International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No.

2, 2012

Prevention of Black Hole Attack on AODV Protocol with Prior Receive Reply Method in MANET
Avinash P. Jadhao
ME Scholar, Department of CSE ,PRMITR Badnera Amravati, Maharashtra ,India apjadhao@gmail.com
Abstract Uncovering & Anticipation of malicious attacks in networking field is an important and challenging security issue in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are dynamic wireless networks without any infrastructure. The dynamic topology of MANET allows nodes to join and leave the network at any point of time. Wireless MANET is particularly vulnerable due to its fundamental characteristics such as open medium, dynamic topology, distributed cooperation and constrained capability. So security in MANET is a complex issue. These networks are weak against many types of attacks. Black hole attack which is one of the possible attacks on AODV routing protocol in mobile ad hoc networks. In this attack, a malicious node advertises itself as having freshest or shortest path to specific node to absorb packets to itself. The effect of black hole attack on ad hoc network using AODV as a routing protocol will be studied in this research. The proposed solution that is capable of detecting and removing black hole nodes in the MANET at the initial stage itself without any delay. Furthermore, we investigate solution for increasing security in these networks. Keywords:- MANET, AODV; Black hole attack; packet delivery ratio; RREQ; RREP; RERR.

Sunil R. Gupta
Department of CSE ,PRMITR Badnera Assistant Professor Amravati, Maharashtra ,India sunilguptacse@gmail.com

I.

INTRODUCTION

In areas in which there is little or no communication infrastructure or the existing infrastructure is expensive or inconvenient to use, wireless mobile users may still be able to communicate through the formation of an ad hoc network [1]. In such a network, each mobile node operates not only as a host but also as a router, forwarding packets for other mobile nodes in the network that may not be within direct wireless transmission range of each other. Each node participates in an adhoc routing protocol that allows it to discover multihop paths through the network to any other node. A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is formed dynamically by an autonomous system of mobile nodes that are connected via wireless links without using an existing infrastructure or centralized administration [1, 2]. MANET nodes are free to move randomly and organize themselves arbitrarily; thus the networks wireless topology may change rapidly and unpredictably. In a MANET, a collection of mobile hosts with wireless network interfaces form a temporary network without the aid of any fixed infrastructure or centralized administration. A MANET is referred to as an infrastructure

less network because the mobile nodes in the network dynamically set up paths among themselves to transmit packets temporarily. Nodes within each others wireless transmission ranges can communicate directly; however, nodes outside each others range have to rely on some other nodes to relay messages. Any routing protocol must encapsulate an essential set of security mechanism. These mechanisms are used to prevent, detect and respond to security attacks. The MANET is more vulnerable to be attacked than wired network. These vulnerabilities are nature of the MANET structure that cannot be removed. As a result, attacks with malicious intent have been and will be devised to exploit these vulnerabilities and to cripple the MANET operation. The most important characteristics are the dynamic topology, which is a consequence of node mobility. A Mobile Ad -Hoc Network (MANET) is a group of mobile nodes that cooperate and forward packets for each other. One of the most critical problems in MANETs is the security vulnerabilities of the routing protocols. A set of nodes may be compromised in such a way that it may not be possible to detect their malicious behavior easily. Such nodes can generate new routing messages to advertise non-existent links, provide incorrect link state information, and flood other nodes with routing traffic, thus inflicting Byzantine failure in the network. In this work, we discuss one such attack known as Black Hole Attack on the widely used Ad -hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol in MANETs. A mechanism presented shows the method to detect & prevent from Black hole attack in Mobile ad hoc network. It is an autonomous system, where nodes/stations are connected with each other through wireless links. There is no restriction on the nodes to join or leave the network, therefore the nodes join or leave freely. This property of the nodes makes the mobile ad hoc networks unpredictable from the point of view of scalability and topology. In ad hoc networks, the routing protocols are divided into three categories: Proactive, Reactive and Hybrid.

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International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012 will provide reliability to that node. Any node having 0 value is considered as malicious node and is eliminated. Hesiri Weerasinghe [9] proposed the solution which discovers the secure route between source and destination by identifying and isolating cooperative black hole nodes. This solution adds on some changes in the solution proposed by the S.Ramaswamy to improve the accuracy. This algorithm uses a methodology to identify multiple black hole nodes working collaboratively as a group to initiate cooperative black hole attacks. This protocol is a slightly modified version of AODV protocol by introducing Data Routing Information (DRI) table and cross checking using Further Request (FREQ) and Further Reply (FREP). Most of the papers have addressed the black hole

problem on the protocol such as AODV. Figure 1: MANET Routing Protocols

II. LITERATURE REVIEW & RELATED WORK There indeed have been numerous attempts published in the literature that aim at countering the Black hole attacks. We survey them in the following. In [5], the authors discuss a protocol that requires the intermediate nodes to send RREP message along with the next hop information. When the source node get this information, it sends a RREQ to the next hop to verify that the target node (i.e. the node that just sent back the RREP packet) indeed has a route to the intermediate node and to the destination. When the next hop receives a FurtherRequest, it sends a FurtherReply which includes the check result to the source node. Based on information in FurtherReply, the source node judges the validity of the route. In this protocol, the RREP control packet is modified to contain the information about next hop. After receiving RREP, the source node will again send RREQ to the node specified as next hop in the received RREP. Obviously, this increases the routing overhead and end-to-end delay. In addition, the intermediate node needs to send RREP message twice for a single route request. In[6], the authors describe a protocol in which the source node verifies the authenticity of a node that initiates RREP by finding more than one route to the destination. When source node receives RREPs, if routes to destination shared hops, source node can recognize a safe route to destination. Sanjay Ramaswamy, et al [7] proposed a method for identifying multiple black hole nodes. They are first to propose solution for cooperative black hole attack. They slightly modified AODV protocol by introducing data routing information table (DRI) and cross checking. Every entry of the node is maintained by the table. They rely on the reliable nodes to transfer the packets. Latha Tamilselvan, Dr. V Sankaranarayanan[8] proposed a solution with the enhancement of the AODV protocol which avoids multiple black holes in the group. A technique is give to identify multiple black holes cooperating with each other and discover the safe route by avoiding the attacks. It was assumed in the solution that nodes are already authenticated and therefore can participate in the communication. It uses Fidelity table where every node that is participating is given a fidelity level that III. ANALYSIS OF AODV PROTOCOL The AODV protocol builds on the DSDV algorithm .it is an on demand routing algorithm[3]. But in contrast to DSR it is a not source based routing scheme rather every hop of a route maintains the next hop information by its own. Operation of the protocol is divided into two functions, route discovery & route maintenance. At first all the nodes send hello message on its interface and receive hello message from its neighbors. This process repeats periodically to determine neighbor connectivity .when a route is needed is to some destination, the protocols start route discovery .It uses two term route request & route reply. This RREP packet is unicast to the next node on RREP path. The intermediate node on receiving the RREP packet make reversal of path set by the RREQ packet. As soon as RREP packet is received by the source, it starts data transmission on the forward path set by RREP packet. Sometimes while data transmission is going on, if path break occurs due to mobility of node out of coverage area of nodes on the active path, data packets will be lost. When the network traffic requires real time delivery (voice, for instance), dropping data packets at the intermediate nodes can be costly. Likewise, if the session is a best effort, TCP connection, packet drops may lead to slow start, timeout, and throughput degradation. It is crucial for AODV to properly handle the sequence numbers A node has to update its own sequence number in two cases:

A] Control Messages in AODV:

Sequence Number and Routing Table Management:

Before starting a route discovery process, the node has to increment its own sequence number. A destination node has to update its own sequence number to the maximum of its current sequence number and the destination sequence number in RREQ packet immediately before transmitting the RREP packet. The sequence numbers in the routing table entries may be changed by the node only in the following circumstances:

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 Offer of a new route to itself, if it is the destination node. Reception of an AODV message with new information about the sequence number for a destination. Expiration of path or path breaks. When a node receives an AODV control message, either to create or to update a route for a particular destination, it searches its routing table for an entry to the destination. If there is no route entry, it creates a new one with the sequence number contained in the control packet, or else the sequence number is set invalid. Otherwise, the node compares the existing entry with the new information and updates it if either The new sequence number is higher than in the routing table entry. The sequence numbers are equal and the new hop count plus one is smaller than in the existing route. The sequence number is unknown. Besides the destination sequence numbers, the routing entry for each valid route contains a precursor list. This list contains all precursor of the node which are able to forward packets on this route. All neighboring nodes to which a RREP was generated or forwarded are included in this list. In the event of a next hop link breakage, notifications are sent to those nodes. Route Request Message RREQ: Source node that needs to communicate with another node in the network transmits RREQ message. AODV floods RREQ message, using expanding ring technique. There is a time to live (TTL) value in every RREQ message, the value of TTL states the number of hops the RREQ should be transmitted. Route Reply Message RREP: A node having a requested identity or any intermediate node that has a route to the requested node generates a route reply RREP message back to the originator node. Route Error Message RERR: Every node in the network keeps monitoring the link status to its neighbors nodes during active routes. When the node detects a link crack in an active route, Route error (RERR) message is generated by the node in order to notify other nodes that the link is down. B] Route Discovery in AODV As an example, consider the following scenario in figure 2. When a node N1 wants to initiate transmission with another node N7, it will generate a route request message (RREQ). This message is propagated through a limited flooding to other nodes. This control message is forward to the neighbors, and those node forward the control message to their neighbors nodes. This process of goes on until it finds a node that has a fresh enough route to the destination or destination node is located. Once the destination node is located or an intermediate node with enough fresh routes is located, they generate control message route reply message (RREP) to the source node. When RREP reaches the source node, a route is established between the source node N1 and destination node N7. Once the route is establish node N1 and N7 can communicate with each other. The following diagram

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012 show exchange of control messages between source node and destination node.

Figure 2: Route Discovery in AODV As an example, consider the following scenario in figure3. When there is a link down or a link between destinations is broken that causes one or more than one links unreachable from the source node or neighbors nodes, the RERR message is sent to the source node. When RREQ message is broadcasted for locating destination node i.e. from node N7 to the neighbors nodes, at node N6 the link is broken between N6 and N7, so a route error RERR message is generated at node N6 and transmitted to the source node informing the source node a route error.

Figure 3: Route Error Message in AODV

IV. BLACK HOLE ATTACK Routing protocols are exposed to a variety of attacks. Black hole attack [6],[7],[18] is one such attack and a kind of Denial Of Service (DoS)in which a malicious node makes use of the vulnerabilities of the route discovery packets of the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept . This attack aims at modifying the routing protocol so that traffic flows through a specific node controlled by the attacker. During the Route Discovery process, the source node sends RREQ packets to the intermediate nodes to find fresh path to the intended destination. Malicious nodes respond immediately to the source node as these nodes do not refer the routing table. The

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International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012 source node assumes that the route discovery process is complete, ignores other RREP messages from other nodes and selects the path through the malicious node to route the data packets. The malicious node does this by assigning a high sequence number to the reply packet. The attacker now drops the received messages instead of relaying them as the protocol requires. As an example, consider the following scenario in figure 4. We illustrate a typical scenario of the protocol packet exchanges, depicting the generation and traversal of RREQ and RREP control messages. The node S is assumed to be the source node desiring to communicate with node D. Thus, as per the explanation earlier, node S would generate the RREQ control message and broadcast it. The broadcasted RREQ control message is expected to be received by the nodes 1, 2 and 3. Assuming that the node 3 has a route to node D in its route table, the node 3 would generate a RREP control message and update its routing table with the accumulated hop count and the destination sequence number of the destination node. Destination Sequence Number [10] is a 32-bit integer associated with every route and is used to decide the freshness of a particular route. The larger the sequence number, the fresher is the route [4]. Node 3 will now send it to node. Since node 1 and node 2 do not have a route to node D, they would again broadcast the RREQ control message. RREQ control message broadcasted by node 3 is also expected to be received by node M (assumed to be a malicious node). Thus, node M being malicious node, would generate a false RREP control message and send it to node 3 with a very high destination sequence number, that subsequently would be sent to the node S. However, since, the destination sequence number is high, the route from node 3 will be considered to be fresher and hence node S would start sending data packets to node 3. Node 3 would send the same to the malicious eventually reach node D (destination node), which would generate RREP control message and route it back. However, since the node S has a RREP control message with higher destination sequence number to that route, node S will ignore two genuine RREP control messages. If any link is disconnected during the transfer of packets then RERR control message is generated. For every RREP control message received, the source node would first check whether it has an entry for the destination in the route table or not. If it finds one, the source node would check whether the destination sequence number in the incoming control message is higher than one it sent last in the RREQ or not. If the destination sequence number is higher, the source node will update its routing table with the new RREP control message; otherwise the RREP control message will be discarded. In Route Maintenance phase, if a node finds a link break or failure, then it sends RERR message to all the nodes that uses the route.

Figure 4: Protocol Packet Exchange V. PROPOSED MECHANISM We consider a MANET consisting of similar types of nodes. Each node may freely roam, or remain stationary in a location for an arbitrary period of time. In addition, each node may join or leave the network, or fail at any time. The nodes perform peer-to-peer communication over shared, bandwidth constrained, error-prone, and multi-hop wireless channel. For the purpose of differentiation, we assume that each node has a unique nonzero ID. All the links in the network are assumed to be bi-directional. However, unlike most of the current security frameworks for MANETs, the proposed mechanism does not assume promiscuous mode of operation of the wireless interfaces of the nodes. The promiscuous mode may not only incur extra computation overhead and energy consumption in order to process the transit packets, but also it will not be feasible in cases where the nodes are equipped with directional antennas. There may be varying number of Black hole nodes in the network at different points of time and these malicious nodes may cooperate with each other to disrupt the communication in the network. The proposed mechanism involves both local and cooperative detection to identify any malicious Black hole node in the network. Once a node is detected to be really malicious, the scheme has a notification mechanism for sending messages to all the nodes that are not yet suspected to be malicious, so that the malicious node can be isolated and not allowed to use any network resources. The mechanism consists of local anomaly security procedures which are invoked sequentially. VI. PROPOSED WORK & OBJECTIVES A. Objectives Objectives of this proposed work are summarized as follow Analyzing the effects of Black hole attack in the light of Network load, packet delivery ratio and End to End delay in MANET. Simulating Black hole attack using Ad- hoc On Demand Vector (AODV) Routing protocol.

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 Comparing the results of AODV protocol with and without Black hole attack. Proposed new security technique in AODV protocol as a counter measure of Black hole attack B. Proposed Work

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012 sent to Receive Reply method in order to continue the default operations of AODV protocol. VIII. NODE MISBEHAVIOUR MODEL Routing protocols basically performs two important functions: Routing function and Data-Forwarding function. Routing function performs routes discovery and routes maintenance activity. Data-forwarding function is concerned with forwarding data packets toward the destination through the established route. In order to work properly, routing protocols need trusted working environments which are not always available and in such a situation network will be vulnerable to various attacks launched by misbehaving nodes. Both routing and data forwarding function would be affected with the presence of misbehaving nodes. Nodes misbehaviour can be classified into following: Malfunctioning: These nodes suffer from hardware failures or software errors. Selfish: These nodes refuse to forward or drop data packet and can be defined into three types (i.e. SN1, SN2 and SN3). SN1 nodes take Participation in the route discovery and route maintenance phases but refuses to forward data packets to save its resources. SN2 nodes neither participate in the route discovery phase nor in data-forwarding phase. Instead they use their resource only for transmissions of their own packets. SN3 nodes behave properly if its energy level lies between full energy-level E and certain threshold T1. They behave like node of type SN2 if energy level lies between threshold T1 and another threshold T2 and if energy level falls below T2, they behave like node of type SN1. Malicious: These nodes use their resource and aims to weaken other nodes or whole network by trying to participate in all established routes thereby forcing other nodes to use a malicious route which is under their control [10]. After being selected in the requested route, they cause serious attacks either by dropping all received packets as in case of Black Hole attack [11].For convenience such malicious nodes are referred as MN

The solution that we propose here is basically modifies the working of the source node without altering intermediate and destination nodes by using a method called Prior_ReceiveReply. In this method three things are added, a new table RR-Table (Request Reply), a timer WT (Waiting Time) and a variable MN-ID (Malicious Node ID) to the data structures in the default AODV Protocol. VII. ALGORITHM PRIOR-RECEIVE REPLY METHOD DSN Destination Sequence Number, NID Node ID, MN-ID Malicious Node ID. Step 1: (Initialization Process) Retrieve the current time Add the current time with waiting time Step 2: (Storing Process) Store all the Route Replies DSN and NID in RR-Table Repeat the above process until the time exceeds Step 3: (Identify and Remove Malicious Node) Retrieve the first entry from RR-Table If DSN is much greater than SSN then discard entry from RRTable and store its NID in MN-ID Step 4: (Node Selection Process) Sort the contents of RR-Table entries according to the DSN Select the NID having highest DSN among RR-table entries Step 6: (Continue default process) Call Receive Reply method of default AODV Protocol The above algorithm starts from the initialization process, first set the waiting time for the source node to receive the RREQ coming from other nodes and then add the current time with the waiting time. Then in storing process, store all the RREQ Destination Sequence Number (DSN) and its Node Id in RRTable until the computed time exceeds. Generally the first route reply will be from the malicious node with high destination sequence number, which is stored as the first entry in the RR-Table. Then compare the first destination sequence number with the source node sequence number, if there exists much more differences between them, surely that node is the malicious node, immediately remove that entry from the RRTable. This is how malicious node is identified and removed. Final process is selecting the next node id that has the higher destination sequence number, is obtained by sorting the RRTable according to the DSEQ-NO column, whose packet is

nodes.SN2 type nodes do not pose significant threat therefore can simply be ignored by the routing protocol. On the other hand SN1, SN3 and MN nodes (defined in section II) are much more dangerous to routing protocols. These nodes interrupt the data flow by either by dropping or refusing to forward the data packets thus forcing routing protocol to restart the route-discovery or to select an alternative route if it is available which in turn may again include some malicious nodes; therefore the new route will also fail. This process form a loop which enforce source to conclude that data cannot be further transferred. This proposed work aimed on the detection and isolation of such SN1 type selfish nodes and MN type malicious nodes. SN3 type selfish nodes will be detected only when they behave similar to SN1 type
nodes.It is not suitable for highly dynamic networks. (As in all distance-vector protocols, this does not perturb traffic in regions of the network that are not concerned by the topology

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change. DSDV requires a regular update of its routing tables, which uses up battery power and a small amount of bandwidth even when the network is idle. IX. CONCLUSION In this paper we have investigated the impact of Black hole attack in mobile adhoc network & its consequences. Black hole attack cause damage to the network & also it is difficult to detect. Proposed approach can be integrated on the basic of routing protocols such as AODV.To show the effectiveness and result of proposed approach, implementation work on Network Simulator NS- 2 still in progress. We intented to develop simulation technique related with term uncovering & anticipation of Black hole attack under AODV in MANET by using different implementable modules, suitable algorithm & for performance related different metrics will be taken into consideration. Future works will include mechanism so as to recognize & exterminate the Black hole attack in mobile adhoc network. REFERENCES [1] Imrich Chlamtac, Marco Conti, Jennifer J.-N. Liu Mobile ad hoc networking: imperatives and challenges, School of Engineering, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, TX, USA, 2003. [2] Gianni A. Di Caro, Frederick Ducatelle, Luca M. Gambardella. A simulation study of routing performance in realistic urban scenarios for MANETs. In: Proceedings of ANTS 2008, 6th International Workshop on Ant Algorithms and Swarm Intelligence, Brussels, Springer, LNCS 5217, 2008 [3] C.E. Perkins, S.R. Das, and E. Royer, Ad-Hoc on Demand Distance Vector (AODV), March 2000, http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-manet-aodv-05.txt [4]Satoshi Kurosawal, Hidehisa, Nakayama, Nei Kato, Abbas Jamalipour and Yoshiaki Nemoto. Detecting Blackhole Attack on AODV-based Mobile Ad Hoc Networks by Dynamic Learning Method. In: International Journal of Network Security, Vol. 5, No.3, pp.338346, Nov. 2007. [5]H. Deng, W. Li, and D. P. Agrawal. Routing Security in Adhoc Networks. In: IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 40, No. 10, pp. 70-75, Oct. 2002. [6] M. A. Shurman, S. M. Yoo, and S. Park, Black hole attack in wireless ad hoc networks. In: Proceedings of the ACM 42nd Southeast Conference (ACMSE04), pp 96-97, Apr. 2004. [7]Sanjay Ramaswamy, Huirong Fu, Manohar Sreekantaradhya, John Dixon, and Kendall Nygard, Prevention of Cooperative Black Hole Attack in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, 2003 International Conference on Wireless Networks (ICWN 03), Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. [8] Tamilselvan, L. Sankaranarayanan, V. Prevention of Blackhole Attack in MANET, Journal of Networks, Vol.3, No.5, May2008.

International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012 [9] Hesiri Weerasinghe and Huirong Fu, Member of IEEE, Preventing Cooperative Black Hole Attacks in Mobile Adhoc Networks: Simulation ImplementationAndEvaluation,IJSEA,Vol2,No.3,July 2008. [10]Nital Mistry, Devesh C Jinwala, Member, IAENG, Mukesh Zaveri, Improving AODV Protocol against Blackhole Attacks, Proceedings of the International MultiConference of Engineers and Computer Scientists 2010 Vol II, IMECS 2010, March 17- 19, 2010, Hong Kong

[11] K. Lakshmi et al. Modified AODV Protocol against Blackhole Attacks in MANET, Proceedings of the International Journal of Engineering and Technology Vol.2 (6), 2010, 444-449 [12] Y. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. Johnson, Ariadne: A secure on-demand routing protocol for ad-hoc networks, In Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom 2002), pp. 1223, ACM Atlanta, GA, September 2002. [13] P. Papadimitratos, and Z. Haas, Secure routing for mobile ad hoc networks, In Proceedings of SCS Communications Networks and Distributed Systems Modeling and Simulation Conference (CNDS 2002), San Antonio, TX, January 2002. [14] K. Snazgiri, B. Dahill, B. Levine, C. Shields, and E.A. Belding-Royer, Secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks, In Proceedings of International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), Paris, France, November 2002. [15]Piyush Agrawal, R.K.Ghosh, SajalK.Das, Coperative Black and Gray Hole Attacks in Mobile AdHoc Networks,in proceedings of the 2nd international conference on ubiquitous information management and communication ,pages 310314,suwon,Korea,2008. [16]Sukla Banerjee, "Detection/Removal of Cooperative Black and Gray Hole Attack in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering and Computer Science 2008 WCECS 2008, October 22 - 24, 2008, San Francisco, USA. [17] Vishnu K, and Amos J .Paul, Detection & Removal of cooperative Black/Gray hole attack in Mobile AD-HOC Networks. International Journal of Computer Applications 2010, Volume 1-No.22, pp.38-42. [18] Hongmei Deng, Wei Li, and Dharma P. Agarwal, Routing Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, University of Cincinnati, IEEE Communications magazine, October 2002.

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International Journal of Computer Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012 [19]Jiwen CAI, Ping YI, Jialin CHEN, Zhiyang WANG, Ning LIU, An Adaptive Approach to Detecting Black and Gray Hole Attacks in Ad Hoc Network, 2010 24th IEEE International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications

AUTHORS PROFILE

Prof.Sunil R. Gupta is Assistant Professor of Department of Computer Science & Engineering at Prof. Ram Meghe Institute Of Research & Technology, Badnera, Amravati . He has 08 Year Teaching Experience , 03 years Research Experience. He did his B.E. (Computer Science & Engineering) in 2002 with First Class & M.E.(Computer Science & Engineering) in 2007 with Distinction First Class from SGB Amravati University. He submitted Ph.D. in 2010 Computer Science & Engineering from SGB Amravati University, Amravati. He is life member of IETE, IE, ISTE and nominee member of CSI India.

Avinash P.Jadhao received his B.E

degree in Computer Science from Amravati University / India. He is working towards his Master in Computer Science and Engineering from Amravati University. He completed Sun Certification i.e. SCJP. He also published various papers in National /International Conference also. He is member of IACSIT (Singapore), CSI Faculty Advisor ,JDIET Student Chapter Yavatmal. His research is focused on Computer networks.

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