Constantinos Pagonis 2004 America's use of private militarized firms in Iraq has increased scrutiny on the use of mercenaries

and renewed political scientists' interest in the topic. However, the presence of mercenaries in armies is as old as warfare itself. Cyrus the Younger of Persia was said to have hired as many as 10,000 Greek mercenaries in the fourth century BC. The Romans, Mongols, Abbasids, Chinese and virtually every European colonial empire utilized mercenaries at some point in their history. Despite the long history of mercenaries in warfare; scholars have thus far confined themselves to individual case studies or region specific analysis. The billions of dollars that are spent on mercenaries every year necessitate a closer examination of mercenaries' effectiveness. Current scholarship has neglected to address whether governments or rebel groups that employ mercenaries win the wars they are fighting. In order to more clearly establish a linkage between the outcome of wars and the use of mercenaries, this paper seeks to identify the presence and number of mercenaries in civil wars throughout the latter half of the twentieth century in both government and rebel armies. This paper argues that there is an established relationship between a government or rebel group's use of mercenaries and victory in a civil war. If the relationship between the presence of mercenaries and the war's outcome is negative, than policy makers are expending resources on forces that are unlikely to change the outcome of wars. Conversely, if the relationship is positive, than policy makers ought to consider increasing their militaries use of mercenaries. This relationship is especially important for third world governments which lack the funding or level of national cohesion to support an effective national army. If governments that employed mercenaries were ultimately successful in defeating rebellions, than relatively limited defense expenditures would most likely be better spent on mercenaries than ineffectual government troops.

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 To prevent semantical differences from obscuring the substantive aspects of this work requires the establishment of several definitions. For the purpose of this paper, a mercenary is defined as a soldier that fights for personal profit rather than an allegiance to a state, ethnic group, political party or ideology. Mercenaries are generally from a country other than the one they are fighting in, but for the purposes of this paper will not solely be limited to foreign forces. P.W. Singer's definition of private militarized firms (PMF) as "profit driven organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare," will be utilized. i Mechanics and other members of militaries that are in noncombat roles are counted in statistics on national armies. Therefore, any member of a PMF that is party to a civil war is considered to be a mercenary irrespective of whether they actually took part in actual combat. A civil war is defined as an "armed conflict between an incumbent government and a rebel organization."ii We begin with a comprehensive overview of the current literature on mercenaries and private military corporations with a particular emphasis on the absence of broad based quantitative studies. The methodology we employed to produce our dataset is then presented and broken down further into regional groupings. A brief account of each civil war where mercenaries were present; identifying the belligerents, the number of mercenaries, the mercenaries' relevance to the overall conflict and the presence of airpower, is included along with descriptive statistics derived from the data set. From this dataset, we evaluate the central hypothesis put forth in the work and provide potential explanations for observed relationships. In the final section, suggestions are given for future research that is not addressed by current scholarship. Past and Present Literature on Mercenaries and PMFs

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 Historical writings on mercenaries provide researchers with parallels that may represent patterns of state behavior that are likely to emulated in the future. Mathew Trundle in his book entitled, Greek Mercenaries from the Late Archaic Period to Alexander, provides a succinct history of mercenary warfare within ancient Greek society. He treats the service of the Greek mercenaries not merely as a military activity but as "a social phenomenon that transcended the societies across the whole Mediterranean."iii According to the author, Greek mercenaries were nothing like the modern soldiers of fortune. He goes so far as to question the appropriateness of the term "mercenary" for the ancient world given its pejorative modern meaning. iv Despite their differences, mercenaries of this period were similar to their modern counterparts in the sense that they did not operate within the community of their own polis or state and had their own identity as a group regardless of where they originally came from. v In his book entitled, Britain and the Yemen Civil War 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins, Jones discusses British mercenaries' engagement in Yemen's civil war. Britain covertly supported Royalist forces fighting against a Republican regime backed by Nasser's Egyptian forces through direct arms shipments and funding for Britain, French and Belgian mercenaries.vi The author's case study demonstrates the extent to which a small cadre of mercenary forces can affect a war. The European mercenaries created significant difficulties for the Republican and Egyptian armies, despite having to overcome intertribal rivalries and profound cultural differences between them and the tribesmen. Guy Arnold provides a history of the ad hoc mercenary bands that fought in conflicts throughout Africa during the nineteen sixties and seventies. In Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World, Arnold counters the commonly held viewpoint that mercenaries during this era fought because they had a zealous hatred of communism and therefore fought to oppose its

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 spread. Rather he finds that they all held a similar psychology that needed the adrenal rushes combat generates. Furthermore, mercenary activity provided them with the opportunity to earn salaries that were several times higher than in their respective national armies. The subtitle of Arnold's book demonstrates his attitude toward mercenaries. According to Arnold, mercenaries are "ruthless peddler[s] of violence and subversion for money".vii Wherever they have engaged in combat, he states that they have been "brutal, cruel, racist and ineffective."viii He claims they have produced "abysmal" results.ix His tirade against mercenaries goes even further; he characterizes mercenaries as "drug addicts, adventurers, racists, the bored and the rootless, psychopaths and killers".x However, even Arnold is forced to admit that the destabilization evident in parts of Africa invite mercenary intervention. A paradigm shift in contemporary international affairs scholarship on mercenaries is evident in several writings. Current literature suggests that there is a shift from "government to governance," in view of the amount of power now wielded by corporate entities.xi Krahmann, considering the changes in his paper entitled "Private Firms and the New Security Governance." The paper highlights the changing dynamic between the accepted model of the state monopoly on violence and its slide back into the hands of individuals. xii In a similar vein, Bunker sees history repeating itself and gives credence to this in "Fourth Epoch War," which highlights cyclical periods of non-state soldier/mercenary ascendancy in the West.xiii Bunker suggests that the current operational environment, wherein there are an increasing number of armed non-state actors, is taxing the capabilities of traditional law enforcement and military forces. He states that the current environment "Represents a literal playground for criminal-soldiers and mercenaries."xiv There are two schools of thought on mercenaries, namely those who support and the remainder who oppose them. The support literature emphasizes the efficiency and effectiveness

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 of PMFs. It is claimed that private security firms have a distinct corporate character; they have used legitimate instruments to secure deals and primarily supported recognized governments, avoiding hostile regimes. This literature set claims that coercion is often essential to breaking deadlocks and bringing opposing parties to the negotiation table. Private security firms are the solution for poor governments that lack the resources to field effective fighting forces, especially as the political and economic costs of peacekeeping continue to escalate. In short, this segment of the literature implies that private security firms for the most part aim to resolve conflicts.xv Those in the opposing camp point to issues of accountability and control. It is argued that private security forms are not subject to checks and balances that restrain regular, national armed forces from abusing their power. Certain authors such as Khareen Pech go further in their opposition to the use of private security firms by arguing that they constitute an "economic imperialist" force. They point to the partnerships between private security firms and mining houses as examples of this trend.xvi Robert Mandel, although not directly opposed to mercenaries, addresses the lack of current regulation which he places into three broad categories: an inability to identify problem, the absence of societal consensus, and a lack of clarity in current PMF regulations.xvii A number of authors argue that in certain contexts, private security outfits may contribute to the perpetuation of the war. For example, Sean Cleary argues that, "EO [Executive Outcomes]'s continued availability and efficiency - together with substantial arms deliveries from several countries - gave the Angolan government reason to believe that the FAA [Angolan Armed Forces] could continue to disregard the cease-fire throughout the Lusaka talks."xviii Singer, in Corporate Warriors, covers the nature of the private military industry from its inception.xix Singer attempts to categorize a diverse collection of companies providing very

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 differentiated products and services into a single construct - adding some order to what Mandel calls the "definitional morass" of private security.xx The definitions he suggests provide a useful framework for classifying firms in the industry. Singer also cites specific examples of firms and notes their successes and failures across the range of services they provide. In his book Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror, Robert Young Pelton demonstrates the extent to which mercenaries have come to play an integral role in Iraq. The author gives a snapshot of life in the world of the PMF and the independent contractors who staff these firms. He also provides a glimpse into the financiers and entrepreneurs that run PMFs and finds that their goals are not always purely financial in nature.xxi In addition to his Iraq specific case study Pelton also addresses the rise of PMFs as a supplemental tool of foreign policy. Pelton views Iraq as only the largest of a new trend wherein governments increasingly outsource vital security functions to PMFs in high risk areas. Although Pelton identifies the increasing role PMFs have in modern conflicts, he does not specify the role PMFS ought to have. The issue of eroding state sovereignty is simply passed over as a secondary concern. The vast majority of writings on PMFs still focus heavily on Africa and the likes of companies such as Executive Outcomes, Sandline, and others that fall within the typical "dogs of war" typology. Literature on mercenary activity in Africa has primarily taken a negative outlook and highlighted policy makers discomfort with the state's loss of a monopoly on the means of violence. Furthermore, authors have expressed their concern with private companies exporting military capability with impunity. Kinsey's Corporate Soldiers and International Security discusses the role private security companies play in the developing world, looking at how the privatization of security effects countries dominated by warlord politics and under conditions which Mary Kaldor terms "new

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 wars."xxii Kinsey asserts that the descent into warlord politics is partially the result of local warlord's alliances with PMFs.xxiiiAs warlord politics and shadow economies increase conflict in Africa, Kinsey argues that strategic complexes or groups that link governments, international non-governmental organizations and private companies will emerge to resolve political impasses, undertake development, and improve on the lack of security that characterizes most new wars. Given a lack of Western interest, mercenaries are likely to play a role in a nascent state's formation. xxiv Abdel Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi, in their compilation of works on mercenaries in Africa entitled, Mercenaries: an African Security Dilemma, seek to publicize the alarming trend toward governments' reliance on PMFs in African countries. O'Brien's essay points out that private security companies flourished more discreetly in Africa throughout the 1970s and 1980s and that it would be wrong to regard them as a uniquely post-Cold War phenomenon. Sierra Leone was home to a private security organization in the diamond business almost forty years before Executive Outcomes was born. xxv The general implication of the papers gathered in this book is that the presence of foreign mercenaries should be limited through legislation and the development of African regional security mechanisms. Tim Spicer, one time director of Sandline International and Executive Outcomes, seeks to counter PMFs critics in his book entitled, An Unorthodox Soldier. The work largely seeks to explain his company's involvement in Sierra Leone, however it also provides an industry insiders view of the PMF industry.xxvi Spicer argues that private military companies can play a legitimate role in resolving conflicts in developing nations. The author cites his own military career in an effort to distinguish between firms like Sandline and popular conception of mercenaries.

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 The mercenaries and PMFs literature is generally not underpinned by thorough investigative research. Very few researchers have tried to engage the subject from a balanced point of view, with the result being that the debate on deployment of private security firms and mercenaries in conflict situations is polarized.xxvii Questions of effectiveness and track records have largely been neglected. This paper seeks to fill the gap in the current literature by objectively identifying the relationship between mercenary participation and a civil war's outcome using a largely quantitative methodology. Constructing a Dataset of Mercenary Activity in Civil Wars Civil war data was derived from Mason, Wiegarten and Fett's work entitled Win, Lose or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars, who in turn extracted their data from the Correlates of War: 1816- 1992 Civil War data set.xxviii Each civil war represents a dyad consisting of the government and opposing rebels. The dates and duration of the 57 conflicts covered, and the army size were maintained in their original form. Civil war outcomes were simplified from the original dataset, with government victories coded as a 1 and rebel victories as a 0. Negotiated settlements were coded as a government victory if they resulted in the maintenance of territorial integrity and as a rebel victory if they resulted in secession. For the purpose of this work, only the name and outcome of the conflict are significant. The other aforementioned data was included to provide a reference frame of each war's magnitude, when viewed in comparison to the number of mercenaries. One additional civil war was added to the original dataset. Zaire's civil war from 19601965 was in actuality two separate civil wars. The first civil war lasting from 1960 to 1964 was between Zaire's government and the secessionist province of Katanga. The Simba revolt lasted a mere 3 months, but had entirely different rebel combatants from the Simba tribes and a

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 government controlled by the leader of the former Katangan rebels. Each of Zaire's civil wars was therefore independently coded. Argentina's civil war was removed from the original dataset and replaced with the Simba Revolt under the title Zaire. Six additional variables were added to Mason, Weingarten and Fett's original data set. Cases where the government or rebels had mercenaries present in their ranks were respectively coded with a 1. Conversely if mercenaries were not present than both variables were coded with a 0. In, instances where there were conflicting claims on the existence of mercenaries all variables were coded with a 0. If mercenaries were present, then the number of mercenaries on either or both sides was recorded. When there were conflicting reports on the number of mercenaries, a simple average was taken between a minimum of two sources. Civil wars in which mercenaries operated or maintained aircraft were coded in a similar manner, with a 1 indicating mercenary operated airpower in the service of rebels and or the government and a 0 indicating its absence. Categorical Considerations The dataset was constructed using civil rather than interstate war data because civil wars occurred more frequently in latter half of the twentieth century, thereby offering more data points. Airpower was included as a separate variable because aircraft provide militaries with unique reconnaissance, transport, and bombing capabilities that cannot easily be emulated by ground forces. Where possible the number of aircraft that were employed was provided as supplemental information that may be used in future research. The classification of forces as mercenary or nonmercenary used in this work requires several clarifications. Soldiers that fight in the service of an ideological objective and which are paid for directly or indirectly by their home governments, are not considered mercenaries under

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 the prior definition established in the paper. Therefore Soviet and Cuban troops and "advisors" in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique were not included in the dataset. Although these soldiers were foreign troops fighting for pay that was provided largely by the local government, the funding for these troops was generally provided as aid by the Soviets. Furthermore, the Soviet and Cuban soldiers did not fight on their own initiative but rather served at the behest of their home governments. Libyan troops and "advisors" in Liberia, Chad, Uganda and the Western Sahara were similarly not classified as mercenaries because they were ultimately controlled and funded by Tripoli. Domestic rebel groups that were directly funded by external parties and which lacked a clear political or ideological objective were counted as mercenaries in the dataset. The RENAMO rebel group in Mozambique was essentially a proxy created by the Rhodesian military that had little in the way of a tangible objective aside from maximizing the amount they could loot.xxix Thus the entirety of RENAMO's forces were scored as mercenaries. Although similar, the Contras in Nicaragua were not coded as mercenaries because they were founded by the indigenous population and held political motives. The Polisario movement in West Africa although falsely deemed mercenary by Morocco, never had the verifiable presence of any mercenary forces within its ranks.xxx The presence or absence of mercenaries, as well as the size of mercenary forces was verified through various primary and secondary sources including newspapers, publications, historical studies, and memoirs. Data on conflicts that occurred from 1980 to the present were primarily derived from major newspapers and publications including the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and BBC Summaries of World Broadcasts. Groups that are in opposition with one another tend to label elements or all of their opposing forces mercenaries in

10

 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 an attempt to undercut their legitimacy. As a result it was necessary to dismiss reports on mercenary activity that came directly from a government or rebel spokesperson, unless there was credible evidence to back the claim, such as a captured soldier with a known history of mercenary activity. For conflicts prior to 1980, data was extracted from historical studies and memoirs of individuals that had been mercenaries or were present in areas of mercenary activity. Determining Mercenaries' Effectiveness The number of civil wars where mercenary activity corresponded with a win for the side which employed them was recorded and expressed as a percentage of the total number of civil wars. Instances where both sides employed mercenaries are still paired and coded to the winner. Any figure in excess of 50% indicates that forces which employ mercenaries have historically proven victorious, whereas a figure below 50% indicates the opposite. Two separate identical correlations were conducted to establish whether governments and rebels respectively won more often than they lost when employing mercenaries. The sums of the forces to outcome, government to outcome and rebel to outcome pairs were then broken down by continent. Airpower was separately paired with each of the three other binary variables that corresponded with a winning outcome and then expressed as a percentage of the total number of civil wars where mercenaries were present. A value greater than the average total win percentage for the use of mercenaries indicates a positive relationship between the use of mercenary operated aircraft and an increase in the probability of victory for the forces employing them. The opposite result indicates a negative relationship between the use of mercenary operated airpower and winning wars. Quantifying Mercenary's Presence

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 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 Latin America and the Middle East each had a single conflict where mercenaries were present. In 1954, the CIA actively funded and supplied 300 Honduran mercenaries that precipitated a military overthrow of Guatemala's left leaning government under Guzman Arbenz.xxxi The CIA and the American military supplied the Honduran mercenaries with approximately 6 Thunderbolt P-47s, 3 P-51 Fighter bombers, both of which had never been seen in Latin American air forces, a Cessna 180, PBY-5 and a P-38 fighter.xxxii Nicaragua's civil war (1982-1990) was also rumored to have mercenary involvement by the UK Guardian newspaper, which claimed that the British PMF Keenie Meenie Services (KMS) was providing the Contras with training.xxxiii However these allegations were never confirmed by another reputable source. The civil war in the Arab Republic of Yemen (1962-1969) was party to a small number of independent European mercenaries. European powers aided the Royalist government military against the breakaway Marxist North Yemen Republic and its Egyptian allies through covert support for 6 British, 10 French and 3 Belgians mercenaries.xxxiv The British mercenaries helped the Royalist forces procure aircraft but did not operate or service them.xxxv Three instances of mercenary involvement occurred in Asian civil wars, all of which were actively funded by the United States in support of their allies. The CIA hired approximately 17,000 Thai soldiers to aid the Laotian government against Communist Pathet Lao guerillas in the Laotian civil war (1960-1973).xxxvi In addition, the CIA hired 300 mercenary pilots to fly 24 twin-engine transports, another 24 dozen short-takeoff-and-landing (STOL) aircraft, and 30 helicopters for its covertly owned company Air America.xxxvii Vietnam (1960- 1975) was a virtually identical situation, but on a much larger scale. The US government hired 60,000 Korean, Filipino and Thai mercenaries to fight with US and South Vietnamese troops against the Communist North Vietnamese government. xxxviii During Indonesia's civil war (1956-1960), the

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 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 CIA hired 3 Taiwanese, 2 Filipino, and 22 Polish mercenary pilots to respectively operate 2 C-45 transport planes, 4 B-26 attack aircraft, and 2 P-51 Mustangs.xxxix The vast majority of mercenary activity in the latter half of the twentieth century occurred in Africa. The civil war in Liberia (1989-1990) was party to approximately 33 European and 180 private military contractors that fought with Charles Taylor's rebel group against the government of Samuel Doe.xl Similarly, Angolan UNITA and FNLA rebels employed approximately 150 British and American mercenaries in their unsuccessful civil war (1975-1991) against the Marxist MPLA government.xli An even small number of mercenaries were employed during the Ugandan civil war, (1980-1988) where the government hired five Defense Systems Ltd. employees to fly and arm the Ugandan Army's two Bell Augusta helicopter gun ships.xlii Nigeria's first civil war (1967-1970) between the federal government and the secessionist state of Biafra occurred on a much larger scale and involved significantly larger mercenary forces. Approximately 283 French mercenaries fought with the Biafrans, under the control of legendary mercenary commander Robert Falques.xliii Both the Federal government and Biafra utilized the services of mercenary pilots. The Nigerian government employed an undocumented number of Egyptian, Czech, British, Australian and East German pilots.xliv Nigeria's air force consisting of 32 aircraft primarily from the Eastern block and 8 Australian helicopters provides for a rough estimate of approximately 35 mercenary pilots.xlv Approximately three Swedes, a West German, and a Pole flew bombing missions for Biafra.xlvi Zaire, currently called the Democratic Republic of Congo, witnessed the widespread use of mercenaries in both of its civil wars. The Katanga secession (1960-1964) had an average of roughly 400 European mercenaries within Katanga's rebel ranks.xlvii This group included a contingent of 63 mercenaries under Mike Hoare's command that were notorious for committing

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 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 atrocities.xlviii Rhodesian mercenary pilots provided airpower to Katangan forces and were rumored to have been responsible for the UN Secretary General's crash landing in Northern Rhodesia.xlix In the subsequent Simba Revolt (1964), approximately 1,500 African mercenaries fought with government forces. The sheer magnitude of mercenary forces in Chad, Mozambique and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) far exceeded that of other African conflicts. During Chad's civil war (1980-1988) Libya actively sponsored about 3,000 mercenaries, 800 of whom were imported Lebanese militiamen, with the remainder from Malawi and surrounding African countries.l Chad's government hired 1,750 mercenaries from Zaire.li In addition to these forces approximately 20 European mercenaries were known to be deployed with Chad's army.lii As previously discussed, the 6,000 soldiers comprising the RENAMO rebel group's forces in Mozambique were virtually all mercenaries paid by Rhodesian and later South African.liii The agriculture company Lonrhos, hired Defense Systems Ltd. mercenaries to protect their landholdings in Mozambique; however they were not explicitly pro-government and therefore not classified as government mercenaries.liv The withering white minority Rhodesian government was the single greatest employer of European mercenaries in any civil war throughout the world in the second half of the twentieth century. Estimates ranged from 6,000 to 1,000 foreign European mercenaries, although several newspaper and intelligence reports indicate a likely figure of around 1,500.lv The Rhodesian air force already had trained pilots and advanced aircraft, thereby eliminating the need for mercenary pilots. Descriptive statistics Mercenary-War Outcome Pairs
Gov./Rebel-Mercenary Wins

Numerical Total
6/14

Percentage
42.85%

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 Constantinos Pagonis 2004

Mercenaries Used by Gov. Gov.- Mercenary Wins Mercenaries Used by Rebels Rebel-Mercenary Wins Gov. and Rebels Both Employ Mercenaries, Gov Wins Gov/Rebel-Mercenary Airpower Wins Gov.- Mercenary Airpower Wins Rebel.- Mercenary Airpower Wins 8/14 4/8 8/14 2/8 2/2 *This accounts for the additional civil war in the gov. and rebel figures. 3/6 2/3 1/3 57.14% 50.00% 57.14% 25.00% 100.00%

50% 66.6% 33.3%

The results of this study prove the opposite of the paper's original hypothesis; there is a negative relationship between a force's use of mercenaries and victory in civil war. Please reference Appendix A and B for the full datasets. Rebels and governments each employed mercenaries in 7 conflicts. In the two civil wars where both the government and rebels utilized mercenaries, the government won in both cases. Government and rebel forces which employed mercenaries won 42.85% of the civil wars. The performance of governments was significantly better than rebel groups. Governments that utilized mercenaries effectively defeated insurgencies in 50% of the civil wars versus a 25% success rate amongst rebel groups. The negative relationship is therefore significantly stronger for rebels than governments. There appears to be a neutral relationship between the use of mercenary operated airpower and winning civil wars. Half of the six civil wars that used mercenary piloted aircraft resulted in a loss for the side employing mercenaries. However the overall success rate would be below 50% if the Biafran loss was included in the total rather than simply as a win for the Nigerian federal government. Governments faired better than rebels winning 66% of their civil wars compared with a 33% success rate amongst rebels. Geographic Distribution of Civil Wars Party to Mercenaries

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 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 Area

Civil Wars Where Mercenaries Were Present Africa Asia Latin America Middle East

Total
14/57 civil wars 9/14 3/14 1/14 1/14

Percentage
24.5% 64.28% 21.42% 7.14% 7.14%

Success Rates
Total: 6/14 Total: 5/9, Gov: 4/9, Rebels 1/9 Total: 0/3, Gov: 0/2, Rebels 0/1 Total: 1/1, Rebels: 1/1 Total: 0/1 Gov: 0/1

The geographic distribution of civil wars wherein there was mercenary involvement indicates a disproportionate usage of mercenary forces in Africa. Furthermore, mercenary allied forces were significantly more successful in Africa than in other regions of the world, winning 55.5% of the conflicts they engaged in. Asian and Middle Eastern militaries that hired mercenaries lost in every civil war covered by this paper. Rebels in Latin America performed better, winning the only major civil war in the region that was party to mercenaries. Conclusions and Explanations of Observed Relationships There are several potential explanations for the observed negative relationship. States that have a well developed national identity and steady revenue sources are likely to militarily prevail over rebel groups. Conversely, governments who lack national cohesion and well funded militaries are already predisposed to lose. Hiring mercenaries may therefore be a measure of last resort that is used in an attempt to stave off an inevitable military defeat. The high number of government loses may therefore reflect the weakness of the states that hired the mercenaries, rather than the mercenaries overall contribution to the conflict. For example, the white minority Rhodesian government was barely clinging to power in the face of determined attacks by the black majority backed ZANU rebels, when it decided to start recruiting European and American mercenaries.lvi

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 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 Similarly, poorly organized and funded rebel groups often turn to mercenaries as a means through which to offset their natural weakness vis-a-vis the state military. Mercenaries may have still been highly effective force multipliers, but inadequate to turn the tide of civil wars, 75% of which rebels have lost. Secessionist rebel groups in Zaire and Nigeria were extremely weak, both numerically and qualitatively in comparison with the national militaries they fought. These rebel groups brought in mercenaries in the hope that they could augment their forces to a degree that would prove sufficient for victory. Governments and rebel groups which achieved victory appear to have used mercenaries to complement preexisting forces rather than as a means of filling a gap in the military's fighting ability. In Zaire, Nigeria, and Uganda, the government militaries were already superior to their rebel counterparts. It is possible that mercenaries provided intelligence and airpower capabilities that gave these governments the marginal advantage that was necessary to prevail over their weaker foes. However it is impossible to determine whether or not the marginal advantage the mercenaries provided was critical to achieving a favorable outcome, without creating a counterfactual history. External intervention appears to partially explain the prevailing negative relationship. Every recorded instance wherein a government or rebel group relied on mercenaries supplied by a foreign power resulted in subsequent defeat. American hired mercenaries that supported allied rebels and governments in Asia failed repeatedly. Similarly, European and Rhodesian allied mercenary groups failed to turn the tide in African civil wars they fought in. Guatemala is the lone exception to the otherwise largely consistent evidence for intervention as an explanatory variable. Suggestions for Future Mercenary Research

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 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 Although this paper fills a gap in the current research on the relationship between mercenaries and the outcomes of civil wars, there are still significant questions that have yet to be answered. The negative relationship between the use of mercenaries and victory in war is weak. More data points are necessary to establish a stronger correlation. Civil wars that have occurred since 1990, notably Sierra Leone, Angola, the DRC, and Columbia are likely to drastically change the razor thin margin of failure that militaries using mercenaries have historically held. Therefore, future studies ought to utilize the figures we have provided here and add civil wars that have occurred in the past twenty years to establish the whether the prevailing negative relationship is maintained. A case study has not yet been undertaken that seeks to identify the qualitative differences between mercenary forces in the twentieth century. The inclusion of airpower in this paper offers researchers a starting point; however there are significant differences in the force multiplying abilities of mercenaries that have yet to be addressed. A comprehensive case study of every conflict where mercenaries were present is virtually impossible. However, there ought to be a compilation of mercenary specific case studies that provide a basis for comparison. For example, what capabilities (intelligence, artillery, heavy lift etc.) did mercenaries utilize in each conflict that proved to be the decisive factor in victory? The quantitative accounting of mercenaries in this paper provides scholars with the necessary data to establish additional relationships between mercenaries and qualitative capabilities. The relative performance of PMFs and independent mercenary groups warrant further study. Singer's work provides a categorical distinction, but it does not give a sufficient basis for measuring the relative performance of the largely ad hoc mercenary groups of the 1960's, typified by The Terrible Ones, and modern PMF's. PMF's are better organized and funded than

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 Constantinos Pagonis 2004 their past counterparts, but they are also under greater scrutiny. A comparative regional case study on Africa, where the majority of both mercenary and PMF activity has taken place would help clarify what if any advantages PMFs have over their traditional counterparts. Similarly, an industry wide analysis of PMF activity in the past twenty years has yet to be undertaken. There are presumably significant differences in the operational effectiveness, human rights record and incidences of illicit behavior in PMFs. Establishing a historical track record of the industries main players would help provide policy makers with a better understanding of how to effectively provide oversight. Furthermore, it would help governments to avoid contracting with firms that are known to actively violate human rights or engage in illegal activity.

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End Notes
i

P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security. International Security 26 (2001/2002): 186 - 220
ii

T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcomes of Civil Wars. Political Research Quarterly 52 (June 1999): 239 - 268
iii

iv

Matthew Trundle, Greek Mercenaries from the Late Archaic Period to Alexander ( New York: Routledge, 2004) 2
v

Trundle, 21-24

Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Publishers, 2004)
vii

vi

viii

ix

Guy Arnold, Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World, (London: MacMillan Press, 1999) 2
xi

xii

Elke Krahmann, "Private Firms and the New Security Governance," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 38, no. 1 (March 2002):15
xiii

Robert Bunker, "Fourth Epoch War," Marine Corps Gazette Vol. 78, no. 9 (September 1994):

20
xiv

xv

See David Shearer, "Outsourcing War", Foreign Policy, No. 112, (Fall 1998): 68-81

Herbert, M. Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, (1998): 307-331 David Shearer, 1998. "Private Armies and Military Intervention", Adelphi Paper No.316, (New York: Oxford University Press) See Khareen Pech, "Executive Outcomes - A Corporate Conquest", in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), (1999): 81-110.
xvi

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xvii

Robert Mandel, Armies Without States: The Privatization of Security (Boulder, Colorado: Rienner Publishers , 2002)
xviii

Sean Cleary "Angola - A Case Study of Private Military Involvement", in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), (1999): 141-174; Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of The Privatized Military Industry (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003)

xix

Robert Mandel, Armies Without States: The Privatization of Security (Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002) 127
xxi

xx

Robert Young Pelton. Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror, (Crown Publishers, New York, 2006) Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999)
xxiii

xxii

Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 112.
xxiv xxv

Kinsey, 131.

Abdel Fatau Musah and J. 'Kayode Fayemi, Mercenaries: an African security dilemma, ( London, Pluto Press, 2000)
xxvi

Timothy Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company, 1999)

xxvii

Abdel-Fatau Musah et al (eds.), Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, (London: Pluto Press, 2000) T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, 256

xxviii

Alex Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) 19
xxx

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"Moroccans open corridor to desert outpost, beat back Polisario Fronters," Christian Science Monitor, 5 September 1980. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) 111 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, 114

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"Iran-Contra Arms Scandal; British Contra Supply Role Probed," Facts on File World News Digest, 20 March 1987. Jones, 194 Ibid.

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House of Representatives, "Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 1991," Federation of American Scientists, 17 October 1990. Available from: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1990_cr/h901017-ia1.htm William M. Leary, "CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974" Central Intelligence Agency, Available from: https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter99-00/art7.html

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Robert M. Blackburn, Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flags," (London: MfCarland and Company, 1994) 143 Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Feet to the Fire, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999): 61-71 Dr. Gary K. Busch, Interview Via Email, Washington DC, 10 April 2007 Vines, 35 "Britons' role in Uganda war" New York Times, 19 February 1986. Arnold, 19 Arnold, 18

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Michael R. Stafford, "Quick Kill in Slow Motion: The Nigerian Civil War," 1 April, 1984, Available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/SMR.htm Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries, (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987) 120 Arnold, 1-6 Mike Hoare, The Road to Kalamata, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989) 3

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Mockler, 51

"Libya Recruits Druze Militiamen," New York Times, 22 September 1987.

"Chadian Government Intensifies Drive Against Rebels in North" Washington Post, 13 July 1983

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"Government Recruits White Mercenaries," The Associated Press, 17 July 1983. Vines, 19 Vines, 51 Wilfred Burchett, The Whores of War, (London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1977) 139

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