Disqualification GARCIA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 1993 | Bellosillo, J. FACTS Pet.

G was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. 1 Apr 1975: G summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty per decision of then Ministry of Public Works in Adm. Case No. 975 for the loss of several telegraph poles & telecom lines o Petitioner did not appeal from the decision. Based on the same facts obtaining in the administrative action, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner with then CFI (now RTC) of Quezon. o 23 Jan 1980: TC rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged. Consequently, G sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. o In an indorsement dated 7 April 1980, petitioner's request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications. o Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency. The Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., by authority of the President, per Resolution No. O.P. 1800, granted executive clemency to petitioner. He was reinstated on March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner's reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman. Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This was o Denied by the COA on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provided for the payment of back salaries and that he has been reinstated in the service. o Petitioner appealed the COA decision to the Office of the President denied "due to legal and constitutional constraint," holding that SC is the proper forum. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition. Solicitor General: the award is implicit in the grant of executive clemency, the ultimate objective of which is to accord full justice to petitioner. COA asks this Court to deny the petition for the following reasons: a) G's acquittal in the criminal case did not necessarily free him from administrative liability; b) G's unexplained failure to appeal the decision in the administrative case was tantamount to a waiver or renunciation of his right to back wages; c) the executive clemency was granted to petitioner for the purpose of reinstatement only since it was silent on the matter of back wages; d) the award of back wages is allowed only if the respondent is exonerated from the administrative charge or that his suspension or dismissal is declared illegal or unjustified by the court; and,

e)

G did not render any service during the period before his reinstatement, hence, hes not entitled to back wages based on "no service, no pay" rule.

ISSUE/HELD/RATIO W/N petitioner is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency YES Our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to extend executive clemency under the following circumstances: "Except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress." The clemency granted to petitioner in the instant case partakes of the nature of an executive pardon. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. The GENERAL RULE is that pardon does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. It cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages (GENERAL RULE!). EXCEPTION is when such is expressly grounded on the person's innocence. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt. Case at bar: G was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the TC was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. The EXCEPTION applies in this case, making his reinstatement automatic thus entitles him to back wages as reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. G dismissal was not the result of any criminal conviction but the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which the President, as its head, has the power of control. In pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified Gs

dismissal and relieved him from administrative liability. His separation from the service being null and void, hes thus entitled to back wages. Established jurisprudence fixes recovery of back wages to a period of five (5) years to be paid an illegally dismissed government employee who has been ordered reinstated. However this only applies in cases where employees of local governments who were removed from office because of abolition of office or position, reduction of work force, or lack of funds on the part of the governments concerned.

This case is different. The petitioner's reinstatement in the instant case which was ordered pursuant to a grant of executive clemency was effected not because of lack of sufficient proof of his commission of the offense but that, more importantly, he did not commit the offense charged. Verily, law, equity and justice dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation and, above all, injustice caused to him and his family by his unfounded dismissal. This Court cannot help surmising the painful stigma that must have caused petitioner, the incursion on his dignity and reputation, for having been adjudged, albeit wrongfully, a dishonest man, and worse, a thief. Consequently, this Court finds it fair and just to award petitioner full back wages from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was reinstated. Petition granted. COA Decision reversed and set aside. Public respondents ordered to pay the full amount of Garcias back salaries from 1 Apr 1975-12 Mar 1984.

Duration of Qualifications CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DE LA CRUZ 2004 | Corona, J. FACTS Feb 1995: Calamba, a DOTC employee, formally filed her protest against de la Cruzs promotional appointment claimed that he did not meet the required 4-year supervisory requirement for the position

o Respondent would indeed lack the required years of work experience to qualify for the contested position if the managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly followed. At the time of his permanent appointment in Nov 1994 as Chief, he had a little over one year of managerial experience as designated Acting Chief. o However, the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his appointment 1981-1993: de la Cruz held several other positions in the ATO o Rapisora v. CSC: the rule that appointees must possess the prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so strictly interpreted as to curtail an agencys discretionary power to appoint, as long as the appointee possesses other qualifications required by law. De la Cruzs promotional appointment was issued in accordance with petitioners selection process (passed rigid screening of ATO Personnel Selection/Promotion Board and [oral & written] exams of DOTC Selection Board) His multifarious experiences and trainings in air transportation were taken into account when he was chosen for the subject position. o His dedication to the service was demonstrated by his conceptualization and establishment of the Airport Crash Rescue Organization (ACRO) procedure in various national airports in the country to ensure the security of both airport personnel and passengers. o Teologo v. CSC: Promotions in the Civil Service should always be made on the basis of qualifications, including occupational competence, moral character, devotion to duty, and, not least important, loyalty to the service. o The power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority.

1994: De la Cruz, a DOTC employee, was promotionally appointed to the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) Designated Acting Chief of said division during the latter part of 1993 Jul 1995: DOTC Secretary Garcia found the protest without merit

On appeal to CSC-NCR: upheld Calambas protest in 1997 and recalled approval of de la Cruzs appointment o The contested position requires four years of work experience in position/s involving management per Qualification Standards Manual prescribed by MC No. 46, s. 1993 and/or four years of experience in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools per ATO Qualification Standards xxx. Taking into account his previous positions, Mr. dela Cruz could not have exercised managerial or supervisory functions for the required number of years. o ATO Director asked for suspension of order recalling the appointment 5 Jan 1998: Denied, BUT 13 Jan 1998: CSC-NCR Director granted the ATO Directors request and affirmed the approval of de la Cruzs appointment. Calamba requested that the CSC implement the CSC-NCRs 5 Jan ruling CSC treated this as an appeal o CSC-NCR Director said the 5 Jan ruling was nonexistent o Granted Calambas appeal o Denied MR by de la Cruz CA set aside the CSC Resolutions, and approved de la Cruzs appointment as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office ISSUE/HELD/RATIO W/N de la Cruz has sufficiently complied with the required experience standards for the position YES. On the requirements (see quoted part in facts): The use of the disjunctive term or in this controversy connotes that either the standard in the first clause or that in the second clause may be applied in determining whether a prospective applicant for the position under question may qualify.

We, however, agree with petitioner that the reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of resolution of the protest against it. o We need not rule on petitioners assertion that respondents subsequent compliance with the experience standards during the pendency of the case should not be counted in his favor since respondent was anyway qualified for the position at the time of his appointment. o Assuming he failed to meet the experience requirement to qualify for the contested position, We are still inclined to uphold the CAs approval of de la Cruzs appointment. The CSC has, on several occasions, allowed the appointment of personnel who were initially lacking in experience but subsequently obtained the same.

Petition denied. CA decision affirmed. Appointment of de la Cruz approved.