The Gettier Problem Author(s): Scott Sturgeon Reviewed work(s): Source: Analysis, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jul.

, 1993), pp. 156-164 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328464 . Accessed: 04/03/2012 18:22
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The GettierProblem
SCOTTSTURGEON Thirty years ago this journal published the most influentialpaper of modernanalyticepistemology- EdmundGettier's'Is JustifiedTrueBelief
23, Knowledge?' (ANALYSIS 1963, pp. 121-23). In it Gettier refuted a clas-

sic theory of propositionalknowledge by constructingthought experiments to test the theory.A cottage industrywas born. Each responseto case. In turntherewould be Gettierwas quicklymet by a new Gettier-style of a responseto the case, a furtherGettierscenario,and a reiteration the process. The industry'soutput was staggering.Its literaturebecame so so complicated,its thoughtexperiments baroque,that commonsensewas of work drownedin stretchedbeyondlimit.The deepsignificance Gettier's on can the resultingcacophony.That significance be seen by reflecting two the problemarises;and second, how it is to be solved. points:first,why 1. WhatgeneratesThe GettierProblem? is Infallibilism the view that whatevergives rise to epistemicjustification it truth.According the infallibilist, is impossibleto justifiedly to guarantees is believesomethingfalse. This has the tidy result that justification sufficient to convert belief into knowledge. Thus the InfallibilistView of knowledge: (IV) S knows P iff (a) S believesP (b) S'sbeliefin P is justified. leads to a of But since guarantees truth are hardto come by, Infallibilism dilemma:either we are justifiedin believingfar less than commonsense is admits,or justification fallible. for the latter horn of the dilemma. This has the messy Fallibilistsopt result that justification is not sufficient to convert belief into knowledge. For you cannot know something false. Since you can, according to the fallibilist, justifiedly believe something false, it follows that knowledge is more than justifiedbelief. The question then is, what has to be added? The view attacked by Gettieranswers this question very simply:add view of knowledge': truth.This is the so-called'traditional (TV) S knows P iff (a) S believesP (b) S's beliefin P is justified (c) P is true.
ANALYSIS 53.3, July 1993, pp. 156-164. @ Scott Sturgeon

THE GETTIER PROBLEM 157

are Heretwo ingredients usedto convertbeliefinto knowledge:fallibilistic and truth.This is the theoryrefutedby Gettier. justification Gettiertargetedthe right-to-leftdirectionof (TV). He presentedclear cases in which justifiedtrue beliefdoes not amountto knowledge.Here is a typicalGettierscenario: (S) Suppose I burgle your house, find two bottles of Newcastle Brown in the kitchen, drink and replace them. You remember purchasingthe ale and come to believethere will be two bottles waitingfor you at home. Yourbeliefis justifiedand true, but you do not know what'sgoing on. side does not providea sufficientcondi(TV) is thus false. The right-hand tion for the left-handside. The GettierProblemis that of delineatingthe minimalcondition which, when appendedto (a) to (c), generatesa sufficient conditionfor knowledge.In brief,the problemis to findthe minimal link betweenjustification truthwhich precludesGettierscenarios. and 2. Solvingthe GettierProblem. The standardsolution to The GettierProblemspringsfrom a simpleidea. We may sketchthis idea as follows: (SS) S knows P iff (a) S believesP (b) S's belief in P is justified (c) P is true standsup to the relevant (d) S'sjustification set of facts. (d) is intended to capture a complex relation holding between those featuresresponsiblefor (b) on the one hand, and a certainset of facts on the other. To fully understand(d), two things must be explained:first, which facts are relevant;and second, what it is for one's justificationto 'standup' to them. The relevantfacts will vary as one thinksof the past, presentor future. To see this, supposeyou believesomethingat time t about an earliertime t*.' Whetheror not this is knowledgewill dependon factswhich post-date t*. But in such cases the possessionof knowledgewill not dependon facts Factsof this sortcannotmakeyoursa Gettier post-datingyour belief-state. scenario.Thus, when you think of the past or presentonly facts occurring
For the sake of simplicityI ignore iteratedknowledgestates, knowledgeof intentional states, and any other situationwhich would force a distinctionbetween facts 'strictly' about the past (like the fact that therewas no McDonald'son the Moon in 1900) and facts not strictlyabout the past (like the fact that Einsteinknew that no one would live on the Sun in 1999).

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on or before the moment of thought will determinewhether you have knowledge. On the otherhand,supposeyou believesomethingat time t abouta later time t*. Whetherthis is knowledgewill dependon facts which post-date Not your belief-state. only will the factsat t * needto be as you believe,but the interimfacts must be kosheras well. Yetwhen you believesomething
at t about a later time t *, facts which post-date t * cannot generate a Gettier

scenario.Therefore,when you think of the past or present the relevant facts will obtain no later than your thought;and when you think of the futurethe relevantfacts will obtain no later than the time considered.So for any token beliefat time t in a propositionabout t*, the relevantfacts will be those occurringup to, and including,the laterof the two. Let 'T' name the set of truths describingthese facts in an arbitrarily chosen case. For condition (c) of (SS) to be non-redundant,we must excludeP fromT (alongwith any truthtriviallyimplyingP). We may then to ask:What is it for one'sjustification 'standup' to T? for for Letus say that one'sjustification P consistsin 'evidence' P,leaving the natureof this phenomenonopen. We noticethat evidenceis defeasible: {E)may be evidencefor P despitethe fact that {E)u {E*)is not evidence for P.In the eventwe say that {E*)defeats{E),or that {E*)is a defeaterfor {E). Intuitively,{E) is ultimatelyundefeatedrelative to a set S iff every elementof S which defeats{E)is itselfdefinitely defeated;and somethingis defeatedin S when somethingin S defeatsit for which thereare definitely defeated. no further defeaters, if thereare,they arethemselves or, definitely into an explicit definitionis not hard, but we this recursive gloss Turning is needn'tbother.Our presentunderstanding enoughto explain (SS): (M) S knows P iff (a) S believesP (b) S's beliefin P is justified (c) P is true (d) S'sevidence{E}is ultimatelyundefeated relativeto T. (M) is the standardpost-Gettiermodel of propositionalknowledge. Its fourth condition is intendedto capturethe minimalconnection between to and justification truthnecessary excludeGettierscenarios. teach us? What does (M) 3. Internalism/Externalism. Call justificationthat is ultimatelyundefeated'full justification'.Whateverthis comes to precisely,full justificationis the crucialfeatureresponsible for turning belief into knowledge. One lesson to be learned from (M) is that epistemic externalism deeply characterizes the nature of full

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justification.Let me explain. debate springsfrom this quesinternalism/externalism Epistemology's Internalists justification tion: what determines say epistemicjustification? is determinedby an agent'sperspective: reasonerswho are perspectivally equivalent;while externalistssay justificaequivalentare justificationally tion is determinedby featuresindependentof an agent'sperspective.But what does this differencereallycome to? Notice first that two scenarios appear the same to a person iff her on perspective each is the same.So if we can reckonthe featuresgivingrise In to appearance, will have found those definingan agent'sperspective. we this regardit is customaryto say that two scenariosappearthe same to a are person when her relevantappearance-states phenomenallythe same. More carefully,scenariosP1 and P2 appearthe same to S just in case her of mental-representations them are, or would be, tokens of the same then amountsto this idea: phenomenaltype. Epistemicinternalism justificationis determinedby the phenomenalfeaturesof an agent's mind:reasonerswhose mental states are phenomenallyidenticalare identical; justificationally and epistemicexternalism amountsto this idea: is from the phenomjustification determined featuresindependent by enal featuresof an agent'smind. Now, we can easily see that full justificationis determinedby features independentfrom an agent'sperspective.Thus externalismis true of the crucial ingredientneeded to convert belief into knowledge: Lesson One - externalismis true of full justification. To see this, notice that full justification mustsatisfyall externalconstraints on knowledge.For instance: in (El) one is fullyjustified believingP only if one is reliableaboutP, (E2) one is fully justifiedin believinga truepropositiononly if one does so becauseone is reliable, beliefonly if one's (E3) one is fully justifiedin a perceptually-based statesare non-deviantly caused. perceptual And so forth.The point is: everyobjectivereal-world connectionnecessary for knowledgewill be necessaryfor full justification well. The failureof as any such connectionwill functionas a defeaterfor condition (b) of (M). Hence the justificationof that condition will convert to full justification exactlywhen the externalconstraintson knowledgeare satisfied.Gettier's
work thus provides a direct route to the conclusion that epistemic externalism is true of the crucial ingredient needed for knowledge.

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4. Infallibilism revisited.
(M) asserts that knowledge is fully justified true belief. The second lesson of Gettier is this:

is Lesson Two- full justification infallible.

Whenever you are fully justified in believing a proposition, that proposition is true. This means that full justification is the only ingredient needed to convert belief into knowledge. Condition (c) of (M) is redundant after all. To see this, suppose you are fully justified in believing P. Now consider the relationship between T and P. There are three possibilities: T logically implies P (i) T logically implies not-P (ii) neither (i) nor (ii). (iii) Case-(i) scenarios ensure that P is true. So no beliefs in this category will be mistaken. Case-(ii) scenarios rule out full justification. For if T logically implies the falsity of your belief in P, then your justification for this belief will not be ultimately undefeated. There will be facts described in T which defeat that justification. This leaves category (iii) as the only potential home for fully justified mistakes. If there are none here, then full justification is infallible. What sort of proposition falls into category (iii)? To begin, notice that T will logically imply P if P is a nomic consequence of the matters of fact up to the salient time. For T will contain a description of the laws of nature along with those facts. Similarly, T will logically imply not-P if this proposition is a nomic consequence of the matters of fact. So T will logically imply neither P nor its negation only if P is nomically indeterminate relative to T. But for P to be logically indeterminate relative to T, and thus belong to category (iii), it must be more than nomically indeterminate relative to T. It must also fail to follow from any of the matters of fact described in T. If, for example, T describes a particular causal relation having E as one of its relata, then T will logically predict E even when E is nomically indeterminate relative to T. (A case like this will be considered shortly.) Thus, for P to be logically indeterminate relative to T it must be nomically indeterminate relative to T and logically indeterminate relative to that set got by subtracting the laws described in T. Three sorts of propositions have been thought to fit the bill: (a) nomic indeterminacies, (b) universal generalizations, and (c) laws of nature. Each category gives rise to familiar epistemic problems. As we are about to see, (M) is a model of propositional knowledge which both explains and helps solve these problems. (a) Suppose you shoot a photon toward the slit in a piece of polaroid and wonder if it will go right or left when passing through. Suppose further that

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of you know all lawsof natureandall matters factup to the momentin question. In other words, suppose you know everythingin T. Finally,let this knowledgerenderit indeterminate, thoughlikely,that the photonwill go to the right.On the basisof this you come to believethat the photonwill go to the right.And supposeit will. Do you know the photonwill go to the right? I submit that you do not know where the photon will go. After all, there'sanotherpossible world exactly like yours save the photon goes to the left. In it you believethe photon will go to the right with exactly the sameevidence- namelyall the evidence- but you are mistaken.Hencethe view that you actuallyhave knowledgeimpliesthat bruteluck makesthe differencebetweenknowledgeand ignorance.This is unacceptable. Luck does not contributeto our possessionof knowledge. Eitherwe have located a counter-example the standardpost-Gettier to model of knowledge,or there lurks a defeatersomewherein the photon case. The latteroption seemsappropriate: itselffunctionsas indeterminacy a defeater.When all the facts save the issue at hand do not fix the issue, then this is reasonto withholdjudgement.Case-(iii)scenariosof this sort are incompatible with full justification. On the other hand, nomic indeterminacies not unknowable.If, for are example,the photon goes to the rightand then strikesa screen,we might verywell come to know the path taken.The lesson is: nomic indeterminacies are knowablewhen they fit into mattersof fact which forge an epistemic route to them. In particular,nomic indeterminacies are known their effects. They are known when the moment of knowledge through itself post-datesthe moment known. But T will logically imply the fact known in these cases (as suggestedfive paragraphsback). We will have shiftedfromcategory(iii) to category(i). This suggeststhe following lemma: LemmaA If microscopicindeterminacies climb into the macroscopic then we have much less knowledge than commonsense domain, would admit. Indeed:if the wobblinessof the tiny reachesup into the world of commonsense, then I submitwe know truthsalmost exclusivelypost facto. Naturally, this does not mean that our commonsensebeliefs are in any sense unreasonable less useful.Theyjust do not amountto knowledge.As far or as I can tell, this differencedoes not make any difference. (b) Supposewe expressthe fact that all Fs are H thus:
UF (Vx)(Fx -+ Hx).

Does (M) provide a useful model for understanding how we can know facts of this sort?

162.

SCOTTSTURGEON

Yes. For on the present definition of T, T will imply UF . Suppose xl,...,xn are the Fs, and each is an H. In the event, T will not only capturethe fact that Hx1, and Hx2,..., and Hxn, it will also capturethe fact EF (3x)(Fx-+ (x = xl v x = x2 v ... v x = n)). All this togetherimpliesUF . Thus knowledgeof universalfact is, for (M), case-(i)knowledge. straightforward Many will find this a cheat. They will arguethat generalfacts must be known on the basis of non-generalfacts, and thus that our definitionof T should be changed. They would have us impoverishT so that it no longer entails facts like UF or EF . Once trimmedin this way, T will no longer form a set sufficientlyrobust to ground our evidencein the usual way. and trade-offbetweenmetaphysics (M) thus helpsclarifyone particular epistemology: of LemmaB Knowledge generalfact seemspossibleonly when general fact is admitted into the backgroundontology of one's epistemic theory. of Unlessyou admitinto your epistemictheorya background generalfact, beliefmay be grounded,such beliefwill not amount into whichreasonable to knowledgeof generalfact. But once you do, knowledgeof generalfact will pose no special problem. It will be straightforwardcategory-(i) knowledge. (c) SupposeL statesa law of nature: L (Vx)(Fx =- Hx).

of the travel or below speed at L that objects Perhaps claims allmoving

how light.Does (M) providea usefulmodelfor understanding we can knowfactsof thissort? than truth aboutevery a Yes.ForT willcontain nomic greater that speed will These jointly is at of light,to wit,thattravelling thatspeed impossible. on nomicknowledge a parwithanyothersort entailL . Thus,(M)renders standsup to the facts,and We of knowledge. haveit whenour evidence factsimplythe nomicfact in so our evidence standswhenthe relevant question. is On the otherhand,(M) explainswhy nomicknowledge problemThereare two Humeanperspectives atic froma Humeanperspective. to here:weak and strong.According the weak worth distinguishing
perspective, nomic knowledge is grounded solely in non-nomic fact. According to the strong perspective, nomic knowledge is grounded solely in empiricalfact.

THE GETTIER PROBLEM

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A weakHumean version (M)is got by excluding of nomictruths from set T.Callsucha weakHumean of truths The 'TwH'. issuethenis:is Llogito relative TwH? callyindeterminate willdescribe onlythenon-nomic whichareempirical, not facts but TwH as thosewhicharemetaphysical well.Forinstance, might describe the TwH So if theempirical metaphysically factthatwateris essentially facts H20. in and implyL thenthiswill be described TwH, henceTwHwill logically L. The resultwill be a case-(i) scenario. the otherhand,if the On imply factsmetaphysically of empirical implythe negation L thenthis will be described TwH, henceTwHwill logically in and The implythatnegation. will L result be a case-(ii) scenario. indetermiTherefore, will be logically naterelative TwHonly if L does not metaphysically to on supervene the facts.Thus: empirical Lemma Nomicknowledge possible a weakHumean C is on version of (M)onlyif the lawsof nature on empirmetaphysically supervene icalmatters fact. of TheweakHumean version (M)explains Humean thatsuperof the view venienceof the nomicon the non-nomic a precondition nomic is for to if knowledge. According this perspective, the laws of naturedo not on of cannot known. be For supervene matters fact,thenthelawsof nature withoutsupervenience, nomicknowledge exactlyanalogous knowlis to case.Butwe haveno knowledge thephoton in case.So edgein thephoton without we haveno nomicknowledge either. supervenience a Humean version (M)is got byexcluding of Finally, strong everything fromT butcontingent matters fact.Thisnaturally of excludes modal the factsusedon the weakHumean nomicknowltheoryto accommodate set edge. The resulting highlyimpoverished of truthswill implyvery little.Thus: LemmaD Nomic knowledge impossible a strongHumean is on version (M). of Hereagain(M)explains trade-off a between and metaphysics epistemolof a ogy.Unless admitintotheontology yourepistemic you theory robust of beliefmay be fact, background metaphysical into whichreasonable such will to But grounded, belief notamount nomicknowledge. as soonas will Itwillbe straightyoudo, nomicknowledge poseno special problem. forward case-(i) knowledge. we one scenario: photon the case. Therefore, havelocated purecase-(iii) And we have claimedthat knowledge missingin such a case. This is
restrictsthe scope of our everydayknowledgeto the extentthat indeterminacy muddies our everyday world. On the other hand, general facts and laws of nature fall into category (iii) only when substantial restrictions are

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ROBERT FOGELIN J.

But on of the placed theontology ourepistemic theory. onceenforced, limit as of ourknowledge seemsnaturally restricted well.Weareleftthenwith definition knowledge: of a streamlined post-Gettier P (PG) S knowsP iff (a)S believes (b)S'sbeliefin P is fullyjustified. on Therecan be no doubtbutthatGettier his finger something put very indeed.2 important London King's College
Strand,London WC2R2LS
2 I thank the discussiongroup to which I belong for encouragement: Tim Crane,Keith Hossack,Mike Martin,LucyO'Brien,David Papineau,GabrielSegal,BarrySmithand BernhardWeiss;and I thank Tom Senor,Peter Smith and an anonymousrefereefor helpfulcomments.

Hookway on KnowledgeInferences
ROBERT FOGELIN J. Inhisbook,Scepticism 1990),Christopher (London: Hookway Routledge, he sentences labelsQ-claims: to callsattention a classof knowledge take like Some[knowledge sentences] thefollowing an indirect questioncompliment: the X knowswhocommitted murder on X knowswhywaterexpands freezing for X knowswhenthetrainleaves London is the knowswhether atomic X weightof sodium 29 X knowshowtheprisoner escaped. formcanbe expressed: Their X knowsQ. (pp.196-97) Phe with sentences call P-claims. such Q-claims Hookwaycontrasts havetheform: claims X knowsthatP. that the analysisof knowledge Hookwaypoints out, quite correctly, on to has sentences to a largeextentconcentrated P-claims the relative
ANALYSIS 53.3, July 1993, pp. 164-168. @ Robert J. Fogelin