To Explain Political Processes Author(s): Charles Tilly Reviewed work(s): Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 100, No.

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To Explain Political Processes1

CharlesTilly New SchoolforSocial Research

Analysts large-scale of politicalprocessesfrequently invokeinvariant models that featureself-contained and self-motivating social units.Few actual political processes conform such models.Revoto lutionsprovide an important example of such reasoningand of itspitfalls. Bettermodelsreston plausibleontologies, specify fields of variation for the phenomenain question, reconstruct causal sequences, and concentrate explanationon links withinthose sequences. Asked to explainparticular instances vigilante of violence,social moveor of ments, citizenship, wars,nationalism, transformation states,sociolfor ogistssearch almostinstinctively general,invariantmodels of those on to the phenomena whichtheycan assimilate cases at hand. Reflecting of whythedisintegration theSovietUnion and its Warsaw Pact allies so wonder:Into what surprised Westernanalysts,sociologists immediately of eventsshould theyhave put the Eastern generalcategory recurrent of nationalEuropeanexperience the 1980s?Does it belongto revolution, or ism,democratization, politicalmodernization, imperial disintegration, something quite different? Sociologists suppose that if theyhad recognized the category when the processbegan theywould have been able to predictits outcome. of S. N. Eisenstadt(1992, p. 21), forexample,places the breakdowns communist in "Are theserevoluregimes parallelwithotherrevolutions: tions'greatrevolutions'-theEnglishcivil war, the American,French, Russian, and Chineserevolutions-whichin manyways usheredin moand dernity createdthemodern politicalorder?Are theylikelyto leadaftera possiblyturbulent period of transition-to a relativelystable world of modernity, withliberalconstitutionalism some kind heralding of 'end of history'? do theytell us something the vicissitudes of Or and of fragilities modernity, even of democratic-constitutional regimes?" 1Correspondence be addressed Charles to for of Center Studies Social may Tilly, for New 64 NewYork Change, School Social Research, University NewYork, Place,
10003-4520.

.50 0002-9602/95/10006-0007$01

? 1995 TheUniversityChicago. rights All of reserved. by 1594 AJS Volume 100 Number6 (May 1995): 1594-1610

Symposium: Tilly Eisenstadtrepliesthat some part of each of these questionsis true. he The Eastern European transitions qualifyas revolutions, says, but unlike theirpredecessors theyset theirfaces against, ratherthan for, In Eisenstadtreinmodernity. theveryprocessofidentifying differences, forcesthe idea that a usefulmodel of revolution specifiessimilarities, invariant general processes.Therehejoins themajority other of analysts. As Eisenstadt does, moreover, sociologists usuallyassumethattheprocesses in question occur withinself-contained social units-societies, states, aggrieved populations, or somethingof the sort-in a selfthan conpropelledway. They assume coherent, durablemonadsrather identities. tingent, transitory connections amongsociallyconstructed We can hardly for blamethem it;we veterans taught themto do itin graduate school, because that is also what we learned to do in graduateschool years earlier. We learned and in turn taught a practice of this sort: social unit;(2) attribute (1) assume a coherent, durable,self-propelling a or generalcondition processto thatunit;(3) invokeor inventan invariant model of that condition process;(4) explain the behaviorof the unit or on the basis of its conformity thatinvariant to model. The mostegregious examplesofinvariant thinking appear in comparative-historical analyses where nations,states, or societiesserve as the Even methodological individualists folobjectsofcomparison. frequently low the same logic,albeiton a smallerscale. They modelthe necessary/ sufficient conditions underwhicha rationaldecisionmaker(or, in other versions,the followerof a unitaryvision, illusion,or impulse) would take stepsto createa state,starta war, rebel,secede, vote,join a social or movement, carryon some otherwell-defined politicalperformance. in Similarreasoning democappearsfrequently studiesofnationalism, ratization, disintegration empires,social movements, the of transformationsof states,wars, revolutions, other and large-scale politicalphenomena. In the case of nationalism, available theories range from to from primordialist constructivist, realistto subjectivist, a surprisbut ing proportion themclaim not to accountforthe variable degreesor of in but qualitiesof nationalism to place mostor all nationalisms the same box (for convenient see Anderson1991; Comaroff and Stern surveys, 1993; Connor 1987; Feschbach 1987; Gellner 1983; Haas 1986; Hobsbawm 1990; Kearney 1991; Lerner 1991; Lowi 1992; Lowy 1989; Segal of offers morepromis1988;Williams1989).The study social movements ing recenttrends,since a numberof scholars have taken to relating variationin the organization movements of to systematically differences and fluctuations political in structure opportunity (e.g., Duyvendak 1994; Giugniand Kriesi1990; Koopmans 1993; Kriesi1993;Tarrow 1993). Yet evenin thisarea muchtheorizing proceeded ifall social movements as has fellintojust two internally old homogeneous categories: and new (Cohen 1595

American Journal Sociology of 1985; Diani 1992; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Mayer 1991; Melucci 1985, 1989). In analysesof democratization stateformation, similarsimplificaand see tionsprevail(forsurveys, Alker1992;Barkeyand Parikh1991; Bratton 1989; Caporaso 1989; Dahl 1989; Diamond and Marks 1992; Di and Moore 1990; Hall and IkenPalma 1990; Gurr 1988; Gurr,Jaggers, berry1989; Held 1987; Kirbyand Ward 1991; Krasner1984; Lee 1988; Mann 1990; Mitchell1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Poggi 1990; Rueschemeyer, Stephens,and Stephens1992; Schmitter Karl 1991). and the Most and Starrhave longsinceoffered same kindofcomplaint about studiesof war (1983; see also Levy 1989; Starr1994). In short, invariant modelsconcerning self-motivating social unitscontinue windlike honto the eysuckle through studyof large-scale politicalprocesses. If it is examinedclosely,the standardpracticemakes littlesense. Coherent,durable, self-propelling social units-monads-occupy a great deal of politicaltheory but none of politicalreality.Ostensiblegeneral such as revolution, or conditions nationalism, war always turnout to fall not at a singlepointbut to stretch along a whole range of positionson some intersecting of continua.The employment invariant of set models, assumes a politicalworld in which whole structures and furthermore, timeafter timein essentially same form. the sequencesrepeatthemselves That would be a convenient worldfortheorists, it does not exist. but Althoughthe assumptionof sharplybounded, self-motivating social unitsdeservesequal criticism, WilliamH. Sewell, Jr. (1992), Margaret Somers(1992), Harrison have recently criticized White(1992),and others monadic thinking effectively so that-however much I disagree with some of theirproposedremedies-I have littleto add to theircritiques. Let me therefore concentrate hereon theassumption invariant of conditionsand processes.The generalstructure runslike this: 1. All A's have characteristics Y, and Z. X, 2. CaseotisanA. X, 3. Therefore has characteristics Y, and Z. ox " A can translateas "revolution, "nationalism,""war," or something sufficient else, while X, Y, and Z can constitute necessaryconditions, or conditions, standardsequences,correlates, consequences.A statement in thisform can easilyreduceto a definition, merely affirming there that existsa set of instancessharingproperties Y, and Z. The statement X, need notreduceto a definition, can however,sincetheargument readily or linksamongtheelements. incorporate causal, sequential, transactional The argument does not assertthatall instancesofA are identical,but it themofffromall does assertthattheyshare essentialproperties setting cases ofnon-A;thoseessential markany suchmodelas invariuniversals 1596

Tilly Symposium: throughempirical ant. Analystsoftenarrive at this sort of argument of for comparison cases ox,f, F, and so on, searching the cases' common properties thatqualifythemall as A's. In thedomainof large-scalepoliso tics, at least, such reasoning badly describeswhat actuallyoccurs as to hindersociologicalanalysis. "Invariant" does not equal "general." Laws concerningvariation sometimes covera verygeneralrange.For an example,considerBoyle's gas law: at a giventemperature pressure a certain the of mass ofconfined varies inversely withits volume. Although have no well-established we broad and sociologicallaws with the elegance of Boyle's formulation, robust empirical generalizations concerning variation-for example,that overlargepopulations declinesas literacy rises-abound infant mortality in different of realmsof social life. I am not challenging possibility the more explicitly causal laws of extremely generalscope, just so long as the theystipulatevariation.I am insteadchallenging common,if often implicit, claim foressential,invariant universals. in Such claims appear frequently macrosociology. Take the case of revolutions helpful (for reviews,see Berejikian1992; Boswell 1989; DeFronzo 1991; Dunn 1989; Goodwinand Skocpol 1989; Hobsbawm 1986; Keddie 1992; Kimmel 1990; Knight 1992; Outram 1992; Rice 1990; Schutzand Slater 1990; Taylor 1984; Wickham-Crowley 1991; Zimmerman 1983). Generations scholarshave pursuedthe chimeraof an inof Fixationon invariant modelsgives variantgeneralmodel of revolution. we riseto a commonbut logically peculiarsociological performance may a of call "improving model."It consists (1) outlining widelyaccepted the an model of phenomenon (2) identifying instanceof A thatfailsto fit A, the the model in one or moreways, (3) modifying model so thatit now accommodatesthe previously exceptionalinstanceas well as those inthe stancesthatalreadybelongedto itsdomain.Most often crucialmodificationrespecifies conditionpostulatedas necessaryin the model's a the previousversion.Thus improving model expandsthe claimed scope The procedure peculiarbothbecause it makes oftheallegedinvariance. is whatever implausible allegations invarianceand because it attenuates of modelattained.Yet as a reviewer profesfor empirical grasptheprevious sionaljournalsI read a half-dozen drafts each yearthatfollowjust such reasoning. Similarreasoningmotivates whole books. When Farideh Farhi comthat began in 1979, for pares the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions sets up the analysis as an extensionof Theda example, she explicitly Skocpol's States and Social Revolutionson the groundsthat Skocpol's to the book is "perhapsthe mostcomprehensive attempt bringtogether of new concerns about theroleofthestate,thestructure peasantcommuin and theroleofinternational factors understanding processes the nities, 1597

American Journal Sociology of and outcomesof revolutions" (Farhi 1990, p. 5). Her methodological is declarationruns this way: "The essence of comparativehistory to maintain particularity each case whileaccepting the of thateach particularity shaped by generalforces is operating thesocietalor global level. at Accordingly, intention to expose theseforcesas theyimpingeon the is in quite specific and unique circumstances the hope of sheddinglighton in as historicalspecificities well as the changingstructures the larger world-historical context thatmake contemporary revolutions utterly not unlike 'classic' revolutions but also not totallysimilarto them"(Farhi 1990, p. 2). Thus all revolutions share attributes Y, and Z, even if X, with respectto a great many otherattributes; effective an theydiffer of withenumeration particof analysiscombines specification universals ulars. True to the challenge,Farhi works with a checklistdrawn directly fromSkocpol: conditionsfavoringclass coalitionsagainst the regime, the of circumstances promoting mobilization thosecoalitionsforrevolutionary action,factors makingthe statevulnerableto attack,and so on. Almostinexorably, thisleads her to proposeone-for-one substitutes for the the factors Skocpol emphasized-for example,Farhi offers connectfor edness and proximity power of capital citiesas a substitute Skocto of seeks to build a bridge pol's solidarity peasant villages. She finally from Skocpol'smodelto herown by (a) showinghow theworlddevelopsincethetimesofSkocpol's mentofcapitalism alteredclass structures has more importance ideology,including to revolutions and (b) attributing religious belief,than Skocpol was readyto concedein 1979. Such an analysis aims to generalizeSkocpol's model ratherthan to from principles variation.But it missesthemark:thecollapsof extract it ing agrarianbureaucracy overburdened international by pressuresand the autonomouspeasant communities aligned against theirlandlordsof keystones Skocpol'stheory-disappearfrom view, withtheirreplaceof mentsin Farhi's analysisby no meansmembers the same causal categories.Thus Farhi draws usefulquestionsfromSkocpol, but in pursuit to of thosequestionstacitly abandons the effort generalizean invariant modelof revolution. Indeed, she has no choice;the model will not, canthatfar. not, generalize Another recent examplemarkseven moreprecisely blindalleyinto the whichthe quest forinvariantmodelshas led analystsof revolution. In on theirexcellent compilation ThirdWorldrevolutions, Jack Goldstone, an Ted Gurr,and FarrokhMoshiri(1991) offer "analyticalframework" the that continues quest forinvariance.En route,however,theymake two turnsthat send them in preciselythe opposite direction,toward broad and incessantvariation. In his theoretical introduction, Goldstone singlesout a trioofrecurrent 1598

Symposium: Tilly causes forrevolution: "Decliningstateresources relativeto expensesand theresources adversaries, of increasing elitealienationand disunity, and growingpopular grievancesand autonomy"(Goldstoneet al. 1991, p. 49). The list echoes Goldstone's Revolutionand Rebellion in the Early Modern World,publishedthesame yearas theeditedvolume,but written over many previousyears. In that book, Goldstonegives a strong toneof breakdownto his mostdramaticstatements: The causesofrevolutions majorrebellions in and operate waysthatseem remarkably similar theforces buildup to causeearthquakes. to that That is,intheyears before a revolution major such or rebellion, socialpressures socialand political for for build.Yet theexisting structures some change time resist and change (even though pressures deformations be visible). may some response the mounting Suddenly, however, to pressure-a state a which bankruptcy,regional rebellion-occurs weakens thatresistance (likea block breaking along fault). that off the At point, there a sudden is release thepent-up of forces a crumblingtheoldsocialstructures-a and of revolution majorrebellion. or Moreconcretely, Scotsand Irishrebelthe lionsin Great Britain 1637-1641, thestate in and bankruptcy calling and in in oftheEstates General France 1789, were themselves to responses the in mounting socialandfiscal pressures those societies. these Yet particular events also servedto unleash greater far socialpressures, whichoverwhelmed these states led to revolutions. and (Goldstone 1991,p. 35) Note severalfeatures thisstatement: emphasison sudden collapse of its in response long-term to change,its claimsto generality, insistence its on uniformity rather than variation. In his first to contribution Revolutions theLate Twentieth of Century, in claimscontinuity theseterms: myworkon earlymodern "In Goldstone revolutions, identify I threeconditions whose conjunctionled to state breakdown: fiscaldistress, elitealienation and conflict, a highpotenand tial formobilization thepopulace. Although particular of the forcesthat in createtheseconditions may be quite different contemporary societies than in earlierones, I believe these conditionsremain centralto the of crises"(Goldstone1991,pp. 37-38). Leapdevelopment revolutionary ing nimbly past the problemof specifying how an observer would know in advance of a revolution's actual occurrence when the threebundles of causes were approachingcriticalmass, Goldstoneimmediately concedes that these conditions"may be produced by a varietyof forces, in and with the institutions structures dependingon how theyinteract that powerful particularsocieties"(p. 49). Populationpressure, propelRevolutionand Rebellion, now lant of state breakdownin Goldstone's fizzlesto a forcethat "may have eitherpositive or negative impact" (Goldstoneet al. 1991, p. 40). state Goldstoneet al. also proposethreegeneralstagesof revolution: at These stages, for crisis,the struggle power, efforts reconstruction. 1599

American Journal Sociology of from however,constitute verifiable no theory; theyfollowtautologically as of thebook'sdefinition revolution "theforcible of overthrow a governby mentfollowed thereconsolidation authority new groups,ruling by of (Goldstoneet through new political(and sometimes social) institutions" al. 1991, p. 37). At the end of the first turn,then,our voyagershave littlemorebaggagethanthe explication a definition. of that revoThen theyarriveat thesecondturn:a recognition post-1945 lutions occur in quite different ways fromtheirpredecessorsbecause dominant and international intervention geopolitical settings, ideologies, have changedfundamentally. Indeed,thecases theyconsider-Vietnam, the Cambodia, ZimNicaragua,Iran, Poland, Afghanistan, Philippines, different patbabwe, South Africa,and Palestine-amply demonstrate of ternsfromthe greatrevolutions England, France, Russia, or China. "We thinknow that a state crisisshould not be definedas a specific in as numbers but objectivecondition rather a situation whichsignificant authorities acting are ofelitesand populargroupsbelievethatthecentral in ways that are fundamentally ineffective, immoral,or unjust" (Goldstoneet al. 1991, pp. 330-31). Thus one of the threegeneralconditions (relativedecline of state resources)collapses into the other two (elite while injustice,previously invisible, alienationand popular grievances) squeezes its way into the argument. thistime,the initialpromiseof By an invariant searchfor generalmodelhas vanished.Justas theonce-hot of crisp predictors earthquakeshas given way to more generaldebate of about the variableoperation plate tectonics (Actonand Gordon 1994; and McConnell 1994),thesearchforunique,invariant Girdler properties ofrevolution ceded to theconception a variablefieldwithin has of which revolutions occur. I have not chosen my example because I thinkGoldstoneet al. are obtuseor empirically mistaken. thecontrary, have drawncorrect On they conclusionsfromtheirevidence: the conditionsfor revolutionare not to but and periodto period.The condiuniform, varyfrom region region tions vary as politicsin generalvaries. Because withina given region and periodmanystatessharepoliticalarrangements, nationaland interappear in theexpenational,roughsimilarities explicablevariations and riencesof connected stateswithrevolution. The searchforcomparisons while the attemptto close at hand therefore advances understanding, is build transhistorical models of revolution doomed to eternalfailure. to the et Goldstone al. onlyerrin refusing recognize generalimplications formethodand theory theirown compelling of analyses. Similarconditions nationalprevailin the studyof social movements, of and ism, democratization, a wide variety otherpoliticalphenomena, as well as in thezones oforganizational behavior,crime,or urbanstructure.Over and oversociologists assumecoherent, durable,self-propelling 1600

Symposium: Tilly social units,attribute generalconditions processesto thoseunits,inor or voke or inventinvariant modelsof the relevantconditions processes, to then explain the unit's behavioron the basis of its conformity that invariant model. It is timeto expungethatintellectual procedure. I am makingno plea forhistorical muchless forepisteparticularism, I mologicalrelativism postmodern or linguisticism.am arguing thatregularities politicallifeare verybroad, indeedtranshistorical, do not in but of structures processesat a largescale. and operatein theform recurrent They consistof recurrent causes which in different circumstances and sequences compound into highlyvariable but nonethelessexplicable effects. have imaginedtheywere dealing with Studentsof revolution phenomenalike ocean tides,whose regularities theycould deduce from sufficient knowledgeof celestialmotion,when theywere actuallyconfronting phenomena like greatfloods, equally coherent occurrences from a causal perspective, variable in structure, but enormously sequence, and consequencesas a function terrain, of built previousprecipitation, environment, humanresponse. and For hydrologists, flood is a wave of water that passes througha a share of the water basin; a severefloodis one in which a considerable For the overflows basin'sperimeter. ourpurposes, equationshydrolothe gistsuse to compute waterflowin floods have three revealing characteristics:theyreducefloodsto special cases ofwaterflowwithin basins rather thanmakingthemsui generis, their results dependheavilyon thehydrolof of ogist'sdelineation thebasin,whileestimation theflood'sparameters requiresextensive empiricalknowledge thatbasin. Yet the equations of the fluidsin embodyverygeneralprinciples, physicsof incompressible open channels(Bras 1990, pp. 478-82). of Note severalimplications the analogy. First,everyinstanceof the from or phenomenon-flood revolution-differs everyotherone; thetest of a good theory therefore so muchto identify is not similarities among instances to accountsystematically parsimoniously their as and for variation. Second, in different and sequences, combinations, circumstances, thesame causes thatproducefloods revolutions producea number or also of adjacent phenomena:smoothly riversand stagnantswamps flowing on the one side, coups d'etat and guerrilla warfareon the other.Third, influence how the relevantprocesses time,place, and sequence strongly character.Fiunfold;in thatsense, theyhave an inescapablyhistorical of nally,the eventsin questionare farfromself-motivating experiences of self-contained structures; are local manifestations fluxes they extending farbeyondtheir own perimeters. Floods and revolutions have no natural boundaries;observersdraw lines around them for theirown analytic convenience. theseregards, In a theyresemble numberof othercomplex but lawfulphenomena: traffic labor marjams, earthquakes, segmented 1601

American Journal Sociology of kets,forest fires, manymore.I suppose,indeed,thatmostinteresting and social phenomenahave exactlythesecharacteristics. Arthur How, then, should we search forthe causes of revolutions? has long since describedone versionof the explanatory Stinchcombe program:to identify deep causal analogies across detailed featuresof ostensibly different historical sequences. (The cause of event X is the minimum of antecedents set that [1] actuallyoccurred,[2] is generally sufficient produceeventsof typeX, and [3] withoutwhichX would to in not have occurred thissetting.) for are that of Concepts thethings capture aspects thefacts a theory; they are thelexicon thatthegrammar theory of turns intogeneral sentences The argument that power fruitfulness is the and abouttheworld. ofthose is and exactness thelexicon of sentences determined the realism by of The and of concepts, notbythetheoretical grammar. problem eliminating of is not false sentences research, traditional the by problem epistemology, as problematic theproblem having as of sentences to interesting enough is be worth or And or accepting rejecting. this determined whether not by that and ourconcepts those of into capture aspects reality enter powerful fruitful causalsentences. (Stinchcombe p. 115) 1978, For thispurpose,Stinchcombe recommends ignoring "epochal theothe ries"invokedby a Trotsky a Tocquevillein favorofthecausal reasonor That meansbreakingbywhichthesethinkers chaintogether narratives. ing down big eventsinto causally connectedsequences of events, and each linkin thechain.More generally, Stinchcombe advocates examining a a shift attention of from priori towardrigorous examiaway theorizing nationand reduction analogies,step by step withincausal sequences of muchof the (Stinchcombe 1978,p. 28). At thatlevel, says Stinchcombe, and a Tocqueville dissolves. betweena Trotsky apparentdisagreement Great historical analystsemployfar more similarcausal accounts than theircompeting epochal pronouncements suggest. Stinchcombe stressesepistemology, conditionsfor the generation of the knowledge.I am stressing ontology, natureof that which is to be known.But our programs dovetail.If the social worldactuallyfellinto structures processes,thenepochal theories, and invarineatlyrecurrent ant models,and thetesting deductivehypotheses would becomemore of means of generating and effective parsimonious knowledge.Because the social world does not conform that prescription, need otherproto we and epistemological gramson both ontological grounds.Our programs in in embeddedsearchfordeep causes operating converge thehistorically and variable combinations, circumstances, sequenceswithconsequently variableoutcomes.Most of theworktherefore concerns the identifinot and but cationofsimilarities overwholestructures processes theexplanationof variability and amongrelatedstructures processes.In studiesof 1602

Symposium: Tilly revolution, work entailsexplaining the why and how different sortsof varietiesof forcibleseizures of power social settings produce different over states. There is hope. Not everyonewho analyzes revolutions and related phenomena resorts invariant to models.In a wide-ranging writsynthesis a tenbefore SovietUnioncollapsed,David Laitin sketched promising the of nationalelitesto break theory variationin the readinessof different withMoscow. It arguedin part that that for between national the thehistorical dimension accounts distinctions in movementstheSoviet Union basedupona single is variable-the degree in to which elites theperipheral nationalities received most-favored-lord in data status Russia.The historical showthatin theterritories of west most-favored-lord was readily status evenwhenthere Moscow, granted, were indigenous no lords. Lordsin theTurkic areaswereoften elite given privileges, they but werenotgivenaccessto positions highstatus of by right. intermediate likeGeorgia Estonia, In cases and elitemobility was but Certain follow from (1) in the this: possible circumscribed. predictions most-favored-lord there regions wouldbe powerful symbolic unity among as titulars fullindependence a waning resolve theconflict for but of of elites interest among branches thetitular two of to begins manifest itself; and(2)inthenon-most-favoredregions, pressure independence the lord for there wouldcomemoreslowly wouldbe unity (butoncesetin motion, settled among titular the with to elites, only minority populations seeking
slow the processdown). (Laitin 1991, p. 157)

Laitin simplifies workby grouping his intotwo categories, Sovietregions but he clearlyinvokesa continuous of principle variation.He does not, accountoftheprocessbywhichtheSoviet obviously, providea complete Union collapsed, or by which any particularstate emergedfromthe he a candidateforone of the collapse. On thecontrary, offers promising constructed causal account would many generalprinciplesa properly invoke. By his rationalchoice analysis of conditionsfor secession,Michael Hechter avenue. Hechter from opensanother arguesthatsecession results the intersection fourpartlyindependent of processes:(1) creationof refor of gions,(2) mobilization collectiveaction,(3) development support forsecessionist programs, acceptanceof independence the previ(4) by state(Hechter1992,p. 269). In each case Hechteridentiouslydominant fies conditionsaffecting extentof two factors:shared or imposed the in interest actingto facilitate secessionand the capacityto do so. Under the headingof supportforsecession,forexample, he proposes(a) low and (b) perception the host of regionaldependenceon the hosteconomy of state'sweaknessas major promoters interest and capacity. ratherthan of seHechteremploysa model of logical concatenation he quence or politicalprocesses;exceptin the sense of logical necessity, 1603

American Journal Sociology of neither offers propositions concerning interaction his fourprocesses the of nor postulates dynamic whichidentities, a in connections, interests, and of or capacitiesalteras a function struggle accommodation. Withinthe standard a priori limits of rational choice analysis, nevertheless, Hechter'sdiscussiondoes providea framework that lends itselfto the civil war, and reanalysisof choicemakingin territorial segmentation, gionallybased revolution(Berejikian 1992; Connor 1987; Gurr 1993; Licklider1993; Lustick 1993; Strang1990, 1991). By depicting secession as a highly contingent outcomeofinteracting politicalprocesses, Hechter breakssharply withinvariant models. In an inquirythat deals moreexplicitly with structure and sequence than Hechter'sdoes, Peter Bearman (1993) looks closely at changing in relations among gentry Norfolk, England, duringthe century before the Civil War, which began in 1640. Using the formaltechniquesof network analysis,Bearmanshowsthata kinship-based regional structure of power gave way to one based much more heavilyon patron-client chains connecting local actorsto nationalcentersof power, that gentry clustered experiencing blockedor downwardmobility together disproporin relitionately patron-client networks forming distinctive, antiregime became gious identities, and that these shared identities-cum-networks major bases of political mobilization(Bearman 1993; Bearman and Deane 1992). At no pointdoes Bearman suggestthat blocked mobility, or he factors analyzesgenerally patron-client networks, theother produce he no model. But he does provideanrevolution; promulgates invariant otherillustration a program of thatinvokespowerful generalcauses in a of particular reconstruction revolutionary processes. on concentrates variationwithin My own versionof that enterprise between Europe over thelast fivecenturies (Tilly 1993). It distinguishes in situations of revolutionary (moments deep fragmention state power) and revolutionary outcomes(rapid, forcible, durable transfers state of as revolution extensive combipower),and itdesignates a full-fledged any in nationof the two. Chronologies revolutionary of situations multiple of the regions Europe demonstrate greatvariationand changein revolutionary processessince 1492. The changesinclude,forexample,an imof situations:statepressiverise in frequency "national"revolutionary in mobilizations whichat least one partymade its claim to fragmenting a state power on the groundsthat it represented coherent,culturally distinct populationthatwas currently receiving unjusttreatment. More important,the revolutionary chronologiesillustrate-prove and temporally variable would be too stronga word-how regionally formsof international relations,state power, administrative structure, of and military activity, extraction, repression shapedthecharacter EuroTo otherforms politicalconflict. the of not pean revolutions, to mention 1604

Symposium: Tilly extent thatgovernmental succession dependedon warrior-kings recruited from intermarrying patrilineages, example,revolutionary royal for situationswere concentrated thosepointswhen a child or an incompetent at came to thethrone. regions intense In of commercial activity, another for example,revolutionary situations commonly tooktheform urbanresisof tance to princely authority. Revolutionturnsout to be a coherent phenomenon, coherent itsvariation but in and in itscontinuity withnonrevolutionary politics,not in any repetitious uniformity. sequences and Its outcomes turn to be path,time,and situation out dependent, constant not from one revolution the next. to I do not claim to have been thefirst noticethisdegreeof variation; to in their practical work,as opposedto their introductions conclusions, and most students real revolutions of proceed as if theywere dealing with path-,time-,and situation-dependent phenomenawhose individualfeatures-but perhapsnotwhose totality-can be explainedby generalpoliticalprinciples, givensufficient information about the context.Nor do I claim that my own recentwork providesall the answers to the big questionsthatstudents revolution of for I have been pursuing centuries. make onlythreesimpleclaims:(1) The construction invariant of models ofrevolution-whichremainsa major activity amongAmericansociologists-is a waste of time.(2) The poor fitbetweensuch modelsand the actual character revolutions of helps accountforthe slow accumulation ofknowledge thesubject,a problem on about whichRod Aya (1990) and JamesRule (1989) have recently properly and complained.(3) The same conclusions hold fora wide rangeof social phenomena,includingmost or all large-scale politicalprocesses. How, then,can we recognizeusefulalternatives invariantmodels to of politicalprocesses? Valid analysesof politicalprocessesrestfirst all of on plausible ontologies-representations what is to be explained in of terms a givenprocess'sboundedness, of and comcontinuity, plasticity, plexity (e.g., recognizing thatnationalism consistsof some actors'claim to act authoritatively behalfofa coherent solidary on and people,a claim whose origins,makers,forms,and effects over time vary enormously and space). For variantphenomena, valid analysesspecify fieldsof the variationwithinwhichtheyfall, which means specifying theirrelation to connectedbut different the phenomena(e.g., delineating continuum interstate along which lie army-to-army intervenwar, covertmilitary tion,full-scale civil war, guerrilla These valid activities, and terrorism). analysesbreakcomplexsequencesintoevents,each of whichinvokesits own configuration causes including cumulative of the of effects previous events (e.g., separatingthe conditions under which a cycle of intense social movement the underwhich activity beginsor endsfrom conditions one movement another or sees some of its demandsrealized).Their gen1605

American Journal Sociology of eral propositions of of for consist principles variation analytically separable aspectsofthephenomena underexamination (e.g., after noticing that democracy entailsbroad, relatively equal citizenship thatgrantscitizens substantial collective control overgovernmental personnel and policiesas well as significant fromarbitrary stateaction,formulating or protection invoking separatetheories breadth, of equality,control, and protection). Such analysesimmediately of yieldcounterfactuals, specifications what else could have happenedifthecausal configuration occurred had differof ently;thus a valid theory democratization yieldspropositions about the conditions authoritarianism oligarchy.Withinlimits,such for and analysesof variationalso yieldcontingent predictions. thisI do not By mean the unconditional predictions invariantmodels, in which the of conditions Y, and Z invariably appearanceof sufficient X, produceoutcome A, but contingent predictions applyingphrases such as "insofar as" to variable conditions,theirinteractions, and their outcomes. In instancessuch as Eastern Europe's struggles 1989, then, we might of reasonably hope to specify fields variation the of within whichtheywere then to anticipatethe likely outcomesunder various stilloccurring, contingent conditions. or Mine, then,is no counselof perfection cryof despair. For, taken thesemethodological have the same comfortable separately, injunctions as familiarity invariantmodels. For all theirother weaknesses-vulnerability spatial autocorrelation, to assumptionsof boundednessand commitments linearity, to independenceof observations, and so onstatistics standardsamplingdesignsand multivariate actuallypresume some such world. Withinthese limits,which theoriesof causalityand variation the shouldchooseremains analysts just as open as before eliminationof invariant models. to Fortunately, have no obligation choose right we now; we can wait forresults a productive of from these rivalry, perhapseven ofa synthesis contentions. thepresent, For anyonewho believeswhatI have said about invariant general modelsand who caresaboutthevalidity broad politiof cal analyseshas plenty workto do. The crucialtheoretical empiriof and cal work should eventuallyreduce the likelihoodthat the next major changein worldpoliticswill baffle sociologists.
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