2012-02-25 Comment Psbank Vs Senate-As of 609pm

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA En Banc PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK and PASCUAL M.
GARCIA III, Petitioner s, - versus SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT CONSISTING OF THE SENATORS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING AS SENATOR JUDGES, NAMELY, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JOKER P. ARROYO, PIA S. CAYETANO, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, TEOFISTO GUINGONA III, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, PANFILO M. LACSON, MANUEL M. LAPID, LOREN B. LEGARDA, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., SERGIO R. OSMENA III, KIKO PANGILINAN, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, RALPH G. RECTO, RAMON REVILLA, JR., ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, MANNY VILLAR, and THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE PROSECUTION G.R. No. 200238
Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti (With Urgent Motion to Lift TRO) Philippine Savings Bank et al v. Senate Impeachment Court et al. G.R. No. 200238 Page 2 of 44 x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PANEL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents. x------------------------------------x
COMMENT AD CAUTELAM EX SUPERABUNDANTI (WITH URGENT MOTION TO LIFT TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER)
Respondents
SENATE
IMPEACHMENT
COURT
(Impeachment Court) and THE PROSECUTION PANEL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Prosecution Panel), through the Office of the Solicitor General and in compliance with the Honorable Supreme Courts Resolution dated February 9, 2012, respectfully submit this Comment Ad Cautelam Ex
Superabundanti.1 With utmost due respect, the issues raised by petitioners are purely political in character which may be decided or resolved only by the Impeachment Court. Hence, this Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti is being filed by respondents without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding the constitutional and exclusive power of the Senate to try
1
For more abundant caution. (Blacks Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 2009.)
and decide all cases of impeachment.2 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to: (a) annul and set aside the subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court directing petitioners to testify and/or bring documents relating to certain currency accounts; and (b) order the Impeachment Court to cease and desist from requiring petitioners to testify and/or bring documents relating to said accounts. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 13, 2012, respondents received a copy of the Resolution dated February 9, 2012 of the Honorable Court requiring them to submit their Comment to the Petition not later than ten (10) days from receipt or until February 23, 2012. On February 23, 2012, respondents filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti seeking an additional period of five (5) days, or until February 28, 2012, within which to file their Comment. This Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti is being filed within the extended period sought.
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3 (6).
ANTECEDENT FACTS On December 12, 2011, one hundred eighty-eight (188) Members of the House filed the Verified Impeachment Complaint against the Honorable Chief Justice Renato Corona (CJ Corona) on the following grounds: (a) betrayal of public trust; (b) culpable violation of the Constitution; and (c) graft and corruption. Since the Verified Impeachment Complaint was filed by at least onethird (1/3) of all Members of the House (or by at least 95 Congressmen and Congresswomen), it automatically became the Articles of Impeachment and was immediately transmitted to the Senate in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
On December 14, 2011, the Senate convened as an Impeachment Court. Summons was issued directing CJ Corona to file his answer to the Articles of Impeachment within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice. CJ Corona filed his Answer dated December 21, 2011.
On January 16, 2011, the impeachment trial commenced. The Prosecution Panel proceeded to present their evidence.
On January 31, 2012, the Prosecution Panel filed a Request
for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum et Ad Testificandum3 seeking to require the President/Manager and/or other authorized officers of petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) to testify and bring the original and certified true copies of the following:
(a)
Customer Identification and Specimen Signature
Card/s of the bank accounts under the name RENATO CORONA which won One Million Pesos (Php1,000,000.00) in the PS Bank Monthly Millions Raffle Promo (PS Bank Raffle Promo) as listed in the Official List of Winners as of March 13, 2008 (List of Winners);
(b)
Monthly bank statements of the bank accounts
under the name RENATO CORONA which won One Million Pesos (Php1,000,000.00) in the PS Bank Promo as stated in the List of Winners, from the time of their opening to January 2012; and
(c)
Other bank accounts, including time deposits,
money market placements, peso/dollar accounts and the like, in the name of RENATO CORONA and/or CRISTINA CORONA.
On the very same day, the Prosecution Panel filed another

3
Annex 1 hereof.
Request
for
Issuance
of
Subpoena
Duces
Tecum
et
Ad
Testificandum4 seeking to require the manager of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) to testify and produce before the Impeachment Court documents relating to bank accounts in the name of RENATO CORONA and/or CRISTINA CORONA.
On February 1, 2012, CJ Corona, through counsel, filed his Opposition5 to the two requests for subpoena. The Prosecution Panel filed a Reply dated February 2, 2012.6
On
February
3,
2012,
the
Prosecution
Panel
filed
Supplemental Request for Subpoena/Reply,7 identifying specific bank accounts in PS Bank which appear to be in the name of CJ Corona. On February 6, 2012, CJ Corona filed his Consolidated Opposition and Rejoinder.8
On February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution9 granting the requests for subpoena. The dispositive portion of the Resolution pertinently states:
b) the Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank, Katipunan Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and
4 5 6 7 8 9
Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex
2 3 4 5 6 7
hereof. hereof. hereof. hereof. hereof. hereof.
certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for the following bank accounts allegedly in the name of Renato C. Corona, and the documents showing the balances of the said accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010: 089-1910037-3 089-13100282-6 089-121017358 089-121019593 089-121020122 089-121021681 089-141-00712-9 089-141-00746-9 089-14100814-5 089-121-01195-7 SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, the corresponding Subpoena Duces Tecum Et Ad Testificandum10 (Subpoena) was issued by the Impeachment Court to the responsible officers of PS Bank directing them to appear before it to:
(a)
testify on [their] knowledge in the case which is
before the Senate in which the House of Represenatives has impeached [CJ Corona]; and
(b)
bring with you the original and certified true
copies of the opening documents for the above-described accounts.
On February 8, 2012, petitioners filed the Petition assailing the Subpoena issued to them. Later that day, petitioner Pascual
10
Annex A of the Petition.
M. Garcia III (Garcia), President of PS Bank, appeared before the Impeachment Court and brought bank documents concerning the peso accounts which appeared to be in CJ Coronas name.
Garcia, however, did not bring the bank documents for the foreign currency accounts of CJ Corona. He claimed that revealing the said documents and the information contained therein will violate the rule of absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426 (the Foreign Currency Deposit Act). He also claimed that sanctions may be imposed on PS Bank if the requested documents and information are disclosed.
In its Resolution dated February 9, 2012, the Honorable Supreme Court:
(a)
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
respondents from implementing the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum, dated February 6, 2012, issued by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court against the Branch Manager (and/or An Authorized Representative competent to testify on the matter herein stated), PSBANK, Katipunan Branch; and
(b) required respondents to comment on the petition not
later than ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Hence, this Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti.
ARGUMENTS I. THE SENATE HAS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE POWER TO TRY AND DECIDE IMPEACHMENT CASES. II. IN ANY EVENT, THE IMPEACHMENT COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; IT HAS, IN FACT, BEEN CONDUCTING THE PROCEEDINGS JUDICIOUSLY.
III. SUBJECTING THE ONGOING IMPEACHMENT TRIAL TO JUDICIAL REVIEW DEFEATS THE VERY ESSENCE OF IMPEACHMENT.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY TO CJ CORONA AND HIS OBLIGATION TO PUBLICLY DISCLOSE HIS ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH PREVAIL OVER HIS CLAIM OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF DEPOSITS;
HENCE, THE SUBPOENA SUBJECT OF THIS CASE WAS CORRECTLY AND JUDICIOUSLY ISSUED.
DISCUSSION I. THE SENATE HAS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE POWER TO TRY AND DECIDE IMPEACHMENT CASES.
The Constitution clearly confers upon the Senate the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.11 The word sole means having no companion, solitary, being the only one, and functioning independently and without assistance or interference.12
The use of the word sole gives the Senate exclusive authority to try and decide all cases of impeachment. It means that the Senate alone shall have the authority to determine the form, manner and conduct by which an impeached public officer shall be tried, and whether said public officer should be convicted or acquitted.13
11 12
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3(6). Websters Third New International Dictionary 2168 (1971), cited in Nixon vs. US, 5066 U.S. 224 (1993). 13 Nixon vs. US, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
The sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment is limited only by three very specific
requirements. These are: (a) the Senators shall be under oath or affirmation; (b) when the President is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside over the impeachment trial; and (c) the impeached public officer may only be convicted upon the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate.14 These limitations are precise, and their nature suggests that no additional limitations on the form, manner and conduct of the impeachment trial have been intended.15
Clearly, the Senate has wide discretion or freedom of action or judgment in the way it tries impeachment cases. The Constitution has left the Senate to deal with details of the trial as public interests, changing conditions and circumstances may require.16 As such, the Senate has full and exclusive control over all incidents and matters that may arise during the impeachment trial. This full and exclusive control covers the issuance of subpoenae and the resolution of motions filed by the parties.
14 15 16
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3(6). Id. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).
There is nothing in the Constitution that defines or describes the manner and grounds upon which the Senate, acting as an Impeachment Court, may issue subpoenae. The Constitution merely says that the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, without limitation on the issuance of subpoenae. a. Outside of any alleged transgression of the express constitutional limitations, the impeachment process was never intended by the Framers to be subject to judicial review. Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the Honorable Supreme Court expanded judicial power, which includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.17
The extent of the Honorable Supreme Courts expanded judicial power in the context of impeachment proceedings, however, was clarified in the twin cases of Francisco vs. The
17
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
House of Representatives18 and Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives.19 In these cases, the Honorable Supreme Court maintained that it cannot take cognizance of purely political questions despite its expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Thus:
These petitions raise five substantial issues: I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution. xxx The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII. 20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
18 19
20
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011. Francisco vs. HRET, supra. See also Gutierrez vs. HRET, 642 SCRA 198, 241.
The Honorable Supreme Court in Francisco thereafter defined what constitutes a political question which is beyond the scope of its power of expanded judicial review:
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionality imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.21
Hence, to determining whether the case falls within the domain of judicial review, the following issues must be answered in the affirmative: (a) conferred Whether a power or function has been upon a political body, branch or
instrumentality of government; (b) Whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on the said power or function; and (c) If there are limits, whether the body, branch
or instrumentality properly acted within such limits.
This Gutierrez. recognized
three-fold In the
test
was the
applied
in
Francisco Supreme to
and Court
Francisco, exclusive
Honorable of the
power
House
initiate
impeachment cases and the express constitutional limitations on this

21
power.
Applying
these
constitutional
limitations,
the
Francisco vs. Nagmamalasakit na Mga Manananggol, et al., supra.
Honorable Supreme Court barred the second impeachment complaint against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide on the ground that the same violates paragraph 5, Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution which expressly provides that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The Honorable Supreme Court in said case, however, refrained from ruling on the issue of what constitutes an impeachable offense for lack of any express constitutional limitations in relation
thereto.22
In Gutierrez, the Honorable Supreme Court again had occasion to rule upon the validity of an impeachment complaint in relation to the limitation on the power to initiate impeachment cases found under paragraph 5, Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Honorable Supreme Court upheld the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints to the House Committee on Justice for appropriate action. On the issue that petitioner therein was denied due process due to the delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules, however, the
Honorable Supreme Court held that since the Constitution did not prescribe any limitation on the manner of
promulgation, the Court is in no position to dictate a

22
460 Phil. 830 (2003).
mode
of
promulgation
beyond
the
dictates
of
the
Constitution.23 It is clear from both Francisco and Gutierrez that there are are instances when the Honorable Supreme Courts power of expanded judicial review may indeed be exercised within the context of an impeachment proceeding, i.e., when there is a clear transgression of an express constitutional limitation on the sole and exclusive power of the Congress to initiate, try and decide impeachment cases.
That is not the case here.
Here, petitioners question the Subpoena requiring them to testify and produce documents on several bank accounts in the name of CJ Corona. Unlike in Francisco and Gutierrez, this matter does not involve or transgress any of the express constitutional limitations on the sole power of the Senate to trial of impeachment cases. The issuance of subpoenae is an act or prerogative of the Senate in the course of the impeachment trial that is not covered by any definite constitutional limitation. Following the principle in Francisco and Gutierrez, it is most respectfully submitted that the Honorable Supreme Court cannot
23
643 SCRA 198, 244 (2011).
exercise its power of expanded judicial review in this case.
This is not to say, however, that the Senate is left without any significant check for the exercise of its sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. This check must, however, must be provided by the text of the Constitution itself. To quote United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Nixon vs. United States:
The Framers have anticipated this objection and created two constitutional safeguards to keep the Senate in check. The first safeguard is that the whole of the impeachment power is divided between the two legislative bodies, with the House given the right to accuse and the Senate given the right to judge. This split of authority avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches. The second safeguard is the twothirds supermajority vote requirement.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
The same principle applies in our jurisdiction. Here, the Constitution entrusted the sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases with the Senate, subject only to three express and exclusive constitutional limitations. To reiterate, these are: (a) the Senators shall be under oath or affirmation; (b)
24
Supra.
when the President is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside (but not vote) over the impeachment trial; and (c) the impeached public officer may only be convicted upon the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate.25
Again, the issue raised in this petition does not involve any clear violation of the foregoing constitutional limitations. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the Honorable Supreme Court cannot exercise its power of expanded judicial review in this case.
b.
Grave abuse of discretion is a tool or standard for judicial review; it cannot be applied to evaluate the actions of the Impeachment Court unrelated to the express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the exercise of its impeachment powers. If the framers intended to confine impeachment proceedings
to clear and simple judicial exercise, it could have easily done so. They, however, saw it fit to exclude the Judiciary from the adjudication of impeachments. This fact all the more underscores the nature of impeachment as a political, rather than judicial, process. At best, all that is being asked of the Senate, as the body
25
Constitution, Article XI, Section 3(6).
solely
mandated
by
the
Constitution
to
try
and
decide
impeachment cases, is that it be judicious. Judicious is defined as well-considered, discreet, widely circumspect.26
Judicious- not judicial. The framers of the Constitution carefully excluded the judiciary (all but the Chief Justice, who presides at the Senate trial of an impeached President) from the adjudication of impeachments.27
There are no other constitutionally provided standards by which the Senate should try and decide impeachment cases. Neither is there a constitutional requirement that the Senate should conduct an impeachment trial like a criminal case, a civil case or any other judicial proceeding. Such details, among others, were left to the Senate to provide as public interests, changing conditions and circumstances may require.28
For these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the concept of grave abuse of discretion cannot apply here. Grave abuse of discretion is essentially a tool or standard for judicial review. It cannot be applied when the controversy or issue pertains to the exercise of powers solely vested by the Constitution in a political body. This is precisely because by vesting said powers solely with said body, the intention of the
26 27
Blacks Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 2009. Posner, Richard A., An Affair of State, The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton, Harvard University Press, Second Printing Edition, 1999, p. 2. 28 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).
Framers was not to subject the decision-making to any outside review. Rather, the intention was to exclusively confine the same with the Senate.
To illustrate, the Constitution vested the Honorable Supreme Court with judicial power, that is, the duty to settle actual controversies involving legally demandable and enforceable rights, as well as determine whether a branch or instrumentality of Government has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Pursuant to this power, the Honorable Supreme Court, as the highest court of the land, can resolve, with finality, actual controversies falling within its jurisdiction. In so doing, it can never be accused of having gravely abused its discretion.
The Senate, on the other hand, was vested by the Constitution with the sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. In the same way that it would be impossible under our Constitution to accuse the highest court of the land to have gravely abused its discretion in deciding matters falling within its jurisdiction, the Senate, absent any transgression of the three express and constitutionally imposed restrictions of its power, cannot be considered to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion in its conduct of an impeachment trial. There can simply be no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Senate in trying and deciding impeachment cases, when full exercise of discretion in these matters has been exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Senate. To construe otherwise would be an unjustified infringement of the Senates sole constitutional power and duty to try and decide impeachment cases.
II. IN ANY EVENT, THE IMPEACHMENT COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; IT HAS, IN FACT, BEEN CONDUCTING THE PROCEEDINGS JUDICIOUSLY. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.29
In issuing the Subpoena, the Impeachment Court performed an act in furtherance of its constitutional duty to try and decide
29
Ganaden v. Honorable Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 169359-61, June 1, 2011.
impeachment cases. Under the Senate Impeachment Rules, the Impeachment Court has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, to enforce obedience to its orders, mandates, writs and judgments, and to make all lawful orders, rules and regulations which it may deem essential or conducive to the ends of justice.30
Records of the proceedings before the Impeachment Court show that the decision to issue the Subpoena was made in accordance with the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials (Senate Impeachment Rules), particularly Rule VI thereof which provides:
VI. The President of the Senate or the Chief Justice when presiding on the trial may rule on all questions of evidence including, but not limited to, questions of materiality, relevancy, competency or admissibility of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless a Member of the Senate shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision after one contrary view is expressed; or the Presiding Officer may at his/her option, in the first instance, submit any such question to a vote of the Members of the Senate. xxx
The Impeachment Court, in fact, held a caucus to discuss and resolve the propriety of the issuance of the Subpoena. It considered the submissions of the parties and the legal principles involved, particularly the constitutional command of public accountability and the rule on absolute confidentiality of foreign
30
Rule V, Senate Impeachment Rules.
currency deposits. After due deliberation, the Impeachment Court issued the Subpoena on the ground that the policy consideration behind Republic Act No. 1405, which exempts impeachment proceedings from the rule of bank secrecy, is carried over to Republic Act No. 6426, the governing law on foreign currency deposits.
Clearly, the decision of the Impeachment Court was arrived at thoroughly, reasonably, judiciously and after due consideration of all pertinent issues. It can hardly be considered whimsical, arbitrary or capricious. At most, the decision would only be a mere error in judgment, which cannot be subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, to allow a public official being impeached to raise to the Honorable Supreme Court any and all issues relative to the impeachment trial would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious process, one that may even go beyond the terms of the Senators-Judges hearing the impeachment case. This is clearly not what the Constitution intended. As aptly observed in Nixon vs. US:
In addition to the textual commitment argument, we are persuaded that the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel against justiciability. Xxx We agree with the Court of Appeals that opening the door of judicial review to the
procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachment would expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years of chaos. Xxx This lack of finality would manifest itself most dramatically if the President were impeached. The legitimacy of any successor, and hence his effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely while the judicial process was running its course, but during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated. Equally uncertain is the question of what relief a court may give other than simply setting aside the judgment of conviction. Could it order the reinstatement of a convicted federal judge, or order Congress to create an additional judgeship if the seat had been filled in the interim?31 (Emphasis supplied.)
Impeachment is inarguably a political act exercised by the Legislature, a political body elected by and directly accountable to the people. This power is lodged in those who represent the great body of the people, because the occasion for its exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the community, and the objects of it may be such as cannot easily be reached by an ordinary tribunal.32
Full discretion is vested in Congress, both the House and the Senate, to determine whether or not an officer should be impeached, subject only to constitutionally provided limits
provided under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
31 32
Supra. Labovitz, John R., Presidential Impeachment, 20 (1978) as cited in Concurring Opinion (Sereno, J.) in Gutierrez vs. House of Representatives Committee on Justice.
Thus, all issues, matters or questions affecting, relating or referring to, in connection with, or arising from, the determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense are left to the wisdom of Congress. These issues of include, the but are not in limited the to, the of
sufficiency
allegations
Articles
Impeachment, the materiality, relevance, competency, admissibility and quantum of evidence required for
conviction, the propriety of the issuance of subpoenae for the production of evidence and other incidental questions.
With all due respect, the Honorable Supreme Court cannot give due course to this petition without contravening the Constitution. The function to initiate, try and decide
impeachment cases is solely vested in Congress. The political character of the process is underscored by a degree of imprecision in the offenses subject of impeachment, thus allowing Congress sufficient leeway to describe the acts as impeachable or not.33
To give due course to this petition and grant petitioner injunctive relief would be tantamount to effectively deciding the
33
Concurring Opinion (Sereno, J.) in Gutierrez vs. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, supra.
outcome of the impeachment case in gross arrogation of an exclusive constitutional duty accorded to a separate and
independent branch of Government. This, the Honorable Supreme Court simply cannot do. III. SUBJECTING THE ONGOING IMPEACHMENT TRIAL TO JUDICIAL REVIEW DEFEATS THE VERY ESSENCE OF IMPEACHMENT. Impeachment by the Legislature as representatives of the People is the only constitutional check on members of the Honorable Supreme Court under our constitutional system.34
With utmost due respect, permitting judicial review over impeachment matters unrelated to any of the express
constitutional limitations thereon is tantamount to installing the Honorable Supreme Court as the final reviewing authority over a process meant to check its own actions. Questions will necessarily arise as to the integrity and independence of the Honorable Supreme Court in deciding such matters, especially when the same involves one of its highest members, as in this case. A decision by the Honorable Supreme Court under these
circumstances may be perceived to have been rendered with partiality, and may not gain the trust of the People. Furthermore,
34
Nixon v. US, supra.
the Constitution provided impeachment as the only means to review a class of impeachable officers. Subjecting the
impeachment process to judicial review by the Supreme Court will give its Members an unfair advantage over the other groups of impeachable officers. This absurd and expectedly self-defeating situation surely could not have been intended by the Framers of the Constitution. Concomitantly, and with all due respect, the Senate, pursuant to its duty under the Constitution, cannot permit such situation to occur.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY TO CJ CORONA AND HIS OBLIGATION TO PUBLICLY DISCLOSE HIS ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH PREVAIL OVER HIS CLAIM OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF DEPOSITS; HENCE, THE SUBPOENA SUBJECT OF THIS CASE WAS CORRECTLY AND JUDICIOUSLY ISSUED. The constitutional command of public accountability has been enshrined as early as the 1973 Constitution. Section 1, Article XIII thus states:
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people.
At the time, the means of enforcing such command was
merely statutory in character. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 states that public officers and employees must disclose their assets, liabilities and income by filing a true, detailed and sworn statement thereof with their respective department heads, or in the case of a department head or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President.
The 1987 Constitution similarly provides that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.35 It, however, strengthened the command of public accountability and constitutionalized the obligation of public officers and employees to declare their assets, liabilities and net worth.
Section 17, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that a public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth.36 In the case of Members of the Honorable Supreme Court, their declaration of assets, liabilities and net worth shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.37 These are constitutional
35 36 37
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1. Id., Art. XI, Sec. 17. Ibid., emphasis supplied.
provisions which must be followed.
Clearly, a public officer has no constitutional right to privacy or secrecy over his bank deposits. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records, as such information is voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.38
Accordingly, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended,39 obligates public officials and employees to accomplish and submit sworn declarations of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests, including those of their spouses and of their unmarried minor children living in their households. This requirement, in which full disclosure of wealth is mandated, is the means to achieve the policy of public accountability of all public officers and employees.40
Petitioners contend that the Subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court directing the production of bank documents covering CJ Coronas foreign currency deposits violates the rule
38 39
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-443 (1976). Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. 40 The Ombudsman, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau et al v. Valeroso, G.R. No. 167828, April 2, 2007.
on absolute confidentiality under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act. This statutory rule on absolute confidentiality,
however, must yield to CJ Coronas clear constitutional obligation to fully declare and publicly disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth. Otherwise, this constitutional obligation will be rendered useless. In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to.41
In fact, the general law on bank secrecy, Republic Act No. 1405, implicitly recognizes the primacy of public accountability and disclosure over confidentiality of deposits. Under said law, which covers all deposits whether of domestic or foreign currency,42 confidentiality of deposits does not apply in cases of impeachment or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials.43 This clearly signifies that public accountability should not be subverted by the general rule on confidentiality of deposits. Thus:
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the
41
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011. 42 Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189206, June 8, 2011. 43 Republic Act No. 1405, Sec. 2.
policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
CJ Corona has publicly admitted ownership of several foreign currency deposit accounts and vowed to disclose them in due time.45 Considering the constitutional command of public
accountability, CJ Corona is not permitted to dictate when he will publicly disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth. In issuing the Subpoena, the Impeachment Court only sought to enforce CJ Coronas constitutional obligation to fully declare and publicly disclose his assets.
Moreover, CJ Coronas foreign currency deposits ceased to be absolutely confidential from the very moment he became a public officer. This is because once a person becomes a public officer, he is legally obliged to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. Petitioners, therefore, have no reason to fear possible criminal liability should they disclose CJ Coronas bank accounts. The rule on absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits never applied to him as a public official in the first place.
To emphasize, the Foreign Currency Deposit Act was enacted: (a) to promote and encourage foreign currency deposits
44 45
Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006, emphasis supplied. Disclosure In Due Time, Says CJ, The Philippine Star, February 11, 2012, p. 1.
and investments in the Philippines; and (b) to give protection to foreign lenders and investors from which said deposits and investments will flow.46 It was never intended to protect local depositors, much less public officers who might have foreign currency deposits in Philippine banks. More significantly, the law was never meant to be used by public officers to renege on their constitutional obligation to disclose their assets, liabilities and net worth, or even by ordinary citizens to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus:
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the countrys economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the inquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as as the case before us. 47
Whenever the Legislature enacts a law, it is deemed to have enacted the same in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together.48 Although the Foreign Currency Deposit Act indeed contains a rule on absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits, this rule should be interpreted together with the underlying legislative
46
Last two Whereas Clauses, Republic Act No. 6426; Salvacion v. Central Bank, 278 SCRA 27 (1997); cf. Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, supra. 47 Salvacion, supra. 48 City of Naga v. Agna, G.R. No. L-36049, May 31, 1976.
policy under Republic Act No. 1405 on the supremacy of public accountability over the confidentiality of bank deposits and the constitutional provision that public officers and employees shall disclose their assets, liabilities and net worth. In other words, the rule on absolute confidentiality must give way to more paramount public interests such as the accountability of public officers and employees.
If at all, it is Republic Act No. 1405, the Bank Secrecy Law, not Republic Act No. 6426 or the Foreign Currency Deposit Act, which applies in the case of CJ Corona and all public officers and employees. The Bank Secrecy Law provides exceptions to the confidentiality of deposits of whatever nature founded on the principle of accountability of public officers and employees over the general rule of confidentiality, among which are cases of impeachment. Therefore, the Impeachment Court may legally inquire into the bank accounts of CJ Corona whether these be in local or foreign currency.
In any event, assuming for the sake of argument that the Foreign Currency Deposit Act applies in the case of CJ Corona, the inquiry into CJ Coronas foreign currency deposits is an exception to the rule on absolute confidentiality.
First, Section 7 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act states that the Monetary Board of the Central Bank49 shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the said Act which shall take effect after the publications in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the BSP promulgates new rules and regulations
decreasing the rights of depositors, rules and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern.
Section 76, Part V (on Foreign Exchange Transactions) of the 2009 and 2010 Manual of Regulations for Banks promulgated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas provides that foreign currency deposits may be inquired into pursuant to a lawful order issued by a competent court. The Resolution and Subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court directing petitioners to produce bank documents covering CJ Coronas foreign currency deposits clearly constitute a lawful order issued by a competent court under which a bank inquiry and the issuance of a subpoena for bank records may be justified.
Second, jurisprudence holds that the strict provisions on confidentiality and exemption from processes of foreign currency
49
Now the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
deposits may be relaxed when the purpose of the law is not being served, and in the interest of substantial justice.
In Salvacion,50 the garnishment of the foreign currency deposits of a foreign transient who was held civilly liable for having raped the petitioner in said case was sustained. The Honorable Supreme Court explained that the Foreign Currency Deposit Act failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality, and that the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. It was further held that the Foreign Currency Deposit Act is primarily intended to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and cannot possibly be applied to foreign currency deposits of mere transients.
In China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals,51 the Honorable Court held that the owner of the funds in foreign currency unlawfully taken and which were undisputably deposited in the account of his daughter may inquire into said deposits even without his daughters written consent. The Honorable Court reasoned that it was not the intent of the legislature when it enacted the law on secrecy on foreign currency deposits to perpetuate injustice.
50 51
Supra. G.R. No. 140687, December 18, 2006.
Here, the Subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court seeks to inquire into foreign currency deposits in the name of CJ Corona, the highest magistrate of the land. He is accused of grave and serious offenses which may constitute betrayal of public trust. Public accountability, paramount public interest and the interests of substantial justice dictate that such an inquiry be allowed so that the Impeachment Court may properly determine whether
the publics trust in CJ Corona has indeed been betrayed. The rule on absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits cannot be used to obstruct proceedings and processes seeking to enforce public accountability. To do so would be a great and rank injustice to the Filipino people.
All told, the Subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court for CJ Coronas foreign currency deposits does not violate the laws on bank secrecy. CJ Corona has no constitutional or statutory right to privacy and confidentiality of his bank deposits. On the contrary, he is constitutionally bound to publicly disclose them as the highest Magistrate in the land. Petitioners cannot be held criminally, civilly or administratively liable should they decide to heed the Subpoena. Hence, petitioners right to life, liberty and property will not be infringed.
URGENT MOTION TO LIFT TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
At the risk of being repetitive, it is respectfully submitted that the Honorable Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of this petition and continue to restrain the implementation of the Subpoena without unduly infringing upon the Senates sole and exclusive constitutional duty to try and decide impeachment cases.
Assuming again for the sake of argument that the Honorable Supreme Court may properly take cognizance of this case, the TRO must be immediately lifted for being factually and legally baseless.
To be entitled to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, a petitioner must show, with clear and convincing evidence, that the following requisites are present: (a)
a clear and unmistakable right; (b) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.52
These requisites are not present in this case.
First,
far
from
being
clear
and
unmistakable,
the
confidentiality of CJ Coronas foreign currency bank accounts are, at best, disputed. To reiterate, the Senate is the final arbiter in all matters relating to the substance and conduct of an impeachment case. Petitioners are not entitled to the issuance of any injunctive writ against the Subpoena. Furthermore, the constitutional principle of public accountability and CJ Coronas obligation to fully and publicly disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevails over the statutory rule on absolute confidentiality of deposits under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act.
Second, as a public official, and no less than the Chief Justice of the highest court of the land, CJ Corona is under an obligation to properly, truthfully and publicly disclose all his assets, liabilities and net worth and that of his spouse and unmarried
52
Boncodin v. National Power Corp. Employees Consolidated Union, 503 SCRA 611 (2006).
minor children. In fact, even after the TRO was issued, he publicly admitted the existence and ownership of foreign currency deposits with petitioner PS Bank and vowed to disclose them in due time. With his willingness to reveal his foreign currency deposits, an inquiry into CJ Coronas foreign currency bank accounts should therefore not result in any material or substantial damage considering that these accounts should have been publicly disclosed by him in the first place.
Third, there is no urgent and paramount necessity to prevent, through the issuance of an injunctive writ, any serious damage to CJ Corona.
As
recognized
by
the
Honorable
Supreme
Court
in
Gutierrez, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender. If there are any rights that should be protected by the Honorable Supreme Court, it should be those of the People. The protection of the People calls for the Honorable Supreme Court to lift the TRO issued.
In fine, the unhampered continuation of the impeachment proceedings against the Honorable CJ Corona would strengthen
the Constitution, the institutions of the Government, the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. It must be stressed that public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.53 The subject impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure that transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected. Verily, the injury being claimed by petitioners as allegedly resulting from the subject impeachment proceedings has no factual and legal basis. Perforce, the TRO must be lifted forthwith and the petition must be dismissed.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the TRO dated February 9, 2012 be lifted forthwith, and the Petition be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
53
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1.
Other reliefs just or equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for ad cautelam ex superabundanti.
Makati City for Manila, February 25, 2012.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Solicitor General Roll No. 25719 IBP (Lifetime) No. 00037, 1-18-93 MCLE Exemption No. III-0008523
KARL B. MIRANDA Assistant Solicitor General Roll No. 33306 IBP (Lifetime) No. 04423, 1-9-2003 MCLE Exemption No. III-000370
MARSHA C. RECON Senior State Solicitor (Officer-in-Charge, Felix Angelo Bautista Division) Roll No. 41169 IBP O.R. No. 883342, 01-10-2012 MCLE Compliance No. III-0003832
NOEL CEZAR T. SEGOVIA Senior State Solicitor Roll No. 40524 IBP No. 880248, 01-09-2012 MCLE Compliance No. III-0003843
HILARION B. BUBAN State Solicitor
Roll No. 50397 IBP No. 841400 MCLE Compliance No. III-0003390
LESTER O. FIEL Associate Solicitor Roll No. 51983 IBP No. 858305, 03-15-2011 MCLE Compliance No. III-0003785
JASON T. LORENZO Associate Solicitor Roll No. 55864 IBP No. 883037, 01-09-2012 MCLE Compliance No. III-000763
JUDY A. LARDIZABAL Associate Solicitor Roll No. 57090 IBP No. 866385, 08-08-2011 MCLE Compliance No. III-0017487
DENISE S. DY Associate Solicitor Roll No. 57316 IBP (Lifetime) No. 010412, 01-11-12 MCLE Compliance No. III-0011975
MICHAEL T. MACAPAGAL Associate Solicitor Roll No. 57135 IBP O.R. No. 879933, 01-06-12 MCLE Compliance No. III-0008492
RONALD JOHN B. DECANO Associate Solicitor Roll No. 58393 IBP No. 884741, 01-20-2012 MCLE Compliance No. (Exempted-New Lawyer)
MARLON P. BOSANTOG Attorney II Roll No. 59094 IBP No. 887196, 01-20-2012 MCLE Compliance No. (Exempted-New Lawyer) OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City Tel. Nos. 818-6301 to 09 local 239, 238 and 237 COPY FURNISHED: (by registered mail) Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile Senate President Office of the Senate President Rm. 606, 6th Floor, GSIS Building Pasay City Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte Speaker Hon. Niel Tupas, Jr. House of Representatives Batasan Hills, Quezon City Hon. Chief Justice Renato C. Corona Supreme Court Padre Faura, Manila Puno and Puno Counsel for Petitioners 12th Floor, East Tower Philippine Stock Exchange Center Exchange Road, Ortigas Center
Pasig City Justice Serafin R. Cuevas Atty. Jose M. Roy III Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez Atty. German Q. Lichauco Atty. Dennis P. Manalo Counsels for Chief Justice Corona c/o Suite 1902 Security Bank Center 6776 Ayala Avenue, Makati City Atty. Maria Valentina S. Santana-Cruz Senate Legal Counsel Senate of the Philippines Pasay City The Senate Secretary Senate of the Philippines Rm. 606, 6th Floor, GSIS Building Pasay City The Secretary General House of Representatives Batasan Hills, Quezon City Public Information Office Supreme Court Padre Faura, Manila EXPLANATION This Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti is being served by registered mail due to lack of time and messengerial personnel, instead of the preferred mode of personal service. MICHAEL T. MACAPAGAL Associate Solicitor

2012-02-25 Comment Psbank Vs Senate-As of 609pm

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2012-02-25 Comment Psbank Vs Senate-As of 609pm

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA En Banc PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK and PASCUAL M.

PANEL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents. x------------------------------------x

Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3 (6).

On January 31, 2012, the Prosecution Panel filed a Request

Customer Identification and Specimen Signature

Monthly bank statements of the bank accounts

Other bank accounts, including time deposits,

On the very same day, the Prosecution Panel filed another

Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex

hereof. hereof. hereof. hereof. hereof. hereof.

testify on [their] knowledge in the case which is

bring with you the original and certified true

copies of the opening documents for the above-described accounts.

Annex A of the Petition.

In its Resolution dated February 9, 2012, the Honorable Supreme Court:

issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining

(b) required respondents to comment on the petition not

later than ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

Hence, this Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti.

Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.

instrumentality of government; (b) Whether there are constitutionally imposed

or instrumentality properly acted within such limits.

This Gutierrez. recognized

impeachment cases and the express constitutional limitations on this

Francisco vs. Nagmamalasakit na Mga Manananggol, et al., supra.

promulgation, the Court is in no position to dictate a

460 Phil. 830 (2003).

That is not the case here.

643 SCRA 198, 244 (2011).

exercise its power of expanded judicial review in this case.

Constitution, Article XI, Section 3(6).

Rule V, Senate Impeachment Rules.

provided under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

Nixon v. US, supra.

At the time, the means of enforcing such command was

provisions which must be followed.

Now the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

Supra. G.R. No. 140687, December 18, 2006.

URGENT MOTION TO LIFT TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

These requisites are not present in this case.

Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1.

Makati City for Manila, February 25, 2012.

HILARION B. BUBAN State Solicitor

You might also like