreement, India gave up all extra-territorial rights and privileges it enjoyed in Tibet, which it inherited from the British colonial legacy, and formally recognised Tibet to be a region of China. The five points agreed to were: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Mutual non-aggression. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Equal and mutual-benefit working relationship. Peaceful co-existence.

23. By the Sino-Indian agreement, it was recognised that six passes (Shipki La, Mana, Niti, Kungribinri, Darma, and Lipu Lekh) were border passes and "traders and pilgrims of both countries" could travel by them. 24. Immediately thereafter the Chinese Government made an official protest to the Indian Government against the stationing of Indian troops at "Wu-Je" (Barahoti), an area which lies south-east of the Niti Pass, describing it as lying "north" of the Niti pass. When informed of the location of the area, the Chinese Government not only refused to correct its embarrassing lack of geographical knowledge, but persisted in claiming the area. China Emerges from Diplomatic Isolation 25. China's success in promoting these Panchsheel principles at the 1955 Bandung Conference helped China emerge from diplomatic isolation. Unfortunately, by the end of the 1950s, however, China's foreign policy stance had become more militant, and the Chinese went back on this treaty within three months of its signing.

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Nehru and Chou En-Lai, 1954 Political Scenario in the Sub-Continent 26. The Indian military in general was reserved in its acclamations, and wished resistance of such a treaty, but was overruled by Menon who insisted that Pakistan was the only real enemy. Little attention was paid to the lurking dangers. India and Pakistan had gone to war over Kashmir's accession to India in 1948. Pakistan saw the advantage over India's nonalignment by taking a strong anti-Soviet line, winning the hearts of the West, and the US and the UK in particular. At this time, the Soviet Union had not yet come out very forcefully on India's side. China looked upon the Kashmir question differently. They had indicated, though, that they did not wish to take sides. They also had their claims on territory on the Ladakh district of Jammu and Kashmir. It was wishful thinking on the part of India's leaders to imagine that China would remain indifferent or neutral on this matter. Again, if only the sound appeals of caution by the army were heeded, ignominy would be spared. Neglect of Army 27. During this time, the military was neglected in areas such as the modernisation and upgrading of forces. The Kulwant Singh report of 1952 severely castigated the government for neglect and recommended the raising of several divisions of troops and purchase of new equipment. However, apart from

23 raising the Indo-Tibetan Border Force, the other recommendations were shelved, as China was considered a friendly by the government. Thus, the Army was specifically told to

concentrate on India's traditional adversary, Pakistan, rather than China, as war with China was viewed as "extremely unlikely." 1955-1960 28. This period was marked by increasing tension and clashes on the border between India and China. Yet India failed to evolve and formulate a comprehensive foreign policy vis--vis China, and tended to treat them as isolated incidents. The Aksai Chin Intrusion 29. The Chinese, wishing to consolidate their gains in Tibet and the surrounding areas, implemented a plan for developing the infrastructure in those regions. A ring road was constructed which led from China to Tibet and from there via the Karakoram Range to Sinkiang and Mongolia and then back to China. The Indian Ladakh district of Askai Chin in the region of Jammu and Kashmir State obstructed the construction of this road, and would have forced the Chinese to build through the harsh Takla Makan desert - not the most favorable terrain. Faced with this, the Chinese Government had the choice of building a shortcut through Indian Territory inaccessible to India, or build the road in a wasteland of the Takla Makan. The PRC decided on the former. Taking advantage of the historical quirk that they had not actually signed the agreement at the Simla Conference, China published maps showing that Aksai Chin belonged to them, and refused the de-facto McMahon line in the East of India, that demarcated the border and control of the land 30. The Chinese built the road and in October 1958, it was discovered, creating a flurry of diplomatic messages by each side, chastising the other for their territorial transgressions. When the public came to know about the Chinese roads, Nehru was faced with increasingly vocal criticism in the Indian Parliament. Ladakh Sector 31. Throughout this time, the Chinese claims were unreasonable and often contradictory, bordering incomprehensible. In 1956, the government-issued "Big Map of the People's Republic of China", showed the eastern border of Ladakh cutting across the middle of Pangong Lake, with Spanggur within India, thus conforming to India's conception of the boundary. A 1947 KMT map showed the same. In a letter of 17 December 1959, Chou En-lai stated that the 1956 map

24 "correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector." Indeed, there should have been no dispute. But, in June 1960, when border talks began, the Chinese Government replaced the 1956 map with a new one that showed the alignment running west of both Pangong and Spanggur lakes.

Chou En Lai

32. Nehru recommended that the Indian and Chinese governments sift through historical evidence and recommend where the border should be. Chou en-Lai's suggestion, made on 07 November 1959, was the complete demilitarization of the entire border to a depth of 20 km, using the McMahon line in the East and the "line of actual control" in the West. This would effectively have jeopardized India's defensive positions in the East, while legitimising Peking's land grab in the West. Essentially, China wanted a solution based on military and strategic positions,

25 while India wanted only a strict adherence to boundaries that had been agreed upon for the last two hundred years. As with the Kashmir dispute, India reacted to the border conflict as a matter of legality, rather than on strategic grounds. Nehru's counter-proposal, was that, in Ladakh, the Indian troops were to withdraw behind the border claimed by China, while the Chinese troops were to withdraw behind the border claimed by India, leaving the territory in between a "No Man's Land" pending a negotiated settlement. He pointed out that in the east there were no Chinese south of the McMahon line save at Longju, which the Indian government could not permit the Chinese to continue to occupy.

Dalai Lama enters India: China Claims NEFA 33. Tensions increased further at India's welcoming of the Dalai Lama. In March 1959, the Dalai Lama with 20,000 followers crossed into India where he was received with great pomp and warmth. Mao felt he had lost face at this, and felt that China "needed a victory in some sphere." The Chinese claim of NEFA was thus voiced in the aftermath of the 1959 Tibetan revolt.

Dalai Lama

26

The Khinzemane Incident 34. In 1959, in a meeting between Nehru and China's Foreign Minister, Chou En-Lai, both countries agreed not to send patrols within two miles of the McMahon Line in NEFA. However, on 7 August 1959, about 200 Chinese troops intruded into the Indian border at Khinzemane in the Kameng frontier division at east of Thagla Ridge. When challenged by the Indian patrol and asked to withdraw, they pushed the Indian party consisting of 10 men to the bridge at Drokung Samba. China considered the sector as within Chinese territory, and stated that the international border ran through the Drokung Samba Bridge. The Longju Incident 35. On 25 August 1959, around 300 Chinese troops crossed into the Longju region of the Subansiri Frontier division and opened fire at the Indian post there. The post was completely surrounded and was captured, but the Indian garrison was later released. In both cases the Chinese heavily outnumbered the Indians. The Indian posts were isolated and solely dependent on air supply. They were typically manned by 12-15 men and with no chances of reinforcements, since there were no access roads leading to it. This was a good reminder of things to come. Unfortunately all that transpired were a few protest notes from the Ministry of External Affairs, GOI. 36. By late 1959, Chinese excursions into Indian territory were getting more and more frequent, and as a result the Army was finally given control of the Indian border in NEFA. 4 Mountain Division was ordered into Assam, from Punjab. It was tasked with the defense of the entire McMahon line from the Bhutan tri-junction to the Burma border. Unfortunately, it was task that it was unprepared and ill equipped to handle. Chou En Lai visits India 37. India's plans of peaceful settlement were momentarily this shattered by these acts of aggression. India seized an opportunity to settle when Chou En-Lai visited Delhi in April 1960. Nehru was advised the joint-expert group that India had a "cast-iron case" that the border should be legally demarcated at Kuen-Lun range further east and not the Karakoram Range further west, as the Chinese held. They informed Nehru that the Kuen-Lun was also far better from the defense angle, and that India and China should nullify the British MacDonald proposal of 1899, which had suggested the border along a line from Daulat-BegOldi near the Karakoram Pass in the north to Lanak La Pass in the south, in mutual settlement. The crux of the evidence was the fact that the Maharaja of Kashmir in the 1840's had actually sent tax collectors on at least two occasions to Aksai Chin, whereas there was no evidence that China had ever attempted to establish an administrative presence in that area.

27

PLA Soldiers on the Front 38. Nehru was anxious to reach such a settlement, but his advisors convinced him against it. A compromise along this line would perhaps have been possible in 1960, and may still be a way out from the impending crisis. Chou En-Lai, however, wanted to reopen the whole 2,000 mile-long border. He had earlier indicated that China would agree to India's claim in the northeastern sector, but went back on this when the Indian side did not agree to the Chinese claim-line in Ladakh. 39. An opportunity to settle the problem was thus lost. Each side tried to extend its actual line of control, and the border question became a matter of prestige and test of strength for each. PROBABLE QUESTIONS Q No 1 Q No 2 Q No 3 Q No 4 Q No 5 Q No 6 Mention salient pts on Sino Indian Agreement of 1945. What was the Significance of the Kulwant Singh Report of 1952? Explain Aksai Chin Intrusion of 1958. Bring out the salient pts of Simla Conference of 1914. Write a short note on the Longju incident of Aug 1959. What were the pts of discussion during visit of Chinese Foreign

Minister to India in April 1960?

28 CHAPTER III FORWARD POST POLICY 40. Due to the increasing frequency of border incidents with the Chinese, it was felt by the Indian leadership that a proper response had to be given. 41. On 02 November 1961, a meeting was held at Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's house that was attended by, Krishna Menon (Defence Minister), Lt Gen Thapar (Chief of Army Staff), Lt Gen BM Kaul (Quarter Master General), Brigadier Palit and O Pulla Reddy (Defence secretary) to discuss the "China issue", and to come up with a pragmatic plan as to what response is appropriate. It was decided, that since China was still a "friend", it cannot be too drastic, but must show a strong Indian resolve. The outcome of the meeting would prove to be one of the turning points in the Sino-Indian conflict and amongst the most controversial pre-war decisions. Decisions taken at PMs Residence 42. The following decisions were taken during the meeting. (a) In Ladakh sector, the Army would patrol as far forward as possible from the present Indian position towards the international border. Posts would be established on the border of Indian territory in an attempt to prevent further Chinese incursions. (b) The same would also apply to areas in Uttar Pradesh on the IndoChina border where posts would be established as far as possible in Indian territory. OP ONKAR 43. The Ministry of External Affairs and the Intelligence Bureau had reasoned that this Indian activity would not elicit a major reaction from the Chinese. This assessment proved to be incorrect. In addition to this fundamental misconception, the Indian Army was not geared up for the task to establish posts in forward areas that it could not support logistically or tactically. Gen Thapar pointed out that the Chinese could never be matched in numbers and resources in the region since they had a well developed network for re-supply and reinforcement whereas India had a relatively underdeveloped infrastructure. His objections were met with assurances from Nehru and Menon that they did not expect any major escalation. The orders were transmitted to the Eastern and Western commands on 5 December 1961 to establish posts. The whole exercise was codenamed "OP ONKAR".

29 44. In Oct 1958, the General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command laid out a detailed paper regarding the defence of NEFA. He had realised that mere patrolling or establishing posts could never defend the McMahon line. Instead, he proposed a front line of forward posts on the border that was supported by

two layers of military strongholds. The forward posts were to act merely as early warning beacons and symbols of territorial possession, and were not to be regarded as defended positions. The second line consisted of more strongly defended posts designed to slow down the advancing Chinese and to increase their logistical layout. The last line would actually stop the Chinese and from there counterattacks would be launched with the help of reinforcements from the plains. 45. Thus, it is clear that sound tactical thinking existed in the Indian Army but the militarily sound advice was largely ignored by the political leadership for short-term solutions and display of bravado. State of the Indian Army Prior to 1962 46. When the IA was ordered into NEFA in closing stages of 1959, it was faced with a deployment without adequate regional roads and infrastructure in one of the highest battlefields in the world. Almost all the posts in the forward and even some in the rear were supported by airlifts. Nearly everything had to be air dropped, right down to the daily rations, but due to the severe terrain, only thirty percent of supplies dropped were recovered. The following conditions existed:(a) The rations provided to the troops had a calorific value suited for warfare on the plains rather then the high-calorie diet that is required for mountain warfare. Lentils, which are the staple food of the Indian soldier, could not be cooked at high altitudes. Pressure cookers, though requested were unavailable due to "administrative delays". (b) Oil cookers, essential for keeping warm and for cooking, were also in short supply. (c) The troops were widely dispersed without connecting roads. Medical facilities were poor. (d) The helicopters used for airlifts, recently purchased from Russia, were inadequate for high-altitude operations. (e) There was a marked shortage of spare parts.

30 (f) Winter clothing, and sometimes even basic clothing, was unavailable. New recruits rarely had the full list of items that were supposed to be issued to them. (g) The army had no means of carrying heavy loads in the mountains and hence its mobility and firepower was severely reduced. Its main means of transport in the era of jets were mules and human porters.

(h) The state of weapons and the training of the "jawans" were inadequate for the terrain they were on and the enemy they faced. (j) Almost all the equipment and weapons were of 1950s vintage. For instance, the standard infantry rifle issued was the Lee Enfield .303, dating back to World War-II. (k) When 4 Mountain Division was deployed, it was not trained nor acclimatized for high altitude warfare. Most of its heavy equipment had to be left in the plains because of the lack of transportation. Thus, they had precious little firepower they could call on if need be. Political Infighting 47. The already grave situation was made worse by a personal feud between the then Finance Minister Morarji Desai and the Defence Minister Krishna Menon. This had resulted in an obstructive Finance Ministry that did not allow the release of essential foreign exchange to buy what little equipment that had been sanctioned. Consequently, the Army's equipment was allowed to become obsolete. Desai claimed that supplies were deliberately withheld from Indian troops in the affected areas. There was considerable unhappiness about this in the Army, both at this and against Menon in general. Because of the playing off of different sections of the military as a result of political maneuvering and infighting, along with the supply crisis, morale was very low. Menon went to Ladakh personally in 1960 to appease dissent. 48. Think tanks at the time were at a general consensus that, to counter the Chinese threat, India should do three things. (a) Increase the number and nature of infrastructure supporting war production and the standard of supplies given to troops. (b) Locating sufficient mobile armored troops at strategic points on the plains to check any potential Chinese advance, whilst keeping an eye on

31 Pakistan. (c) Train and arm sufficient numbers of Tibetan and other ethnic guerrilla groups to tie down significant number of Chinese troops behind the front lines, in order to hamper transfer of troop, communication, and material. It was said that "the principal problem seems to be lack of interest on the part of the present Indian Government" to enact these suggestions. 49. The combination of ill-supply, ill-preparedness, numerical and technological inferiority and the heavy-handed decisions taken by a government with little care for ground realities of the impending conflict coalesced to ensure the failure of the Indian Army against the Chinese. The training and professionalism of the Indian Jawan could not make up for the tremendous odds stacked against them. PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Question No1 What were the decisions taken during the meeting at the PMs residence on 02 Nov 1961, in response to the increasing border skirmishes? Question No 2 Question No 3 Write a short note OP ONKAR. Bring out state of the Indian Army as it existed during 1962.

Question No 4 Describe the internal feuding among the Indian Political leadership and its impact on def preparedness and procurement of def related equipment.

32

CHAPTER IV

THE CONFLICT BEGINS Chinas Reaction to Fwd Post Policy 50. The establishment of posts in the forward areas without adequate military support had created a situation that was ripe for a military disaster. On 8 September 1962, Brigadier JP Dalvi, Commander, 7 Mountain Brigade received a message that about 600 Chinese soldiers had crossed Thagla Ridge and had surrounded the Dhola post. The post commander had requested immediate reinforcements. Thagla Ridge overlooking key Chinese garrisons was an exceedingly remote area with terrain that was not conducive for troop movement. Being a Saturday it would also take a long time for the information to reach Delhi along the chain of command. It was further complicated by Nehru's absence. He was attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. OP Leghorn 51. A conference was held with General Officer Commanding, 4 Mountain Division Gen Niranjan Prasad presiding over it and the following were decided:(a) The Dhola post commander would be ordered to stay put, without restoring to withdrawal. The Assam Rifles wing at Lumla, which was two days march away, would be ordered to establish contact with Dhola. (b) The detachments of 9 PUNJAB at Shakti and Lumpo would move to Dhola while the ones at Tawang would move to Lumpo. Tawang, along with Tsangdhar and Hathungla, were vital positions that had to be defended at all costs. Any diversion of troops from 9 PUNJAB to Dhola would leave Tawang defenceless. 52. There were no plans to cater for a major clash at Tawang if one should occur. The route from Tawang to Thagla was fit only for man pack columns, making troop movement difficult. A sound move would have been to abandon Thagla Ridge and concentrate on defending Tawang. However, under political pressure from Brigadier General Staff at HQ XXXIII Corps, 9 PUNJAB was ordered to depart for Lumpo. Thus began Operation Leghorn with the limited aim of persuading the Chinese to leave Indian territory. The haphazard manner in which 9 PUNJAB was dispatched, exposed the sad fact that Army HQ had no strategic plan in place to deal with a major Chinese response to our Forward Posts policy.

33

Op Conference at Tezpur 53. On 12 September, a meeting was held between Gen LP Sen (Army Commander, Eastern Theater), Gen Umrao Singh and Gen Niranjan Prasad at Tezpur. Gen LP Sen reiterated New Delhi's decision to "expel" the Chinese from Indian territory. Unfortunately, this was far removed from the ground situation. Gen Umrao Singh correctly pointed out that the Chinese could quickly build up to a Divisional strength and easily outbid any Indian reinforcements in the Thagla area. Furthermore, all Indian supply trips to areas around Dhola would have to be by airdrops, while the Chinese road head was a few miles behind Thagla Ridge. Gen Umrao Singh suggested that Dhola post should be withdrawn 3 Km to the south to the original map marked boundary, and said that, sending 7 Brigade to Thagla would expose Tawang and make defence of Nagaland and Manipur more onerous. Army HQ ignored this sound military advice, due to political, rather than any strategic pressure. This contributed to the tragic events leading it to the defeat on 26 Oct - Purely due to political expediency of pandering Indian security.

Namkha Chu : De Facto Military Boundary 54. The Chinese resorted to their previous methods adopted in Longju and Khenzemane. The Namka Chu, a fast moving rivulet with four bridges crossing it, had now become the de-facto military boundary. 9 PUNJAB was ordered to dig in

34 opposite the Chinese to prevent further incursion into Indian territory. 9 PUNJAB was pinned down opposite to Chinese posts and could not mount an attack due to the Chinese being on higher ground with clear lines of fire. In addition, any attack by 9 PUNJAB without proper bridging equipment, which they did not have, would have been suicidal due to constant Chinese monitoring. 55. 9 PUNJAB finally managed to reach Dhola on the morning of 15 September and found Chinese troops on both sides of the Namka Chu river. The Chinese had control of the whole of the Thagla Ridge area. China demanded that the Indians withdraw. The Chinese troops were not mere Frontier guards, as was expected, but well armed troops with automatic weapons one of the mountain infantry divisions of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). 56. On 17 September, Army HQ ordered 9 PUNJAB to "capture" Thagla Ridge. Brigadier Dalvi, the only senior commander in the area, refused to execute the order. He explained the ground situation and asked for it to be countermanded. In New Delhi the public was being assured that "the Army has been told to drive away the Chinese from our territory in NEFA", a task which the IA was in no position to do. Dalvi realized that Dhola had become militarily indefensible, as well as Hathungla and Karpola, given the current troop strengths. He advised his HQ to abandon the posts. Dhola had however become a prestige issue with the political leadership by now and the army was ordered to retain the post. Despatch of Reinforcements 57. On 20 September, a Chinese sentry near Bridge II on Namka Chu threw a grenade on the Indian position whereupon both sides opened fire. In the resultant shoot-out, four Chinese sentries were killed while there were five Indian casualties. The situation thus had escalated to full-fledged shooting. Meanwhile HQ Eastern Command and XXXIII Corps finally managed to supply reinforcements and shore up 7 Mountain Brigade by rushing 1/9 Gorkhas and 2 RAJPUT by 26 September. Stocking of supplies for 9 PUNJAB and the other regiments began belatedly but efforts were hampered due to severe lack of available portage. On the opening day of the war on 20 October 1962, 513 soldiers, 282 jawans and officers died for no fault of theirs. Sit at NEFA: Reaction of Indian Political and Military Leaders 58. At this point it would be interesting to note that the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister (DM) and the Finance Minister were abroad, and had not deemed that the NEFA situation warranted an early return. In their absence, the officiating DM, Mr. Raghunath, held a meeting to discuss the Thagla situation with Gen LP Sen. It was decided that: (a) Chinese were to be evicted from the North bank of Namka Chu.

35 (b) (c) Thagla Ridge was to be contained. Tsangle was to be patrolled.

59. These were exactly the same objectives and orders that were issued earlier to Brigadier Dalvi and were later countermanded. Gen Sen now ordered Gen Umrao Singh to come up with an operational plan to meet the above objectives. Gen Umrao Singh, had consistently resisted Operation Leghorn. Gen Umrao Singh passed the assignment to Gen Prasad who in turn passed it to Brig Dalvi. The appreciation prepared by Brig Dalvi attempted to show how unrealistic Operation Leghorn was. The envisaged operation would require supplies and equipment in amounts far beyond what airdrops and porters could deliver prior to the onset of winter. Moreover, this was assuming that the Chinese strength would remain constant at one battalion. Change of Command 60. The plan called for a limited flanking movement from Bridge V at western edge of the valley. This move was to be exec in 3 stages. (a) (b) (c) Stage I. Stage II. Stage III. Lumpo to Tsangdhar via Karpola. Tsangdhar to Muskar and then to Tseng Jong.

61. When Gen Umrao Singh saw this draft, he was not satisfied, stating that it was too optimistic, but forwarded it to Gen Sen with his adverse comments. Gen LP LP Sen overruled Gen Umrao Singh and ordered Brigadier JP Dalvi to go ahead with the plan. However, this brought the Gen Umrao Singh and Gen LP Sen conflict to criticality. Gen LP Sen met the defence minister and asked for permission to remove Gen Umrao from GOC XXXIII Corps. Krishna Menon agreed and on 03 October it was decided that Lt Gen BM Kaul (on leave at that time) would replace Gen Umrao Singh. PROBABLE QUESTIONS Q No 1 Q No 2 Why was OP Leghorn launched? Bring out the Chinese political and Mil reaction to the Indian

forward Posts Policy in Namkha Chu Sector. Q No 3 What were the reasons for the change of command in the

Eastern Sector?

36 CHAPTER V RE-DPLY OF FORCES 62. Lt Gen BM Kaul arrived in Tezpur on 4 Oct to take over the NEFA operations. He moved to Lumpo on 5 Oct. Two battalions of 7 Brigade were located there. He ordered 1/9 Gorkha and 2 RAJPUT to move onto Tsangdhar. Both battalions were under strength and did not have the requisite supplies or portage. The troops moved out in cotton uniforms with fifty rounds and light weapons leaving other equipment behind for heights ranging over 14,500 feet and 16,000 feet. Deaths resulted due to lack of acclimatization. In spite of operational difficulties, Gen BM Kaul still planned on the 10 Oct date laid down by Gen LP Sen to complete Operation Leghorn. BM Kaul planned to place a battalion on Thagla Ridge across the Namkha Chu River. The task was to be undertaken by 2 RAJPUT. When it was pointed out that they had absolutely no artillery cover and summer clothing for altitudes of 16,000 feet, Gen BM Kaul replied that "determined infantry do not need artillery" and that 6,000 sets of clothing would be arriving "soon" via airdrop. Meanwhile at Tsangdhar, the place scheduled for airdrop, the bulk of the airdrops were getting lost due to supplies landing in inaccessible places. There were only 3 days rations available to 1/9 Gorkhas and 2 RAJPUT with both battalions spending the nights in summer clothing and one blanket per man. Clash at Tseng Jong 63. Finally it was decided to send a patrol rather than commit a whole battalion. A patrol of 9 PUNJAB under Major Chaudhary consisting of 50 men was launched. It reached Tseng Jong on 09 Oct. On 10 October, about 800 Chinese troops supported by heavy mortars attacked 9 PUNJAB. The PUNJAB bn was outnumbered yet fought gallantly and repulsed the first Chinese assault inflicting heavy casualties. The PUNJABis had 06 dead and 11 wounded and asked Brig JP JP Dalvi permission to withdraw. JP Dalvi requested BM Kaul to wit hold further implementation of Op Leghorn, in view of the gravity of the situation. Inexplicably, Gen BM Kaul replied that he had no authority to pull back from Thagla and decided to go to Delhi to talk with the PM. 64. The battle at Tseng Jong was now raging furiously. Major Chaudhary was wounded and made an appeal for mortar and machine gun fire to extricate his force. Brig JP Dalvi, who was watching the battle, made the decision not to open up with his mortars and machine guns. Firstly, Tseng Jong was beyond his range of weapons. Secondly, it would have ignited the entire 12-mile front in an all-out battle. The RAJPUTs and GORKHAS who had been advancing to Tseng Jong as ordered earlier would have been mowed down by the Chinese machine guns across the Namkha Chu. Moreover, JP Dalvi could not have sustained a firefight for long. He had two 3-inch mortars with 60 rounds each and 2 machine guns with only 12,000 rounds. That would have barely sufficed for half an hour.

37

38

Lt Gen BM Kaul visit Delhi. 65. Lt Gen BM Kaul was moving to Delhi via a route that was parallel to the Chinese positions along the Namkha Chu. An all out attack by the Chinese who were in division strength would have jeopardized Gen BM Kaul's chances of reaching Delhi. JP Dalvi, then gave the orders for 9 PUNJAB to fall back to Bridge IV. 66. Virtually defenceless, and committed against fully supported, fully entrenched, and a fully outnumbering enemy, the Indians fought most valiantly, inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers. Surprisingly, the Chinese allowed the casualties to reach Indian lines. Later, the Chinese were found burying the Indian dead with full military honors, a testament to the professionalism of both sides. And due to political ineptness, a defenceless India found herself at the defending side of an increasingly hostile conflict. 67. Gen BM Kaul reached Delhi on 11 October and immediately met the Prime Minister to apprise him of the latest developments at Thagla. He explained at the conference attended by the Defence Minister, Finance Minister and the three chiefs about the tactical unsoundness of the Indian position. Yet he offered three choices at the meeting: (a) (b) (c) Launch an attack despite the overwhelming Chinese superiority. Cancel the orders of attack and hold on to present positions. Withdraw to a more advantageous position.

68. Gen LP LP Sen opined that 7 Mtn Brigade would hold on against the Chinese and recommended that it remain in its current position. He was backed by Gen Thapar and Gen BM Kaul on this. PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Q No 1

What were the steps taken by Lt Gen BM Kaul to redeploy his

forces in the NEFA Sector? Q No 2 Q No 3 Write a short note on the clash at Tsen Jong. What were action were tasked to Maj Chaudharys patrol?

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CHAPTER VI THE CHINESE ATTACK ON THAGLA Tasking of 7 Mountain Brigade 69. 7 Mountain Brigade in Thagla was reinforced by 4 Grenadiers. They had arrived from Delhi only a few weeks prior and were in summer clothing with three days rations and fifty rounds of ammunition per rifle, and a total of 2,500 men. By 16 Oct they were further reinforced by 450 Border Roads Pioneers to assist in carrying loads and collecting airdrops. 7 Mountain Brigade which normally could defend a linear defence of 300 yards was now tasked by Army HQ to defend 12000 yards without artillery cover to break up enemy attacks. Efforts were made to build up 7 Brigade in this regard by increasing the tempo of airdrops between 15 and 19 Oct. Paradoxically, as the tempo of airdrops increased, the amount actually collected decreased. Between 17 and 19 Oct the Chinese were seen steadily building up using their 7-ton weight category road at Marmang. On 18 Oct, the Chinese marking parties were seen moving to forming-up places for a night advance and a dawn attack. Frantic messages were sent by 7 Brigade to Army HQ in this regard, but no decision was taken. Chinese Artillery Bombardment & Infantry Action 70. On morning of 20 Oct, the Chinese attacked with an artillery bombardment of 76 mm and 120 mm mortars at the Indian positions of Bridge III and Bridge IV. Massive infantry assaults followed in divisional strength. The RAJPUT and Gorkha positions in Dhola area were attacked with two brigades strength of the enemy. One brigade advanced on Tsangdhar. Other columns were sent to Hathungla to prevent Indian forces from retreating via Bridges I and II while others threatened the divisional HQ at Zimithang. The RAJPUT and Gorkha were completely encircled and cut off from each other. They held on for over three hours despite lack of artillery support and reinforcements. Many platoons fought till the last man against overwhelming odds. 71. Major BK Pant, of 2 RAJPUT, displayed exemplary courage in the battle. His Company held fast against three waves of Chinese assaults and suffered heavy casualties. Pant himself was wounded in the stomach and legs. He continued to lead and inspire his men, exhorting them to fight till the end to the last man. The Chinese sensing that their obstacle in taking 2 RAJPUT lay with Major Pant, brought a volley of machine gun fire on his position killing him instantly. His last words were "Men of the RAJPUT Regiment, you were born to die for your country. God has selected this small river for which you must die. Stand up and fight like true RAJPUTs." He died proudly shouting the RAJPUT battle-cry: "Bajrang Bali ki Jai."

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41

LADAKH SECTOR
TO KASHGAR
KARAKORAM PASS DAULAT BEG OLDI QARATAGH PASS QUIZIL JILGA

CHINESE CLAIM LINE 1956 AKSAI CHIN LINE SEPARATING FORCES IN SEP 1960

CHANG CHENMO
MORGO

DEHRA SAMZUNGLING GALWAN R

LINZITHANG

SH YO K

SHAMAL LUNGPA TSOG TSALU KONGKA LA LANAK LA

LEH
R

SHYOK
IND US

LINE REACHED BY HOT SPRING DAMBUGURU PHOBRANG CHINESE AFTER KHURNAK FORT TANGTSE PANGONG TSOINVASION IN 1962
CHUSHUL SPANGGUR TSO DUMCHELE
RUDOK

LADAKH

DUNGTI

CHINA
(TIBET)

CHANG LA HANLE DEMCHOK CHUMAR JARA LA

TO GARTOK

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72. By 9 am, the Chinese had completely wiped out of the RAJPUT and the Gorkhas. 2 RAJPUT alone had 282 killed, 81 wounded and captured and 90 unwounded and captured out of their total strength of 513. Brigadier Dalvi, finding that 7 Mountain Brigade was being run over by the Chinese, tried to lead a small retreating party of Indian troops back to Indian lines but was taken prisoner at Dhola. Thereafter the Indian posts at Tsangle were eliminated giving the Chinese control over the western end of NEFA. At the eastern edge of NEFA, fighting commenced near the Indian strongpoint of Walong. On 20 Oct, the Chinese attacked the forward posts in Ladakh. The Galawan post fell within a few weeks as did other Chinese targets. The Last Stand 73. When news of the events of 20 Oct reached New Delhi, the reaction was of shock, surprise and a sense of betrayal. Pandit Nehru felt that China had betrayed India and had forced an unwanted war on India instead of peaceful coexistence as espoused in Panchsheel. After the Namkha Chu debacle, Army HQ tried to find reinforcements for despatch to the NEFA front. It was clear that the threat from a grumbling Pakistan precluded large-scale transfers of divisions from the western border. Hence new divisions in NEFA were raised by pulling out battalions from all over the rest of India. The Fortress Defence Strategy. 74. A strategic plan for NEFA was developed by Army HQ. It focused on the two great ridges in NEFA; each one some distance behind the other. Se La, the key feature on the first ridge was to be vital ground backed up by another large garrison at Bomdilla on the second ridge, about 60 miles away. These two strong points would be built up to the requisite strength by stocking it up for a siege lasting 15-20 days. Even if the road between Se La and Bomdilla had to be abandoned to the Chinese, air drops would take over for both perimeters. It was also reasoned that the Chinese would be unable to sustain a siege for long due to their stretched lines of communications while the Indians would be supplied from the plains easily, and would have artillery and other heavy weapons at their disposal. This box or fortress defence strategy appealed to Lt. Gen Harbaksh Singh who was Lt. Gen Kaul's replacement, due to the latter falling ill at that time. It must be noted that the Gen Thorat-Sen plan detailed earlier called for concentrating at Bomdilla. Militarily, concentrating at Bomdilla would have made sense; however, this idea was rejected as it would require handing over more territory to the Chinese. The government, in a political face-saving gesture, overlooked a fundamental rule of war, that the exchange of territory is acceptable to reach at a more strategic position from where victory can be achieved from potential defeat.

43 Gen BM Kaul reassumes Comd of IV Corps. 75. On 28 Oct, Gen BM Kaul reassumed command of IV Corps from Gen Harbaksh Singh. Immediately on assuming command Gen BM Kaul visited Se La and Bomdilla. The Gen Harbaksh Singh- Palit plan of building up Se La and Bomdilla was progressing well. Se La, under 62 Brigade, was manned by five battalions. Sixty miles down the road, Bomdilla was held by 48 Brigade with three battalions. Total strength in the area was around 10-12,000 men. In-between the two was Dirang Dzong, an administrative centre. However, Gen BM Kaul made some fundamental changes to the Gen Harbaksh-Palit plan which proved to be the final undoing of the Indian Army in NEFA. BM Kaul allowed the newly appointed GOC 4 C 4 Mtn Division Maj Gen AS Pathania to set up his HQ at Dirang Dzong rather than at Se La or Bomdilla. This resulted in only one brigade to defend Se La rather than the two envisaged in the Harbaksh-Palit plan. Se La, Bomdilla and Dirang Dzong could now no longer hold out independently. A great deal depended on keeping the 60-mile stretch between Se La and Bomdilla open. 62 Brigade in Se La 76. On 16 November, the Chinese launched probing attacks on the northwest and northeast approaches at Se La. 62 Brigade at Se La put up a stiff resistance, however Pathania ordered them to fall back to Dirang Dzong. Maj Hoshiar Singh, the commander of Se La wanted to hold out at Se La, however under orders a battalion was pulled back from a key prepared position on the Se La perimeter. It was told to occupy a point just behind and below the Se La pass to protect the retreat route. The sight of troops falling back demoralized the Se La defenders. The Chinese by then had encircled Se La now moved into the vacated prepared positions and opened fire. Fighting became heavy and there was vicious hand-tohand combat. As dawn broke, 62 Brigade was in full retreat from Se La.

Indian Gorkha Soldiers, 1962

44

Period of Indecision 77. The question that now remained was whether to make a stand at Dirang Dzong or at Bomdilla. Again, Gen Kaul made a critical mistake: instead of specifying instructions to Pathania on the course of action (since Lt. Gen Kaul was directing the theatre operations), he left this important decision to Pathania's discretion. Pathania opted for something else. Now 65 Brigade at Dirang Dzong was ordered to head for the Assam plains and not Bomdilla. Although the Chinese had opened light arms fire on the Dirang Dzong HQ, only small enemy parties had reached its vicinity. Pathania had 3000 men of 65 Brigade under his command and could have put up a fight if he wanted. Yet he ordered a withdrawal from Dirang Dzong. In addition, a column of 65 Brigade with tanks, infantry and support troops left for Bomdilla. However it disintegrated on being ambushed by the Chinese on the road stretch. Bomdilla now remained the last Indian stronghold in NEFA. It was held by 48 Brigade under the command of Brig Gurbaksh Singh. It would have proved to be a major obstacle for the Chinese, had it not been for Lt Gen Kaul who ordered several companies from Bomdilla to be moved out for road clearing operations. Chinese attack Bomdilla 78. On 18 November when the Chinese attacked, Bomdilla had only six companies in place of the intended twelve. On 18 Nov, 48 Brigade which was engaged in repulsing a Chinese attack in their prepared positions, Gen Kaul phoned Brig Gurbaksh Singh and asked for a column to be sent towards Dirang Dzong. Brig Gurbaksh Singh protested since it would mean pulling out troops form his defences and opening Bomdilla to the Chinese. Interestingly, at that time Pathania had already abandoned Dirang Dzong and a relief column from Bomdilla would have served little purpose. Yet Gen Kaul was insistent. Accordingly, at 1115 h. Two infantry companies, two of 48 Brigade's four tanks and two mountain guns were rounded up for Dirang Dzong. No sooner had the column left Bomdilla, it was promptly ambushed by the Chinese hidden in the nearby wooded slopes. The Indian troops tried returning to their original positions, but these were already held by the Chinese. A full scale attack on the Bomdilla perimeter was now in progress. Bomdilla Falls 79. After several hours of fighting, the Chinese managed to capture Indian bunkers in both forward and rear areas of the perimeter and pressurised one flank. Seeing that no reinforcements were forthcoming from the plains, Brig Gurbaksh Singh decided to order a withdrawal from Bomdilla. He intended to regroup and fight at Rupa, 8 Km to the south. However, 48 Brigade's withdrawal was slow. Reinforcements arrived at Bomdilla at 1830 h. They were never told to the contrary even though Brig Gurbaksh Singh had abandoned Bomdilla. Brig

45 Gurbaksh Singh again thought of defending Bomdilla, but by then the Chinese had cut his lines of communications. On 19 November, 1962, Bomdilla fell at 0300 h. The planned defence at Rupa never materialized and the remnants of 48 Brigade finally dissolved at Chaku, a position further south of Rupa on 20 November. All resistance by 4 Mountain Division had now ended.

80. The overwhelming Chinese assault had extended their lines of communication and supplies much too far. Being unable to maintain it, they declared a unilateral cease-fire on 24 Oct 1962. While not withdrawing their claims, they withdrew to the pre-war boundaries north of the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, but kept 38,000 Sq Km of seized territory up to their Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh district.

PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Question No 1 the

Describe the tasks delegated to 7 Mountain Brigade when

bed was deployed for defence of Thagla ridge during Oct 1962. Question No 2 Describe the act of gallantry displayed by Maj BK Pant of 2

RAJPUT during the Chinese (PLA) attack on Thagla during 18 -20 Oct 1962. Question No 3 Briefly describe the Chinese attack on the Thagla Ridge during 20 Oct 1962, with a sketch of imp landmarks and Indian posts. Question No 4 by Give out the outline plan for the defence of NEFA developed

AHQ after the events of 20 Oct 1962. Question No 5 Give a brief of the vacillation displayed by the mil leadership

during the Chinese attack on Bomdilla.

46

CHAPTER VII BATTLE OF WALONG: 18 OCT - 16 NOV 1962 81. Walong is a small hamlet located near the tri junction of Tibet, Burma and India. Situated on an ancient trade route, it was manned by an Assam Rifles post with a small airfield capable of handling Indian Air Force Otters and Caribou aircraft. The hills surrounding Walong were ranging between 10,000 to 16,000 feet. Air drops were the only way to support this sector. The Chinese carried out occasional incursions through the Lohit Valley to familiarize themselves. In response, 6 KUMAON was moved into the area in March 1962 with a Coy posted about two miles from the border. The Chinese activity however increased with posts moving closer to the border. 18 - 25 Oct 1962: The Initial Chinese Incursions 82. Although 6 KUMAON was responsible for the Walong sector, an Assam Rifles platoon was manning the post at the border. 6 KUMAON was deployed as follows. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 'A' Coy - Richu NH 5200 'B' Coy - East Ridge NH 5477 'C' Coy - Kibithoo NH 5196 'D' Coy - Ladders area NH 5483 Battalion Tactical Headquarters - Kibithoo Battalion HQ with Adm elements - Walong

83. On 18 Oct, a recce patrol under Subedar Surendra Chand was sent to Hundred Hill (NH 4999). Two Chinese officers and fifty Other Ranks were observed. In response one platoon of Assam Rifles was sent to Ninety Hill (NH 4990) under the control of Subedar Bhairab Singh of A Coy. The 2 other platoons of A Coy were occupying Sangram NH 5199 and Richu. On 21 Oct light signals were observed on the Chinese side. In response Major Gamathinayagam of A Coy moved with a platoon, less a section, to the McMahon Ridge. One platoon was sent to Dichu Nullah to prevent any enemy advance from the Taluk Pass. 84. At 0015 h on 22 Oct, the Himalayan calm was shattered by the noise of Chinese mortar and machine gun fire. Threehundred enemy troops attacked the two platoons' position of A Coy and another en group attacked Madiah Top (NH

47 5302). Accurate Indian 3" mortar fire however brought the attack to a brief halt. Little later, reinforced in numbers, the Chinese made another attack along with simultaneous assaults on Lohit II (NH 5303) and Laila (NH 5101). For four hours they were held back, till through sheer numbers they broke through. Nk Bahadur stepped in after his first and second gunners

were killed and manned the LMG. He kept on firing till a burst of automatic fire brought him down. The Indians withdrew to establish positions in Walong. D Coy under Lt Bikram Singh was to provide the screening position at Ashi Hill (NH 5484) along with a mortar and MMG section. Lieutenant Singh had the planks over the Namti Nullah weakened from the Indian side.

Battle of Walong

48

85. When the Chinese came in at 0300 h on 23 October, the first Chinese soldier stepped on the plank and fell into the nullah. As the following Chinese milled around, very lights were fired revealing the Chinese on a cramped path. The mortars and MMGs sighted on this section brought down accurate fire. About twohundred Chinese troops were killed or wounded in this action against nine Indian fatalities. At 0400 h the screen was ordered to withdraw. Meanwhile 4 Sikh made contact with the enemy and subjected them to fire from 3 mortar, LMGs and MMGs. Meanwhile the Chinese had set off a bush fire and sneaked forward. Sensing the twin danger, Sepoy Piara Singh tried to douse the fire and fire at the enemy. Profusely bleeding he refused to be evacuated and died fighting to the end. On the night of 25 Oct, the Chinese tried another probe but the SIKHS held firm. As some of the Chinese started to close in, Sepoy Kewal Singh rushed out of his post and charged them with his bayonet killing a few in hand to hand combat. However he was mortally wounded. 26 - 13 November 1962: Reorganizing & Reinforcing 86. Over the next few days there were clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols as the Chinese rushed in reinforcements. On Oct 26th, B Coy of 4 SIKH was out on an recce patrol when it was surrounded by the Chinese. While the outnumbered Indians were unable to break the encirclement, it was decided to attack the Chinese flank to surprise them. A unit led by Lance Naik Kartar Singh volunteered for the task. The unit sneaked in and launched an attack on the Chinese. Surprised by this the enemy reeled in disarray allowing the encircled patrol to break free. Meanwhile the Indian defences were in a state of turmoil. Initially 5 Brigade was in charge of the Walong sector. 87. It was reorganised and brought under Headquarters 2 Infantry Division which allotted Walong to 181 Brigade. However the Divisional Commander of 2 Infantry Division objected, so 11 Brigade under Brigadier N.C. Rawlley was asked to move to Walong. This changing and chopping was to the detriment of the defence of Walong. Furthermore to bring it up to full brigade strength, initially 2/8 Gorkha Rifles was asked to move to Walong. But halfway through the move they were replaced by 3/3 Gorkha Rifles. Then suddenly 3/3 Gorkha Rifles was asked to move to Hayuliang. Finally when 11 Brigade took over 3/3 GORKHAS were brought back to Walong. By 03 November the following units were in place. (a) 4 SIKH (i) (ii) (iii) 'A' Coy - Dong Hill East of Lohit river 'B' Coy - Maha Plateau, Ladders West of Lohit river 'C' Coy - Dong plateau

49 (iv) (v) (b) 'D' Coy - Lachman Ridge 3" Mortar - Slopes of Dong Hill

3/3 GORKHAS (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 'A' Coy - Dong Plateau 'B' Coy - Dong Hill east of Lohit River 'C' Coy - Ladders Area 'D' Coy - Lachman Ridge

(c) November)

4 DOGRA 1 Coy to reinforce Tri Junction area (arrived on 14

88. Green Pimple Spur (NH 4983), which overlooked the Brigade defences was occupied by the Chinese. Since a further advance along this spur could mean the fall of the Walong airstrip, 'A' Coy was asked to retake it. Led by Captain Mathur the men moved into position for a morning assault on 06 November. Unfortunately at the last moment the promised mortar support did not come. Still at 0850 h. to the cries of Kali Mata ki Jai they attacked. In spite of sustained Chinese mortar and machine gun fire the KUMAONis managed to force the forward Chinese posts to retreat. The KUMAONis soon ran out of ammunition but continued engaging in hand to hand combat. But now the determined Chinese fire forced a retreat. This was also the only option as even if they took Green Pimple they had no ammunition to resist a counter attack. The Coy took defensive positions at 11,000 feet along the West Ridge. However weakened, it was attacked repeatedly by the Chinese and after the fifth attack it was relieved by D Coy, commanded by Lt Bikram Singh. 89. Meanwhile 4 SIKH had been conducting aggressively patrolling and managed to, kill many of the enemy. However the three battalions were holding positions in such a manner that sub-units of one, were placed under another and two of the battalions held positions on both sides of the river. As seen from the above, the 4 SIKH were spread across 6000 yards an abnormally large frontage. The Gorkhas were spread across 3000 - 4000 yards. This was reason enough for poor command and control. The 6 KUMAON bn HQ was east of the river but they held the lines west of the river. 4 SIKH and 3/3 Gorkhas held positions east of the river while their headquarters were on the west of the river. In addition to these three battalions, the following were deployed. (a) (b) A Coy of Assam Rifles. 71 Heavy Mortar Battery.

50 (c) (d) (e) 17 Field Regiment Battery. Platoon of 6 MAHAR. Platoon of Engineers.

90. This didn't make any sense but no commander tried to correct it. In spite of this all the units held firm against repeated probing attacks from the Chinese who were now at divisional strength. Spoiling Attacks by 13 KUMAON 91. As the enemy built up for the final attack, on the Indian forces, it was decided to launch a spoiling attack on the Chinese columns. The attack was to be launched on Yellow Pimple as it was dominated by the Tri Junction area. On 13 November the bn, less Lt. Bikram's four platoons, marched to Tri Junction. On 14 November with the 4 SIKH providing a diversion, Yellow Pimple was attacked by two companies under Capt BN Singh and Major Sharma. As the valiant KUMAON charged up, they were met by heavy artillery and machine gun fire. Unfortunately the only fire support for 13 KUMAON came from 3" mortars. Captain B.N. Singh's Coy reached about 20 meters from the top. 92. As sustained enemy fire seemed to bog them down, Subedar Govind Singh charged forward with an LMG to destroy an enemy bunker. Meanwhile another enemy machine gun nest opened up on him and the brave Subedar charged that one too, silencing it, but in the process was killed. Inspired by this feat of bravery, Subedar Trilok Singh likewise charged another MG nest but was swept by MG fire. The other Coy now had closed to 50 mts before they too ground to a halt. By now the Indians had lost 20 men and Captain B.N. Singh was wounded. 2/Lt Khatri took over. The CO, Colonel Madiah, decided to send the two reserve platoons to reinforce the attack. Human Wave Tactics 93. Meanwhile the Chinese had stabilised their positions and at 2030 h, made a battalion size counter attack. The two companies were surrounded and sustained hand-to-hand combat took place. However the darkness allowed some of them to disengage and even though they were subjected to heavy shelling, some of them under 2/Lieutenant Khatri and 2/Lieutenant Jindal inched their way back to Tri Junction. Exhausted and depleted the 6 KUMAON now braced themselves for the final attack. At 0430 h on 15 November the Chinese attacked Tri Junction. For two hours they were pummeled with machine guns and mortars but held on till the attack fizzled out. However Captain Bhatia and 2/Lieutenant Khatri were wounded. Now the Chinese established an OP about 200 yards from Tri Junction. The next series of attacks commenced on 15 November. It was followed by attacks every four hours in which Chinese used human wave tactics.

51 94. The reinforcement from 4 DOGRA were cut off and only 33 men made it. They brought in much needed ammunition. Four more Chinese attacks were repulsed but by now Indians were running out of men and ammunition. Meanwhile A Coy of 4 SIKH came under sniper attacks. A patrol under Subedar Harnam Singh was sent to cut the off the enemy, but was thrown back. At night the Chinese attacked, wave after wave. But the Sikhs held firm. Havildar Labh Singh was wounded thrice and each time rejoined the fighting after getting first aid. Soon the Coy had lost its Officer Commanding and second-in-command along with two platoon commanders. 95. Subedar Harnam Singh and Massa Singh were wounded. Lance Havildar Kirpa Ram the battalion tradesman kept supplying ammunition to the bunkers. On one of his runs he was hit and wounded but continued his task. Another hit killed him. Meanwhile D Company was also attacked. After the first two waves were repelled, with dead Chinese littering the ground, a third wave followed. This time after bitter fighting the position fell. The few who straggled back spoke of the gallant Company commander, Lt Yog Palta. He moved from bunker to bunker encouraging his men, pausing to fire his Sten gun and hurl grenades. A burst of LMG fire hit him in the neck and with the death of the young commander the position fell. The Sikhs fought tenaciously. Two platoons were wiped out to a man. The Chinese dead were piling up all around. Finally the order to withdraw came and what was left of the Sikhs made their way back. They were the only troops who captured some Chinese arms. 96. On 16 November, the Chinese launched an attack against all forward posts. Between 0500 h and 0530 h supported by artillery, mortar and machine gun fire, they attacked A Company of 4 SIKH at Maha plateau north of D Company at Lachman Ridge. By 0530 h the SIKH positions were overrun and the remaining Sikhs were ordered to withdraw. Now the Gorkhas of D Company were the next target. Subedar Kharak Bahadur commanding the forward platoon held fire till the Chinese closed in. The subsequent firing killed 12 Chinese and wounded 15. A second attack at 0630h was also beaten back. The Chinese now tried to flank the Company. Seeing this, Naik Keshar Bahadur Gurung picked his Sten and moved to a vantage point from where he kept engaging the enemy till ordered to withdraw. Lachman Ridge : D Coy, 3/3 GORKHA RIFLES 97. By 1500h the Chinese started closing in and the Company Commander, Capt KN Bavadam, could not contact the bn or Brigade HQ. So he decided to break through the Chinese cordon on his own. He and Subedar Kharak Bahadur evacuated Major Samatsar of 4 SIKH who had been wounded. As the withdrawal proceeded they were ambushed and outnumbered by Chinese units which had slipped around them. Naik Keshar Bahadur Gurung was hit on the hip but continued to fight till another round tore into his neck. He was mortally wounded. Havildar Chandra Bahadur Pun took over the Sten and provided covering firing

52 till the last man was able to withdraw. Unfortunately he was killed in the process. D Company now found themselves in the abandoned positions of the 4 SIKH, C Company. The Gorkhas occupied the positions and continued the fight. Finally as the Chinese started to rain in artillery, Captain

Bavadam asked the Gorkhas to pull back. In this process a number of personnel were killed including Captain Bavadam. Ladders Post: C Coy, 3/3 GORKHA RIFLES 98. C Company in Ladders Post lower down the ridge, east of Maha Plateau was commanded by Major NB Chand. Maintaining strict fire control the Gorkhas were fighting fiercely. Their position on the Kibithu-Walong track, on the west bank of the Lohit river got its name from the steps cut into the rock face. The Gorkha positions were in the rock caves. As long as support from the east bank existed, the Gorkhas were safe. The Chinese attacked on 15th morning and suffered heavily. Falling back they blasted the GORKHAS with bazooka fire for the whole day but failed to make any dent. That night they made a second attack and were again repulsed. On 16th morning the GORKHAS watched the attack on the Sikhs position east of the river. The river which was supposed to be unfordable and un-crossable was crossed by the Chinese using rubber dinghies. Once the Sikhs position fell the GORKHAS were exposed. The Chinese lined up direct fire weapons across the bank and began to methodically blast the Ladders. 99. The Gorkha bunkers were collapsing one by one but the GORKHAS remained put. Many men were killed in the process and Major NB Chand ordered his men to the trenches. The Chinese still could not advance. At 1000 h, the bn HQ of 4 SIKH was asked for ammunition and reinforcements but the Sikhs could not spare any. By now, 4 SIKH, 4 DOGRA and 6 KUMAON had withdrawn. Major Chand ordered his Company to withdraw at 1630 h, with most able to escape, except for Major Chand himself, who was captured. Meanwhile east of the Lohit river, A and B Companys, along with the bn HQ, were stuck. C Company of 4 SIKH was attacked by the Chinese at midnight on 16 November. A platoon of B Company was sent to reinforce 4 SIKH at High Plateau. By the time the GORKHAS reached there, the Sikhs were overrun and the GORKHAS returned after a brief firefight. Dong Plateau: A Coy 100. At 0600 h A Company at Dong Plateau was subjected to heavy shelling and mortar fire. Under this cover the Chinese started edging closer. The shelling by the Chinese set fire to A Company positions but the Gorkhas hung on tenaciously. At 1430h the Chinese again resumed a build up and as the positions became untenable, Major Chatterjee was ordered to withdraw A and B

53 Companies by bn HQ. B Company led by Major RS Virk was intercepted by the Chinese. This forced them to change route and they subsequently were lost. No 6 Pl made it to battalion HQ on 17 November only to find the Chinese already there. The rest crossed at Dantir Nallah at 2100h on 16 November and were on their way to the hills across Yepak when the Chinese ambushed them further confusing the group. 101. On 16 November, Major Chatterjee and Major Thapa along with Captain SN Kapil and Captain GS Bajaj (artillery) and 60 80 ORs were ambushed. Except for Captain Bajaj and 2/Lt Madeira who had escaped, the rest were captured. Brigade HQ's orders to withdraw never reached the GORKHAS. Due to this the Chinese had already moved into positions behind them where other units had withdrawn or had collapsed. At 0730 h on 16 November, the Chinese reinforced by two more brigades attacked with 120mm mortar fire. By now communication with Brigade HQ had been cut off. The supply route to Tri Junction was cut off. The only other pocket was at the West Ridge where four platoons were under comd Lt Bikram Singh. At 0830 h this ad hoc Company was attacked by 4000 Chinese troops, using human wave tactics. 102. From three sides, the Chinese poured in artillery and machinegun fire. But the Kumaonis held on till the situation became militarily futile and orders were given to withdraw. As Lt Bikram Singh started extricating his men he was cut down. The Chinese suffered terrible casualties (almost 5 times). By midday all troops were asked to withdraw. Some managed to get back through the treacherous terrain. But many never received the orders. They slugged it out to the last man, to the last bullet. Later Brigadier NC Rawlley said, "6 KUMAON at Tri Junction fought and fought and fought till there was nothing left. After this there was eerie silence." Sikhs, Kumaonis, Gorkhas and Dogras fought shoulderto-shoulder to the bitter end. Two months after the cease-fire when the Indians returned they found that the Chinese had marked the positions of the dead. Many of the bunkers showed the dead where they had last manned their weapons.

54

55

PROBABLE QUESTIONS Question No 1 On a sketch show the loc of Walong and the force disposition of the Indian troops deployed for its defence in Oct 1962. Question No 2 Describe the actions of C Company 3/3 GR in defence of

Ladders Post and of A Coy in defence of Dong Plateau. Question No 3 What were the causes and nature of the reorganisation and

reinforcement measures taken for enhancing def potential of Walong sector during Nov 1962? Question No 4 Bring out the force disposition after the reorganisation and

reinforcement of the holding forces in Walong. Question No 5 Describe the actions of the Indians forces at Tri junction.

56

CHAPTER VIII BATTLE OF NAMKA CHU, 10 OCT - 16 NOV 1962

"I can tell this House that at no time since our independence, and of course before it, were our defence forces in better condition, in finer fettle, and with the background of our far greater industrial production...to help them, than they are today. I am not boasting about them or comparing them with any other country's, but I am quite confident that our defence forces are well capable of looking after our security." - Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru addressing the Lok Sabha on 25 November 1959. 103. Namkha Chu in the NEFA sector is testimony to the decisions made by our former Prime Minister, an arrogant Defence Minister and a politically connected General. It caused the rout of a proud army with many of its men dying like animals. Location and Terrain. 104. Namkha Chu, flows through a gorge situated east of the remote Tri Junction of Tibet, Bhutan and India. It is 200 km from the railhead of Misamari and 60 km from the road head of Tawang. The Nyamjang river flows in from Tibet and enters India at Khinzemane. It meets Namkha Chu 1.5 km south of Khinzemane. Local grazers used seven improvised bridges to take their cattle across the Namkha Chu. They were from East to West known as Bridge No-I to Bridge No-V, Log Bridge and Temporary Bridge. Following Hathung La on the route to Dhola Post, the track hits Bridge I. After Bridge-I the track forked - the eastward branch reached Khinzemane, the one going North West along the river and re-crossing it to the South across Bridge II led to Dhola Post opposite Bridge III. 105. A little further was Bridge IV and close to Tsangle was Bridge V. Between IV and V the Log Bridge and Temporary bridges were located. The bridges were useless when the river was in spate. In Oct one could walk across the river bed. The Thagla ridge which sprawls from west to east overlooks Namka Chu and has four prominent passes Dum Dum La (17,000 feet), Karpola II (16,000 feet), Yamatso La (16,000 feet) and Thag La (14,000 feet). To get to Tawang the road traverses from Misamari up to 2743 mtr to a place called Eagle's Nest, another 200 mtr to Bomdilla. Then it drops to 1676 metres to Dirang Dzong, followed by an ascent to Se La at 4180 metres, another drop to 1524 metres to Jang with a

57 final climb to Tawang (3048) metres. From here the journey had to be along tracks with mules and porters. There were no staging areas for acclimatization. Prelude 106. The dispute in this area revolved around Thagla Ridge. The Chinese claimed it was on the Tibetan side and India claimed it was on its side of the McMahon line. Accordingly in 1959 an Assam Rifles post was established at Khinzemane. The Chinese disputed it and a force of 200 Chinese pushed back the weak Indian force towards the bridge on the Nyamjang Chu at Drokung Samba which they claimed was the McMahon line. After the Chinese retired the Indians again reoccupied the post. The Chinese again tried to dislodge but this time were resisted by the Assam Rifles. This time they withdrew and started a chain of diplomatic exchanges between the two Governments.

The Namkha Chu Terrain 107. Under Nehru's forward policy some extra posts were ordered to be deployed on the McMahon line. One such post was proposed at the Tri junction. A party under Captain Mahabir Prasad from 1 Sikh went to locate the post. However due to heavy snowfall it could not access it, so they located the post at Che Dong on the southern bank of the Namka Chu. While the post was dominated by the surrounding area, it was easy to maintain-with an access to water. However this should have been a temporary post and should have been relocated at a later time. For some reason it never was. An Assam Rifles unit was sent to man it.

58

Chinese Lay Siege on Che Dong 108. On 8 September, Chinese troops laid siege to the Assam Rifles post. In order to get a quick response the post commander inflated the number to 600 enemy troops. In many other places similar situations were met with an order to stay put. Probably because the higher number, 7 Infantry Brigade was ordered to move in and evict the Chinese. 7 Brigade was part of 4 Division commanded by Major General Niranjan Prasad. At this time two battalions of 7 Brigade, 9 PUNJAB and 1 SIKH were in Tawang and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles in Misamari on its way back after a 3-year tenure in NEFA. There was no airfield and all maintenance was by air drops. Raw and un-acclimatised troops with cotton uniforms and canvas shoes were sent into the mountains. All this was advertised and alerted the Chinese. The first man to protest was Lt. Gen Umrao Singh. When Lt. Gen Sen in charge of Eastern Command refused to heed his advice, he followed it up with a written protest. Deployment: 14 Sept 09 Oct 1962 109. 7 Infantry Brigade was commanded by Brigadier JP Dalvi and consisted of 9 PUNJAB, 4 Grenadiers, 2 RAJPUT and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles plus some symbolic artillery. 9 PUNJAB was led by Lt Col RN Mishra. With harvesting time in the region the men had to move everything by themselves for the long arduous trek. Each man carried one blanket, 100 rounds of ammunition, two grenades, three days rations and LMG clips. It came to 35 kg per person. After a forced march it reached Bridge on 03 September. Next morning leaving one Coy behind at Bridge, Lt Col Mishra took the rest to Bridge II, where a Coy of Chinese troops was in position both sides of Namka Chu. Ignoring the Chinese shouts in Hindi to go back, he left two companies about 50 meters away and took the last one to the Che Dong post. The log Bridge II was destroyed and a 50-man Chinese detachment occupied the opposite side. Raising of 4 Corps 110. The next night 9 PUNJAB at Bridge II crept in close forcing the Chinese to move most of their troops to the North bank. Meanwhile Lt Gen Umrao Singh's protests were causing a problem for the Government and the Army HQ. To avoid the impasse, General Thapar and Lt Gen Sen formed 4 Corps to handle NEFA leaving 33 Corps with Lt Gen Umrao Singh. Lt Gen BM Kaul was put in charge of 4 Corps - a most unusual step for a Chief of General Staff (CGS) to do with direct access to the Prime Minister. Lt Gen Kaul took charge on 04 October. Meanwhile 2 RAJPUT and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles had reached Lumpo. The men were in cotton uniforms, canvas shoes and were living in the open after marching

59 through slushy roads. 4 Grenadiers who had arrived at Tawang a few days earlier were in no better shape. The buildup of troops to Tsangdhar was slow. There were no porters and everything had to back packed.

Air Sup 111. Furthermore poor planning in the air drops did not help. Instead of snow clothes & ammunition they got tent pegs, kerosene was dropped in 200L barrels. Many rolled down slopes and although some could be retrieved, many were given up. Especially high were losses from drops by C119s due to the higher speed of the aircraft. Meanwhile two platoons of MMGs from 6 MAHARr and 34 Heavy Mortar Regiment reached Lumpo. The mortars had no ammunition. A little later four 75mm guns of 17 Field Parachute regiment were dropped at Tsangdhar. On 6 Oct, Lt Gen Kaul and Maj Gen Prasad made their way to Namkha Chu. The Brigade HQ was located at Rongla and Tactical HQ at Zimithang. The troops were extended on a frontage of 12 miles or 20,000 yards more than 6 times their normal frontage. Furthermore the Corps, Divisional and Brigade commanders were all there. Lt Gen Kaul now understood the situ of the Indian troops and tried to muster up all available resources. He sent a message to Eastern Command for "marshalling of all military and air resources." Lt Gen BM Kaul directs Prep of Def at Thagla 112. Late in the game Lt. Gen Kaul realised what he had got into and was now desperate. The government however was not ready to escalate the border clash into an all out war. Meanwhile GRENADIERS, RAJPUT and GORKHAS were on the way to Tsangdhar. The units had marched through severe cold, with groups of 3 men sharing TWO sheets. As mentioned they were in cotton uniforms resulting in a good deal of sick casualties; frostbite and pulmonary disorders. Two Gorkhas died of pulmonary-edema the next day. So Lt. Gen Kaul now turned to his pet 'positional warfare' theory while Major General Prasad and Brigadier JP Dalvi wanted to find a way from their untenable position. The Chinese meanwhile had advantage of position and had now mustered up to a division at Thagla. Est of Post at Yamatso La 113. So Lt Gen Kaul set his plans in motion on the morning of 8 Oct. He decided that 2 RAJPUT would occupy Yamatso La west of Thag La peak as it was unoccupied using the Tseng-Jong approach. Brigadier Dalvi projected the improbability. The plan meant moving a battalion to a peak 16,000 feet above sea level under Chinese view with no artillery support. Brigadier Dalvi convinced Lt. Gen Kaul to at least send a patrol of 9 PUNJAB to find a suitable crossing place for the RAJPUTS and cover them by taking positions at Tseng Jong. The

60 RAJPUTS, less one Coy, left behind at Bridge 1 were to advance on first light of 10 Oct. 114. The patrol of 9 PUNJAB led by Major Choudhary left on 08 Oct and established itself by 3 p.m. Meanwhile two companies of the 2 RAJPUT was in the Bridge 4 area with the rest at Dhola post. It was as unprepared with only ninety sleeping bags, no ammunition for its 3 mortars. Meanwhile the close proximity between Chinese and Indian troops caused skirmishes. A grenade attack on 20 September on PUNJAB was met with effective retaliation. Four PUNJABis were wounded and one Chinese was killed. 09 Oct passed uneventfully except for a grenade attack in the Bridge IV area. One more platoon from 9 PUNJAB had reinforced the Tseng Jong area and one section from it, was stationed at the spur of Karpo La II.

10 Oct 1962: The Skirmishes Begin 115. On 10 Oct at first light, the Chinese attacked the Tseng Jong position. Around 0800 h, 600 Chinese troops attacked the post. The Indians totaled 56

61 men with only pouch ammunition. Still they beat back the first assault. Around 9:30 a.m. the Chinese attacked a second time. Now the section at Karpo La II moved to the flank of the Chinese. When the Chinese emerged, it opened up on them inflicting heavy casualties. The Chinese retaliated by bringing down mortar fire. As the first fire rang out the RAJPUTS were strung on the Southern bank of the Namkha Chu. Orders were issued to move up to Yamatso La. The forward Coy was about 450 meters from the Temporary bridge with Lt Col Maha Singh Rikh following behind with the second Coy. Lt Gen Kaul now proceeded to give another order. He asked Lt Col Rikh to hold on and set defensive positions. Protests about the positions being dominated by the Thag La ridge were brushed aside. He then left handing over command to Brigadier Dalvi saying, "It is your battle." Moreover a Coy of the 1/9 Gorkhas had to accompany the party to provide protection.

116. Meanwhile Major Chaudhary was asking for mortar and machine gun fire. Brigadier JP Dalvi had two 3" mortars and two machine guns but he had to make the painful decision of not opening fire as the retaliatory fire from the south bank would decimate the RAJPUTs who were still milling around. Helplessly they watched the Chinese reinforcements clamber up for a second attack. The Chinese attacked a third time from three directions and at this time Major Chaudhary asked the unit to withdraw. By that time the Chinese were on Major Chaudhary's position, hand-to-hand combat was in process. Somehow he withdrew what was left of his two platoons. Sepoy Kanshi Ram brought back an AK-47 snatched from a Chinese soldier. The withdrawal was made possible by the gallantry of Naik Chain Singh. Asking his men to fall back, Naik Singh covered their withdrawal with an LMG, till he was gunned down by a machine gun burst. Major Chaudhary, Sepoy Ram and Nk Singh were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. The Punjabis outnumbered 20 to 1 lost 6 dead, 11 wounded and 5 missing. Peking Radio admitted to a 100 casualties. Later that day the Chinese buried our men with full military honours in view of our men. It was a clever move to beguile the Indians into complacency. Meanwhile the Chinese started reinforcing their positions with more troops and heavy mortars. A long line of mules and porters were seen carrying equipment. Firing lines were cleared with mechanical saws, and barbed wire & sticks used to defend their positions. Fighting at Tsangle 117. Meanwhile the Grenadiers, led by Lt Col KS Harihar Singh, arrived and started deploying. The Chinese taunted them for their efforts to cut trees with machetes and digging tools. Attempts to withdraw the PUNJABis from Tsangle were rebuffed by Lt Gen Kaul. The Lt Gen, who was sick, instead of giving up his command and admitting himself to the hospital, went to his residence and commanded from his sick bed. In the Army of 1962 this no longer seemed strange. On 18 Oct the Chinese preparations intensified. Officers were holding

62 conferences and pointing out Indian positions at Namkha Chu and Tsangdhar. Bearings were taken and noted down. Tsangle Post and Bridge V came under fire for 90 minutes. With a foot of snow falling, Brigadier Dalvi was forced to take whatever snow clothes from the men at Namkha Chu and give it to those in Tsangle. A Coy of the 1/9 Gorkha Rifles was ordered to be deployed at Tsangle. Brigadier JP Dalvi protested at this piece meal deployment but was threatened with a Court Martial. The next day the Chinese activities climaxed. The RAJPUTs counted 2000 men with stores in the area between Tseng-Jong and Temporary Bridge. Mules and porters came across Thag La. Men were laying tape markers for night assaults. Brigadier JP Dalvi protested again asking to withdraw his men from this deathtrap. He offered to resign, rather than watch his men get massacred. Brigadier JP Dalvi thought the attack was going to come the next day and in three days his brigade would be wiped out. Major General Prasad promised he will be there the next day to share the fate of the brigade.

118.

On 19 October the troops were deployed as follows; (a) 4 Grenadiers, commanded by Lt Col KS Harihar Singh (i) (ii) (iii) (b) 1 Bn less 2 Coy - Bridge I 1 Coy - Drokung Sambha (under Div HQ) 1 Coy - Serkhim with 1 platoon at Hathung La

9 PUNJAB, commanded by Lt Col RN Misra (i) (ii) 1 Bn less 1 Coy - Bridge II 1 Coy - Bridge V and Tsangle

(c) 2 RAJPUT, commanded by Lt Col MS Rikh Total Strength - 513 men, 8 Officers (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (d) 1 Bn less 3 Coy Brigade IV A Coy Brigade III B Coy Log Bridge C Coy Temporary Bridge

1/9 Gorkha Rifles, commanded by Lt Col BS Ahluwalia (i) (ii) 1 Bn less 2 Coy - Che Dong - Tsangdhar Track 1 Coy - behind Bridge II (near Brigade HQ)

63 (iii) (iv) (e) (f) 1 Coy less platoon - Tsangdhar 1 Platoon - between Tsangdhar and Bridge V

Assam Rifles1 Platoon - Che Dong 34 Heavy Mortar Battery less platoon - Tsangdhar (no ammunition)

(g) Field Regiment - 17 Para 1 Troop - Tsangdhar (2 operational - 260 rounds of ammunition, no radio sets for OP) (h) 6 Mahar - 1 MG Coy less a platoon* (*Platoon with 1/9 GR, rest with RAJPUTs at Bridge V) (j) (k) 100 Field Coy - Rong La Brigade HQ - 100 yards behind Rola (Dhola Post)

Infiltration by Chinese troops 119. Against this the Chinese forces consisted of the following:(a) (b) 11 Mountain Division and 3 Regiments

120. On the night of the 19 Oct the Chinese went into their forming up areas. In utter contempt of the Indians across the river, they lit fires to warm themselves. To Major Gurdial, Second-In-Charge of 2 RAJPUT, the idea of his under strength battalion fighting the hardened PLA troops seemed suicidal. He looked around at his isolated weak companies, un-acclimatised and weak, 150 rounds/rifleman, 17 magazines, 28 rounds per LMG and 2 grenades per soldier. The 3" Mortars of the battalion had only 60 rounds of ammunition, equal to five minutes firing time. The night was dark and bitter cold. The stars stood out brightly. The sentries of 2 RAJPUT stood wrapped in blankets shuffling around to keep warm. The men were huddled in twos and threes for warmth. Unknown to them in the thousands of yards that separated the posts, with visibility under 20 yards, Chinese infantry columns were infiltrating through large gaps. Fording the river was easy. They quickly moved past the link roads avoiding contact with Indian patrols where they were suspected of operating. Element of Surprise

64 121. The overhead communication wires were cut just before the attack so that the Indians could not be alerted. In the dark shadows of the coniferous forests the noises were muffled by the thick moss on rocks. Slowly the Chinese columns gathered into battalions. Each got into a position above and behind the RAJPUT companies. Other columns likewise moved to the Tsangdhar position to take on the Gorkhas. Other Chinese columns had moved two nights before and gone to Hathung La to carry out blocking movements. The fires and other activity of the earlier nights had kept the defenders focus on the front. The plan was to hit like a battering ram at the centre, into the RAJPUTs, and the left flank and cutting off the rest of the troops. Outside the temp was well below zero and the fires lit by the Chinese still flickered. The first pre dawn light could be seen when the darkness was broken by the hollow booming sound of mortars. The muzzle flashes were followed by a pause before the valley erupted in a roar. It was 0514 h and the Battle of Namkha Chu had begun. 20 Oct 1962: Chinese Actions 122. At 0514 h, 150 guns and mortars opened upon all the localities at Namkha Chu and Tsangdhar. The 82mm and 120mm rounds crashed into trees and rocks, forcing the men in the open to take refuge in the bunkers whose firing bays faced forwards. It continued for an hour, as the Indians helplessly watched unable to counter it with any weapon. The Indian 3" Mortars made futile attempt to fire back. Even as they tried to get the range right, the Chinese ranged in on them and blew them away. The signals

bunker was zeroed in quickly using 75mm recoilless guns, and blown up, killing all in it including Captain Mangat - a signals officer. Progress of Battle 123. After an hour or so there was a brief lull for 7 - 15 minutes before the Chinese bugles and whistles for an infantry attack became audible. To the shock of the defenders, the attack was from above and behind. This meant their trenches were exposed and they had to scramble out of their bunker to face upwards. At Temporary Bridge, Subedar Dashrath Singh realised what was happening and moved Naik Roshan Singh's section to a bump 150 yards upslope. Barely had Roshan's men took position when the Chinese came into view. With AK-47s opening up, they charged. Roshan and his men poured fire into the bunched up Chinese cutting down many. Temporary Bridge 124. 2/Lt Onkar Dubey with No 7 pl along with Subedar Janam Singh rushed with 15 LMG clips and two men to support Nk Roshan. From the flanks he and

65 his men poured fire on the Chinese breaking up two attacks. Firing the last two clips at the enemy he was severely wounded in the stomach & chest and fell down unconscious. He was later taken prisoner. Meanwhile Subedar Dashrath Singh's men turned uphill and opened fire on the advancing Chinese. The Chinese rushed down using cover from tree to tree. Dashrath and his men repulsed three attacks. They came in to hand-to-hand combat losing four more men. Subedar Dashrath fell unconscious and was taken POW. On the eastern flank, Major BK Pant's D Coy platoon under Subedar JN Bose came under attack. The crescendo of AK-47 fire overshadowed the noise of Indian LMGs and rifles. 125. Nk Roshan's unit was finally overcome with every man killed. The attention now turned to Subedar Bose's platoon. After three waves of assault there were only 10 survivors. The gallant Bengali led the remaining men into a bayonet charge. Most of the men were killed. Major B.K. Pant meanwhile tried to rally the men. Hit at the beginning of the battle in the leg he had to take over after Major Sethi was killed in the first round of mortar attacks which collapsed his bunker. Hobbling from position to position he kept inspiring his men on. He was hit again in the stomach and leg. Still he continued to inspire his men to break a fourth attack. At this point the enemy targeted him and hit him all over with machine gun fire. He uttered the Regiment's war cry before his last breath. Log Bridge 126. B Company was deployed at Log Bridge. As the first shells landed, Lt Subhash Chander reacted quickly and turned his men around to face uphill. However a salvo of mortar shells set fire to his command post as well as the Coy kitchen. The resulting fire to ghee & wheat engulfed the post trapping him inside and burning him to death. Subedar Har Lal, of No 5 Pl, now rallied his men quickly dispersing them amongst the trees and rocks. He kept exhorting his men and when ammunition ran out asked them

to use their rifles as lathis. Subedar Gian Chand's No 4 Pl also got into position amongst the trees. They held off 3 waves of attacks before he too was overwhelmed. With Subedar Mohan Lal killed early in the battle only Naik Hoshiar with 6th platoon was left. With the other two platoons absorbing the first few attacks, No 6 Pl got more time to get into position. Using their Lee Enfield .303 rifles they inflicted heavy damage. In spite of firing upwards, the RAJPUTs were effective because the ricocheting bullets continued to drop the Chinese. Bridge IV 127. Little by little the superior volume of the Chinese AK-47s overwhelmed the Indians. With ammunition running out the Chinese moved in. Each and every

66 soldier had to be overcome by hand-to-hand to combat. Percussion grenades were extensively used. As Naik Hoshiar ran out of ammunition he grabbed a Sten gun and was trying to reload when a percussion grenade exploded, hitting him in the arms & chest. As he regained consciousness, he found four Chinese holding him. A services wrestler, Naik Hoshiar struggled for some time before being overpowered. Meanwhile the area under Bridge IV continued to get pounded with the bn HQ getting special attention. Major Gurdial, 2IC rallied his men around. Seeing no enemy activity across the river he realised the attack was coming from uphill. Frantically he tried to set the Vickers MG around to face uphill. Men were being hurried out of bunkers to face uphill. Lt Bhup Singh joined up Lt Col Rikh in the bn Command Post. Uphill Fighting 128. The full brunt of the attack struck Lt Bhup's No 12 pl under Subedar Biswas, the bn Command Post in the centre and Subedar Ram Chander's C platoon to the east. The bunched up Chinese were cut down by volley's of rifle and LMG fire. Yet the Chinese continued to attack. The advantage of the Ak-47s along with HE and percussion grenades thrown down proved decisive. The Indians had to throw uphill, a task much harder. As the men in the upper slopes struggled, some of the men in the lower slopes started withdrawing towards Bridge III including 11 pl led by Subedar BC Roy. Meanwhile the now depleted C Coy and the Bn HQ had held off two attacks. The Chinese attacked a third time from the south and south west. With Major Gurdial rallying them, they desperately tried to fight back but succumbed to the inevitable. Major Gurdial was overpowered and captured. Bunker Bursting 129. With the flanking platoons almost wiped out to a man the remnants fell back to the battalion bunker. Captain Bhatia and Lt Col Rikh and a few others were now in the bunker. The Chinese opened up with a machine gun trying to break through the bunker. When that failed, a Chinese soldier crawled up to the bunker and threw a grenade just as Lt Col Rikh was peeping out. The grenade hit his rifle and exploded, breaking his jaw and cutting his lips. Lt. Bhup rushed out and shot the Chinese soldier and dragged Lt Col Rikh back in. He was propped up and given an LMG to resume firing. Another Chinese LMG burst through the door killing Captain Bhatia and hit

Lt Col Rikh again in the shoulder breaking it. He however managed to gun down the Chinese soldier. Yet another Chinese broke through and rounds hit him in the elbow and leg, consequently breaking them. The pain and loss of blood caused him to collapse. Lt Bhup continued to hold them off with one jawan. The Chinese had now encircled three sides and were pouring machine gun fire. Finally the

67 defenders' ammunition ran out. On this the Chinese threw percussion grenades and overpowered Lt Bhup and the jawan. Bridge III 130. The fourth and last locality, Bridge 3, was held by A Coy with a platoon of Assam Rifles holding the Che Dong area. The Assam Rifles (AR) held the top of the spur while 2 platoons No1 pl and 2 pl, held the lower slopes 600 hundred feet below. A 3rd platoon held a position another 800 feet lower overlooking Bridge 3. The initial hour long shelling drove the Assam Rifles unit from the post. As the shelling lifted Captain Ravi Eipe began to move towards the Assam Rifles post to get a better view. As he approached there was firing from the post. Thinking it was the AR men firing in panic he shouted out. Soon he saw some figures in khaki and realised the Chinese had already taken over the post. He alerted Coy Havildar Major Saudagar Singh's men to reposition themselves just as the attack began. The Chinese then attacked from the top and the West. Facing them were the 2 platoons of CHM Singh and Subedar Basudeo Singh. CHM Saudagar's men had reorganised and took a heavy toll on the attacking Chinese. CHM Singh himself snatched an AK-47 from a Chinese soldier and blew away 5 Chinese soldiers. By 0700h the platoons were being swarmed by Chinese troops. No 1 Pl got cut off and fought to the death. RAJPUT Posns Are Overrun 131. Captain Eipe was hit on the shoulder and was incapacitated. The remnants of the battered No 2 and 3 Pl were asked to withdraw. With this the last RAJPUT position was overrun. Temporary and Log Bridge were overpowered and the systematic mopping up began. The attack had begun at 0514 h with the shelling lasting till 0630 h. By 0930 h mopping operations were in full swing till it ended at 1130 h. The main positions of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles were above Che Dong on a track from the Assam Rifles post. D Coy held the central location with A and C Company on either side. The fourth Company was above bridge II protecting the Brigade HQ. As the Gorkhas were getting into their morning stand, the first salvo of Chinese shells hit their positions. As the officers scrambled to figure the situations they found the telephone lines were dead. Now the Chinese who had infiltrated past them in the last two nights launched their attack. The Gorkhas fought back. GORKHAS Withdraw Towards Tsandhar 132. The 3" mortars opened up only to be silenced by the Chinese guns. By 0625 h, C Coy was under attack by fivehundred Chinese troops. Company Commander, Captain Gambhir, was killed and 2/Lt Dogra, platoon commander, was wounded. Lt Col Ahluwalia asked Subedar Major Jit Bahdur Chetri to take his men and

68

reinforce 2/Lt Dogra's platoon. By 0715 h, 2/Lt Dogra's platoon was overrun. Wounded, he continued to fight with an LMG allowing the remnants of his platoon to fall back. Subedar Dhan Bahadur Chand also covered with an LMG. By 0730 h, A Coy was under attack from rear as well as the front. Lt Col Ahluwalia was wounded in the shoulder as hand-to-hand fighting began. With no hope, the CO ordered a withdrawal towards Tsangdhar. Meanwhile word came of Subedar Chetri's platoon being encircled and captured. Captain Mahabir Prasad and Lt Mahindra were wounded and missing. The GORKHAS fell back in confusion. One lot went towards the Tsangdhar track the other towards Bridge II. Indian troops breakout of Chinese encirclement 133. Many of the attempts to reach Karpo La II or Rong La were thwarted by the Chinese who got there ahead of them. Even at this point there were defiant attacks of bravery. Subedar Bhab Bahadur Katwal with 15 men was heading for Karpo La I. The route was blocked by a Chinese MMG. Subedar Bahadur led his men in a charge with the Gorkha war cry, Ayo Gorkhali. The machine gun chattered and then there was silence. All the men were killed or wounded & captured. Small parties of men however did make it across the Chinese encirclement and reached Bhutan. Many others perished due to the cold & starvation as they tried to make their way in the cold, hostile and desolate mountains with no blankets or winter clothing. The Sikh Para Gunners also displayed an astonishing defiance. With no ammunition they took up LMGs & rifles and fought the Chinese after the Gorkha platoons were overrun. The Chinese encircled them and called them to surrender. They refused and continued fighting till they ran out of ammunition. One third was killed and the rest were wounded and captured. 7 Mountain Brigade withdraws to Hathung La 134. 7 Mountain Brigade had lost all cohesion within the first hour of the battle. By 8 a.m. the first stragglers of 1/9 Gorkha came back to HQs with news that the bn was overrun. Middle & left defences were already broken. Small arms fire was now homing in on Brigade HQ. Brigadier JP Dalvi got Div HQ's permission to leave Rong La and fall back to Tsangdhar hoping to reform and fight. The Rajputs and Gorkhas were expected to fall back to Tsangdhar. Brigadier JP Dalvi and his men left for Tsangdhar after destroying all documents. However they soon found that Tsangdhar was already breached and changed directions to Serkhim. The group wandered around for days avoiding Chinese patrols. At one point they had been without food for 66 hours. Sometime on the morning of 22 Oct they ran into a Chinese Coy and were captured. At Bridge II, 9 PUNJAB had not been shelled. After communications with Brigade HQ was cut off, they remained in touch with Div HQ. At 11 a.m. on 20 Oct, Major General Prasad ordered withdrawal to Hathung La. The withdrawal attracted heavy Chinese

69 mortar fire. This was followed by an attack on the positions of D Coy under Major Chaudhary.

Chinese Attack Drokung Samba 135. Once again repeated attacks collapsed the defence and all the men went down fighting. Another group of twenty men under Havildar Malkiat Singh were on their way to reinforce the Tsangla defences. They stumbled into a large Chinese force. In the unequal encounter, the Punjabis inflicted heavy casualties before going down. Havildar Singh was amongst those who were killed. With the Chinese reaching Hathung La before the Punjabis, they too had to take the route through Bhutan. At Drokung Samba, C Coy of Grenadiers came under attack from three sides by a battalion of the Chinese. Soon the bridge was blown up cutting off any withdrawal. With no hopes, the men under 2/Lt Rao fought wave after wave of attacks. Most including 2/Lt Rao were killed. The rest of the Grenadiers at Bridge I received orders to pull out and managed to escape through Bhutan. It took them 17 days. Thus ended the Battle of Namkha Chu. The word 'battle' is grossly misleading, for what was essentially a massacre. Within the first hour of battle 7 Brigade had lost all cohesiveness. It was then essentially a desperately one-sided battle with many Indian platoons fighting to the death, to the last round, last man. 7 Mountain Brigade in Disarray 136. 2 RAJPUT suffered major losses but lived up to the Regiment's reputation. Of the 513 all ranks, 282 were killed that morning, 81 were wounded and captured, and 90 were captured unwounded. Only 60 men, mostly rear elements got away. The GORKHAS lost 80 dead, 44 wounded and 102 captured. 7 Mountain Brigade lost a total of 493 men that morning. The Chinese also lost heavily. Lt Col Rikh was captured and subjected to repeated interrogations on the characteristics of the RAJPUT. He was told it was because the Chinese suffered their maximum casualties in NEFA (North East Frontier Agency). In the bitter flush of defeat, the valour of these men went un-recognised. In the small village of Lumpo, on the track leading to the Hathung La pass, stands a memorial. A memorial consisting of a tin shed under which loose wooden boards are stacked with names of those who fell in the battle. To rub salt in the wounds, not all the men are mentioned. This is considered sufficient to honour them!

70 PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Question No 1

Briefly describe the terrain features of Namkha Chu and

deployment of troops on various posts est along the ridge line during Oct. Question No 2 Describe the tactics used by Chinese forces to infiltrate behind 2 RAJPUT. Question No 3 Describe the sequence of events that led to Brig JP Dalvi being threatened with Court Martial. Question No 4 the Bring out the gallant actions of 4 RAJPUT bn and mention

achievements of Lt Col B Avasthi, CO of the bn.

71

CHAPTER IX BATTLE OF BUMLA ORBAT: 20 Oct 1962. 137. 62 Infantry Brigade was inducted on night 21/22 for defence of Tawang. 13 DOGRA less two companies arrived on night 21/22 Oct 1962. Major General Niranjan Prasad and his tactical headquarter reached Tawang by 1800 hours on 22 Oct. He was Officiating Corps Commander and had a non existent Brigade under him.

Action of 1 SIKH Pl at Bumla and Battle of Tawang. 138. On 23 Oct at about 0700 hours the Chinese attacked the 1 SIKH platoon at Bumla Ridge having evicted the Assam Rifles platoon earlier. Own troops fought fiercely and withstood two attacks. Finally they ran out of ammunition and the position was captured in the third attack. In this action every man fought till the last round. There were only two wounded survivors. The platoon in the end having run out of ammunition took on the Chinese attack with the bayonet engaging in close quarter battle (CQB). The platoon commander Subedar Joginder Singh was awarded Param Vir Chakra. The Chinese tried to outflank the main defences of 1 SIKH but failed due to accurate arty fire. The Chinese

72 now decided to approach Tawang through Nyamjang Chu axis. General Prasad had the option of fighting at Tawang or to withdraw South of Tawang Chu and fight from there. Withdrawal started on 23 Oct and the bridge at Tawang Chu was blown in the face of enemy. The Chinese occupied Tawang unopposed on 25 Oct 1962.

Induction of 4 RAJPUT 139. With the setback at Namka Chu, fresh troops were being rushed to NEFA. 4 RAJPUT which was in Belgaum was asked to move. It was without a Commanding Officer at this time. It moved via Pune, Barauni and reached New Missamari on 23 Oct. Major Trilok Nath officiating as CO was told that the bn was assigned to 65 Brigade under Brigadier GM Saeed. The battalion had strength of 8 officers, 18 JCOs and 575 OR. The battalion was asked to occupy the left side of Bomdilla with 1 MADRAS on the right. But even before it could get there it was reassigned to Dirang Dzong. There was utter chaos at New Missamari. Desperate demands were being made for troop labour and vehicles. 1 Ton trucks were plying and were being grabbed by whoever needed it. Most of the battalion had to foot it to Dirang.

116 7

MILA I PTSO
2

BUMLA IB HILL I I D T LA

LANDA I
I

11

1 SIKH

(-2)

11

13 DOGRA 117 (-2)

I97

4 GARH RIF TAWANG

4 ARTY I

11

G LA

BOMDIR

73 CHAPTER X BATTLE AT LAGYALA GOMPA

140. In one of the last battles of the 1962 war, the men of 4 RAJPUT fought a valiant battle to the last man last bullet. D Coy Arrives in Dirang 141. The first Coy to reach Dirang was D Coy under Major PL Kukrety. He was personally briefed by Major General AS Pathania and asked to occupy the left flank of the Division covering the approach from Orka La-Punsum la. Kukrety moved his men quickly and reached his position in one day instead of the

74 expected three. While the actual distance was 30 km with ridges and rivers cutting it the RAJPUT did it in 28 hours. They quickly dug in positions and sited their MMG section and 3.7 inch howitzer. Over the next few days they witnessed the remnants of Brigadier Dalvis brigade filterering in along with refugees and a few Chinese prisoners. The Chinese prisoners were debriefed and sent away to bn HQ. In spite of not getting permission to register his guns Major Kukrety went ahead and ranged them. C Coy was hijacked by a staff officer of 4 Infantry division to be used for protecting Divisional headquarters. 4 RAJPUT Gets its Commanding Officer 142. A permanent CO was assigned to the bn now. Lt Col Brahmanand Avasthy was the Adjutant at IMA, Dehradun before being posted as Senior Instructor for the Junior Commanders course at Infantry School. He was to take over 2 RAJPUT which was the battalion he was commissioned in. But by the time he could get there 2 RAJPUT was decimated at Namkha Chu. So he was assigned 4 RAJPUT and was immensely proud of being the RAJPUT CO. Colonel Avasthy was considered one of the finest officers in the army. A thorough professional he quickly got into stride. He sent a long note to Major Kukrety advising him on the siting of guns and MMGs. He gave advice to the quartermasters on the nuances of running the logistics which he considered the most important aspect of keeping a battalion finely tuned. 143. Further assignments were handed out which continued the piecemeal deployment seen all over NEFA. A section of mountain guns were deployed to assist D Coy under Captain Ghosal. They were situated one km from Dangsikpu. A platoon from C Coy under Naib Subedar Ranjit Singh was sent with the guns. 144. A Coy led by Major KPP Nair was asked to move along track Nyukmadong, east of Pt 3011- Tangyap and report on Chinese movement and seal the approach and prevent any infiltration attempts to cut of the retreat of 4 Mountain Division. The terrain A Coy had to traverse is mountainous dense forests at 10000 to 14000 feet. The paths were three feet wide, visibility about five meters due to thick fog. With porters not available for fear of the enemy the troops had to handle the equipment themselves which slowed them down. Meanwhile 2/Lt Choudhary of 6 Field Regiment was sent along with an OP party. By 12 November Nair reached Pt 3446 near his position. The artillery tried to register the guns but the thick vegetation hid the smoke and the group had to be satisfied with registering the mortars. En activity in Luguthang 145. Meanwhile a patrol of 1 SIKH had reported enemy activity at Luguthang village. On account of this Nair was asked to send out a patrol under Naib Rai Singh along with an FOO. Nair tried to get Trilok Nath to drop the requirement for the FOO as he felt that the guns not yet ranged were not much use. But he was

75 overruled. As the patrol was returning Choudhary insisted on a break and decided to brew tea. Rai Singh protested but Choudhary refused to listen. Finally Rai Singh left a section to guard the officer and continued on. A short while later a Chinese unit attracted by the smoke assaulted and wiped it out. Only one man Sepoy Ganga Din made it back to tell the story.

Ambush of Composite Patrol 146. To follow up on the 1 SIKH patrol a strong patrol consisting of a Coy 2 SIKH LI, and two pl from 4 SIKH Li and 1 SIKH Li making a total of 200 men was sent out. The patrol crossed the Luguthang-Kya La line and headed North East. It planned to climb the highest ridge to get a commanding view of the area to harass and interdict the Chinese. But it became dark as the patrol reached the foot of the ridge. The patrol decided to halt for the night and draw up defences. But unknown to them the Chinese had their own patrols on the lookout for Indian patrols. A Chinese patrol tracked the Sikhs and as night drew, called in reinforcements to surround it. They attacked late at night. The Sikhs tried to put up a defence but were ineffective. Sixtythree men were killed or wounded and the rest fell back in complete disarray. Chinese Tactics of Infiltration 147. The Brigade HQ was shocked and ordered aggressive patrolling in the area. A party of 4 RAJPUT under Naib Subedar Man Singh encountered the Chinese in the Jalak Pu area. On hearing the news Major Nair rushed in to reinforce with his two remaining platoons. The engagement continued for some time before Nair was asked to pull back to his original positions. The Chinese having suffered some casualties retreated to find another way around his point. This was in keeping with their tactic of maintaining their objectives which was to get into positions behind Indian lines to cut of troops retreating from Sela. Re-Deployment by 4 RAJPUT 148. While frantic debates were going on at Corps and Division HQ about the fate of Se La, Lt. Col. Avasthy went about deploying his units to be in the best positions. C Coy less a platoon was pulled back from Lubrang and deployed on Pt 2898. B Coy under Major Mullay had occupied Gompacher. 149. Meanwhile the confused decision had been arrived to withdraw from Sela. Suffice to say it was characterised by utter confusion. With 62 Infantry Brigade falling back from Sela it looks like Awasthi decided to defend Bridge 1 to allow the brigade and remnants from 4 Division to retreat. At 0730 h on 18 November HQ 65 Infantry Brigade asked the battalion to withdraw. A little later Battalion HQ asked D Coy to fall back to Headquarters area near Sapper Camp. By the time

76 the Battalion HQ decided to withdraw they had elements of B Coy, elements of C Coy and D Coy. This group consisted of seven officers. In addition to Lt Col Avasthy it included Major Trilok Nath, Major Y Tandon, Captain Dayal Singh, Captain SK Mitra, Lt DS Drar and 2/Lieutenant Chatrapati Singh. 4 RAJPUT Sub units had fought cohesively to allow the men in the north in Se La to fall back.

Chinese Ambush Site At Luguthang-Kya-La Withdrawal from Sela by 62 Brigade

77

150. Col Avasthy and his men waited for as much time as possible holding off sporadic Chinese attacks. But 62 Brigade never came its broken elements had already filtered out through other routes. Finally Col Avasthy pulled back to Lubrang destroying any stores that could not be carried back. From there he moved to Phudung joined by various stragglers. The party soon swelled. Many of the wounded had to be carried. Col Avasthy himself was carrying the doctor who was snow blinded. This force reached Priyadung, where they saw that the track bifurcated to Morshing. One side climbed towards an old monastery Lagyala Gompa and the other followed a stream towards Morshing. With stories of local guides misleading units and delivering them to Chinese ambushes fresh in their minds there was some discussion on which route to take. For some reason Avasthy and his RAJPUT took the route to Lagyala Gompa. Last Moments of 4 RAJPUT 151. Lagyala Gompa is a monastery located on a high feature overlooking the Morshing Valley as well as the route Avasthy was taking. There was a plateau enroute just before it made its steep climb to the monastery. It was an ideal killing field. Unfortunately a fivehundred strong Chinese unit had already moved in behind and one group was waiting in ambush at Lagyala Gompa. As Avasthy and his troops approached the Gompa they came under heavy fire from the Chinese. His men fought back. They could have probably chosen to fall back and look for another way around but decided to fight the Chinese. Although lacking heavy firepower Avasthy launched a two pronged counter attack. The battle was fierce and the Chinese annoyed by the casualties they were taking tried to isolate Avasthy and cut him off. But Avasthys men surrounded their gallant leader and fought to the bitter end. Finally it came down to hand to hand combat and after a few hours the Chinese prevailed. Over two hundred Chinese bodies and one hundred and twenty-six Indian bodies littered the area. Every Indian was killed or wounded i.e. hundred percent casualties. Among them were Avasthy and his fellow officers. A shepherd boy who later became the Head Lama of the monastery is the only witness to this heroic episode. The Chinese dug a mass grave for the Indians and left a flattened ration tin with the names of the officers. After the ceasefire the bodies were retrieved. Avasthys body was found with a blood soaked letter to his wife.

78

Retreat to Tenga 152. A Coy led by Major KPP Nair lost contact with the Battalion after being told to fall back to the foot hills. After a long trek they reached Sapper camp only to see the Chinese troops milling about. Moving cross country via Sangti they

79 moved towards Tenga valley. Meanwhile their column swelled with stragglers from various units. Short of Tenga an encounter with a Chinese patrol made them back off and take a detour through the jungle eventually reaching Bhalukpong on 03 December. This loose group of men consisting of RAJPUT, SIKH and DOGRA troops retained their rifles, radios and other stores till the very end. The men had not eaten for days living on wild roots and other jungle food. 153. The other column under Kukrety likewise had fallen back after losing contact with Battalion HQ. Reaching Phudung he found the Chinese already there. Trying to avoid Chinese columns they moved towards Jamla. Their party had also swelled with stragglers and was later ambushed by the Chinese. Somehow the group reached Bhutan and eventually reached Bhairabkhund. From there Kukrety was taken to Lt Gen Kaul for debriefing and was treated to tea and sweets. The Corps Commander asked Kukrety if he would go back and see what became of 4 RAJPUT bn HQ party. Kukrety accordingly went and discovered the ambush site and mass grave and had the unfortunate task of identifying the men. Lt Colonel B Avasthy: CO 4 RAJPUT 154. It is an irony that the war started and ended with RAJPUT battalions bearing the brunt of Chinese attacks. In Lt Col Bramhanand Avasthy the Regiment and the Indian Army lost one of its finest officers. Considered one of the best COs in the Indian Army he was responsible for many of the drills still followed in the Indian Army. One General remarked that if he had a few more officers like Lt Colonel Avasthy the story of 1962 would have been very different. Lt Gen SK Sinha (retd) said that if Avasthy had survived he would have certainly risen high in the Indian Army. It is one of the sad ironies of war that men like Avasthy never received any honour because there was no one left to cite them or those who were there are too ashamed to come forward and have their role exposed. There must be many more such heroes whose deeds are known to a few.

Lt Col B Avasthy

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CHAPTER XI THE BATTLE OF CHUSHUL Introduction 155. One of the bitter ironies of life is that greatest acts of heroism and valour mostly happen when the odds are hopeless and death and defeat inevitable. Throughout history nations have always glorified such episodes in their ballads and poems, by honouring the heroes and commemorating the event. However endless these may be, the heroic stand of C Company of 13 KUMAON at Rezang La on 18 November 1962 will always be among the more glorious chapters. The monument that stands at Chushul asks, "How can a Man die better than facing fearful odds, for the ashes of his fathers and the Temples of his Gods." C Company was fighting for neither ashes nor temples, for there were none at Chushul. The loss of Chushul would not even have had much bearing on the ultimate defence of Ladakh. A Matter of Political Honour 156. In days of 1962 when our national leaders were still vacillating Chushul became a matter of national honour. Chushul is only 15 miles from the border as the crow flies and even then had an all weather landing strip. It was the pivotal point of our frontier posts in this sector as it was astride the second route into Tibet from Leh about 120 miles further west. The road built after 1962 rises to nearly 17,000 feet crossing the Ladakh range at the desolate and wind blown Chang La pass, steeply descends into Tangtse and then goes on to Chushul. Between the Chang La and Tangtse the road takes the traveller though the most beautiful scenery with matching beautiful wildlife. Golden marmots dart in and out of their holes and in the distance you can sometimes spot a snow leopard. Geography 157. Chushul is at 14,230 feet and is a small village in a narrow sandy valley about 25 miles long and four miles wide, flanked by mountains that rise to over 19,000 feet. The northern end touches the Pangong Tso, a deep saltwater lake nearly a hundred miles long and that makes for one of natures most glorious sights. Also near Chushul is a gap in the mountains called the Spanggur Gap that leads to another beautiful lake, the Spanggur Tso that like the Pangong extends well into Chinese territory. The Chinese had built a road from Rudok in Tibet right up to the Spanggur Gap capable of carrying tanks. In the first phase of their assault on Ladakh in Oct 1962, the Chinese had overrun many of our major border posts on the line between Daulat-Beg-Oldi near the Karakoram Pass to Demchok astride the Indus on the border with Tibet. Chushul was the solitary

81 Indian position east of the Ladakh range. Geography favoured the Chinese and they were able to make a major concentration of men and material for an attack on Chushul.

SHAMAL LUNGPA

QIZIL JILGA

R CHANG CHENMO KONGKA LA R SHYOK LEH SHYOK PHOBRANG LUKUNG DAMBUGURU KHURNAK FORT LANAK LA

R INDUS

THAKUNG

YULA PANGONG TSO SHINGZANG

CHUSHUL
REZANG LA

SPANGGUR TSO RUDOK

DUNGTI

DUMCHELE WESTERN HIGHWAY

CHINA LADAKH
CHANG LA

Battle of Chushul

Defence of Ladakh 158. Till September 1962, the defence of all of Ladakh was vested with the 114 Brigade commanded by Brigadier T.N. Raina (later General and COAS). It consisted of just two infantry battalions, the 1/8 Gorkha Rifles and 5 JAT. Initially, only the Gorkhas were deployed in the Chushul and when the gravity of the Chinese threat began to be realised 13 KUMAON, which was at Baramula in the Kashmir Valley, was sent in to reinforce 114 Brigade. In the first week of Oct 3 Himalayan (later Mountain) Division was formed for the overall defence of the Ladakh. The Chushul sector was left entirely to 114 Mountain Brigade. On 26

82 Oct, 114 Mountain Brigade set up its headquarters at Chushul and braced for the inevitable Chinese attack. The newly-arrived 13 KUMAON began deploying on 24 Oct in the lull that followed the first phase of the Chinese attacks. The forward defences of Chushul were on a series of hill features given evocative names like Gurung Hill, Gun Hill and Mugger Hill, but 'C' Company of 13 KUMAON got Rezang La which was about 19 miles south of Chushul. Chushul was an important target for the Chinese.

Defence of Chushul 159. As part of the forward policy a number of posts were established around Chushul. The J&K militia manned these posts. As tensions with the Chinese mounted Western Command requested a division of troops (4 brigades) for an effective defence of Leh. In September 1962 only 114 Brigade with 2 battalions the 1/8 Gorkha Rifles and 5 JAT were located. These units were strung in pickets. They could at the most only serve as trip wires to any Chinese advance. They were targets for Chinese intimidation. In May Alpha post manned by a JCO and 14 OR of J & K militia was surrounded by 2 companies of Chinese troops. The troops were told that the post had to be held at all costs. The Chinese stood 120 yards away and got into attack formation. The JCO still held his nerve and did not open fire. Finally the Chinese withdrew. In a similar incident on 10 July a Gorkha post was surrounded by Chinese troops at 200 yards. The Chinese used loudspeakers to try and convince the Gorkhas that they should not be fighting for India. But Subedar Jang Bahadur told them to push off. Once again the Chinese withdrew but the stage was being set for further confrontations. Deployment of Indian Forces 160. In Oct 62 the deployment of the Indian Army was as follows: (a) Daulat-Beg-Oldi and Chi Chap sector -14 J &K Militia plus 1 Company, 5 JAT. (b) (c) Galawan Valley - one company 5 JAT. Chang Chamo Valley - 5 JAT less 2 Companies.

(d) Chushul - Company less Pl 1/8 Gorkha Rifles deployed on Sirijap posts. (e) (f) Yalu Posts - Company 1/8 Gorkha Rifles. Spanggur Gap - 2 Companys 1/8 Gorkha Rifles.

83 Galawan Post 161. On night 19/20 Oct all the 14 J & K militias posts as well as the Galawan post held by 5 JAT were attacked. North of DBO at Chandini the post was held by Subedar Sonam Stobdan and 29 men. Attacked by 500 Chinese the men held out for a whole day. Only one man survived seriously wounded. Sub Sonam was awarded the MVC and Sepoys Chiring, Wangchuk and Phunchok were awarded VrCs. Galawan post held by Subedar Jang Bahadur Thapas men since July was reinforced by a Company of 5 JAT led by Major Hasabnis. The Chinese pounded this post with artillery for a full day before overrunning it. Sub Thapa was amongst those killed. The attacks continued remorselessly. Post Parmodak at 17,000 feet was held by a section of one NCO and 5 OR. Soon the others were dead leaving only Havaldar Tulsi Ram.

Undaunted he continued to pepper the advancing Chinese with LMG fire till he was gunned down. Likewise at Post Bishan at 18,645 feet, CHM Anand Ram and twelve men of the J & K militia were pounded by Chinese for 45 minutes. The Chinese made two assaults but were beaten back. Surrounded, Anand Ram found a gap along a steep precipice and extracted his men out one by one. So did Subedar Amar Singh and his platoon at Post Patrol Base south of the Galwan river. Although tasked with observing the Chinese and asked to withdraw if contact was made he stood his ground. He and most of his section was wiped out. Srijap Post 162. The next posts to be attacked were Srijap I and Srijap II. Held by the GORKHAS led by Maj Dhan Singh Thapa the Chinese pounded it with artillery from 6 am. In spite of this they beat back two Chinese asssaults. Meanwhile Naik Rabi Lal Thapa who had taken a storm boat from Thakung post saw this battle from 1000 metres. As the Chinese made a third assault the GORKHAS leapt out with shouts of "Ayo Gorkhali". Khukris and bayonets clashed in a last grim battle. By 0830 h it was over with most of the Gorkhas dead. A hundred Chinese were also strewn around. Major Dhan Singh Thapa was awarded the PVC. Chang La and Jara La 163. By 22 Oct the Chinese had cleared all posts north of Chushul. On 27 Oct they turned to the southern approaches. The posts Chang La and Jara La were attacked. For four hours its outnumbered defenders fought bravely. Subedar Ishe Thundup commanding the Chang La post asked his men to withdraw and covered it himself. In the process he was killed earning a MVC posthumously. The men at Jara La were surrounded but managed to break through in the night.

84 164. Chushul stood isolated with only the battalion headquarters of 1/8 GR and a MMG section to defend it. However the Chinese also needed a break to regroup from the severe losses they had suffered. For eight days they had launched from masses of troops supported by heavy artillery. The Indians had some small arms and 2 mortars with very little ammunition. Still they had caused heavy casualties. Blue uniformed porters were seen carrying truckloads of wounded and dead at the end of each days battle. They suffered over 50 percent casualties. 114 Brigade in Outskirts of Leh 165. 114 Mountain Brigade had to reel back in the face of the Chinese assault. The Brigade now concentrated its resources on the outskirts of Leh. If Leh fell it would open the door to the whole of Ladakh. Brigadier T N Raina was planning the deployment of his newly arrived battalion: the 13 KUMAON when the orders arrived for him to move to Chushul to take over command of its defences. At first it seemed like an impractical plan that characterised the Indian response elsewhere against the Chinese, since there was only bn HQ of 1/8 GR and two MMG sections at Chushul. But the Corps Headquarters clarified the situation. Leh was to be Divisional HQ for 3

Infantry Division commanded by Maj Gen Budh Singh. The 70 and 163 Infantry Brigades along with two tank troops, a field artillery regiment, a heavy mortar battery and other supporting arms were being airlifted. This was made possible by the Air Force An-12s. 166. 114 Mountain Brigade now comprised of 1 JAT, 5 JAT, 13 KUMAON, 1/8 Gorkha Rifles and elements of J&K Militia. In addition there were two tank troops of 20 Lancers, Battery of 13 Field Regiment, a troop of 32 Heavy Mortar Regiment and Coy of Mahar Regiment MMG. It was in charge of the LukungChushul-TsakaLa area a distance of 80 km. Brigadier Raina flew down to Chushul on 28 Oct with the rest of the Brigade HQ moving by road. Threat Perception 167. It was perceived that the Chinese could attack Chushul in three possible ways (a) From Tsaka La in the South down the mountains east of Dungti. This would have to be an infantry attack because of lack of motorable roads. They could also come down the Demchok Dungti road allowing them to use armour and artillery. But this would mean a major battle at Dungti where 70 Infantry Brigade was deployed.

85 (b) An attack via Thakung in the North West which gave them two options. (i) Advance along Marsmik La to Lukung and subsequently along Lukung -Thakung-Chushul. A waterborne assault across the Pangong Lake.

(ii)

(c) The third way would be to attack Chushul via Rudok. This had motorable roads up to the forward posts allowing for an infantry attack supported by armour and artillery around the Spanggur Gap. 168. It seemed highly likely that the Chinese would take the third option. This left two options for the defenders. Options for Holding Forces 169. The defenders had the following options. (a) Holding the heights east of the Chushul Valley Gurung Hill, Magar Hill and Rezang La. (b) Defending the heights on the west side of Chushul.

170. The second option meant giving up the airfield and thus the first option was chosen. Accordingly the Brigades sector was divided into two sub sectors Lukung and Chushul. Force Deployed 171. The forces were deployed as under: (a) (b) Lukung 5 JAT with a Coy at Tsaka La Spanggur Gap One Coy 1/8 Gorkha Rifles

(c) Gurung Hill One Coy 1/8 Gorkha Rifles. Plus 2 troops of Tanks, Artillery (d) (e) (f) Rezang La One Coy 13 KUMAON Magar Hill Two Coys 13 KUMAON Thakung Heights 2 Coys 1 JAT

86 Preparatory Phase 172. Once allocated the troops started digging in and set up defences. For once supplies started arriving in sufficient numbers. In fact there was a shortage of porters to carry the stores to forward positions. Under Brigadier Rainas supervision every tankable approach was mined and covered by 106 mm recoilless guns. The Field Artillery and armour was hidden under cover. In addition dummy guns, tanks and fuel tanks were set up. Old disused bull dozers were made to look like tanks. Having prepared their positions, the Indians awaited the Chinese attack. The Battle 173. On 18 November it was unusually cold. A mist shrouded the area with visibility for only 200 yards. The calm of the dawn was shattered by the explosions of artillery fire. At 0435 h the battle for Chushul had begun. Chinese artillery barrage targeted the dummy fuel dumps, artillery positions and tank positions. The Indians had the satisfaction of watching the Chinese waste a lot of ammunition on the dummy defences. 174. Brig Raina asked for situation reports from the various battalions. Only 1/8 GR and 13 KUMAON had been shelled. Raina ordered covering fire for the two battalions and the 25 pounders of the 38 Field Artillery replied back. By 0515 h 1/8 GR reported enemy figures moving in the dark. At 0545 h the Chinese attacked the 2 platoons on Gurung Hill commanded by Captain P L Kher. The GORKHAS beat back the attack. As the Chinese started an artillery bombardment in preparation for an attack the Indian gunners fired back in Defensive Fire mode at Chinese preparation sites. Guided by OP 2/Lt SD Goswami the artillery attack caught the Chinese in the open and the severe casualties forced them to abandon the attack. Joint action by Infantry and Armour 175. 13 KUMAON was now asked to send out a patrol led by Major Jatar to see what was happening with C Coy at Rezang La. The phone wires were dead. Meanwhile the radio crackled with Kher reporting a second attack forming. Once again 2 Lt Goswami brought down accurate fire. The Chinese advanced line after line. The artillery and MMGs were tearing big gaps in the advancing Chinese. At 150 yards Kher ordered his men to open fire. Meanwhile other Chinese troops were streaming down the gullies leading to Gurung hill from the Spanggur Gap. Now the AMX 13 tanks of B Squadron 20 Lancers commanded by 2/Lt SPS Baswani were thrown in. As Baswani tried to fire his gun he found the automatic loading gear had frozen. He switched to manual. After a few rounds the loader thawed out. The crews pumped out High Explosive shells decimating ranks of advancing Chinese. As they ran out of ammunition they withdrew to reload. On their return they found the Chinese still swarming in huge numbers. Even for the

87 concept of human waves this was unprecedented. Inspite of whole lines being decimated the Chinese pressed forward desperate to take Gurung Hill at any cost. By 0900h they reached the forward posts manned by Subedar Amar Bahadur Gurung. Initially the GORKHAS were thrown back but the valiant Gurung led a khukri charge and retook the positions. However he was mortally wounded. Meanwhile Kher was wounded and as he watched the Chinese attack developed again, he had two options. (a) (b) Stand and fight and be eventually overrun. Withdraw to Camels back where he had a better chance.

176. He opted for the second and called for artillery fire on his own positions to give him a chance to disengage. Meanwhile 2/Lt Goswami continued to direct fire from his Observation Post. The three others in his post were dead. After ordering fire on his position he started to withdraw on Khers order when he was hit. He collapsed and lay there till a patrol found him in the night and brought him back. But the severe cold had caused frost bite and his legs had to be amputated. 2/Lt Goswami was awarded the MVC. The three other men- Tech Assistant Gurdeep Singh received the VrC and signalers Nk Pritam Singh and L/Nk Sarwan Singh received Sena Medals. The Chinese had achieved half their aim of taking the two shoulders with Gurung Hill in their hands.

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PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Question No 1 the

Describe the significance of Chushul on a sketch showing

imp landmarks / geographical features. Question No 2 Enumerate the early standoffs which took place between the

Indian & Chinese troops before the conflict. Question No 3 What were the two options avail for defence of Chushul. Which option was finally exercised and for what reasons? On a sketch depict deployment as per the two sub sectors. Question No 4 Question No 5 Rezang La. Write a short note on the Battle of Gurung Hill. Write an account of the actions of C Coy, 13 KUMAON at

90

CHAPTER XII BATTLE OF REZANG LA Location 177. Rezang La as the name suggests is a pass and is loc on the southeastern approach to Chushul Valley. The feature is 3000 yards long and 2000 yards wide at an average attitude of 16,000 feet. Digging defensive positions and building shelters was hard going the men were still not acclimatised and cold wintry winds made life even harder. At this altitude it took hours to bring a kettle to boil for tea and whatever fruit and vegetables that came were frozen hard. More than the thin air and cold, the location of Rezang La had a more serious drawback. It was crested to Indian artillery because of an intervening feature, which meant that they had to make without the protective comfort of the big guns. Prelude 178. When the order to move to Chushul came, CO 13 KUMAON, Lt Col HS Dhingra was in hospital but he cajoled the doctors into letting him go with his men. Major Shaitan Singh commanded C Company of 13 KUMAON. C Company's three platoons were numbered 7, 8 and 9 and had .303 rifles with about 600 rounds per head, and between them six LMGs, and 1,000 grenades and mortar bombs. The Chinese infantry had 7.62mm self loading rifles, MMGs and LMGs; 120mm, 81mm and 60mm mortars; 132mm rockets; and 75mm and 57mm recoilless guns to bust bunkers. They were much more numerous and began swarming up the gullies to assault Rezang La at 4 a.m. while a light snow was falling. 179. The Ahirs waited till the Chinese came into range and opened up with everything they had. The gullies were soon full of dead and wounded Chinese. Having failed in a frontal attack the Chinese let loose a murderous shelling. Under the cover of this intense shelling the Chinese infantry came again in swarms. 'C' Company, now severely depleted, let them have it once again. Position after position fell fighting till the last man. C Company had three JCOs and 124 other ranks with Major Shaitan Singh. When the smoke and din of battle cleared, only 14 survived, nine of them severely wounded.13 KUMAON regrouped and 114 Brigade held on to Chushul. The battalion war diary records that they were now "Less our C Company." The Chinese announced a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November but little more than what the survivors had brought back was known about 'C' Company.

91 180. Every man had died a hero. Major Shaitan Singh was conferred the Param Vir Chakra. Eight more received the Vir Chakra while four others the Sena Medal. 13 KUMAON received the battle honour 'Rezang La'. Defences at Rezang La 181. Rezang La is a massive feature. It was defended by C Company of 13 KUMAON led by Maj Shaitan Singh. They were deployed over a 2 km frontage with a total of 118 men. The 3 platoons were as under :(a) 7 pl led by Subedar Surja 3000 yards north of the pass.

(b) 9 pl led by Subedar Ramchandra was 1100 yards south of position of 7 pl. (c) 8 pl deployed a further 1600 yards south with Company HQ behind them along with the 3 Mortars. 182. Due to the shortage of guns 13 KUMAON did not have artillery cover which was needed for the more important posts. Although they were well entrenched they did not have mines as well as adequate overhead protection for the command posts. 183. Every morning the Company would put out 3 Observation Posts and every evening the pls would send out 3 Listening Posts (LP). In addition, patrols consisting of an NCO and 3 OR would constantly move about each platoon overlapping with the other. With the distances between the Rezang La and the others there was very little support that could be given. The morale of the men was high dispite being pitted against fearful odds. 184. Few events in the annals of heroism can match this. 'C' Company gave its all to defend Chushul, a Ladakhi village, which for one brief moment in our history came to symbolise our national honour. 185. On the night of 17 November the LPs as usual went forward. At 2200 h a storm blew up lashing the area with heavy winds and snow for about two hours. When it subsided the fresh snow helped in seeing upto 600 meters. At 0200 h the LP from 8 pl saw a body of troops half a mile away moving up the pass. The LP commander Lance Naik Brij Lal rushed back to inform his pl HQ. pl HQ sent an LMG out to the LP post. On returning to the post with section commander Hukum Chand it was found that the Chinese were less than 250 yards away. Along with Lance Naik Ram Singh and his LMG section they moved further down to engage the Chinese. Since the Chinese were now moving rapidly Hukum Chand fired a red very light as well as opened a burst of LMG fire to warn the rest of the Coy. There was silence now from the LP. Meanwhile the burst of LMG

92 fire had brought the rest of the Company to a rapid stand to. Maj Shaitan Singh checked on the wireless of the various positions of his Pls.

186. Meanwhile a Chinese patrol sneaked up and cut the lines to the battalion headquarters. The Company lines were now silent. The platoons were ordered to put out their patrols to see what was happening. At 0435 h all Pl reported heavy shelling. The barrage went on for 20 minutes. Naik Ram Kunwar in charge of the mortars reported that No 1 mortar position was hit. The crew was killed and the optical sight was damaged. A new crew was assembled. Meanwhile for some reason nobody from 5 JAT under 13 KUMAON seemed to have reported the tell tale flashes of shelling. 136. Maj Shaitan Singh ordered the platoons to watch their flanks as the first attack was probably a feint. Meanwhile Naik Sahi Ram and his LMG section which had moved forward to cover a reentrant saw a Chinese column come up carelessly. When the column came close the section opened up with LMG and grenades and decimated the column.

Maj Shaitan Singh, PVC

93 187. At 0505h both Hari Ram and Surja saw attacks forming up against their platoon positions. They requested mortar support. Under the OPs accurate sighting the mortars hammered the Chinese attack causing heavy casualties. By 0515 h the attacks had been beaten back. Over the next 50 minutes there were a couple of skirmishes with Chinese patrols. For some reason the Chinese seemed to just walk in with no tactical movement of any sort.

188. Now the Chinese realised that this was no walkover and started forming for a more tactical assault. Subedar Surja watching the attack forming up asked Lance Naik Ram Singh to take an LMG and move 40 yards forward towards some rocks along with Gulab Singh. The Chinese meanwhile brought in a MMG and set it up 600 yards from the platoon lines. Then under a 10 minute mortar barrage they attacked. With the MMG covering them they advanced to about 40 yards when Surja ordered his men to open fire. The fire from the platoon lines as well as the LMG fire from the left broke up the attack. However the MMG was causing problems with three dead and a few more with serious wounds. Surja now had only 11 men with him. It became imperative to take out the MMG. Gulab Singh volunteered for the job. Along with Ram Singh he worked his way 500 yards down the left to the cover of some rocks. As they peered over the rocks at the MMG 70 yards away they also saw a platoon sized unit in a depression. Realising that they had been lucky to come this far the two men charged the 70 yards with the cry " Data Shri Krishna ki Jai". 30 yards away the MMG opened up and Gulab Singh fell. Ram Singh still continued firing from the hip till a burst of MMG fire hit him. He fell only five feet away from the MMG. The mission to knock off the MMG had failed by a few feet. Action of 7 pl and 8 pl 189. Meanwhile No 7 pl also continued to get hammered by mortar fire. Then an MMG was dragged up opposite them and they too were under MMG fire. The combination of continuous mortar and MMG fire was taking its toll. The No 2 mortar position was hit killing its crew. They reorganised, forming a new line consisting of Lance Naik Sri Ram for the No 1 mortar and himself and Naik Surat Singh for the No 2 unit. 190. The Chinese planned to finish off 7 and 8 pl before taking on No 9 Pl and Company HQ. At 0655 h first light, the Chinese artillery began again. Naik Chandgi Rams 3rd Section and Hukum Singhs No 1 Section opened up and cut down the first two waves. Regrouping the Chinese launched two more attacks which were also beaten back. But now the KUMAONis were down to a few men. As the 5th attack was launched, Chandgi Ram led his men into a bayonet charge. Likewise Hari Ram took the second section in a counter attack which temporarily stabilised the situation. But the Chinese threw in yet another wave also engulfed Raghu Naths No 1 Section. With that attack 8 platoon ceased to

94 exist. At 7 pl as the barrage lifted Surja saw a mass of Chinese tps at 40 yards. Calmly he called up HQ to tell them that they were going out to meet the assault. A vicious hand to hand fight ensued in which all the men were killed. All were found with multiple bullet and bayonet wounds. At 0800h the Chinese fired a green light signaling the end of No 7 and 8 Pl and Chinese victory.

R CHANG CHENMO KONGKA LA R SHYOK LEH SHYOK PHOBRANG LUKUNG TANGTSE DAMBUGURU KHURNAK FORT LANAK LA

R INDUS

THAKUNG

YULA PANGONG TSO SHINGZANG

CHUSHUL Rezang La REZANG LA

DUNGTI

SPANGGUR TSO RUDOK

WESTERN HIGHWAY

LADAKH

CHANG LA

Loc of Rezang La

Action of 9 Pl 191. The Chinese now regrouped in the area where they had wiped out No 7 pl. The fight was not over. A little distance away Naik Sahi Ram watched, and waited at his position. He waited for the Chinese to assemble before he let rip with his LMG. The bunched up Chinese did not expect this and were mowed down in large numbers. The Chinese fled and Sahi Ram settled back awaiting the next attack. The Chinese brought in recoiless guns and methodically destroyed his positions. Shaitan Singh gauged the situation and decided that the

95 best position for him to make his stand would be the No 7 pl position. After Sahi Rams devastating fire the position was clear of Chinese. He called up 9 pl Subedar Ramchander and told him to leave 2 LMGs to engage the Chinese while the rest of the men moved to the bump. The 2 LMGs were under Sepoy Nihal Singh and Harphul Singh. The mortars now without ammunition were to be disabled and all maps and other documents burned. The men moved in single file. After they had covered 600 yards tragedy struck. An unseen MMG coughed to life and mowed down the attacking KUMAONis. Major Shaitan Singh was hit and pulled by Phul Singh to cover 32 men were killed in the action. Meanwhile back at No 9 pl position the few men left behind were under attack. With the odds arrayed against them Lance Havaldar Balbir Singh led his three men into the Chinese tps. Ram Kunwar and the remaining men fired off their last rounds before machine gun fire killed them. The two LMG men and the MMG had been duelling for ten minutes now. Harphul finally managed to hit one of the crew neutralizing one MMG briefly. A 75 mm antitank rocket exploded near his position killing him instantly. Nihal singh continued to fire till he was hit on both elbows and could not hold on anymore. Rezang La Falls 192. As Ram Kunwar disabled the mortars and was moving away he was hit by rifle fire. He saw the Chinese 20 yards away. Angry he took a rifle and went inside the command post. The first Chinese soldier to peek in received a round in his head. The remaining Chinese threw fro hand grenades to silence him. Phul Singh along with OP Jai Narayan tried to drag Shaitan Singh. But the gaping hole in his back was draining his life out. Finally as Maj Shaitan Singh stopped breathing they moved back to the main lines. Incredibly both Nihal Singh and Ram Kunwar managed to slip out of enemy captivity and make it back to safety. Of the 118 men at Rezang La 109 men laid down their lives. Five men were captured and only four men returned back alive. 193. With the fall of Rezang La the men on Magar Hill now awaited the anticipated Chinese attack. At one point a Chinese column was marching up the gully between Rezang La and Gurung Hill. The guns were moved into direct firing mode. Wisely the Chinese decided not to attack. At another point the Chinese moved in mortars in the Spanggur Gap. Sighted by the Magar observation post they were immediately shelled. One mortar was knocked off and the rest scampered back to safety. But with Gurung Hill in their hands the Chinese now could regroup and roll down the hill and overrun the Gorkhas and KUMAONis and take the airfield. This would cut off troops deployed eastwards including those on Magar Hill.

194. With over one thousand Chinese killed for 140 Indian dead the Brigade had achieved its primary task. It was now decided to pull all troops to positions in

96 depth and wait for the second round. Accordingly in the night the units withdrew with smart discipline taking with them every piece of equipment. Except for a couple of disabled tanks and empty fuel containers and other junk everything else was pulled out. The depth positions had better tactical advantages. To attack these positions the Chinese would have to come up from the lower heights. Also their build up would have to be in the open. The attack would have to traverse through the Chushul Valley an ideal killing field. The Cease Fire 195. The second round never came. On 21 November the Chinese declared a ceasefire. The Indian Army and 114 Brigade was justifiably proud of its conduct during the battle of Chushul. Outnumbered ten to one they had fought with considerable lan and tactical skills inflicting horrendous casualties on the Chinese. There was no vain sacrifice of lives due to egos. Peking radio admitted to having suffered its worst casualties at Rezang La. Ironically it could have also been an indicator of things to come. The Indian Army was just coming to grips with this war. Barely a fraction of the Army had been involved.

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CHAPTER XIII WITHDRAWAL FROM DAULAT- BEG-OLDI Orbat of 114 Infantry Brigade 196. 114 Infantry brigade was deployed with the following troops. On the night of 23/24 Oct 1962 C Company was ordered to withdraw to Thoise by carrying out a tactical withdrawal. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (j) 197. Two Troops of 20 Lancers. 38 Field Battery of 13 Field Regiment. One Troop 32 Heavy Mortar Regiment. 1 JAT. 5 JAT. 13 KUMAON. 1/8 GORKHA Rifles. Y Company 1 MAHAR (Machine Gunners). One Company Engineers.

Company wise deployment of 5 JAT was as under:(a) (b) (c) (d) A Company Battle of Galawan. B Company Battle of Hot Springs. C Company Battle of Daulat-Beg-Oldi. D Company Battle of Konoma.

Orders for Withdrawal 198. On the night of 23/24 Oct 1962 C Company was ordered to withdraw to Thoise. The route was long and arduous. The climate was most inhospitable. The semi frozen nalas and streams made going very hazardous and difficult. The column had some sick personnel with it. It fell on Major Bhairon Singh to organize and conduct the most difficult operation. The Company took 12 days to reach one of the outposts in the rear of Daulat-Beg-Oldi and North of Thoise. After a rest of six days at this place they were taken back to Thoise on vehicles from there they deinducted to Y Station for re-equipping and reorganization.

98 Eventually the company rejoined the battalion after a long separation of ten months this march back is an epic in itself. The credit of bringing the entire company without a single casualty goes to Major Bhairon Singh who with his personal example and doggedness kept the morale of the column high.

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CHAPTER XIV LIMITED ROLE OF THE INDIAN AIRFORCE Use of Offensive Air Power 199. The IAF only carried out air supply and was not used for any offensive action. The permission for use of offensive air power was sought as early as 7 May 1962. However, use was sanctioned by the Cabinet only on 25 May, with the stipulation that the Line of Control (LoC) was not to be crossed. Offensive air power was not used at all in 1962. Pre-war Debate on the Use of Offensive Air Power 200. Maj Gen DK Palit was Director, Military Operations (DMO) under the Chief of General Staff (CGS) had, as early as 02 May, 1962, recommended the use of offensive air power to redress the adverse force ratio in Ladakh. Offensive air action was considered feasible in both NEFA and Ladakh. 201. The Army headquarters put forward the view that there was little reason to fear strategic bombing, since there was no intelligence of bomber bases in Tibet. Fighting if any, was not likely to spread beyond border areas. Indian air defences were capable of countering strategic bombing by the Chinese. The Chinese were assessed as only capable of occasional raids, with no serious effect on the border war. Indian Intelligence Assessments 202. Offensive air action was first discussed on or around 18 September during one of the daily meetings chaired by the Defence Minister. In view of the shortage of troops, it was proposed that that all troops be withdrawn from outer Ladakh into inner Ladakh to concentrate around Leh. As this meant the loss of the major part of Ladakh, including Chushul airfield, it was vehemently opposed. The CAS, Air Chief Marshal Aspy Engineer, offered to fly reinforcements and equipment to Chushul. He also offered to provide Close Air Support (CAS) missions against targets in West Tibet bordering Ladakh, if any troop concentrations were noticed there. The IB was asked to make an assessment of PLAAF strength, which could be brought to bear against India. 203. Mr. BN Mullick was the Director of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) from 1950 to 1964. He claims that accurate intelligence assessments of Chinese intentions were passed on to Service headquarters as early as June 1962. Information was also received of Pakistani plans to attack India simultaneously from the West, in coordination with the Chinese. Despite the withdrawal of support after the rift with the USSR, the IB felt that the PLAAF would be capable of undertaking missions at night as far as up to Madras, without interference, due to our lack of night

100 interceptors. Operations against Indian forces could also be undertaken from Chinese airfields in Tibet, Yunnan and even Sinkiang. The IB inputs indicated that the PLAAF already had MiG-21 supplied by the USSR before the rupture. They also had night interception-capable MiG-19s as well as MiG-17s. It was felt that this would make it difficult for our Canberras to operate. 204. The official history gives Indian Air Force strength as 559 fighters and fighter bombers. These included aircraft like the French Ouragan and Mystere, the Hawker Siddeley Hunter and the Gnat. The Hunter and the Gnat were among the most modern subsonic aircraft at the time. Of the Chinese aircraft, only the MiG-19 was comparable in performance. Most IAF aircraft were based in the western sector and would have been able to support Army operations in Ladakh. However, two squadrons each of Ouragans (Toofanis) and Vampires were also based in the eastern sector at Tezpur, Bagdogra, Chabua, and Jorhat. Two squadrons of Hunters were also available at Kalaikunda, close to Calcutta. Apart from these airfields, many second World War strips used in the Burma campaign were still available. Unlike the Chinese airfields, the Indian airfields were at sea level; aircraft would be able to operate easily Indian Fears of Escalation 205. The fear of escalation dominated Indian thinking throughout the crisis. On 26 May, 1960, the Defence Minister directed both the Chiefs of the Army and the Air Force to explore likely sites for constructing new airstrips and to assess aerial supply requirements in order to establish new posts under the `Forward Policy'. However, flying fighter aircraft within 15 miles (24 km) from the International Border (IB) was prohibited by orders issued by the Prime Minister on 20 Oct, 1962, in order to avoid exacerbating tension. There were no restrictions on transport flying. When the Army urgently requested in December 1961, a waiver for operational reasons, the Defence Minister agreed to permit fighter flights on a case-by-case basis; no blanket authority was given. Canberra aircraft were then used for mapping and reconnaissance missions to obtain data on Chinese deployments. 206. The task of evicting the Chinese intruders from the Thag La ridge was delegated to 7 Infantry Brigade in the Namkha Chu valley. The brigade had just two 75 mm artillery pieces. Gen BM Kaul, now Commander, IV Corps, requested the use of IAF fighter aircraft on 09 September, 1962. The request was repeated on 07 Oct as he felt that a Chinese offensive could not be faced without air support. 207. In the Western sector, Chinese troops had surrounded the Galawan post on 04 July, 1962. The GOC, XV Corps asked for Air Force aircraft to overfly the post in order to boost the morale of the encircled troops. After hostilities commenced, IAF fighters were put on alert for operations in Ladakh by 19 Oct. When the Indian inferiority in artillery became apparent, the headquarters

101 XV Corps requested Western Command urgently for Close Air Support missions on 31 Oct. Army Headquarters Position on CAS 208. The Army headquarters categorically refused the IV Corps request on September 11, saying that Close Air Support (CAS) would not be used. On 07 Oct, the Army clarified its stand stating that "...the use of offensive air support is not to our advantage". Since the Indian Army was heavily dependent on air supply, Chinese retaliation could affect the aerial re-supply of our troops. A similar reply was sent to Western Command as well. The Army Headquarters also felt that the Chinese could bomb our population centres, communications and transport links. As a concession, IAF aircraft were placed on alert in both sectors, to be used only in "extreme emergency". Air Headquarters' views on Offensive Air Support 209. The official history states that no documents are available to explain the decision to forego the use of offensive air support. However, Air Marshal HC Dewan (retd), then Director of Operations at Air headquarters, is quoted as saying that he had advised the CAS against the use of offensive air support. In his view, the rugged and heavily forested terrain in NEFA precluded the use of Close Air Support against dispersed infantry. Since armour was not likely to be used, there were no worthwhile targets for air attack. With our troops heavily dependent on air supply, it would be best not to provoke the Chinese. As the larger Air Force, they could withstand losses that the IAF could not. IAF resources were also to be kept in the West to deal with a possible Pakistani threat. Lastly, he felt that India was likely to forfeit international sympathy, if it chose to `escalate' the conflict. There is no mention of bombing targets in Tibet. It seems that only Close Air Support in NEFA was under consideration. It was apparently felt that even within our borders, the use of offensive air power would be `escalatory'. 210. The IB assessment of overwhelming Chinese superiority and likely Chinese retaliation appears to have tilted the balance against the use of offensive air power. The decision to limit the role of the Air Force to transport and supply seems to have been taken between 18 September and 20 September, 1962. One year later, in a conversation with Marshal Arjan Singh, then Deputy Air Chief, Palit says that the Marshal admitted this grave misjudgement. Request for American Military Aid and Galbraith's Role 211. When Bomdilla fell on 18 November, it was decided to abandon Tezpur. The Chinese advance was considered unstoppable in the hills and valleys of Assam. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Thapar then recommended to the PM the evacuation of Assam and the holding of a defensive line in the plains of Siliguri. The PM agreed.

102 212. After Bomdilla fell Palit, recommended the use of Close Air Support in the plains and interdiction in the hills, to cut roads and supplies, to Additional Secretary (Defence) Harsh Sarin. However, Sarin was opposed to the use of the IAF unless cities in North India could be adequately defended from air attack. The prospect of intervention by American and British airpower was discussed. There is no evidence of

any discussions with the IAF. On 19 November, Sarin promised to take up the matter with the PM. 213. The next day Palit was shown a draft from Jawaharlal Nehru to President Kennedy, asking for 12 squadrons of F-104 fighters and two squadrons of B-57 bombers. These would be manned by Americans. They would defend Indian cities until Indian personnel had been trained. The IAF personnel would handle all action beyond Indian frontiers. The IAF personnel would also require American training to man the B-57 bombers required to attack the Chinese mainland. In all this, the IAF does not seem to have been consulted. The US later turned down the request for intervention, on the grounds that it could not commit its aircraft when the IAF's own fighters had not been committed. 214. John Kenneth Galbraith was US Ambassador to India during this period. According to Galbraith, Pakistan had to be restrained from embarrassing India in the West. On 18 Oct, 1962, Galbraith was shown a draft State Department telegram from President Kennedy to President Ayub Khan, promising Pakistan firm support on Kashmir, if it desisted from attacking India in the West. He felt the Indians would regard this as blackmail, just when the Chinese were menacing India. He strongly advised the State Department not to send the telegram as drafted. Galbraith's account appears to confirm the Indian fears of Sino-Pakistani collusion cited by Mullick. 215. On 20 November, the planning group at the US Embassy in New Delhi decided that about 12 C-130 transport aircraft would be sent in as soon as possible. The Seventh Fleet would be asked to steam into the Bay of Bengal. The airlift already underway would be intensified. Galbraith once again urged the Indians to desist from using the IAF. Neville Maxwell states in his book, India's China War, that an American aircraft carrier was indeed despatched from the Pacific towards Indian waters. However, since the crisis passed within 24 hours of Nehru's appeal, the ship turned back before it reached the Bay of Bengal. 216. Galbraith too believed the use of offensive air action would lead to massive Chinese retaliation. He felt the IAF was not a very effective force. He did not believe that the USAF would be able to protect Indian cities. Despite complete control of the air, the Chinese could not be kept from advancing or resupplying their forces. They were not likely to use major roads to advance. They

103 would do so under cover of forest and at night. In these circumstances, the Indians would be unwise to initiate air action. 217. Galbraith seems to have felt that, unlike conventional armies, the People's Liberation Army had only a light logistics train. However, Maxwell states in his book that the Chinese had all-weather roads capable of taking the largest vehicles. They had also laid "lateral roads in the Tsangpo valley with feeders to the south" running to within a few miles of the McMahon line. Large forces had also been stationed in Tibet for years, to fight the Khampa rebels. The troops were suitably equipped and clothed for fighting at high altitude. All this would have required an extensive logistical infrastructure, which could have been targeted.

PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Question No 1 Bring out the factors owing to which the IAF was not effectively utilized during the 62 Ops. Question No 2 Write a short note on US intervention, when the dispute erupted into a large scale mil conflagration.

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CHAPTER XV
US INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION 218. The PLA had managed in one large sweep to penetrate close to the outskirts of Tezpur, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the AssamNorth-East Frontier Agency border. The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in Tezpur to the south of the Brahmaputra River, all prisons were thrown open, and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur's currency reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance. 219. On the evening of 20 November, Nehru, seeing the disintegration of his own armies and countrymen, made an appeal to the United States, for armed aid, including airstrikes, if Chinese forces continued to advance, and air cover, in case of raids by the Chinese air force. With the Chinese outnumbering every Indian division and faced with the idea of bombing on Indian towns, the United States Navy ordered an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal due to reach there in late November. 220. When the situation created the possibility of Assam falling into the hands of Chinese, then the Prime Minister, JL Nehru requested the United States of America and Great Britain for help. An immediate response was given by U.K and U.S.A Within a day of requisition, air lift was arranged and supplies started arriving at Calcutta and various places. They gave us whatever they were asked to give. No demand was made on India to change her non-alignment policy. No conditions were made about payment. They gave arms, munitions as well as transport planes and other supplies. Later on, the high level delegations of the U.K and U.S.A visited New Delhi to ascertain Indias requirements and discuss the manner and method of their delivery. 221. Similar sentiments were also expressed by U.K West Germany. France, Canada, Australia and a number of other countries. But only U.K and U.S.A gave generous aid to India and therefore, India should consider that U.K and U.S.A were real friends during 1962s emergency U.S.S.R never gave any assistance to India during those traumatic days of 1962. Ceasefire 222. China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance farther, and on 19 November it declared a unilateral cease-fire. Chou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, 21 November. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated,

105 Beginning from 21 November, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 01 December, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November, 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territorynorth of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control. 223. Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian charg d'affaires on 19 November, (before India's request for United States air support) but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later. The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire and thus American intervention on India's side in the war was avoided. Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin, were therefore still involved in some minor battles. But the ceasefire did finally signal an end to the fighting. The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities. 224. Militarily, no organized Indian resistance was left in either disputed sector after the retreat of the Brigade at 3 am on 20 November. The Chinese withdrew to the prewar Line of Actual Control and returned all the territory they had captured during the war, but kept disputed territories they had de facto control of prior to the war and had simply affirmed control of during the war by expelling the Indian forces. Of the disputed areas, China kept most of the Aksai Chin, which comprised 32% of the disputed territory and withdrew from the North East Frontier Agency, which comprised 68%. Return of Indian PsOW 225. Over the following months, vehicles, weapons, and prisoners of war were returned by China unconditionally as a show of goodwill. According to Anna Louise Strong, a Marxist living in China during 1962, the return of heavy weapons were said to be due to logistical constraints of transporting them to China. Returning the weapons to India for goodwill purposes was considered more desirable than destroying them or abandoning them to the natives. China released 731 sick and wounded Indian soldiers in December 1962, and the remainder 3,213 soldiers, including one brigadier (Brig. JP Dalvi), 26 field officers and 29 officers of company grade, started arriving in India from April 1963 onwards. The Indian forces did not take any Chinese prisoners. 26 died due to wounds in the PoW Camp, while another 15 were repatriated in December when the Chinese used them to return confiscated weapons.

106 226. Toward the end of the war India increased her support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of elite Indian-trained "Tibetan Armed Force" composed of Tibetan refugees. The CIA had already begun operations in bringing about change in Tibet. International Reactions 227. The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy making of using aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract from its internal issues. The United States Marine at the time viewed China as an aggressor during the China-India border war. This was further triggered by Mao Zedong's views that: "The way to world conquest lies through Havana, Accra, and Calcutta." They were also of the view that conflict was caused due to India's provocations to China. However China, in the past, had been adamant to gain control over regions to which it has a "traditional claim", which triggered the dispute over NEFA and Aksai Chin and indeed Tibet. The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered blatant Chinese communist aggression against India. In a May 1963 National Security Council meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally. The Non-Aligned Nations 228. The non-aligned nations, perhaps unsurprisingly, remained non-aligned, and only the United Arab Republic openly supported India. Six non-aligned nations, Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia, met in Colombo on 10 Dec 1962. The proposals stipulated a Chinese withdrawal of 20 km from the customary lines without any reciprocal withdrawal on India's behalf. The failure of these six nations to unequivocally condemn China deeply disappointed India. Pakistans Reaction 229. While Western nations did not view Chinese actions favorably because of this war, Pakistan, which had had a turbulent relationship with India ever since the Indian partition, improved its relations with China after the war. Prior to the war, Pakistan also shared a disputed boundary with China, and had proposed to India that the two countries adopt a common defence against "northern" enemies (i.e. China), which was rejected by India. However, China and Pakistan took steps to peacefully negotiate their shared boundaries, beginning on 13 Oct 1962, and concluding in December of that year. Pakistan also expressed fear that the

107 huge amounts of western military aid directed to India would allow it to threaten Pakistan's security in future conflicts. Mohammed Ali, External Affairs Minister of Pakistan, declared that massive Western aid to India in the Sino-Indian dispute would be considered an unfriendly act towards Pakistan. 230. As a result Pakistan made efforts to improve its relations with China. The following year, China and Pakistan peacefully settled disputes on their shared border, and negotiated the China-Pakistan Border Treaty in 1963, as well as trade, commercial, and barter treaties. On 2 March 1963, Pakistan conceded its northern claim line in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir to China in favor of a more southerly boundary along the Karakoram Range. The border treaty largely set the border along the McCartney-MacDonald Line. Because of India's failure against China, Pakistan triggered the Second Kashmir War with India. 231. However, it effectively ended in a stalemate as the Sino-Indian War had caused the previously passive government to take a stand on actively modernizing India's military. China offered diplomatic support to Pakistan in this war but did not offer military support. In January 1966, China condemned the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan as a Soviet-US plot in the region. In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Pakistan expected China to provide military support, but it was left alone as India successfully helped the rebels in East Pakistan to found the new nation-state of Bangladesh.

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CHAPTER XVI IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE AGGRESSION OF 1962

232. Prior to 1962 war, the Himalayas were considered as a natural barrier against any invaders from the North. The Chinese invasion provide that there was no natural defence to Indias Northern frontiers despite the geographical reality, that Himalayas is not a homogeneous region in terms of Geopolitical imperative of Indias security. After the 1962 war, the relations between China and India were naturally strained and Nepal and Bhutan felt the pressure of Chinese aggression. As a result of 1962 war, the Northern borders of India became an active frontier and produced a new awareness for rapid construction of roads and tracks up to the border for strategic reasons. Since 1962, a number of roads were strengthened to meet the requirements of defence for plying of heavy military vehicles besides undertaking heavy construction of other vital links. After 1962, national attention got focused on the border area states from the defence point of view. Developments of these areas were given top priority which was essentially to meet the defence requirements that ware not met earlier. Nehru amongst others had an inkling of the impending disaster. Even then, sufficient measures had not been taken earlier to safeguard India from the possible Chinese aggression. India was not sufficiently prepared against China as it was more than adequately prepared against Pakistan. All this changed after 1962. It was realised that Indias Northern borders had to be strengthened against the Chinese threat as well and the Country had to be prepared for it. Change in Defence Expenditure 233. Prior to 1962 Sino-India war, the total budget was very nominal. The situation changed after 1962 war. The defence expenditure of India jumped up from around Rs 474 crores in 1962-63 to Rs 816 crores and thereafter showed a gradual increase. In 1962, the Department of Defence production was created for expanding the Defence Production base to meet the increased requirement of the Armed forces rather than to meet social demand added to the ecological hazards. Change in Thinking 234. Prior to 1962, the majority of the writers on matters of defence considered that defence expenditure to be unproductive and a drain on the scarce national resources. But the same Debate after the Chinese onslaught advocated massive increase in Defence Expenditure. It was realised that maintaining our territorial integrity is the primary function of the state and as a corollary, the defence

109 expenditure was not only considered desirable and essential but also it was thought that the defence expenditure is not entirely unproductive and a waste.

Change in Threat Perception 235. India did not expect the Chinese to take any large scale aggressive action in regard to the border dispute and had made no preparation for the defence of the Northern border. On the other hand, China had made all the military preparations at each and every point of view. Prior to 1962, it was assumed that a major threat to Indian security could come only from Pakistan. The mindset has now changed. Change in Foreign Policy, Defence Planning and Management 236. Prior to 1962, the concept of defence was not very well appreciated. Nehru romanticized foreign policy and advocated nonalignment. The Panchsheel Policy gained ground because it was realised that the cold war between the two superpowers had a negative impact on the third world countries. In his quest for peaceful coexistence, Nehru failed to fortify the countrys defence and in particular, the Chinese threat was either not foreseen or underestimated. The Chinese aggression however shattered Nehrus myth that threats to security could be met by peaceful diplomatic moves. It confirmed the news that defence consciousness in the nation was wanting and the need was felt for maintaining armed forces for resisting any external aggression. 237. The reasons for the 1962 debacle range from sheer incompetence to faulty intelligence, from lack of coordination between the three Services to developing tension between them. The relations between the Defence Minister Krishana Menon and the Chief of the Armed forces were stated to be strained. It was alleged that the Defence Minister refused to take note of the reports of the previous Generals regarding the Chinese preparations for launching an attack on India who were unprepared from various point of view. The 1962 war was an extremely important event for India, its foreign policy and defence. After the debacle of 1962, several heads rolled and the policies with regard to use of force were changed. The most notable aspect was the change in concept of defence planning and management. 238. Once the nation recovered from the initial shock and the nature of long term threat became clear, it was realised that the defence potential cannot be built in a matter of weeks or months and thus the Government set about organising defence preparedness in a more systematic manner. The Government realised that it had to think of defence planning as long term problem. The immediate aims in 1963 were:(a) Expansion and modernization of the Army.

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(b) (c)

Modernization of the Air Force. Creation of an adequate defence production base.

(d) Improvement and expansion in the means of communication and transportation. (e) balanced Replacement of overage ships of the Navy and making it a force.

239. The national defeat of 1962 led to a new thinking on the need for long term planning on defence issues and the result was that, for the first time in post independence India, Five Years Defence Plan was prepared in 1964. In 1964-65, a five year defence plan from 1965-66 to 1969-70 was formulated and implemented. 240. In brief, the plan envisaged the following:(a) The building of and maintenance of a well equipped Army with strength of over 8, 25,000 men. (b) Maintenance of 1 45 Squadron Air Force including replacement of older aircraft by modern aircraft and improvement of the air defence radar and communication facilities. (c) A phased programme for replacement overage ships of the Navy.

(d) Improvement of road communications and transportation in the border areas. (e) Strengthening of the defence production base to eventually meet the requirement of arms and ammunition of the Armed Forces, improving the general organisational arrangements in the fields of provisioning and procurement, storage, training etc., to ensure most economic utilisation of funds allocated for Defence.

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CHAPTER XVII SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE 1962 CONFLICT: AN ERA OF HOSTILITIES

241. After 1962 war, India took a firm stand against China who continued with negative and intransigent attitude towards Colombo proposal and commenced propaganda against India. She conducted nuclear explosion in 1964 Oct. In 1965 Indo-Pak War, China declared her active support to Pakistan. China kept up pressure on the Sino-Indian border by violating the Line of Actual Control. Defence Minister Mr Chavan informed the House that since 15 September, China had intruded across the Line of Actual Control on 33 occasions, and further informed that:(a) The Chinese have ever since August/September in collusion with Pakistan started a policy of harassment and aggression on our borders . they have increased their strength along the border. Whether we like it or not, we have to live with the Chinese presence along with our border and meet their challenges as best as we can . we have taken steps to deal with Chinese threat in a suitable manner, depending upon operational needs and circumstances. (b) However, there were no major clashes on the Line of Actual Control during 1966 but the Chinese continued with series of minor intrusions across the entire border area. A kind of intrusion is that she started loudspeaker propaganda across the Nathu La advising India troops to revolt against the present Government of India and set up a Peoples Government in India. She openly supported Naga, Mizo and Naxalbari insurgents and described them as fighting against Indias neocolonisation. Violation of Diplomatic Code 242. On 13 June, 1967, China expelled two Indian diplomats from Peking on the grounds that they were indulging in espionage activities and put the entire India Staff of the Indian Embassy and their families in Peking under siege in the Embassys walled compound. This act of Chinese resulted into a serious deterioration of India-China relations. India took reciprocal actions against the entire Chinese staff of the Chinese Embassy at New Delhi. A t last, China lifted the siege of the resulted on the lifting the restrictions on the movements of the Chinese staff and allowed the Chinese Secretary to leave New Delhi as a part of reciprocal action.

112 Nathu La Incident 243. On 11 September, 1967, Chinese launched an attack at Nathu La with heavy mortar, recoilless guns and artillery fire. This was most serious incident since 1962 war. Chinese intrusion at Nathu La followed by firing of automatic weapons which continued from 11 to 14 September. On 15 September, China handed over the dead bodies of India soldiers with arms and ammunition for the sake of preserving Sino-Indian friendship. 244. Though the Chinese had launched a heavy attack at Nathu La, for the first time since the 1962 War, Indian troops gallantly defended their positions and beat back the Chinese. This incident was nothing but the testing of Indias defence preparedness and extreme end of deadlock in Sino-Indian relations. Recent Diplomatic Processes 245. In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, an agreement to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (Load). Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred. During the visit of Chinese Prime Minister to India, China recognised the territory of Sikkim and Assam as belonging to India, while India during the visit of its PM, Atal Behari Vajpayee to China, recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as an autonomous part of China. 246. India still has concerns over China's military modernisation. Additionally, China's military aid to Pakistan as well as its proliferation of nuclear technology is a matter of concern to the Indian public, which fought another war with Pakistan in 1999. 247. In 2001, there were reports that India had actually taken two prisoners during the war, Yang Chen and Shih Liang. They were not released at the conclusion of the war. Instead, the two were imprisoned as spies for three years before being interned in a mental asylum in Ranchi, where they spent the next 38 years under a special prisoner status. After their case was reported on by local journalists, the Indian government took actions to release them. After the Chinese government investigated the case, it lobbied for the release of the two men. Both men, now well into their 60s, have since been reunited with their families in Sichuan. The Government of India has since issued a clarification that the men were not POWs. 248. On 6 July, 2006, the historic Silk Road passing through this territory was reopened. On 20 November, 2006 Indian politicians from Arunachal Pradesh appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962. Since 2004, Chinese military forces

113 have increased patrolling of the Chumar region, which is not even claimed by China. The process of peace is disconnected on both sides and China remains fairly unilateral in their thinking both sides have agreed to resolve the issues by peaceful means.

Fresh Chinese Incursions Across LAC 249. China continues to needle Indian forces all along the 4,057 Km Line of Actual Control (LAC). In the latest set of incursions across the LAC, Chinese Patrols once again transgressed into the Indian side at the strategically located Pangong Tso Lake as well as Trig Heights in eastern Ladakh on 2 to 3 September, said sources. 250. There were both boat and vehicle-mounted Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) patrols on the north bank of Pangong Tso, two-third of which is controlled by China as it extends from India to Tibet at an altitude of 4,218 mtr, on 2 September. 251. PLA has really stepped up incursions into our side in eastern Ladakh region this year, with well over 100 transgressions being recorded there since January. Pangong Tso and Trig Heights have become quite contentious since the 1999 Kargil conflict, with China even constructing a track right up to the lakes southern bank during that time to demonstrate its support to Pakistan. 252. China, its assessed, wants the border to be drawn in a straight line on the lake to gain strategic advantages. It seeks similar gains in Trig Heights and Demchok areas in the western sector. 253. But eastern Ladakh is not the only region where Chinese patrols have been flexing their muscles in an aggressive border management policy to put pressure on India and lay claim to disputed areas along the LAC. 254. Chinese moves have been witnessed in the eastern sector in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim in recent months. In fact, perturbed by the incursions into Sikkim. 255. Over 80 incursions across the 206 km Sikkim-Tibet border being recorded since January, the Indian establishment is especially worried about the so-called 2.1 sq km finger area, the northern-most tip of Sikkim, which China is claiming as its own territory. The government, incidentally, is now conducting a fresh survey of the northern plateau in Sikkim to counter claims by China. The survey is using latest technology to chart out the watershed in the area, which is usually used to demarcate boundaries in mountainous areas.

114 Indias Submissive Posture 256. Many feel Chinas game plan could well be to use Sikkim as a leverage in its policy of exerting pressure on India over the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh. Always careful of not ruffling Chinese feathers, India often downplays instructions by its troops holding that they take place due to differing perceptions of the still-unresolved LAC. 257. The fact however remains that the step-up in incursions has been accompanied by a hardening of the Chinese posture in the never-ending border to delineate the LAC. 258. The Indian elephant has a deep-seated and chronic inferiority complex vis--vis the Chinese dragon. Way back in 1950, after the Chinese communist revolution, the US offered Chinas UN Security Council seat to India. Jawaharlal Nehru turned down the offer, apparently on Soviet advice, for fear that accepting the American invitation would offend China. 259. China has always been grateful to India for this generous gesture, though it might have displayed its gratitude with an inscrutability that is truly oriental. In 1962 China invaded India, an exercise facilitated by the then defence minister Krishna Menon (a Nehru protg), under whose stewardship Indias ordnance factories had stopped making arms and ammunition (which might have offended the sensibilities of our big neighbour in the east) in favour of coffee percolators, among other widgets. Nehru ordered the Indian army to throw out the Chinese; instead the invaders threw out our valiant but tragically ill-equipped soldiers. The Chinese withdrew, but to this day Beijing lays claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh (through it has, graciously, allowed India to keep Sikkim). 260. To foster cordial relations in South Asia, China helped Pakistan achieve full nuclear status in the early 1990s, a favour which Islamabad has returned by acknowledging Chinese suzerainty over Aksai Chin, the high-altitude desert which India claims as its own. Among other tokens of its friendship, Beijing has stoutly and steadfastly resisted Indias inclusion in the same Security Council which Nehrus pehle aap politesse ushered China into. And of course in the recent nail-biting Vienna meet of the NSG, Beijing did its best to play last-minute spoiler for Indias hopes (now realised) of ending 34 years of nuclear apartheid. 261. There is a customarily submissive posture adopted by New Delhi in its relations with Beijing. Why is it that New Delhi is so sensitive about stepping on Beijings toes, when China has no compunction about stomping on Indian toes.

115

PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Question No 1 by

Briefly describe the present day incursions being carried out

the Chinese along the disputed regions.

116

CHAPTER XVIII STRATEGIC LESSONS OF THE CONFLICT

262. The Sino Indian conflict of 1962 was fought predominantly in the higher of the Himalayas and was essentially Mountain warfare.
263. Mountain warfare refers to warfare in the mountains or similarly rough terrain. This type of warfare is also called Alpine warfare, Mountain warfare is one of the most dangerous types of combat as it involves surviving not only combat with the enemy but also the extreme weather and dangerous terrain. Siting of Defences 264. In combat, holding the high ground gives a great advantage in both defence and offense. Attacking a prepared enemy position in mountain terrain requires a greater ratio of attacking soldiers to defending soldiers than would be needed on level ground. Mountains at any time of year are dangerous lightning, strong gusts of wind, falling rocks, extreme cold, and crevasses are all additional threats to combatants. Movement, reinforcements, and medical evacuation up and down steep slopes and areas where even pack animals cannot reach involve an enormous exertion of energy. Raising of Addl Mountain Divisions 265. Due to the instability in the region and need for constant deployment in the mountainous regions, the Indian Army now has some of the most extensive and well developed Mountain Warfare capabilities in the world. The mountain warfare units were vastly expanded after the 1962 war, with the creation of six divisions. The Army presently has 10 Army Divisions dedicated to mountain warfare (8 Mountain Divisions and 2 Mountain Strike divisions) and another infantry division earmarked for high altitude operations. Each division has personnel strength of 10,000-13,000 troops and consists of 3 brigades with 3,000 to 4,500 men each. Two more mountain divisions, with air assets are being raised, and will be operational within five years. The two divisions will also have air assets, including Utility helicopters, Helicopter gunship and Attack helicopters. Training 266. The following Mountain warfare training institutes have been est. (a) The Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun conducts preliminary mountaineering and mountain warfare training for all Officer Cadets.

117 Discontinued in the late 1980s, the Bhadraj Camp was revived after the Kargil War. (b) For more specialized training, the Army operates the Parvat Ghatak School, Mountain Warrior at Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh. This highaltitude commando school is the highest of its kind in India at 15,000 feet. With the mercury dipping to minus 20 degrees providing a freezing tougher terrain to impart training in conditions similar to Siachen. (c) Another school, the High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS) is located near Gulmarg, Jammu and Kashmir. Set up in 1948 as the 19 Infantry Division Ski School, HAWS has over the years become the Army's nodal agency for specialised training and dissemination of doctrines in high-altitude, mountain and snow warfare. Mountain warfare courses are conducted in the Sonamarg area, and snow-craft & winter warfare training in the Gulmarg area. HAWS played an important role during the Kargil War by conducting crash courses for troops prior to their deployment. Joint Trg with Foreign Armies 267. Recognizing the extensive experience of the Indian Army in mountain warfare, troops from other nations regularly train and conduct joint exercises at these schools. These include forces from UK, US, Russia, etc. In 2004, US Special Forces teams came to India to study the lessons learned by Indian Army units during the Kargil War in order to apply them to their operations in Afghanistan. Russian troops are also training at the High Altitude Warfare School in Gulmarg to apply the knowledge to their operations in Chechnya. They will also visit Siachen and other Army posts. Intelligence Collection 268. One of the highly articulated reasons for the "military debacle" of 1962 was the "failure of intelligence". This was probably necessary at that time, on top of the depiction of V.K. Krishna Menon as the evil genius and B.N. Mullik as the ingenuous hawk who had pushed the Prime Minister into the "disastrous" forward policy, for salvaging the reputation and the morale of the army. The intelligence community meekly accepted the role of scapegoat, sticking to the traditional response of "we will neither confirm nor deny". However, what was the factual position is given in succeeding paragraphs. Avoiding Sense of Complacency in Defence Preparedness 269. Intelligence had reported that the Chinese were building a road through Aksai Chin. Yet the Government, apart from a few angry condemnations, chose to ignore its strategic significance for many years. "History" records that the Army top brass believed that the Chinese would not react strongly to the Indian

118 moves under the forward policy. Brig DK Palit, DMO, said in a meeting at HQ 4 Infantry Div in August 1962 that, in the appreciation of the Army HQ, a shooting war with China could be ruled out. China would not react and was in no position to fight. Their belief permeated to the lower echelons of the Army, with the result that even field formations had become

complacent. Further, they erred on the lower side in assessing the military capabilities of China. Whatever intelligence was available did not receive careful attention by the Army HQ. For example, GOC IV Corps received a message from Army HQ on 9 Oct 1962, conveying a reliable intelligence report that some 300 mortars and guns had been seen moving near Tsong Dzong towards the McMahon Line and that Tawang could be the objective. Lt Gen Kaul had also got from intelligence full and complete information about the dispositions and strength of Chinese troops at Thag La Ridge. 270. However, internal introspection was carried out and, for the first time since 1947, the Govt of India had a comprehensive look at our capabilities for intelligence collection, analysis and assessment relating to China - as well as stay-behind requirement. Some of the major lessons learnt and the steps taken to meet (or at least reduce) those inadequacies are as follows. (a) The HUMINT capability needed to be improved, though we had a fairly good capability for the collection of tactical and topographical intelligence about Tibet. We lacked a similar capability relating to Yunnan (and North Myanmar, by extension) and Sinkiang. The network of intelligence collection outposts along the Indo-Tibetan border was revamped and strengthened. (b) We still have a lot to do relating to Yunnan and Xinjiang, but improved technical collection and better liaison arrangements are helpful. (c) Rudimentary arrangements existed for the sharing of China-related intelligence between India and the US. However, US intelligence did not alert India about the Chinese military-build up in Tibet and the goings-on in Yunnan in 1962. In retrospect, China may not have needed much of extra mobilisation and not too many indicators may have been available even to US intelligence at that time. It becomes necessary to improve the arrangements for exchange of intelligence and assessments with countries sharing India's concerns relating to China, without developing a dependence on them to meet our needs. Special and long-term arrangements were worked out and they have stood the test of time quite well. We had also learnt the lesson that if you know something, you can get more to supplement it; but if you know nothing, no country will provide fresh information freely.

119 Technological Advancements 271. We had, either in civilian or military establishments, hardly any worthwhile capability for the technical collection of intelligence (TECHINT) in 1962. This was one lesson that was learnt very well and the gap filled adequately. Without going into classified details, it can be said that the defence establishment (for the collection of tactical intelligence) and the IB and R&AW, its successor in the field of foreign intelligence (for the collection of strategic intelligence) have done very well in this area. They have taken major initiatives and have developed very significant capabilities, skipping generations of techniques in the process. 272. The present capabilities include communications intelligence, monitoring of nuclear tests and rocket firings, electronic intelligence relating to radar emissions, deep photo surveillance, satellite imagery (in cooperation with ISRO) etc. Many of these capabilities are amongst the best in the world. They have proved their worth in 1971, during the "flap" in 1989, in pinpointing Trans border terrorist training camps, and during the Kargil operations. 273. How well we are able to make full use of the collected intelligence is a different matter. Intelligence Analysis 274. One criticism was that our threat perceptions had largely, if not exclusively, been focussed northwards towards Tibet and the likely Chinese threats from Yunnan in the East through North Myanmar and from Xinjiang were not adequately anticipated. There has not been much credible evidence that Chinese troops had attacked India through Myanmar. This is not to say that such a contingency could be ignored. At the same time, we can realistically be prepared against possible and plausible scenarios but not against all capabilities. For example, we would find it almost impossible to protect ourselves against the capabilities of missile attacks by the United States or Russia or against a full-scale attack by the Chinese PLA. We have to take into account the possible intention to use such total capabilities. 275. We had failed to foresee the likelihood of the confrontation with China resulting in the occupation of some of our territory by the Chinese. Therefore, we had not developed a stay-behind capability for the continued collection of intelligence and harassment against the Chinese in Indian territory occupied by them. Once the Chinese actually occupied portions of our territory, we hardly knew what was happening there and had to watch helplessly. The creation of a stay-behind set-up was given high priority and an effective organisation and system put in place. However, very recently that organisation has been "transferred" to other duties and the task left to the local authorities. This erosion of our stay-behind intelligence collection and operational capabilities is a retrograde step.

120 276. We lacked the capability to assess the mindset, perceptions, intentions, medium and long-term plans etc. of the top Chinese leadership. We were handicapped by inadequate level of knowledge of the Chinese language and by the difficulties (faced by all countries) in interacting with Chinese leaders and officials at policy-making levels in Beijing. We have come a long way in developing our language and strategic analytical capabilities. All the same, we share with most other countries a difficulty in fully understanding the "inscrutable Chinese". 277. It is encouraging to note that matching expertise in analysing intelligence collected through various technical means exist today. However, the meagre quantities of such experts result in only partial utilisation and occasional delays. More concerted efforts are required to build on the existing base and make a quantum jump in the volumes of technical intelligence that we can analyse in as close to real time as possible. Coordination and Overall Assessments 278. Our capability for a coordinated and meaningful analysis assessment of all the available intelligence, open as well as secret, was very poor. Consequently, the advice to the policy-making level was often based on wishful thinking and personal hunches rather than on well-analysed and assessed likely scenarios. Two of the major reasons for this have still not been overcome, though significant progress has been made. (a) The survival instinct of the various organisations providing intelligence inputs to protect their "turf" and their "indispensability". They are still reluctant to be forthcoming in sharing intelligence and analysis and prefer to advice the policy-making levels directly. (b) The in-built resistance to making full use of the expertise for analysis available in academia and other non-governmental think-tanks. 279. A major step taken to evolve an effective and coordinated National Security Management (NSM) was the setting up of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the Cabinet Secretariat. Despite the best intentions, the JIC could not become anything more than a "cut and paste" set-up due to various reasons. The Ministry of External Affairs did not seem to give it due importance or provide adequate political inputs. The intelligence organisations seemed more interested in getting their "paragraphs" included in the periodical reports and position papers than in achieving balanced and holistic assessments. The JIC was converted into the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) in 1998. 280. The setting up of the government-sponsored and government-funded Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) was, for a long time, the only visible concession to expertise at the "non-governmental" level. The creation of

121 the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in 1998 was aimed at strengthening the assessment capability at the non-governmental level. It was expected to provide a structured and functional NSM setup. An ad hoc coordination mechanism was functional in 1971 and the result was the successful liberation of Bangladesh. If such structure had existed in 1962, 1972 and even in 1987, the military "disasters" of 1962 and 1987 (foray into Sri Lanka) could have had different endings; and India could have come out better after the Simla Conference in 1972. This major reform in NSM could easily become the cornerstone of coordinated approaches to future threats to our national security. It seems, however, that its full potential is yet to be achieved.

Decision Making 281. The political leadership that took over at the time of independence had had no exposure to national security as matters relating to India's foreign relations and defence were exclusively handled from London prior to 1947. Further, to quote Admiral JG Nadkarni, post-independence "India's military has always chafed at the bit when controlled by the 'babus'. Quite rightly they feel that they know far more about strategy than those in the Ministry of Defence. On the other hand, the politicians can point to the occasions when they have listened to the army with disastrous results. The 1962 debacle against China was a result of Jawaharlal Nehru falling prey to an inexperienced army general's advice. Similarly, our better-forgotten adventure in Sri Lanka was undertaken at the behest of an ambitious army chief." 282. "History" notes that the Indian defence set-up after independence lacked institutionalised support for decision making at the national level. Well established and well respected agencies providing politico-military linkages did not exist. It was personality-oriented decision making in the vital area of national security. 283. Further, the political thought process in the country precluded the possibility of considering China as a real military threat. There was a mismatch between our perception of the enemy and what the enemy actually did. The deployment was based on the belief that the line we moved to occupy was just a political line to establish our claim and not a defensive line. A study of the 1962 conflict, as also of the 1965 and 1971 wars clearly brings out the imperative necessity and urgency of educating the people about the basics of war and familiarising them with military matters, if a democratic state is to be safe and strong.

122 Defence Potential & Preparedness 284. India justifiably continues to have serious concerns over the modernisation of China's military, its nuclear and missile capabilities and its military assistance to Pakistan in the nuclear as well as conventional fields, its intentions in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal etc. Despite these concerns, Indian attitude towards China has become more relaxed and more trusting. The Special Task Force on the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the Government in 2000 concentrated was just a political line temporarily to establish our claim to what we are holding on strengthening our capabilities vis--vis Pakistan without a similar exercise relating to China. It is essential that we should continue to move forward in improving our relations with China, in order to blunt any move towards developing the intention to use the full military capabilities. However, our keenness to move forward should not make us forget the painful lessons of the past. We cannot afford another traumatic experience in our relations with China.

PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Question No 1 Bring out some of the Strategic lessons learnt by the defence forces of India after the 1962 debacle. Question No 2 What are the salient actions undertaken by the Min of Defence, Government of India to improve the standard of the Indian army in particular.

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CHAPTER XIX ANALYSIS OF CHINESE MIL STRATEGY AND TACTICS : LESSONS DRAWN

285. From an analysis of the information on the tactics followed by the Chinese during the operations during 1962 it is obvious that they had a well developed doctrine for fighting at high altitudes and terrain as applicable to the plateau of Tibet and in the Himalayas. Salient features of this doctrine are covered in the subsequent paragraphs. Effective Use of Topography 286. The Chinese believed that due do the difficulties of terrain and rarified atmosphere formations were easily decentralized and change of deployment was, therefore, not easy. The terrain could, however, be suitably used for encircling and annihilating enemy troops piecemeal. Troop Movement 287. In order to develop mobility among their troops following measures had been formalized:(a) Troops should be made familiar with difficulties and obstacles to movement found in the area. (b) Endurance training should be intensified to develop persevering will power among troops so that they can stand pain and fatigue. (c) Number of personal in heavy weapon detachments should be increased. Employment of Artillery 288. Units / formations below a division were equipped with light guns. Heavy guns were employed in those areas where it was possible to maneuver them. 289. Observation Posts were positioned in the forward areas, on flanks and even behind the enemy lines through infil. 290. If the range of the guns permits these were sited well spread out. Centralised control, however, was maintained.

124 Intelligence 291. Tibetan armed forces and militia were well adapted to the terrain and were used to maintain close contact with the local population for intelligence purpose. Peoples information nets and information stations were established for collection and speedy passage of information. 292. Small detachments penetrated behind the enemy lines where they:(a) Organised reconnaissance of the enemy, topography and climate changes. Selected the best routes and methods of maneuver and studied in detail the pattern of enemy activity; (b) Observe the policy on minority communities in order to exploit the weaknesses; (c) Tried to secure the leadership of the local party committees and win the cooperation of the local population; (d) Kept in close touch with their own headquarters. Offensive Operations 293. Offensive operations revolved around the following practices. (a) The tactical principles of concentrating overwhelming numbers, of aiming at one point with attack from two or more sides and of launching fierce attacks for quick decisions were being followed. (b) Emphasis was placed on exploiting enemy gaps and flanks, on long range raids, and on envelopment, penetration and infiltration. (c) Securing of bridges, ferry points, communication hubs, defiles, mountain passes, and important high ground was considered necessary for the smooth development of offensive operations. (d) Due to limitations imposed by the terrain in changing dispositions, initial deployments were made with great care. Various components of a force were trg to flight alone and also be able to support each other. Powerful mobile reserves were set up. (e) Selected elements, operating in coordination with the main forces, were sent to infiltrate into enemy rear areas in order to secure important passes, to demolish bridges, and to cut off enemy routes of withdrawal. These measures were considered most useful in completely annihilating the enemy.

125 (f) Before launching an assault, attempt would be made to reduce as much as possible the distance to be covered by the assaulting forces. This was done to conserve physical energy. (g) When it would be planned to capture high ground frontal attacks would be avoided. If an attack was to develop along a valley, the high ground on the two flanks of the valley and the ground important to defence was to be captured first. (h) Covering positions of the enemy were dealt with by launching an advance element which aimed at achieving surprise by using darkness, terrain and swift movement through gaps and flanks. This element was required to create favourable conditions for the success of the main force by occupying key points, by moving into the enemy positions and by destroying the enemy. (j) To provide a fresh assaulting force in good time for the rapid and successful progress of an attack, reserve units moved closer to the first line troops. In a mountain offensive it is considered necessary to launch the reserves earlier than in the plains. (k) Command posts were moved over short distances at numerous times. The step ladder method of moving was adopted to start command posts from one place to another or to make use of a lower level command post in directing a battle. (l) Their approach to crossing a river was the same as their attack. Crack units were sent ahead to secretly cross the river in darkness or bad weather at sites lying on the flaks of the selected crossing place. From there they, along with airborne forces, are required to assist the main crossing by capturing important tactical features. Defensive Operations 294. Def in mountains was offensive defense. The salient pts are as follows:(a) Repeated attacks should be launched on the enemy with small forces before he can start his attack in order to tire and demoralize him. (b) Main forces and weapons were concentrated along valleys and roads to organize defence in depth. (c) A position would ordinarily be established at the waist of a hill. When the terrain was found favourable the position would be extended downwards. When the comparative distance from the waist of the hill to the top and bottom was not too large a defensive position is established at

126 the top as well. However, ordinarily, only warning posts are established at the foot of a hill and hill top. (d) To oppose advancing enemy crack detachments were sent to the important passes on the enemys route and to his flanks and rear. These detachments, in collaboration with local armed militia, were required to lay ambushes and launch raids with a view to inducing the enemy to move into the preplanned killing area. (e) During a stalemate the enemy would be engaged with SA and gun fire and his forward positions raided in order to restrict his reconnaissance and to prolong and interfere with his preparations for an attack. (f) The defence detachments assigned to defend vital points along the border were required to mobilize and organize the locals in the region into a border peoples defence line, which provided early warning in the event of hostilities. (g) Detachments detailed to defend the border were amalgamated with the major defence system in the nearby areas so that they could function under a unified command. Tactical Lessons Learnt from 1962 Operations Tactics 295. The most noticeable feature of the Chinese tactics during recent operations was that these were conducted by them strictly according to their textbook doctrines. The surest way to anticipate and defeat the enemy, consequently, lies in the thorough study of the Chinese organisation, tactics and mental make up. Security 296. The Chinese employed a variety of methods to collect intelligence in the field. The normal security measures which are adopted in our Army can provide an adequate counter to the Chinese intelligence activities provided these measures are enforced with painstaking thoroughness. 297. In addition to the intensive and skilful patrolling by combat troops the Chinese employed following methods for gathering intelligence :(a) Civilians from their areas capable of speaking local languages are sent in disguise behind the enemy lines. These personal normally operate in groups of three and carry with them a spare set of civilian clothes to change according to needs. It is believed that they extensively used such

127 personal for collecting urgent information prior to an attack and send them to the rear of a battalion bridge, division and even a Corps area ranging from 8 to 40 miles in depth. (b) Contacts are established among local civilians for gathering intelligence. It is one of their established techniques to get their agents employed as labourers / menials in the units of an opposing force. (c) Chinese soldiers disguised in the uniforms of the opposing forces are sent into and behind the enemy lines. This is a well established method which the Chinese use to gain vital military information like reinforcements, personalities of commanders, gun areas, location of formation headquarters and so on. 298. From the above it should be obvious that the training and vigilance of our troops in field security duties has to be of the highest orders. To enforce this Commanders at all levels will make it a point to constantly test the vigilance of their troops in this field. Security of information 299. The standard of security of foreigners is much higher than ours. There is still a tendency amongst our officers to indulge in loose talk and thereby give away information of military value to unauthorized persons. Conditions For Realistic Training 300. Training should be carried out under complicated and the most difficult situations, stereotyped situation and rigid solution of tactical problems should be avoided. In war actions and battles do not progress smoothly. Consequently if troops get accustomed to favourable conditions during training they will lack the mental robustness to stand the strains of actual battle. Conditions of extreme hardship, hunger and isolation should be built into our training exercises. Command and Battle Procedure 301. Principle of command in battle is founded on recognized procedure. Commanders may vary their interpretation of the process, but much of it is constant irrespective of whether we fight on the plains or in the mountains. 302. A higher commander should give the lower commander his appreciation of the situation with a firm task, make sure that the latter is provided with the necessary means and then leave him alone to execute that task. In allotting important operational tasks, there should be no ambiguity and it should be done personally by one commander to another and not through an agency. Battle procedure can be perfected only by constant training under variety of situations.

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Headquarters 303. Formation and unit headquarters must be trained to live hard on austerity scales and be so sited that they can defend themselves. Headquarters should function away from huts and habitations. 304. The staff and signals at all headquarters, in many cases thrown together for the first time, should train to work as a single team each having the confidence of the other. Only an infallible system of inter-communication, for which both are responsible, can enable a commander to influence the battle and retain balance. Patrolling 305. During the operations there seemed to be a general lack of taking elementary precautions when patrols / parties were outside their perimeter. It was extraordinary how parties were ambushed when they stopped to brew tea. One particular instance was when an OP officer having been on patrol with an Infantry party decided that he was in a safe place and stopped to brew tea. In spite of the protestations of his escort JCO he insisted on stopping and brewing tea. The JCO wisely decided to move on having left a section to look after the OP party. Shortly afterwards he heard the sound of firing. His section rejoined him but everyone of the OP party including the officer were killed. This was one of the many similar incidents which took place during the withdrawal. It is difficult to break habits like tea drinking but the lighting of fires for cooking cannot be done when in contact with the enemy or on patrol. 306. It was apparent that the chief fault was that units were not fully alive to the fact that we were at war. Many were still working on the lines to which they had become accustomed to in J & K. There, however, were some commendable exceptions to this state of affairs. 307. Offensive patrolling is the essence of infantry field craft. Like a well turned out quarter-guard in peacetime, it is the hallmark of a good infantry battalion in battle. It calls for sound training, aggressive leadership and a spirit of adventure. Not only must intensive patrolling be resorted to during operations when it is vital to dominate no mans land and gain information about the enemy, it should also continue during periods when there are no active hostilities on the border. Besides meeting the tactical requirements, intensive patrolling is essential during quiet periods for the following reasons:(a) Keep the troops psychologically mobile and physically fit.

129 (b) Keep the troops acclimatized to cold. Long stays in a prepared defensive position where heating devices are available can have adverse effect on the troops unless they regularly move out for patrolling. Enemy Sound Signals 308. The Chinese frequently used sound signals, particularly the bugle calls, during a number of battles in NEFS. A careful study should be made of the pattern of the Chinese sound signals. This will help in anticipating developments in battle and can also assist in planning the use of these signals by own troops to confuse the enemy. Communications 309. Failure of wireless and line communications even within units often took place during operations. The effect of such failures needs no explanation.

310. As many alternative means of communications as possible should be preplanned. Use of fully trained runners and visual signaling should be extensively made. Digging 311. Wherever our troops were not properly dug in with adequate overhead cover they suffered considerable number of casualties from the enemy shelling brought down in preparation for an attack. Properly dug weapon pits and crawl trenches

would not only have minimised casualties but added to the confidence and morale of troops when they come into the open to repulse an enemy assault after the termination of the enemys preparatory bombardment. Camouflage and Concealment 312. Our defended positions, particularly the automatic weapon pits, telephone exchange, headquarters, mortars positions and so on are located by the enemy they are heavily and accurately shelled during the enemys preparation for an attack. On occasions our positions were accurately shelled even without preliminary registration. Skilful camouflage and concealment of our defences is therefore of vital importance. Alternative Positions

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313. In mountainous terrain it is not easy to cover all approaches to a defended locality unless a series of alternative trenches and weapon pits are prepared for occupation as the need arises. These should be linked by well dug communication trenches. 314. Alternative positions and weapons pits also provide an effective means of concealing from the enemy the exact location of our weapons and manned field defences.

Fire Control 315. The Chinese appeared to have taken deliberate measures to ensure that ammunition available in a position under their attack was exhausted before their main assault was launched. Two measures were adopted by them:(a) Before launching a major attack, repeated probing attacks were made against our positions. This was done with the dual purpose of gathering information about our dispositions and running down our ammunition. (b) During an assault the initial waves often consisted of local Tibetan militia who suffered the main brunt of our fire power and suffered heavy casualties. Their main forces were launched only after the initial fury or fire had subsided and they had discovered approaches which were not effectively under fire. 316. Strict fire control in the mountains where ammunition replenishment is a major problem is an important battle winning factor which must be cultivated to perfection.

Reinforcement 317. At times, it may be desirable during a battle to reinforce a defended locality which is holding an important piece of ground. As the process of reinforcing a position in the mountains is time consuming it is essential to preplan the following:(a) Select covered routes and mark them for movement by night.

(b) In each locality additional trenches/bunkers/weapon pits should be prepared in advance to accommodate reinforcing troops. If alternative positions are fully prepared then this requirement is automatically met.

131 Local Counter Attack 318. It was repeatedly experienced that the enemy after capturing a position continued to be in a disorganized state for considerable lengths of time. Under such circumstances, a local counter attack has a high probability of success. Observation Post 319. The purpose of an observation post is purely to observe and report on the enemy activities. It is not expected to fight. Its strength depends on the task, the distance it is going to be away from the main position and the duration of its stay at the selected vantage point. Clear orders should be given about the action it should take when attacked or surprised by the enemy. An OP to be of value should be in communication with the main position. If it is not in a position to pass back information then it should rejoin the main position without delay. Fighting in Isolation 320. Merely siting defensive positions for all-round defence is of little consequence unless all ranks are trained to fight in isolation which calls for a high standard of leadership, training and mental robustness. This can be imparted if training is carried out under proper conditions. Sniper 321. The Chinese senior officers have sometimes been reported to have appeared in battle on horse back and should have been easy to pick out by our snipers. Similarly Chinese line parties which very closely followed an assault should also have provided a suitable target. The Chinese sub units in a battalion did not possess wireless sets and disruption of their line communications could have paid good dividends.

Psychological Warfare 322. The Chinese had extensively indulged in loud speaker propaganda in the Fwd Def Lines. Broadcasts in the native languages of our troops deployed in a sector were directed towards confusing the troops and undermining their morale. By lectures and discussions our troops must be mentally prepared to anticipate this type of insidious technique so that they do not only ignore it but by listening to them are fortified in their belief that the Chinese treachery will stop short of nothing. Health and Hygiene

132 323. A number of frostbite cases took place during operations. On analysis it has been found that ignorance of the causes and preventive measures against frostbite was, very often, the main reason for the troops suffering from this disability. A better understanding of the causes, treatment and preventive measures against this affliction is required. Administration 324. Tactical success in mountainous terrain depends on administrative support. This is a responsibility of each echelon of command. In simple language it means just this, that it is the moral duty of a commander who launches troops into battle to ensure that they are given the wherewithal of carrying out the task assigned to them. On the other hand, it implies, equally, that formations / units must conserve what they have got live hard and frugally. The vehicle should be regarded as a bonus; troops must learn to fight without them. Map Correction 325. Maps of our border areas are old and at places do not conform to the details on the ground. While suitable remedial action by the survey is in hand it is the duty of all units to submit any map corrections which are noticed by them without delay. Endurance 326. Ability to fight with vigour, determination and audacity under extremely difficult conditions found on our Northern Borders depends on the endurance of troops. 327. Endurance consists in being tough in body, mind and spirit. Endurance training consists essentially in the gradual application of stress, by setting tasks of increasing difficulty. Each task must be within the developing capacity of the individual. Each task must be within the developing capacity of the individual. Each task successfully accomplished after great effort will stiffen the will to succeed in more difficult tasks.

328. It is not too difficult to make the body fit and physically capable of standing upto demands likely to be made upon it. It requires greater care to develop toughness of mind. Dogged perseverance and refusal to give in can be developed by putting troops through marches, exercises and adventure training with an element of discomfort, hunger and danger built into these activities.

133 Battle Psychology 329. Whenever possible, troops should be put through a Battle Inoculation Course to familiarize them with the noise and confusion of battle. Psychologically, all ranks must be prepared to stand up to sustained shelling and mortaring. 330. In training for battle, men must live hard, their officers must live alongside them without any special privileges and officers and men together must get integrated into a psychologically attuned unit. Selective Training 331. Covering too many subjects during training produces very little effective results. Commanders at all levels should pick up subjects of real importance and then concentrate on them. For example, in the training of an infantry soldier two aspects which stand out above everything else are endurance and skill at arms. Anti Air Raid Training 332. Training to escape with minimum damage from an air raid should receive attention at all levels. Formation Headquarters and static installation should pay particular attention to this aspect. 333. The aim should be not only to escape without damage but also to continue to function during and immediately after an air raid. Leadership 334. Finally, it was once again brought out that in battle there is no substitute for good, sound and robust leadership. 335. Qualities which go to make a good leader are known to all. What actually needs attention is the cultivation of these qualities and their applications. Essentially, a leader must gain and keep, whatever the circumstances, the respect and confidence of his troops so that he can get them to do what he wants them to d. leadership is a mixture of personal example, persuasion and compulsion. 336. It is enough for a leader to merely issue out orders for what he wants done. The test of leadership lies in what is actually accomplished by his troops under conditions of stress and strain.

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337. We have learnt from and acted on most of the micro-lessons relating to collection, collation and analysis of intelligence. We have, however, not done enough about the macro-lessons relating to coordination and fusion of all available intelligence, holistic threat assessments and making of policy based on proper analysis of all variables. We have set up the apparatus that looks good on paper but still make security policy at the highest level based on gut feelings, hunches, electoral requirements and populism. The maturing of the political leadership in all the parties to accept National Security Management as being beyond the pale of partisan politicking and requiring expert inputs is a painfully slow process in any country. It is imperative that the process in India concludes successfully before we face the next serious threat.

PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Question No 1 PLA

Bring out the salient aspects which were displayed by the

in their methodology of exec Mountain warfare. Question No 2 the What are tactical lessons that can be drawn out of study of

conflict of 1962 in the various operations fought in the Northern & Eastern sectors? Question 3. Bring out the implications of the Chinese Aggression of 1962. Question 4. Describe the Role played by UK and USA during the Indo China conflict. Also include a brief note on the reaction of the Non aligned countries. Question 5. Write a short note on use of air force and the reasons which governed its passive role. Question 6. What are the lessons learnt at the strategic level in the war?

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CHAPTER XX ACTS OF BRAVERY: GALLANTRY AWARD WINNERS 338. 1/8 Gurkha Rifles (a) Major Dhan Singh Thapa, Param Vir Chakra Nick named as Hamro company commander Major Dhan Singh Thapa also known as Dhanu was commanding D company 1st Battallion the 8 Gorkha Rifles. Sri Jap Post which was the most dominating post overlooking the area north of Pangongso Lake in the Ladakh sector. The attack is imminent dig fast and dig deep, we will not surrender, shouted the company commander. Determined to hold on the gallant company commander inspired courage with personal example shouting last man last round. An incendiary grenade found its mark inside Dhanus bunker. With exemplary presence of mind brave Dhanu rolled on the ground and put out the fire. Rifleman Tulsi Ram reported the company commander to be killed in action. However Dhanu and his batman Khardhoj Gurung were in Chinese captivity. Here too he was trying to find out about the well being of his men. The Chinese officer shouted you are guilty of establishing a post in Chinese territory, killing over 150 and wounding many more than that of peace loving Chinese soldiers. Dhanus reply was, the territory belongs to India. You should be ashamed of launching an unprovoked massive attack killing more than 20 peace loving Indian soldiers. (b) Naik Rabi Lal Thapa, Maha Vir Chakra On 21 Oct 1962, the Chinese suddenly opened a heavy barrage of artillery and mortar fire on Srijap post in Ladakh. The wireless set was damaged and the post lost contact with the base. Naik Rabi Lal Thapa who was the commander of another post volunteered to go to Srijap post in a storm boat to reconnoiter and bring back the latest situation report. When he was 1000 yards short of the post the enemy spotted and fired at the boat from three directions. In complete disregard of his safety Naik Rabi Lal Thapa carried on with his mission. Though the boat was badly damaged he managed to bring back valuable information. The same evening another post was in imminent danger. Naik Rabi Lal Thapa again volunteered to undertake evacuation of this post by boat. While returning from the post, both his boats came under enemy fire and were sunk. At grave risk to his life Naik Rabi Lal Thapa went to the rescue of his comrades and saved the lives of his colleagues. For this act of bravery he was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.

136 339. 13 KUMAON (a) Major Shaitan Singh, Param Vir Chakra (Posthumous) Major Shaitan Singh was commanding C Company of 13 KUMAON deployed at Rezang La in the Chushul sector at a height of about 18,000 feet. The locality was isolated from the main defended sector and consisted of five defended platoon positions. On night 17/18 November 1962 the Chinese forces subjected the locality to heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire and attacked in overwhelming strength following human wave tactics. Magnificent bravery and tenacity was displayed by Major Shaitan Singh and his men, and against heavy odds the attack was foiled. The Chinese attacked repeatedly with greater vigour and added strength only to be beaten back. During the action Major Shaitan Singh moved at great personal risk from one platoon locality to another sustaining the morale of his men. His personal example, unwavering courage and adamantine will were a tonic to his men. Major Shaitan Singh was mortally wounded when he received a medium machine gun burst in his stomach but he refused to be evacuated. When the final Chinese onslaught came Major Shaitan Singh had little to defend Rezang La with. His handful survivors of the valiant company fought with unprecedented zeal, making a desperate effort to save Rezang La. When only a few men were left in his company he ordered them to go back to the battalion headquarters and narrate the saga of the battle fought by C Company. 1310 dead Chinese soldiers lay on Rezang La in silent testimony to the courage and daring of 114 Ahirs of Charlie Company. Major Shaitan Singhs supreme courage leadership and exemplary devotion to duty inspired his company to fight gallantly to the last man last round. Thus Major Shaitan Singh laid down his life in setting a record of dauntless daring which is unparalleled in the annals of military history. He was awarded with Param Vir Chakra (posthumously). 340. 4 SIKH (a) Sepoy Kewal Singh, Mahavir Vir Chakra A tiger who spilt his blood. It is difficult to explain the motives of human behaviour. The courageous have large hearts, and stresses and strains bring out the best in them. Kewal was heard hissing a loud oath. Then, surging with love for his motherland and shouting Saragarhi, he leapt out of his trench like an angry tiger and threw himself into the fray. He tore into a group of the invaders, sprayed them with bullets, killing eight of them before he himself fell. This was his martyrdom; he spilt his blood defending his post. 341. 9 PUNJAB (a) Major Mahender Singh Chaudhary, Maha Vir Chakra( Posthumous) On 9 Oct 1962 Major M S Chaudhary was ordered to establish two platoon sized posts at Tsengjong, North of Log Br

137 in Namkha Chu valley on the Thagla Ridge. On 10 Oct this post was assaulted by a large Chinese force of about battalion strength. Although his post had not had sufficient time to dig in and coordinate The defences, he stood his ground with the small arms at his disposal and kept the enemy at bay for more than nine hours after which he was ordered to withdraw south of the Log Bridge, which he did successfully. Although he was wounded, he refused to be evacuated and continued to be a source of great inspiration to his men through this and the subsequent operation on 20 Oct. In the later battle he inflicted some hundred casualties on the enemy. (b) Naik Chain Singh, Maha Vir Chakra Oct 1962, Naik Chain Singh was sent with the rest of his platoon at Tsangle to reinforce the platoon position at Tsengjong , North of Namkha Chu. Early next morning 500 Chinese concentrated in the vicinity of this post and assaulted it with guns and mortars .Although greatly outnumbered and with limited ammunition, Naik Chain Singh and his men inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and repulsed two determined attacks. Naik Chain Singhs platoon ran out of ammunition and was ordered to withdraw. Leading by personal example he took over the Light Machine Gun and covered the withdrawal of balance of his men. He was hit by a burst of enemy Machine gun fire. Seriously wounded he remained undeterred and was hit again by a machine gun burst and was killed on the spot. Naik Chain Singh and his section displayed exceptional courage and inflicted heavy casualties and delay on the numerically superior enemy.

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ROLL OF HONOUR

Tawang War Memorial

HOW CAN A MAN DIE BETTER THAN FACING FEARFUL ODDS FOR THE ASHES OF HIS FATHERS AND THE TEMPLE OF HIS GODS?

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BATTLES

UNITS

AWARD WINNERS

PHOTOGRAPHS

CHUSHUL

1/8 GR

MAJ DHAN SINGH THAPA, PVC

CHUSHUL

1/8 GR

NK RABI LAL THAPA , MVC

CHUSHUL

1/8 GR

CAPT P L KHER, VrC

CHUSHUL

1/8 GR

RFN TULSI RAM THAPA, VrC

REZANGLA

13 KUMAON MAJ SHAITAN SINGH, PVC

REZANGLA

13 KUMAON LT COL DHINGRA, AVSM

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REZANGLA

13 KUMAON

HONY CAPT RAM KUMAR YADAV , VrC

BATTLES

UNITS

AWARD WINNERS

PHOTOGRAPHS

REZANGLA

13 KUMAON

SUB RAM CHANDER, VrC

REZANGLA

13 KUMAON

NB SUB SURJA , VrC

REZANGLA

13 KUMAON

NB SUB HARI SINGH , VrC

REZANGLA

13 KUMAON SEP/NA DHARAM PAL DHAIYA, VrC

REZANGLA

13 KUMAON

NK GULAB SINGH,VrC

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REZANGLA

13 KUMAON

L NK SINGH RAM,VrC

BATTLES

UNITS

AWARD WINNERS

PHOTOGRAPHS

REZANGLA

13 KUMAON

NK HUKUM RAM,VrC

WALONG

4 SIKH

SEP KEWAL SINGH, MVC

NAMKHA CHU

2 RAJPUT

MAJ GURDIAL SINGH , MVC

NAMKHA CHU

2 RAJPUT

SUB( HONY ) CAPT B C ROY ,VrC

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NAMKHA CHU

2 RAJPUT

CAPT G S BHATIA,VrC

NAMKHA CHU

2 RAJPUT

HAV SAUDAGAR SINGH , VrC

BATTLES

UNITS

AWARD WINNERS

PHOTOGRAPHS

NAMKHA CHU

2 RAJPUT

SEP JAGPAL SINGH, VrC

NAMKHA CHU

9 PUNJAB

MAJ MAHENDER SINGH CHAUDHARY, MVC

NAMKHA CHU

9 PUNJAB

NK CHAIN SINGH ,MVC

NAMKHA CHU

9 PUNJAB

2LT NAVEEN CHANDRA KOHLI, VrC

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NAMKHA CHU

9 PUNJAB

HAV MALKIAT SINGH, Vic

BUMLA

1 SIKH

SUB JOGINDER SINGH, PVC

PROBABLE QUESTIONS

Question No 1 (a)

Write brief notes on:Action of Maj Dhan Singh Thapa, PVC in the Ladakh sector.

(b) Action of C Coy, 13 KUMAON in the defence of Rezang La and the gallantry displayed by Maj Shaitan Singh. (c) Action of Nk Rabi Lal Thapa, in Srijap post for which he was awarded the MVC. Question No 2 Short Notes on:-

(a) Reinforcement action carried out by Nk Chain Singh at Tsen Jong in the Namka Chu sector. (b) Role played by Maj MS Chaudhary of 9 PUNJAB.

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NOTES

Lt Gen Brij Mohan Kaul 1. Lt Gen Brij Mohan Kaul was the controversial general who was sacked for the Indian military debacle against the Chinese in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. He was a kinsman of Jawaharlal Nehru. 2. He was a Kings Commissioned Indian Officer from Sandhurst (1933), who was commissioned as an infantry officer who later switched to the Army Supply Corps during the Second World War. He served as the divisional commander of 4 Infantry Division, Chief of General Staff and finally as the commander of IV Corps during the 1962 war. 3. He was also the first ever recipient of the Param Vishisht Seva Medal instituted by the Government in 1960. His citation reads: for successfully completing the project 'Amar' which entailed the construction of 1,450 quarters for troops in Ambala. This was the first project of its kind and was completed through hot weather and the monsoons in the face of numerous problems. Lt Gen Kaul overcame these difficulties by dint of hard work and initiative of the highest order. He displayed organising ability, drive, and resourcefulness. It was by his determination, leadership and personal example that the task was completed by due date

BIBLIOGRAPHY LIST OF REF MTRLS

Prescribed (a) (b) War in High Himalayas India China War Maj Gen DK Palit Neville Maxwell.

Recommended Himalayan Blunder Brig JP Dalvi