Copyright 2012ConstitutionalCourt Citation:BVerfG,1BVR256/08dated02.03.2010,paragraphno.(1345),http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100302_1bvr025608.html Freefornoncommercialuse.Commercialuseonlywithpermissionofthecourt.

G ideline tothejudgmentoftheFirstSenateof2March2010 1BvR256/08 1BvR263/08 1BvR586/08 1. Asixmonth,asaprecautionwithoutoccasionretentionoftelecommunicationstrafficdatafromprivate serviceproviders,suchasDirective2006/24/ECoftheEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncilof15March 2006(OJL105of13April2006,pp.54,hereinafter:Directive2006/24/EC)shallberead,notsimply incompatiblewithArticle10oftheBasicLaw,toapossiblepriorityofthispolicy,itisnotso. 2. Theprincipleofproportionalityrequiresthatthelegalelaborationofsuchadatastoreassociatedwiththe specificweightofthestorageencroachmentonfundamentalrightsadequatelyintoaccount.Required standardsaresufficientlysophisticatedandclearregulationsregardingdatasecurity,datause,transparency andlegalprotection. 3. Ensuringdatasecuritystandardsandtheclearpurposeoflimitingthepotentialuseofdataisresponsibleas anintrinsicpartofthearrangementofthedataretentionrequirementthefederallegislatureunderArticle73 paragraph1No.7oftheBasicLaw.Incontrast,theresponsibilitydependsontheestablishmentofpolling arrangementsthemselvesandforthedevelopmentofthetransparencyandlegalprotectionprovisionsofthe respectiveprofessionalcapacities. 4. Asfarasdatasecurityregulationswillrequirethatclaimaveryhighstandardofsafetystandardsclearand binding.Itiscertainlythereasonforthelawtoensurethatthisisgearedtothedevelopmentofprofessional discussions,newinsightsandknowledgecontinuallyreceivesandisnotsubjecttoafreeassessmentof generaleconomicfactors. 5. Therecallandtheimmediateuseofthedataareonlyrelatively,iftheyserveimportantfunctionsofthe superiorprotectionoflegalprotection.Inthefieldoflawenforcement,thisrequiresareasonablesuspicionby certainfactsofaseriouscrime.Forthesecurityandthefulfillmentofthetasksoftheintelligenceservices, theymaybeallowedonlyifthereactualevidenceofaspecificdangertolife,limborlibertyofaperson,tothe existenceorthesecurityoftheFederationoraStateoracommondanger. 6. Theonlyindirectuseofdatatoprovideinformationbytelecommunicationsserviceprovidersabouttheowner ofInternetProtocoladdressesisalsoindependentoflimitingcriminalorlegalgoodscatalogsforlaw enforcement,securityandtheperceptionofintelligencetasksallowed.Theprosecutionofoffenses,such informationshallbepermittedonlybyspecialimportanceinthelawexplicitlynamedcases.
FEDERALCONSTITUTIONALCOURT

1BvR256/08 1BvR263/08 1BvR586/08 Delivered on2March2010 flipclock inspectoroffice asClerkof theoffice Onbehalfof hepeople Inp oceeding of hecon i ionalcomplain

I.

First Third 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th ofProf.Dr.G.... KoftheLord... theJ...GmbH, representedbyitsManagingDirector, LordoftheU... LordoftheR... ZoftheLord... byDr.B... Second byDr.G...

Agent: LawyerMeinhardStarostik, SchillStrasse9,10785Berlin

against ,113a,113boftheTelecommunicationsActasamendedbytheActAmending theinterceptionoftelecommunicationsandotherundercoverinvestigativemeasures andtheimplementationofDirective2006/24/ECof21December2007(Federal LawGazetteIp3198)

1BvR256/08 II

First Third 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th byDr.Dr.hcH... thewomanL... MrB's... WomenP... KoftheLord... byDr.L... byDr.W... ofProf.Dr.S... WomenS... LordoftheF... LordoftheS... theLordV... WoftheLord... Second byDr.S...

Agent: Dr.Dr.hclawyerBurkhardHirsch, Rheinallee120,40545Dsseldorf

against Thelawestablishingnewrulesontelecommunicationssurveillanceandother undercoverinvestigativemeasuresandtheimplementationofDirective2006/24/EC of21December2007(FederalLawGazetteIp3198)


1BvR263/08 III.

First Third 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th 39th 40th Awoman... MrB's... MrsBof... MrsBof... MrB's... LordofD... TheDr.D... ofDr.E... LordoftheF... LordoftheG... thewomanG... WomenH... WomenH... WomenH... ofMr.H... ofMr.H... WoftheLord... WoftheLord... theLord'sT... ofDr.T... LordoftheS... byDr.S... WomenS... WomenS... WomenS... WomenS... WomenP... LordoftheN... LordoftheN... ThewifeM... LordoftheM... ThewifeM... thewomanL... ofMrs.K... KoftheLord... KoftheLord... ofMrs.K... ofMrs.K... byDr.H... Second MrsBof...

41st 42nd 43rd

WomenH... WomenH... WomenH...

Agent: Prof.Dr.JensPeterSchneider, Lrmannstra e10,49076Osnabrck

against Theregulationsondataretentioninthelawontherevisionoftelecommunications surveillanceandotherundercoverinvestigativemeasuresandtheimplementationof Directive2006/24/ECof21December2007(FederalLawGazetteIp3198)

1BvR586/08

theFederalConstitutionalCourtFirstSenatewiththeparticipationofthejudgeandjudge Presidentpaper, HohmannDennhardt, Bryde, Gaier, Eichberger, Schluckebier, churchyard, Masing

tothehearingon15December2009by J dgmen rulesasfollows:

1. The113aand113boftheTelecommunicationsAct,asamendedbyarticle2,paragraph6oftheAct Amendingtheinterceptionoftelecommunicationsandotherundercoverinvestigativemeasuresandthe implementationofDirective2006/24/ECof21December2007(FederalLawGazettePartIpage3198) violatedArticle10,paragraph1oftheConstitutionandarevoid. 2. 100g,paragraph1,sentence1oftheCriminalProcedureCode,asamendedbyArticle1,point11ofthe ActAmendingtheinterceptionoftelecommunicationsandotherundercoverinvestigativemeasuresandthe implementationofDirective2006/24/ECof21December2007(FederalLawGazettePartIpage3198)fails, thenasfarastrafficdataaccordingto113aoftheTelecommunicationsActshallbesubjecttoArticle10, paragraph1oftheBasicLawandistothatextentvoid. 3. Theinterimresultofthearrangementof11March2008intheprocess1BvR256/08(FederalLawGazette PartI,page659),repeatedandextendedbyorderof28October2008(FederalLawGazettePartIpage 2239),recentlyreiteratedbyorderdated15thOctober2009(FederalLawGazettePartIpage3704),by providersofpubliclyavailabletelecommunicationsservicesinthecourseofofficialrequestsforinformation collected,butfornowarenotinaccordancewith113bsentence1,sentence1oftheTelecommunications Acttotherequestingauthoritiessentbutsavedtelecommunicationstrafficdatatobedeletedimmediately. Theymaynotbetransmittedtotherequestingagencies. 4. TheFederalRepublicofGermanyshallreimbursethecomplainantstheirnecessaryexpensesofthe constitutionalcomplaintprocedure.

Rea on : A.

A
Subject of the constitutional complaints are provisions of the Telecommunications Act (hereinafter: the Telecommunications Act) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter: StPO) which govern the a preventive retention of telecommunications traffic data by providers of publicly available telecommunications services for six monthsandtheuseofthesedata. I.

2
The challenged provisions of the law were establishing new rules on telecommunications surveillance and other undercoverinvestigativemeasuresandtheimplementationofDirective2006/24/ECof21December2007(BGBlI S. 3198 , the Law on the revision of telecommunications surveillance) are added or changed after the Article 16 Paragraph 1 of 1 January 2008 entered into force. They are used to implement the Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data, with the provision of publicly availableelectroniccommunicationsservicesorofpubliccommunicationsnetworksandprocesses,andamending Directive2002/58/EC(OJL105of13April2006,pp.54,hereinafterDirective2006/24/EC).

3
FirstAllconstitutionalcomplaintsdirectlytotheTelecommunicationsAct113aand113b,whicharebyArticle 2No.6oftheActAmendingtheinterceptionoftelecommunicationshasbeeninsertedintotheTelecommunications Act.The constitutional complaints in the process 1BvR 263/08 and 1 BvR 586/08 also directly contact to 100g StPO,asamendedbyArticle1,No.11oftheActAmendingtheinterceptionoftelecommunications,insofarasheis collectingunder113aTelecommunicationsActallowsstoreddata.

4
a) 113a TKG aims to have regard to all publicly available telecommunications services traffic data that provide information about participating in a telecommunication connection ports, over time, has taken place to the telecommunications,andtheplacesthatcommunicatesfromwhichistosaveforsixmonthsandkeepavailablefor the State responsibilities. The law takes so long been imposed on the Federal requirements (see Bundestag document14/9801,p8BRDrucks755/03Beschluss,pp.33ffBRDrucks406/1/04BRDrucks406/04<decision> BRDrucks 723/05 Beschluss, p.1), which in 2006 joined with reference to the relevant actions on European level, including the German parliament. He called on the federal government to approve the draft of the Directive 2006/24/EC and to submit soon a draft Implementation Act (see Bundestag document 16/545, pp. 4, 16/690, p 2 BTPlenarprotokoll16/19,p1430).Whichthefederalgovernmentcameupwiththedraftlawonthereorganizationof telecommunicationssurveillancepursuantto(seeBundestagdocument16/5846).

5
113a para 1 sentence 1 of the Telecommunications Act requires providers of publicly available telecommunicationsservicesasdefinedin113apara25TKGseparatelylistedtelecomstrafficdataforlandline, internetandmobilephonecalls,tosendSMS,MMSandsimilarmessagestoEmailconnectionstotheInternetand save for a period of six months. A person providing such services, without actually generating traffic data shall ensure in accordance with 113a para 1 sentence 2 of the Act, that the data is stored, and communicated to the FederalNetworkAgency,whocollectsthedata.Anyoneprovidingtelecommunicationservices,whilechangesto 113aTKGdatatobestoredisalsorequired,under113aTKG,paragraph6tostoretheoriginalandthechanged information.Afterexpirationoftheretentionperiod,thedatamustbedeletedinaccordancewith113para11ofthe Telecommunications Act within one month. The contents of the communication and data requested websites may under 113a TKG, section 8 can not be saved. For data security refers to 113a para 10 of the Telecommunications Act in the telecommunications sector and due diligence requires that the access to this data onlyspeciallyauthorizedpersonsshallbereserved.

6
Inadditiontostorageunder113aTKGisforprovidersoftelecommunicationsservicesinaccordancewith96of the Act to continue the ability to store telecommunications traffic data and use to the extent necessary for the

purposesspecifiedtherein.After the end of a telecommunications link these data must be used according to 96 para 2 sentence 1 of the Telecommunications Act, in essence, as far as they are needed for determining the fees andthebillingoftheparticipants(97para1sentence1TKG),tocreateanitemizedbill(99para1sentence1 TKG), as required for the detection, localization and removal of faults or defects in telecommunications systems required ( 100, paragraph 1 TKG), and to provide information about the owner of connections, from which threateningorharassingphonecallswentout(101para1sentence1TKG).

7
113aTKGis:

8
113a

9
Storagerequirementsfordata

10
(1)Anyoneprovidingpubliclyavailabletelecommunicationsservicestoendusers,isrequired tosavehimfromhisserviceintheuseoftrafficdatageneratedorprocessedinaccordance withparagraphs2to5,sixmonthsinthecountryorinanotherMemberStateoftheEuropean Union.Anyonewhopubliclyavailabletelecommunicationsservicestoendusersprovides, withoutactuallygeneratingtrafficdata,orprocess,mustensurethatthedataisstoredin accordancewithClause1,andtheFederalNetworkAgency,uponrequest,indicatingwho collectsthisdata.

11
(2)Theproviderofpubliclyavailabletelephoneservicestosave:

12
Firstthephonenumberorotheridentifierofthecallingandcalledparty,andincaseofany orderorothercollaboratingportforwardingsettings,

13
Secondthebeginningandtheendoftheconnectionbydateandtime,indicatingthe underlyingtimezone,

14
Thirdincaseswhere,inthecontextoftelephoneservicedifferentservicesareused, informationabouttheusedservice,

15
4thinthecaseofmobiletelephoneservicesfurthercomprises:

16
a)theinternationalmobilesubscriberidentifierforthecallingandthecalledterminal,

17
b)theinternationalidentificationofthecallingandthecalledterminal,

18
c)thedesignationbythecallingandthecalledterminalatthebeginningoftheconnection usedradiocells,

19
d)Inthecaseofprepaidanonymousservices,thefirstactivationoftheservicebydate,time andnameoftheradiocell

20
5thinthecaseofinternettelephonyservicesandtheInternetProtocoladdressofthecalling andcalledparty.

21
Sentence1shallapplyaccordinglyinthetransmissionofatext,multimediaorsimilar message,buttakinginsteadoftheinformationundersentence1No.2ofthetimesof dispatchandreceiptofthemessagestore.

22
(3)Theproviderofservicesofemailstore:

23
Firstwhensendingamessage,theidentifieroftheelectronicmailandtheInternetProtocol addressofthesenderandtheidentifieroftheelectronicmailboxofeachrecipientofthe message,

24
Seconduponreceiptofamessageinanelectronicmailbox,theidentifieroftheelectronic mailboxofthesenderandthereceiverofthemessageandtheInternetprotocoladdressof thesendingtelecommunicationssystem,

25
ThirdwithaccesstotheelectronicmailboxwhoseIDandtheInternetProtocoladdressofthe personusingit,

26
4ththedatesreferredtoinparagraphs1to3usesoftheservicedateandtime,indicatingthe underlyingtimezone.

27
(4)TheproviderofInternetaccessservicesandsave:

28
FirsttheuseofthesubscriberforanInternetassignedInternetProtocoladdress,

29
Secondauniqueidentifieroftheconnection,viawhichInternetuse,

30
ThirdthebeginningandtheenduseoftheInternetundertheassignedInternetProtocol addressbydateandtime,indicatingtheunderlyingtimezone.

31
(5)Ifprovideroftelephoneservicesreferredtointhatprovision,trafficdatareferredtoin96 para2purposessaveevenorrecordwhenthecallgoesunansweredorbecauseof interferenceofnetworkmanagementisunsuccessful,thetrafficdataarealsoinaccordance withthisprovisionstore.

32
(6)Anypersonwhoprovidestelecommunicationsservicesandthisischangingaccordingto therecordsthatthisprovisionistostoretheoriginalandthenewdisclosureobligationand thetimingofthetransferofthisinformationbydateandtime,indicatingtheunderlyingtime zone.

33
(7)Anypersonwhooperatesamobilenetworktothepublicisboundtothestoredunderthis provisiondesignationsofradiocellscollectedinwelldata,whichgiverisetothegeographic locationsoftherespectiveradiocellservingradioantennasandtheirmainbeamdirections.

34
(8)Thecontentsofthecommunicationanddataonreferringsitesbyvirtueofthisprovision cannotbesaved.

35
(9)Thestorageofthedatareferredtoinparagraphs17shallbemadesothatrequestsfor informationoftheauthorizedbodiescanbeansweredimmediately.

36
(10)Theobligorunderthisprovisionhasonthequalityandtheprotectionofstoredtrafficdata inthefieldoftelecommunicationsduediligencetobeobserved.Underwhichheshalltake technicalandorganizationalmeasures,thataccesstothestoreddataispossibleonlyforthis purposebyhimspeciallyauthorizedpersonnelonly.

37
(11)Theobligorunderthisprovision,thestoreddatasolelyonthebasisofthisprovisionis deletedwithinonemonthaftertheexpiryoftheperiodreferredtoinparagraph1ortoensure thedeletion.

38
b) 113b TKG governs the purposes for which authorized pursuant to 113a TKG data will be used. He distinguishes between the transfer of authority to allow this use to perform their tasks, and use by telecommunicationsserviceprovidersthemselvestosupplyinformationpursuantto113TKG,inparticularrelating totheownershipofInternetconnections.

39
aa) 113b sentence 1, sentence 1 TKG governs the purposes for which may transmit the data to the telecommunications company authorities. The conditions under which these may in turn use the data should be regulatedbyfederalorstatelawprovisionsofspecificlegislation.113bsentence1,sentence1TKGprovidesthat the storing obligor those data that are stored solely on the basis of the retention requirement under 113a TKG, exclusivelyfortheprosecutionofcriminaloffenses(No.1),topreventseriousriskstopublicsafety(maytransmit No.2)andtheperformanceofintelligencetasks(No.3)totheappropriateauthorities.

40
Thetransmissionofdatatotherelevantbodymustbemadeattheirrequestunder113bsentence1,sentence1 TKGonlytotheextentprovidedintherelevantstatutoryprovisionsofthetradelawswithreferenceto113aTKG expresslyarrangedinaparticularcase.

41
Theprofessionallegalbasisforauthoritytousethestoredunder113aTKGdataforlawenforcementisthatof the complainants in the proceedings 1 BvR 263/08 and 1 BvR 586/08 attacked 100g StPO. For security and performanceofdutiesoftheintelligenceservicesnowrefer20moftheFederalCriminalLaw(hereinafter:BKAG) as amended by the Act to address the threats of international terrorism by the Federal of 25 December 2008 ( Federal Law Gazette I p 3083 ) and various state law provisions to 113a TKG, allowing the official use of the storeddataunderthisprovision.

42
Storedinapermissiblewaytelecommunicationstrafficdatacould,however,beforeentryintoforceof113aTKG to have law enforcement, security or performance of intelligence tasks are used. That was paragraph 1 StPO 100g,asamendedbyArticle1oftheLawamendingtheCodeofCriminalProcedureof20December2001(BGBlI S. 3879 , hereinafter 100g StPO aF) is suspected of a crime of considerable importance or of an offense committedbyaterminalofthetelecommunicationsoffenseonthebasisofajudicialorderanobligationofservice providerstoprovideinformationviatelecommunicationsconnectiondatabefore.AlsoapprovedasArticle34bpara2 no1oftheLawontheDutiesandPowersoftheBavarianStatePolice(PoliceDutyLaw,hereinafterBayPAG)as amended by the Act to Amend the Police Act and the jobLaw Parliamentary Control Committee of 24 December 2005 (GVBl p. 641) or 8 paragraph 1 sentence 1 No. 4 of the Act on Cooperation between the federal and state governments on matters of constitutional protection and the Federal Agency for State Protection (Federal Constitution Protection Act, hereinafter BVerfSchG) as amended of the Act to supplement the Terrorism Act of 5 January 2007 ( Federal Law Gazette I page 2 ) to security or to meet the intelligence services over existing telecommunicationsconnectiondatainformationobtained.

43

bb)113bsentence1,sentence2TKG,theuseofthestoredunder113aTKGtoincludeotherthanthosein 113bsentence1,sentence1TKGthesepurposesbutoutofprinciple.Itcanhoweverbeanexceptionintheway thattheymaybeusedbyserviceprovidersandtoprovideinformationpursuantto113oftheAct.

44
113,paragraph1TKGallowsauthoritiestocallupsocalledcustomerandinventorydatainaccordancewith 95and111,theTelecommunicationsAct,inparticularoftelephonenumbers,portnames,andnamesandaddresses ofportowners.113bsentence1clauseallows2TKGittotheserviceproviders,informationabouttheownersof socalled"dynamic"InternetProtocoladdresses(hereinafterIPaddresses)grant.IPaddressesarenotinthecurrent state of development of a port is normally assigned to be a socalled "static" IP addresses, but assigned to the Internetusers,onlyforthedurationofeachaccesstotheInternetasadynamicIPaddresses.Abouttheownerof theportthatwasusedfromwhichaparticulardynamicIPaddressataparticulartimeis,therefore,canonlyprovide information to be given when the traffic data can be analyzed, which provide information about which port the specificIPaddressforrelevanttime,wasassigned.This allows 113b sentence 1, sentence 2 TKG for the data storedunder113aTKG.

45
The prevailing view were traffic data to provide information about the holder of dynamic IP addresses to 113 paragraph1TKGbeusedevenbeforetheentryintoforceof113aand113bTKG(cf.LGStuttgart,Decisionof January4,200513Qs89/04,NJW2005,p614<614f>LGHamburg,decisionof23June20051Qs43/05, MMR2005,p711<712f>Sankol,MMR2006,p361<365>aALGBonn,Decisionof21May200431Qs65/04, DuD 2004, p 628 <628 f>, Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court, judgment of 4 December 2008 4 U 86/07 , MMR 2009, 412 <413 f> Baer, Guide to computer evidence, 2007, p 148, para 212 Bock, in: Geppert / Piepenbrock / contactor / Schuster, Beck. 'Commentary on the shear TKG, 3rd edition 2006, 113 para. 23f.) Accessed it was onlyinaccordancewith96oftheActofstoredtrafficdata.ThepossibilityofidentifyingtheholderofadynamicIP addressviaaninformationpursuantto113paragraph1TKGwasthereforedependentonwhethersuchdatawere savedatthetimeoftherequestyet.

46
ImportanceistheidentificationoftheholderofIPaddressesasthecopyrightnotice.Shouldtherightsholdersto record the IP addresses where copyright violations are committed on the Internet, the law enforcement authorities withrequestsforinformationpursuantto113paragraph1TKGidentifyindividualsubscribers,againstwhichcan dotheownersandhavingconsideredthecriminalactsthencivillaw.Whileconceding101paragraph2sentence1 No.3oftheCopyrightAct('theCopyrightAct)asamendedbyArticle6,point10oftheActtoimproveenforcement of intellectual property rights of 7 July 2008 ( BGBl I S. 1191 ) under their copyrights under certain conditions, become injured as a civil right of access to the telecommunication services vendors. This may provide this information under 101 para 9 of the Copyright Act on the basis of a warrant under use of telecommunications trafficdata.However, this is a throwback to the data stored under 113a TKG data excluded (see OLG Frankfurt amMain,Decisionof12May200911W21/09,MMR2009,page542<544>referencesHoeren,NJW2008,pp. 3099<3101>Baker,in:Rensen/Brink,linesofjurisdictionoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,2009,p99<111f>, footnote49).

47
Informationreferredtoin113para1sentence1TKGbegrantedtotheextentnecessaryfortheprosecutionof criminaloffensesormisdemeanors,topreventthreatstopublicsafetyororderorfortheperformanceofintelligence tasks.

48
cc)113bTKGis:

49
113b

50
Usingthedatastoredunder113a

51
Theobligorunder113maysolelyonthebasisoftheretentionrequirementunder113aof

thedatastored

52
Firsttoprosecutecrimes,

53
Secondtoavertseriousthreatstopublicsafetyor

54
Thirdtofulfillthestatutorydutiesoftheconstitutionalprotectionoffederalandstate authorities,theFederalIntelligenceServiceandtheMilitaryIntelligence

55
transmittedtothecompetentauthoritiesattheirrequest,totheextentprovidedinthe respectivestatutoryprovisionswithreferenceto113aandthetransmissionisplacedinan individualcase,andforotherpurposeswiththeexceptionofoneprovisionofinformation pursuantto113,hemustnotusethedata.113paragraph1sentence4shallapply accordingly.

56
TheTelecommunicationsAct113boftheregulationreferencedin113TKGprovidesinrelevantpart:

57
113

58
Manualproceduresforinformation

59
(1)Anypersonwhoprovidesbusinesstelecommunicationsservicesorassists,hasineach casetothecompetentauthoritiesshallpromptlyuponrequest,informationaboutthecharges under95and111data,asnecessaryfortheprosecutionofcriminaloffensesor misdemeanors,torespondtothreatstopublicsafetyororderortofulfillthestatutoryduties oftheconstitutionalprotectionoffederalandstateauthorities,theFederalIntelligence ServiceortheMilitaryisrequired.Informationaboutdatabywhichtoaccessdevicesor networkusedinthisorinstoragefacilitieswillbeprotected,particularlyPINorPUKhas, pursuanttosentence1oftheobligorpursuanttoarequestforinformationpursuantto161 para1sentence1,163para1CodeofCriminalProcedure,thedatacollectionprovisionsof thepolicelawsofthefederalorstategovernmentstopreventthreatstopublicsafetyor order,8paragraph1oftheFederalConstitutionProtectionAct,therelevantprovisionsof theStateConstitutionProtectionAct,2paragraph1oftheFederalIntelligenceServiceAct and4bedistributedtootherpublicorprivatebodiesthatdatanotbedisclosed,togiveone oftheMADlaw..Accesstodatathataresubjecttotelecommunicationssecrecyispermitted onlyundertheconditionsofthisrelevantstatutoryprovisions.Providinginformationaboutthe issuerhastobetruetoitscustomersandthirdpartiestodisclose.

60
(2)...

61
c) 100g para 1 sentence 1 StPO regulate the collection of telecommunications traffic data for law enforcement purposes. Law enforcement agencies can then initially, as stipulated in 100g StPO aF access to traffic data, which saved the telecom companies on the basis of 96 of the Act. In addition, 100g StPO now allows the collectionofunder113aTKGprecautionsaveddata.Herearedirectedagainsttheconstitutionalcomplaintsinthe process1BvR263/08and1BvR586/08.

62
Specifically, it allows 100g para 1 sentence 1 StPO 113a TKG referring to the law enforcement authorities, withouttheknowledgeofthepersonconcernedtocollecttrafficdatatotheextentnecessaryfortheinvestigationof

thefactsordiscoveringthewhereaboutsoftheaccused.Is this true only if justified certain facts to the suspicion that someone as a perpetrator or a participant an offense designated by or in specific cases considerable importance,especiallya100ainparagraph2StPOoffensecommitted,attemptstocommitorhasacriminalhas prepared or that someone as a perpetrator or a participant has committed an offense by means of telecommunication.

63
Thedatacollectionmayunder100gpara2sentence1inconjunctionwith100bpara1sentence1and2StPO, exceptinexigentcircumstanceswillbearrangedonlybythejudge.Theordermaybedirectedinaccordancewith 100gpara2sentence1inconjunctionwith100aparagraph3StPOonlyagainsttheaccusedpersons,oragainst, ortakethembecauseofcertainfactsisthattheyarespecifictothesuspectorreceivemessagesoriginatingfromit orpass,orthattheaccusedusedtheirconnections.

64
Whencommittedbymeansoftelecommunicationscrime,thetrafficdatacollectionisinaccordancewith100g para 1, sentence 3 Code of Criminal Procedure only if the investigation of the facts or the determination of the whereaboutsoftheaccusedhopelessotherwisewould,andthecollectionofdatainproportiontotheimportanceof thematterstands.This limitation was the legislature on the grounds of proportionality required because the traffic datacollectionwasobtainedbythestoragerequirementaccordingto113aTKGassociatedexpansionofthetotal volumeofdataoninterventionintensity(seeBundestagdocument16/5846,p52).

65
Ofthemeasuresaccordingto100gpara1sentence1StPO,thepersoninaccordancewith101paragraph4, sentence1StPOisinformed.Theirjudicialreview,hemay,withintwoweeksofnotification(101para7sentence 2StPO).Incertaincases,anotificationunderstay(101para4CodeofCriminalProcedure),inothercasesthey canbereset(CodeofCriminalProcedure101para5).Alongtermdeferralunder101para5CodeofCriminal Procedurerequires,unlikethewaiverofanoticeunder101para4CodeofCriminalProcedurebyacourt.

66
100gStPOis:

67
100g

68
(1)Ifparticularfactsjustifythesuspicionthatsomeoneasaperpetratororaparticipant

69
Firstisacriminaloffenseofconsiderableimportanceintheindividualcase,especiallyonein 100aparagraph2designatedoffensecommitted,committing,incaseswheretheattemptis punishable,hasattemptedorpreparedbyacrimeor

70
Secondanoffensecommittedbymeansoftelecommunications,

71
thenanybemadewithoutknowledgeoftheaffectedtrafficdata(96para1,113ofthe TelecommunicationsAct),totheextentnecessaryfortheinvestigationofthefactsorthe determinationofthewhereaboutsofthesuspectis.Inthecaseofsentence1,No.2,the measureisonlyallowediftheinvestigationofthefactsorthedeterminationofthe whereaboutsoftheaccusedwouldbepointlessotherwiseandthecollectionofdatain proportiontotheimportanceofthematterstands.Thecollectionoflocationdatainrealtime isonlyinthecaseofsentence1No.1admissible.

72
(2)100aand100bpara3paragraphs1to4,sentence1shallapplyaccordingly. Notwithstanding100bpara2sentence2No.2inthecaseisenoughofacrimeof considerableimportancespatiallyandtemporallysufficientlyspecificdesignationof telecommunications,iftheinvestigationofthefactsorthedeterminationofthewhereabouts

oftheaccusedwouldbedifficultotherwisehopelessorsignificantly.

73
(3)Ifnot,thecollectionoftrafficdatainthetelecommunicationsserviceprovider,itis determinedafterthecompletionofthecommunicationtothegeneralprovisions.

74
(4)Onmeasuresunderparagraph1shallbepreparedinaccordancewith100bpara5of eachyearatableareindicatedinthecontract:

75
Firstthenumberofcasesinwhichactionunderparagraph1havebeencarriedout

76
Secondthenumberofarrangementsofmeasuresunderparagraph1,distinguishedbyinitial andextensionorders

77
Thirdeachunderlyingcauseoffense,brokendownbysection1sentence1No.1and2

78
4ththenumberofrecentmonthswerequeriedforthetrafficdataunderparagraph1, calculatedfromthedateofthearrangement

79
5ththenumberofmeasuresthathaveremainedinconclusive,becausetherequesteddata werenotavailableinwholeorinpart.

80
Second Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and Council, the implementation of the challenged regulationsastheyrelatetotheprosecutiontoserve,wasadoptedbytheCouncilonthebasisofArticle95voting againstIrelandandSlovakia(seeCouncildocument6598/06ADD1of27February2006,p4),aftertheEuropean Parliament a submitted by France, Ireland, Sweden and Great Britain on draft article 31, paragraph 1, point c, and Article34paragraph2letterbEUVintheentryintoforceoftheTreatyofLisbon,asamended(hereinafterTEUaF) rejectedbasedFrameworkDecisionontheretentionoftelecommunicationsdata(seeCouncildocument8958/04 dated28April2004)had(seeparliamentarydocumentP6TA[2005]0348).

81
a) The Directive builds on the fact that telecommunications traffic data are a valuable tool in the prosecution of criminal offenses, particularly in the areas of organized crime and terrorism (see recitals 7 to 10 of Directive 2006/24/EC) and that some Member States regulations on the retention of such data would adopt that differed greatlyfromeachother(seeparagraph5ofDirective2006/24/EC).Thethuscreatedlegalandtechnicaldifferences affecttheinternalmarketforelectronictelecommunications,becausetheprovidersoftelecommunicationsservices with different requirements for data to be stored and the storage time were facing (see paragraph 6 of Directive 2006/24/EC).

82
b) The validity of Directive 2006/24/EC, both as to its compatibility with Community fundamental rights (see Klesczewski, in: Festschrift for Gerhard Fezer 70th birthday, 2008, p 19 <24 f> Klug / Reif, RDV 2008, p 89 <91 ff>Rusteberg,VBlBW2007,p171<176>Westphal,EuZW2006,p555<558f>Zoeller,GA,2007,pp.393<410 etseq>AdvocateGeneralKokott,AdvocateofJuly18,2007CaseC275/06ECR2008,I271<276>,paras82 Promusicae)aswellasinrelationtotheundrawnbasisofcompetence.EuropeanCommunitycalledintoquestion (see grid / Schnabel, MMR 2007, p 411 <412 f> Jenny, CR 2008, p 282 <285> Klesczewski, in: Festschrift for Gerhard Fezer 70th birthday, 2008 , pp. 19 <22 ff> Klug / Reif, RDV 2008, p 89 <91> Leutheusser Schnarrenberger, ZRP 2007, p 9 <11 ff> Rusteberg, VBlBW 2007, p 171 <173 f> Westphal, EuZW 2006, p 555 <557f>Zoeller,GA,2007,p393<407etseq>).

83
Byjudgmentof10February2009,theCourtdismissedanactionforannulmentunderArticle230oftheTreatyof

Ireland (see ECJ, judgment of 10 February 2009 Case C301/06 ), which was based on the fact that the predominant purpose of the Directive to facilitate the prosecution of criminal offenses and that therefore the legal basisonlytheunanimitywhichimpliedprovisionsoftheEUTreatyoldversiononpoliceandjudicialcooperation,in particularArticle30,Article31,paragraph1,pointc,andArticle34paragraph2letterbEUVaFwouldbeconsidered (seeactionon6July2006CaseC301/06OJC237of30September2006,p.5).Here,theCourtstatedexplicitly clear that the decision does not have a possible breach of Community fundamental rights to the object (see ECJ, judgmentof10February2009CaseC301/06.,Para57).

84
c) Pursuant to Article 1 paragraph 1 Directive 2006/24/EC Directive aims to harmonize the provisions of the MemberStatesconcerningtheobligationsofprovidersofpubliclyavailableelectroniccommunicationsservicesorof apublictelecommunicationsnetworkoperatorsfortheretentionoftelecommunicationsdatatoensurethatthedata forthepurposeoftheinvestigation,detectionandprosecutionofseriouscrime,asdefinedbyeachMemberStatein itsnationallaw,areavailable.WhenadoptingtheDirective,theCouncilstatedtotheMemberStateshavetodefine theterm"seriouscrime"inArticle2,Paragraph2oftheCouncilFrameworkDecisionontheEuropeanarrestwarrant andthesurrenderproceduresbetweenMemberStates(2002/584/JHA)of13June2002(OJL190of18July2002, page1)thecriminaloffensesandoffenseswiththeuseoftelecommunicationsfacilitiestobeconsideredappropriate (see Council document 6598/06 ADD 1, p 4). The use of the data sets for the tasks of security or intelligence servicesisnotthepolicy.

85
AccordingtoArticle3paragraph1Directive2006/24/ECrequiresMemberStatesmustensurethatstoredinArticle 5ofDirective2006/24/ECondatainalistedstock,whichaccordingtoArticle6ofDirective2006/24/EGaperiod ofatleastsixmonthstotwoyearsfromthedateofthecommunicationtobedetermined.UnderArticle4Directive 2006/24/EC, Member States must ensure that the retained data will be passed only in certain cases and in accordance with its domestic law to the competent national authorities. Each Member State shall specify the procedures and conditions for access to data in accordance with the requirements of necessity and proportionality mustbeobserved.

86
Article7ofDirective2006/24/ECrequiresMemberStatestoensurethatareobservedinrelationtothedatatobe retained on certain minimum standards of data security. In addition, the rules in Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC applicable (see recitals 15 and 16 of Directive 2006/24/EC). Guarantee under Article 8 of Directive 2006/24/EC, Member States shall ensure that the stored data and other information required to be forwarded immediately upon request to the competent authorities. Under Article 13 of Directive 2006/24/EC, Member States shallalsoensurethatthemeasurestakentoimplementtheprovisionsofChapterIIIofDirective95/46/ECproviding for judicial remedies, liability and sanctions in view of the data processing according to Directive 2006 / 24/EG be fullyimplemented.Noregulationmeetsthepolicyaboutwhoshouldbearthecostofdatastorage.

87
Third 100g StPO is moreover important for the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime ( Federal Law Gazette II, S. 1242 , 'the Convention on Cybercrime) importance (cf. Bundestag document 16/5846, pp. 27 f and 50).TheConventionrequiresnotonlythecreationofsubstantivecriminallawtocombatcomputercrime,butalsoto certain criminal procedure rules. In particular, under Article 16 of the Convention, the competent authorities authorizedtoordertheimmediatesafetyoftrafficdata.Personsinwhosecontrolaresuchdatamustbeobligedto securetheshorttermandwhole,toallowcompetentauthoritiestoobtaintheirtransfer(socalledQuickFreezing).A similar provision was unnecessary for the legislature, however, because the data is stored frozen due to the extensivestorageunder113aTKGalreadybeendrawnup(seeBundestagdocument16/5846,p.53).

88
4thAttherequestofthecomplainantintheproceedings1BvR256/08,theFederalConstitutionalCourtbyorderof 11 March 2008 a temporary injunction is issued, will be allowed after the 113b sentence 1 No. 1 of the TelecommunicationsActrestrictedpendingadecisiononthemeritsonlyapplied(seeBVerfGE121,1).Byorderof 28October2008hasextendedtheinterimordertotheeffectthatcouldalsobemadeof113bsentence1No.2 and3oftheTelecommunicationsActtothemaindecisionmakingwithuserestrictions(seeBVerfGE122,120).In addition,thefederalgovernmentwasorderedtoreportforeachsuccessiveperiodofseveralmonthsonthepractical implications of the measures provided for in 113a TKG Data storage devices and the interim order for the

prosecution.TheFederalGovernmentisthatfortheperiods1May2008to31July2008,from1August2008to1 March2009andfrom1March2009to1stSeptember2009complied. II

89
FirstThe complainant in the proceedings 1BvR 256/08 are opposed to the 113a and 113b of the Act. They allegetheviolationofArticle10,paragraph1,Article12,paragraph1,article14,paragraph1,Article5,paragraph1 andArticle3paragraph1GG.WhichhavejoinedwiththesameargumentintherunasCase1BvR508/08process morethan34,000applicants.

90
a)Theconstitutionalcomplaintwasadmissible.

91
aa) The complainants 1) to 3) and 5) to 8 used) as a highschool teachers, lawyers, managers, accountants and certified public accountant and investigative active journalist home and work various telecommunications services such as fixed lines, mobile phones, Internet services and email accounts . They would not be reasonable to complainfirstbeforethecompetentcourtsagainstthetelecommunicationscompanies.

92
Thecomplainantwasdevelopingto4)anddrivethesoftwareforacommercialInternetprivacysoftware.Thework isdoneinconjunctionwithotherindependentoperatorswillusetheirsoftwareontheirservers.Whilepursuingthe complainanthimselfalsoapubliclyaccessibleserveranonymization.Theanonymityserviceisprovideasaresultof thechallengednormsisnolongereconomical.Also,itwouldsufferthelossoftheircustomersbecausetheycould notbecauseoftheretentiontrusttoremainanonymous.Infact,thestoragerequirementaprofessionalbancoming. Thestoragerequirementitconcernsitself,presentandimmediate,sinceitcouldnotbeexpectedtorespondbytheir failuretocomplywiththeriskoffinesorcriminalproceedings.

93
bb) The admissibility of the constitutional complaint is not contradicted, that the challenged provisions were intended to implement the Directive 2006/24/EC. The federal legislature is incompatible with the Directive 2006/24/EC,ifthedatastoredunder113aTKGdatashouldbeusednotonlyforseriouscrimes,butalsosecurity andperformanceofintelligencetasks.

94
The Federal Republic of Germany is also not obliged to implement the Directive 2006/24/EC. This is contrary to Article95andofCommunityfundamentalrights.It violates the right to respect for private life and correspondence underArticle8ECHRandleadstoadisproportionateinterferencewiththeprotectionaffordedbyArticle10ECHR freedomofexpression.TheDirectiveshouldthereforenotbeusedinGermany.Atleasttheconstitutionalcomplaint is admissible, because the challenged norms for an annulment by the European Court of Justice for a preliminary rulingunderArticle234ECTreaty(nowArticle267TFEU),whoseimplementationissoughtexaminedinitsentirety basedonthefundamentalrightsoftheBasicLawcouldbe.Holding,theCourtnottoDirective2006/24/ECinvalid, theFederalConstitutionalCourttodeclarethemunconstitutionalascompetenceandthecontestedinapplicable 113aand113bTKGbediscarded.

95
b) The constitutional complaints were well founded. If it were a storage of data on stocks, which is unconstitutional.Let there be now possible to determine all the communication partner of a person in the last six months.Thestorageoftheradiocells,willenablethephoneinthearea,virtuallyuninterruptedmovementprofiles. The storage of the IP address it in future permit to track the Internet usage patterns of the past six months. In contrast,nothingindicatedthatthestorageofaffectingmeasurableclearancerateorcrimerate.

96
aa) The challenged provisions violated Article 10 paragraph 1 GG. The data to be stored fell within the scope of telecommunicationssecrecy.TheInternetfallsunderArticle10paragraph1GGwhilealsogoingasfarasitusedas a medium of mass communication. With the 113a, 113b TKG reasonable interference with the secrecy of telecommunicationsisnotjustified.

97
(1)guaranteeingapropercriminaljusticesystemcannotjustifytheretention.Intheareaofcybercrimeissuein thefirstplacebyassets.Asfarastelecommunicationsequipmentwouldbeusedonlyasanaidinthecommission of traditional crimes, legal protection of all types were affected. The suitability of data retention for combating organizedcrimeorthepreventionofterroristattackswouldbeconsideredextremelylow.

98
Generalpreventiveeffectsofretentionarenotexpectedtoseriously.Inthefieldoflawenforcementjustdecided milder powers of intervention are appropriate as the defense against specific hazards. Data that had been won to respondtothreatsoflegalprotectionforthemostlikely,notbeusedtoprosecuteminoroffenses.Asecondaryuse is permitted only if the collection of data and to the purpose for which details are given of secondary use, is proportionate.Whichwillnotbetakenintoaccount.Advanced investigative powers of law enforcement authorities couldincreasetheclearancerateatmostslightly.Whetherthisleadstoareductioninthecrimerateisextremely questionable.

99
The suitability of the retention of data for protection of legal rights is uncertain. Although it prevents that communications are not allowed to understand why, because their circumstances are not saved. However, it is uncleartowhatextentthereneedstostoredata.Inanycase,avarietyofcommunicationsdataforbillingpurposes will be stored and evidence for up to six months. Criminal groups took advantage of opportunities the other hand, anonymousprepaidplanssuchastelecommunicationsorInternetcafes.

100
(2) As compared to the retention of less drastic means get the quickfreezing process into consideration, which concernstheprotectionofallremainingstoredtrafficdataofaperson.Inveryexceptionalcasesisalsothelocation ofthestoreallatsomepointtheavailabletrafficdatapossible(GlobalFreezing).

101
(3) The severity of the interference with Article 10 paragraph 1 GG derives from the fact that all people are affected,thetelecommunicationsservicestothepublicwouldtaketocomplete.Thestorageofsuspicionregardless successes.The mere possibility that data could be needed for purposes of law enforcement or security does not justifytheintervention.Thedataretentionenablesthecreationoftelecommunicationsandmotionprofilesandhave large variance. This is all the more weighty, as telecommunications taking place in the expectation of complete confidentiality.

102
A generalized, overall supervision in the form of a comprehensive collection of telecommunications links, as it represents the retention is, even the greatest dangers to defend against unconstitutional. The probability that the storeddatawouldbeneededlatertosecurityorlawenforcementpurposes,benegligibleandcouldnotjustifysucha serious surgery. The retention personality enables images with unprecedented accuracy. The communication of contentdataarequiterevealing.Accesstothecircumstancesofthetelecommunicationsweighnolessheavilythan on the communication content. It enables comprehensive personal and behavioral profiles. Traffic data provided a wealthofinformationaboutsocialrelationships.

103
Theretentionasincreasestheriskofwronglyconvictedorsuspendedinvestigationsareinnocent,andtheriskof data abuse. Traffic data may be selectively used against unpopular persons and were suitable for the control of individuals and groups as well as for industrial espionage. Only the reticles of the data storage effectively protect againstabuse.

104
The retention affect impartiality which is essential for democracy in communication. The protection of human dignityrequiresadegreeofunobservedcommunicationespeciallyinthecontextofspecialrelationshipsoftrust.The damagethatarisesthroughthesurveillanceofcitizens,wouldnotbeoutweighedbytheassociatedefficiencygains. The retention have reduced the development of countermeasures and could ultimately result in the amount of availabledataeventelecommunications.On the other hand, the increasing digitization, the decrease of the stored trafficdataforbillingpurposes,thesameevenwithouttheretentionofmorethan.

105
Thisisdisproportionate,becausetheexpectedbenefitinasignificantproportiontotheirdisadvantagesforpatients andsocietyasawholestand.Theprotectionoflegalrightswouldimproveinafewcases.Withareductionincrime levelswasnotexpected.Inviewoftheimportanceofotherpersonaldataforlawenforcementthreatensaslippery slope.

106
bb) The impugned provisions also infringe Article 12 paragraph 1 GG. The 113a and 113b TKG attacked a disproportionate effect on the professional practice of freedom of commercial providers of telecommunications servicesandtheprofessionalfreedomofmembersoftrustprofessionals.

107
So it touches the relationship of trust between lawyer and client, where it can be revealed by analysis of telecommunications traffic data, the attorneyclient relationship. The retention of the shrink from contact with telecommunicative specialized consultants, because it farreaching conclusions about health and mental health, religion or financial circumstances may be considered. Journalists threatened with the loss of informants. This negative effect prevails over any measurable public interest. Given the small number of cases in which it was important to communicate with professional secrets, concerns the protection of legal interests are guaranteed withoutretention.

108
Alsowithregardtotheserviceproviderviolatestheproportionalityofdataretentionrequirement.Aschemeunder which the consequent capital costs must be repaid does not exist. In the absence of adequate compensation arrangements also made the cost of managing, processing and transmission of storage data to the competent authorities of the Inpflichtnahme telecommunications company but was unacceptable. Without adequate compensationtothemshouldtheperformanceofdutiesoflawenforcementandsecurityarenotimposedasacore tasksofthestate.

109
cc) If equipment previously used by telecommunications service providers as a result of retention could not be used to attack the 113a and 113b TKG also similar in the confiscatory property guarantee of Art 14 para 1 sentence1GGone.Thisisnotcompatiblewithoutadequatecompensationwitharticle14paragraph1GG.

110
dd)113aand113bTKGalsocontrarytoArticle5paragraph1GG.They violated the freedom of expression, information and broadcasting freedom. The more expensive the telecommunications data retention. This is forcing less wealthy citizens, businesses and organizations to restrictions. In addition, providers and users would be deterredbythestateinparticularcriticalinformation.Theimpairmentofthefreedomofinformationstandtherenot prevent nonrequested web pages due to 113a TKG should be saved. Provider of telemedia often stored in violation of the Telemedia Act, the IP addresses of users. It had the state authorities in accordance with 15 paragraph 5, sentence 4 in conjunction with 14 para 2 TMG access. Of views, information and broadcasting are constitutiveofaliberaldemocracy.Giventheeffectonoverallsocialinformationexchangeanditsonlylimitedvalue grabadisproportionateeffectontheretentionofArticle51BasicLaw.

111
ee)113aand113bTKGeventuallyhurtthegeneralprincipleofequalityunderArticle3,paragraph1GGinmore waysthanone.

112
Thisappliesfirstofall,asfarassuccessesfortheexchangeofinformationviatelecommunicationsnetworks,but notforspatiallydirectexchangeofinformation,storageofcommunicationsdata.Giventhehighlevelofintervention ofthisdifferentiationwasnotparticularlyretentionjustifiedbecauseintherangeofspatialanddirectcommunication oftenwouldfindotherevidence.

113
It also violated Article 3 para 1 Basic Law, that would indeed captured the use of information resources on the Internet,butnotthatoftraditionalmassmediasuchasmagazines,booksandtelevision.Thatmasscommunication is particularly prone to damage over the telecommunications networks, there is no compelling evidence. An

unjustified difference in treatment was also that the retention does not use computers not telecommunicative detected.Similarly,Article3para1BasicLawhadbeenviolatedbecausethelegislaturehadnotjustifiedexcepton thechoiceofmilderagentssuchastechnical,structuralandenlighteningpreventionmeasures,orthequickfreezing method.

114
Norwerethedifferenceintreatmentbetweenthetelecommunicationsandelectronicinformationexchangeandthe postal system embodied as a distanced exchange information, the unequal treatment of telecommunications undertakingstopostalorganizations,theunequaltreatmentoftheuseoftelecommunicationsservicesovertheuse of other services and the unequal treatment of telecommunications companies to other companies such as banks andairlinesconstitutionallyjustified.

115
Furthermore, violates the equal treatment of small telecommunications companies to the general principle of equality,becausethiswouldbeagroupoftypicalcaseswithoutsufficientcausemuchmorestrain.

116
Not be justified to Article 3 paragraph 1 GG finally be the cooptation without compensation of private telecom companiesforpublicpurposes.The criteria for the admissibility of a special levy to finance function had not been met.The prevention of threats and punishment of crimes are the general tasks that need to be funded from tax revenuesandnotthecompaniesandtheircustomersarelikelytobeimposed.

117
SecondThecomplainantintheproceedings1BvR263/08turnoutagainst113aand113bTKG100gStPO also compared, insofar as it relates to the collection of the stored under 113a TKG. They allege a violation of Article1,Section1,Article2,paragraph1inconjunctionwithArticle1,Section1,Article10paragraph1andArticle 19paragraph2GG.

118
a)Theconstitutionalcomplaintwasadmissible.

119
aa) The complainants are lawyers, a high school teacher, a journalist, a former finance chief justice, a graduate student and member of the German Bundestag, or Parliament of a country. The complainant 3) is now Minister of Justice.

120
Eachofthemtakemultipleproviderstocomplete.Theytookadvantageprivate,freelanceortheirpoliticalactivities landlines,mobilephones,Internetaccessandemailaccountsandarethereforeaffectedbythestorageoftheirdata telecommunications.

121
bb)Thattheselfstoragesuccessesbyaprivate,standtheadmissibilityofconstitutionalcomplaintscitedabove. Fortheywouldimmediatelyplacedbythestatutoryprovisionof113aand113boftheAct.

122
cc)Itisnotreasonableforthecomplainants,whofollowthefilingofconstitutionalcomplaintstoeachofthedue processoflaw.

123
dd) The constitutional complaints are at least allowed, unless the legislature, in transposing the Directive 2006/24/EC of national constitutional law contrary, although it remains scope for implementation of its compliance withpermit,orifitwentbeyondtherulesprescribedbytheDirective.Thisisregardingstoragepurposes,thedata usedtojustifycrimes,theabandonmentofpreciserulesandproceduresrelatedtotheuseauthorizedbodiesofthe case.

124
ee) Moreover, the Directive 2006/24/EC ultra vires and could unfold in Germany has no legal effect. Also decide whether an act of the European Community in breach of Article 1 of the Basic Law and could therefore claim in

domestic law has no validity, only the Federal Constitutional Court. A submission to the European Court has no cause. Insofar as the Federal Constitutional Court is not entitled to consider, decide on the validity of Directive 2006/24/ECitselfasubmissiontotheEuropeanCourtofJusticewastobearoused.TheDirective2006/24/ECwas adopted without a legal basis and with Community fundamental rights, in particular with Article 8 ECHR, incompatible.

125
b)Theconstitutionalcomplaintswerewellfounded.

126
aa)Directive2006/24/ECwasineffective.ItwasadoptedonthebasisofArticle95,eventhoughtheydonotthe establishmentorfunctioningofthesubjecthave,butmeasuresofpoliceandjudicialcooperationwithinthemeaning ofArticle29etseqEUVaF

127
bb)Theretentionunder113aand113bTKGviolateshumandignity.Inafreesocietyshouldnotanyoneusea communicationtool,asapotentialcriminalsortroublemakerswillbedealtwith.Giveafreesocietywithouttrustina confidentialcommunicationisnotthere.Theremustbeacoreareaofpersonallifebeleftinwhichtheindividualis freefromgovernmentmonitoring,controlorinfluence.Withtheretentionofthestateconstructedaninfrastructureto destroy the confidence of citizens in a free communication and can allow more monitoring in the future. This is contrarytohumandignityandtheprinciplesofconstitutionaldemocracy.

128
cc) 113a and 113b TKG disproportionately interfered with the right to informational selfdetermination under Article2,paragraph1inconjunctionwithArticle1paragraph1GG.

129
Thestorageaccordingto113aTKGverdachtslossuccessesand,moregenerally.Thestoreddataisallowedto createpersonalprofiles.Thestayoftheuserofamobilephonetotrackleaveforthelastsixmonths.Thereisno provision for the deletion of the core area of private life of data concerning hit. The providers are not required to documentthetransferofdataandthetransmitteddatasettocharacterize.

130
113bTKGdoesnotsatisfytheprincipleofcertainty.Asalumpsumpurposesonlyprosecutingcrimesagainst serious threats to public safety and the performance of intelligence tasks are mentioned. It is not enough that the moredetailedspecificationofthepurposeofinterventioninthewaylegalaccessstandardssuccesses.Becauseof the encroachment on fundamental rights successes already with the storage of data. According to the commandment of the clarity of purpose must be determined accurately the storage. Since the countries are solely responsiblefortheaccessarrangements,theuseofthedataiscompletelyunmanageable.

131
Thesurgerystandinthefaceofhisseverityinproportiontothebenefitsachievable.Theretentionletnotexpecta significantgainforthefightagainstcrime.

132
dd)ThecontestedprovisionsalsoviolatethesecrecyunderArticle10oftheBasicLawinitsessentialcontent.

133
ee) The decision latitude, which would leave the Directive 2006/24/EC, are not filled in conformity with the Constitution. 113b TKG go beyond the purpose of the Directive where the stored data would be provided to all intelligencepurposes.100gStPOdefinethegroupofoffenseswhichcouldjustifytheretrievalofstoreddata,not unique.Itremainsopenwhenanoffenseisalsointheindividualcaseisofconsiderableimportance.Incontrast,it cameaslongasthelegalcommunityeverconsidersignificantinfact,andisstandardforanyfutureauthorityto determine separately whether their purpose was given mandatory under European law and whether it is consistent withnationalconstitutionallaw.100gStPOlettheretrievaloftrafficdataforanyoffensecommittedbymeansof telecommunicationtogosofarandrepelthepurposebytheDirective,terroristoffenses.

134
ThirdThe complainant in the proceedings 1BvR 586/08 are opposed to the 113a and 113b of the Act and

100g StPO. They allege the violation of Article 10 paragraph 1 and Article 2 para 1 in conjunction with Article 1 paragraph1GG.

135
a) The constitutional complaint was admissible. The complainants Members of the German Bundestag, and membersofthegroupAlliance90/TheGreens,whoarealsoparttimeasalawyeroradoctorworkingbeyourself, and immediately present in their right under Article 10 paragraph 1 GG, and their right to informational self determinationaffected.

136
Nor can the scheme since the implementation of Directive 2006/24/EC belasse considerable leeway to be reviewed extensively by the German fundamental rights. Necessarily be fixed and only the types of categories of dataandtheminimumretentionperiodofsixmonths.Implementationscopeexistedregardingthestorageanduses of all authorized locations, access conditions and procedures for the allocation and the requirements for data security.Where Member States provide that, in the limits of Article 15, paragraph 1 Directive 2002/58/EC of the security and the fulfillment of the tasks of the intelligence services use other than law enforcement, they were subjecttofullconstitutionalcontrol.Thedeterminationofseriouscrimes,theprosecutionsuccessestotheretention, lies in the hands of Member States. Article 7 of Directive 2006/24/EC lay down minimum requirements, the more extensivedataprotectionrequirementsinthenationalconstitutionallawisnotblocked.Finally,thefinancingofthe retentionintheDirectiveisnotregulated.

137
AcompletereviewoftheconstitutionalprovisionsondataretentionisalsopossibleiftheDirective2006/24/ECis invalid,theEuropeanCourtofJusticerealizetheinvalidityoftheDirectiveorifareviewofthecompetenceofthe European Community to adopt the policy exception by the Federal Constitutional Court even am considering. A validationtemplatecouldbebasedinparticularonaviolationofCommunityfundamentalrights.

138
b)Theconstitutionalcomplaintsarewellfounded.The challenged provisions violated Article 10 paragraph 1 GG. Thisprotectstheconfidentialityofthecircumstancesofthecommunicationprocess.Initsscopethereforefellunder 113para2TKGtostoredataandtelephonetrafficunder113aTKG,section3and4tostoreemailtrafficand Internet access information. The fact that the Internet and mass communication takes place, the freedom of broadcastingtraditionallyhasbeenassigned,doesnotprecludethis.Thatindividualcommunicationcouldbetaught fromrich,inordertotriggertheprotectionoffundamentalrights.

139
TheregulationsondataretentionintervenedinthescopeofArticle10GG.Thegovernmentinterventionwillbegin with the traffic data retention requirement under 113a TKG. He continued with the approved under 113b TKG transmit traffic data to government authorities. More acts are to evaluate intervention and use of data by the authoritiesentitledtoreceiveinformationandthesharingofinformationwithotherauthoritiesorprivate.

140
Beadequatelydefined100gStPOArticle1No.1,becauseitcoversinfringementsofconsiderableimportancein theindividualcaseandconcretizingthe100aparagraph2StPOdesignatedoffenseslinkedto.Criticaltoassess whether100gStPO1No.2intermsofsection1sentence2100gStPO.Whendatacollectionwascaughtina proportiontotheimportanceofthematterisnotvisibletothecitizenwiththenecessaryclarity.Theproblemisthe determination of 113b TKG. In the field of security and intelligence services is not possible to predict to what extentshouldaccesstheenforcementagenciestosupplydata.

141
The retention also contrary to the principle of proportionality. Effective law enforcement is indeed a legitimate purpose.Also,didnotdenytheappropriatenessandnecessityofdataretention.Thequickfreezingprocessisnot equally well suited, because it was irrelevant, if not traffic or were no longer available. The retention, however, is inappropriate.Trafficdatacouldbesubstantialconclusionsaboutthecommunicationormovementbehavior.Dueto itsautomaticanalyzabilitytheywereforgridsearchmethods,andstrategicsurveillancebytheintelligenceservices are particularly suitable. They provided investigative leads and allowed social, political or economic relationship networks to be reconstructed. Comprehensive personality profiles could be created. Particularly stressful had the Verdachtslosigkeit of storage and its exceptional spread. Considered to be beyond the effect on overall social

behaviorandthedemocraticdiscourseandabuseconcerns.

142
100g StPO go about implementing Directive 2006/24/EC beyond what is necessary, because the retrieval of storeddataaccordingto113aTKGcangenerallyalsobeduetocrimescommittedviatelecommunications.Even mediumrich from crime to access the retained data. This go too risk of being exposed to unwarranted suspicion, makingitthesubjectofinvestigationstobeburdensome.Thedatacollectionwasmadeinsecret.100gParagraph 2inconjunctionwith100band101StPOgrantonlylater,weakenedbyarestrictivelegalnotificationpractice. The effectiveness of the judges of title is disputed. The existing access ways are usually been sufficient. When considering alternative methods of investigation such as the quickfreezing process fall adequacy assessment is negative.

143
113b sentence 1 No. 2 of the Telecommunications Act opens up access to the data already stored anlasslos significant threats to public safety. Intelligence Surveillance measures were taken in advance of specific hazards associatedwithsignificantlyreducedlegalprotection.GiverestrictionsonthelawfulinterceptionofMPsnot.Given their Vorwirkungen on the behavior of citizens and the democratic discourse, the rules were unreasonable under 113bsentence1No.2and3oftheAct.

144
Professionalsecrecywerenotprotectedseparately.ParticularlyprejudicialinthisWOULDmaketophysiciansand not solely as a criminal defense lawyers from. It also lacked sufficient structural requirements for data backup serviceproviders.This entails considerable risks of abuse. Even more inappropriate is the use of data by private enforcementofcivilclaims,asitenables113bsentence1,sentence2TKG.Ascouldbedeterminedinthisway onlytheownerofports,theportowner,butdoesnotnecessarilyagreewiththeInternetusers,whetherinpursuitof amuchlargerrangeofonlookersexpected.

145
The obligations under 113a TKG, para 10, to observe the necessary care and telecommunications, through technical and organizational measures to ensure that the stored data are accessible only specially authorized persons,willnotfurtherconcretised.Datasecuritywillbeguaranteednotsufficient.Theweightoftheintervention would not be outweighed by its added value. Especially with organized crime and terrorism, he was the lowest, since the offender refusing to pay the power to subvert storage, which is easily possible. The repercussions of storageonthedemocraticdiscourseandthedangersofadatabreachcouldnotbesufficientlyreducedbylimiting theuses. III.

146
The constitutional complaints, the Federal Government, the Federal Administrative Court, the Bundesgerichtshof, theFederalCommissionerforDataProtectionandFreedomofInformationandPrivacyCommissioneronbehalfof thecountrieshavetakentheBerlinCommissionerforDataProtectionandFreedomofInformationstatus.

147
FirstThe federal government considers the constitutional complaint inadmissible in part and in any event without merit.

148
a)Notallowedaretheconstitutionalcomplaints,unlesstheyweredirectedsolelyagainst113aand113bofthe Act.

149
aa)ThesearenotsubjecttotheinspectionpowersoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,iftheymeetthemandatory requirements of the Directive 2006/24/EC. Extent of discretion conferred existed, the federal law implementing orientationofthemeasuresprovidedforinDirective2006/24/ECregulationminimized.An erupting act is said not, becauseit'snotaboutthedivisionofpowersbetweentheEuropeanCommunityandtheMemberStates,butonlygo to the one in the European Union. At European level there is finally sufficient fundamental rights protection. A violationofhumandignityisalsonotclear.

150
bb)ThecomplainantswerenotgiventheprimacyofCommunitylawcomplaintsauthority.113bsentence1No.1 of the Act and 100g StPO did not go beyond the limits of the Directive 2006/24/EC storage purposes. In the definition of serious offenses are considered appropriate means of telecommunications equipment also committed crimes.TheDirective2006/24/ECadmittheextentofthepurposeofstoragetouseforsecurityandintelligencetask fulfillment. 113b sentence 1 No. 2 and 3 of the Telecommunications Act to the extent it merely contains a use other legal provision. This should be alone in the constitutional complaint procedure is not capable of being challenged,however,becausetheydonotaffectfundamentalrightsconcern,theexcessofthegoingbyDirective 2006/24/ECevenarrangedcomplaints.Anadditionalcomplaintscouldresultonlyfrompowerstandards,authorized a further use of the stored data. 113b TKG does not contain such provisions. The regulated there rather a restricted purposes, only the possible uses of data. The Telecommunications Act 113a and 113b have also berufsregelndenotrendintheforceexertedbythecomplainantsaboutprofessionsasalawyerorjournalist.Article 14oftheBasicLawisnotaffected.Thestoragerequirementdoesnotshortenthepropertyrightsofthecompanies concerned, but an independent but set mandatory behavior. A violation of freedom of expression is excluded from theoutset.Thestorageaccordingto113aTKGwasneutralopinion.

151
cc)Theapplicant'sconstitutionalcomplaintto4)inMethod1BvR256/08failontheprincipleofsubsidiarity.Itwill notmakeclearthatnoreliefwaspossiblebytheordinarycourts.

152
b)Inanycase,theconstitutionalcomplaintsareunfounded.

153
aa)113aTKGwasconstitutionallyunobjectionable.

154
(1) The regulation encroaches within the scope of Article 10 GG. It, however, go only a requirement for private storageofcertaindatawiththeaimofenablingasubsequentaccess.Thus,113aTKGdistinguishescategorical standards of competence for public use of the stored data. 113a TKG constituted a moderate encroachment on Article 10 paragraph 1 GG dar. He brings about only that the data for six months, a cancellation of the persons concernedwerewithdrawn.Thestoreddatadonotrelatetocommunicationscontent.Theycameonlyinresponse toanotherqualifiedcompetencestandardintheknowledgeofthestate.Finally,thestorageisnosecretsuccesses. Thedatatobestoredandthedurationofstoragearedefinedclearlyandconclusively.

155
Purpose of 113a TKG was to adapt the fight against terrorism and serious crime in the conditions of modern communication techniques. 113a TKG would be suitable. It prevents that 100g StPO by the increase in flat rates,andtheresultingdecreaseinaccordancewith96oftheActofstoreddata,andbythesteadyincreasein Internetusebyoffenderslosetheirfooting.

156
The analysis of traffic data is indispensable for the prosecution. In particular, it could be evidence of crimes committedwhen,forstaysofsuspectsincrimescenearea,tobewonfirstandNachtatverhaltenofsuspects,the suspectsinconnectionwitheachotheronthecourseofescaperoutesandtoidentifyothersuspects.Especiallyfor theprosecutionofdrugcrime,theprovisionoflocationdataissignificant.Trafficdatatocomeintheverificationof suspectsorsubmissionsindiscoveringthewhereaboutsofaccusedimportance.Theelucidationofthedistribution ofchildpornographicimagesontheInternetcanpracticallyonlybebasedontrafficdata.Whenagangorcriminal offensescommittedprofessionalknowledgeofcommunicationskillsfortheinvestigationoforganizationalstructures and serial crimes is essential. Against the appropriateness of the data storage does not speak the way to work aroundit.

157
113aTKGwasalsorequired.The quickfreezing process is not equally effective. It could hold only those data whicharestoredinanyway.Itmakessenseifitisonlywhenitreferstoanearcontemporaryfacts.

158
Finally, 113a TKG was also appropriate. The Anlasslosigkeit conclude the adequacy of storage, not from the

outset.Theirspreadwillnotsayanythingconcreteabouttheassociatedstress.Thecollectionofpersonaldataisto storenotautomaticallyunconstitutional.Thedatawouldbestoredbyprivatecompaniesforaparticularpurpose,and onlybecauseoffurtherpowersfromthestatestandardsnoted.Thedatastoredunder113aTKGdatawereindeed to draw conclusions about the personality of the person concerned, but had only limited sensitivity. They do not concernthecontentofcommunicationintermsofpersonalityandwerenotrelevantbeyondexistingregulationsfor otherdatatobestored.Thestorealsosuccessesopenly.Theobligationtomaintaininformationaboutwhetherthe GermanlawoftheCommercialCode,thetaxcodeortheBankingActknown.Constitutionallimitswasdeveloped by the Federal Constitutional Court only for the query facts. The store itself is, moreover, but probably not unreasonable.However,thedatamustbelimitedinquiryinaqualifiedway.Thestorageperiodofsixmonthsleave by the conditions justifying the pursuit of specific crimes. An intimidating effect is not produced by 113a TKG. Decisiveisnotthesubjectiveperceptionofthenormaddressees,butatrueunderstandingofstandards.

159
(2) the storage for the telecom service provider costs violated neither Article 12 nor Article 14 of the Basic Law. Article14BasicLawdoesnotconferageneralprotectionofassets.113aTKG,butneitherthesubstancenorthe organizationoftherightsofthecomplainantconcernedoftheircompanies.Thedevaluationofthetechnicalfacilities areunsubstantiatedstatementsmade.Thefreedomofoccupationwillnotbeaffected.Theplaintiffsweretopractice theirprofessionwithoutthechallengedregulationisnotdifferent.Onlytheserviceproviderwouldbeburdenedwith additionalduties.Recoursetofulfillapublicmissiontoredeemhimselfnorfromanyclaimforcompensation.

160
(3)TheschemewascompatiblewithArticle3paragraph1GG.Telecommunicationsanddirectcommunicationare notcomparable.Direct communication and electronic communication could not be saved to the same extent. The difference in treatment between telecommunications and postal services is justified. Postal communication was slowtouseforacrimelesssuitableastelecommunications.Largeandsmalltelecommunicationscompanieswould not be treated differently. Prior to unequal economic impact of the relevant protected liberties, not the general principleofequality.Aninequalityissaidnotillegalspeciallevy.

161
(4) The constitutional requirements for data security are met. 109 para 1 Telecommunications Act requires the serviceprovidertotakeappropriatetechnicalmeasuresorothermeasurestakentoensuretheprivacy,protectionof telecommunications secrecy and protection of telecommunications and data processing systems against unauthorizedaccessbyemployeesandthirdparties.Operatorsoftelecommunicationsfacilitiesarerequiredunder 109 para 3 TKG, submit to the Federal Network Agency, a security plan that will describe the technical measures and other protective measures for the fulfillment of obligations to data security. It was to update and rectify the requestoftheFederalNetworkAgency.Theserviceproviderwouldhavetobeobservedaccordingto113aTKG, para 10 in the telecommunications sector due care and limit access to data through special appropriations. Violations of the secrecy and privacy requirements are administrative fines to prosecution under 148 TKG or criminalunder149para1,No.1618oftheAct.115TKGallowtheAgencytoenforcethedataprotectionrules. Finally,thecompanywouldbesubjecttocontrolsoftheFederalCommissionerforDataProtectionandFreedomof Information.

162
bb)113bTKGwasconstitutional.Itrestrictsthestoragepurposeandbesufficientlyprecise.Theuseofthedata directed to other statutory standards, the determination of a separate analysis needed. As compared to the lower content monitoring of telecommunications surgery, the use of data security under 113b sentence 1 No. 2 of the TelecommunicationsActshouldnotbesubjecttothethresholdofimmediateconcernformostseniorlegalinterests. Judgereservationsaretoberegulatedintherespectiveenablingrules.Thetransmissionofdataonperformanceof intelligence functions under 113b sentence 1 no 3 TKG is not objectionable. Within certain limits, even without occasion of telecommunications content control for intelligence purposes had been assessed as constitutionally permissible(referencetoBVerfGE100,313<358ff>).

163
cc) was also constitutionality of 100g StPO. The possibility of criminal proceedings traffic data query in its present form was approved. A comparison, intensive intervention in the secrecy of telecommunications lies in accessingunder113aTKGstoredtrafficdataisnotalsobecausemoredatawereavailable.Inviewofthecontent comparedwiththesurveillanceoftelecommunicationslighterweightofthetrafficdatacollection,itislogicalthat

100gStPOlessstringentrequirementsfortheadmissibilityofdatacollectionas100aStPOimagine.

164
Insofaras100gwouldlinkpara1No.1oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure100aofthecriminaloffensesand paragraph2StPOalsoanoffenseofconsiderableimportanceinaparticularcaserequire,theFederalConstitutional Court has recognized this as a sufficiently precise. Also 100g 1 No. 2 StPO is safe. The choice of means of prosecutiondependedontheabilitytosolvethecrimeinquestionatall.Thedeceptive100g1No.2and100g section1sentence2StPObill,introducedbymeansoftelecommunicationscrimescommittedduringtheretrievalof datatrafficonthereservationlackofalternativesandidentificationofafurthertestofproportionality.Anevenfurther restrictionofaccesspossibilitiesherebyrelieveawholerangeofcommunicationsbylawenforcement,eventhough the criminal justice enjoy constitutional status. 100g StPO not violate the core area of private life. The telecommunicationstrafficdatathatrelatetoregardlessoftheabilitytocreatewiththehelpofcommunicationand movementprofiles,notinanintensiveway.

165
Second The Federal Administrative Court sees in the challenged provisions of an interference with Article 10 paragraph1GG,whosejustificationisdubious.Thein113bsentence1TKGtheseusesaresobroadthat,inthe time of storage was predictable, should be used for what purpose the data. It follows that infringement of the prohibitiononthecollectionofpersonaldatatoberetainedornotyetdeterminableindeterminatepurposesare.The basic law of limitation is also not inconsiderable weight. The storage requirement covers data with high personal relevance, the major conclusions about the personality and personal circumstances of the user, the social environment and its motions as well as the nature of the content of communication allowed. Another option is the creationofpersonalprofiles.Thedatastoragecanhaveseriousconsequencesintheeventofcriminalproceedings for the individual. Misuse of data is possible. The store had a huge mass appeal. Their spread could cause a substantial intimidation effect. On the other hand, the data would be deleted in many cases, without having been submittedtogovernmentagencies.Theusesarenotlimitedtotheprotectionofhighrankinglegalinterests.113b sentence1No.2oftheTelecommunicationsActdoesnotconclusivelyshowthatlegalprotectioncouldjustifythe useofdata.113bsentence1number3oftheTelecommunicationsAct,referstoavarietyoffederalandstatelaw taskdescriptions.Perhapsthedataarethusintendedtoprotectintereststhatcouldnotjustifytheirretentioninthe pastengagedinthesecrecyoftelecommunications.

166
Third The Federal Court has by the Chairman of the 1st Criminal Division and one of the investigating judge pointed out that had been in offenses committed by means of telecommunications data, the identification of the perpetrator would have made so far at the time of the request already cleared regularly. When Internet use inferenceswereexcludedonthecontentofexperience.Duetotheprevailinglevelofflatratecontracts,thedataline is often 24 hours will be maintained daily. In this case, are derived from the data stored in most cases not even moreinformationaboutthefrequencyanddurationofInternetuse.Inemailtraffic,especiallythestorageoftheIP addressisrequiredtohavepriortotheintroductionofdataretentiononlyundercertainconditionsonthetermination oftheconnectionmaybesaved.SincetheIPaddresseshadbeendeletedinthepastfewyears,afteradayortwo, a prosecution of property crimes or acts of child sexual abuse is usually not been possible. Without retention of offenders on the Internet there is hardly any risk of detection. Let there be a legal vacuum. The President of the Federal Court pointed out that the traffic data were only indicative effect and in need of support by other findings. Areasofsocialbehaviorwerenotalreadysogoareas,becauseasidefromgoingtotheirpreventivemonitoring.

167
4thThe Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information holds the eventfree data storage according to 113a TKG unconstitutional. From their unconstitutionality follow the provisions of 113b of the transmissionoftheAct.100gStPOisunconstitutionalbecausethethresholdisdefinedusingunreasonablylow. AtthesamecontraventionoftheprovisionsofArticle8and10ECHR.

168
Thegeneralauthorityfortheretentionwasnotadequatelydefined.Theusesarenotlimitedtoachievepreciseand limited.The prosecution of offenses pertaining to terrorism and organized crime will be improved not sustainable becausetheoffenderaffectedgroupshaveavarietyofwaystoworkarounddataretention.

169
Traffic data from the communication behavior were more intense. Particularly sensitive are data that relate to

communicationwithprofessionalsecrets,anditthereforeneededforthedifferentiatingregulations.Thesensitivityof thedatatobestoredduetotechnicalinnovationstotakeon.Trafficdataallowedconclusionsaboutbehaviorsand interests, and farreaching insights into the movement and communication patterns. They reflected the social networkofthoseconcerned.The membership of parties, trade unions and citizens' initiatives could become clear. Togetherwithinformationabouttheprofessionorbusinessactivityoftheotherpartywouldcomefromtrafficdatato draw conclusions on possible discussion topics. Time and frequency of connections allowed conclusions on the intensity of contacts. It could complete personality and sociograms images are created. Confidence in the use of modernmeansofcommunicationisaffectedbylongtermdataretention.Risksofabusewouldbeeliminatedasfar aspossiblebylaw.TheTelecommunicationsActneithercommittoaseparatedstorageofthedatastoredunder 113a TKG to a more secure encryption. It contains no guidelines for assigning access permissions, logging of accessesandtheexaminationofhistoricaldataonindividualrequests.

170
Is far too inadequate use of data for law enforcement purposes. Access to retained data could at best for the prosecutionofseriouscrimesareconcerned.The conditions can be waived under which a notification may be too vagueandnotaffordedtherequiredindividualassessment.Moreover,ajudicialreviewofthereticleofnotifications is not provided for adequately. Regarding the use of data storage and security for the performance of intelligence taskstherewasariskoftoolowathresholdretrieval.Wasinappropriateandthat113bTKG,theuseofunder 113aTKGIPaddressesstoredtodeterminetheunderlyingpersonpursuantto113TKGenables,becausethisis alsopermissiblefortheprosecutionofoffenses.

171
5thTheBerlinCommissionerforDataProtectionandFreedomofInformationprovidesby113aand113bTKG violated the secrecy of its essential content. In addition, these regulations were contrary to the prohibition on the retentionundeterminedornotyetdeterminablepurposes.Inanycasetheyallowedbutadisproportionaterestriction of telecommunications secrecy. In addition, there is no specific purpose. 113 sentence 1, sentence 2 TKG, the useofstoredtrafficdatatogiveinformationpursuantto113TKGenablestoallregulatoryauthorities.Misuseof data by private is hard to prevent. 113a TKG paragraph 6 prevents the users to surf anonymously using anonymizing services on the Internet. The protection of special trust relationships remain unconsidered. Given the seriousness of the encroachment on fundamental rights, the quickfreezing process had to be tested as an alternative.EventheorderofthefundamentalrightscarefulimplementationofDirective2006/24/ECisignoredifthe use of the stored data is already available for the pursuit of simple offenses and to address the threats will be approvedforlowconservationinterest.100gStPOisdisproportionate.100gparagraph2,sentence2StPOleave with major criminal offenses a spatially and temporally sufficiently specific enough designation of telecommunications,iftheinvestigationofthefactsisdifficultotherwisehopelessandmajor.Thisextensivetraffic dataviewsarepossible,whichmightaffecttherightsofthousandsofcitizens.Constitutionallyproblematicisalso truethatthelegislaturemightcreatein101para4and5,CodeofCriminalProcedurenotificationopenspaces.

172
6thTheknowledgeableinformantsConstanzeKurz,Prof.Dr.FelixFreiling,Prof.Dr.AndreasPfitzmann,Prof.Dr. Alexander Rossnagel, Prof. Dr. Christoph Ruland, the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, the Berlin Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information , the Federal Ministry of JusticewiththeparticipationoftheFederalMinistryofEconomicsandTechnologyandtheFederalMinistryofthe Interior, the complainant in the proceedings 1 BvR 256/08 and 1 BvR 263/08 and the Federal Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications and New Media (BITKOM), the Association of German Internet Economy (eco) and the Association of Telecommunications and ValueAdded Services Association (VATM) have commented on technical, factual and legal questions of the court. These related to the telecommunications traffic dataretentiondebtor,bymeansoftelecommunicationsoffensescommitted,theprovisionofinformationpursuantto 113 TKG, to ensure the retention data against unauthorized access and possible legal aspect of the use of this data.IntheopinionoftheFederalMinistryofJusticehavebeeninvolvedthroughtheFederalMinistryofEconomics and Technology, the Federal Network Agency and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Criminal Police Office,theFederalAgencyforStateProtectionandtheAttorneyGeneral.

173
7th In addition, the association of business telecommunications users eV (TELECOM eV), the Association of GermanBookTradeAssociationandtheAssociationofMusicIndustryAssociationexpresseditsopinion.

IV

174
At the hearing, have expressed themselves: the complainant, the Federal Government, the Federal Criminal Police,theFederalNetworkAgency,theBavarianStateGovernment,theFederalCommissionerforDataProtection and Freedom of Information, the Berlin Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, as knowledgeable informants Prof. Dr. Dr. hc HansJrg Albrecht, Constance Short, Prof. Dr. Felix Freiling, Prof. Dr. Andreas Pfitzmann, Prof. Dr. Alexander Rossnagel, Prof. Dr. Christoph Ruland, the Federal Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications and New Media (BITKOM) The Association of German Internet Economy (eco), the Association of Telecommunications and ValueAdded Services Association (VATM), the AssociationofGermanBookTradeAssociationandtheFederalAssociationofMusicIndustry B.

175
Theconstitutionalcomplaintsareadmissible. I.

176
FirstThecomplainantsallegeallowableasaviolationofArticle10paragraph1GG.Theyusevariouspersonaland business telecommunications services such as telephone services, in particular, the electronic mail and Internet services,andclaimtobeviolatedbythestorageandintendeduseoftheirtrafficdatainitsbasicrighttomaintain secrecyoftelecommunications.Sincearticle10paragraph1GGprotectstheconfidentialityofthecircumstancesof telecommunications(cf.BVerfGE 67, 157 <172>, 85, 386 <396>, 120, 274 <307> established case law) is that suchabreachbythechallengedprovisionspossible.

177
The challenged provisions relate to the complainant, immediately, and present themselves. Although the storage requirement is directed to 113a TKG not affected as users of the complainant, but to the service provider. However, these are, without a decision space (see BVerfGE 107, 299 <313 f> ) for storing essential data of the complainantobliged.113aTKGthusleadstoadirectandimmediatestorageofdataforthecomplainantin113b sentence1TKGintendedpurposes.

178
At an immediate selfconcern is lacking in terms of 113b of the Act and 100g StPO not because these regulations only develop on the basis of further enforcement record effects and it is not clear whether and to what extent is communicating the complainant will be affected. If the person acquired any knowledge of the law enforcementrecords,thelaststatementtobetouchedwithacertainprobabilityofsuchmeasures.Thisisespecially significantifthemeasureshavealargevarianceandthirdpartiesmayalsocollectrandom(seeBVerfGE109,279 <307f>,113,348<363>,120,378<396f>).Thereafter,thecomplainantshaveexpressedtheirownconcernand immediateenough.Giventheconsiderablestorageperiodofsixmonthsandthelargescatterofthedatacollected,it isnotunlikelythatduringthetransmissionanduseofthedataaccordingto113boftheActand100gStPOalso applies to individuals who did not give rise to corresponding measures. Statements by the complainant himself would be accused of a crime which are so in support of the selfconcern is not required (see BVerfGE 109, 279 <308>,113,348<363>,120,378<396f>).NordotheydemonstratethatIamresponsibleforsignificantthreatsto publicsafetyortopursueactivitiesthataffectthetaskgroupoftheintelligenceservices.

179
SecondThe constitutional complaint of the complainant to 4) in Method 1 BvR 256/08 is also permissible with regardtoArticle12paragraph1GG,ifsheturnsagainsttheobligationsassociatedwiththestorageoftechnicaland financialburdens.Asananonymityserviceproviderthatoperatesatthesametimealsoapubliclyaccessibleweb server,theygenerallymeettherequirementsof113aTKG,aresofarwithoutcompensationorcompensationrules provided.Sincethefailuretocomplywiththeseobligationsisreinforcedwithafine(see149para1No.36,para2 TKG), it is not unreasonable, in violation of 113a TKG to await execution file and then search against this professionaljudicial(cf.BVerfGE81,70<82>).Sheissoaffectedbythestoragerequiredimmediately,andpresent themselvesintheirprofessionalfreedom.

II

180
The constitutional complaints are not inadmissible to the extent the challenged regulations adopted pursuant to Directive2006/24/ECare.

181
However,theFederalConstitutionalCourt'sjurisdictionhascontrolovertheapplicationofCommunityornowEU law,whichisthebasisforanyactsofGermancourtsandauthoritieswithinthejurisdictionoftheFederalRepublic ofGermanyclaimed,inprinciple,ofnotcheckedthisrightisnotthestandardoffundamentalrightsoftheBasicLaw aslongastheEuropeanCommunities(ortoday,theEuropeanUnion),inparticulartheEuropeanCourtofJustice, effective protection of fundamental rights and ensure generally that by the Basic Law respectively as required unconditionally fundamental rights protection is important to essentially the same, since the essential content of fundamental rights generally guarantees (cf. BVerfGE 73, 339 <387>, 102, 147 <162 f> ). These principles also applytodomesticlegislation,themandatoryrequirementsofaDirectiveintoGermanlaw.Constitutionalcomplaints aredirectedagainsttheuseofabindinglawinthissense,theEuropeanUnion,arestrictlyprohibited(seeBVerfGE 118,79<95>,121,1<15>).

182
TheapplicantcanrelyonthefundamentalrightsoftheBasicLaw,however,totheextentcalledtothelegislature asintheimplementationofEUlawisfreedom,thatis,byUnionlawisnotdetermined(seeBVerfGE121,1<15>). Moreover, the constitutional complaints are present but also permissible if the challenged provisions are based on policyprovisionsthathaveamandatorycontent.ThecomplainantscontendthatitlackedtheDirective2006/24/EC on a Community legal basis of competence and it is contrary to European Grundrechtsverbrgungen. They seek, therefore,amongotherthings,withoutbeingabletodothisdirectlyinthefaceofheragainsttheimplementationof legislation addressed constitutional complaint before the competent courts, a presentation by the Federal Constitutional Court to the European Court of Justice to give preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU (ex Article 234TEC)declaresvoidthepolicyandpavingthewayforfreelydoingareviewofthechallengedprovisionsofthe standardofGermanfundamentalrights.Inanycase,inthiswayanexaminationofthechallengedprovisionsofthe standard of fundamental rights of the Basic Law after the request of the complainant is not precluded from the outset. C.

183
Theconstitutionalcomplaintsarejustifiedinessence.Thechallengedprovisionsviolatetheplaintiffs'fundamental rightunderArticle10paragraph1GG.AsubmissiontotheEuropeanCourtofJusticeisnotanoption,sinceitisnot a possible precedence of Community law matters. The fundamental rights guarantees of the Basic Law are a a differentdesignImplementationofDirective2006/24/ECcitedabove.

184
Unfounded, the applicant's constitutional complaint to 4) in Method 1 BvR 256/08, insofar as these claims infringementofArticle12paragraph1GG. I.

185
The constitutional complaints are no reason for a preliminary ruling before the European Court of Justice under Article267TFEU.AlthoughitwouldasubmissionbytheFederalConstitutionalCourt(cf.BVerfGE37,271<282>) are, in particular, if the interpretation or validity of Community or Union law are in question, the priority claimed before the national law and its implementation by the Federal Constitutional Court generally not the standard of fundamentalrightsoftheConstitutionistested.However, such a template can only be acceptable and necessary whenitcomestotheinterpretationorvalidityofEUlaw.Thisisnotthecase.

186
The effectiveness of Directive 2006/24/EC and therefrom may result therefrom primacy of Community law over Germanfundamentalrightsarenotrelevanttothedecision.ThecontentofthedirectiveleavestheFederalRepublic of Germany for the design of the form prescribed in its retention of telecommunications traffic data is a wide

discretion. The Directive requires Member States but to the operators of publicly available electronic communications networks and communications services for storage of virtually all telecommunications traffic data for a period of at least six months, impose (Article 1, 3, 5 and 6 of Directive 2006/24/EC). Its provisions are, however, mainly due to the limited selfstorage requirements and do not govern access to data or their use by the authorities of the Member States. In particular, they harmonize neither the issue of access to information by the relevant national law enforcement authorities, the question of the use and exchange of information between these authorities(seeECJ,judgmentof10February2009CaseC301/06Rn.83).Basedontheminimumrequirements oftheDirective(Article7and13ofDirective2006/24/EC),italsolieswiththeMemberStatestotakethenecessary measurestoensuredatasecurity,transparencyandlegalprotection.

187
This content is the policy without violating the fundamental rights of the Basic Law to be implemented. The constitution prohibits such storage is not under any circumstances. Rather, it can also be independent of an eventual supremacy of Community law in accordance with the stipulations of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law permitted arranged (see below IV). An examination of the challenged provisions in the overall scale of the GermanbasicrightsdoesnotgetthemintoconflictwiththeDirective2006/24/EC,sothattheireffectivenessand priorityisnotimportant. II

188
ThechallengedprovisionsengageArticle10paragraph1GG.

189
FirstArticle10paragraph1GGguaranteesthesecrecyoftelecommunications,whichistheintangibletransferof informationtoindividualrecipientsbymeansoftelecommunications(seeBVerfGE106,28<35f>,120,274<306f> ) in front of a notice by The public authorities shall protect (see BVerfGE 100, 313 <358>, 106, 28 <37> ). This protection covers not only the content of communication. But protected the confidentiality of the circumstances of the communication process, including in particular whether it has conducted when and how often between what personsortelecommunicationsequipmenttelecommunicationstrafficorbeingtempted(cf.BVerfGE67,157<172>, 85,386<396>,100,313<358>,107,299<312f>,115,166<183>,120,274<307>).

190
The protection afforded by Article 10 paragraph 1 GG is not only the first access, and content with the public authoritytakesnoteoftelecommunications.Itsprotectiveeffectalsoextendstotheinformationanddataprocessing operations,whicharelinkedtotheacknowledgmentofprotectedcommunicationprocesses,andontheusethatis made of the acquired knowledge (see BVerfGE 100, 313 <359> ).An encroachment on fundamental rights, each inspection,recordingandrecoveryofcommunicationsdataandanyanalysisofitscontentorotherusebythepublic authorities(cf.BVerfGE85,386<398>,100,313<366>,110,33<52f>).Inthecollectionoftelecommunications data,theirstorage,theircomparisonwithotherdata,theiranalysis,theirtriageforfurtheruseortransmissiontothird partiesoftheirowninterventionsarethusdependingontelecommunicationssecrecy(seeBVerfGE100,313<366 f>).Consequently,inthearrangementinrelationtocommunicationscompaniestocollectdatatelecommunications, storeandtransmitittogovernmentagencies,eachanencroachmentonArticle10para1BasicLaw(seeBVerfGE 107,299<313>).

191
ThiscomesfromArticle2para1inconjunctionwithArticle1paragraph1GGfollowingrighttoinformationalself determination in addition to Article 10 of the Basic Law does not apply. Referring to the Basic Law Article 10 includes telecommunications, a special guarantee, which displaces the general rule and result from the special requirements for the data that is obtained by interfering with the secrecy. In this respect, however, can the conditions under which developed the Federal Constitutional Court under Article 2, paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 1 paragraph 1 GG, largely transferred to the more specific guarantees of Article 10 of Basic Law (see BVerfGE100,313<358f>).

192
Seconda) in 113a paragraph 1 TKG imposed on service providers of telecommunications traffic data storage interferes with the secrecy of telecommunications. This applies primarily for the storage requirements concerning

telecommunications services pursuant to 113a Section 25 of the Act and in connection therewith pursuant to 113para6and7oftheAct.Theextenttherecordsthatprovideinformationonwhether,when,whereandhowoften taken between which telecommunications connections or record has been tried. This is particularly true for the storage of data services to the electronic mail pursuant to 113a TKG para 3, whose confidentiality is also protectedbyArticle10para1BasicLaw(seeBVerfGE113,348<383>,120,274<307>).That can intercept e mailstechnicallyeasychangestoitsconfidentialcharacterandnothingforprotection.AninterferencewithArticle10 paragraph1GGreasonsforthestorageofInternetaccesssuchdatainaccordancewith113apara4oftheAct. AlthoughtheInternetprovidesnotonlytherecordingofindividualcommunication,whichfallsundertheprotectionof telecommunicationssecrecy,butalsotoparticipateinmasscommunication.Sinceadistinctionbetweenindividual andmasscommunicationwithouttheprotectionoffundamentalrightscontrarytheretoconnectionwiththecontents of each transmitted information is not possible, can be seen already in the storage of the Internet as such data relatingtoanintervention,evenifdetailsofthevisitedInternetpagesnotincluded(seeGusy,in:v.Mangoldt/Klein /Starck,GG,Vol1,5thedition2005,Article10para44Hermes,in:.Dreier,GG,Vol1,2ndedition2004,Article10 para.39).

193
The engaging quality of the 113a TKG is not affected by the fact that the storage required by this rule is not executedbythestateitself,butbyprivateserviceproviders.Becausethesearetakenonlyasassistantstodothe jobbystateauthoritiestocomplete.113aTKG,theprivatetelecommunicationscompaniestostoredatarequired solelyfortheperformanceofworkbystateagenciesforpurposesoflawenforcement,securityandtheperformance ofintelligencetasksinaccordancewith113bTKG.Itassignsthestateassociatedwiththestorageimpairmentof fundamentalrightstodirectly,withoutthestoragecompanywithdutytotheextentthereremainsascope,thedata shall be stored so that requests for information of the authorized public agencies can be met without delay in accordancewith113aparagraph9oftheAct.Undertheseconditions,thestorageofthedataislegallyattributable tothelegislatureasadirectinterferencewithArticle10para1BasicLaw(seeBVerfGE107,299<313f>).

194
b)encroachmentsonfundamentalrightsinArticle10paragraph1GGarealsointherulesfordatatransmissionin 113bsentence1,sentence1TKG.Although this provision opens in itself does not use the stored under 113a TKGdata,butthelawspecificallyreferstootherstandardstobecreateddemand.However,itisthebasicrule,may beusedforwhatpurposesthedata.Theyreleasedthisregard,thetelecommunicationscompaniesfromtherestof their existing obligation of confidentiality. That the data ultimately used only once in the tiered mesh of rules on differentlevelsoftheirstandardsetofruleswillnotalterthefactthatthedefinitionofpurposesandpermissionto usepartofthedatatransmissionandcontrolaresofarengagedincharacter.Again,itisirrelevantthat113bTKG transfers the data relates to the part of private service providers. The proposed transfer is based on a statutory provisionandthusdirectlylinkedtoanactoffundamentalrightsunderArticle1,paragraph3GGpublicauthorityisa sovereign arrangement requires an individual basis and made to authorities. It is thus legally be regarded as an encroachmentofthestate.

195
c)anencroachmentonArticle10paragraph1GGalsodueto113bsentence1sentence2inconjunctionwith 113para1oftheAct.Afterthat,authoritiesfromserviceprovidersinformationaboutinventoryandcustomerdatain accordancewith95,111TelecommunicationsActrequirethatserviceproviderscanonlyusetheunder113a TKG, paragraph 4 to determine the data stored. Regardless of whether and to what extent general information in accordancewith113TKGisanencroachmentonArticle10paragraph1GGorwhethertheextentprinciplealone therighttoinformationalselfdeterminationunderArticle2,paragraph1inconjunctionwithArticle1para.1Basic Lawistobeconsidered,atleastforinformationpursuantto113bsentence1,sentence2,113para1affirmative TKGaninterferencewithtelecommunicationssecrecyunderArticle10paragraph1GG.Foritisheretheuseofthe stored under 113a TKG, and thus by an interference with Article 10 paragraph 1 GG data obtained. Any subsequentuseofdata,whichwereoncecollectedintheformofaninterferencewithArticle10paragraph1GGis alwaystobemeasuredagainstthisfundamentalright(cf.BVerfGE100,313<359>,110,33<68f>113,348<365> ).Again, it may not be important that this is not legally required use by the public sector itself, but is done by privateagenciesinfulfillmentofthatrequest.

196
d) any interference with Article 10 paragraph 1 GG 100g StPO ultimately justified. It allows law enforcement agencies, the stored under 113a TKG to allow for storage of the obligor and forward to use. 100g para 1

sentence1StPOitselfandtheexerciseofthatauthorityasactsofpublicaccess,therefore,alsoaforcewithinthe scopeofArticle10paragraph1GG. III.

197
Meetformallywiththechallengedprovisionsarenoobjections.TheysatisfythestatutoryreservationofArticle10 paragraph2sentence1GG,andarecoveredbyfederaljurisdiction.

198
FirstLimitations of the telecommunications secrecy may be placed only on the basis of a law under Article 10 paragraph2sentence1GG.Nodoubt,subjectfirstlytotheextent113boftheActand100gStPO,whichis provide a legal basis for the adoption arrangements in each individual case, because of their access to the data possiblyinconjunctionwithotherprovisions.Constitutionallyunobjectionablesofarisalso113aTKG,whichisto store the data does not refer to caseby arrangements, but even those directly prescribed. Article 10 paragraph 2 sentence1GGlimitationsoftelecommunicationssecrecyisalsodirectlycontrarytothelawbynot(cf.BVerfGE85, 386<396ff>).

199
Second The federal government does not lack a legislative competence. The 113a, 113b TKG find their competence basis in Article 73 paragraph 1 GG No. 7, 100g StPO are found in Article 74 Paragraph 1 No. 1, Article72oftheBasicLawfirst

200
Article73Paragraph1No.7oftheBasicLawonlyentitledtodirectlycontrolthetechnicalaspectsofcreatinga telecommunications infrastructure and information transmission by means of telecommunications equipment. Not included are the standard rules, which are directed to the transmitted content or nature of the use of telecommunications(seeBVerfGE113,348<368>,114,371<385>)andaboutatelecommunicationssurveillance forthepurposeofobtaininginformationprovidefordutiesoflawenforcementorsecurity.Suchregulationsarewith regardtothelegislativepowersallocatedtotherespectiveareaoflaw,forthepurposeofthemonitoringcarriedout (seeBVerfGE113,348<368>).

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The 113a and 113b are of the Telecommunications Act power to regulate the telecommunications law, however, also detected as part of the herewith connected to data protection provisions of factual connection. Absenceofanexpressconferralofpoweristherightofprivacyinprinciplewithinthecompetenceofthestates.A federalresponsibilityforitscontrolisoffactualconnection,however,insofarasthefederalonetohimonlegislation assigned matter regulate judiciously can not, without the data protection laws are regulated (see BVerfGE 3, 407 <421>,98,265<299>,106,62<115>,110,33<48>,settledcaselaw,theprivacylaw,seeSimitis,in:Simitis, BDSG,6thed,2006,1,para4)..Thisisfor113a,113bTKGthecase.Theserelatetotheprovisionsofthe Telecommunications Act on Data Protection and normalize in connection with the regulation of the technical conditions of the transfer of information each has to comply to the use of the provision of telecommunications services produced or processed data. They tie in directly to those situations that fall within the scope of the legislationmatteroftelecommunications.Becauseofthiscloserelationshipbetweentechnologicaltransferprocess andtheresultingdatacanprovidethenecessarydataprotectionlawsregulatingtheiruseonlyasaunitmadebythe federal legislator who has the power to regulate the transmission process. Otherwise there would be a risk of inconsistency causing disintegration of the technical and legal data protection regulations for data processing. Accordingly, the Telecommunications Act contains the provisions of 113a and 113b of the Act and about the secrecyin88etseqTelecommunicationsActandin91107TKGextensivedomainspecificdataprotection regulations,whichkompetenziellelegalitysofarasfarascanbeseennotwascalledintoquestion.

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The range for the federal government can meet this competence base those regulations that are necessary to a civillaworregulationoftheuseofdata.In particular, it may provide for the provisions that are necessary so that under 113a TKG provided data storage and transmission of data to law enforcement and emergency response agencies and intelligence services and their use for providing information pursuant to 113 TKG the basic legal requirements of Article 10 para . meet a GG. Since for encroachments on Article 10 paragraph 1 GG, that its

purpose is specifically determined range, precise and clear standards (see BVerfGE 100, 313 <359 f>, 110, 33 <53>, 115, 320 <365>, 118 , 168 <187 f> ), this includes the competence to areaspecific, precise and clear regulatorystandardsofthepurposeofstorage.Thelegislationextendsfederaljurisdictioninthisregardbutonlyas far as is necessary for dataprotection point of view as well as related constitutional requirements. The authorizationstodataretrievalitselfcannotsupportthefederalgovernment,therefore,onArticle73Paragraph1No. 7oftheBasicLaw.Heneedstoownatitleorskills,thedecisionlefttothecountrieshere.

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113a,113bTKGcarrythebillinprinciple.Theyconfinethemselvessolelytocreateobligationsbystoringand transmissionrulesstatetheconditionsforaccesstothedata.Fillingtheirownarrangementstoleaveontheother hand,isdataretrieval.Withoutprejudicetothesubstantivequestionwhetherthefederalgovernmentusesherehas sufficientlylimitedinscope(seebelowVIandCV53b),areheretoraisenoobjectionstocompetencylaw. IV

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Substantiveconstitutional,theinterferencewiththesecrecyoftelecommunications,iftheyservelegitimatepublic purposesandmeettherestoftheprincipleofproportionality(seeBVerfGE100,313<359>are),thatistoachieve thepurpose,appropriate,necessaryandreasonable(seeBVerfGE109,279<335etseq>,115,320<345>,118,168 <193>,120,274<318f>establishedcaselaw).

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A sixmonth eventfree retention of telecommunications traffic data for qualified uses in connection with law enforcement,securityandthetasksoftheintelligenceservices,asitis,113a,113bTKGorder,thenwithArticle 10oftheBasicLawisnotsimplyincompatible.The legislature may pursue such a regime legitimate purposes for theattainmentofsuchstorageinaccordancewiththeprincipleofproportionalityisappropriateandnecessary.One suchstoreislackingintermsofproportionalityinthestrictsenseofthebeginningofajustificationcapability.Inone configuration to the specific weight of the inherent in this procedure makes due allowance, falls one without occasionstorageisnotalreadythetelecommunicationstrafficdata,assuch,thestrictprohibitionofstoringdataon storageinthejurisprudenceoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt(cf.BVerfGE65,1<46f>,115,320<350>,118,168 <187>).

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First The more effective law enforcement, maritime security and the fulfillment of the tasks of the intelligence servicesarelegitimatepurposesthataninterventioncaninprinciplejustifythesecrecyoftelecommunications(see BVerfGE 100, 313 <373, 383 f>, 107, 299 <316>, 109 , 279 <336>, 115, 320 <345> ).This is an illegitimate, the principle of freedom of the Article 10 paragraph 1 GG selftranscending goal is not already in it, should that telecommunications traffic data is backed anlasslos precaution. Article 10 paragraph 1 GG does not prohibit any precautionarycollectionandstorageofdataatall,butprotectsagainstunreasonabledesignofsuchadatacollection and especially against this boundless economic determination of goals. It is strictly forbidden, only the storage of personal data to be retained, vague and not definable purposes (cf. BVerfGE 65, 1 <46>, 100, 313 <360> ). A precautionarymeasurewithoutoccasion,datastorageisonlypermittedinexceptionalcases.It is subject, both in terms of their justification, and in its design, particularly in relation to the proposed uses, particularly stringent requirements.

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Second A precautionary measure without occasion retention of telecommunications traffic data for later transmission to the eventrelated charge of law enforcement or security authorities or to the intelligence agencies may look at the legislature to achieve its objectives, as appropriate. There are hereby created educational opportunities that would exist otherwise, and given the increasing importance of telecommunications for the preparationandperpetrationofcrimesinmanycasesarepromising.Itisirrelevantwhethertheregulationscreated bythelegislatorwillbeabletoreconstructcompletelyalltelecommunicationslinks.Althoughensuringsuchadata storagemaynotrequirealltelecommunicationsconnectionsreliablyspecificporttakerscanbeassigned,andsome criminalsstoragebytheuseofhotspots,internetcafes,foreignInternetphoneserviceorrunningunderfalsenames registeredprepaidcellphonesmaybethesuitabilityofathearrangementsarenotcountered.Thisdoesnotrequire that the control objective is actually achieved in each individual case, but merely requires that the purpose of achievementisencouraged(seeBVerfGE63,88<115>,67,157<175>,96,10<23>,103,293<307>).

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Third The legislature may assess a sixmonth retention of telecommunications traffic data as required. Less restrictive means to enable as wideranging educational activities are not evident. A comparably effective educational opportunity is not particularly in the socalled quickfreezing process, is located at the the place of anlasslosgeneralstorageoftelecommunicationsdatastoringinindividualcasesonlyandonlytothedateonwhich thisinstancebecauseofacertainsuspicionspecificreasonconsists.Suchproceduresmaycapturethedatafrom the period prior to the placement of their storage only if they are still present, is not as effective as continuous storage,whichensurestheexistenceofacompletedatasetforthelastsixmonths.

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4thAsixmonthretentionoftelecommunicationstrafficdataasprovidedin113aTKGscopeisnotunreasonable fromtheoutsetinthestrictsense.

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a)However,itisatsuchastoreisaveryseriousengagementwitharangeofvariation,asthelegalsystemdoes not know yet: It covers the entire period of six months, virtually all telecommunications traffic data of all citizens withoutlinkingtoanattributablereprehensibleconduct,aAbstractonlydangerousorotherwisequalifiedsituation. Thestoragereferstoeverydaybehavior,whichineverydaylifefortheelementaryandparticipateinsociallifeinthe modernworldcannolongerbeleftout.Basically,anyformoftelecommunicationsisexcludedinprinciplefromthe store.Whilethesystemcanresultinoccasionalgapsthatpreventeachandeverytelecommunicationslinkcanbe reconstructed individualizing as under certain circumstances when using hotspots, confusing private networks or service providers in nonEuropean countries. A regular alternative for the citizens opened this, though. The legislaturetried,rather,inprinciple,capturealltelecommunicationslinkssothatuserscanbeidentifiedaswidelyas possible.

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The strength of the data is far reaching. Depending on the use of telecommunications services of the parties concernedcanalreadyfromthedataitselfgaininsightsintothesocialenvironmentandtheindividualactivitiesof all citizens and especially if they serve as starting points for further investigation. Although with a telecommunication traffic data storage, as provided in 113a TKG, only the connection data (time, duration, and ports involved the location in the mobile telephony) is held, but also the content of communication. From these data suggest, however, in a comprehensive and automated analysis to move into the private sphere into reaching substantive conclusions. Addressees (whose membership of certain occupational groups, institutions or interest groupsortheservicestheyprovide),date,timeandlocationoftelephoneconversationspermitiftheyareobserved over a longer period, in combination, provide detailed information about social or political affiliations, and personal preferences,inclinationsandweaknessesofthosewhoseconnectiondataareanalyzed.Thereisnoconfidentiality protection is not far. Depending on the use of telecommunications in the future and increasing density, such a storage permit the creation of meaningful movement and personality profiles virtually every citizen. In terms of groupsandassociations,thedataalsomayallowthedetectionofinternalcontrolstructuresanddecisionprocesses.

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A storage, the grounds for such uses normally permits and to allow in certain cases, a serious interference. Of weightisalsoherethatregardlessofwhatevermateriallyfromdesignregulatedtheuseofdataincreasestheriskof citizens, will face further investigation, without having to have even given rise to it. It suffices, for instance, at an inopportune time in a particular cell or had been contacted by a particular person to be, to be exposed to a large extent come under investigation and explanation pressure. Also, the abuse potential associated with such data collection exacerbate the harmful effects. This is especially true because of the multitude of different private providers in which the telecommunications data is stored. Have been given the number of storage obligor is the numberofthoselarge,haveaccesstosuchdataandhave.Sincethestoragerequirementmitbetrifftsmallerservice providers, the security comes from abuse regardless of all possible and necessary efforts of legislators in view of theirperformanceduetostructurallimitations.Thisisreinforcedbythefactthatthedemandsputforwardatthedata managementanddatatransmissiontotheauthoritiesahighdegreeoftechnicalmasteryandsophisticatedsoftware, whichcombinesaninherentriskofvulnerabilitiesandtheriskofmanipulationbyinterestedparties.Specialattention giventostorageoftelecommunicationsdatafurtherinthattheythemselvesandtheintendeduseofthestoreddata of the victims not immediately noticed, but also detect compounds that are included under confidentiality expectations.This without occasion, the retention of telecommunications traffic data is likely to cause a diffusely threateningfeelingofBeobachtetseinsthatmayaffecttheimpartialexerciseoffundamentalrightsinmanyareas.

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b) Despite the extraordinary spread and the weight is associated with their engagement to the legislature to introduce a sixmonth storage requirement, as provided in 113a TKG, absolutely not constitutionally prohibited. However, it corresponds to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court that the state has a collection of personaldatatoberetainedundeterminedornotyetdeterminablepurposesisprohibitedconstitutionallystrictly(cf. BVerfGE65,1<46>,100,313<360>,115,320<350>,118,168<187>).Tosuchanaprioriprohibitedformofdata collectionisataprecautioneventfreestorageofthetelecommunicationsconnectiondataisnotinanycase.Ifthey are for specific purposes, such storage may be incorporated into a meet the appropriate legal intervention design (seebelowvideo)butalsotherequirementsofproportionalityinthenarrowersense.

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aa) is decisive for this first, that the proposed retention of telecommunications traffic data is not implemented directlybythestatebutbyacommitmentfromtheprivateserviceprovider.Thedataismergedsothatthestorage is not itself, but remain divided on many individual companies and assist the state as a whole is not directly available.This is especially what is necessary to ensure that the arrangements and technical measures, no direct accesstothedata.Theretrievalofdatabygovernmentagenciesisonlyinasecondstepandisnowclosertocase basis for legally established criteria. The design of the can for retrieval and further use of the stored data while empoweringprovisionstoensurethatthestorageisnottoovagueorarenotidentifiablepurposes.Itcanandmust beguaranteedwiththearrangementofsuchastoragerequirementthatanactualknowledgeacquisitionanduseof thedataarelimitedinstandardclearforminawayisthattheweightoftheextensivedatacollectionintoaccount, andtheretrievalandtheactualuseofthedataonthosethatarerequiredpartofthedatacollectionislimited.The separation of storage and retrieval supports both the structurally by statutory design closer to ensuring end transparencyandcontrolofdatausage.

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bb) A sixmonth retention of telecommunications traffic data also highlights not already proved the principle of Article 10 paragraph 1 GG as such, it violates neither the core of human dignity (Article 1, Section 1 GG) nor its essential content (Art. 19, para . 2 GG). It remains, despite its extraordinary length or limited effect. Thus, the content of telecommunications of which is recessed to the traffic data limited storage. The storage period is also limited.Althoughastorageperiodofsixmonths,giventhescaleandsignificanceofthedatastoredverylongand liesattheupperlimitofwhatiscapableofjustificationundertheproportionalityconsiderations.Afteritsexpiry,the citizenscouldrelyontheirdataiftheywerenotretrievedfromexceptionallyweightyoccasionbedeletedandno oneisreconstructed.

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cc) The storage of telecommunications traffic data for six months is as even as a measure that would capture a total of communications or activities of the citizens generally applied. Rather, it ties in more limited ways of maintainingtheimportanceoftelecommunicationsinthemodernworldandtorespondtothespecificriskpotential associated with this. The new telecommunications means to overcome time and space in a way incomparable to otherformsofcommunicationandgenerallytotheexclusionofpublicperception.Theyfacilitatecommunicationand thusalsothecovertactionofcriminalsandalsoallowdispersedgroupsofafewpeopletocometogetherandwork together effectively. By virtually resistancefree communication, a pooling of knowledge, readiness to act and criminalintentispossible,whichprovidessecurityandlawenforcementwithnewkindsoftasks.Somecrimestake place immediately with the help of new technology. Integrated into a conglomerate of technically nurmehr communicating computers and computer networks such activities well beyond the observation. At the same time they can establish new types of threats such as attacks on the telecommunications of third parties. A reconstruction of the telecommunications links is therefore just for effective law enforcement and security is of particularimportance.

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Inaddition,thereisintermsoftelecommunicationsdataforlackofpublicvisibilityandnosocialmemory,which is,asinotherareas,allowedtoreconstructpasteventsonthebasisofrandommemory:telecommunicationsdata is either removed, and then completely lost or saved, and are thus fully available. Therefore, the legislature in decidinghowmuchtodeletesuchdataorstoragehavetomakeabalanceofinterestsandconsidertheinterestsof state involvement. This can also include in its considerations, that the spread of certain forms of contract for telecommunications services providers (such as the increase in flat rates) for application of a strict deletion requirementsfortelecommunicationstrafficdata,whicharenotrequiredforthecontract,reducingtheavailabilityof

suchdata.Alsointhisrespectcantheprecautionarysavingoftelecommunicationstrafficdataarebasedonfactors inthecharacteristicsofmoderntelecommunicationshaveaspecificreason.

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Conversely,shouldthestorageoftelecommunicationstrafficdataisnotseenasasteptowardsalegislationthat was aimed at the greatest possible coverage of all the precautionary saving for the prosecution or risk prevention usefuldata.Such legislation would be inconsistent regardless of the design rules of use, from the outset with the Constitution.The constitutional safety precaution, an eventfree storage of telecommunications traffic data implies ratherthatthisisanexception.Youmaynotresultincombinationwithotherexistingfilestotheconstructabilityof virtuallyallactivitiesofcitizens.Relevanttothejustificationofsuchstoragecapacityissoparticularthattheyare notdonedirectlybygovernmentagencies,notcoveringthecontentofcommunicationandthatthestoreiscalledby its customers websites by commercial service providers strictly prohibited. The introduction of telecommunication traffic data retention can thus not serve as a model for the creation of additional precautionary measure eventfree datacollection,butcompelsthelegislatorwhenconsideringnewstorageobligationsorprivilegesinviewofallthe variousexistingdatacollectionstobemorecautious.Maybethatthefreedomofexerciseofcitizensnotcovered totallyandregisteredontheconstitutionalidentityoftheFederalRepublicofGermany(seepartoftheconstitutional identityoftitleBVerfG,decisionoftheSecondSenateof30June20092BvE2/08etc.juris,marginal.240),for theobservanceofwhichtheFederalRepublicmustbeusedinEuropeanandinternationalcontexts.Precautionary storage of telecommunications traffic data is the scope for further eventfree data collection also differ on how the EuropeanUnionshouldbeconsiderablylower.

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dd) In summary, a sixmonth retention of telecommunications traffic data is in the legislature in 113a para 18 TKG extent provided under present circumstances is not unreasonable from the outset. For their safety, however, theconstitutionalrequirementthatthedesignofstorageanduseofdatatothespecificweightofsuchstoragetakes appropriateaccount. V.

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The design of a precautionary telecommunications traffic data storage, as provided in 113a TKG is subject to specificconstitutionalrequirements,particularlyintermsofdatasecurity,theextentofdatause,transparencyand legalprotection.Onlyifthereistosufficientlydemandingstandardsandclearrulesareinplace,lyinginthestorage ofsuchinterventionisproportionateinthenarrowersense.

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FirstA storage of telecommunications traffic data in the scope of 113a TKG requires the implied warranty of a highstandardofdatasecurity.

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Giventhescaleandpotentialsignificanceofthejobscreatedwithsuchdatabasesisthedatastoragesecurityfor the proportionality of the challenged provisions of great importance. This is especially true because the data is storedinprivateserviceproviderswhoactundertheconditionsofefficiencyandcostpressures,whilehavingonly limited incentives to ensure data security. They deal privateprinciple and are not bound by specific duties. At the sametimetheriskofillegalaccesstodataislarge,because,givenitseclecticexplanatorypowercanbeattractive foravarietyofactors.Commandmentsisthusaparticularlyhighstandardofsecuritythatgoesbeyondthegeneral constitutionallyrequiredlevelforthestorageofdatatelecommunications.Suchrequirementsshallbeeitherthedata securityforthestorageofdataandfortheirtransmissionalsocallsforeffectivesafeguardstoensuretheerasureof data.

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Inremarksatthehearingandinwrittencommentsonthisprocedurefromawiderangeofexpertpageoftoolsto increase data security has been identified. Called as a separate storage of under 113a TKG to store data on physically separate and the Internet decoupled computers connected to an asymmetric cryptographic encryption underseparatecustodyofthekeys,thespecificationofthefourpersonruleforaccessingthedatawithadvanced methodsofauthenticationforaccesstothekeys,theaudittrailofaccesstothedataanditsdeletionandtheuseof automated error correction process and plausibility. In addition to such technologybased instruments and the

creation of information requirements for data breaches, the introduction of strict liability, or a strengthening of compensationclaimshasbeencalledformoraldamages,inordertocreateincentivesfortheimplementationofan effectivedataprotection.

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TheConstitutiondoesnotpurportdetailexactlywhatSicherheitsma gabenaregivenindetail.Theresultmustbe astandardtoensurethatspecificguaranteesinregardtothecharacteristicsofthejobscreatedbyaprecautionary telecommunications traffic data storage data sets a particularly high level of security. This includes ensuring that this standard for example by resorting to simple legal right figures like the state of the art (see Heibey in: Rossnagel, manual data protection law, 2003, p 575, para 19, p 598, para 145.. Tinnefeld / Ehrmann / Gerling, Introduction to the Data Protection Law, 4th edition 2005, p 628) at the level of developmentoriented and professionaldiscussionofnewknowledgeandinsightscontinuallyreceives.Accordingly,providedthatthestorage company with duty to adapt their measures thereon verifiable for example on the basis of periodic refreshing securitypolicies.Thepotentialdangerarisingfromthedatabasesinquestionallowsitnottosubjectthedescribed security requirements of a free assessment of general economic factors. If the legislature a blanket retention of telecommunications traffic data invariably requires, it is one of the necessary conditions that the affected vendors can not only fulfill their duty to store, but also the corresponding requirements for data security. Building on the expert opinions, it is obvious that in principle the current state of discussion, a separate storage of the data, a sophisticatedencryption,asecureaccessregime,usingaboutthefoureyeprincipleandanaudittrailmustbetaken toensurethesafetythedatatoensureconstitutionallyadequate.

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Necessarylegalarrangementsthatsuchaparticularlyhighlevelofsecurityinaqualifiedway,atleastpretendthe merits of clear and binding standards. It is up to the legislature, the technical specification of the given scale to entrust a supervisory authority. The legislator has taken to ensure that the decision is not about the nature and extentoftheprecautionstobetakenultimatelyuncontrollablyliesinthehandsoftheirtelecommunicationsprovider. Thedemandstobedifferentiatedeitherbytechnicalregulationsprovideageneralwayoringeneral,andthenflesh out in a transparent manner by binding individual decisions of the supervisory authorities in respect of individual companies possibly upgraded to various standard levels. Constitutionally, continue to be offered to the public a transparent control, involving the independent data protection officer (see BVerfGE 65, 1 <46> ) as well as a balancedsystemofsanctions,whichalsoattachestobreachesofdatasecurityisareasonableweight.

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Second A retention of telecommunications traffic data, as provided in 113a TKG is to continue to advance legislation for use of this data. The relative configuration of these decisions using rules not only about the constitutionalityoftheseprovisionsestablishingaseparateprocedureitself,butactsontheconstitutionalityofthe store already returned as such. According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the conditions for data use and its extent in the relevant legal principles are more narrowly defined the heavier the weight of the storage operationlocated.Reason,purposeandscopeoftheinterventionandtheappropriateactionlimitsareregulatedby thelegislatorareaspecific,preciseandstandardclear(seeBVerfGE100,313<359f>,110,33<53>,113,29<51> ,113,348<375>,115,166<191>,115,320<365>,118,168<186f>).

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The use of a anlasslos systematic storage of virtually all telecommunications traffic data collected databases accordingly subject to particularly stringent requirements. In particular, this is not the same extent constitutionally permissible, such as the use of telecommunications traffic data that service providers depending on the particular operationalandcontractualconditionspartlyinfluencedbythecustomerscansaveinaccordancewith96ofthe Act. Given the inevitability of, completeness, and thus increase the validity of six months as a precaution systematicallycollectedtheirtrafficdataretrievalhasamuchgreaterweight.Sinceanevaluationofthesedatadeep intotheprivatelivesofpenetratingconclusionsandpossiblydetailedpersonalandallowsmotionprofilesthatcanso far not be assumed without further assume that the use of this data is generally less weight than a contentbased telecommunicationsmonitoring(forinterrogationundertheoldlawcf.BVerfGE107,299<322>).Rather,theuseof suchdatacanonlyberegardedasproportionateifitisparticularlyhighrankingpublicinterests.Theuseofthedata isthereforeimmenselyimportanttasksfortheprotectionoflegalinterestsintoaccount,thatis,topunishcrimesthat threatentheimmenselyimportantlegalinterestsortodefendagainstsuchthreatstolegalgoods.

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a) For the prosecution, it follows that a retrieval of the data, at least the suspicion is justified by certain facts presupposes a serious crime. What offenses should be covered from this, the legislature finally set with the obligationtostoredata.Hecomesheretoanareaofdiscretion.He can either use existing catalog or create your own catalog, as to offenses for which telecommunications traffic data are particularly important to detect. The qualification of a crime must be difficult but in the criminal law provisions in particular about by the punishment findanobjectifiedexpression(seeBVerfGE109,279<343etseq,especially347f>).Ageneralclauseoronlythe referencetoseriouscriminaloffensesrangingfromnootherhand.

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About the abstract definition of a relevant offense catalog, the legislature must ensure that recourse to the precaution saved telecommunications traffic data is permitted only if in individual cases pursued offense seriousness (see BVerfGE 121, 1 <26> , to serious criminal offenses meaning see BVerfGE 107, 299 <322> particularlyseriousoffensesreferredtoinArticle13paragraph3GGcf.BVerfGE109,279<346>)andtheuseof thedataisproportionate.

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b) The security is to use the data in question to limit equally effective. To open the data access by reference to catalogsofcertaincrimes,theyareunabletoservethedataused(seeBVerfGE122,120<142>),isnotaviable control technology. She takes the requirements for the degree of legal protection and clarity of their risk leads to uncertainty,ifindeedposeoffenseevenmerepreparatoryactsandthreatsoflegalprotectionunderpenalty.Instead, offertotakeimmediatelegalrighttothegoodsintermsthatjustifytheiruseofdataprotectionshould,aswellasthe intensity of the threat of legal interests that must be achieved as a threshold for this intervention. Such a rule reflectsthecharacterofthesecurityasprotectionoflegalrightsandguaranteesanimmediateconnectionwiththe ultimategoal,whichistojustifytheencroachmentonfundamentalrights.

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The balance between the weight results of the data storage and use of past intervention and the importance of effective security to ensure that a release of precaution saved telecommunications traffic data only to respond to threatstolife,limborlibertyofaperson,totheexistenceorthesecurityofthefederalorstateormaybeadmitted toavertacommondanger(seeBVerfGE122,120<141etseq>).Thelegalbasisforauthorityinthisrespectshould at least actual evidence of a specific threat to the protected legal interests require. This requirement means that sufficientgeneralassumptionsorempiricalpropositionsnottojustifyaccesstothedata.Rather,certainfactsmust beestablishedwhichsupportthepredictionofarealdanger.Itrequiresafarsituationwhereinsomecasesthereis areasonableprobabilitythatintheforeseeablefuturewithoutgovernmentinterventioncausedthedamagetosafety underthestandardbycertainpersons.TherelevantobservationsoftheSenateregardingtherequirementsforonline searches are here accordingly (see BVerfGE 120, 274 <328 f> ).The real risk is determined by three criteria: the individualcase,theproximityofthetransformationofadangerthananinjury,andthereferencetoindividualpersons responsible.Theinterrogationofstoreddataasaprecaution,however,canbejustifiedevenifnotyetbeascertained with reasonable certainty that the danger will arise anytime soon, if certain facts indicate a danger in a particular case for a supremely important right. The facts must allow for one to conclude on an at least by its nature, concretisedandtemporallyforeseeableevents,secondly,thatcertainpeoplewillbeinvolved,astotheiridentity,at leastasmuchisknownisthatthemeasurewastargetedagainstthemandtheycanbeconcentrated.Incontrastto the weight of the encroachment on fundamental rights is not sufficiently taken into account when the actual intervention event is still largely moved to the front end of a not yet foreseeable in detail specific danger to safety underthestandard.

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c) The constitutional requirements for the use of data security authorizations apply to all intervention with preventive objectives. They are thus made for the use of information by the intelligence services. Since the impairment is by engaging in all these cases the same for those affected, there is no reason to regard these requirements, agencybased differentiation, such as between police authorities and other authorities entrusted with preventivetaskssuchasconstitutionalprotectionauthorities.Thepoliceanddomesticintelligenceauthoritieshave differentresponsibilitiesandpowershaveandmakethefollowupwithadifferentdepthofpenetrationcanbe,forthe weightingofusingprecautioncoverageandlongtermstoredtelecommunicationstrafficdatabasicallyirrelevant(see BVerfGE 120, 274 <329 f> ) . Although able to discriminate between the different agencies with authorizations preventive tasks before the Constitution endure (see BVerfGE 100, 313 <383>, 120, 274 <330> ). However, the legislaturealsoexistsfortheregulationoftheindividualpowersofsecurityagencies,whosemissionistoadvance

education, subject to the constitutional requirements that arise from the principle of proportionality (see BVerfGE 120,274<330f>).Theseleadtothepresentcasetoensurethatbothintermsoftheprotectedlegalinterestsas wellastothecorrectiveactionlimittobeobservedinthisparticulardemandsonthedataareused.

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There is no reason why these requirements should not apply for the completion of the intelligence services. Althoughlimitingtheroleofintelligenceservicesgenerallytothecollectionofinformationtoinformthegovernment. This reduces the weight of the intervention to the extent that it connects itself to the individual citizens about the danger of being observed is not beyond the danger of further measures ATTACHING thereto. At the same time reducestheweightthiswaybutalsotojustifysuchinterventionsbecauseofmereinformation,thegovernmentcan not legally protected injury to be prevented. This is possible only through followup of the competent security authorities,theconstitutionallimitationsontheuseofdatamustnotbeunderminedbyfurtheruseofpowersinthe run. A special loading effects of such interventions to the citizens is, moreover, that not only the particular engagement in the secrecy of telecommunications, as such, covered usually happens, but almost made the entire activities of the secret intelligence services. Powers of these services to use the precautionary areawide telecommunication traffic data stored to convey the feeling of being watched uncontrollable in a special way to developsustainableandintimidationeffectsontheperceptionoffreedom.

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TheSenateisawarethatitwouldeliminatetheuseoftheprecautionarytelecommunicationstrafficdatastoredon thepartoftheintelligenceservicesinmanycases.Thisisduetothenatureoftheirdutiesaspriorinformationand does not constitute a constitutionally intolerable event, the drawbacks of the principle of proportionality resulting requirementsforanencroachmentofthiskind(seeBVerfGE120,274<331>).

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be d) Limiting the use of data for specific purposes must be ensured for the use of the data according to their retrievalandtransmissiontotheauthoritiesandretrievingflankedprocedurally.Itshouldbeensurebylawthatthe datawillbeanalyzedimmediatelyafterdeliveryand,iftheyareirrelevantforthepurposesoftheinvestigation,will bedeleted(seeBVerfGE 100, 313 <387 f> ).Moreover, it is necessary to provide that the data will be destroyed after it for the specified purposes are no longer required, and that there is a log is made (see BVerfGE 100, 313 <362>,113,29<58>).

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The telecommunications traffic data lose their protection mediated by the Basic Law Article 10 not by a government agency that has already become aware of them. The requirements of the fundamental right to a clear earmarkingthereforerelatetothesharingofdataandinformationtootheragencies.Thispurpose,however,doesnot change.Theyrequire,however,aseparatelegalbasis,whichinturnissufficientconstitutionalrights(seeBVerfGE 100,313<360>,109,279<375f>).Adisclosureoftheinformationtelecommunicationtrafficdatatootheragencies maybeprescribedbylawaccordinglyonlyiftheyaretoperceivepurposeforwhichaccesstothesedatawouldalso be directly admissible (see BVerfGE 100, 313 <389 f>, 109, 279 < 375 f>, 110, 33 <73> ).This is to monitor the forwardingauthority(seeBVerfGE100,313<395f>).Thiscanbeearmarkedtoensureonlyifitappearsafterthe acquisitionisthatitisdatathatisstoredasaprecautionanlasslos.Thelegislaturehasthereforetoarrangeforthis informationlabelingrequirements(seeBVerfGE100,313<360f>).

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e) Constitutional limits may eventually also result in terms of volume of data to retrieve. Thus distinguished as proportionalitypointofmanygradationsbetweenthevariousrequestsforinformation,suchaswhethertheyinvolve onlyasingletelecommunicationsconnection,theyaimtopromotethetransferofdatafromonlyonecellatagiven time, they are only related to the communication between individuals may be limited to a certain period or a particular form of communication and here also the location data to include or exclude, or whether they aim to completetransmissionofthedataofapersontocreateamovementorasdetailedpersonalityprofile.Also,itcan makeinviewoftheengagementweightmakeadifferencewhetherbeinterposedinthetransmissionofdatafilters thatcertaincommunicationlinesfortheprotectionofspecialtrustrelationshipsortedout.

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Given the high thresholds that apply under the above provisions already in principle for the use of telecommunications traffic data stored as a precautionary measure, the legislature in the immediate control of the volume of data has, however, use some discretion. In particular, it is also generally free of him, such a

proportionality considerations to leave the decision on the arrangement of a data retrieval appointed judge in the examinationofeachcase.Constitutionally,offeredasacorollaryoftheprincipleofproportionality,however,atleast forasmallcircleofconfidentialitydependentonspecifictelecommunicationslinksprovidedageneralprohibitionof transmission.Hastothinkaboutinconnectiontoorfrompersons,authoritiesandorganizationsinsocialorreligious areas that offer basically remain anonymous callers completely or predominantly by telephone counseling in psychological or social distress, and which themselves or their employees to the extent other confidentiality obligationssubject(cf.99para2TKG).

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ThirdRelativelyaprecautionwithoutoccasionretentionoftelecommunicationstrafficdataandtheiruseisstillonly whenthelegislaturemeetsreasonableprecautionstoensuretransparencyofdatauseandtoensureeffectivelegal protectionandeffectivesanctions.

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a) The conditions of the constitutionally acceptable use of data obtained through such storage requirements are partofthetransparency.As far as possible must be done using the open data. Otherwise, it generally requires at least one subsequent notification of individuals. Failing this exceptionally well, the need for nonnotification of a judicialdecision.

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aa) A precautionary measure without occasion retention of all telecommunications traffic data for six months, among other reasons such a serious procedure, because it can cause a feeling of constant being watched, they allowed in an unpredictable way deep insight into the private lives without recourse to the data for the citizens is directlyfeltorseen.Theindividualdoesnotknowwhatgovernmentagencywhichknowsabouthim,butIknowthat manyauthorities,includingmaximumpersonalcanknowabouthim.

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The legislature needs to diffuse the threat, which can receive the data stored this way, catch by effective transparency rules. Rules for informing the utilizations of data collection or victims are generally the basic instrumentsofdataprotectionofbasicrights(seeBVerfGE100,313<361>,109,279<363f>,118, 168 <207 f>, 120, 351 <361 f> ). For the use of extensive and diverse data sets of a meaningful eventfree precaution telecommunicationstrafficdataretentionrequirementshavetobehighsofar.Youhavetotakethejob,adecrease tocomplywiththeignoranceoftheactualrelevanceofthedataresultingthreat,unsettlingcounterspeculationand toprovidethepartiesanopportunitytoputsuchmeasuresintothepublicdiscussion.Forothersuchrequirements from the requirement for effective legal protection under Article 10 paragraph 1 GG in conjunction with Article 19 paragraph4oftheConstitutionarederived.Withoutknowledgeofthoseaffectedmayneitherillegitimacyoftheuse of the Data nor any right to cancellation, rectification or satisfaction will be maintained (see BVerfGE 100, 313 <361>,109,279<363>,118,168<207f>120,351<361>).

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bb)Therequirementsoftransparencyisoneoftheprincipleofopennessofthecollectionanduseofpersonaldata. Theuseofdatawithouttheknowledgeofthepersonconcernedisconstitutionallypermissibleonlyifitisotherwise frustrated the purpose of the investigation, which is used for data retrieval. For security and performance of the dutiesoftheintelligenceagencies,thelegislaturemayacceptthisinprinciple.Incontrast,comesinthecontextof law enforcement and an open collection and use of the data into account (cf. 33 paragraph 3 and 4, Code of CriminalProcedure).Investigationsarecarriedoutheretosomeextentwithotherknowledgeoftheaccusedandin hispresence(see,forexample,102,103,106StPO).Accordingly,thepersoninfrontofthequeryortransferof hisdatamustbenotifiedinprinciple.Asecretuseofthedatamayonlybeprovidedifitisplacedinindividualcases andjudicial.

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As far as the use of the data is secret, the legislature has the duty to provide at least a subsequent notification. This should ensure that those to which a data query whether as suspects, police or liable third parties directly related,hasputatleastinretrospect,tohaveknowledgeinprinciple.Exceptionsmayprovideforconsiderationby thelegislatureinconstitutionallyprotectedlegalinterestsofthirdparties.However,theyaretobelimitedtowhatis strictly necessary (see BVerfGE 109, 279 <364> ). Possible exceptions to the notification requirements in connection with the prosecution, about if the disclosure would result in the interference with the secrecy of telecommunicationstothefactthatthisfailsitspurpose,ifthenotificationcannotbedonewithoutrisktolifeand

limb of a person or if their predominant concerns an interested person opposed, for example because of the notification of a measure that has had no further consequences, the fundamental right of intervention would still developing(seeBVerfGE100,313<361>,109,279<364etseq>).Iftherearecompellingreasonstoalsoexclude asubsequentnotification,thisistoconfirmjudicialandcheckatregularintervals(seeBVerfGE109,279<367f>). Correspondingly,itrequiresarefinementofthenotificationobligationsalsowithregardtotheuseofdataforsecurity purposesormissionsoftheintelligenceservices.

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Constitutionally, in contrast, are not offered comparable strict notification duties to persons whose telecommunications traffic data was also detected only by chance and are not themselves the focus of regulatory action were. Such party may give it in the analysis of telecommunications traffic data on a large scale, without becoming aware of their shortterm data leave traces or consequences for the person concerned must have. A notificationcanbecomparedtodeepentheminindividualcases,buttheintervention(seeBVerfGE109,279<365> BVerfGK 9, 62 <81>). In these cases, a notification can generally be avoided even if the victims were not significantly affected by the measure and it is apparent that they have no interest in being notified. Requires a judicialconfirmationofthisdecisionisnotconsideringit.

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b) The relative configuration of a precautionary storage of telecommunications traffic data and their use requires furtherensuringeffectivejudicialprotectionandadequatesanctions.

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aa) To ensure effective judicial protection is a query or transmission of such data in principle be placed under judicialauthority.

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AccordingtothejurisprudenceoftheConstitutionalCourt,maybeconstitutionallyrequiredpreventivecontrolbyan independent body to determine measures that cause a serious encroachment on fundamental rights. This is especially true if the encroachment on fundamental rights and secretly made for the person concerned is not immediately perceptible (see BVerfGE 120, 274 <331> ).For the interrogation and transfer of telecommunications traffic data, this may be the case. Given the weight of the inherent in this procedure, the margin of the legislature reduced to the extent that such action is basically to make it subject to judicial order. Judges, because of their personalandmaterialindependenceandtheirexclusivebindingtothelawtherightsofvictimsineachcasethebest andsafesttrue(cf.BVerfGE77,1<51>,103,142<151>,120,274<332>).AnexceptionismadeunderArticle10, paragraph 2, sentence 2 Basic Law for the control of interference with the freedom of telecommunications by the intelligence services. This can take the place of preventive judicial review which also specifically related to the particularmeasurecontrolbyonememberappointedbythenationalrepresentativebodyorsubsidiarybodycontact (cf.BVerfGE30,1<21>).

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Lawmakershaveacommandmenttocombinepreventivejudicialreviewinaspecificandclearstandardformwith strictrequirementsonthecontentandreasoningofthecourtorder(seeBVerfGE109,279<358f>).Itfollowsalso the requirement of a sufficiently substantiated justification and limitation of the query of the coveted data, which allows the court only to exercise effective control (see BVerfGE 103, 142 <160 f> ).Only on this basis, and the court ordering must be formed independently make a judgment on whether the requested use of the data corresponds to the statutory requirements. This careful examination of the triggering conditions is required by law including in particular the intervention threshold. The decision of the court order must be justified in content. Moreover,thedatatobetransmittedinaccordancewiththeprincipleofproportionalitymustbedescribedsufficiently selectiveinaclearmanner(seeBVerfGE103,142<151>),sothattheserviceprovidermustnotmaketheirown substantiveexamination.Thismayonlybebasedoncleararrangementsfordatatransmissionrequiredandjustified.

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Theeffectivenessofcontrol,italsomeansthatthedataresultingfromthearrangementofthetelecommunications companies can be filtered out as a third party bound and sent to storage, the authorities say that is not a direct access to the data is opened. In this way, the use of the data on the interaction of various actors referenced and linkedtoeachotherincontrollingdecisionmakingstructures.

251

bb)offeredConstitutionally,isalsoopeningalegalprotectionmechanismforsubsequentmonitoringoftheuseof thedata.Ifaninterestedpartypriortotheoperationhadnoopportunitytoputbeforethecourtsagainsttheuseof telecommunicationstrafficdataistodefendhimajudicialreviewtoopenlater.

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cc) Finally, is a proportionate design requires effective sanctions for violations. Would also serious violations of internationaltelecommunicationssecrecyasaresultremainunpunished,withtheconsequencethattheprotectionof personalrights,evenifitisfoundinArticle10paragraph1GGisaparticularexpression,wouldwitherinthefaceof theintangiblenatureofthisright(seeFederalConstitutionalCourt,Orderofthe1stChamberoftheFirstSenateof 11 November 2009 1 BvR 2853/08 juris, paragraph 21,. BGHZ 128, 1 <15>), this would contradict the commitmentofpublicauthorities,whichdetailthedevelopmentofhispersonalitytoallow(cf.BVerfGE35,202<220 f>,63,131<142f>,96,56<64>)andprotectitfromthreatsbyathirdpartylegalpersonality(seeBVerfGE73,118 <210> 97, 125 <146>, 99, 185 <194 f> BVerfGK 6, 144 <146>). This may be particularly the case when unauthorized data obtained should be used largely unhindered or unauthorized use of data for lack of material damageonaregularbasiswouldremainwithoutthesatisfactionofservingvictimscompensation.

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Thelegislaturehasinthisregard,however,adegreeoflatitude.Hemayinparticulartakealookattheextentto which such arrangements fit into the overall scheme of criminal procedure law or the applicable tort law. In that regard,hemustbearinmindthatforseriousviolationsofpersonalrightsaccordingtocurrentlawalreadyprohibited use both on the basis of an assessment (see BVerfGE 34, 238 <248 et seq>, 80, 367 <375 f>, 113, 29 <61 > BVerfGK 9, 174 <196> BGHSt 34, 397 <401>, 52, 110 <116>) and a liability for moral damages may be justified (cf.BVerfGE34,269<282285f>BVerfGK6,144<146f>BVerfG,Orderofthe1stChamberoftheFirstSenate of11November20091BvR2853/08juris,paragraph21BGHZ128,1<12>)..In deciding whether it needs in this regard further regulations, it is therefore not prevented from observing, first, whether the seriousness of the violationofprivacy,intheunauthorizedacquisitionoruseofthisisfrequentlyinquestiondata,evenonthebasisof currentlawofthecaselawintheconstitutionallyrequireddueaccountistaken.

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4thLessstringentconstitutionalstipulationsonlyapplytoanindirectuseofprecaution,thedatastoredintheform of official information claims against service providers in terms of the connection holders of certain IP addresses that they have to determine, using the data retained. The creation of such an inquiry demands is independent of limiting legal protection or crime catalogs a total of more extensively acceptable than the query and use of telecommunicationstrafficdataitself

255
a)ForinformationabouttheholdersofcertainIPaddressestobeusedforthedeterminationoftelecommunications trafficdatamustbestoredasaprecaution,mustnotbegivenonconstitutionalgroundstheotherwiseapplicableto theuseofsuchdataverystrictconditions.

256
Ofimportanceisthistheonethattheauthoritiesthemselves,noknowledgeofthereceiveddatatobestoredasa precaution.The authorities called in the context of such information does not accept the claims as a precaution anlasslos stored data itself, but only receive personal information about the owner of a particular port, which was determinedbytheserviceproviders,drawingonthesedata.Itisthestrengthofthedataseverelylimited:theuseof the precautionary stored data alone leads to the inquiry, which port owner was declared under a wellknown, as otherwisedeterminedIPaddressontheInternet.Suchinformationhasitsformalstructuretoacertainsimilaritywith the query of the owner of a phone number. Its cognitive value remains selective. Systematic exploits over an extendedperiodoftimeorthecreationofpersonalityandmovementprofilescannotbeachievedsolelyonthebasis ofsuchinformation.

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Is significantly different to that used for such information from the outset only a fixed small segment of data, its storage may be arranged by themselves at much lower conditions. A dynamic storage only the information necessary for such Internet data to identify IP addresses could have been a lot less stressful than the weight of nearlycompletestorageofdatafromalltelecommunicationslinks.Fromtheinteractionofthesefactorsshowsthat areapplicabletotheuseoftelecommunicationstrafficdatastoredasaprecautionotherwiseapplicablerequirements forsuchinformationisnotequally.

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b)However,thejustificationofregulatoryinformationrequirementsfortheidentificationofIPaddressessignificant weight.Withit,thelegislatureactsontheconditionsofcommunicationontheInternetandlimitstheextentoftheir anonymity.Onthisbasis,inconjunctionwiththesystematicretentionofInternetdatatoalargeextenttheidentity ofInternetusersaredetermined.IfindividualscanseethedamagetotheInternettoregistertheirIPaddressesand make a complaint or determine if the agency itself IP addresses assigned to this particular port owners and the underlyingcommunicationsareindividualizedwithconsiderableprobability.

259
The assignment can be an IP address to a connection holder from the weight for the person concerned ago, despite a certain similarity with the identification of a phone number can not be equated. Telephone numbers are permanently assigned as an identifier shared between users, so that a search of its owner is also possible, regardlessofspecifictelecommunicationsrecords.Incontrast,aninquiryhasbeenabouttheconnectionownerofa dynamic IP address is also required in the information used and by which that port from that IP address at a particulartime.In addition, the phone number to private parties can be suppressed without difficulty, while the IP addresscanbeobfuscatedinprincipleonlywiththeuseofanonymizingservices.Also,thepossibleegorelevance ofaqueryoftheownerofanIPaddressotherthantheownerofaphonenumber:eventheextentofcontactswith management, which are each made by calling Internet pages is new, it more meaningful than a phone number retrieval.Also, the knowledge of a contact with a website to another substantive significance: As the content of websitesotherthanthatthephoneconversationspokenwordelectronicallysecuredandlongercanbecalledagain, it can be with her reconstructed often reliably identify which object is the Communicating set apart has. The individualizationoftheIPaddressasthe"phonenumberoftheInternet"isatthesametimerevealingthecontentof communication.Thecurrentdistinctionforthephonecallconnectionofexternaldataandcallcontentresolvesitself here.Individualized, the visitors to a particular site using the information about an IP address, you know not only whohehadcontact,butusuallyknowsthecontentsofthecontact.

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Of course, conversely, an increased interest in the possibility of being able to communicate on the Internet connections for protection of legal rights or to protect the legal system to assign the respective actors. Given the increasingimportanceoftheInternetforthemostdiverseareasandprocessesofeverydaylifealsoincreasesthe riskofitsuseforcriminaloffensesandviolationsinavarietyofartinaconstitutionaldemocracy,theInternetmay not form a legal vacuum. The possibility of an individual assignment of Internet contacts for violations of some significanceisthereforelegitimateforthelegislature.Insofarasrelevantinformationfromserviceprovidersunderthe currenttechnicalconditionsunderwhichIPaddressesprimarilyfortheparticularsession("dynamic")areassigned to, telecommunications traffic data is analyzed, this raises no fundamental objections to thus. Nor can the legislaturetoensureareliableassignmentoftheseaddressesovertimetheprovisionofappropriatedataorprovide anextensiverecoursetotheextentdatakeptbytheserviceprovider.Ithasamarginofdiscretionhere.

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c)Accordingly,thelegislatureofsuchinformationindependentlyoflimitinglegalprotectionorcrimecatalogsforthe prosecutionofcriminaloffensesallowforthesecurityandtheperformanceofdutiesoftheintelligenceserviceson the basis of the general way Encroachment appropriations (see Bock, in: Geppert / Piepenbrock / contactor / Schuster,Beck'schercommentaryontheAct,3rdedition2006,113para7Graulich,in:.Arndt/Fetzer/Scherer, TelecommunicationsAct,2008,113para8)..Regardingtheactionlimits,however,ensurethatinformationcannot be obtained out of the blue, but only because a sufficient initial suspicion, or whether a specific threat to each individualcasebasedonfact.Therequirementofaneconomybasedonfactualevidenceintherealriskispaidfor theintelligenceservicesaswellasforalltorespondtothreatstopublicsafetyandorderauthorities.Thelegaland factualbasisoftheappropriaterequestsforinformationaretoberecorded.Ajudgemustbereservedincontrastto similarinformationnotbeprovided.

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The considerable weight of the intervention of such information allows not, however, these generally and unconditionallyacceptandtomonitororpreventanyoffenses.TheabolitionoftheanonymityoftheInternetrequires atleastalegalinterestaffected,bythelegalsystemisusuallyahighlightedimportanceisattached.Thisincludes informationrelevanttoprosecutionorpreventionofoffensesisnotcomplete.Itmust,however,totheextentandin somecasesparticularlyweightyoffensesactwhichthelegislaturemustexpresslydesignate.

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Also,thereisnoreasontotakebackfortheidentificationofIPaddressestheprincipleoftransparency(seeabove CV3).The interested party that can go into the control from using the Internet anonymously, has in principle the right to know when and why this anonymity has been lifted. Accordingly, the legislature has at least provide notificationobligationsasandwhenthusthepurposeoftheinformationwillnotbethwartedorotherwiseoverriding interestsofthirdpartiesortheindividualsthemselvestothecontrary.Asfaraswaiverofnoticeinaccordancewith appropriatestatutoryprovisionsofexception,thereasonistomakethisrecord.Requiresconfirmationofajudicial waiverofnoticeisnotincontrast.

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5thTheconstitutionallyrequired,ensuredatasecurity,andtheproportionalityrequirementsofasufficientstandard clear restrictions on data use is an integral part of the arrangement of the retention requirement and therefore the responsibility of the federal legislature that imposes the obligation. In contrast, the responsibility is directed to the creationofselfretrievalsystemsandforthedevelopmentofthetransparencyandlegalprotectionprovisionsofthe respectiveprofessionalcapacities.

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a) Except as shall be determined in connection with the obligation of service providers into a precautionary measureeventfreeretentionoftelecommunicationstrafficdataaboutdatasecurity,thisresponsibilityisanintegral component of the storage requirement and hereby legally connected, follow the federal government pursuant to Article 73 Paragraph 1 No. 7 GG . For this purpose, in addition to the regulations for security of stored data also include provisions for security of data transmission, and this is to ensure protection of the trust relationship (see aboveCV1andCV2e).

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The federal government also is responsible to ensure the constitutional requirements as appropriate, sufficiently precise limitation of the uses of the data that is tracked with the storage. The reason is this ineradicable in the constitutional context of data storage and use, as it is settled case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, are stored data must from the outset only to specific, domainspecific, accurate and standardized with clearly defined purposes,soastoensuresufficientalreadyinthestorage,thatthedatawillbeusedonlyforpurposesthatjustify the weight of data storage. A lock can not be justified as such abstract, but only insofar as it serves sufficiently weighty, specifically designated purposes (cf. BVerfGE 65, 1 <46>, 118, 168 <187 f> ). In contrast, it is inadmissible,regardlessofsuchpurposestocreateadatapoolofstorage,itsuseasneededandleavethepolitical discretionofthesubsequentdecisionofvariousgovernmentbodiesremains.Insuchacase,theconstitutionalityof storagemightlacksufficientlypredictableandlimitedpurposesatthetimeoflyinginthestoreprocedurenotyetbe assessed.Theirsignificanceforthecitizenwouldneitherpredictablenorlimitedinaccordancewiththeprincipleof proportionality. This material combination of storage and use of data as a critical link between engagement and justification must also in the interplay between federal and state governments are not broken. The competence to ensurethislinkagegrows,thefederalgovernmentunderArticle73paragraph1GGNo7offactualconnection(see aboveIIIC2).

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The restrictions to the federal government in connection with the storage arrangements accordingly be taken to determinethequalifyingconditionsforuseofthedataforthepurposeoflawenforcement,securityortheprevention of danger by the intelligence services is developed according to the above provisos. Here, too, the necessary arrangements are to maintain the fencing in the further use of the data, especially in the form of identification and loggingrequirements.

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b) In contrast, the federal government falls with the arrangement of the storage requirement and not simply the responsibilityaboutwhetherandtowhatextentcanbeusedeffectivelyonthedatawithinthelimitsspecifiedbyhim purpose. The adoption of rules that govern the retrieval of data itself is not fundamentally a federal matter, but depends on the general legislative powers. After that, the authorization will not be to retrieve the data based on Article 73 paragraph 1 GG No. 7, but is based on each of those skills to create standard, which governs the legislation for the use of data tracked tasks (see BVerfGE 113 , 348 <368>, 114, 371 <385> ). In the field of maritimesecurityandthetasksoftheintelligenceservices,theresponsibilitysowidelyamongcountries.Otherthan ensuringtheconstitutionallyrequiredlimitationoftheusesthatmustberegulatedunoactuwiththestorageforthe

dataprotectionlawsclampingofinterventionandjustification,andmayrequiremorethanjustrecallauthorizingthe protectionofotherconstitutionalrequirementsthatapplytotheuseofdatasuchasinparticularthearrangementsfor notificationofindividualsandtoensureeffectivelegalprotectionfollowinglegislativeactsofthecountrybeleft.The responsibilityfortheconstitutionalityoftheseregulationsrequirethatthesedirectitselftotheextent VI.

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Thechallengedprovisionsdonotmeettheserequirements.Although113aTKGdoesnotcontradictthatreason thebasicrighttoprotectionoftelecommunicationssecrecyunderArticle10paragraph1GG,becausetherangeof the storage requirement would be in accordance with 113a paragraph 1 to 7, 11 TKG disproportionately from the outset.However, the regulations are in line for data security, for the purposes and to ensure transparency of data use and for nonlegal constitutional requirements. So there is a lack of the proportionality principle for the correspondingdevelopmentofthesystemasawhole. 113a, 113b of the Act and 100g StPO, as far as this allows the retrieval under 113a TKG data to be stored are therefore compatible with Article 10 paragraph 1 GG doesnot.

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First113aTKGisunconstitutionalnotonlybecauseofitsreach.Thelegislaturemayassessarrangedwithhis duty of storage, which extends anlasslos in paragraphs 1 to 7 on nearly all the traffic data publicly available telecommunicationsservices,asformoreeffectivelawenforcementandriskprevention,appropriate,necessaryand proportionate in the narrower sense (see above C IV). Despite their reach is the regulation on the amount of data collectedherlimitedyetsufficient.Thecontentsoftelephoneconversations,faxesandemailsmayas113aTKG Section8clarifiesexplicitlystoredaslittleasthewebsiteorservicethatauserhascontactedtheInternet.Also,the legislature in accordance with 113a paragraph 1, 11 TKG six months and a subsequent deletion is determined thereon within one month of a constitutionally acceptable nor storage duration. Also at this time can not find that targetstheschemeinconjunctionwithotherprovisionstoamountsortocreateacomprehensivedatacollectionin generaltothewidestpossibleconstructabilityofanyactivitiesofcitizens.Significantextentthevalidityofthedata protectionlawotherwisewellpervadingprincipleofdataeconomyandnumerousdeletionobligationstopreventthe legislature to allow the emergence of preventable data collections are always investigated. Are important for assessingtheextentthisparticularinstance,11etseqTMG,whichbasicallyrequiretheserviceprovidertothe TelecommunicationsActdoesnoterasethedatarequiredforsettlement(see13par4No.2,15TMG)andthus preventing even in relation to private economic incentives that internet use is recorded in the general commercial contentanddatacollectionsthatwillbereconstructed.113aTKG,socannotbeunderstoodasanexpressionofa general public pension data for the purpose of law enforcement and risk prevention, but despite its size, a limited exception that tries the special challenges of modern telecommunications for law enforcement and security into account.

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SecondIncontrast,thereisalackofdatacollectionforsuchaconstitutionallyrequiredensuringaveryhighsafety standards. 113a Section 10 TKG statuiert respect only the undetermined constant duty, through technical and organizationalmeasurestoensurethataccesstothestoreddataispossibleonlyspeciallyauthorizedpersons,and otherwise refers only to the telecommunications sector in general due diligence. This lack of a provision that contributes to the particularly high demands on the security of comprehensive and meaningful data collection accordingto113aTKGbill.Thecauseforthereferenced88and109TKGensuresuchsafetystandardisnot particularlyhigh,butallowtheirwideapplicationinaccordancewith,avarietyofrelativities.Thisappliesinparticular to109oftheAct.Thus,under109para1TKGtomeetanyserviceproviderappropriatetechnicalmeasuresor other measures to protect the secrecy of telecommunications and the telecommunications and data processing systemsagainstunauthorizedaccess.Todeterminetheappropriatenessofuseismadeto109para2clause4of the Telecommunications Act (see Klesczewski in: Scker, Berlin's commentary on the Act, 2nd ed, 2009, 109 para12.).Afterthemeasuresareappropriatewhenthenecessarytechnicalandeconomicburdenisproportionateto the importance of protected rights. Based on the criteria developed above, thus the specific requirements for the protectionofstoredaccordingto113aTKGdataarenotsufficientlyguaranteed.Thelegallyprescribedstandardof "reasonabletechnicalprecautionsorothermeasures"requiredonlyto"consider"thestateoftechnicaldevelopment (see109para2sentence2TKGKlesczewskiin:Scker,Berlin'scommentaryontheTelecommunicationsAct,2 ed,2009,109para.13),andputsthesafetyrequirementsinindefinitepermanentmannerinthegeneraleconomic

considerations to the individual case. Moreover, the detailed specification of this standard is left to the individual telecommunications providers, which have to provide their services under the conditions of competition and cost pressures.

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Aspecificationoftheserequirementsisnotensuredintheformofordinancesorbythesupervisoryauthorities.In particular, 110 of the Telecommunications Act does not guarantee the validity of reasonable safety standards. Althoughinthecontextofthisstandardtobecreatedbysublegalregulations(see110,paragraph2and3ofthe Telecommunications Act) aspects of data security can be also detected. Primarily determined by technical objectives and standard in this regard neither content standards nor does it the aspect of data security but otherwiseitcontains.Incidentally,twoyearsafterentryintoforceofthestoragerequirementof113aTKG,oneof the new regulation takes account of adjustment telecommunications monitoring regulation does not occur. Accordingly,itisalsoinDecember2009inaccordancewith110para3sentence3oftheTelecommunications ActonthewebsiteoftheFederalNetworkAgencypublished(seeFederalNetworkAgency,OfficialJournal2009,p 4706)technicalguidelinesfortheimplementationoflegalmeasuresforthesurveillanceoftelecommunicationsand information requests for Traffic data (TRTKV) pursuant to 110 para 3 TKG take effect until one year after this adjustment(Index1<Regelungsbereich>TRTKV,PartB,TR1<Grundstzliches>TKV).

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Sufficientdatasecurityisensurednotto109para3oftheAct.Althoughthestandardrequiresthatoperatorsof telecommunications facilities to identify safety officer and to create a security policy must submit to the Federal NetworkAgency.Eventhen,theconceptwhenchangingtheunderlying"facts"toadaptandresubmit.However,so averyhighstandardofsafetyisnotguaranteedreliable.Thusdetected,thesystemoperatorrulealone,butnotthe entiretargetaudienceof113aTKG,whichalsoincludesotherserviceproviders.Inaddition,referringto109para 3 TKG material only to the requirements of 109 para insufficient 1 and 2 of the Act. It is also not guaranteed sufficiently clear standard form a continuous and controllable adjustment of security standards at the level of technologicaldevelopment.Isnotclearsofarwhether109para3sentence4oftheTelecommunicationsActalso requires an adjustment to the technical development of protective measures and to continue developing the legal safetystandards.Inanycase,thereisalackofcommitmenttothecontinuationofaperiodizedapproachtosecurity thatcouldallowaneffectivecontrolinthisregard.

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The lack of adequate safety standards in the Telecommunications Act 9 BDSG can also compensate in conjunction with the accompanying nonconditioning. Notwithstanding their sometimes abstract high standards remain the norm, which is anyway only secondarily applicable (cf. Fetzer, in: Arndt / Fetzer / Scherer, Telecommunications Act, 2008, before 91 para 10 Klesczewski in. Scker, Berlin to comment Telecommunications Act, 2nd ed, 2009, 91 para. 15), too general to draw together in a sufficiently specific and reliablewaytoensuretheveryhighsafetystandardsunder113aTKGdatatobestored.

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Overall,averyhighsafetystandardunder113aTKGforthedatatobestoredisnotguaranteedinabindingnorm andclearform.Neither the storage requirement, the expert of the respondents in the present process as the core elements of these instruments (separate storage, asymmetric encryption, foureyes principle combined with advanced methods of authentication for access to the keys, audit trail of access and deletion) set enforceable nor are they imposed other measures that ensure an equivalent level of safety. Also, there is a lack of a balanced systemofsanctions,theviolationofdatasecurityisnolessweighttoaviolationofthestoragedutiesitselfisthe finesforfailuretocomplywithstoragerequirementsconsiderablywiderthanthatforthebreachofdatasecurity(see 149paragraph2sentence1inconjunctionwith149para1No36and38TKG).Theconstitutionalrequirements forthesafetyofdatacollection,similartothatcreatedby113aTKGenoughapplicablerules,notso.

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ThirdTheprovisionsconcerningthetransmissionanduseofdatasufficientunder113bsentence1,sentence1 TKGnottheconstitutionalrequirements.

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a)incompatiblewiththedevelopedfromtheprincipleofproportionalitystandardsarethefirstregulationsontheuse ofdataforlawenforcement.

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aa) 113b sentence 1 No. 1 of the Telecommunications Act in connection with 100g StPO does not meet the verystrictconditionsunderwhichaloneisallowedunder113aTKGstoreddatabeused.Althoughthelegislature haswiththeserules,adifferentiatedandintheirinteractionaccordingtoArticle74Paragraph1No.1andArticle72 paragraph1GGmadefinalpurposeofthedatausedforlawenforcement.Thelegislaturemakesitfortheuseofthe data, however, meet similar requirements as previously for the collection of telecommunications traffic data were that the service provider must store in accordance with their operational and contractual requirements in a more limitedextent,andforindividualsthroughcontractspartiallyavoidableunder96oftheAct.Thisreflectsthevery serious surgery, which is a precaution in the eventfree data storage and systematic of 113a TKG, insufficient account.

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Already100gpara1sentence1No.1CodeofCriminalProceduredoesnotguaranteethatmaybegeneraland inspecificcasesonlyseriouscrimesrisetoacollectionofrelevantdata,butcanregardlessofanyfinalcatalog generallysufficemajorcriminaloffenses.Certainlyremains100gpara1sentence1No.2,sentence2StPOback behind the constitutional stipulations, regardless of their severity by any means of telecommunications offenses committedpursuanttoageneralconsiderationaspartofaproportionalitytestcansufficeasapossibletriggerofa dataquery.Withthissystem,thestoredunder113aTKGdataareofpracticaluseinrelationtoalloffenses.Their use thus loses in light of the ongoing importance of telecommunications in everyday life, their exceptional nature. Thelegislatureislimitedtonotmoreontheuseofthedatafortheprosecutionofseriouscrimes,butisthisallabout and thus also on the European law given objective data storage, which is also limited itself solely to the prosecutionofseriouscriminaloffenseswithouttheinclusionofriskpreventionfarout.Althoughuseofthesedata, especially for the prosecution of offenses committed by means of telecommunications be very useful, so that complicatetheelucidationoftheirlimitationinsomecasesmaypreventoreven.Itis,however,inthenatureofthe guaranteeofArticle10paragraph1GGandtherelatedrequirementsofproportionality,thatnoteverymeasurethat isusefulforlawenforcementandinsomecasesalsomayberequiredconstitutionallypermissible.Conversely, in consequence of this the relevant requirements of telecommunications in the area of lesser crimes are not being considered for legal vacuum: the information required under 113 para 1 of the TKG, the lawmakers even under theindirectuseofthestoredunder113aTKGtoeducateprovideforalloffenses(seeaboveCV4c).Similarly, thereby recourse according to 100g StPO remains on otherwise than in accordance with 113a TKG stored telecommunicationstrafficdatapossible.

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bb) is not the constitutional requirements 100g StPO continue to the extent that it permits in principle, a data retrieval without the knowledge of the person concerned ( 100g para 1 sentence 1 StPO). The constitutional requirements regarding the transparency of the data using a secret enable collection of data stored under 113a TKGonlyifitisplacedoncompellingreasonsrequiredbylawclosertoconcreteformandjudicially.

281
cc) The design of the notification requirement is not sufficient to fully comply with the above stipulations developed.However, the scope of the proposed notification requirements as such is subject to no constitutional objection.101para1,4and5,CodeofCriminalProcedureprovides,inaccordancewiththejurisprudenceofthe Federal Constitutional Court (see BVerfGE 109, 279 <363 ff> before) less stringent regulations, the principle of a subsequentnoticetotheaffectedconstitutionallyviableinbalancingbringinexceptionalindividualcasesconflicting predominant concerns. It is not objectionable so far in particular, that are to notify concerned, on which the data requestisnotrelated,accordingto101paragraph4,sentence4CodeofCriminalProcedureisnotineverycase, but only in accordance with an assessment. As part of this balance can and must be indirectly affected by the interestssufficientlyintoaccount.

282
Mayhaveinsufficientcontrast,therulesforjudicialreviewincaseswhereanotificationcanbeomitted.101para 6CodeofCriminalProcedureprovidesforjudicialreviewonlyforthepostponementofthenotificationpursuantto 101paragraph5StPObefore,butnotforthewaiverofanotificationpursuantto101para4ofCriminalProcedure. This reflects the high priority of alert for a transparent use of data stored under 113a TKG does not sufficiently account.Totheextentthatadatarequestisdirectlyrelatedtotrafficdataforaparticularperson,maybewaivedthe subsequentnotificationonlyafterajudicialreviewoftherelevantexemptionreasons.Atonesuchcontrolislacking inthosecasesshouldnotberequiredinthoseofanotificationpursuantto101paragraph4,sentence3Codeof

CriminalProcedurebecausethepredominantconcernsofanaffectedperson.

283
dd)Incontrast,judicialreviewofthedataretrievalanddatasharingisguaranteedeveninamannerconsistentwith constitutional requirements. The collection of the stored under 113a TKG data required under 100g para 2 sentence1,100bpara1sentence1StPO,theorderbythejudge.Thecourtorderauthorizingtheauthoritiesnotto adirectaccesstothedata,butrequirestheserviceprovider,it'sinanintermediatesteptofilteroutthestipulations ofthearrangementandtobetransmitted.Furthermore, there is according to 101 para 1, para 7 sentence 2 to 4 Code of Criminal Procedure, the possibility of having a judicial review of the legality of bringing the action. That theserulesensureeffectivelegalprotectionisnottotal,isnotapparent.

284
Not regulated sufficiently clear norm, however, the statutory provisions to the formal requirements of the court order. 100g Paragraph 2 in conjunction with 100b para 2 Code of Criminal Procedure regulates only minimum requirementsoftheoperativepartoftheremainder,thegeneraldutytogivereasonsappliestodecisionsunder34 StPO.Thelegislatureshouldconsideranewregulationonwhetheritwouldbehelpfultothestrictrequirementsfora statement of reasons for judicial orders (see BVerfGE103,142<151>,107, 299 <325>, 109, 279 <358 f> ) by to giveaspecialanddifferentiatedinstructionreprint.Inanycaseitmustbeensuredbylaw,thattheamountofdatato betransmittedintheorderinamannerconsistentwiththeproportionalityprincipleandsufficientlyselectiveforthe serviceproviderisclearlydescribed.

285
b)Thechallengedprovisionsdonotsatisfytheconstitutionalrequirementswithregardtoaccessingandusingthe storedunder113aTKGdataforsecurityandforthetasksofintelligenceservices.113bsentence1No.2and3 oftheTelecommunicationsActsatisfiestherequirementsofareasonablelimitalreadyusesitssystemtonot.The federallegislatureissatisfiedherewithasketchinjustgeneralizing,thetaskareasforwhichdataretrievalwillbe possible,withoutspecificallynamingtheuses.Heleavestheconcreteratherlaterlegislation,especiallylegislation by the states. He is his responsibility for the constitutionally required to limit the uses do not. If he orders the storageoftelecommunicationstrafficdata,itisuptohimatthesametime,thenecessaryconstitutionaljustification for their uses and intervention thresholds and to ensure the necessary followfencing provisions set binding. Such determinations do not contain 113b sentence 1 TKG. Rather, the obligation of service providers for preventive retention of all telecommunications traffic data and also the release of these data for use by the police and the intelligenceservicesundernearlytheentiretaskonecreatedforawiderangeandunlimitedusesopendatapool,on theonlybygrossobjectiveslimitedineachcaseonitssolediscretion,thelegislaturecanbeaccessedatboth federal and state governments can. The provision of such a settlement to end its open data pool picks up the necessaryconnectionbetweenstorageandstoragepurposesandisnotcompatiblewiththeConstitution(seeabove CV5a).

286
Cannotbecriticizedisincontrasttoin113bTKGnooverarchingrulesonnotificationrequirements,ortojudicial reviewincaseofusingthestoredunder113aTKGdataareincludedforpurposesofsecurityandtheperformance of duties by the intelligence services. While such regulations are constitutionally indispensable. The federal legislature could this with the retrieval of data related arrangements, as the particular design of the trade laws and leaveitwhereappropriate,throughstatelaws.

287
c)Thedevelopmentoftheuseofthestoreddataaccordingto113aTKGisalsodisproportionatetotheextentas isprovidedforthetransferofanyprotectionoftrustrelationships.Atleastforanarrowcircleofdependentspecial confidentialitytelecommunicationslinks,suchprotectionisnecessaryinprinciple(seeaboveCV2sattheend).

288
4thFinally, also satisfies 113b sentence 1, sentence 2 TKG, the indirect use of the stored under 113a TKG dataforinformationprovidedbytheserviceprovideraccordingto113Paragraph1providesfortheAct,notinall respectswiththerequirementsofproportionality.

289
After the abovedeveloped standards, it is subject, however, no constitutional objection that the legislature in 113b sentence 1, sentence 2 TKG information about the connection owner of certain of the authorities is already

knownIPaddressesarenotunderthemoststringentconditionsrequiredforadirectconsultationoftheaccordingto 113a TKG data must be considered. There can be no objection to the extent that, under 113b sentence 1, sentence 2 TKG in conjunction with 113 para 1 TKG such information without prior judicial authorization for the prosecutionofcrimesofallkindsandgenerallyallowedforthetasksofsecurityandintelligenceservicesare.Not quite clear, however, the regulation regarding the required action limits. In a constitutional interpretation, they can however understand the effect that refers 113 paragraph 1 TKG to the respective professional regulatory interventionprinciplesandtoaccessthedataatleastasufficientreasonablesuspicioninaccordancewith161, 163 Criminal Procedure Code or a real risk in terms of police general clauses requires (see Bock, in: Geppert / Piepenbrock/contactor/Schuster,Beck'schercommentaryontheAct,3rdedition2006,113para7Graulich,in:. Arndt / Fetzer / Scherer, Telecommunications Act, 2008, 113 para. 8). The intervention threshold of the real danger, the rule in a constitutional interpretation and requests for information for the intelligence services are removed.

290
Likewise, by way of constitutional interpretation can track any abuse of the provision to circumvent the 100g StPOaremet.113bsentence1clauseauthorizes2inconjunctionwith113para1TKGverfassungsgem em inunderstandingnottoopenpollingtheportauthoritiestoowners,thetelecommunicationslinksthatarenotknown. Instead, he allowed according to its justification in the laws which have been expressed towards goal only to individualinformation,theauthoritiespreviouslyknownIPaddresses(seeBundestagdocument16/6979,p.46).The legislature may consider necessary under the new rules, if he sees an opportunity to clarify this law. The unconstitutionalityof113bsentence1,sentence2inconjunctionwith113para1TKGisnotsofarobserved.

291
Underproportionalityconsiderationslargelyto113bsentence1,sentence2inconjunctionwith113para1TKG is to the extent that it can generally be sufficient for the prosecution of offenses such queries. Although the legislatureisbarredbytheabovestipulationsdonotalwaysdeveloped,suchinformationisparticularlyimportantin cases of misdemeanor laws in use (see above CV 4 c). However, this requires clear standards of special regulationsthatarepresentlylacking.Unconstitutional113bsentence1,sentence2inconjunctionwith113para 1 of the TKG also is the extent that there are no rules to notification of individuals. Pursuant to 113 para 1 sentence4TKG,thedebtormustprotectinformationtothoseaffectedsilence,andalsoprovideinformationfromthe requestingauthorityisnoguaranteenotification.Thismeetstheconstitutionalrequirementsforatransparentuseof datastoredunder113aTKGnot(seeaboveCV3a).

292
5thIn summary, neither the statutory requirements for data security or the requirements set forth for use of the dataaccordingto113bsentence1No.1oftheTelecommunicationsActinconnectionwith100gStPO113b sentence1No.2and3oftheActand113bsentence1,sentence2TKGtheconstitutionalrequirements.Thus,it lacksthesametimethestoragerequirementunder113aTKGitselftoaconstitutionallyplausiblejustification.The challengedprovisionsaregenerallynotcompatiblewithArticle10paragraph1GGhencecompatible. VII

293
Incontrast,thechallengedprovisionsregardingArticle12paragraph1GG,asfarastodecideinthisproceeding on this, subject to any constitutional concerns. The complainant 4) in the process 1BvR 256/08 is not covered by thechallengedprovisionsandthefinancialburdenassociatedwiththisviolatedtheirprofessionalfreedom.

294
FirstTheimpositionofretentionobligationsrelatingtothecomplainant,atleastinsofarastheyalsoownapublicly available anonymizing server operates is, however, an attack on their professional freedom dar. As a commercial provider of an anonymity service they can rely on the professional freedom under Article 12 paragraph 1 GG appointed.The regulation has objectively berufsregelnde trend. The storage requirements are addressed to those serviceprovidersthatprovidepubliclyavailabletelecommunicationsservicesusuallypaidforendusers(see113a, Section 1, 3 No. 24 TKG) and thus to service providers who offer services in any case typically for commercial purposes.

295

During the procedure, it is a profession regulation. This is regulated under 113a TKG storage and in 113b sentence 1, sentence 1 TKG a transfer duty representing himself as a technical stipulations for the provision of telecommunications services. Goes wrong, however, the argument that the duty of storage WOULD against anonymizingservicesasacareerchoicecontrol,becauseafinalanonymizationcouldnolongerbeoffered.Although regulationisnotacareerchoicebeconsideredonlyifaccessislimitedtoalegalcareer,butevenifthereasonable exercise of a profession is made virtually impossible (cf. BVerfGE 30, 292 <313> ). However, the storage requirement leads to 113a TKG, paragraph 6 does not mean that anonymization services generally can not be operated. The anonymizing services can continue to offer their users, without identifying possible to surf the IP addressthroughaprivateontheInternet.Theyenableuserstohaveastatic(andthereforeopen)IPaddresstohide their identity and protect other users from hackers or other illegal access. Repealed the anonymity only to the authorities,whileeventhenonlyifaccordingtothestrictconditionsfortheimmediateuseofthestoredunder113a TKGtrafficdata,adataretrievalisexceptionallypermitted.Thereforebeheldthatonlycustomerswhoseanonymity isagainsttheinterestinthesemostseriouscases,investigatingauthorities.Theofferofananonymisationservice doesnotbecomeatotalinvalid.

296
Second The reasoned by the imposition of storage obligations intervention is constitutionally justified. It is not unreasonableintermsoftechnicalcomplexityorintermsoftheassociatedfinancialburdens.

297
Interventions in the profession of freedom must be justified by sufficient reasons for the common good (cf. BVerfGE94,372<390>,101,331<347>,121,317<346>).Basicallysoundreasonsofpublicinterestsufficient(cf. BVerfGE7,377<405f>,16,286<297>,81,156<189>establishedcaselaw).Evenhere,therequirementsofthe principle of proportionality, that is, the intervention must be to achieve the engagement objectives appropriate, necessaryandproportionateinthenarrowersense.Theseconditionsarefulfilledhere.

298
a) The storage and transmission requirements to legitimize themselves in terms of invasion and occupation, the freedom from the goal of a more effective law enforcement, maritime security and the tasks of the intelligence services.Theyarebasedonreasonablegroundsthatthepublicinterest,fortheirpromotion,theyaresuitable.Aless intrusive regulation which is not as effective and economical for the public sector is evident. As the telecommunicationstrafficdatawillnotoccursincetheprivatizationofthetelecommunicationssectorinthestate, thisinturnisadirectstorageisnotinaposition.AtransferofalltheconnectiondatatotheStatesothatthestore carrieshimselfruled,becauseoftheassociatedrisksbothfortheprotectionoftelecommunicationssecrecyandfor thesecurityandintegrityofthedata.The necessity does not apply to damage to the profession by imposing cost burdensorcostlyobligationsnotonlybecausethefinancingwouldbethetaskinquestionfromtaxrevenuesforthe victimsofalessrestrictivemeans(seeBVerfGE81,156<193f>,109,64<86>).Lessrestrictivemeansarenot thosethatmerelyshiftacostburden(seeBVerfGE103,172<183f>,109,64<86>).

299
b)Theimpositionofthedutyofstorageseemstoaffectedserviceproviderstypicallyarenotoverlyburdensome.

300
aa) The storage requirement exceeds the limit of admissibility by the technical effort, which they demanded the service providers. Since moving to the relevant service provider in the telecommunications market, they have alreadyahighleveloftechnicalmasteryinthefieldoftelecommunicationsdatacollection,storageandprocessing have.About these capabilities must also small enterprises in this sector. Moreover, at least a majority of under 113a TKG data to be stored is already concerned by the telecommunication companies are temporarily stored for theirownpurposes.Demandingorganizationalrequirementstoensuredatasecurityarisenotonlyfromthestorage requirementof113aTKG,butnomatteralreadythesubjectoftheofferedservicesofthecompaniesconcerned. To that extent the imposition of specific obligations under 113a TKG not disproportionate in technical and organizationalexpertise.

301
bb)thestoragerequirementisdisproportionateandnotinrelationtothefinancialburdenthatthefirmderivesfrom the storage requirement of 113 of the Act and the obligations thereto Unbind sequence ends as ensuring data security.This is particularly unacceptable, not because private companies would thus entrusted with public duties permitted. A categorical distinction between "state functions" and "private duties" with the result of fundamental

inadmissibility of enslavement for public purposes by private individuals at their expense can not be found in the Constitution.Rather,thelegislaturehasbroaddiscretion,toensurethatdutiesofcommoninterests,hehasimposed ontheprivatecourseoftheirwork(seeBVerfGE109,64<85>).Basically,hecanloadandmeasurestosafeguard publicintereststhatareinneedofregulationasaresultofcommercialactivities,therelevantmarketactorsimpose inordertointegratetheassociatedcostsinthiswayinthemarketandthemarketprice.Thelegislatorisnotlimited to,aprivatecompanytobeinserviceonlyiftheirprofessionalactivitiesmayhaveanimmediateimpactintermsof directthreatsorhazardsthatareatfault.Rather,theextentsufficientenoughpropertyandresponsibilityofproximity betweentheprofessionandtheobligationimposed(cf.BVerfGE95,173<187>).

302
Then there are the storage requirement for the costs incurred burdens no fundamental objections. The legislature moved this way, the costs associated with the storage in accordance with the privatization of the telecommunications sector as a whole in the market. Just as the telecommunications company of the new opportunities to use telecommunications technology to make a profit, they must also assume the costs for the containment of the new security risks associated with telecommunications, and process them in their prices. Obligations imposed on companies are closely related to the services they provide and may even be provided as suchonlybythem.Alsoherearenotimposedonindividualserviceprovidersofferingspecialcasebycasebasis, but designed in a general form the framework for the provision of telecommunications services. It is therefore not constitutionallyobjectionableifthecompanieshavethisthenalsobearthecostsprinciple.Butthecommongoodso requires no specific objective to provide a cost for this replacement (cf. BVerfGE 30, 292 <311> ). A law that regulates the business activities in such a way that private individuals in the exercise of their professional obligationsimposedonitregularlyaffectsalargenumberofpeopleisnotalreadyconsidereddisproportionatewhen individuals affected unreasonably burdened, but only when it is at affects a larger group violated the principle of proportionality (cf. BVerfGE 30, 292 <316> ). Have that the cost burdens in this way, choking effects is not substantiatedraisedstillrecognizable.

303
Inthisrespect,toconsiderfurtherwhetherornotintermsofspecificgroupsofcases(cf.BVerfGE30,292<327> ) or special situations from the perspective of proportionality hardship cases are given. For each case arises from thistowhatthecomplainantto4)inMethod1BvR256/08no.Inparticular,ithasalsointermsofanonymityabout theservicesasufficientlyfromtheothertelecommunicationscompaniesexceedingpollutioneitherforthemselvesor forotherprovidersofthoseservicescoveredbyconcretenumberstounderstand.Onlyunderthisconditioncouldbe but found to exceed the legislative maneuver space for the enslavement of anonymizing services. As long as the assessment is made by the legislature only by conjecture and allegations in question, the Federal Constitutional Courtdoesnotexaminethisissue(seeBVerfGE114,196<248>).

304
Nofundamentalconcernsaboutpossibleremainingcostburdenisalsosubjecttothereportingobligationpursuant to113bsentence1No.1oftheTelecommunicationsActinconnectionwith100gStPO,forwhichthelegislature a compensation scheme has provided (see 23 para 1 Judicial Remuneration and Compensation Act). The envisagedcompensationclaimsarenotthesubjectoftheseproceedings. VIII

305
Alsoincidentallyarisefromthefundamentalrights,asfarastheviolationisallegedallowednolargerequirements inthechallengedprovisions. IX.

306
TheviolationofthefundamentalrighttoprotectionoftelecommunicationssecrecyunderArticle10paragraph1GG leadstothenullityof113aand113boftheTelecommunicationsActand100gpara1sentence1StPO,when such traffic data may be collected pursuant to 113a TKG. The challenged norms are therefore subject to ascertainmentexplaintheviolationoffundamentalrightsnullandvoid(cf.95para1sentence1and95para3 sentence 1 of the FCC). Accordingly, the interim result of the arrangement of 11 March 2008 and 28 To October 2008fromtheserviceprovidersinthecontextofrequestsforinformationcollectedforthetimebeingbutnotdeleted

immediatelytransmittedtotherequestingauthorities,butsavedtelecommunicationstrafficdata.Youmaynolonger besenttotherequestingentities.

307
Thedecisiononcostsisbasedon34apara2FCC.

308
The decision was taken unanimously in terms of European law issues, the formal constitutionality and the compatibilityoftheprecautionaryprincipletelecommunicationstrafficdatastoragewiththeConstitutionintheresult. Inassessingtheextentof113aand113boftheTelecommunicationsActasunconstitutional,itistheresultof7 1votesandintermsofothersubstantiveissues,sofarasappearsfromthedissentingvotes,adoptedby6:2votes.

309
That the regulations under 95 para 3 sentence 1 of the Federal Constitutional Court is to declare null and void andcontrarynotonlytotheConstitution,theSenatedecidedbya44vote.Accordingly,therulesarenotappliedto alimitedextentonaninterimbasison,butitremainsatthestatutorystandardresultoftheannulment.

Paper Gaier Churchyard Di HohmannDennhardt Eichberger Bryde Schluckebier

Masing en ingOpinionofJ dgeSchl ckebie 1BvR256/08 1BvR263/08 1BvR586/08

tothejudgmentoftheFirstSenateof2March2010

310
Icannotasaresultofthedecisionandinmanypartsofthegroundsoftheconsiderationsoutlinedbelowagree.

311
The retention of traffic data writes to the Senate the action of a particularly serious interference with the fundamentalrightunderArticle10GG.Inmyopinion,suchaprocedureisindeedattachspecialimportance:itturns out,however,comparedtocontentbasedsurveillanceofasignificantlylowerseverity(I.).Ithinkthecausedbythe storage of traffic data and the criminal procedural law access control intervention also in view of the legislators' objectives,notablytheEnlightenmentandofoffenseswhichareinsomecasesofconsiderableimportance,orvia telecommunicationscommitted,however,difficultaufklrbarareconstitutionallyinprinciplejustified.Theunderlying regulations are looking for I apprehend the proportionality test in the strict sense, a particular appropriateness and reasonableness test was essentially (see II). The only exceptions are the substantive requirements to ensure the securityofdatatobestoredandtransmittedintelecommunicationtrafficdata,totheextentIagreewiththemajority of the Senate, in any case take up again below. The legal consequence statement would be based on the assessmentofthemajorityoftheSenateoftheannulmentofthechallengedprovisionsinsight,tomymindwas,it should have been according to the Senate adopted interim measures until a new regulation for further deems applicable(seeIII.). I.

312
TheSenatemajorityseesthestorageoftrafficdataforaperiodofsixmonthsfromtheserviceprovidersisavery seriousviolationofthefundamentalrightunderArticle10paragraph1GG.Idonotagreewiththisweighting.

313
Thesecrecyoftelecommunicationsprotectsthecontentsandthecircumstancesofthecommunicationpriortoa notice b the public authorit (see BVerfGE 100, 313 <358>, 106, 28 <37>, 107, 299 <312 f> ). Write to the obligationofprivateserviceproviderstostore(113aTKG)interventionquality,becausetheproviders'auxiliariesof the state "were and this was therefore attributed to store wins, so for the evaluation of the intensity of the

intervention,thefactofparticularimportancethatbeforeapossibleaccessbythepublicauthorities,thetrafficdata exclusively in the sphere of private service providers remain. You are in the hands of the contractor to whom the servicesclaimParticipantsmeetbringsinanycontractofthiskindpresupposedbasictrust,thatwilltreatanyway, firstofoperationalandaccountingreasonsresultingdatastrictlyconfidentialandensuretheirprotection.Moreover, thepotentialforthestateoftheartadequatelevelofdatasecurityisguaranteed,absentthuseachobjectifiedbasis for the adoption of a eingriffsintensivierenden intimidation effect, or as the verdict put it "feeling of the constant being watched" and "vague threat". In addition, the recording is not secret, but because the law made known. Its subjectisnotthecontentoftelecommunications.Asfarasthetrafficdataallowlimitedconclusionsonsuchcontent orwouldallowthecreationofmotionpicturesandsocialprofiles,thisconcernsthequestionoftheproportionalityof therelevantregulationsaswellasaccesstoproportionalityrequirementsofthelawontheapplicationlevel.Bethat those in individual cases intrusive uses in existence according to weighty reasons, it does not justify them as exceptional cases, as they prove on the whole, attach decisive importance to the weighting of the store and this fullybeused.

314
TheSenatehasalready,initsjudgmentdated12thMarch2003(BVerfGE107,299<322>)forpublicationofcall datatelecommunications,whichreferredtotelephoneconversations,pointedoutthattheweightoftheintervention there by the call behind the back to stay in communication contentbased telephone surveillance, of course, but stillgreatbe.Althoughthepresentcaseisgiveninviewofthewidespreadimpactoftheretentionrequirementand forethought a special case design. However, it must in the weighting of the intervention maintained is still a noticeabledistancefromsuchaveryserioussurgery,suchasthoseintheacousticsurveillanceofprivatehomesor at the online search of information technology systems, but also in the content monitoring and evaluation of telecommunicationsthroughdirectaccessofstateorgansandwheretherealsounlikehereisparticularlyacute risk that the absolutely protected core area of private life is concerned. The collection of traffic data of all telecommunications contacts with the private party without notice by the public authority and subject to strict substantive requirements separately provided possibility of their regular way on the right application level by ordering judges reviewed and strictly limited query on procedural, backed measures such as those provided for the collection according to 100g StPO are based on the other hand from the perspective of the individual concernedbasicentitynotinthiswayoverweightencroachmentonfundamentalrightsthatwouldjustifythisrateas "very serious" and thus be classified as one of the gr tdenkbaren interference with fundamental rights. After an intervention is due to the storage of the private provider that can be characterized as very overweight. This differentiationwillwinhermoreimportancewhenassessingthereasonablenessofthechallengedprovisions. II

315
Thechallengedprovisionsofthedutyofstorageandcollectionoftrafficdataforlawenforcementpurposesare contrarytotheassessmentoftheSenatemajoritynotunreasonably,theyarethevictimsandthereforerelatively wellunreasonableinthestrictsense.

316
First The regulations satisfy the need for adequacy and reasonableness as sufficient discharge of the proportionalityprincipleintoaccount.BasedonanoverallbalancebetweentheseverityoftheprocedureinArticle10 paragraph 1 GG, and the weight of the reasons justifying it turns out that the legislature has maintained resulting fromthisbidlimits.

317
The principle of proportionality requires the strict sense that the severity is not the procedure for a total considerationmustbeoutofproportiontotheweightofitjustifiablereasons(cf.BVerfGE90,145<173>,92,277 <327>,109, 279 <349 ff>, 115, 320 <345> ).In the tension between the duty of the state for protection of legal rights and interests of individuals in protecting his guaranteed by the constitutional rights it is primarily the task of thelegislaturetoreachinanabstractwaytobalancetheconflictinginterests(seeBVerfGE109,279<350>,115, 320 <346> ). He is there what the approach, the Senate majority proceeds terminology an assessment and designfreedom.

318
Whenevaluatingtheconstitutionaladequacyoftheschemeisthestartingpointtoconsiderthatfundamentalrights

arenotexhaustedinittowardoffstateintervention.Poweroftheirobjectivelegaldimensionfollowsfromthemthe dutyofthestatetoprotectcitizensfromattacks.Thisdutytoprotectincludesthedutytotakeappropriatemeasures topreventtheviolationofproperty,iftheypossiblyexplaintoassignresponsibilityforthemandrestorepeacetothe law (cf. Jutta Limbach, AnwBl 2002, p 454). In this sense, is one of ensuring the protection of citizens and their fundamentalrightsandthefoundationsofthecommunityandpreventingcrimeatthesametimeastheawareness of the important conditions for peaceful coexistence and the carefree use of fundamental rights by the citizens. Effectiveinvestigationofcrimesandeffectivesecurityarethereforenotperseathreattothefreedomofcitizens, however,isnotpermittedwithoutmeasureorlimit.Theyareofferedundertheappropriateandreasonabletoprotect theuseoffundamentalrightsandprotectthelegalinterestsofindividuals.Thecitizenmustbeintherightstateto effectiveprotectionb thestatecanleavethesameastheprotectionagainstthestate(seeDiFabio,NJW2008, 421<422>).Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional Court of the state as composed of peace and order might be described,andheacknowledgedtobeguaranteedsecurityofitscitizensasaconstitutionalvalue,associatedwith othersinthesamerankandindispensable,becausetheinstitutionofthestatederivesalsoontheirjustification(cf. BVerfGE49,24<56f>,115,320<346>).

319
The balancing of conflicting interests by the legislator who has to create the legal basis for the investigation of crime and security, is to take into account that individuals are 'reasonable in its community orientation and community bondage some damage to the protection of legal rights and protection of fundamental rights of other citizens,butalsoserveasitsownprotection(cf.BVerfGE4,7<15>,33,303<334>,50,166<175>).Alsoinview ofthefactmustbegiventothelegislatureadesignspacefortheincumbentcompensation,inordertobothprotect the liberties of the subjects of fundamental rights, on the other hand, to create, but those legal framework, the effective protection of fundamental rights and legal interests of citizens against injury and the elucidation of punishablebyappropriateandreasonablemeansfacilitateeffective.

320
SecondThelegislaturehasthedutytosavethetelecommunicationtrafficdataforaperiodofsixmonths,theend useofcontrolandsurveycontrolinthecriminalproceedingsheheldconstitutionallyrightfuldesignframework.The outgoing of the challenged provisions impairment for those affected by the traffic data storage telecommunication subscribersinrespectofprotectedrightsandlegalprotectionisnotunfairandunreasonable,ontheoppositesideof the tofind balance is the legislative weight to the protection of the injured through criminal legal interests of individuals and the community and the corresponding risks defense in an age very farreaching expansion of electronic communication, which often leave little trace. It looks, in principle, the majority of the Senate so addressestheseconcerns,however,onlywhenconsideringthequestionoftheappropriatenessandnecessityofthe regulations, provides it, however, not explicitly to a reasonableness test, the affected interests really is "to each otherinarelationship."

321
a)thelegislaturewhenabstractbalancebetweentherightinquestionestatesandinterestsinthetensionbetween "freedomandsecurity"firstrightfuldesignspace(seeBVerfGE109,279<350>,115,320<346>)isdeterminedby the nature of the objects of regulation and the reality of the scheme should be fair, with marked. Therefore, the purpose and effectiveness of the regulations when assessing the appropriateness and reasonableness of taking in theview.

322
The legislature has fundamentally reformed the law on the revision of telecommunications surveillance and other undercover investigative measures and the implementation of Directive 2006/24/EC of the system of criminal procedure covert investigation methods. He has been based in a very careful way to be expert opinions, an extensive discussion of the law, but also advice on the prosecutorial and police practice (cf. Bill Bundestag document 16/5846, p.1). In parliamentary procedure is carried out an extensive consultation of experts (see the minutesofthe73rdand74thmeetingoftheLegalCommitteeoftheGermanBundestag,16thelectoralperiod,on19 and21September2007).Theaimwasalsotobeimplementedbythen,thislawoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt. The law was finally adopted by a very large majority (see plenary of the Bundestag, 16th electoral term, 124th meetingon9November2007,pp.13009(D),seealsothecontributionbyFederalJusticeMinisterBrigitteZypries, supra, plenary p 12 994 f). The legislature intended the new technological developments into account, as he to educate especially difficult determinable crime, transaction and economic crime as well as crimes committed by usingmoderncommunicationtechnologies(seeBillBundestagdocument16/5846,p.2),particularlythehasattached

to this issue in the regulations a big effect. It was further the stated goal, the irrefutable needs an effective, constitutional criminal justice system to take account of whose job it is to create within the bounds of justice and peacelaw.Thisobjective,thediscoverabilityofthefactsnecessarytoclarifyforwardprinciple(ibid.p.22).Here,the legislaturealsoassumedthatespeciallytelecommunicationstrafficdataduetothetechnicaldevelopmenttowards flatratesunlikeintherecentperiodthanjusttheconnectiondataofthephoneformanymonthswereavailable often either are not being saved or have been deleted again before may be a court order to disclose information obtained or even necessary for an application to information previously determined (ibid. p.27). It is also widely knownthateveninandthroughtheInternet,evencrimesarecommitted.Thesocialreality,includingtheexistence of crime constitutes, also here from the various divisions in the area of telecommunications. If the legislature responded to this, that is, in his opinion necessary, but only effectively possible if proper traffic data subject for a certain period of retention and storage of duty that he imposed on service providers, so this is not in principle inappropriate, and the basic entities, to the data it is unreasonable. Such care is familiar with the legal system in otherfields,suchaswithoutthisbeingdirectlycomparableinthefieldofpopulationreportingrequirementsorthe Provisionofsocalledaccountmasterdatabythebanks(cf.24cKWG,BVerfGE118,168).

323
Not that the approach adopted by the legislature is out of balance, some validation is also found in the Annual Report2008/2009theFederalNetworkAgency,whichidentifiesthetrendinthenumberofdifferentapproachesto voiceandotherdatacommunicationsinrecentyears.Thereportshowsimpressivelytheexorbitantratesofincrease in the number of connections, but especially in the power exchanged voice and data volumes. It shows that the communication behavior of people in recent years has fundamentally changed (cf. ibid about page 38 of the DSL lines,page50toencourageparticipationinthemobilenetworks,pp.53tovoicevolumeinthemobileandtherateof increaseintheflatratebilling,trafficvolumeonpage59forbroadbandconnections).

324
Under these circumstances, it may not be the legislature, in principle, failed to give attention to the purpose of protecting the legal interests of crime victims on the effectiveness of the to be provided by his agent and to the changingsituationevenbytheobligationofserviceprovidersintheirspherestoretrafficdataforacertainduration andreproachadjust.Thekeepingupofthestatebodieswithtechnologicaladvancescanalsobeseennotonlyas a meaningful complement the arsenal of crimedetection methods, which adds further effective conventional measuresofinvestigation,butisagainstthebackgroundofthedisplacementoftraditionalformsofcommunication toelectroniccommunications,includingthesubsequentdigitalprocessingandstoragetobeseen.Foreffectivelaw enforcement and security not only in relation to serious crime, but also for the investigation of crimes that are in somecasesofconsiderableimportance,orarecommittedbymeansoftelecommunications,butarewithoutaccess to traffic data difficult aufklrbar, the availability of traffic data for a period of six months is not objectionable assessment of the legislator is of great importance (cf. BVerfGE 115, 166 <192 et seq> , see also BVerfG, 1st ChamberoftheSecondCourtdecisionof22August20062BvR1345/03,NJW2007,351<355>).

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The Senate majority recognizes accordingly that the increased use of complicated electronic or digital means of communication and their penetration into almost all areas of life, the prosecution, as well as the security and advancedcommunicationtechniquesinthecommissionofvariouscrimesareincreasinglybeingusedandtherefor more effective and criminal actions contribute. They weighted the development but the proportionality test in the strictsenseisnotuptothenecessaryextentforIapprehend.

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b)TheSenatemajorityalsorestrictstheassessmentanddiscretionofthelegislaturetomeetonthefieldofcrime intelligenceandsecuritytoprotectthepeopleadequateandreasonableregulations,apracticalresultinthealmost complete. Thus it contributes to the constitutional requirement of judicial restraint ("judicial selfrestraint") to the conceptual decisions democratically elected legislature does not take sufficient account. It gives the legislature a legalsystemuntilthedetailsonthenatureofanactionguidethatitleavesnoroomforasignificantsolution,which thegiven,continuedrelationshipsdevelopedinthetelecommunicationssectorisjustinitsestimation.

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ThejudgmentisastorageperiodofsixmonthsthattherequiredbytheECDirectiveminimumastheupperlimit before lying down and possibly constitutional justification able to write to the legislature before control technology that the use of relevant regulations also include the access requirements have limited him to a catalog exploits

technologyincriminallawandincludesthepossibilityofusingthetrafficdataandtoeducatecommittedbymeans of telecommunication difficult inexplicable crimes and expands the notification obligations and the legal minimum requirementsinaparticularkindthenlefttothelegislaturenoappreciableroomleftforadesignintheirownpolitical responsibility.Heisessentiallylimitedtotheedgeofthecatalogforthecriminalproceedingsdemandslightlyadjust andchange.Hehastoimplementthejudgment,hedoesnotwanttodispensewithanewregulationtoCommunity law. This replaces the judgment in the practical result of the legislation to the Senate for the details of a constitutionallypermissibleonlyconsideredregulation.

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ThirdTheSenatemajorityurgesthatthelegislaturemustcreatewithinbothclarityofpurposeofuseoftheaccess requirementsandprocessassurancerequirements.Soshetakestothelegislaturethecontrolsystemwasableto workwithasystemofcomplementarylegalbases,asinotherareassofarremainedunopposed.Thus,theSenate constitutionallyaboutthesocalledaccountmasterdatadecisionisnotdisputedthatthedemandforthefulfillment of other regulated legal tasks may be required are described must recall the occasion and requirements but in a differentlaw(seeBVerfGE118,168<191>).Payeeinformationisdeemedinsufficient,theSenatehasbeenonthe other hand in the decision to socalled automatic number plate recognition, where the challenged law, however, madenostatementofpurposeandthereforeallpossibleuseswereincluded(seeBVerfGE120,378<409>).The situation here is different, however ( 113b TKG). It is therefore just the standard clarity and, if those legal requirements and stipulations that lead to the significant intensification of the procedure by retrieving the data, are regulatedinaspecificareaeachquiteindependentstandardterritorialstructure.Bothschemesareofcoursesubject possiblyalsointheirinteractiontheconstitutionalrequirementsandconstitutionalreview.Evenwhencompared to a national legislature of the federal legislature, the responsibility for the storage of traffic data carries the supplemental any Provincial regulation also satisfy the Constitution. A law enforcement deficit can not therefore arise.

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Accordingly,thereisnoreason,inadditiontothecriminalaccessstandardsof100gStPO,whichhasbeenwith theconstitutionalsymptomssometimesattacked,wouldbeextendedtothedetailedconditionsfortheuseoftraffic dataforsecuritypurposesandforpurposesoftheintelligenceservices.

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4thTheSenatebarredthelegislaturefinallytheavailabilityofalltrafficdatafortheinvestigationofcrimesthatare not designated in the current catalog of 100a paragraph 2 StPO, but in some cases are still of considerable importance,aswellassuchactsarecommittedbymeansoftelecommunications(100gpara1sentence1No.1 and2StPO).Heconsideredinsufficientbytheweightofeligibleoffenses,andiftheyarelegallyconsideredtobe difficultaufklrbartheirimportancefortheeffectiveinvestigationofcrimes.InthecaseofNo.1of100gpara1 sentence 1 StPO, the legislature is based on criteria set by the Senate in its judgment dated 12th March 2003 ( BVerfGE107,299<322>approved)forreleaseofconnectiondatatelecommunications.There, the Senate pointed outthatthatinterferenceisjustifiedonlyincrimes,whichattachesparticularweighttothelegislatureingeneraland in specific cases also have considerable importance, as a result of the damage and the degree of threat to the public.IdonotseethatthereisnotobjectedtobytheSenateactionlimitwouldbetheaccesstosocalledstock marketdataweightedfundamentallydifferent.Theproportionalitytestineachcaseresponsibleforthedesignofthe caseinquestion,orderingjudges,whoincludetheweightoftrafficaccessingthedataineachcaseinatradewith andtobelimitedbythewordingofhisorder.

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WithregardtothewillbymeansoftelecommunicationcommittedoffensesforwhichruledtheSenateaccessto thedatastoredunder113aTKGalsoknowtrafficdataisnotweightedenoughthatthelegislaturehereemanates fromawarenessconsiderabledifficulties.Thesecanalsoappearnexttothespecificweightoftheunsolvedindeed the retrieval of prepreserved traffic data as appropriate, especially when as here has endowed the legislature retrievalconditionswithastrictsubsidiarityclausegivingthemeasureisonlyallowediftheinvestigationofthefacts ortodeterminethewhereaboutsoftheaccusedinanyotherwaywouldbefutileandthecollectionofdataevenin somecasesinproportiontotheimportanceofthematteris(100gpara1sentence2StPO).

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Sinceitisforthelegislaturetoensureeffectivelawenforcementandtoprecludeanysignificantgapsinprotection, the state can not be denied, even on this side of particularly serious offenses in respect of at least more specific

weight of a damaged legal right to access to open to traffic data, because he believes in his estimation, the only way to rule out the emergence of de facto largely unprotected by the law and an extensive drainage of the Enlightenment.Examplestopointisfarabouttheoffenseofenactment(238para1No.2oftheCriminalCode, "cyber stalking"), where verification at a "word against another's constellation", but also to identify a previously unknownperpetrator,theTrafficdataareoftenthesoledeterminationapproach.Thepossibilityofaflyingstarthere leads further limited because it is not recognized as the email traffic, and ultimately dependent on the goodwill of serviceproviders.Thesameappliestothefactsofthethreat,butespeciallyintheareaoffraudontheInternet,are at the police crime statistics, as evidenced by the considerable number of cases in question. Considering finally come, other offenses ( 202a to 202c, spying and interception of data also see 269, 303a, 303b of the Penal Code, forgery of evidentiary documents, data manipulation, computer sabotage, 38 para 1 WpHG in conjunction with14para1No.1WpHG,socalledinsidertrading,38paragraph2inconjunctionwith39Paragraph1No. 1,20para1sentence1WpHG,Nos.13,unlawfulmarketmanipulation,86oftheCriminalCode,spreadingof propagandaofunconstitutionalorganizations).

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Although it seems inconceivable that the legislature one of these events provided for in the Senate takes up the requiredcatalogofseriouscrimes.Hewill,however,thelimitsofthereasonableprincipleofguiltcommittedcriminal threat,whichisabletojustifyit.Offenseswhichwerenotcommittedonacommercialortriggeranespeciallyhigh damageinindividualcases,maybehardlyincludedinsuchacatalog,asitappearsfortheSenate.Also,relianceon onlyoperationallyremaining"nonretaineddata"istheexplanation,lackhardlyabletomitigate.There are between providers experience shows large differences. Part are not held the data, some after just a few hours or days canceled. Even the investigative steps that lead to the application for a warrant and then prepare for such an application, and the decision on the application will often take longer to claim, as the traffic data available for operationalreasons,theserviceproviderare.

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5th The situation is similar with regard to the access threshold set by the Senate for security purposes. The Senateheldsufficientlyweightylegalinterests,toconsiderthetrafficdataasaccessibleandusable,wouldbetaken to avert a common danger is not at the same time for property of significant value, its conservation in the public interest, must involve. It seems incomprehensible to exclude significant property in this sense, they're also constitutionallyprotected(seeArticle14paragraph1GG).TheinclusionofthiswellisatleastSchutzgutsthennot unreasonable if the traffic data collection such as in 20m BKAG also a subordinate clause provides ("... otherwisedifficultorhopelessmuchwouldbe.').

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6thAs far as the Senate majority eventually extending the notification requirements in case of access to traffic datapostulatedandgenerallyforthecriminallawisnotonlyasocalledopenaccess,buta"priorrequiresthequery or transfer "taking place notification if protection is not contrary to the purpose of the inspection, leaving these requirements,thelegislativeapproachanddoessoatthediscretionofthelegislature.Theconceptofthelegislator was to the effect that all " undercover investigative measures to regulate, "which he has calculated explicitly the trafficdatacollection(BillBundestagdocument16/5846,p.2).Also100gStPOprovidesthattrafficdata(initially) "without the knowledge of the person concerned" shall be applicable. This also has a good reason. Because investigations are regularly marked by a considerable momentum and leading accelerated. Efforts, the process keeping and lawenforcement purposes does not necessarily timel are due to, first held in check. The legislature has accordingly made for traffic data collection a sophisticated system of notification (see 101, Section 1, paragraph4,sentence1,No.5,paragraph5StPO),whichrequiresnoadvancenotice.Inaddition,hehastoraise withthepermission,initiallywithoutknowledgeoftheaffectedtrafficdata,recognizablemadeaclassification,which datesbacktothefactthatusuallyhinderthepurposeoftheinvestigation,theNichtbekanntseinthewhereaboutsof thepersonconcernedortheneedtospeedupthefindingsofaprenotification.Thisisclearlynotunreasonable,the partyconcernedandreasonableresult,thelegislatureconstitutionallyatliberty. III.

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By the Senate were to annul the challenged provisions, although the legal consequence of the incompatibility statementcarriedbythemajority.However, it would also based on the constitutional assessment of the majority, drawingonapermanentjurisprudenceoftheFederalConstitutionalCourtnearbytoputthelegislatureadeadlinefor

new rules and the existing regulations in line with the stipulations of the Senate adopted interim measures to temporarilytoexplainfurtheritsapplication.BecausetheSenategrantsthelegislaturetheopportunitytoprovidea traffic data storage requirement for six months and to create in the judgment under those conditions the access rules,whichessentiallycorrespondtotherequirementsoftheinterimmeasures.Thestipulationsofthejudgmentare different from those in the interim measures primarily only by the fact that greater demands are placed on data securityandadditionalnotificationrequirementswillbedemanded.Thissuggeststhatthebalanceaccordingtothe common practice of the Federal Constitutional Court by an annulment originally foreseen and not to consider it mandatory to allow temporarily only access to data by service providers that are made operational or accounting reasonsstillexist.Sothenforthetimebeinguntilanewregulationforthesecurityandsignificantdeficienciesin the investigation of serious crimes also be taken into account and to get. On the grounds of the Senate adopted interim measures and considerations made there is referred. In addition, the service provider must suspend its provision for the implementation of the challenged regulation and restoring the old state, have been around in the caseofCommunitylawrequirednew,amendedthelawtocreatetheconditionsagainatconsiderableexpense. Schluckebier Di en ingOpinionofJ dgeEichbe ge 1BvR256/08 1BvR263/08 1BvR586/08 tothejudgmentoftheFirstSenateof2March2010

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I agree with the decision of the Senate majority in parts of the judgment and result in substantial reason not to elements.IagreeinprinciplethecriticismofthejudgeSchluckebierthereon,whoseopinionIamintheresultand reasoning in the predominantly connect. I can not therefore be limited below a brief summary of my views on fundamentalconsiderations:

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First Also, in my opinion, the legal arrangement of the storage of telecommunications traffic data is given its staffingandoveralllength,andtheirAnlasslosigkeittheconsiderabledurationofmandatorydataretentionaweighty procedure in Article 10 paragraph 1 GG. Since, the commitment to being saved on the traffic data and does not control the content of telecommunications operations, and because it is decentralized in the private service providers, associated with the storage operation is not the overriding emphasis by the Senate majority ascribes to himingeneral.ThefearoftheSenatemajoritybyintimidationeffectonthecommunicationbehaviorofthepeopleI hold in light of the legislative concept of data storage, which excludes free access of public authorities at the decentralized, private service providers stored traffic data and rigorous substantive and procedural hurdles in particular a substantial judicial authority for a data retrieval provides or supplement also, in my opinion to such statutoryrequirementnorisunfounded,atleastforempiricalevidence.

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The main loading effect for the subject of protection of Article 10 paragraph 1 GG, the proceeds from the dispositionofthedatastorageforitscitizensis,therefore,inmyopinionbecauseinthefirstplaceinthelateofthis largedatacollectionpotentialdangerduetoabusebytheserviceprovidersthemselvesbyunauthorizedthirdparties orbyanexcessiveuseoflawenforcementorpoliceauthorities.Againstthismustbetakencare.Therefore,Ifully agree with the position of Senate majority to the requirements for an advanced data backup, the service providers arebylawprescribe.Evenmostoftheotherproceduralsafeguardsfordatastorage,dataretrievalandthereuseof data (deletion and logging requirements, transparency and legal requirements), which holds the majority of the Senatewascalledfor,Iagreeinprinciple,althoughfallinginthejudgmentofTheSenatemajoritytothelegislature in this respect the stipulations in my estimation over long distances to small scale, and not sufficiently take into accountthediscretion,conferredbytheConstitutiontothelegislatureinthisregard.

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SecondUnliketheSenatemajorityandinaccordancewiththejudgeSchluckebierIamoftheopinionthatcomply with113a,113bTKGunderlyinglegislativeconceptofatieredlegislativeresponsibilityforstoringconfiguration and data retrieval on the principle of the Constitution is consistent. Within this conception reason 113b TKG not independent,thearrangementofdatastoredunder113aTKGbeyondencroachmentonArticle10paragraph1GG.

Therulecontainsratherofferedtheconstitutionallyintendedpurposeforthestorageoftrafficdata.Only in 113b sentence1oftheTelecommunicationsActprovidedotherstatutoryauthorizationforretrievaloftrafficdataleadsto arenewed,ontheimportanceofgoingbeyondpreviouslymadedatastorageprocedureinArticle10paragraph1GG. Inthisway,thefederallegislatorleaveswith113bTKGwithresponsibilityfortherelevantsubjectarealegislators of the federal or the state to him to decide by virtue of its constitutional and democratic legitimacy of rightful authority, whether and to what extent it for the purpose of law enforcement, security or access to the concerns of theintelligenceservicestothetelecommunicationstrafficdata.Here,therelevantlegislationhasofcoursetrueto themselvestheconstitutionallimitsofaproportionateaccesstotrafficdata.

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A constitutionally impermissible arrangement of a data collection is on indefinite storage for purposes not herein. The federal legislature has designated in 113b TKG along with the changes made in 113a TKG obligation for serviceproviderstostoredata,thepurposesforwhichthestoreddatamaybeused.Bythefederallegislature,the arrangementofdatastorageassumedresponsibilityforthefacttothedetrimentofcitizensestablishedriskpotential requires,however,alsoinmyopinionsofarIagreewiththepositionofSenatemajorityinthestartingpointtoin addition to the basic description of the purpose determining at least a minimum threshold of intervention, such as they described in 113b sentence 1 No. 1 Telecommunications Act in connection with the same time adopted 100gStPOSection1fortheprosecutionandtheconceptof"significantrisk"in113bsentence1No.2TKGfor security,butnotcomparablein113bsentence1no3TKGforthefulfillmentofthetasksofintelligenceservicesis provided. This would require the appropriate supplement. A detailed and final determination of the uses, as the Senate majority required by the federal legislature along with the arrangement of data storage, I think constitutionally,howevertobeunnecessary.

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Third Finally, and most of all, I can weigh the outcome of the Senate majority does not agree, as far as the provision under 100g StPO use the stored under 113a TKG data for purposes of law enforcement unconstitutional.This is due, first, that the Senate majority the very outset, the caused by the arrangement of the datastorageprocedureinArticle10paragraph1GGinmyopiniontoomuchweightandthelegitimateconcernsof the general public as well as individual citizens effective law enforcement and an effective security on the other hand too little importance attaches. It also respects the legislature in evaluating the competing interests and the developmentofthesystemrightfulscopeistoolow.ForthisIrefertothesplitofmycommentsinthedissenting opinionofJudgeSchluckebier.

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Theproportionalitytest,theSenatemajorityalsosuffersfromthefactthatinherconsiderationofthegreatestever engaging a comprehensive, ultimately starts a movement or social profile of the citizentargeted data retrieval. Herein may lie in fact, a procedure which is equivalent to that of a heavy weight in its access to the telecommunicationscontentofthecitizen.Thisviewcan,however,disregardsthefactthatalargenumberofdata queriesindividualevents,shortperiodsoftimeandthetelecommunicationslinksonlyoneorafewpeople(suchas telecommunicationslinkstoapersoninadayoronlyatacertainhour)haveastheirobjectto.Onesuchquerydata is shown only a slight, at least not with the access to communications content comparable weight intervention, despite the fact that it is answered in the comprehensive scale data collection. By the Senate majority sees ANY data retrieval is a very serious encroachment on Article 10 paragraph 1 GG, regardless of its actual extent in individual cases, and therefore the legislature generally constitutionally very high activation threshold holds for committed, she is, even if she denies this, in my opinion, also in contradiction to a score that similar data by the Senatewithoutobjection,maybeinterrogatedbytheauthorities,iftheyarenotstoredunder113aTKG,butbythe serviceproviderforoperationalreasons.

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Based on this, I can support, despite the different weighting in the base, the majority of the Senate to scale formulatedrequirementsforapermissibleuseoftrafficdataforreasonsofsecurityandintelligencepurposes(CV2 b and c) still, but not the requirements for the use of data for tracking offenses (CV and C VI 2 a 3 a aa). In that regard,Ithinkthatthelegislaturein100gStPOcreateddifferentiatedapproachtodatacollectionanduseoflaw enforcement to be constitutional. It is the responsibility of each individual case to decide on the admissibility of a data query appointed judge, the legitimate interests of those affected by Article 10 paragraph 1 GG, taking into accounttheweightofcarryingtheappliedtechniquesappropriateaccount,asthisnameforthecrimescommittedby meansoftelecommunicationsoffensesin100gsection1sentence2StPOexpresslyrequiredbylaw,willalso.

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4thEvenfromthestandpointofthemajorityoftheSenate,inmyopinionwouldbemerelytheunconstitutionalityof the challenged provisions, and determine in accordance with the interim measures adopted in this matter, at least thetimebetweendatacollectionandstorageofuptoarrangeforthecreationofaconstitutionalrevisionwas.With the seamless annulment of the provisions and the obligation to delete the findings on the basis of the interim measures traffic data takes the Senate majority disadvantages for law enforcement, especially the risk of non exclusion of hazards important conservation interest in buying, although a consultation which the interim in the arrangements meet the requirements formulated in the constitutional principle of holding and expecting a correspondinglegalregulationis.Suchasolutioncannotsupportme. Eichberger