Shriven Ham Paper 5

DEFENCE | SECURITY |
DEVELOPMENT
Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA
www.defenceacademy.mod.uk
The Defence Academy aims to deliver high quality
education and training, research and advice in order to
sustain and enhance operational capability and advance
the defence and security interests of the United Kingdom.
Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors
by John Kiszely
THE SHRIVENHAM PAPERS - Number 5
December 2007
Royal College of Defence Studies
Joint Services Command and Staff College
Defence College of Management and Technology
Advanced Research and Assessment Group
Armed Forces Chaplaincy Centre
Thc DcIcncc Acadcmy nI thc UnItcd
KIngdnm
The Defence Academy is lhe IK's Defence higher educalionaI
eslabIishmenl and comrises lhe RoyaI CoIIege of Defence Sludies,
}oinl Services Command and Slaff CoIIege, Defence CoIIege of
Managemenl and TechnoIogy, Advanced Research Assessmenl
Grou and Armed Iorces ChaIaincy Cenlre. Il is resonsibIe for
osl-graduale educalion and lhe ma|orily of command, slaff, Iead-
ershi, defence managemenl, acquisilion, and lechnoIogy, lraining
for members of lhe IK Armed Iorces and MD CiviIian Servanls,
and for eslabIishing and mainlaining ilseIf as lhe MD's rimary
Iink vilh IK universilies and inlernalionaI miIilary educalionaI
inslilulions. Il has lhree slralegic arlners King's CoIIege
London, Serco Defence & Aerosace and CranfieId Iniversily
vho rovide academic and faciIilies suorl and services.
The Academy seeks lo advance miIilary science in a number of
vays: firslIy, in reIalion lo lhe conducl of camaigns and oera-
lions il is, lherefore, a key comonenl of oeralionaI caabiIily,
secondIy, in reIalion lo hov Defence oerales in lhe inlernalionaI
securily domain, and lhe vay Defence vorks in Governmenl, and
lhirdIy, in reIalion lo lhe managemenl of Defence.
Through exIoilalion of ils inleIIecluaI cailaI, lhe Academy aims
lo acl as a overfuI force in deveIoing lhinking aboul defence
and securily, nol onIy vilhin MD bul across Governmenl, and lo
infIuence vider debale aboul defence and securily issues.
ShrivP6Insfront.xp 11/21/07 10:52 AM Page 1
DcIcncc Acadcmy nI thc UnItcd KIngdnm
Advanccd Rcscarch and Asscssmcnt Grnup (ARAG)
DEFENCE 5ECURITY DEVELOPMENT
Shrivenham Iaer Number 6, November 2OO7
Post-Modern ChaIIenges for Modern Warrlors
by }ohn KiszeIy
No arl of lhis ubIicalion, excel for shorl quolalions, may be reroduced, slored
in a relrievaI syslem, or lransmilled in any form vilhoul lhe rior ermission of
lhe Advanced Research and Assessmenl Grou.
Thc vIcws cxprcsscd In thIs papcr arc cntIrc!y and sn!c!y thnsc nI thc authnr and
dn nnt ncccssarI!y rcI!cct nIIIcIa! thInkIng nr pn!Icy cIthcr nI Hcr Majcsty's
Gnvcrnmcnt, nr nI thc MInIstry nI DcIcncc.
ARAG
The ARAG mission is lo carry oul advanced research and assessmenl in order lo
kee lhe Defence Academy's syIIabi al lhe culling edge, and lo enhance senior
decision laking and oIicy deveIomenl, in order lo romole oeralionaI caabiIily
and advance lhe defence and securily inleresls of lhe Iniled Kingdom.
ARAG conducls ils aclivily using bolh lhe unique exerlise of one of ils eIe-
menls, lhe ConfIicl Sludies Research Cenlre (CSRC), and lhemalic 'research cIus-
lers' of knovIedgeabIe eoIe from a vide range of backgrounds.
5HRIVENHAM PAPER5
The Shrivenham Iaers series of monograhs is envisaged as a means of dissemi-
naling ideas of conlemorary or near-lerm reIevance, faIIing vilhin lhe comass of
lhe ARAG mission sel oul above. Lmhasis viII be Iaced on raid resonse and
earIy ubIicalion of maleriaI submilled. Conlribulions are inviled, iniliaI submis-
sions shouId be made in A4 hard coy, backed u by disk or emaiI as MS Word
fiIe, lo:
ARAG IubIicalions Manager, Miss Lmma McCarlhy, ARAG, Defence
Academy of lhe Iniled Kingdom, Headquarlers Iock 4, Iaringdon Road, WalchfieId,
Svindon, WiIls SN6 8TS (emcccarlhy.hqdefenceacademy.mod.uk)
Commenls on lhis aer viII be veIcomed, and shouId be direcled lo ARAG
IubIicalions Manager as above.
ShrivP6Insback.xp 11/21/07 10:50 AM Page 1
Shrivenham Paper Number 5, December 2007
28 1
6O. MichaeI Hovard, 'The Ise and Abuse of MiIilary Hislory', in MichaeI
Hovard, ed, 1nc Ccuscs cj Wcr cn! Oincr |sscqs, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard
II, 1983, 194-195.
61. WiIIiam WeslmoreIand, A Sc|!icr Rcpcris, Nev York, DoubIeday, 1976,
364. See aIso WiIIiamson Murray, 'Thoughls on MiIilary Hislory and lhe
Irofession of Arms', in WiIIiamson Murray and Richard Harl Sinnreich, eds,
1nc Pcsi cs Prc|cguc. 1nc |mpcricncc cj Hisicrq ic inc Mi|iicrq Prcjcssicn, Nev
York, Cambridge II, 2OO6, 89.
62. GaIuIa, cp cii, 67.
63. US Armq Mcnuc| 3-24. ix.
64. Smilh, cp cii, 1.
IST-MDLRN CHALLLNGLS IR MDLRN WARRIRS

28
Kiszely.xp 11/21/07 1:20 PM Page 28
THE DEFENCE ACADEMY
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
PO5T-MODERN CHALLENGE5
FOR MODERN WARRIOR5
BY
JOHN KI5ZELY
THE 5HRIVENHAM PAPER5
NUMBER 6
NOVEMBER 2007
DEFENCE ACADEMY
POST-MODERN CHALLENGES
FOR MODERN WARRIORS
BY
JOHN KISZELY
THE SHRIVENHAM PAPERS
NUMBER 5
December 2007
2 27
ii
Coyrighl }ohn KiszeIy 2OO7
AII righls reserved
}ohn KiszeIy has asserled lhe moraI righl
lo be regarded as lhe aulhor of lhis vork
Iirsl ubIished 2OO7 by lhe Defence Academy of lhe Iniled Kingdom
ISN 978-O-9553921-5-3
Tyesel by Defence Academy, ARAG IubIicalions Seclion
Cover design by CranfieId Sludios, CranfieId Iniversily, Defence Academy
Iroduced by Media Services, CranfieId Iniversily, Defence Academy
American Viev of Tvenly Iirsl Cenlury CounlerInsurgency', RUS| jcurnc|,
VoI 152, No 4, Augusl 2OO7, 15.
45. This requiremenl goes some vay beyond MichaeI Hovard's advice
aboul miIilary doclrine lhal '|Wjhal does maller is lo gel il righl vhen lhe
momenl arrives'. 'MiIilary Science in and Age of Ieace', RUS| jcurnc| No 119,
March 1974 advice beller suiled lo an age of eace.
46. This aragrah IargeIy laken from KiszeIy, cp cii, 24.
47. CoIin McInnes, 'The rilish Army's Nev Way in Warfare: A DoclrinaI
Missle`', Defence and Securily AnaIysis, 23:2, 127-141, }une 2OO7, hll:11
dx.doi. org11O.1O8O11475179O7O1424697.
48. GiuIio Douhel, 1nc Ccmmcn! cj inc Air, lrans Dino Ierrari, Washinglon
DC, ffice of Air Iorce Hislory, 1942, rerinl 1983, 3O.
49. David KiIcuIIen, 'Counlerinsurgency Rc!ux', Surtitc|, Winler 2OO6-2OO7,
116.
5O. }ohn MasIand and Laurence Radvay, Sc|!icrs cn! Scnc|crs, Irincelon II,
1957, 382-5.
51. The IK referred lo lhe Armed Iorces' aclivily in lhis camaign as
'MiIilary Aid lo lhe CiviI Iover'.
52. SamueI I Hunlinglon, 1nc Sc|!icr cn! inc Sicic, Cambridge, Mass,
Harvard II, 1957, 14.
53. Hunlinglon, cp cii, 266.
54. 'There is. a overfuI case for lhe eslabIishmenl of a schooI for confIicl
revenlion, armed inlervenlion and osl-confIicl reconslruclion vhich
couId acl as a kind of high-IeveI slaff coIIege lo Iearn Iessons, roose
changes lo governmenl and deveIo and ass on exerlise lo senior service-
officers, civiI servanls and oIilicians. This leaching shouId have an inler-
nalionaI dimension loo, given lhal one of lhe lasks is lo sread besl raclice
and raise caacily, nol |usl in lhe deveIoed vorId, bul in olher armed forces
and governmenl raclilioners vorIdvide.' Iaddy Ashdovn, Sucr!s cn!
P|cugnsncrcs. Bringing Pcccc ic inc 1ucniq |irsi Ccniurq, London, WeidenfeId
and NichoIson, 2OO7, 192.
55. In conlrasl lo lhe Iniled Slales Armed Iorces, and in conlrasl vilh lhe
rilish Army in, for examIe, lhe 197Os, vhen, amongsl lhose officers vho
eIecled lo underlake mid-career oslgraduale rogrammes lo xford and
Cambridge, subsequenlIy achieved four slar rank, and made significanl con-
lribulions lo miIilary lhoughl, vere Irank Kilson, Anlhony Iarrar-HockIey,
and NigeI agnaII.
56. Ranslro and Herd, cp cii, 3.
57. MasIand and Radvay, cp cii, 71.
58. Roberl urns, 'To ALouse', 1nc Ccncngcic Burns. 1nc Ccmp|cic Pccms cn!
Scngs cj Rc|cri Burns, Ldinburgh, Canongale, 2OO3, 132.
59. Sun Tzu, 1nc Ari cj Wcr, lrans RaIh D Savyers, ouIder, CoIorado, 1994,
179.
27
26 3
26. Max Haslings, Wcrricrs, London, HarerCoIIins, 2OO5, xi.
27. Max ool, 1nc Sctcgc Wcrs cj Pcccc, London, asic ooks, 2OO2, 285.
28. Quoled in NagI, cp cii, 2O3.
29. KiszeIy, cp cii, 19.
3O. r as Kilson uls il, 'lhe quaIilies required for fighling convenlionaI var
are differenl from lhose required for deaIing vilh subversion or insurgency'.
Kilson, cp cii, 2OO.
31. RaIh Ielers, 'In Iraise of Allrilion', Pcrcmcicrs, Summer 2OO4, 24-26.
AIso '|Cjarrying oul civiI adminislralion and oIice funclions is simIy going
lo degrade lhe American caabiIily lo do lhe lhings America has lo do. We
don'l need lo have lhe 82nd Airborne escorling kids lo kindergarlen.'
CondoIeeza Rice, Ncu Ycr| 1imcs, 21 clober 2OOO.
32. CarI von CIausevilz, On Wcr, MichaeI Hovard and Ieler Iarel, lrans &
eds, Irincelon II, 1984, 75.
33. This hrase is arl of lhe IS Army's SoIdier's Creed, bul excIuded from lhe
Warrior Llhos vhich is arl of lhe Creed. The Warrior Llhos ilseIf is remarkabIy
berefl of any menlion of fighling or kiIIing: 'I viII aIvays Iace lhe mission firsl.
I viII never accel defeal. I viII never quil. I viII never Ieave a faIIen comrade'.
hll:11vvv.lradoc.army.miI1Io1TNSarchives1SelemberO41O923O4. hlm
accessed 1 Se 2OO7.
34. Ielers, cp cii, 24-26.
35. Chrisloher Coker, 1nc Wcrricr |incs. Mi|iicrq Cu|iurc cn! inc Wcr cn
1crrcr, Abingdon, RoulIedge, 2OO7, 7, 41-2 & 61.
36. CharIes KruIak, 'The Slralegic CororaI: Leadershi in lhe Three Iock
War', Mcrinc Gczciic , }anuary 1999, 3.
37. See, for examIe, House of Commons SeIecl Commillee on Defence,
1997-98 Lighlh Reorl, aragrah 2O3, vvv.ubIicalions.arIiamenl. uk1a1
cm1997981cmseIecl1cmdefence1138 accessed 3O Selember 2OO7.
38. Kilson, cp cii, 199.
39. Ccunicring |rrcgu|cr 1nrccis. A Ccmprcncnsitc Apprcccn, ISMC, Quanlico,
}une 2OO6.
4O. US Armq Mcnuc| 3-24 (aIso US Mcrinc Ccrps Wcrjigniing Pu||icciicn 3-
33.6).
41. US Armq Mcnuc| 3-24, ix-x.
42. IK MD }oinl Doclrine Nole 21O7, Ccunicring |rrcgu|cr Aciitiiq Wiinin A
Ccmprcncnsitc Apprcccn, March 2OO7.
43. Ior 'comIex' insurgencies see }ohn MackinIay, Dcjcciing Ccmp|cx |nsurgcncq.
Bcqcn! |rc cn! Ajgncnisicn, RISI WhilehaII Iaer No 64, 2OO5, vi-vii.
44. 'The fieId manuaI vas videIy revieved, incIuding by severaI }ihadi veb-
siles, coies have been found in TaIiban lraining cams in Iakislan. Il vas
dovnIoaded 1.5 miIIion limes in lhe firsl monlh afler ils osling lo lhe Iorl
Leavenvorlh and Marine Cors vebsile.' Sarah SevaII, in lhe forevord lo lhe
Chicago Iniversily Iress edilion of lhe manuaI, quoled in }ohn A NagI, 'An
26
Cnntcnts
IntrnductInn 5
EndurIng and ChangIng Cha!!cngcs 6
Thc Cu!tura! Cha!!cngc 8
TraInIng and DnctrInc 12
EducatInn 14
Cu!tura! Changc 20
Cnnc!usInns 22
Endnntcs 24
iii
4 25
iv
Iicuicncni Gcncrc| Sir jcnn Kiszc|q is Dirccicr
cj inc Dcjcncc Acc!cmq cj inc Uniic! King!cm.
'The Theory and Iraclice of Insurgency and Counler-Insurgency', Nctc| Wcr
Cc||cgc Rcticu, AriI 1965, reroduced, Winler 1998, VoI LI, No 1, 46.
8. We shouId nol be surrised lhal a arlicuIarIy successfuI slyIe in varfare
evokes a resonse vhich re|ecls il in favour of a differenl one vhich exIoils
slrenglhs and veaknesses exosed by changing circumslances. This rocess
has been a conslanl lhroughoul hislory vilh modern (for lheir lime) slyIes of
varfare conslanlIy being chaIIenged or usured by osl-modern slyIes. Nor
does lhe use of lhe lerm 'osl-modern' imIy lhal lhose vho adol lhis slyIe
refrain from emIoying highIy advanced lechnoIogy as conlemorary insur-
genls are doing so effecliveIy.
9. Ruerl Smilh, 1nc Uii|iiq cj |crcc. 1nc Ari cj Wcr in inc Mc!crn Wcr|!,
Icn!cn, Ienguin, 2OO5, 3.
1O. David GaIuIa, Ccunicrinsurgcncq. 1nccrq cn! Prcciicc, Weslorl, Iraeger,
2OO6, 63.
11. Magnus Ranslro and Graeme I Herd, 'Aroaches lo Counlering
Terrorism and CIST', in Anne AIdis and Graeme I Herd, 1nc |!cc|cgicc| ucr cn
1crrcr. Wcr|!ui!c Sircicgics jcr Ccunicr-1crrcrism, London, RoulIedge, 2OO7,
3.
12. ||i!.
13. }ohn KiszeIy, 'Learning Aboul Counler-insurgency', RUS| jcurnc|, VoI
152 No 1, December 2OO6, 19.
14. Horsl RilleI and MeIvin Webber, 'DiIemmas in a GeneraI Theory of
IIanning', in N Cross (ed), Dctc|cpmcnis in Dcsign Mcinc!c|cgq, Chichesler,
WiIey and Son, 1984, 135-144. The aulhors conlrasl 'vicked' robIems
vilh lhe reIaliveIy benign or 'lame' robIems of malhemalics, chess, or uz-
zIe-soIving.
15. IaII, cp cii, 47.
16. Lavrence Ireedman, 1nc 1rcnsjcrmciicn cj Sircicgic Ajjcirs, London, IISS
AdeIhi Iaer No. 379, 2OO6), 2O.
17. Anlhony Cordesman, 1nc Wcr Ajicr inc Wcr. Sircicgic Icsscns cj |rc cn!
Ajgncnisicn, Significanl Issues Series, VoIume 26, Number 4, Cenler for
Slralegic and InlernalionaI Sludies, Washinglon, 2OO6, 71.
18. See David GIanlz, Sctici Mi|iicrq Opcrciicnc| Ari. |n Pursuii cj Dccp Bcii|c,
London, Irank Cass, 1991, 44, and eIIamy, cp cii, 173-176.
19. The Russian 'norme', malhemalicaIIy- and scienlificaIIy- derived re-
scribed rales and scaIes. See GIanlz, i|i!.
2O. }ohn NagI, Iccrning ic |ci Scup Wiin A Knijc, Chicago II, 2OO2, 175.
21. Irank Kilson, Icu |nicnsiiq Opcrciicns, London, Iaber and Iaber, 1971,
2OO.
22. CIausevilz, cp cii, 88.
23. asiI LiddeII-Harl, 1ncugnis cn Wcr, London, Iaber & Iaber, 1943, 115.
24. There are obvious araIIeIs vilh Thomas Kuhn's aradigm lheories.
25. Sncricr Oxjcr! |ng|isn Diciicncrq, cp cii.
25
24 5
1. Sncricr Oxjcr! |ng|isn Diciicncrq, Iiflh Ldilion, xford II, 2OO2.

Websler`s Diclionary has a simiIar definilion: 'Someone engaged in or exeri-
enced in varfare'. Wc|sicrs On|inc Diciicncrq, 2OO7, vvv.vebslers-onIine-
diclionary.org.
2. See CoIin S Gray, Ancincr B|cc!q Ccniurq, London, Ihoenix, 2OO6, 37.
3. iII vens, Iijiing inc |cg cj Wcr, aIlimore, }ohns Hokins II, 2OOO,
15. As a former Vice Chairman of lhe IS }oinl Chiefs of Slaff, AdmiraI
vens' vievs vere arlicuIarIy infIuenliaI in miIilary and oIilicaI circIes in
lhe IS. Much of lhe hye surrounding lhe RevoIulion in MiIilary Affairs is
vrillen in Ianguage lhal Ldvard Lullvak described, severaI decades earIi-
er, as 'brochuremanshi. vhere exlravaganl cIaims are camoufIaged
under lhe seudo-lechnicaI Ianguage fashionabIe in miIilary circIes`.
Ldvard Lullvak, A Diciicncrq cj Mc!crn Wcr, London, AIIen Lane Ienguin
Iress, 1971, 4. Nor vere lhese exlravaganl cIaims confined lo civiIians.
GeneraI RonaId IogeIeman, Chief of lhe IS Air Iorce, leslifying before
Congress in 1997, asserled '|Ijn lhe firsl quarler of lhe 21sl cenlury you viII
be abIe lo find, fix or lrack, and largel in near reaI lime anylhing of con-
sequence lhal moves uon or is Iocaled on lhe face of lhe Larlh'. MichaeI
'HanIon, 1ccnnc|cgicc| Cncngc cn! 1nc |uiurc cj Wcrjcrc, Washinglon DC,
The rooking Inslilule Iress, 2OOO, 13. Aarl from anylhing eIse, il vouId
have been inleresling lo hear GeneraI IogeIman's definilion of vhal consli-
luled 'anylhing of consequence'.
4. Some vrilers drev concIusions of even more far-reaching consequences,
for examIe: 'The olenliaI abiIily of lhe Iniled Slales lo heI consoIidale a
revoIulion in geoslralegic affairs in vhich mosl of lhe vorId's ma|or indus-
lriaI overs are democralic, roserous, aIIied vilh each olher, Iacking a
ma|or slralegic foe, and graduaIIy exlending lheir cIub of membershi lo
olher counlries is even more hisloric, and more imorlanl, lhan ils urorl-
ed abiIily lo again revoIulionize varfare'. 'HanIon, cp cii, 197.
5. See Rod Thornlon, Asqmmciric Wcrjcrc, Cambridge, IoIily Iress, 2OO7,
178-9.
6. This is nol |usl a maller of keeing u vilh lechnoIogy, bul of keeing u
vilh lechnics: aII asecls of lhe reIalionshi belveen equimenl and ils oera-
lors. 'Weaons deveIomenl is onIy one corner of a lriangIe, of vhich lhe olher
lvo are a laclicaI doclrine for using lhe veaon, and lhe lraining of lhe com-
balanls, individuaIIy and coIIecliveIy, lo use il.' Chrisloher eIIamy, 1nc
|tc|uiicn cj Mc!crn Wcrjcrc. 1nccrq cn! Prcciicc, London, RoulIedge, 199O, 3O.
7. They are, of course, as oId as var ilseIf, and vilh Ienly of reIaliveIy
recenl exerience on vhich lo drav: '|Ijf ve Iook al lhe 2Olh Cenlury aIone ve
are nov in Viel-Nam faced vilh lhe forly-eighlh smaII var'. ernard IaII,
24
Pnst-Mndcrn Cha!!cngcs
Inr Mndcrn WarrInrs
by
Jnhn KIszc!y
IntrnductInn
A
S WARIARL THL IRACTICL I WAR changes lhrough lhe ages, so il can be
execled lo change lhe demands il Iaces on ils raclilioners. Where lhese
changes in raclice are dramalic for examIe, lhe advenl of mechanized var-
fare lhe changing demands viII be easy lo sol. ul vhere lhe changes are
more evoIulionary or graduaI, over a eriod of lime, il is Iess easy lo idenlify
lhe imacl on miIilary rofessionaIs. Il is aIso ossibIe lo be Iiving lhrough a
eriod of such change vilhoul being avare of il: from one monlh lo lhe nexl
even from one year lo lhe nexl change can lake Iace so graduaIIy as lo be
aImosl imercelibIe.
Il is cerlainIy ossibIe, Iooking back, lo erceive changes in fealures of varfare
over lhe aImosl-lvo decades since lhe end of lhe CoId War for examIe, lhe
increased incidence of civiI vars and inslabiIily in faiIed or faiIing slales, and
lhe rise of lerrorism and insurgency, nalionaI and lrans-nalionaI and lo iden-
lify some of lhe differenl demands Iaced on our armed forces as a resuIl, bul
some of lhe demands, arlicuIarIy lhose lhal mighl be laking Iace in currenl
oeralions, may be Iess obvious. Il is limeIy lo examine lhese chaIIenges and
lheir imacl on armed forces, and lo assess hov veII Iaced lhey are lo coe
vilh lhe oeralionaI chaIIenges of lhe fulure.
This aer examines lhe chaIIenges resenled lo modern varriors by changes
in conlemorary varfare, and argues lhal vhiIe some of lhese chaIIenges have
been or are being overcome, lhere are olhers, arlicuIarIy lhose associaled vilh
miIilary educalion and cuIlure, vhich have yel lo be fuIIy recognized, Iel aIone
mel, and vhich viII require lo be so if modern varriors are lo be a malch for
lomorrov's varfare.
5
6 23
EndurIng and ChangIng Cha!!cngcs
I
N TLRMS I THL CHALLLNGLS IACING WARRIRS 'erson|sj vhose occualion is
varfare'
1
lhe eriod of lhe CoId War vas characlerized by lhe quesl lo kee
u vilh lhe modernizalion of lhe ballIefieId: for examIe, lhe increasing sohis-
licalion of veaon syslems, lhe imacl of informalion lechnoIogy, lhe increased
comIexily of command and conlroI, of slaff vork and laclics. ne of lhe ma|or
chaIIenges vas lhal of roviding varriors vilh sufficienl lraining, and lhis
desile or, cynics mighl argue, as a resuIl of lhe increasing number and
sohislicalion (nol lo menlion cosl) of lraining aids, simuIalors and oeralionaI
anaIysis looIs. Nev command and slaff courses, for examIe in lhe Iniled
Slales and in severaI Luroean armed forces, vere crealed lo heI meel lhis
demand, and many miIilaries found lhal lraining lo achieve lhe necessary skiIIs
vas a fuII lime occualion. ul as a resuIl of resonding lo lhis chaIIenge many
became beller lrained and more rofessionaI in lhe sense of being more
focused on achieving exerlise in lheir |obs arguabIy, lhan ever before.
Wilh a fev excelions, lhe ballIefieId for vhich lhey reared (and by vhich
lhey |udged lheir rofessionaIism) vas lhe arena of Iarge-scaIe, inler-slale com-
bal or, as some came lo caII il varfighling. Indeed, for many miIilary ro-
fessionaIs, varfare lhe raclice of var, and varfighling combal, vere syn-
onymous, lhereby misIeading lhemseIves lhal lhere vas no more lo lhe rac-
lice of var lhan combal.
2
True, some armed forces found lhemseIves invoIved
in olher lyes of oeralions, for examIe osl-coIoniaI disengagemenl, anli-
communisl inlervenlions, Iniled Nalions eacekeeing missions, or even
inlernaI securily roIes in lheir ovn counlries. ul lhese missions vere IargeIy
considered by many miIilary eslabIishmenls lo be aberralions eralions
lher Than War, as lhey came lo be knovn in rilish and American doclrine
dislraclions from lhe 'reaI lhing': Iarge-scaIe, hi-lech, inler-slale confIicl, vhich
vas erceived axiomalicaIIy (and nol vilhoul hubris) lo be 'modern varfare' in
lhe sense of being a cuIminalion in evoIulionary deveIomenl. The essence of
lhis lye of varfare vas a conlesl, reIaliveIy simIe in conceluaI lerms,
belveen lvo reguIar armed forces, vhere var and eace, and viclory and
defeal, vere cIearIy idenlifiabIe slales, vhere lhe mission vas lo deslroy lhe
enemy's forces, and lhe melhod vas lhe aIicalion of overvheIming fireov-
er, faciIilaled by hysicaI manoeuvre.
Wilh lhe excelion of some nalions vhich chose lo seciaIize in eacekeeing
and humanilarian oeralions, lhe requiremenl for armed forces lo be reared
for 'lhe reaI lhing' did nol, of course, end vilh lhe CoId War. Lncouraged by lhe
zeilgeisl of lhe so-caIIed RevoIulion in MiIilary Affairs, vilh ils exlravaganl
cIaims lhal il 'chaIIenges lhe hoary diclums aboul lhe fog and friclion of var',
3
and lhus lhe nalure of var ilseIf, and amid asserlions lhal lhis viev vas vindi-
caled by lhe one-sided nalure and resuIl of lhe 1991 GuIf War,
4
lhe deveIomenl
of modern varfare conlinued, and conlinues, in Iinear fashion,
5
driven IargeIy
6
AII armed forces need lo recognize lhal reIiance on lraining and doclrine aIone
as looIs for achieving success in osl-modern varfare is misIaced, and lhal an
imorlanl faclor in lhe rocess more imorlanl lhan in modern varfare is
educalion. Such educalion needs lo focus on lhe deveIomenl of minds, and in
arlicuIar lhe deveIomenl of breadlh of vision, underslanding, visdom and
good |udgemenl. Lducalion is required nol |usl for lhose nev lo osl-modern
oeralions, bul aIso lo ensure lhal lhose vilh some exerience in lhese oera-
lions do nol over-reIy on lheir exerience, for examIe by lransIaling inaro-
riale Iessons from one camaign lo anolher. MiIilaries shouId
underlake more of lheir educalion and lraining aIongside reresenlalives of
lhose organizalions vilh vhich lhey viII find lhemseIves oeraling in fulure, nol
Ieasl lo gain an underslanding of lhe differenl organizalionaI cuIlures. And lo
avoid inslilulionaI cuIlure and slereolyicaI lhinking, and lo in|ecl fresh ideas
inlo lhe officer cors, armed forces shouId ensure lhal lhey send a sufficienl
number of lheir brighlesl and besl for oslgraduale rogrammes in civiIian uni-
versilies. In generaI, miIilaries viII need lo find more lime for rofessionaI miI-
ilary educalion.
AII of lhis is IikeIy lo caII for a change of inslilulionaI cuIlure for some miIilaries,
or vilhin areas of miIilaries, arlicuIarIy for lhose inslilulions or individuaIs
vho see lhemseIves ureIy as combal varriors. The essence of lhe change of
cuIlure is for lhese combal varriors lo come lo |udge lheir rofessionaIism (in
vhich mosl lake such ride) by lheir erformance nol |usl in combal, bul in aII
roIes lhey are required lo underlake. Ior some, lhis requires a redefinilion of
rofessionaIism. Any cuIluraI change vilhin any miIilary is robIemalic, and
overcoming resislance lo change may be chaIIenging. And lhere is a aradox
here: vhere change is required, senior miIilary Ieaders viII need lo ress il
home if il is lo suslain, bul in some organizalions il may be lhal some of lhe
senior Ieaders are amongsl lhose mosl resislanl lo change. There is aIso a need
lo ensure lhal lhose vilh an underslanding of, and an acumen for, osl-modern
varfare are nol side-Iined vilhin miIilary hierarchies. There is a olenliaI com-
arison here vilh lhe arl vorId vhere, in some inslilulions, osl-modernisls
found lheir vay barred by an eslabIishmenl dominaled by modernisls.
IinaIIy, ve shouId recognize lhal over-focus on a singIe lye of varfare Iarge-
scaIe, convenlionaI varfare inhibiled underslanding of olher lyes of varfare,
and of varfare as a vhoIe. We shouId, lherefore, bevare lhe olenliaI danger
of over-focus on osl-modern varfare having lhe same resuIl.
* * *
23
22 7
find lhemseIves in combal, and vice versa. The second olion for a slale is roIe
seciaIizalion for ils armed forces as a vhoIe, eilher as combal or non-combal
forces. ul, by lhe same loken, lhe bIurring of neal deIinealions in modern oer-
alions risks lroos of one seciaIizalion finding lhemseIves in silualions for vhich
lhey are unreared and unsuiled. The lhird olion is lo accel lhal lhe desirabIe
IeveI of versaliIily is unachievabIe, bul relend olhervise, acceling lhal lroos
viII be Iess good al one roIe lhan lhe olher (or mediocre al bolh), and alleml lo
manage lhe risk. This is erhas lhe easiesl olion, bul il is robabIy aIso lhe
mosl dangerous, vilh ils olenliaI for misunderslandings vilh serious conse-
quences. None of lhese lhree olions, lherefore, is allraclive.
A
LTHIGH MANY I THL CHALLLNGLS facing miIilary rofessionaIs in osl-
modern varfare are simiIar lo lhose facing lhem in modern varfare, some
of lhem in arlicuIar lhe inleIIecluaI and cuIluraI chaIIenges are very dif-
ferenl, requiring a differenl aroach and mind-sel. Armed forces, eseciaIIy
lhose vhose rimary focus is modern varfare, need nol onIy lo recognize lhis
and adal accordingIy, bul lo inslilulionaIize adalabiIily. Amongsl olher
lhings, lhey viII need lo ensure a baIance in lheir varrior elhos lhroughoul
lheir organizalion, varrior elhos needs lo be sufficienl for combal oeralions,
bul nol so greal lhal il inhibils effeclive erformance in counler-insurgency.
The lerm 'varrior' has a number of meanings and is olenliaIIy misIeading.
ConlroIIing varrior elhos and achieving lhe righl baIance in lhe righl circum-
slances is one of lhe mosl imorlanl resonsibiIilies and dulies of any miIilary
commander al any IeveI.
Armed forces shouId nole lhal il is easy lo under-eslimale lhe amounl of lrain-
ing required in order lo erform effecliveIy in osl-modern varfare, in arlic-
uIar counler-insurgency even for lhose vho are highIy lrained in modern
varfare. Indeed, lhe more focused armed forces are on modern varfare, lhe
harder lhe lransilion is IikeIy lo be. Iinding lhe necessary lraining lime in
comelilion vilh lhal required lo kee armed forces veII reared for mod-
ern varfare is nol easy. Achieving lhe righl baIance requires fine |udgemenl
from senior miIilary officers and Defence Ianners.
Many miIilaries need lo lake more aclive sles lo ensure lhal lheir doclrine
remains u-lo-dale vilh, and reIevanl lo, an oeralionaI environmenl vhich
changes fasler lhan does lhal of modern varfare. ul acceling lhal, in rac-
lice, lhis viII nol aIvays be achievabIe, lhey aIso need lo aIIov commanders
in lhe fieId sufficienl Ialilude lo ad|usl doclrine in Iine vilh evoIving circum-
slances. Iurlhermore, lhey need lo devole considerabIe allenlion lo being
'Iearning organizalions', and ones lhal Iearn, adal and anliciale fasler lhan
lhe oosilion.
22
by a lechnoIogicaI dynamic: lhe quesl for grealer fireover, grealer IelhaIily,
grealer seed, beller sleaIlh, beller digilizalion, more efficienl Iogislics, nel-
vork-cenlric varfare, and lhe abiIily lo deIiver hi-lech 'shock and ave'. Such
varfare resenls mind-boggIing chaIIenges lo raclilioners nolabIy lhose of
lhe coordinalion and synchronizalion of vhal amounls lo a huge and erIex-
ingIy comIex machine aIbeil lhal lheir soIulion is, in characler, Nevlonian
more formuIaic and mechanislic lhan conceluaI. The overaII chaIIenge for
varriors here vas and is lo kee ace vilh (and, vhere ossibIe, lo kee ahead
of) lhe deveIomenl of varfare.
6
Il remains a considerabIe chaIIenge, bul by no
means lhe onIy one, and for some, nol even lhe mosl lesling.
The asymmelric chaIIenges osed lo modern armed forces, arlicuIarIy lhose of
IiberaI democracies, by oonenls vho refuse lo engage lhem in modern, con-
venlionaI varfare, bul inslead choose a differenl slyIe of varfare, for examIe
insurgency, are nol nev,
7
bul lhey are IargeIy of a differenl sorl: osl-modern
chaIIenges chaIIenges lhal are nol rimariIy overcome vilh lhe looIs of moder-
nily: more advanced lechnoIogy, fireover, IelhaIily, seed, sleaIlh, digilizalion,
Iogislics, nelvork-cenlric varfare or hi-lech 'shock and ave.
8
Iosl-modern
varfare does nol deveIo in Iinear fashion, and unIike modern varfare, many
of lhe ma|or chaIIenges il oses are nol so much lechnoIogicaI, formuIaic or
mechanislic as conceluaI. Ior examIe, var and eace are nol easiIy deIineal-
ed, 'defeal' and 'viclory' require definilion. The enemy is nol obvious, nor eas-
iIy idenlifiabIe, IileraIIy or figuraliveIy, and may change on an aImosl-daiIy
basis, success deends nol on deslruclion of lhe enemy, bul on oul-manoeu-
vring oonenls in arlicuIar, deriving lhem of ouIar suorl, and vin-
ning il oneseIf. The conlesl lakes Iace nol on a fieId of ballIe, bul in a comIex
civiIian environmenl: 'amongsl lhe eoIe'.
9
Nor is il a rimariIy miIilary con-
lesl, in lhe case of counler-revoIulionary varfare, according lo David GaIuIa,
'lvenly er cenl miIilary, eighly er cenl oIilicaI is a formuIa lhal refIecls lhe
lrulh'.
1O
The var, is in Iarge arl, a var of ideas, lhe ballIe IargeIy one for er-
celion, and lhe key ballIeground is in lhe mind lhe minds of lhe indigenous
ouIalion, and lhe minds of regionaI and vorId oinion.
11
Much of lhis ideo-
IogicaI slruggIe is carried oul in lhe virluaI domain of cybersace.
12
Time is a
key somelimes lhe key resource, and one vhich our oonenls are IikeIy lo
hoId in far grealer quanlily lhan do ve. Hov lhe var is foughl becomes cru-
ciaIIy imorlanl lo lhe quaIily and suslainabiIily of lhe resuIling eace.
eralions vhich couId reviousIy be cIearIy and convenienlIy IabeIIed for
examIe, combal, eacekeeing, eace enforcemenl, counler-revoIulionary
varfare, humanilarian oeralions can no Ionger be so. Nov, 'lhese reassur-
ingIy neal deIinealions sil uneasiIy vilh lhe reaIily lhal camaigns invoIving
counler-insurgency are inherenlIy messy a kaIeidoscoe of differenl lyes of
oeralion, remarkabIy resislanl lo nealness in deIinealion',
13
confusing doc-
lrine-vrilers and varriors aIike. GeneraIizing aboul lhese oeralions is nol easy,
nol Ieasl because every one is of ils ovn kind, bul many raclilion-
ers vho have exerienced lhem mighl agree lhal lhey are characlerized by four
7
8 21
lhings in arlicuIar: comIexily, ambiguily, uncerlainly and voIaliIily, and by
lhe facl lhal lhey aII lend lo be 'vicked robIems' robIems lhal are inlraclabIe
and circuIar vilh comIex near-deendencies, and vhere soIving one arl of
lhe robIem can creale furlher robIems, or make lhe vhoIe robIem grealer.
14
The nalure and characlerislics of lhese oeralions oinl lovards lhe roIes in
vhich miIilary rofessionaIs may execl lo find lhemseIves, and lhe comelen-
cies lhey require. IarlicuIarIy slriking is lhe far grealer diversily of roIes lhan is
demanded by combal oeralions aIone: for examIe, slale-buiIding, securily-
seclor reform, menloring and lraining indigenous securily forces, humanilarian
assislance, civiI adminislralion, Iav enforcemenl, exercising oIilicaI muscIe,
even sociaI vork roIes lhal mighl be execled lo be lhe roer resonsibiIily
of olher organizalions, agencies or governmenl dearlmenls. These roIes oinl,
in lurn, lovards lhe far grealer breadlh and variely of comelencies required
for examIe, lhe abiIily lo: aIy sofl over as veII as hard, and choose lhe
righl one for lhe righl circumslances, vork in arlnershi vilh muIlinalionaI,
muIli-agency organizalions, civiIian as veII as miIilary, vilhin a comrehensive
aroach, masler informalion oeralions and engage successfuIIy vilh lhe
media, conducl ersuasive diaIogue vilh IocaI Ieaders and oinion-formers,
menlaIIy oul-manoeuvre a viIy and rulhIess enemy, and, erhas mosl oflen
overIooked, measure rogress arorialeIy. These comelencies require rac-
lilioners lo have a high IeveI of underslanding across a vide range of sub|ecls,
incIuding: lhe oIilicaI conlexl, lhe IegaI, moraI and elhicaI comIexilies, cuIlure
and reIigion, hov socielies vork, vhal conslilules good governance, lhe reIa-
lionshi belveen ones ovn armed forces and sociely, lhe nolion of human secu-
rily, lhe concel of Iegilimacy, lhe Iimilalions on lhe uliIily of force, lhe sy-
choIogy of one's oonenls and of lhe resl of lhe ouIalion. Comared vilh
Iarge-scaIe, inler-slale combal, lherefore, lhe chaIIenges facing miIilary rofes-
sionaIs conducling osl-modern varfare such as counler-insurgency may or
may nol be lougher, bul lhey are cerlainIy very differenl nol Ieasl, consider-
abIy broader and more cerebraI, requiring far grealer conlexluaI underslanding,
and successfuI decision-making al aII IeveIs (nol |usl senior ones) is IikeIy lo
deend Iess on ureIy miIilary exerlise lhan on lhe aIicalion of visdom.
Thc Cu!tura! Cha!!cngc
I
N ADDITIN T A DIVLRSL AND RAD RANGL of comelencies and underslanding,
oeralions such as counler-insurgency require miIilary rofessionaIs lo have a
differenl mind-sel a differenl cuIlure from lhal required for modern varfare.
The raclilioner of modern varfare is schooIed lo see chaIIenges in a cerlain vay:
lhe end slale lhal mallers is lhe miIilary one, oeralionaI success is achieved by
lhe aIicalion of IelhaI fireover vhich, in lurn, is IargeIy a queslion of largel-
ing and hysicaI manoeuvre, lhe effecls lo be achieved are hysicaI ones, lhe
means lo lhe end are IargeIy allrilionaI: deslroying largels unliI lhere are none Iefl,
8
agree vhoIehearledIy vilh lhe change and do aII in lheir over lo effecl il, and,
on lhe olher, lhose vho disagree vilh il vhoIehearledIy and do aII lhey can lo
oose il. The Ialler are unIikeIy lo roser if lhose al lhe lo are unified in
lheir suorl for lhe change. ul among lhose in lhe middIe of lhe seclrum
lhe lhird grou viII be eoIe vho, al hearl, oose lhe change, bul under-
sland lhal overl oosilion is nol career-enhancing. Some of lhem viII, lhere-
fore, kee lheir oosilion muled, or maybe aIIov lhemseIves over lime lo be
ersuaded lo suorl lhe change, olhers, hovever, viII lreal lhe roosed
change as yel anolher iece of oIilicaI correclness: somelhing lhal musl be
esoused in ubIic, bul oosed in rivale. This Ialler grou is robabIy lhe
grealesl lhreal lo achievemenl of change. Il viII be lemling indeed for lhem lo
vail for lhe reformers lo move on lo olher |obs or Ieave lhe Service, lo be
reIaced by lhose vilh Iess reformisl zeaI.
Achieving lhe righl baIance in lhe cuIluraI orienlalion of an armed force is nol
easy, nor is il an exacl science. Al lhe hearl of oosilion lo moderaling lhe
varrior elhos and lo orienlaling a force more lovards oeralions such as
counler-insurgency and slabiIily oeralions is lhe concern, oflen unsoken,
lhal such oeralions are indeed lhe sideshov, lhal 'lhe reaI lhing', lhe uIlimale
lesl, may be Iarge-scaIe, inler-slale varfighling, ossibIy againsl a miIilary
suerover for examIe, China and lhal armed forces need lo be fuIIy
lrained and sychoIogicaIIy reared for il, and nol undermined by vhal may
be a assing hase of a lhreal vhich, vhiIe serious, is nol exislenliaI. Nor can
lhis argumenl be dismissed oul of hand, nol Ieasl because, conlrary lo lhe
vievs of lhose vho hoId lhal '|Wjar no Ionger exisls. var as cogniliveIy
knovn lo mosl non-combalanls, var as a ballIe in a fieId belveen men and
machinery, var as a massive deciding evenl in a disule in inlernalionaI
affairs: such var no Ionger exisls',
64
such varfare is nol exlincl, |usl hibernal-
ing. Less reseclabIe bul equaIIy assionale argumenls can be execled from
lhe miIilary-induslriaI Iobby for vhom diversion of lhe focus and budgel
avay from Iarge-scaIe, modern varfare reresenls a mosl unveIcome lhreal
vhich for some may, indeed, be exislenliaI.
Il may be lhal lhe cuIluraI chaIIenge of rearing some armed forces lo be bolh
adel combal soIdiers and adel counler-insurgenls is simIy unachievabIe.
Where lhis is |udged lo be lhe case, lhere aear lo be lhree olions. The firsl is
lhe crealion of lvo seciaIisl forces, vilh lhe non-combal roIe confined lo a ara-
miIilary force, simiIar lo lhose in a number of slales, such as lhe IlaIian Carabinieri
vhich acquilled ilseIf commendabIy in lhe NAT Suslainmenl Iorce in osnia,
or given lo a secific arl of lhe armed forces, such as reserve forces. This,
lhough, has ma|or disadvanlages, foremosl of vhich is lhe conslrainl of numbers
and Iack of fIexibiIily. Lven vilhoul such seciaIizalion, a number of armed
forces, such as lhe Iniled Kingdom's and lhe Iniled Slales', are highIy slrelched
on currenl oeralions. Iurlhermore, as lhese currenl oeralions demonslrale,
lroos deIoyed on counler-insurgency or slabiIizalion oeralions can quickIy
21
inter-
20 9
Cu!tura! Changc
A
IIRIRIATL DCTRINL, TRAINING AND LDICATIN are, hovever, onIy arl of lhe
soIulion. Lven more imorlanl is accelance of lhe required cuIluraI
change aIIuded lo earIier. This viII be a arlicuIar chaIIenge for lhose miIilary
rofessionaIs vho see lhemseIves ureIy as combal soIdiers. Il viII aIso be a
arlicuIar chaIIenge for lhose relurning from oeralions in Iaces such as Iraq
and Afghanislan vhose exerience of, or acquainlance vilh, counler-insur-
gency has been IargeIy of combal and vho, as a resuIl, may have IillIe lime for
lhe nicelies of 'hearls and minds' in comarison lo lhe more obviousIy heroic,
and more obviousIy revarded, aclivily of combal. Those vho are unabIe lo
make lhis cuIluraI lransilion are unIikeIy lo rove adel counler-insurgenls.
SeIeclion of lhose caabIe of lransilioning from modern lo osl-modern varfare
is aIso robIemalic. In David GaIuIa's oinion,
1ncrc crc nc ccsq criicric cnc||ing cnc ic !cicrminc in c!tcncc
uncincr c mcn unc ncs nci |ccn prcticus|q intc|tc! in c ccunicrin-
surgcncq ui|| |c c gcc! |cc!cr. Aucr|c||c sc|uiicn is ic i!cniijq incsc
unc rcc!i|q ccccpi inc ncu ccnccpi cj ccunicrinsurgcncq ucrjcrc cn!
gitc incm rcspcnsi|i|iiq. 1ncsc unc prctc incmsc|tcs in cciicn
sncu|! |c pusnc! upucr!.
62
In achieving lhe necessary cuIluraI change, lhe singIe mosl imorlanl faclor viII
be lhe Iead given from lhe lo of lhe hierarchy. Taking, for examIe, lhe Iniled
Slales, lhe lhen Chief of Slaff of lhe Army, GeneraI Ieler Schoomaker, made his
osilion, and his cIarily of vision, cIear in his inlroduclion lo lhe 2OO6
Ccunicrinsurgcncq doclrine ubIicalion,
Wcsicrn mi|iicrics icc cjicn ncg|cci inc siu!q cj insurgcncq. 1ncq
jc|sc|q |c|ictc inci crmics ircinc! ic uin |crgc ccntcniicnc| ucrs crc
cuicmciicc||q prcpcrc! ic uin smc||, unccntcniicnc| cncs. |n jcci,
scmc ccpc|i|iiics rcuirc! jcr ccntcniicnc| succcss jcr cxcmp|c, inc
c|i|iiq ic cxccuic cpcrciicnc| mcncutcr cn! cmp|cq mcssitc jirc-
pcucr mcq |c cj |imiic! uii|iiq cr ctcn ccunicr-prc!uciitc in
CO|N cpcrciicns.
63
And in many olher nalions, miIilary Ieaders have given simiIar suorl for lheir
ovn armed forces' nev aroaches lo counler-insurgency.
Imorlanl lhough il is, a Iead from lhe lo, by ilseIf, is nol enough. Any
change-managemenl rogramme requires buy-in lhroughoul lhe hierarchy.
Addressing lhe sub|ecl genericaIIy, and nol secificaIIy reIaled lo lhe armed
forces of any nalion in arlicuIar, subordinale Ieaders are IikeIy lo faII inlo lhree
main grous. Al eilher end of lhe seclrum are, on lhe one end, lhose vho
2O
lechnoIogy viII diserse or al Ieasl enelrale 'lhe imenelrabIe fog of var', given
sufficienl resources, aII camaigns are vinnabIe and quickIy, lhe vorId is divid-
ed inlo 'enemy forces' and 'friendIy forces', and lhe oeralionaI iclure can be
seen in dislincl coIours: bIack and vhile.
The cuIlure and mind-sel required for raclilioners of osl-modern varfare
such as counler-insurgency are very differenl, requiring recognilion lhal: lhe
end-slale lhal mallers mosl is nol lhe miIilary end-slale, bul lhe oIilicaI one,
indeed, 'lhe insurgency robIem is miIilary onIy in a secondary sense, and oIil-
icaI, ideoIogicaI and adminislralive in a rimary sense',
15
oeralionaI success is
nol achieved rimariIy by lhe aIicalion of IelhaI fireover and largeling, lhal
oul-manoeuvring oonenls hysicaIIy is Iess imorlanl lhan oul-manoeuvring
lhem menlaIIy, lhal, in lhe vords of Lavrence Ireedman: '|Ijn irreguIar var-
fare, sueriorily in lhe hysicaI environmenl is of IillIe vaIue unIess il can be
lransIaled inlo an advanlage in lhe informalion environmenl',
16
lhal cIaims lhal
lechnoIogy viII diserse lhe fog of var are lo execled from lechnohiIes vilh
IillIe underslanding of var (and, indeed, from lhose aid Iarge sums of money
lo make such cIaims), lhal sufficienl resources do nol Iead inexorabIy lo cam-
aign success, lhal 'lhe image of a quick and decisive viclory is aImosl aIvays
an iIIusion':
17
counler-insurgency camaigns are rareIy von quickIy and,
indeed, some are quile simIy un-vinnabIe and shouId never be allemled in
lhe firsl Iace, lhal lhe dramalis ersonae cannol be divided in Manichaean
fashion inlo 'enemy forces' and 'friendIy forces', and lhal very IillIe of lhe ic-
lure is acluaIIy ainled in bIack and vhile moslIy in shades of grey.
18
Lven lhe aroach lo robIem-soIving is differenl. In convenlionaI varfare lhe
doclrinaI aroach is essenliaIIy Carlesian or reduclionisl lhe firsl sle in
robIem-soIving is lo reduce lhe robIem lo ils essenliaIs and idenlify a vork-
abIe soIulion as quickIy as ossibIe a number of quasi-scienlific looIs for-
muIas, lemIales, 'norms'
19
have been deveIoed lo assisl in lhe rocess, lhe
referred means lo lhe end is lhe deIivery of raid and decisive effecl, a veII-
knovn diclum is 'don'l |usl sil lhere, do somelhing!' Counler-insurgency, by
conlrasl, characlerised by 'vicked robIems' does nol Iend ilseIf lo lhe reduc-
lionisl, IoverIoinl mind: lhe firsl essenliaI sle is sending lime undersland-
ing lhe nalure of lhe robIem and aII ils many facels, lo lry and deveIo for-
muIas, lemIales and 'norms' is lo misundersland lhe nalure of lhe robIem,
lhe deIivery of raid and decisive effecl is bul one means in many circum-
slances il may be nol onIy singuIarIy inaroriale, bul acliveIy counler-ro-
duclive, and lhe viser counseI is somelimes 'don'l do somelhing, |usl sil lhere!'
The degree of cuIluraI chaIIenge is easy lo undereslimale. InIess educaled
olhervise, lhose schooIed in convenlionaI varfare are IiabIe lo conducl
counler-insurgency as convenlionaI varfare. When lhe enIighlened GeneraI
Creighlon Abrams assumed command in Viel Nam in 1968 he vas briefed on
lhe camaign Ian:
9
10 19
1nc |ricjcr sicic! inci inc missicn ucs ic scc| cui cn! !csircq inc
cncmq, inc missicn cj MACV jMi|iicrq Assisicncc Ccmmcn! Vici
Ncm} un!cr Gcncrc| Wcsimcrc|cn! jcr inc pcsi jcur qccrs. A|rcms
sicppc! inc |ricjing cn! urcic cui cn cn ccsc| 1nc missicn is nci ic
scc| cui cn! !csircq inc cncmq. 1nc missicn is ic prcti!c prcicciicn
jcr inc pccp|c cj Vici Ncm.
2O
And Irank Kilson drev allenlion in 1971 lo rilish Army commanders in
counler-insurgency vho 'resenl lhe silualion lo subordinales in lerms of con-
venlionaI varfare'.
21
Such commanders are, of course, lransgressing, amongsl
olher lhings, CIausevilz`s 'firsl, lhe sureme, lhe mosl far-reaching acl of |udge-
menl lhal lhe slalesman and lhe commander have lo make. |vhich isj lo eslab-
Iish. lhe kind of var on vhich lhey are embarking, neilher mislaking il for, nor
lrying lo lurn il inlo, somelhing lhal is aIien lo ils nalure'.
22
Since aII lhese cuIluraI chaIIenges require lhe convenlionaI combal varrior lo
|ellison some oId, and oflen deeIy heId, lenels, il is erhas vorlh recaIIing
asiI LiddeII Harl's viev lhal 'lhe onIy lhing harder lhan gelling a nev idea inlo
lhe miIilary mind is lo gel an oId one oul'.
23
Moreover, ralher Iike modernisls
and osl-modernisls in Tvenlielh Cenlury arl, some rolagonisls of modern
varfare have an inherenl disdain for lhose vho esouse a osl-modern slyIe,
have a desire (conscious or sub-conscious) lo rove lhal lheir slyIe is suerior,
and are lherefore reIuclanl lo change.
24
An imorlanl asecl of lhis differenl mind-sel or cuIlure required by miIilary
rofessionaIs concerns lheir varrior elhos a lerm lhal immedialeIy inlroduces
a secondary meaning of lhe vord 'varrior': 'a erson.dislinguished in fighl-
ing.fig |uraliveIyj a hardy, courageous or aggressive erson', or as one con-
lemorary hislorian suggesls of varriors, 'eoIe vilh a enchanl |'a slrong or
habiluaI Iiking'
25
j for fighling.
26
To be effeclive in combal, an army needs ils
members lo have a seIf-ercelion of varriors as fighlers, and lhe army as a
vhoIe needs lo be imbued vilh lhe characlerislic siril, or elhos, of lhe fighling
varrior: lhe desire lo cIose vilh lhe enemy and kiII him. Aslrong varrior elhos
is, lhus, a recious commodily. ul lo be effeclive al counler-insurgency and
slabiIizalion oeralions, an army needs ils members lo erceive lhemseIves as
somelhing olher lhan, or more lhan, |usl varriors. InIess lhey do, lhey are
IiabIe lo aIy a varrior elhos, aroach and melhods, for examIe exercising
hard over (in arlicuIar, 'kinelic soIulions') vhen lhey shouId be exercising
sofl over in Max ool's vords, 'fighling smaII vars vilh big var melhods'.
27
As lhe oId saying goes, 'if lhe onIy looI you have in your looI box is a hammer,
aII robIems begin lo resembIe naiIs'.
28
To be effeclive al bolh combal and
counler-insurgency, lhe army needs lo have sufficienl varrior elhos, bul nol so
much lhal il cannol adal, olhervise varrior elhos becomes an obslacIe lo ver-
saliIily and success. Combining lhese lvo cuIlures is highIy robIemalic.
1O
1nus ii is sci! inci cnc unc |ncus inc cncmq cn! |ncus nimsc|j ui||
nci |c cn!cngcrc! in c nun!rc! cngcgcmcnis. Onc unc !ccs nci
|ncu inc cncmq |ui |ncus nimsc|j ui|| scmciimcs |c ticicricus,
scmciimcs mcci uiin !cjcci. Onc unc |ncus nciincr inc cncmq ncr
nimsc|j ui|| intcric||q |c !cjccic! in ctcrq cngcgcmcni.
59
Iinding lhe necessary lime for inleIIecluaI deveIomenl in an officer's career, and
in lhe over-healed syIIabi of many miIilary coIIeges and schooIs, viII be a consid-
erabIe raclicaI chaIIenge, arlicuIarIy al lhe same lime as rearing for Iarge-
scaIe combal oeralions (vhich, as has been oinled oul, is ilseIf a fuII-lime occu-
alion), and arlicuIarIy al a lime vhen many armed forces find lhemseIves very
heaviIy commilled lo currenl oeralions. The scaIe of lhe educalionaI require-
menl is easy lo under-eslimale. Vieved as sub|ecl areas, lhere may be no more
lhan haIf a dozen vhich, lo use Hunlinglon's hrase, 'fronlier on miIilary knovI-
edge' aIlhough oIilics, economics, anlhrooIogy, socioIogy, sychoIogy and
erhas above aII hislory sring quickIy lo mind. ul lhese are nol sub|ecls lhal
Iend lhemseIves lo a reduclionisl aroach lo Iearning, lo be covered in a fev
eriods of inslruclion, nor are lhey olionaI for miIilary Ieaders in counler-insur-
gency. Taking miIilary hislory as an examIe, il shouId be sludied, as MichaeI
Hovard famousIy advised, 'in vidlh, in delh and in conlexl',
6O
(fasl becoming
lhe mosl quoled and Ieasl observed advice on lhe sub|ecl). Nor does lhe soIulion
Iie in over-rogramming exisling courses al lhe exense of lime for refIeclion, Iel
aIone lhe easy olion of cosmelic change a lick-in-lhe-box aroach vhich
aIIovs lhose vho vish lo do so lo cIaim lhal lhe necessary change has been made.
There is, of course, an imorlanl Iace in lhe Iearning rocess for seIf-educalion,
arlicuIarIy in lhe sludy of hislory. ul lhe lemlalion for lhe unvise, or al Ieasl
lhe un-forevarned, viII be lo oslone such seIf-educalion unliI il is loo Iale. In
many of loday's armed forces (incIuding lhe rilish and lhe American), mosl
senior officers, and a number of middIe-ranking ones as veII, are in |obs, vhelher
oeralionaI or non-oeralionaI, vhich are so demanding lhal IillIe lime is Iefl for
any reading lhal is nol |ob-reIaled, and, indeed, very IillIe lime for crealive lhink-
ing of any sorl. Acaulionary laIe is lhal of GeneraI WiIIiam WeslmoreIand vho
lhroughoul his lime as commander in Viel Nam had beside his bed lhe vorks of
a number of aulhors, incIuding Mao Zedong and lhe insighlfuI ernard IaII,
vhich couId have been key lo heIing him soIve lhe robIems lhal confronled
him. ul 'I vas usuaIIy loo lired in Iale evening lo give lhem more lhan occa-
sionaI allenlion'.
61
IinaIIy, on lhe sub|ecl of educalion, is lhe requiremenl for il lo be research-Ied. To
kee al lhe culling edge of lhe sub|ecl, arlicuIarIy in comelilion vilh a Iearning
and adalive enemy, requires a corus, or body, of academic research exerls
aIongside, and abIe lo inleracl vilh, raclilioners and sludenls. The risk here is
lhal since research oulul is difficuIl, if nol imossibIe, lo measure, research
dearlmenls become highIy vuInerabIe lo financiaI culs.
19
18 11
slereolyicaI lhinking vhich may inhibil lhinking 'oulside lhe box'. An offi-
cer cors needs some of ils members, indeed ils brighlesl and besl, lo receive
lhe inleIIecluaI slimuIalion lhal rolracled immersion in lhe very differenl
free-lhinking cuIlure lhal a good civiIian universily can rovide for exam-
Ie, lhrough maslers' and doclors' rogrammes and lo bring lhal slimuIa-
lion and fresh aroach back inlo lhe armed forces. Mosl armed forces rec-
ognize lhis, bul lhere is vide divergence in lhe exlenl lo vhich lhey creale
such oorlunilies and incenlivize arlicianls. The rilish Armed Iorces
are nol currenlIy in lhe Iead in lhis resecl.
55
There is one asecl of deveIoing minds and underslanding lo coe vilh lhe
chaIIenges of counler-insurgency lhal deserves seciaI menlion and lhal is
lhe need lo deveIo cuIluraI underslanding a key eIemenl of lhe conlesl
bolh in lhe hysicaI domain and lhe 'severeIy undersludied' ideoIogicaI
one.
56
There is a lendency, arlicuIarIy in busy armed forces (and nol excIud-
ing lhose vho beIieve lhal cuIluraI undersalnding is arl of lheir inherilance)
lo shorl-cul lhe cuIluraI underslanding rocess by focusing on lhe lraining
chaIIenge: hov lo behave in deaIing vilh lhose of anolher cuIlure, vhal basic
errors lo avoid, a smallering of a fev handy hrases. Imorlanl lhough lhis
is, ve deIude ourseIves if ve beIieve lhal a behaviouraI check-Iisl does any
more lhan scralch lhe surface of cuIluraI underslanding. If, as has been
argued, success in oeralions such as counler-insurgency deends on men-
laIIy oul-manoeuvring oonenls, lhere is a requiremenl lo gel inside lheir
minds, lhis cannol be done vilhoul a roere underslanding of lheir cuIlure.
And if lhe sychoIogicaI imacl of our aclions is aII-imorlanl, ve cannol
hoe lo succeed vilhoul underslanding lhe sychoIogy and cuIlure of lhose
vhose behaviour ve are lrying lo infIuence. ConsislenlIy under-eslimaled is
lhe requiremenl for grealer Iinguislic skiIIs lhan lhal rovided by lhe equiv-
aIenl of a lourisl hrase-book. LquaIIy imorlanl is lhe requiremenl for cuI-
luraI seIf-avareness: underslanding our ovn cuIlure, in arlicuIar our cuI-
luraI inherilance vhal ve have inheriled in lhe vay of sub-conscious
assumlions, ercelions and re|udices vhich may affecl hov ve reIale lo
eoIe of olher cuIlures. Moreover, MasIand and Radvay drev allenlion lo
lhe conneclion belveen cuIluraI avareness and lhe deveIomenl of lhe oIil-
icaI sohislicalion required by counler-insurgenls: 'for any execulive lhe
beginning of oIilicaI sohislicalion is lhe reaIizalion lhal lhere are men vho
may nol feeI as he feeIs, vho may nol dream as he dreams, or vho may nol
ray as he rays'.
57
In addilion lo deveIoing minds, lherefore, is lhe need,
vhere necessary, lo broaden lhem lo make lhem more oen and sensilive lo
lhe vievs of olhers, and Iess cerlain of lheir ovn omniscience and reclilude.
An imorlanl allilude is lhal advocaled by lhe Scols oel, Roberl urns: '
vad some Iov'r lhe giflie gie us1To see ourseIs as olhers see us'.
58
Inderslanding bolh lhe oonenls' cuIlure and one's ovn are essenliaI eIe-
menls of success. If ve do nol recognize lhis, ve musl execl lo Iose. In lhe
vords of Sun Tzu:
18
|i is. rcmcr|c||q !ijjicu|i jcr cn crmq ic |c rcc||q gcc! ci |cin ccm-
|ci cn! ccunicr-insurgcncq. Ncic||c cxcmp|cs cj inis !icncicmq crc
inc Russicn cn! |srcc|i crmics, nign|q c!cpi ucrjigniing mccnincs
uiin c ucrricr cincs sc sircng inci incq nctc jcun! ii c|mcsi impcs-
si||c ic c!cpi ic inc rcuircmcnis cj ccunicr-insurgcncq. On inc
cincr si!c cj inis ccin crc incsc crmc! jcrccs unicn nctc |crgc|q jcrc-
gcnc ucrjigniing cs incir ccrc cciitiiq, insicc! cnccsing ic |cccmc
spccic|isi pcccc|ccping jcrccs, cn! unc nctc jcun! ii |css ccsq incn
incq migni nctc uisnc! ic rcgcin inc ucrricr cincs ncc!c! ic mcci inc
cnc||cngcs cj ccm|ci cpcrciicns.
29
Moreover, counler-insurgency ossesses fealures vilh vhich lhe ure varrior
elhos is highIy uneasy: comIexily, ambiguily and uncerlainly, lhe vhoIe concel
of sofl over, oIilicaI 'inlerference', media scruliny, lhe 'unfair' conslrainls of
ruIes of engagemenl vhich can negale lhe use of lhe lrum card fireover. And
il requires lhese varriors lo acquire some decidedIy un-varrior-Iike allribules,
3O
such as emolionaI inleIIigence, emalhy vilh one's oonenls, loIerance, alience,
sublIely, sohislicalion, nuance and oIilicaI adroilness allribules vhich, lo some
varriors, aear lo undermine lhe varrior elhos on vhich success in combal
deends. Warriors can lhus be highIy uncomforlabIe vilh a roIe as counler-insur-
genls, and highIy resislanl lo any change of cuIlure. Such varriors mighl agree
vilh RaIh Ielers vriling in lhe IS Army |ournaI Pcrcmcicrs:
A sc|!icrs jc| is ic |i|| inc cncmq. A|| c|sc, ncuctcr impcricni ii
mcq cppccr ci inc iimc, is scccn!crq. 1nccrics !cni uin ucrs.
Wc|| ircinc!, uc||-|c! sc|!icrs in uc||-cuippc! crmics !c. An! incq
!c sc |q |i||ing cjjcciitc|q. 1ncrc is nc su|siiiuic jcr snc!!ing inc
cncmqs ||cc!.
31
Iroonenls of such an aroach somelimes enIisl CIausevilz in suorl:
Kin!-nccric! pccp|c migni cj ccursc inin| inci incrc ucs scmc ingc-
nicus ucq ic !iscrm cr !cjcci cn cncmq uiincui icc mucn ||cc!snc!,
cn! migni imcginc inis is inc iruc gcc| cj inc cri cj ucr. P|ccscni cs
ii scun!s, ii is c jc||ccq inci musi |c cxpcsc!. |j cnc si!c uscs jcrcc
uiincui ccmpunciicn, un!cicrrc! |q inc ||cc!snc! ii intc|tcs, uni|c
inc cincr si!c rcjrcins, inc jirsi ui|| gcin inc uppcr ncn!,
32
Thal may have been lrue of varfare in CIausevilz's day, bul in counler-insur-
gency conducled by armed forces of IiberaI democracies in lhe Tvenly Iirsl
Cenlury il is simIy nol lrue lhal 'if one side uses force vilhoul comunclion,
undelerred by lhe bIoodshed il invoIves, vhiIe lhe olher refrains, lhe firsl viII
gain lhe uer hand'. In lhese circumslances, disarming or defealing an enemy
vilhoul loo much bIoodsed is nol so much kind-hearled as cIever.
11
12 17
There is, neverlheIess, a dicholomy here. In an era vhen armed forces can execl
lo be deIoyed on counler-insurgency and slabiIizalion oeralions, lhere is a dif-
ficuIl baIance lo be achieved in lhe slrenglh of lheir varrior elhos. So is a varrior
|usl a miIilary rofessionaI` r is a varrior essenliaIIy a erson vilh a slrong
habiluaI Iiking for fighling, an aggressive erson vhose |ob is lo 'deslroy lhe
enemy'
33
.'lo kiII lhe enemy aII eIse. is secondary'`
34
As Chrisloher Coker
oinls oul, kiIIing is one of lhe lradilionaI marks of lhe varrior, and he observes
lhal vhiIe AchiIIes is lhe archelyaI varrior in lhe Weslern lradilion, loday 'for
many soIdiers lhe archelyaI hero is Rambo. a one dimensionaI aclion figure
engaged in a comeIIingIy reduclive vision of var as ure vioIence'.
35
And lhere
is a furlher comIicaling faclor. Some counler-insurgency camaigns, such as
lhose in Iraq and Afghanislan loday, conlain significanl eIemenls of combal, as
deicled in lhe nolion of lhe Three Iock War ('lhe enlire seclrum of laclicaI chaI-
Ienges in lhe san of a fev hours vilhin lhe sace of lhree conliguous cily
bIocks'
36
). Combal and counler-insurgency are nol muluaIIy excIusive.
TraInIng and DnctrInc
A
KLY RLQIIRLMLNT IR AN ARMLD IRCL re-orienling from one lye of varfare
lo anolher is having agiIe and resonsive lraining and doclrine organiza-
lions. Ior many miIilaries invoIved in conlemorary oeralions il is robabIy lrue
lo say lhal lraining has adaled fasler lhan doclrine. The amounl of re-deIoy-
menl lraining in, for examIe, lhe IK and IS armed forces is nov significanlIy
increased, incIuding nol onIy lhe seciaIisl laclics and lechniques required, bul
aIso seciaI-lo-counlry briefings, cuIluraI avareness and Ianguage lraining.
There is aIso increasing recognilion lhal such lraining needs lo viden sliII furlher
lo incIude, amongsl olher lhings, knovIedge and underslanding of lhe arl lhal
lhe miIilary Iine of oeralion Iays in a muIli-disciIinary, comrehensive
aroach, and a more hoIislic aroach lo lhe sludy of insurgency. This has
invoIved some redefinilion of lhe lraining requiremenl. Il vas oflen cIaimed lhal
il vas reIaliveIy simIe for armed forces lrained in combal lo ad|usl lo vhal vere
erceived lo be lhe Iesser demands of oeralions olher lhan combal, such as sla-
biIily oeralions and counler-insurgency, bul much harder, if nol imossibIe (in a
shorl sace of lime), for lroos lrained onIy for oeralions olher lhan combal lo
become combal-caabIe.
37
True lhough lhis is, il vas inlerreled by some lo
imIy lhal counler-insurgency required IillIe exlra lraining for veII lrained com-
bal lroos. This vas an error. Irank Kilson commenled adverseIy on lhis allilude
lovards oeralions olher lhan combal, or vhal he caIIed Lov Inlensily
eralions, in lhe earIy 197Os: 'a considerabIe number of officers. sliII consider
lhal il is unnecessary lo make any greal efforl lo undersland vhal is invoIved in
Lov Inlensily eralions, and lhe cry lhal a fil soIdier vilh a rifIe can do aII lhal
is required is oflen heard'.
38
This cry is occasionaIIy sliII lo be heard, aIbeil infre-
quenlIy, and rareIy from anyone vilh any underslanding of lhe sub|ecl.
12
ccr musi nctc scmc i!cc cj iis rc|ciicn ic incsc cincr jic|!s cn! inc
ucqs in unicn incsc cincr crccs cj |ncu|c!gc mcq ccniri|uic ic nis
cun purpcscs. |n c!!iiicn, nc ccnnci rcc||q !ctc|cp nis cnc|qiicc|
s|i||s, insignis, imcginciicn, cn! ju!gcmcni ij nc is ircinc! simp|q in
tccciicnc| !uiics. 1nc c|i|iiics cn! nc|iis cj min! unicn nc rcuircs
uiinin nis prcjcssicnc| jic|! ccn in |crgc pcri |c ccuirc! cn|q
inrcugn inc |rcc!cr ctcnucs cj |ccrning cuisi!c nis prcjcssicn. 1nc
jcci inci, |i|c inc |cuqcr cn! inc pnqsicicn, nc is ccniinucus|q !cc|-
ing uiin numcn |cings rcuircs nim ic nctc inc !ccpcr un!crsicn!-
ing cj numcn ciiiiu!cs, mciitciicn cn! |cncticur unicn c |i|crc|
c!ucciicn siimu|cics. jusi cs c gcncrc| c!ucciicn ncs |cccmc inc prc-
rcuisiic jcr cnirq inic inc prcjcssicn cj |cu cn! mc!icinc, ii is ncu
c|sc c|mcsi unitcrsc||q rcuirc! cs c !csirc||c uc|ijicciicn jcr inc
prcjcssicnc| cjjiccr.
52
This cerlainIy resonales loday, and lhe nalure of currenl oeralions suggesls
lhal vhal may have been a desirabIe quaIificalion fifly years ago is nov
essenliaI. These comIex oeralions deend for success on a muIli-disciIi-
nary, comrehensive aroach, combining a number of Iines of oeralion
for examIe, oIilicaI, diIomalic, securily, economic, sociaI and lhe miIi-
lary rofessionaI requires an underslanding across lhe breadlh of lhese disci-
Iines. There is aIso a coroIIary lo lhis for lhe melhod and aroach lo lhe
deIivery of rofessionaI miIilary educalion in-service. Such educalion and
lraining is cuslomariIy deIivered in mosl counlries in slaff coIIeges or var
coIIeges miIilary eslabIishmenls IargeIy reslricled lo members of lhe armed
services. This may meel lhe requiremenl of rearalion for an oeraling
environmenl vhich is ilseIf reslricled lo lhe armed services, aIlhough lhis has
nol been vilhoul some disadvanlages. Hunlinglon referred lo lhese coIIeges
as 'rofessionaI monasleries'.
53
A ureIy miIilary Iearning environmenl,
vhelher or nol a 'rofessionaI monaslery', no Ionger meels lhe requiremenl.
There is a slrong argumenl for miIilary rofessionaIs lo underlake al Ieasl
some of lheir educalion and lraining aIongside reresenlalives of lhose olher
organizalions vilh vhich lhey viII be oeraling in fulure, nol Ieasl for beller
muluaI underslanding of lhe very differenl inslilulionaI cuIlures invoIved.
This is aIready haening lo some exlenl in coIIeges vhere oulsiders are
inviled for shorl moduIes, bul lhere is scoe for increasing lhis raclice sliII
furlher. Indeed, some counlries hosl muIli-disciIinary eslabIishmenls such
as Ghana's InlernalionaI Ieacekeeing Training Cenlre, and Iaddy Ashdovn
has roosed a simiIar eslabIishmenl 'a schooI for confIicl revenlion,
armed inlervenlion and osl-confIicl resoIulion'
54
in lhe Iniled Kingdom.
A furlher vay of avoiding lhe effecl of lhe 'rofessionaI monaslery' is for
some oslgraduale officer educalion lo lake Iace avay from lhe essenliaIIy
miIilary cuIlure of miIilary academies. Hovever good lhese academies may
be, lhere is IikeIy lo be an inslilulionaI cuIlure vilh lhe allendanl risk of
17
16 13
lribulor lo oeralionaI caabiIily. The nalure of fulure oeralions viII aImosl cer-
lainIy Iace a grealer remium lhan in lhe asl on lhis conlribulion, vilh lhe
increased inleIIecluaI demands il is IikeIy lo Iace on miIilary Ieaders al aII IeveIs.
Whelher lhese Ieaders malch u lo lhe oeralionaI chaIIenges lhey viII face,
vhelher lhey succeed or faiI, is IikeIy lo deend much more lhan in lhe asl on
lheir inleIIecl. If so, lhen recruiling officers of lhe necessary inleIIecl and educal-
ing lhem lo a high slandard lhroughoul lheir careers viII be even more imorlanl
in fulure. To be veII reared, officers viII lhus need lo be bolh veII lrained and
veII educaled (lhal is lo say, having veII-deveIoed minds and underslanding of
lhe nalure of lhe sub|ecl). In combal oeralions il mallers Iess lhal officers are veII
lrained bul oorIy educaled, il seIdom delermines lhe oulcome. In oeralions
such as counler-insurgency, il is IiabIe lo be lhe difference belveen success and faiI-
ure. The educalionaI requiremenl is, lhus, far more aboul leaching officers 'hov lo
lhink', lhan 'vhal lo lhink' lhe anlilhesis of vhal MasIand and Radvay varned
againsl, fifly years ago, as 'lhe slockiIe aroach' lo Iearning: lhinking in lerms of
'counling, iIing and sloring'.
5O
DeveIoing minds is mosl decidedIy nol some-
lhing lhal can be achieved as arl of re-deIoymenl lraining.
Lducalion is imorlanl even erhas, arlicuIarIy for armed forces, such as
lhe rilish, vho have erceived exerience of counler-insurgency. The lemla-
lion for lhese armed forces is lo beIieve lhal lheir exerience reIieves lhem of lhe
requiremenl for educalion. This beIief is iII-founded. Ior examIe, al lhe oul-
sel of lhe 2OO3 deIoymenl lo Iraq, lhe rilish army had considerabIe and
aImosl universaI exerience of counler-insurgency, bul aarl from a smaII num-
ber of eoIe vho had briefIy served in Afghanislan or Sierra Leone, and a very
fev individuaIs seconded lo olher armies, lhis exerience vas confined lo one
lhealre aIone, and a very sui gcncris one al lhal: Norlhern IreIand
51
(camaigns
in lhe aIkans vere nol counler-insurgency, bul eacekeeing1eace enforce-
menl). As a resuIl, and vilh very Iimiled educalion (as oosed lo lraining) in
counler-insurgency, lhere vas a lendency among some lo over-drav on lhe
Iessons of lhe Norlhern IreIand camaign.
Some asecls of lhe educalionaI requiremenl for miIilary rofessionaIs are more
obvious lhan olhers, vilh some sub|ecls being more obvious candidales for sludy,
for examIe hislory. Indeed, a Iack of underslanding of hislory, and of lhe imor-
lance of ils sludy, is a sure sign of a miIilary Ieader deslined lo faiI in oeralions
such as counler-insurgency. ul focus on one sub|ecl can obscure visibiIily of lhe
vider educalionaI requiremenl, a requiremenl veII arlicuIaled by SamueI I
Hunlinglon, aIso fifly years ago.
jusi cs |cu ci iis |cr!crs mcrgcs inic nisicrq, pc|iiics, cccncmics,
sccic|cgq cn! psqcnc|cgq, sc c|sc !ccs inc mi|iicrq s|i||. |tcn mcrc,
mi|iicrq |ncu|c!gc c|sc ncs jrcniicrs cn inc nciurc| scicnccs cj cncm-
isirq, pnqsics cn! |ic|cgq. 1c un!crsicn! nis irc!c prcpcr|q, inc cjji-
16
The underIying chaIIenge, lhough, is lhal armed forces aIso need lo relain lheir
caabiIily lo conducl Iarge-scaIe, convenlionaI varfare, lraining for vhich, ar-
licuIarIy for Iand forces, is (as has been oinled oul) a olenliaIIy fuII-lime occu-
alion in ilseIf, bul lraining lime is finile and, for many armed forces, is under
ressure from a high rale of oeralionaI deIoymenls. Achieving lhe necessary
amounl of lraining lime for bolh combal and for olher oeralions, and for bolh
var and lhe var, is highIy robIemalic.
Turning lo doclrine, nev doclrine on bolh sides of lhe AlIanlic recognizes lhe
need for a differenl aroach lo counler-insurgency. In }une 2OO6, lhe IS
Marine Cors roduced a 'lenlalive manuaI', Ccunicring |rrcgu|cr 1nrccis. A
Ccmprcncnsitc Apprcccn, in vhich ils sonsor, Lieulenanl GeneraI }im Mallis,
argued lhal,
Mcrincs ui|| |c cs|c! ic !c mcnq inings cincr incn ccm|ci cpcrc-
iicns ic |cci cur c!tcrscrics. Mcrincs ncc! ic |ccrn uncn ic jigni
uiin uccpcns cn! uncn ic jigni uiin injcrmciicn, numcniicricn ci!,
cccncmic c!ticc, cn! c |ccsi icucr! gcc! gctcrncncc jcr inc |ccc|
pccp|c. Winning cn! prcscrting inc gcc!ui|| cj inc pccp|c is inc |cq
ic ticicrq.
39
This aroach is conlinued in lhe Ialesl IS Army and Marine Cors coun-
lerinsurgency doclrine, ubIished remarkabIy quickIy in December 2OO6.
4O
In
lheir inlroduclion lo lhe ubIicalion significanlIy, |oinlIy signed
Lieulenanl GeneraIs David Ielraeus, IS Army, and }ames Amos, IS Marine
Cors, slress lhal:
1nis mcnuc| ic|cs c gcncrc| cpprcccn ic ccunicrinsurgcncq cpcrc-
iicns.|i siritcs ic prcti!c incsc ccn!uciing ccunicrinsurgcncq ccm-
pcigns uiin c sc|i! jcun!ciicn jcr un!crsicn!ing cn! c!!rcssing spc-
cijic insurgcncics.
And conlrary lo recels reviousIy esoused by neo-Cons in lhe Dearlmenl
of Defense, lhe generaIs aIso slress lhal:
Sc|!icrs cn! Mcrincs crc cxpccic! ic |c nciicn |ui|!crs cs uc|| cs
ucrricrs. 1ncq musi |c prcpcrc! ic nc|p rccsic||isn insiiiuiicns cn!
|ccc| sccuriiq jcrccs cn! cssisi in rc|ui|!ing injrcsiruciurc cn! |csic
scrticcs. 1ncq musi |c c||c ic jcci|iicic csic||isning |ccc| gctcrncncc
cn! inc ru|c cj |cu.
41
This is aIso lhe rilish Armed Iorces' aroach in lheir emerging |oinl doc-
lrine
42
on vhal is lermed 'Counlering IrreguIar Aclivily' vhich, Iike ils IS
counlerarl, seeks lo inslrucl miIilary ersonneI aboul counler-insurgency as a
13
14 15
vhoIe and aboul associaled lhreals, and emhasizes lhe need for miIilary acliv-
ily lo be arl of a comrehensive aroach invoIving aII inslrumenls of over.
Many olher miIilaries are aIso udaling lheir doclrine vilh a simiIar aroach.
ul lhere are furlher chaIIenges for armed forces here. The firsl arises from lhe
facl lhal, as oinled oul earIier, every insurgency is , making generaI-
izalions robIemalic. Doclrine lhal does nol lake lhis sufficienlIy inlo accounl
can be dangerous, bul equaIIy, doclrine lhal is loo vary of lhis ilfaII can
become so generaI and anodyne as lo be of very Iimiled assislance. SecondIy,
insurgency is becoming increasingIy comIex, vilh lhe advenl, for examIe, of
lrans-nalionaI, and hybrid insurgencies
43
for vhich lhe counler-insurgency doc-
lrine suilabIe for nalionaI insurgencies may be eilher of Iimiled uliIily or
counler-roduclive. And lhirdIy, lhe nalure of comIex insurgencies is lhal lhey
are amoeba-Iike (mulaling in shae and form lo lake advanlages of lhe circum-
slances in vhich lhey find lhemseIves), dynamic (ro-acliveIy changing lheir
laclics lo suil lheir urose), and agiIe (abIe lo make lhese changes quickIy).
And insurgenls, being lhinking enemies, sludy our doclrine
44
and ad|usl lheir
melhods and laclics accordingIy. In consequence of lhese faclors, lhe IikeIihood
is lhal some asecls of our doclrine are IiabIe lo be oul of dale aImosl from lhe
day of ubIicalion. MiIilary doclrine and lraining organizalions need, lhere-
fore, lo be fIexibIe enough lo make lhe necessary and aroriale changes, and
agiIe enough lo be abIe lo do so quickIy.
45
And armed forces need lo be Iearn-
ing organizalions, vhich can Iearn and adal a key lenel of lhe nev IS doc-
lrine and do so even fasler lhan lheir agiIe oonenls. IarlicuIarIy in counler-
insurgency, il's 'Who Learns Wins'.
EducatInn
H
LRL THLRL IS A IIRTHLR CHALLLNGL. In convenlionaI varfare, lhe looIs neces-
sary for any conceluaI change in a miIilary`s aroach lo varfare are
essenliaIIy lvo-foId doclrine and lraining. Il comes naluraIIy, lherefore, lo miI-
ilaries lo Iace lheir failh in lhese looIs as lhe means of re-orienlaling from one
lye of varfare lo anolher. Such failh is, hovever, misIaced and misIeading. A
furlher essenliaI inslrumenl in lhis rocess is educalion.
Il is necessary here lo dislinguish belveen lraining and educalion. Training is
rearing eoIe, individuaIIy or coIIecliveIy, for given lasks in given circum-
slances, educalion is deveIoing lheir menlaI overs and underslanding.
Training is lhus aroriale rearalion for lhe rediclabIe, bul for lhe unre-
diclabIe and for conceluaI chaIIenges, educalion is required. And, as noled
earIier, currenl and IikeIy fulure oeralions, arlicuIarIy lhose such as counler-
insurgency, are characlerized by comIexily, ambiguily, uncerlainly and
voIaliIily aII of vhich add u lo unrediclabiIily and by chaIIenges lhal are
nol so much formuIaic and mechanislic as conceluaI and 'vicked'. This caIIs
14
for minds vhich can nol onIy coe vilh, bul exceI in, lhese circumslances
lhus, minds lhal are agiIe, fIexibIe, enquiring, imaginalive, caabIe of rigorous
anaIysis and ob|eclive crilicaI lhinking, minds lhal can conceluaIize and inno-
vale, minds al home vilh sohislicalion and nuance ('inlerreling shades of
grey'), and minds lhal have deveIoed underslanding, inluilion, visdom and
good |udgemenl.
46
Moreover, osl-modern oeralions are aIso characlerized
by devoIved decision-making vhere reIaliveIy |unior commanders are making
very senior decisions. The requiremenl for lhis educalion is nol, lherefore, |usl
a requiremenl for senior officers.
The reIalionshi belveen lraining and doclrine, on lhe one hand, and educalion,
on lhe olher is imorlanl. AII lraining and doclrine needs lo be founded on edu-
calion. If lhey are nol, lhe raclilioner is IiabIe lo Iack lhe versaliIily and fIexibiIi-
ly needed lo adal lhem lo changing circumslances or lo exlemorize. Indeed,
doclrine aIone 'may conslrain lhe abiIily lo lhink oulside lhe box |andj. Iimil
lhe abiIily lo undersland noveI silualions'.
47
This is arlicuIarIy aIicabIe in lhe
fIuid, unrediclabIe, 'messy' oeralions vhich characlerize osl-modern varfare.
Here doclrine and lraining are IiabIe lo be onIy rough guides, requiring lhe rac-
lilioner lo ossess lhe abiIily lo sol vhen and vhere lhey are no Ionger aro-
riale, and lo adal accordingIy. Moreover, adalabiIily by ilseIf is inadequale,
ve musl aIso osess lhe underslanding (resuIling from educalion) vhich viII
enabIe us lo anliciale change. As GiuIio Douhel noled '|Vjiclory smiIes on lhose
vho anliciale changes in lhe characler of var nol lhose vhovail lo adal lhem-
seIves afler lhey occur'.
48
Iurlhermore, vilhoul a considerabIe degree of educa-
lion, Iearning is IiabIe lo be exerienliaI, oflen based on lhe Iasl camaign, vilh a
lendency lo lransose inaroriale Iessons from one camaign lo
anolher, and over-focus on lraining as oosed lo educalion oflen resuIls in loo
much Iearning lime being senl on counler-insurgency nol enough on insur-
gency: '|Wjhoever vouId undersland modern counlerinsurgency musl firsl
undersland modern insurgency'.
49
IinaIIy, success in osl-modern oeralions
require miIilary Ieaders al aII IeveIs lo ossess oIilicaI sohislicalion and nous
from lhe |unior commander engaging vilh a IocaI mayor, lo more senior ones
deaIing vilh regionaI governors, righl u lo lhe mosl senior commanders inler-
acling vilh and advising oIilicaI Ieaders al nalionaI IeveI. Lducalion has a key
roIe lo Iay in deveIoing lhe necessary oIilicaI acumen.
Il is imorlanl lo recognize lhe urose of lhis educalion. Ils urose is nol lhe
urisl one of lhe ursuil of knovIedge for ils ovn sake, bul of deveIoing caaci-
ly for good |udgemenl. Such educalion, lherefore, has a lraining dimension in lhal
il is rearing raclilioners lo exercise good |udgemenl in lheir rofession, bul nol
|usl in lheir nexl |ob or deIoymenl, bul over lhe duralion of lheir career. Thus, ils
ayback shouId nol be |udged by lhe imrovemenl lo an individuaI's immediale
erformance, bul by lhe vaIue il adds lo erformance over lhe course of a career,
and in lhe vaIue added lo lhe organizalion as a vhoIe over a simiIar lime-san.
}udged in lhis vay, rofessionaI miIilary educalion is a direcl and essenliaI con-
15
who wait
requires military
14 15
vhoIe and aboul associaled lhreals, and emhasizes lhe need for miIilary acliv-
ily lo be arl of a comrehensive aroach invoIving aII inslrumenls of over.
Many olher miIilaries are aIso udaling lheir doclrine vilh a simiIar aroach.
ul lhere are furlher chaIIenges for armed forces here. The firsl arises from lhe
facl lhal, as oinled oul earIier, every insurgency is , making generaI-
izalions robIemalic. Doclrine lhal does nol lake lhis sufficienlIy inlo accounl
can be dangerous, bul equaIIy, doclrine lhal is loo vary of lhis ilfaII can
become so generaI and anodyne as lo be of very Iimiled assislance. SecondIy,
insurgency is becoming increasingIy comIex, vilh lhe advenl, for examIe, of
lrans-nalionaI, and hybrid insurgencies
43
for vhich lhe counler-insurgency doc-
lrine suilabIe for nalionaI insurgencies may be eilher of Iimiled uliIily or
counler-roduclive. And lhirdIy, lhe nalure of comIex insurgencies is lhal lhey
are amoeba-Iike (mulaling in shae and form lo lake advanlages of lhe circum-
slances in vhich lhey find lhemseIves), dynamic (ro-acliveIy changing lheir
laclics lo suil lheir urose), and agiIe (abIe lo make lhese changes quickIy).
And insurgenls, being lhinking enemies, sludy our doclrine
44
and ad|usl lheir
melhods and laclics accordingIy. In consequence of lhese faclors, lhe IikeIihood
is lhal some asecls of our doclrine are IiabIe lo be oul of dale aImosl from lhe
day of ubIicalion. MiIilary doclrine and lraining organizalions need, lhere-
fore, lo be fIexibIe enough lo make lhe necessary and aroriale changes, and
agiIe enough lo be abIe lo do so quickIy.
45
And armed forces need lo be Iearn-
ing organizalions, vhich can Iearn and adal a key lenel of lhe nev IS doc-
lrine and do so even fasler lhan lheir agiIe oonenls. IarlicuIarIy in counler-
insurgency, il's 'Who Learns Wins'.
EducatInn
H
LRL THLRL IS A IIRTHLR CHALLLNGL. In convenlionaI varfare, lhe looIs neces-
sary for any conceluaI change in a miIilary`s aroach lo varfare are
essenliaIIy lvo-foId doclrine and lraining. Il comes naluraIIy, lherefore, lo miI-
ilaries lo Iace lheir failh in lhese looIs as lhe means of re-orienlaling from one
lye of varfare lo anolher. Such failh is, hovever, misIaced and misIeading. A
furlher essenliaI inslrumenl in lhis rocess is educalion.
Il is necessary here lo dislinguish belveen lraining and educalion. Training is
rearing eoIe, individuaIIy or coIIecliveIy, for given lasks in given circum-
slances, educalion is deveIoing lheir menlaI overs and underslanding.
Training is lhus aroriale rearalion for lhe rediclabIe, bul for lhe unre-
diclabIe and for conceluaI chaIIenges, educalion is required. And, as noled
earIier, currenl and IikeIy fulure oeralions, arlicuIarIy lhose such as counler-
insurgency, are characlerized by comIexily, ambiguily, uncerlainly and
voIaliIily aII of vhich add u lo unrediclabiIily and by chaIIenges lhal are
nol so much formuIaic and mechanislic as conceluaI and 'vicked'. This caIIs
14
for minds vhich can nol onIy coe vilh, bul exceI in, lhese circumslances
lhus, minds lhal are agiIe, fIexibIe, enquiring, imaginalive, caabIe of rigorous
anaIysis and ob|eclive crilicaI lhinking, minds lhal can conceluaIize and inno-
vale, minds al home vilh sohislicalion and nuance ('inlerreling shades of
grey'), and minds lhal have deveIoed underslanding, inluilion, visdom and
good |udgemenl.
46
Moreover, osl-modern oeralions are aIso characlerized
by devoIved decision-making vhere reIaliveIy |unior commanders are making
very senior decisions. The requiremenl for lhis educalion is nol, lherefore, |usl
a requiremenl for senior officers.
The reIalionshi belveen lraining and doclrine, on lhe one hand, and educalion,
on lhe olher is imorlanl. AII lraining and doclrine needs lo be founded on edu-
calion. If lhey are nol, lhe raclilioner is IiabIe lo Iack lhe versaliIily and fIexibiIi-
ly needed lo adal lhem lo changing circumslances or lo exlemorize. Indeed,
doclrine aIone 'may conslrain lhe abiIily lo lhink oulside lhe box |andj. Iimil
lhe abiIily lo undersland noveI silualions'.
47
This is arlicuIarIy aIicabIe in lhe
fIuid, unrediclabIe, 'messy' oeralions vhich characlerize osl-modern varfare.
Here doclrine and lraining are IiabIe lo be onIy rough guides, requiring lhe rac-
lilioner lo ossess lhe abiIily lo sol vhen and vhere lhey are no Ionger aro-
riale, and lo adal accordingIy. Moreover, adalabiIily by ilseIf is inadequale,
ve musl aIso osess lhe underslanding (resuIling from educalion) vhich viII
enabIe us lo anliciale change. As GiuIio Douhel noled '|Vjiclory smiIes on lhose
vho anliciale changes in lhe characler of var nol lhose vhovail lo adal lhem-
seIves afler lhey occur'.
48
Iurlhermore, vilhoul a considerabIe degree of educa-
lion, Iearning is IiabIe lo be exerienliaI, oflen based on lhe Iasl camaign, vilh a
lendency lo lransose inaroriale Iessons from one camaign lo
anolher, and over-focus on lraining as oosed lo educalion oflen resuIls in loo
much Iearning lime being senl on counler-insurgency nol enough on insur-
gency: '|Wjhoever vouId undersland modern counlerinsurgency musl firsl
undersland modern insurgency'.
49
IinaIIy, success in osl-modern oeralions
require miIilary Ieaders al aII IeveIs lo ossess oIilicaI sohislicalion and nous
from lhe |unior commander engaging vilh a IocaI mayor, lo more senior ones
deaIing vilh regionaI governors, righl u lo lhe mosl senior commanders inler-
acling vilh and advising oIilicaI Ieaders al nalionaI IeveI. Lducalion has a key
roIe lo Iay in deveIoing lhe necessary oIilicaI acumen.
Il is imorlanl lo recognize lhe urose of lhis educalion. Ils urose is nol lhe
urisl one of lhe ursuil of knovIedge for ils ovn sake, bul of deveIoing caaci-
ly for good |udgemenl. Such educalion, lherefore, has a lraining dimension in lhal
il is rearing raclilioners lo exercise good |udgemenl in lheir rofession, bul nol
|usl in lheir nexl |ob or deIoymenl, bul over lhe duralion of lheir career. Thus, ils
ayback shouId nol be |udged by lhe imrovemenl lo an individuaI's immediale
erformance, bul by lhe vaIue il adds lo erformance over lhe course of a career,
and in lhe vaIue added lo lhe organizalion as a vhoIe over a simiIar lime-san.
}udged in lhis vay, rofessionaI miIilary educalion is a direcl and essenliaI con-
15
who wait
requires military
16 13
lribulor lo oeralionaI caabiIily. The nalure of fulure oeralions viII aImosl cer-
lainIy Iace a grealer remium lhan in lhe asl on lhis conlribulion, vilh lhe
increased inleIIecluaI demands il is IikeIy lo Iace on miIilary Ieaders al aII IeveIs.
Whelher lhese Ieaders malch u lo lhe oeralionaI chaIIenges lhey viII face,
vhelher lhey succeed or faiI, is IikeIy lo deend much more lhan in lhe asl on
lheir inleIIecl. If so, lhen recruiling officers of lhe necessary inleIIecl and educal-
ing lhem lo a high slandard lhroughoul lheir careers viII be even more imorlanl
in fulure. To be veII reared, officers viII lhus need lo be bolh veII lrained and
veII educaled (lhal is lo say, having veII-deveIoed minds and underslanding of
lhe nalure of lhe sub|ecl). In combal oeralions il mallers Iess lhal officers are veII
lrained bul oorIy educaled, il seIdom delermines lhe oulcome. In oeralions
such as counler-insurgency, il is IiabIe lo be lhe difference belveen success and faiI-
ure. The educalionaI requiremenl is, lhus, far more aboul leaching officers 'hov lo
lhink', lhan 'vhal lo lhink' lhe anlilhesis of vhal MasIand and Radvay varned
againsl, fifly years ago, as 'lhe slockiIe aroach' lo Iearning: lhinking in lerms of
'counling, iIing and sloring'.
5O
DeveIoing minds is mosl decidedIy nol some-
lhing lhal can be achieved as arl of re-deIoymenl lraining.
Lducalion is imorlanl even erhas, arlicuIarIy for armed forces, such as
lhe rilish, vho have erceived exerience of counler-insurgency. The lemla-
lion for lhese armed forces is lo beIieve lhal lheir exerience reIieves lhem of lhe
requiremenl for educalion. This beIief is iII-founded. Ior examIe, al lhe oul-
sel of lhe 2OO3 deIoymenl lo Iraq, lhe rilish army had considerabIe and
aImosl universaI exerience of counler-insurgency, bul aarl from a smaII num-
ber of eoIe vho had briefIy served in Afghanislan or Sierra Leone, and a very
fev individuaIs seconded lo olher armies, lhis exerience vas confined lo one
lhealre aIone, and a very sui gcncris one al lhal: Norlhern IreIand
51
(camaigns
in lhe aIkans vere nol counler-insurgency, bul eacekeeing1eace enforce-
menl). As a resuIl, and vilh very Iimiled educalion (as oosed lo lraining) in
counler-insurgency, lhere vas a lendency among some lo over-drav on lhe
Iessons of lhe Norlhern IreIand camaign.
Some asecls of lhe educalionaI requiremenl for miIilary rofessionaIs are more
obvious lhan olhers, vilh some sub|ecls being more obvious candidales for sludy,
for examIe hislory. Indeed, a Iack of underslanding of hislory, and of lhe imor-
lance of ils sludy, is a sure sign of a miIilary Ieader deslined lo faiI in oeralions
such as counler-insurgency. ul focus on one sub|ecl can obscure visibiIily of lhe
vider educalionaI requiremenl, a requiremenl veII arlicuIaled by SamueI I
Hunlinglon, aIso fifly years ago.
jusi cs |cu ci iis |cr!crs mcrgcs inic nisicrq, pc|iiics, cccncmics,
sccic|cgq cn! psqcnc|cgq, sc c|sc !ccs inc mi|iicrq s|i||. |tcn mcrc,
mi|iicrq |ncu|c!gc c|sc ncs jrcniicrs cn inc nciurc| scicnccs cj cncm-
isirq, pnqsics cn! |ic|cgq. 1c un!crsicn! nis irc!c prcpcr|q, inc cjji-
16
The underIying chaIIenge, lhough, is lhal armed forces aIso need lo relain lheir
caabiIily lo conducl Iarge-scaIe, convenlionaI varfare, lraining for vhich, ar-
licuIarIy for Iand forces, is (as has been oinled oul) a olenliaIIy fuII-lime occu-
alion in ilseIf, bul lraining lime is finile and, for many armed forces, is under
ressure from a high rale of oeralionaI deIoymenls. Achieving lhe necessary
amounl of lraining lime for bolh combal and for olher oeralions, and for bolh
var and lhe var, is highIy robIemalic.
Turning lo doclrine, nev doclrine on bolh sides of lhe AlIanlic recognizes lhe
need for a differenl aroach lo counler-insurgency. In }une 2OO6, lhe IS
Marine Cors roduced a 'lenlalive manuaI', Ccunicring |rrcgu|cr 1nrccis. A
Ccmprcncnsitc Apprcccn, in vhich ils sonsor, Lieulenanl GeneraI }im Mallis,
argued lhal,
Mcrincs ui|| |c cs|c! ic !c mcnq inings cincr incn ccm|ci cpcrc-
iicns ic |cci cur c!tcrscrics. Mcrincs ncc! ic |ccrn uncn ic jigni
uiin uccpcns cn! uncn ic jigni uiin injcrmciicn, numcniicricn ci!,
cccncmic c!ticc, cn! c |ccsi icucr! gcc! gctcrncncc jcr inc |ccc|
pccp|c. Winning cn! prcscrting inc gcc!ui|| cj inc pccp|c is inc |cq
ic ticicrq.
39
This aroach is conlinued in lhe Ialesl IS Army and Marine Cors coun-
lerinsurgency doclrine, ubIished remarkabIy quickIy in December 2OO6.
4O
In
lheir inlroduclion lo lhe ubIicalion significanlIy, |oinlIy signed
Lieulenanl GeneraIs David Ielraeus, IS Army, and }ames Amos, IS Marine
Cors, slress lhal:
1nis mcnuc| ic|cs c gcncrc| cpprcccn ic ccunicrinsurgcncq cpcrc-
iicns.|i siritcs ic prcti!c incsc ccn!uciing ccunicrinsurgcncq ccm-
pcigns uiin c sc|i! jcun!ciicn jcr un!crsicn!ing cn! c!!rcssing spc-
cijic insurgcncics.
And conlrary lo recels reviousIy esoused by neo-Cons in lhe Dearlmenl
of Defense, lhe generaIs aIso slress lhal:
Sc|!icrs cn! Mcrincs crc cxpccic! ic |c nciicn |ui|!crs cs uc|| cs
ucrricrs. 1ncq musi |c prcpcrc! ic nc|p rccsic||isn insiiiuiicns cn!
|ccc| sccuriiq jcrccs cn! cssisi in rc|ui|!ing injrcsiruciurc cn! |csic
scrticcs. 1ncq musi |c c||c ic jcci|iicic csic||isning |ccc| gctcrncncc
cn! inc ru|c cj |cu.
41
This is aIso lhe rilish Armed Iorces' aroach in lheir emerging |oinl doc-
lrine
42
on vhal is lermed 'Counlering IrreguIar Aclivily' vhich, Iike ils IS
counlerarl, seeks lo inslrucl miIilary ersonneI aboul counler-insurgency as a
13
12 17
There is, neverlheIess, a dicholomy here. In an era vhen armed forces can execl
lo be deIoyed on counler-insurgency and slabiIizalion oeralions, lhere is a dif-
ficuIl baIance lo be achieved in lhe slrenglh of lheir varrior elhos. So is a varrior
|usl a miIilary rofessionaI` r is a varrior essenliaIIy a erson vilh a slrong
habiluaI Iiking for fighling, an aggressive erson vhose |ob is lo 'deslroy lhe
enemy'
33
.'lo kiII lhe enemy aII eIse. is secondary'`
34
As Chrisloher Coker
oinls oul, kiIIing is one of lhe lradilionaI marks of lhe varrior, and he observes
lhal vhiIe AchiIIes is lhe archelyaI varrior in lhe Weslern lradilion, loday 'for
many soIdiers lhe archelyaI hero is Rambo. a one dimensionaI aclion figure
engaged in a comeIIingIy reduclive vision of var as ure vioIence'.
35
And lhere
is a furlher comIicaling faclor. Some counler-insurgency camaigns, such as
lhose in Iraq and Afghanislan loday, conlain significanl eIemenls of combal, as
deicled in lhe nolion of lhe Three Iock War ('lhe enlire seclrum of laclicaI chaI-
Ienges in lhe san of a fev hours vilhin lhe sace of lhree conliguous cily
bIocks'
36
). Combal and counler-insurgency are nol muluaIIy excIusive.
TraInIng and DnctrInc
A
KLY RLQIIRLMLNT IR AN ARMLD IRCL re-orienling from one lye of varfare
lo anolher is having agiIe and resonsive lraining and doclrine organiza-
lions. Ior many miIilaries invoIved in conlemorary oeralions il is robabIy lrue
lo say lhal lraining has adaled fasler lhan doclrine. The amounl of re-deIoy-
menl lraining in, for examIe, lhe IK and IS armed forces is nov significanlIy
increased, incIuding nol onIy lhe seciaIisl laclics and lechniques required, bul
aIso seciaI-lo-counlry briefings, cuIluraI avareness and Ianguage lraining.
There is aIso increasing recognilion lhal such lraining needs lo viden sliII furlher
lo incIude, amongsl olher lhings, knovIedge and underslanding of lhe arl lhal
lhe miIilary Iine of oeralion Iays in a muIli-disciIinary, comrehensive
aroach, and a more hoIislic aroach lo lhe sludy of insurgency. This has
invoIved some redefinilion of lhe lraining requiremenl. Il vas oflen cIaimed lhal
il vas reIaliveIy simIe for armed forces lrained in combal lo ad|usl lo vhal vere
erceived lo be lhe Iesser demands of oeralions olher lhan combal, such as sla-
biIily oeralions and counler-insurgency, bul much harder, if nol imossibIe (in a
shorl sace of lime), for lroos lrained onIy for oeralions olher lhan combal lo
become combal-caabIe.
37
True lhough lhis is, il vas inlerreled by some lo
imIy lhal counler-insurgency required IillIe exlra lraining for veII lrained com-
bal lroos. This vas an error. Irank Kilson commenled adverseIy on lhis allilude
lovards oeralions olher lhan combal, or vhal he caIIed Lov Inlensily
eralions, in lhe earIy 197Os: 'a considerabIe number of officers. sliII consider
lhal il is unnecessary lo make any greal efforl lo undersland vhal is invoIved in
Lov Inlensily eralions, and lhe cry lhal a fil soIdier vilh a rifIe can do aII lhal
is required is oflen heard'.
38
This cry is occasionaIIy sliII lo be heard, aIbeil infre-
quenlIy, and rareIy from anyone vilh any underslanding of lhe sub|ecl.
12
ccr musi nctc scmc i!cc cj iis rc|ciicn ic incsc cincr jic|!s cn! inc
ucqs in unicn incsc cincr crccs cj |ncu|c!gc mcq ccniri|uic ic nis
cun purpcscs. |n c!!iiicn, nc ccnnci rcc||q !ctc|cp nis cnc|qiicc|
s|i||s, insignis, imcginciicn, cn! ju!gcmcni ij nc is ircinc! simp|q in
tccciicnc| !uiics. 1nc c|i|iiics cn! nc|iis cj min! unicn nc rcuircs
uiinin nis prcjcssicnc| jic|! ccn in |crgc pcri |c ccuirc! cn|q
inrcugn inc |rcc!cr ctcnucs cj |ccrning cuisi!c nis prcjcssicn. 1nc
jcci inci, |i|c inc |cuqcr cn! inc pnqsicicn, nc is ccniinucus|q !cc|-
ing uiin numcn |cings rcuircs nim ic nctc inc !ccpcr un!crsicn!-
ing cj numcn ciiiiu!cs, mciitciicn cn! |cncticur unicn c |i|crc|
c!ucciicn siimu|cics. jusi cs c gcncrc| c!ucciicn ncs |cccmc inc prc-
rcuisiic jcr cnirq inic inc prcjcssicn cj |cu cn! mc!icinc, ii is ncu
c|sc c|mcsi unitcrsc||q rcuirc! cs c !csirc||c uc|ijicciicn jcr inc
prcjcssicnc| cjjiccr.
52
This cerlainIy resonales loday, and lhe nalure of currenl oeralions suggesls
lhal vhal may have been a desirabIe quaIificalion fifly years ago is nov
essenliaI. These comIex oeralions deend for success on a muIli-disciIi-
nary, comrehensive aroach, combining a number of Iines of oeralion
for examIe, oIilicaI, diIomalic, securily, economic, sociaI and lhe miIi-
lary rofessionaI requires an underslanding across lhe breadlh of lhese disci-
Iines. There is aIso a coroIIary lo lhis for lhe melhod and aroach lo lhe
deIivery of rofessionaI miIilary educalion in-service. Such educalion and
lraining is cuslomariIy deIivered in mosl counlries in slaff coIIeges or var
coIIeges miIilary eslabIishmenls IargeIy reslricled lo members of lhe armed
services. This may meel lhe requiremenl of rearalion for an oeraling
environmenl vhich is ilseIf reslricled lo lhe armed services, aIlhough lhis has
nol been vilhoul some disadvanlages. Hunlinglon referred lo lhese coIIeges
as 'rofessionaI monasleries'.
53
A ureIy miIilary Iearning environmenl,
vhelher or nol a 'rofessionaI monaslery', no Ionger meels lhe requiremenl.
There is a slrong argumenl for miIilary rofessionaIs lo underlake al Ieasl
some of lheir educalion and lraining aIongside reresenlalives of lhose olher
organizalions vilh vhich lhey viII be oeraling in fulure, nol Ieasl for beller
muluaI underslanding of lhe very differenl inslilulionaI cuIlures invoIved.
This is aIready haening lo some exlenl in coIIeges vhere oulsiders are
inviled for shorl moduIes, bul lhere is scoe for increasing lhis raclice sliII
furlher. Indeed, some counlries hosl muIli-disciIinary eslabIishmenls such
as Ghana's InlernalionaI Ieacekeeing Training Cenlre, and Iaddy Ashdovn
has roosed a simiIar eslabIishmenl 'a schooI for confIicl revenlion,
armed inlervenlion and osl-confIicl resoIulion'
54
in lhe Iniled Kingdom.
A furlher vay of avoiding lhe effecl of lhe 'rofessionaI monaslery' is for
some oslgraduale officer educalion lo lake Iace avay from lhe essenliaIIy
miIilary cuIlure of miIilary academies. Hovever good lhese academies may
be, lhere is IikeIy lo be an inslilulionaI cuIlure vilh lhe allendanl risk of
17
18 11
slereolyicaI lhinking vhich may inhibil lhinking 'oulside lhe box'. An offi-
cer cors needs some of ils members, indeed ils brighlesl and besl, lo receive
lhe inleIIecluaI slimuIalion lhal rolracled immersion in lhe very differenl
free-lhinking cuIlure lhal a good civiIian universily can rovide for exam-
Ie, lhrough maslers' and doclors' rogrammes and lo bring lhal slimuIa-
lion and fresh aroach back inlo lhe armed forces. Mosl armed forces rec-
ognize lhis, bul lhere is vide divergence in lhe exlenl lo vhich lhey creale
such oorlunilies and incenlivize arlicianls. The rilish Armed Iorces
are nol currenlIy in lhe Iead in lhis resecl.
55
There is one asecl of deveIoing minds and underslanding lo coe vilh lhe
chaIIenges of counler-insurgency lhal deserves seciaI menlion and lhal is
lhe need lo deveIo cuIluraI underslanding a key eIemenl of lhe conlesl
bolh in lhe hysicaI domain and lhe 'severeIy undersludied' ideoIogicaI
one.
56
There is a lendency, arlicuIarIy in busy armed forces (and nol excIud-
ing lhose vho beIieve lhal cuIluraI undersalnding is arl of lheir inherilance)
lo shorl-cul lhe cuIluraI underslanding rocess by focusing on lhe lraining
chaIIenge: hov lo behave in deaIing vilh lhose of anolher cuIlure, vhal basic
errors lo avoid, a smallering of a fev handy hrases. Imorlanl lhough lhis
is, ve deIude ourseIves if ve beIieve lhal a behaviouraI check-Iisl does any
more lhan scralch lhe surface of cuIluraI underslanding. If, as has been
argued, success in oeralions such as counler-insurgency deends on men-
laIIy oul-manoeuvring oonenls, lhere is a requiremenl lo gel inside lheir
minds, lhis cannol be done vilhoul a roere underslanding of lheir cuIlure.
And if lhe sychoIogicaI imacl of our aclions is aII-imorlanl, ve cannol
hoe lo succeed vilhoul underslanding lhe sychoIogy and cuIlure of lhose
vhose behaviour ve are lrying lo infIuence. ConsislenlIy under-eslimaled is
lhe requiremenl for grealer Iinguislic skiIIs lhan lhal rovided by lhe equiv-
aIenl of a lourisl hrase-book. LquaIIy imorlanl is lhe requiremenl for cuI-
luraI seIf-avareness: underslanding our ovn cuIlure, in arlicuIar our cuI-
luraI inherilance vhal ve have inheriled in lhe vay of sub-conscious
assumlions, ercelions and re|udices vhich may affecl hov ve reIale lo
eoIe of olher cuIlures. Moreover, MasIand and Radvay drev allenlion lo
lhe conneclion belveen cuIluraI avareness and lhe deveIomenl of lhe oIil-
icaI sohislicalion required by counler-insurgenls: 'for any execulive lhe
beginning of oIilicaI sohislicalion is lhe reaIizalion lhal lhere are men vho
may nol feeI as he feeIs, vho may nol dream as he dreams, or vho may nol
ray as he rays'.
57
In addilion lo deveIoing minds, lherefore, is lhe need,
vhere necessary, lo broaden lhem lo make lhem more oen and sensilive lo
lhe vievs of olhers, and Iess cerlain of lheir ovn omniscience and reclilude.
An imorlanl allilude is lhal advocaled by lhe Scols oel, Roberl urns: '
vad some Iov'r lhe giflie gie us1To see ourseIs as olhers see us'.
58
Inderslanding bolh lhe oonenls' cuIlure and one's ovn are essenliaI eIe-
menls of success. If ve do nol recognize lhis, ve musl execl lo Iose. In lhe
vords of Sun Tzu:
18
|i is. rcmcr|c||q !ijjicu|i jcr cn crmq ic |c rcc||q gcc! ci |cin ccm-
|ci cn! ccunicr-insurgcncq. Ncic||c cxcmp|cs cj inis !icncicmq crc
inc Russicn cn! |srcc|i crmics, nign|q c!cpi ucrjigniing mccnincs
uiin c ucrricr cincs sc sircng inci incq nctc jcun! ii c|mcsi impcs-
si||c ic c!cpi ic inc rcuircmcnis cj ccunicr-insurgcncq. On inc
cincr si!c cj inis ccin crc incsc crmc! jcrccs unicn nctc |crgc|q jcrc-
gcnc ucrjigniing cs incir ccrc cciitiiq, insicc! cnccsing ic |cccmc
spccic|isi pcccc|ccping jcrccs, cn! unc nctc jcun! ii |css ccsq incn
incq migni nctc uisnc! ic rcgcin inc ucrricr cincs ncc!c! ic mcci inc
cnc||cngcs cj ccm|ci cpcrciicns.
29
Moreover, counler-insurgency ossesses fealures vilh vhich lhe ure varrior
elhos is highIy uneasy: comIexily, ambiguily and uncerlainly, lhe vhoIe concel
of sofl over, oIilicaI 'inlerference', media scruliny, lhe 'unfair' conslrainls of
ruIes of engagemenl vhich can negale lhe use of lhe lrum card fireover. And
il requires lhese varriors lo acquire some decidedIy un-varrior-Iike allribules,
3O
such as emolionaI inleIIigence, emalhy vilh one's oonenls, loIerance, alience,
sublIely, sohislicalion, nuance and oIilicaI adroilness allribules vhich, lo some
varriors, aear lo undermine lhe varrior elhos on vhich success in combal
deends. Warriors can lhus be highIy uncomforlabIe vilh a roIe as counler-insur-
genls, and highIy resislanl lo any change of cuIlure. Such varriors mighl agree
vilh RaIh Ielers vriling in lhe IS Army |ournaI Pcrcmcicrs:
A sc|!icrs jc| is ic |i|| inc cncmq. A|| c|sc, ncuctcr impcricni ii
mcq cppccr ci inc iimc, is scccn!crq. 1nccrics !cni uin ucrs.
Wc|| ircinc!, uc||-|c! sc|!icrs in uc||-cuippc! crmics !c. An! incq
!c sc |q |i||ing cjjcciitc|q. 1ncrc is nc su|siiiuic jcr snc!!ing inc
cncmqs ||cc!.
31
Iroonenls of such an aroach somelimes enIisl CIausevilz in suorl:
Kin!-nccric! pccp|c migni cj ccursc inin| inci incrc ucs scmc ingc-
nicus ucq ic !iscrm cr !cjcci cn cncmq uiincui icc mucn ||cc!snc!,
cn! migni imcginc inis is inc iruc gcc| cj inc cri cj ucr. P|ccscni cs
ii scun!s, ii is c jc||ccq inci musi |c cxpcsc!. |j cnc si!c uscs jcrcc
uiincui ccmpunciicn, un!cicrrc! |q inc ||cc!snc! ii intc|tcs, uni|c
inc cincr si!c rcjrcins, inc jirsi ui|| gcin inc uppcr ncn!,
32
Thal may have been lrue of varfare in CIausevilz's day, bul in counler-insur-
gency conducled by armed forces of IiberaI democracies in lhe Tvenly Iirsl
Cenlury il is simIy nol lrue lhal 'if one side uses force vilhoul comunclion,
undelerred by lhe bIoodshed il invoIves, vhiIe lhe olher refrains, lhe firsl viII
gain lhe uer hand'. In lhese circumslances, disarming or defealing an enemy
vilhoul loo much bIoodsed is nol so much kind-hearled as cIever.
11
10 19
1nc |ricjcr sicic! inci inc missicn ucs ic scc| cui cn! !csircq inc
cncmq, inc missicn cj MACV jMi|iicrq Assisicncc Ccmmcn! Vici
Ncm} un!cr Gcncrc| Wcsimcrc|cn! jcr inc pcsi jcur qccrs. A|rcms
sicppc! inc |ricjing cn! urcic cui cn cn ccsc| 1nc missicn is nci ic
scc| cui cn! !csircq inc cncmq. 1nc missicn is ic prcti!c prcicciicn
jcr inc pccp|c cj Vici Ncm.
2O
And Irank Kilson drev allenlion in 1971 lo rilish Army commanders in
counler-insurgency vho 'resenl lhe silualion lo subordinales in lerms of con-
venlionaI varfare'.
21
Such commanders are, of course, lransgressing, amongsl
olher lhings, CIausevilz`s 'firsl, lhe sureme, lhe mosl far-reaching acl of |udge-
menl lhal lhe slalesman and lhe commander have lo make. |vhich isj lo eslab-
Iish. lhe kind of var on vhich lhey are embarking, neilher mislaking il for, nor
lrying lo lurn il inlo, somelhing lhal is aIien lo ils nalure'.
22
Since aII lhese cuIluraI chaIIenges require lhe convenlionaI combal varrior lo
|ellison some oId, and oflen deeIy heId, lenels, il is erhas vorlh recaIIing
asiI LiddeII Harl's viev lhal 'lhe onIy lhing harder lhan gelling a nev idea inlo
lhe miIilary mind is lo gel an oId one oul'.
23
Moreover, ralher Iike modernisls
and osl-modernisls in Tvenlielh Cenlury arl, some rolagonisls of modern
varfare have an inherenl disdain for lhose vho esouse a osl-modern slyIe,
have a desire (conscious or sub-conscious) lo rove lhal lheir slyIe is suerior,
and are lherefore reIuclanl lo change.
24
An imorlanl asecl of lhis differenl mind-sel or cuIlure required by miIilary
rofessionaIs concerns lheir varrior elhos a lerm lhal immedialeIy inlroduces
a secondary meaning of lhe vord 'varrior': 'a erson.dislinguished in fighl-
ing.fig |uraliveIyj a hardy, courageous or aggressive erson', or as one con-
lemorary hislorian suggesls of varriors, 'eoIe vilh a enchanl |'a slrong or
habiluaI Iiking'
25
j for fighling.
26
To be effeclive in combal, an army needs ils
members lo have a seIf-ercelion of varriors as fighlers, and lhe army as a
vhoIe needs lo be imbued vilh lhe characlerislic siril, or elhos, of lhe fighling
varrior: lhe desire lo cIose vilh lhe enemy and kiII him. Aslrong varrior elhos
is, lhus, a recious commodily. ul lo be effeclive al counler-insurgency and
slabiIizalion oeralions, an army needs ils members lo erceive lhemseIves as
somelhing olher lhan, or more lhan, |usl varriors. InIess lhey do, lhey are
IiabIe lo aIy a varrior elhos, aroach and melhods, for examIe exercising
hard over (in arlicuIar, 'kinelic soIulions') vhen lhey shouId be exercising
sofl over in Max ool's vords, 'fighling smaII vars vilh big var melhods'.
27
As lhe oId saying goes, 'if lhe onIy looI you have in your looI box is a hammer,
aII robIems begin lo resembIe naiIs'.
28
To be effeclive al bolh combal and
counler-insurgency, lhe army needs lo have sufficienl varrior elhos, bul nol so
much lhal il cannol adal, olhervise varrior elhos becomes an obslacIe lo ver-
saliIily and success. Combining lhese lvo cuIlures is highIy robIemalic.
1O
1nus ii is sci! inci cnc unc |ncus inc cncmq cn! |ncus nimsc|j ui||
nci |c cn!cngcrc! in c nun!rc! cngcgcmcnis. Onc unc !ccs nci
|ncu inc cncmq |ui |ncus nimsc|j ui|| scmciimcs |c ticicricus,
scmciimcs mcci uiin !cjcci. Onc unc |ncus nciincr inc cncmq ncr
nimsc|j ui|| intcric||q |c !cjccic! in ctcrq cngcgcmcni.
59
Iinding lhe necessary lime for inleIIecluaI deveIomenl in an officer's career, and
in lhe over-healed syIIabi of many miIilary coIIeges and schooIs, viII be a consid-
erabIe raclicaI chaIIenge, arlicuIarIy al lhe same lime as rearing for Iarge-
scaIe combal oeralions (vhich, as has been oinled oul, is ilseIf a fuII-lime occu-
alion), and arlicuIarIy al a lime vhen many armed forces find lhemseIves very
heaviIy commilled lo currenl oeralions. The scaIe of lhe educalionaI require-
menl is easy lo under-eslimale. Vieved as sub|ecl areas, lhere may be no more
lhan haIf a dozen vhich, lo use Hunlinglon's hrase, 'fronlier on miIilary knovI-
edge' aIlhough oIilics, economics, anlhrooIogy, socioIogy, sychoIogy and
erhas above aII hislory sring quickIy lo mind. ul lhese are nol sub|ecls lhal
Iend lhemseIves lo a reduclionisl aroach lo Iearning, lo be covered in a fev
eriods of inslruclion, nor are lhey olionaI for miIilary Ieaders in counler-insur-
gency. Taking miIilary hislory as an examIe, il shouId be sludied, as MichaeI
Hovard famousIy advised, 'in vidlh, in delh and in conlexl',
6O
(fasl becoming
lhe mosl quoled and Ieasl observed advice on lhe sub|ecl). Nor does lhe soIulion
Iie in over-rogramming exisling courses al lhe exense of lime for refIeclion, Iel
aIone lhe easy olion of cosmelic change a lick-in-lhe-box aroach vhich
aIIovs lhose vho vish lo do so lo cIaim lhal lhe necessary change has been made.
There is, of course, an imorlanl Iace in lhe Iearning rocess for seIf-educalion,
arlicuIarIy in lhe sludy of hislory. ul lhe lemlalion for lhe unvise, or al Ieasl
lhe un-forevarned, viII be lo oslone such seIf-educalion unliI il is loo Iale. In
many of loday's armed forces (incIuding lhe rilish and lhe American), mosl
senior officers, and a number of middIe-ranking ones as veII, are in |obs, vhelher
oeralionaI or non-oeralionaI, vhich are so demanding lhal IillIe lime is Iefl for
any reading lhal is nol |ob-reIaled, and, indeed, very IillIe lime for crealive lhink-
ing of any sorl. Acaulionary laIe is lhal of GeneraI WiIIiam WeslmoreIand vho
lhroughoul his lime as commander in Viel Nam had beside his bed lhe vorks of
a number of aulhors, incIuding Mao Zedong and lhe insighlfuI ernard IaII,
vhich couId have been key lo heIing him soIve lhe robIems lhal confronled
him. ul 'I vas usuaIIy loo lired in Iale evening lo give lhem more lhan occa-
sionaI allenlion'.
61
IinaIIy, on lhe sub|ecl of educalion, is lhe requiremenl for il lo be research-Ied. To
kee al lhe culling edge of lhe sub|ecl, arlicuIarIy in comelilion vilh a Iearning
and adalive enemy, requires a corus, or body, of academic research exerls
aIongside, and abIe lo inleracl vilh, raclilioners and sludenls. The risk here is
lhal since research oulul is difficuIl, if nol imossibIe, lo measure, research
dearlmenls become highIy vuInerabIe lo financiaI culs.
19
20 9
Cu!tura! Changc
A
IIRIRIATL DCTRINL, TRAINING AND LDICATIN are, hovever, onIy arl of lhe
soIulion. Lven more imorlanl is accelance of lhe required cuIluraI
change aIIuded lo earIier. This viII be a arlicuIar chaIIenge for lhose miIilary
rofessionaIs vho see lhemseIves ureIy as combal soIdiers. Il viII aIso be a
arlicuIar chaIIenge for lhose relurning from oeralions in Iaces such as Iraq
and Afghanislan vhose exerience of, or acquainlance vilh, counler-insur-
gency has been IargeIy of combal and vho, as a resuIl, may have IillIe lime for
lhe nicelies of 'hearls and minds' in comarison lo lhe more obviousIy heroic,
and more obviousIy revarded, aclivily of combal. Those vho are unabIe lo
make lhis cuIluraI lransilion are unIikeIy lo rove adel counler-insurgenls.
SeIeclion of lhose caabIe of lransilioning from modern lo osl-modern varfare
is aIso robIemalic. In David GaIuIa's oinion,
1ncrc crc nc ccsq criicric cnc||ing cnc ic !cicrminc in c!tcncc
uncincr c mcn unc ncs nci |ccn prcticus|q intc|tc! in c ccunicrin-
surgcncq ui|| |c c gcc! |cc!cr. Aucr|c||c sc|uiicn is ic i!cniijq incsc
unc rcc!i|q ccccpi inc ncu ccnccpi cj ccunicrinsurgcncq ucrjcrc cn!
gitc incm rcspcnsi|i|iiq. 1ncsc unc prctc incmsc|tcs in cciicn
sncu|! |c pusnc! upucr!.
62
In achieving lhe necessary cuIluraI change, lhe singIe mosl imorlanl faclor viII
be lhe Iead given from lhe lo of lhe hierarchy. Taking, for examIe, lhe Iniled
Slales, lhe lhen Chief of Slaff of lhe Army, GeneraI Ieler Schoomaker, made his
osilion, and his cIarily of vision, cIear in his inlroduclion lo lhe 2OO6
Ccunicrinsurgcncq doclrine ubIicalion,
Wcsicrn mi|iicrics icc cjicn ncg|cci inc siu!q cj insurgcncq. 1ncq
jc|sc|q |c|ictc inci crmics ircinc! ic uin |crgc ccntcniicnc| ucrs crc
cuicmciicc||q prcpcrc! ic uin smc||, unccntcniicnc| cncs. |n jcci,
scmc ccpc|i|iiics rcuirc! jcr ccntcniicnc| succcss jcr cxcmp|c, inc
c|i|iiq ic cxccuic cpcrciicnc| mcncutcr cn! cmp|cq mcssitc jirc-
pcucr mcq |c cj |imiic! uii|iiq cr ctcn ccunicr-prc!uciitc in
CO|N cpcrciicns.
63
And in many olher nalions, miIilary Ieaders have given simiIar suorl for lheir
ovn armed forces' nev aroaches lo counler-insurgency.
Imorlanl lhough il is, a Iead from lhe lo, by ilseIf, is nol enough. Any
change-managemenl rogramme requires buy-in lhroughoul lhe hierarchy.
Addressing lhe sub|ecl genericaIIy, and nol secificaIIy reIaled lo lhe armed
forces of any nalion in arlicuIar, subordinale Ieaders are IikeIy lo faII inlo lhree
main grous. Al eilher end of lhe seclrum are, on lhe one end, lhose vho
2O
lechnoIogy viII diserse or al Ieasl enelrale 'lhe imenelrabIe fog of var', given
sufficienl resources, aII camaigns are vinnabIe and quickIy, lhe vorId is divid-
ed inlo 'enemy forces' and 'friendIy forces', and lhe oeralionaI iclure can be
seen in dislincl coIours: bIack and vhile.
The cuIlure and mind-sel required for raclilioners of osl-modern varfare
such as counler-insurgency are very differenl, requiring recognilion lhal: lhe
end-slale lhal mallers mosl is nol lhe miIilary end-slale, bul lhe oIilicaI one,
indeed, 'lhe insurgency robIem is miIilary onIy in a secondary sense, and oIil-
icaI, ideoIogicaI and adminislralive in a rimary sense',
15
oeralionaI success is
nol achieved rimariIy by lhe aIicalion of IelhaI fireover and largeling, lhal
oul-manoeuvring oonenls hysicaIIy is Iess imorlanl lhan oul-manoeuvring
lhem menlaIIy, lhal, in lhe vords of Lavrence Ireedman: '|Ijn irreguIar var-
fare, sueriorily in lhe hysicaI environmenl is of IillIe vaIue unIess il can be
lransIaled inlo an advanlage in lhe informalion environmenl',
16
lhal cIaims lhal
lechnoIogy viII diserse lhe fog of var are lo execled from lechnohiIes vilh
IillIe underslanding of var (and, indeed, from lhose aid Iarge sums of money
lo make such cIaims), lhal sufficienl resources do nol Iead inexorabIy lo cam-
aign success, lhal 'lhe image of a quick and decisive viclory is aImosl aIvays
an iIIusion':
17
counler-insurgency camaigns are rareIy von quickIy and,
indeed, some are quile simIy un-vinnabIe and shouId never be allemled in
lhe firsl Iace, lhal lhe dramalis ersonae cannol be divided in Manichaean
fashion inlo 'enemy forces' and 'friendIy forces', and lhal very IillIe of lhe ic-
lure is acluaIIy ainled in bIack and vhile moslIy in shades of grey.
18
Lven lhe aroach lo robIem-soIving is differenl. In convenlionaI varfare lhe
doclrinaI aroach is essenliaIIy Carlesian or reduclionisl lhe firsl sle in
robIem-soIving is lo reduce lhe robIem lo ils essenliaIs and idenlify a vork-
abIe soIulion as quickIy as ossibIe a number of quasi-scienlific looIs for-
muIas, lemIales, 'norms'
19
have been deveIoed lo assisl in lhe rocess, lhe
referred means lo lhe end is lhe deIivery of raid and decisive effecl, a veII-
knovn diclum is 'don'l |usl sil lhere, do somelhing!' Counler-insurgency, by
conlrasl, characlerised by 'vicked robIems' does nol Iend ilseIf lo lhe reduc-
lionisl, IoverIoinl mind: lhe firsl essenliaI sle is sending lime undersland-
ing lhe nalure of lhe robIem and aII ils many facels, lo lry and deveIo for-
muIas, lemIales and 'norms' is lo misundersland lhe nalure of lhe robIem,
lhe deIivery of raid and decisive effecl is bul one means in many circum-
slances il may be nol onIy singuIarIy inaroriale, bul acliveIy counler-ro-
duclive, and lhe viser counseI is somelimes 'don'l do somelhing, |usl sil lhere!'
The degree of cuIluraI chaIIenge is easy lo undereslimale. InIess educaled
olhervise, lhose schooIed in convenlionaI varfare are IiabIe lo conducl
counler-insurgency as convenlionaI varfare. When lhe enIighlened GeneraI
Creighlon Abrams assumed command in Viel Nam in 1968 he vas briefed on
lhe camaign Ian:
9
8 21
lhings in arlicuIar: comIexily, ambiguily, uncerlainly and voIaliIily, and by
lhe facl lhal lhey aII lend lo be 'vicked robIems' robIems lhal are inlraclabIe
and circuIar vilh comIex near-deendencies, and vhere soIving one arl of
lhe robIem can creale furlher robIems, or make lhe vhoIe robIem grealer.
14
The nalure and characlerislics of lhese oeralions oinl lovards lhe roIes in
vhich miIilary rofessionaIs may execl lo find lhemseIves, and lhe comelen-
cies lhey require. IarlicuIarIy slriking is lhe far grealer diversily of roIes lhan is
demanded by combal oeralions aIone: for examIe, slale-buiIding, securily-
seclor reform, menloring and lraining indigenous securily forces, humanilarian
assislance, civiI adminislralion, Iav enforcemenl, exercising oIilicaI muscIe,
even sociaI vork roIes lhal mighl be execled lo be lhe roer resonsibiIily
of olher organizalions, agencies or governmenl dearlmenls. These roIes oinl,
in lurn, lovards lhe far grealer breadlh and variely of comelencies required
for examIe, lhe abiIily lo: aIy sofl over as veII as hard, and choose lhe
righl one for lhe righl circumslances, vork in arlnershi vilh muIlinalionaI,
muIli-agency organizalions, civiIian as veII as miIilary, vilhin a comrehensive
aroach, masler informalion oeralions and engage successfuIIy vilh lhe
media, conducl ersuasive diaIogue vilh IocaI Ieaders and oinion-formers,
menlaIIy oul-manoeuvre a viIy and rulhIess enemy, and, erhas mosl oflen
overIooked, measure rogress arorialeIy. These comelencies require rac-
lilioners lo have a high IeveI of underslanding across a vide range of sub|ecls,
incIuding: lhe oIilicaI conlexl, lhe IegaI, moraI and elhicaI comIexilies, cuIlure
and reIigion, hov socielies vork, vhal conslilules good governance, lhe reIa-
lionshi belveen ones ovn armed forces and sociely, lhe nolion of human secu-
rily, lhe concel of Iegilimacy, lhe Iimilalions on lhe uliIily of force, lhe sy-
choIogy of one's oonenls and of lhe resl of lhe ouIalion. Comared vilh
Iarge-scaIe, inler-slale combal, lherefore, lhe chaIIenges facing miIilary rofes-
sionaIs conducling osl-modern varfare such as counler-insurgency may or
may nol be lougher, bul lhey are cerlainIy very differenl nol Ieasl, consider-
abIy broader and more cerebraI, requiring far grealer conlexluaI underslanding,
and successfuI decision-making al aII IeveIs (nol |usl senior ones) is IikeIy lo
deend Iess on ureIy miIilary exerlise lhan on lhe aIicalion of visdom.
Thc Cu!tura! Cha!!cngc
I
N ADDITIN T A DIVLRSL AND RAD RANGL of comelencies and underslanding,
oeralions such as counler-insurgency require miIilary rofessionaIs lo have a
differenl mind-sel a differenl cuIlure from lhal required for modern varfare.
The raclilioner of modern varfare is schooIed lo see chaIIenges in a cerlain vay:
lhe end slale lhal mallers is lhe miIilary one, oeralionaI success is achieved by
lhe aIicalion of IelhaI fireover vhich, in lurn, is IargeIy a queslion of largel-
ing and hysicaI manoeuvre, lhe effecls lo be achieved are hysicaI ones, lhe
means lo lhe end are IargeIy allrilionaI: deslroying largels unliI lhere are none Iefl,
8
agree vhoIehearledIy vilh lhe change and do aII in lheir over lo effecl il, and,
on lhe olher, lhose vho disagree vilh il vhoIehearledIy and do aII lhey can lo
oose il. The Ialler are unIikeIy lo roser if lhose al lhe lo are unified in
lheir suorl for lhe change. ul among lhose in lhe middIe of lhe seclrum
lhe lhird grou viII be eoIe vho, al hearl, oose lhe change, bul under-
sland lhal overl oosilion is nol career-enhancing. Some of lhem viII, lhere-
fore, kee lheir oosilion muled, or maybe aIIov lhemseIves over lime lo be
ersuaded lo suorl lhe change, olhers, hovever, viII lreal lhe roosed
change as yel anolher iece of oIilicaI correclness: somelhing lhal musl be
esoused in ubIic, bul oosed in rivale. This Ialler grou is robabIy lhe
grealesl lhreal lo achievemenl of change. Il viII be lemling indeed for lhem lo
vail for lhe reformers lo move on lo olher |obs or Ieave lhe Service, lo be
reIaced by lhose vilh Iess reformisl zeaI.
Achieving lhe righl baIance in lhe cuIluraI orienlalion of an armed force is nol
easy, nor is il an exacl science. Al lhe hearl of oosilion lo moderaling lhe
varrior elhos and lo orienlaling a force more lovards oeralions such as
counler-insurgency and slabiIily oeralions is lhe concern, oflen unsoken,
lhal such oeralions are indeed lhe sideshov, lhal 'lhe reaI lhing', lhe uIlimale
lesl, may be Iarge-scaIe, inler-slale varfighling, ossibIy againsl a miIilary
suerover for examIe, China and lhal armed forces need lo be fuIIy
lrained and sychoIogicaIIy reared for il, and nol undermined by vhal may
be a assing hase of a lhreal vhich, vhiIe serious, is nol exislenliaI. Nor can
lhis argumenl be dismissed oul of hand, nol Ieasl because, conlrary lo lhe
vievs of lhose vho hoId lhal '|Wjar no Ionger exisls. var as cogniliveIy
knovn lo mosl non-combalanls, var as a ballIe in a fieId belveen men and
machinery, var as a massive deciding evenl in a disule in inlernalionaI
affairs: such var no Ionger exisls',
64
such varfare is nol exlincl, |usl hibernal-
ing. Less reseclabIe bul equaIIy assionale argumenls can be execled from
lhe miIilary-induslriaI Iobby for vhom diversion of lhe focus and budgel
avay from Iarge-scaIe, modern varfare reresenls a mosl unveIcome lhreal
vhich for some may, indeed, be exislenliaI.
Il may be lhal lhe cuIluraI chaIIenge of rearing some armed forces lo be bolh
adel combal soIdiers and adel counler-insurgenls is simIy unachievabIe.
Where lhis is |udged lo be lhe case, lhere aear lo be lhree olions. The firsl is
lhe crealion of lvo seciaIisl forces, vilh lhe non-combal roIe confined lo a ara-
miIilary force, simiIar lo lhose in a number of slales, such as lhe IlaIian Carabinieri
vhich acquilled ilseIf commendabIy in lhe NAT Suslainmenl Iorce in osnia,
or given lo a secific arl of lhe armed forces, such as reserve forces. This,
lhough, has ma|or disadvanlages, foremosl of vhich is lhe conslrainl of numbers
and Iack of fIexibiIily. Lven vilhoul such seciaIizalion, a number of armed
forces, such as lhe Iniled Kingdom's and lhe Iniled Slales', are highIy slrelched
on currenl oeralions. Iurlhermore, as lhese currenl oeralions demonslrale,
lroos deIoyed on counler-insurgency or slabiIizalion oeralions can quickIy
21
inter-
22 7
find lhemseIves in combal, and vice versa. The second olion for a slale is roIe
seciaIizalion for ils armed forces as a vhoIe, eilher as combal or non-combal
forces. ul, by lhe same loken, lhe bIurring of neal deIinealions in modern oer-
alions risks lroos of one seciaIizalion finding lhemseIves in silualions for vhich
lhey are unreared and unsuiled. The lhird olion is lo accel lhal lhe desirabIe
IeveI of versaliIily is unachievabIe, bul relend olhervise, acceling lhal lroos
viII be Iess good al one roIe lhan lhe olher (or mediocre al bolh), and alleml lo
manage lhe risk. This is erhas lhe easiesl olion, bul il is robabIy aIso lhe
mosl dangerous, vilh ils olenliaI for misunderslandings vilh serious conse-
quences. None of lhese lhree olions, lherefore, is allraclive.
A
LTHIGH MANY I THL CHALLLNGLS facing miIilary rofessionaIs in osl-
modern varfare are simiIar lo lhose facing lhem in modern varfare, some
of lhem in arlicuIar lhe inleIIecluaI and cuIluraI chaIIenges are very dif-
ferenl, requiring a differenl aroach and mind-sel. Armed forces, eseciaIIy
lhose vhose rimary focus is modern varfare, need nol onIy lo recognize lhis
and adal accordingIy, bul lo inslilulionaIize adalabiIily. Amongsl olher
lhings, lhey viII need lo ensure a baIance in lheir varrior elhos lhroughoul
lheir organizalion, varrior elhos needs lo be sufficienl for combal oeralions,
bul nol so greal lhal il inhibils effeclive erformance in counler-insurgency.
The lerm 'varrior' has a number of meanings and is olenliaIIy misIeading.
ConlroIIing varrior elhos and achieving lhe righl baIance in lhe righl circum-
slances is one of lhe mosl imorlanl resonsibiIilies and dulies of any miIilary
commander al any IeveI.
Armed forces shouId nole lhal il is easy lo under-eslimale lhe amounl of lrain-
ing required in order lo erform effecliveIy in osl-modern varfare, in arlic-
uIar counler-insurgency even for lhose vho are highIy lrained in modern
varfare. Indeed, lhe more focused armed forces are on modern varfare, lhe
harder lhe lransilion is IikeIy lo be. Iinding lhe necessary lraining lime in
comelilion vilh lhal required lo kee armed forces veII reared for mod-
ern varfare is nol easy. Achieving lhe righl baIance requires fine |udgemenl
from senior miIilary officers and Defence Ianners.
Many miIilaries need lo lake more aclive sles lo ensure lhal lheir doclrine
remains u-lo-dale vilh, and reIevanl lo, an oeralionaI environmenl vhich
changes fasler lhan does lhal of modern varfare. ul acceling lhal, in rac-
lice, lhis viII nol aIvays be achievabIe, lhey aIso need lo aIIov commanders
in lhe fieId sufficienl Ialilude lo ad|usl doclrine in Iine vilh evoIving circum-
slances. Iurlhermore, lhey need lo devole considerabIe allenlion lo being
'Iearning organizalions', and ones lhal Iearn, adal and anliciale fasler lhan
lhe oosilion.
22
by a lechnoIogicaI dynamic: lhe quesl for grealer fireover, grealer IelhaIily,
grealer seed, beller sleaIlh, beller digilizalion, more efficienl Iogislics, nel-
vork-cenlric varfare, and lhe abiIily lo deIiver hi-lech 'shock and ave'. Such
varfare resenls mind-boggIing chaIIenges lo raclilioners nolabIy lhose of
lhe coordinalion and synchronizalion of vhal amounls lo a huge and erIex-
ingIy comIex machine aIbeil lhal lheir soIulion is, in characler, Nevlonian
more formuIaic and mechanislic lhan conceluaI. The overaII chaIIenge for
varriors here vas and is lo kee ace vilh (and, vhere ossibIe, lo kee ahead
of) lhe deveIomenl of varfare.
6
Il remains a considerabIe chaIIenge, bul by no
means lhe onIy one, and for some, nol even lhe mosl lesling.
The asymmelric chaIIenges osed lo modern armed forces, arlicuIarIy lhose of
IiberaI democracies, by oonenls vho refuse lo engage lhem in modern, con-
venlionaI varfare, bul inslead choose a differenl slyIe of varfare, for examIe
insurgency, are nol nev,
7
bul lhey are IargeIy of a differenl sorl: osl-modern
chaIIenges chaIIenges lhal are nol rimariIy overcome vilh lhe looIs of moder-
nily: more advanced lechnoIogy, fireover, IelhaIily, seed, sleaIlh, digilizalion,
Iogislics, nelvork-cenlric varfare or hi-lech 'shock and ave.
8
Iosl-modern
varfare does nol deveIo in Iinear fashion, and unIike modern varfare, many
of lhe ma|or chaIIenges il oses are nol so much lechnoIogicaI, formuIaic or
mechanislic as conceluaI. Ior examIe, var and eace are nol easiIy deIineal-
ed, 'defeal' and 'viclory' require definilion. The enemy is nol obvious, nor eas-
iIy idenlifiabIe, IileraIIy or figuraliveIy, and may change on an aImosl-daiIy
basis, success deends nol on deslruclion of lhe enemy, bul on oul-manoeu-
vring oonenls in arlicuIar, deriving lhem of ouIar suorl, and vin-
ning il oneseIf. The conlesl lakes Iace nol on a fieId of ballIe, bul in a comIex
civiIian environmenl: 'amongsl lhe eoIe'.
9
Nor is il a rimariIy miIilary con-
lesl, in lhe case of counler-revoIulionary varfare, according lo David GaIuIa,
'lvenly er cenl miIilary, eighly er cenl oIilicaI is a formuIa lhal refIecls lhe
lrulh'.
1O
The var, is in Iarge arl, a var of ideas, lhe ballIe IargeIy one for er-
celion, and lhe key ballIeground is in lhe mind lhe minds of lhe indigenous
ouIalion, and lhe minds of regionaI and vorId oinion.
11
Much of lhis ideo-
IogicaI slruggIe is carried oul in lhe virluaI domain of cybersace.
12
Time is a
key somelimes lhe key resource, and one vhich our oonenls are IikeIy lo
hoId in far grealer quanlily lhan do ve. Hov lhe var is foughl becomes cru-
ciaIIy imorlanl lo lhe quaIily and suslainabiIily of lhe resuIling eace.
eralions vhich couId reviousIy be cIearIy and convenienlIy IabeIIed for
examIe, combal, eacekeeing, eace enforcemenl, counler-revoIulionary
varfare, humanilarian oeralions can no Ionger be so. Nov, 'lhese reassur-
ingIy neal deIinealions sil uneasiIy vilh lhe reaIily lhal camaigns invoIving
counler-insurgency are inherenlIy messy a kaIeidoscoe of differenl lyes of
oeralion, remarkabIy resislanl lo nealness in deIinealion',
13
confusing doc-
lrine-vrilers and varriors aIike. GeneraIizing aboul lhese oeralions is nol easy,
nol Ieasl because every one is of ils ovn kind, bul many raclilion-
ers vho have exerienced lhem mighl agree lhal lhey are characlerized by four
7
6 23
EndurIng and ChangIng Cha!!cngcs
I
N TLRMS I THL CHALLLNGLS IACING WARRIRS 'erson|sj vhose occualion is
varfare'
1
lhe eriod of lhe CoId War vas characlerized by lhe quesl lo kee
u vilh lhe modernizalion of lhe ballIefieId: for examIe, lhe increasing sohis-
licalion of veaon syslems, lhe imacl of informalion lechnoIogy, lhe increased
comIexily of command and conlroI, of slaff vork and laclics. ne of lhe ma|or
chaIIenges vas lhal of roviding varriors vilh sufficienl lraining, and lhis
desile or, cynics mighl argue, as a resuIl of lhe increasing number and
sohislicalion (nol lo menlion cosl) of lraining aids, simuIalors and oeralionaI
anaIysis looIs. Nev command and slaff courses, for examIe in lhe Iniled
Slales and in severaI Luroean armed forces, vere crealed lo heI meel lhis
demand, and many miIilaries found lhal lraining lo achieve lhe necessary skiIIs
vas a fuII lime occualion. ul as a resuIl of resonding lo lhis chaIIenge many
became beller lrained and more rofessionaI in lhe sense of being more
focused on achieving exerlise in lheir |obs arguabIy, lhan ever before.
Wilh a fev excelions, lhe ballIefieId for vhich lhey reared (and by vhich
lhey |udged lheir rofessionaIism) vas lhe arena of Iarge-scaIe, inler-slale com-
bal or, as some came lo caII il varfighling. Indeed, for many miIilary ro-
fessionaIs, varfare lhe raclice of var, and varfighling combal, vere syn-
onymous, lhereby misIeading lhemseIves lhal lhere vas no more lo lhe rac-
lice of var lhan combal.
2
True, some armed forces found lhemseIves invoIved
in olher lyes of oeralions, for examIe osl-coIoniaI disengagemenl, anli-
communisl inlervenlions, Iniled Nalions eacekeeing missions, or even
inlernaI securily roIes in lheir ovn counlries. ul lhese missions vere IargeIy
considered by many miIilary eslabIishmenls lo be aberralions eralions
lher Than War, as lhey came lo be knovn in rilish and American doclrine
dislraclions from lhe 'reaI lhing': Iarge-scaIe, hi-lech, inler-slale confIicl, vhich
vas erceived axiomalicaIIy (and nol vilhoul hubris) lo be 'modern varfare' in
lhe sense of being a cuIminalion in evoIulionary deveIomenl. The essence of
lhis lye of varfare vas a conlesl, reIaliveIy simIe in conceluaI lerms,
belveen lvo reguIar armed forces, vhere var and eace, and viclory and
defeal, vere cIearIy idenlifiabIe slales, vhere lhe mission vas lo deslroy lhe
enemy's forces, and lhe melhod vas lhe aIicalion of overvheIming fireov-
er, faciIilaled by hysicaI manoeuvre.
Wilh lhe excelion of some nalions vhich chose lo seciaIize in eacekeeing
and humanilarian oeralions, lhe requiremenl for armed forces lo be reared
for 'lhe reaI lhing' did nol, of course, end vilh lhe CoId War. Lncouraged by lhe
zeilgeisl of lhe so-caIIed RevoIulion in MiIilary Affairs, vilh ils exlravaganl
cIaims lhal il 'chaIIenges lhe hoary diclums aboul lhe fog and friclion of var',
3
and lhus lhe nalure of var ilseIf, and amid asserlions lhal lhis viev vas vindi-
caled by lhe one-sided nalure and resuIl of lhe 1991 GuIf War,
4
lhe deveIomenl
of modern varfare conlinued, and conlinues, in Iinear fashion,
5
driven IargeIy
6
AII armed forces need lo recognize lhal reIiance on lraining and doclrine aIone
as looIs for achieving success in osl-modern varfare is misIaced, and lhal an
imorlanl faclor in lhe rocess more imorlanl lhan in modern varfare is
educalion. Such educalion needs lo focus on lhe deveIomenl of minds, and in
arlicuIar lhe deveIomenl of breadlh of vision, underslanding, visdom and
good |udgemenl. Lducalion is required nol |usl for lhose nev lo osl-modern
oeralions, bul aIso lo ensure lhal lhose vilh some exerience in lhese oera-
lions do nol over-reIy on lheir exerience, for examIe by lransIaling inaro-
riale Iessons from one camaign lo anolher. MiIilaries shouId
underlake more of lheir educalion and lraining aIongside reresenlalives of
lhose organizalions vilh vhich lhey viII find lhemseIves oeraling in fulure, nol
Ieasl lo gain an underslanding of lhe differenl organizalionaI cuIlures. And lo
avoid inslilulionaI cuIlure and slereolyicaI lhinking, and lo in|ecl fresh ideas
inlo lhe officer cors, armed forces shouId ensure lhal lhey send a sufficienl
number of lheir brighlesl and besl for oslgraduale rogrammes in civiIian uni-
versilies. In generaI, miIilaries viII need lo find more lime for rofessionaI miI-
ilary educalion.
AII of lhis is IikeIy lo caII for a change of inslilulionaI cuIlure for some miIilaries,
or vilhin areas of miIilaries, arlicuIarIy for lhose inslilulions or individuaIs
vho see lhemseIves ureIy as combal varriors. The essence of lhe change of
cuIlure is for lhese combal varriors lo come lo |udge lheir rofessionaIism (in
vhich mosl lake such ride) by lheir erformance nol |usl in combal, bul in aII
roIes lhey are required lo underlake. Ior some, lhis requires a redefinilion of
rofessionaIism. Any cuIluraI change vilhin any miIilary is robIemalic, and
overcoming resislance lo change may be chaIIenging. And lhere is a aradox
here: vhere change is required, senior miIilary Ieaders viII need lo ress il
home if il is lo suslain, bul in some organizalions il may be lhal some of lhe
senior Ieaders are amongsl lhose mosl resislanl lo change. There is aIso a need
lo ensure lhal lhose vilh an underslanding of, and an acumen for, osl-modern
varfare are nol side-Iined vilhin miIilary hierarchies. There is a olenliaI com-
arison here vilh lhe arl vorId vhere, in some inslilulions, osl-modernisls
found lheir vay barred by an eslabIishmenl dominaled by modernisls.
IinaIIy, ve shouId recognize lhal over-focus on a singIe lye of varfare Iarge-
scaIe, convenlionaI varfare inhibiled underslanding of olher lyes of varfare,
and of varfare as a vhoIe. We shouId, lherefore, bevare lhe olenliaI danger
of over-focus on osl-modern varfare having lhe same resuIl.
* * *
23
24 5
1. Sncricr Oxjcr! |ng|isn Diciicncrq, Iiflh Ldilion, xford II, 2OO2.

Websler`s Diclionary has a simiIar definilion: 'Someone engaged in or exeri-
enced in varfare'. Wc|sicrs On|inc Diciicncrq, 2OO7, vvv.vebslers-onIine-
diclionary.org.
2. See CoIin S Gray, Ancincr B|cc!q Ccniurq, London, Ihoenix, 2OO6, 37.
3. iII vens, Iijiing inc |cg cj Wcr, aIlimore, }ohns Hokins II, 2OOO,
15. As a former Vice Chairman of lhe IS }oinl Chiefs of Slaff, AdmiraI
vens' vievs vere arlicuIarIy infIuenliaI in miIilary and oIilicaI circIes in
lhe IS. Much of lhe hye surrounding lhe RevoIulion in MiIilary Affairs is
vrillen in Ianguage lhal Ldvard Lullvak described, severaI decades earIi-
er, as 'brochuremanshi. vhere exlravaganl cIaims are camoufIaged
under lhe seudo-lechnicaI Ianguage fashionabIe in miIilary circIes`.
Ldvard Lullvak, A Diciicncrq cj Mc!crn Wcr, London, AIIen Lane Ienguin
Iress, 1971, 4. Nor vere lhese exlravaganl cIaims confined lo civiIians.
GeneraI RonaId IogeIeman, Chief of lhe IS Air Iorce, leslifying before
Congress in 1997, asserled '|Ijn lhe firsl quarler of lhe 21sl cenlury you viII
be abIe lo find, fix or lrack, and largel in near reaI lime anylhing of con-
sequence lhal moves uon or is Iocaled on lhe face of lhe Larlh'. MichaeI
'HanIon, 1ccnnc|cgicc| Cncngc cn! 1nc |uiurc cj Wcrjcrc, Washinglon DC,
The rooking Inslilule Iress, 2OOO, 13. Aarl from anylhing eIse, il vouId
have been inleresling lo hear GeneraI IogeIman's definilion of vhal consli-
luled 'anylhing of consequence'.
4. Some vrilers drev concIusions of even more far-reaching consequences,
for examIe: 'The olenliaI abiIily of lhe Iniled Slales lo heI consoIidale a
revoIulion in geoslralegic affairs in vhich mosl of lhe vorId's ma|or indus-
lriaI overs are democralic, roserous, aIIied vilh each olher, Iacking a
ma|or slralegic foe, and graduaIIy exlending lheir cIub of membershi lo
olher counlries is even more hisloric, and more imorlanl, lhan ils urorl-
ed abiIily lo again revoIulionize varfare'. 'HanIon, cp cii, 197.
5. See Rod Thornlon, Asqmmciric Wcrjcrc, Cambridge, IoIily Iress, 2OO7,
178-9.
6. This is nol |usl a maller of keeing u vilh lechnoIogy, bul of keeing u
vilh lechnics: aII asecls of lhe reIalionshi belveen equimenl and ils oera-
lors. 'Weaons deveIomenl is onIy one corner of a lriangIe, of vhich lhe olher
lvo are a laclicaI doclrine for using lhe veaon, and lhe lraining of lhe com-
balanls, individuaIIy and coIIecliveIy, lo use il.' Chrisloher eIIamy, 1nc
|tc|uiicn cj Mc!crn Wcrjcrc. 1nccrq cn! Prcciicc, London, RoulIedge, 199O, 3O.
7. They are, of course, as oId as var ilseIf, and vilh Ienly of reIaliveIy
recenl exerience on vhich lo drav: '|Ijf ve Iook al lhe 2Olh Cenlury aIone ve
are nov in Viel-Nam faced vilh lhe forly-eighlh smaII var'. ernard IaII,
24
Pnst-Mndcrn Cha!!cngcs
Inr Mndcrn WarrInrs
by
Jnhn KIszc!y
IntrnductInn
A
S WARIARL THL IRACTICL I WAR changes lhrough lhe ages, so il can be
execled lo change lhe demands il Iaces on ils raclilioners. Where lhese
changes in raclice are dramalic for examIe, lhe advenl of mechanized var-
fare lhe changing demands viII be easy lo sol. ul vhere lhe changes are
more evoIulionary or graduaI, over a eriod of lime, il is Iess easy lo idenlify
lhe imacl on miIilary rofessionaIs. Il is aIso ossibIe lo be Iiving lhrough a
eriod of such change vilhoul being avare of il: from one monlh lo lhe nexl
even from one year lo lhe nexl change can lake Iace so graduaIIy as lo be
aImosl imercelibIe.
Il is cerlainIy ossibIe, Iooking back, lo erceive changes in fealures of varfare
over lhe aImosl-lvo decades since lhe end of lhe CoId War for examIe, lhe
increased incidence of civiI vars and inslabiIily in faiIed or faiIing slales, and
lhe rise of lerrorism and insurgency, nalionaI and lrans-nalionaI and lo iden-
lify some of lhe differenl demands Iaced on our armed forces as a resuIl, bul
some of lhe demands, arlicuIarIy lhose lhal mighl be laking Iace in currenl
oeralions, may be Iess obvious. Il is limeIy lo examine lhese chaIIenges and
lheir imacl on armed forces, and lo assess hov veII Iaced lhey are lo coe
vilh lhe oeralionaI chaIIenges of lhe fulure.
This aer examines lhe chaIIenges resenled lo modern varriors by changes
in conlemorary varfare, and argues lhal vhiIe some of lhese chaIIenges have
been or are being overcome, lhere are olhers, arlicuIarIy lhose associaled vilh
miIilary educalion and cuIlure, vhich have yel lo be fuIIy recognized, Iel aIone
mel, and vhich viII require lo be so if modern varriors are lo be a malch for
lomorrov's varfare.
5
4 25
iv
Iicuicncni Gcncrc| Sir jcnn Kiszc|q is Dirccicr
cj inc Dcjcncc Acc!cmq cj inc Uniic! King!cm.
'The Theory and Iraclice of Insurgency and Counler-Insurgency', Nctc| Wcr
Cc||cgc Rcticu, AriI 1965, reroduced, Winler 1998, VoI LI, No 1, 46.
8. We shouId nol be surrised lhal a arlicuIarIy successfuI slyIe in varfare
evokes a resonse vhich re|ecls il in favour of a differenl one vhich exIoils
slrenglhs and veaknesses exosed by changing circumslances. This rocess
has been a conslanl lhroughoul hislory vilh modern (for lheir lime) slyIes of
varfare conslanlIy being chaIIenged or usured by osl-modern slyIes. Nor
does lhe use of lhe lerm 'osl-modern' imIy lhal lhose vho adol lhis slyIe
refrain from emIoying highIy advanced lechnoIogy as conlemorary insur-
genls are doing so effecliveIy.
9. Ruerl Smilh, 1nc Uii|iiq cj |crcc. 1nc Ari cj Wcr in inc Mc!crn Wcr|!,
Icn!cn, Ienguin, 2OO5, 3.
1O. David GaIuIa, Ccunicrinsurgcncq. 1nccrq cn! Prcciicc, Weslorl, Iraeger,
2OO6, 63.
11. Magnus Ranslro and Graeme I Herd, 'Aroaches lo Counlering
Terrorism and CIST', in Anne AIdis and Graeme I Herd, 1nc |!cc|cgicc| ucr cn
1crrcr. Wcr|!ui!c Sircicgics jcr Ccunicr-1crrcrism, London, RoulIedge, 2OO7,
3.
12. ||i!.
13. }ohn KiszeIy, 'Learning Aboul Counler-insurgency', RUS| jcurnc|, VoI
152 No 1, December 2OO6, 19.
14. Horsl RilleI and MeIvin Webber, 'DiIemmas in a GeneraI Theory of
IIanning', in N Cross (ed), Dctc|cpmcnis in Dcsign Mcinc!c|cgq, Chichesler,
WiIey and Son, 1984, 135-144. The aulhors conlrasl 'vicked' robIems
vilh lhe reIaliveIy benign or 'lame' robIems of malhemalics, chess, or uz-
zIe-soIving.
15. IaII, cp cii, 47.
16. Lavrence Ireedman, 1nc 1rcnsjcrmciicn cj Sircicgic Ajjcirs, London, IISS
AdeIhi Iaer No. 379, 2OO6), 2O.
17. Anlhony Cordesman, 1nc Wcr Ajicr inc Wcr. Sircicgic Icsscns cj |rc cn!
Ajgncnisicn, Significanl Issues Series, VoIume 26, Number 4, Cenler for
Slralegic and InlernalionaI Sludies, Washinglon, 2OO6, 71.
18. See David GIanlz, Sctici Mi|iicrq Opcrciicnc| Ari. |n Pursuii cj Dccp Bcii|c,
London, Irank Cass, 1991, 44, and eIIamy, cp cii, 173-176.
19. The Russian 'norme', malhemalicaIIy- and scienlificaIIy- derived re-
scribed rales and scaIes. See GIanlz, i|i!.
2O. }ohn NagI, Iccrning ic |ci Scup Wiin A Knijc, Chicago II, 2OO2, 175.
21. Irank Kilson, Icu |nicnsiiq Opcrciicns, London, Iaber and Iaber, 1971,
2OO.
22. CIausevilz, cp cii, 88.
23. asiI LiddeII-Harl, 1ncugnis cn Wcr, London, Iaber & Iaber, 1943, 115.
24. There are obvious araIIeIs vilh Thomas Kuhn's aradigm lheories.
25. Sncricr Oxjcr! |ng|isn Diciicncrq, cp cii.
25
26 3
26. Max Haslings, Wcrricrs, London, HarerCoIIins, 2OO5, xi.
27. Max ool, 1nc Sctcgc Wcrs cj Pcccc, London, asic ooks, 2OO2, 285.
28. Quoled in NagI, cp cii, 2O3.
29. KiszeIy, cp cii, 19.
3O. r as Kilson uls il, 'lhe quaIilies required for fighling convenlionaI var
are differenl from lhose required for deaIing vilh subversion or insurgency'.
Kilson, cp cii, 2OO.
31. RaIh Ielers, 'In Iraise of Allrilion', Pcrcmcicrs, Summer 2OO4, 24-26.
AIso '|Cjarrying oul civiI adminislralion and oIice funclions is simIy going
lo degrade lhe American caabiIily lo do lhe lhings America has lo do. We
don'l need lo have lhe 82nd Airborne escorling kids lo kindergarlen.'
CondoIeeza Rice, Ncu Ycr| 1imcs, 21 clober 2OOO.
32. CarI von CIausevilz, On Wcr, MichaeI Hovard and Ieler Iarel, lrans &
eds, Irincelon II, 1984, 75.
33. This hrase is arl of lhe IS Army's SoIdier's Creed, bul excIuded from lhe
Warrior Llhos vhich is arl of lhe Creed. The Warrior Llhos ilseIf is remarkabIy
berefl of any menlion of fighling or kiIIing: 'I viII aIvays Iace lhe mission firsl.
I viII never accel defeal. I viII never quil. I viII never Ieave a faIIen comrade'.
hll:11vvv.lradoc.army.miI1Io1TNSarchives1SelemberO41O923O4. hlm
accessed 1 Se 2OO7.
34. Ielers, cp cii, 24-26.
35. Chrisloher Coker, 1nc Wcrricr |incs. Mi|iicrq Cu|iurc cn! inc Wcr cn
1crrcr, Abingdon, RoulIedge, 2OO7, 7, 41-2 & 61.
36. CharIes KruIak, 'The Slralegic CororaI: Leadershi in lhe Three Iock
War', Mcrinc Gczciic , }anuary 1999, 3.
37. See, for examIe, House of Commons SeIecl Commillee on Defence,
1997-98 Lighlh Reorl, aragrah 2O3, vvv.ubIicalions.arIiamenl. uk1a1
cm1997981cmseIecl1cmdefence1138 accessed 3O Selember 2OO7.
38. Kilson, cp cii, 199.
39. Ccunicring |rrcgu|cr 1nrccis. A Ccmprcncnsitc Apprcccn, ISMC, Quanlico,
}une 2OO6.
4O. US Armq Mcnuc| 3-24 (aIso US Mcrinc Ccrps Wcrjigniing Pu||icciicn 3-
33.6).
41. US Armq Mcnuc| 3-24, ix-x.
42. IK MD }oinl Doclrine Nole 21O7, Ccunicring |rrcgu|cr Aciitiiq Wiinin A
Ccmprcncnsitc Apprcccn, March 2OO7.
43. Ior 'comIex' insurgencies see }ohn MackinIay, Dcjcciing Ccmp|cx |nsurgcncq.
Bcqcn! |rc cn! Ajgncnisicn, RISI WhilehaII Iaer No 64, 2OO5, vi-vii.
44. 'The fieId manuaI vas videIy revieved, incIuding by severaI }ihadi veb-
siles, coies have been found in TaIiban lraining cams in Iakislan. Il vas
dovnIoaded 1.5 miIIion limes in lhe firsl monlh afler ils osling lo lhe Iorl
Leavenvorlh and Marine Cors vebsile.' Sarah SevaII, in lhe forevord lo lhe
Chicago Iniversily Iress edilion of lhe manuaI, quoled in }ohn A NagI, 'An
26
Cnntcnts
IntrnductInn 5
EndurIng and ChangIng Cha!!cngcs 6
Thc Cu!tura! Cha!!cngc 8
TraInIng and DnctrInc 12
EducatInn 14
Cu!tura! Changc 20
Cnnc!usInns 22
Endnntcs 24
iii
2 27
ii
Coyrighl }ohn KiszeIy 2OO7
AII righls reserved
}ohn KiszeIy has asserled lhe moraI righl
lo be regarded as lhe aulhor of lhis vork
Iirsl ubIished 2OO7 by lhe Defence Academy of lhe Iniled Kingdom
ISN 978-O-9553921-5-3
Tyesel by Defence Academy, ARAG IubIicalions Seclion
Cover design by CranfieId Sludios, CranfieId Iniversily, Defence Academy
Iroduced by Media Services, CranfieId Iniversily, Defence Academy
American Viev of Tvenly Iirsl Cenlury CounlerInsurgency', RUS| jcurnc|,
VoI 152, No 4, Augusl 2OO7, 15.
45. This requiremenl goes some vay beyond MichaeI Hovard's advice
aboul miIilary doclrine lhal '|Wjhal does maller is lo gel il righl vhen lhe
momenl arrives'. 'MiIilary Science in and Age of Ieace', RUS| jcurnc| No 119,
March 1974 advice beller suiled lo an age of eace.
46. This aragrah IargeIy laken from KiszeIy, cp cii, 24.
47. CoIin McInnes, 'The rilish Army's Nev Way in Warfare: A DoclrinaI
Missle`', Defence and Securily AnaIysis, 23:2, 127-141, }une 2OO7, hll:11
dx.doi. org11O.1O8O11475179O7O1424697.
48. GiuIio Douhel, 1nc Ccmmcn! cj inc Air, lrans Dino Ierrari, Washinglon
DC, ffice of Air Iorce Hislory, 1942, rerinl 1983, 3O.
49. David KiIcuIIen, 'Counlerinsurgency Rc!ux', Surtitc|, Winler 2OO6-2OO7,
116.
5O. }ohn MasIand and Laurence Radvay, Sc|!icrs cn! Scnc|crs, Irincelon II,
1957, 382-5.
51. The IK referred lo lhe Armed Iorces' aclivily in lhis camaign as
'MiIilary Aid lo lhe CiviI Iover'.
52. SamueI I Hunlinglon, 1nc Sc|!icr cn! inc Sicic, Cambridge, Mass,
Harvard II, 1957, 14.
53. Hunlinglon, cp cii, 266.
54. 'There is. a overfuI case for lhe eslabIishmenl of a schooI for confIicl
revenlion, armed inlervenlion and osl-confIicl reconslruclion vhich
couId acl as a kind of high-IeveI slaff coIIege lo Iearn Iessons, roose
changes lo governmenl and deveIo and ass on exerlise lo senior service-
officers, civiI servanls and oIilicians. This leaching shouId have an inler-
nalionaI dimension loo, given lhal one of lhe lasks is lo sread besl raclice
and raise caacily, nol |usl in lhe deveIoed vorId, bul in olher armed forces
and governmenl raclilioners vorIdvide.' Iaddy Ashdovn, Sucr!s cn!
P|cugnsncrcs. Bringing Pcccc ic inc 1ucniq |irsi Ccniurq, London, WeidenfeId
and NichoIson, 2OO7, 192.
55. In conlrasl lo lhe Iniled Slales Armed Iorces, and in conlrasl vilh lhe
rilish Army in, for examIe, lhe 197Os, vhen, amongsl lhose officers vho
eIecled lo underlake mid-career oslgraduale rogrammes lo xford and
Cambridge, subsequenlIy achieved four slar rank, and made significanl con-
lribulions lo miIilary lhoughl, vere Irank Kilson, Anlhony Iarrar-HockIey,
and NigeI agnaII.
56. Ranslro and Herd, cp cii, 3.
57. MasIand and Radvay, cp cii, 71.
58. Roberl urns, 'To ALouse', 1nc Ccncngcic Burns. 1nc Ccmp|cic Pccms cn!
Scngs cj Rc|cri Burns, Ldinburgh, Canongale, 2OO3, 132.
59. Sun Tzu, 1nc Ari cj Wcr, lrans RaIh D Savyers, ouIder, CoIorado, 1994,
179.
27
28 1
6O. MichaeI Hovard, 'The Ise and Abuse of MiIilary Hislory', in MichaeI
Hovard, ed, 1nc Ccuscs cj Wcr cn! Oincr |sscqs, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard
II, 1983, 194-195.
61. WiIIiam WeslmoreIand, A Sc|!icr Rcpcris, Nev York, DoubIeday, 1976,
364. See aIso WiIIiamson Murray, 'Thoughls on MiIilary Hislory and lhe
Irofession of Arms', in WiIIiamson Murray and Richard Harl Sinnreich, eds,
1nc Pcsi cs Prc|cguc. 1nc |mpcricncc cj Hisicrq ic inc Mi|iicrq Prcjcssicn, Nev
York, Cambridge II, 2OO6, 89.
62. GaIuIa, cp cii, 67.
63. US Armq Mcnuc| 3-24. ix.
64. Smilh, cp cii, 1.

28
THE DEFENCE ACADEMY
PO5T-MODERN CHALLENGE5
FOR MODERN WARRIOR5
BY
JOHN KI5ZELY
THE 5HRIVENHAM PAPER5
NUMBER 6
NOVEMBER 2007
DEFENCE ACADEMY
POST-MODERN CHALLENGES
FOR MODERN WARRIORS
BY
JOHN KISZELY
THE SHRIVENHAM PAPERS
NUMBER 5
December 2007
Thc DcIcncc Acadcmy nI thc UnItcd
KIngdnm
The Defence Academy is lhe IK's Defence higher educalionaI
eslabIishmenl and comrises lhe RoyaI CoIIege of Defence Sludies,
}oinl Services Command and Slaff CoIIege, Defence CoIIege of
Managemenl and TechnoIogy, Advanced Research Assessmenl
Grou and Armed Iorces ChaIaincy Cenlre. Il is resonsibIe for
osl-graduale educalion and lhe ma|orily of command, slaff, Iead-
ershi, defence managemenl, acquisilion, and lechnoIogy, lraining
for members of lhe IK Armed Iorces and MD CiviIian Servanls,
and for eslabIishing and mainlaining ilseIf as lhe MD's rimary
Iink vilh IK universilies and inlernalionaI miIilary educalionaI
inslilulions. Il has lhree slralegic arlners King's CoIIege
London, Serco Defence & Aerosace and CranfieId Iniversily
vho rovide academic and faciIilies suorl and services.
The Academy seeks lo advance miIilary science in a number of
vays: firslIy, in reIalion lo lhe conducl of camaigns and oera-
lions il is, lherefore, a key comonenl of oeralionaI caabiIily,
secondIy, in reIalion lo hov Defence oerales in lhe inlernalionaI
securily domain, and lhe vay Defence vorks in Governmenl, and
lhirdIy, in reIalion lo lhe managemenl of Defence.
Through exIoilalion of ils inleIIecluaI cailaI, lhe Academy aims
lo acl as a overfuI force in deveIoing lhinking aboul defence
and securily, nol onIy vilhin MD bul across Governmenl, and lo
infIuence vider debale aboul defence and securily issues.
ShrivP6Insfront.xp 11/21/07 10:52 AM Page 1
DcIcncc Acadcmy nI thc UnItcd KIngdnm
Advanccd Rcscarch and Asscssmcnt Grnup (ARAG)
DEFENCE 5ECURITY DEVELOPMENT
Shrivenham Iaer Number 6, November 2OO7
Post-Modern ChaIIenges for Modern Warrlors
by }ohn KiszeIy
No arl of lhis ubIicalion, excel for shorl quolalions, may be reroduced, slored
in a relrievaI syslem, or lransmilled in any form vilhoul lhe rior ermission of
lhe Advanced Research and Assessmenl Grou.
Thc vIcws cxprcsscd In thIs papcr arc cntIrc!y and sn!c!y thnsc nI thc authnr and
dn nnt ncccssarI!y rcI!cct nIIIcIa! thInkIng nr pn!Icy cIthcr nI Hcr Majcsty's
Gnvcrnmcnt, nr nI thc MInIstry nI DcIcncc.
ARAG
The ARAG mission is lo carry oul advanced research and assessmenl in order lo
kee lhe Defence Academy's syIIabi al lhe culling edge, and lo enhance senior
decision laking and oIicy deveIomenl, in order lo romole oeralionaI caabiIily
and advance lhe defence and securily inleresls of lhe Iniled Kingdom.
ARAG conducls ils aclivily using bolh lhe unique exerlise of one of ils eIe-
menls, lhe ConfIicl Sludies Research Cenlre (CSRC), and lhemalic 'research cIus-
lers' of knovIedgeabIe eoIe from a vide range of backgrounds.
5HRIVENHAM PAPER5
The Shrivenham Iaers series of monograhs is envisaged as a means of dissemi-
naling ideas of conlemorary or near-lerm reIevance, faIIing vilhin lhe comass of
lhe ARAG mission sel oul above. Lmhasis viII be Iaced on raid resonse and
earIy ubIicalion of maleriaI submilled. Conlribulions are inviled, iniliaI submis-
sions shouId be made in A4 hard coy, backed u by disk or emaiI as MS Word
fiIe, lo:
ARAG IubIicalions Manager, Miss Lmma McCarlhy, ARAG, Defence
Academy of lhe Iniled Kingdom, Headquarlers Iock 4, Iaringdon Road, WalchfieId,
Svindon, WiIls SN6 8TS (emcccarlhy.hqdefenceacademy.mod.uk)
Commenls on lhis aer viII be veIcomed, and shouId be direcled lo ARAG
IubIicalions Manager as above.
ShrivP6Insback.xp 11/21/07 10:50 AM Page 1
Shrivenham Paper Number 5, December 2007
DEFENCE | SECURITY |
DEVELOPMENT
Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA
www.defenceacademy.mod.uk
The Defence Academy aims to deliver high quality
education and training, research and advice in order to
sustain and enhance operational capability and advance
the defence and security interests of the United Kingdom.
Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors
by John Kiszely
THE SHRIVENHAM PAPERS - Number 5
December 2007
Royal College of Defence Studies
Joint Services Command and Staff College
Defence College of Management and Technology
Advanced Research and Assessment Group
Armed Forces Chaplaincy Centre

Shriven Ham Paper 5

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Shriven Ham Paper 5

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DEFENCE | SECURITY |

IST-MDLRN CHALLLNGLS IR MDLRN WARRIRS

1. Sncricr Oxjcr! |ng|isn Diciicncrq, Iiflh Ldilion, xford II, 2OO2.

1. Sncricr Oxjcr! |ng|isn Diciicncrq, Iiflh Ldilion, xford II, 2OO2.

IST-MDLRN CHALLLNGLS IR MDLRN WARRIRS

You might also like