Water Users Organization for Institutional Reform in Pakistans Irrigation Sector

Masahiro NAKASHIMA Faculty of International Studies Hiroshima City University Hiroshima, Japan E-mail:nakashim@intl.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp

Abstract
Irrigation water demand has increased in many countries due to agricultural development and population growth. Present water-use institutions in Pakistan are not able to maintain discipline when users face the need for more water. This results in inequity in irrigation water distribution, a major problem for the farmers. In 1998, the Pakistani government started an institutional reform in the irrigation sector. A key to success in this reform is participatory irrigation management through farmer organizations. This report discusses the past and present experiences of farmer organizations. Particular emphasis is on the recent efforts to form a water users organization and the role of collective action in the reform. The conditions of user governance of irrigation water are discussed, which include social empowerment, autonomy, and sustainability of the water users organizations.

1. Introduction
Increasing water demand in many countries is forcing water-use institutions to undergo fundamental changes. Water use institutions1 define relationships among water users and between water users and water suppliers (governments). To transform traditional water-use institutions in response to modern social, economic and resource conditions, institutional reforms in water sectors have recently been implemented in several countries (Gorriz et. al. 1995; Nakashima 1998). In such reforms, an important feature is the increased management role of resource users through transfer of responsibilities from the government. This shift of responsibilities can be substantiated by active user participation and devolution of government power. There has been considerable accumulation of research made by Ostrom (1992) and others on the role of water users, which will contribute in the recent and future efforts of the institutional reforms in water sectors. The author conducted a field study, in February and March 1998, on Pakistans institutional reform in the irrigation sector in Punjab Province. Interviews were conducted with the Pakistani government agencies, international organizations, private Pakistani organizations, and farmer organizations. This report introduces the institutional reform and a case of the associated experiences to form water users organizations. There has not been many reports that focus on the process of forming such organizations. The case involves interesting facts which deserve attention. Based on the past and present experiences in water users organizations , a few necessary conditions for user governance of irrigation water are discussed. The following information is mostly based on the field interviews, which are supplemented by reports and papers as indicated in the text.

2. Institutional Reform in Irrigation Sector

Irrigation water demand in Pakistan has been increasing due to agricultural development and

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population growth. Cropping intensity has grown to more than 100%2 (Haq et al. 1997). Present irrigation systems cannot meet the increased demand, nor can the institutions cope with competing interests. The institutions regulate both the users and the suppliers. The water distribution rule among farmers, warabandi3 , had been working fairly well before increases in water demand put greater pressure on the institution. The supplier institution consists of century-old government regulations enforced by provincial irrigation departments. These institutions on both sides were not able to maintain discipline when the farmers were faced with the need for more water and government officers were faced with intense pressure from the farmers.4 Irrigation fees had been sufficient to cover operation and maintenance (O&M) costs until the irrigation sector started to deteriorate in the 1970s. Due to weakened discipline, the collection of irrigation fees from the farmers declined, and revenues fell short of government O&M expenditures. The gap between recoveries and expenditures through water fees was 44 % in 1992, which was high and increasing (World Bank 1994). Consequential deterioration of irrigation infrastructure, together with eroding institutions, has brought irregular water distribution to the canals, resulting in unequal irrigation water distribution among farmers (Bandaragoda et al. 1995). Inequity in irrigation water distribution is a major problem for farmers.5 The irrigation sector has been suffering from these and more problems in spite of the fact that the government has implemented irrigation projects for the past 40 years. The government found themselves receiving not enough benefits out of the projects. In the early 1990s, there were growing sentiments in the donor agencies and the Pakistani government that it is unwise to keep spending on irrigation if the existing agencies and institutions are not capable of taking care of the irrigation sector. In 1994 the World Bank presented a proposal for irrigation management reform in the report entitled, "Pakistan Irrigation and Drainage: Issues and Options (World Bank 1994). Pakistans central government, in consultation with the Provinces, gave careful consideration to the reform model proposed by the World Bank. The proposed concept of privatization, with introduction of water markets and individual water rights, was not accepted6 ; but the government adopted the concept of decentralization and participatory management (Ministry of Water and Power 1998). Motivation to pick up the decentralization concept seems that the government could remove the financial gap by handing over a part of responsibilities to farmers organizations. An agreement was made between Pakistans government and the World Bank with regard to the reform. In 1997, the Pakistani provincial assemblies passed provincial irrigation and drainage authority bills for all provinces of Pakistan (Provincial Assembly of the Punjab 1997). This legislation served to launch an institutional reform in irrigation management. Implementation of the reform started in 1998 only on a pilot basis. The reform, however, is controversial and satisfactory progress is uncertain. The institutional reforms involve three entities, characterized by decentralization: the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA), the Area Water Board (AWB), and Farmers Organizations (FOs). The PIDA, successor to the Provincial Irrigation Department (PID), is an autonomous body having independent revenue collection and spending authority. Below the PIDA in each Province, a financially self-accounting AWB will be created on a trial basis around a canal command. Additionally, below the AWB, FOs will be formed, on a pilot basis, along a distributary system (secondary level)7 . The AWB will receive water from the PIDA and deliver it to FOs, and the FOs will operate and maintain the distributary system with financial self-sufficiency. The FO will consist of Water Users Associations (WUAs), with each WUA operating a watercourse (tertiary level). The schedule for

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the reform was set forth as follows. Within 1 year after initiating the reform, 4 pilot AWBs are established in 4 provinces and operated for 7 to 10 years to see which AWB composition would work best. In addition, within 1 to 2 years, pilot Farmer Organizations are established on all distributaries included in the canal command of the pilot AWBs. The pilot AWB will be evaluated, and if it is successful, the reform will be extended on a nation wide scale. It will take 6 years to complete the pilot projects, which will cover 25% of Pakistans irrigation system.

3. Forming a Water Users Organization

A key to success in the institutional reform is the farmers participatory irrigation management (PIM). The PIM approach will manifest itself as a water users organization, taking over the government responsibility of a distributary system and participating in the PIDA Board and AWB as farmers representatives. This is the most significant shift of power from the government to the farmers. The FOs and WUAs are organized water users (farmers) who will be the basic actors of the institutional reform, together with the government agencies. 3.1 Rural Society and Water Users Participation There is widespread concern among opponents that PIM will cause conflict in the Pakistani rural social system. For example, Biraderi8 , a traditional tribal system in Pakistan might lead to conflicts with the new farmers organization. Rural politics is characterized by a one-man feudal system, in which a rich and influential person dominates the rural community9 . The village is often a faction-ridden society influenced by landlords and not in a harmonious condition. The influential farmers always try to obtain more water, and equity among farmers is elusive. The poor farmers may be afraid of participatory management, thinking the influential farmers will exploit it. When farmers try to organize themselves and elect their representatives in a Biraderi system, a feudal system, or a faction-ridden society, their village society may be disturbed, creating additional political conflicts. These could lead to even more difficulty in water distribution. The winner may monopolize the water, and the loser may be deprived completely. This would cause water disputes and even drive people to violence. 3.2 Past Experiences and Recent Efforts The On-Farm Water Management Program (OFWM), implemented since 1976, has accumulated 20 years experience. The Agriculture Department is in charge of the program, primarily construction works such as land leveling and watercourse lining. Farmer participation is an important element of the program, since farmers can gain a sense of ownership and better quality work. The OFWM involves farmers in 50% of the cost, including physical and financial contributions. The Department provides subsidies as well as training for farmers in technical aspects of OFWM. The Department assisted in organizing a farmers group, the Water Users Association. After 5 years of informal activities by WUAs, the WUA Act was enacted in 1981, at which time a WUA became a formal group. There have been problems in sustaining the WUAs. From the governments side, the OFWM program needed the farmers as project workers and did not pay much attention to the farmers own activities. From the farmers side, the WUA was necessary only to obtain the subsidy and complete the structural works, indicating formation of the farmers group was motivated by a specific government -3 -

project and subsidy, not by the irrigation management activities necessary after the project. Experiences in many countries indicate that those organizations created for government projects became inactive after project completion and eventually disappeared (Nakashima 1996). We may call this type of approach project-driven. Pakistans experiences in organizing farmers at a watercourse (tertiary level) were similar and most of WUAs formed in the past are not functioning. Farmer will have to revitalize these defunct WUAs or start totally new WUAs. In February and March 1998, the author visited two pilot project sites for PIM10 . They are located in Bahawalnagar, Punjab Province, in the Fordwah Eastern Sadqia Irrigation and Drainage Project. One pilot project has been implemented by OFWM of the Agriculture Department for the command area (22,300 acres) of Bhukan Distributary and Bahaderwah Minor canal. The other pilot project has been implemented by the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) for the command area (43,400 acres) of Hakra4-R Distributary canal. It may be noted that the pilot projects do not necessarily guarantee successful PIM in the whole Punjab Province. This is because the pilot project covers a small area with only two distributary systems, though the area is quite representative of the whole Punjab Province. Moreover, the pilot project area received many resources for social mobilization. There are so many distributary systems ( about 3000 in the Punjab Province) that the government cannot put as many resources to each one as was done in the pilot project. The Agriculture Department and IIMI have helped farmers organize themselves, with the goal of taking over the distributary system. This goal is an essential component of the institutional reform: the Farmers Organizations (FOs) operate and maintain the distributary systems, with the autonomy of financial self-sufficiency. The following describes, based on the field study, farmers experiences with the PIM approach. 3.3 Organizing Farmers The organizing process started in 1995. At the first contact with farmers, their perception of the reform was negative. There were rumors that irrigation water supply would become like a utility, installing meters and raising the water charge. The farmers first tried to reject the idea of starting an organization. It took 3 months to correct these erroneous ideas. When the government officers met with farmers, the villagers were suspicious and afraid of strangers, probably due to past conflicts brought in by outsiders11 . It was necessary to speak to them personally and meet them in small groups. If the officers had met them in large groups, the meeting mights have become political. The IIMIs pilot project adopted a four-step approach in the social (farmers) organization process (Bandaragoda et al. 1997). The first step was familiarization meetings, in which the objectives of the pilot project were introduced to the village people, baseline information of each village was collected, and Social Organization Volunteers (SOVs) were identified. The SOVs were contact farmers from the water user community, who mediated between the IIMIs team and the water users. The second step was rapport-building meetings. In this step, the SOVs and water users conducted a series of small group meetings to build rapport and increase awareness about water management. The third step was consultation meetings to consult the water users regarding tentative plans for forming water users organizations. The meetings were held in groups larger than the rapport meetings. The fourth step was selection meetings. A series of selection meetings was conducted for the

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purpose of determining the process for selecting leaders of the WUA at the watercourse level. This step was completed by the end of 1996 at 119 out of 123 watercourses. The final step was Federation meetings to initiate the identification of organization leaders, office bearers for the pilot Water Users Federation at the water distributary level. All the WUAs joined the Federation, and the Federation leaders were selected from the WUA representatives at the meeting of March 1997. 3.4 Motivation to Participate Most important was farmer motivation to participate in the organization. Initially, there was a belief among farmers that the reform was being imposed by the World Bank and it would only increase the water fee, not the supply. The basic motivation of farmers was to start such collective actions as: jointly voicing and presenting their problems, stop water theft through social pressure and monitoring, and run the distributary system when management responsibility was handed over. There is a financial motivation for farmers to promote participation because farmer organizations need contributions (such as water fees) from as many farmers as possible to keep the organization financially self-sufficient. With adequate financial resources, the organization can operate and maintain the distributary system and watercourses. Upstream farmers in the canal systems were not suffering as much as downstream farmers. Nevertheless, upstream farmers and even influential farmers did have motivations to join the WUAs. They joined the organization to avoid lose everything they had. If they did not participate, they might lose some benefits. Even head-end farmers had a problem (they had to pay a bribe every 6 months to an irrigation officer) and they wanted to remove that problem. There were head-end small farmers who did not have access to canal water, and they wanted to join the organization for equitable water distribution. Out of 123 watercourses in the Hakra 4-R distributary system, there were 2 watercourses where farmers did not organize WUAs by early 1998, at the time of authors visit. These were mainly highly influential farmers at the head reach of the distributary12 . 3.5 Selecting Leaders Selecting a leader for a farmers organization can create political conflict in a rural society, as pointed out earlier. This socially sensitive process was handled peacefully in the pilot projects. The process was so transparent that the farmers could make no mistaken assumptions. Transparency, as in this case, is a critical condition for the sound behavior of people and the sound development of any organization. The farmers did not vote to elect leaders. Representatives were elected by unanimous agreement. When the farmers found difficulties in reaching a consensus, they postponed a decision, talked more among members, held meetings again and again, and finally reached a consensus. When they encountered the influence of political power in a meeting, they just postponed the decision and discussed the issues again, until they reached a unanimous consensus13 . This was an important process for the farmers to empower themselves and for the organization to develop its capacity. There was a case in which an influential farmer (District Counselor) wanted to become the president of an organization. However, the people did not chose him because if he became the president, ordinary farmers would not have access to him and such a president would be useless for the organization.

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Instead, the people chose an ordinary farmer for the position, since they have easy access to him. He would be available to the village people due to proximity. They knew the influential farmer would have his own agenda and would not work for ordinary farmers. The first president of the Federation was the president of a WUA at the tail-end of the distributary. It is important to note that the president at the tail-end, the most disadvantaged location, became the Federations president. The Federations executives are not small farmers14 . The executives are considered somewhat rich as per their holding size. As regard social sanctions, for example, the effectiveness usually depends how influential the executive offers are.

4. Experience with Collective Action

4.1 Collective Action The Federation of Hakra 4-R holds a monthly meeting of the General Body, consisting of 25 executives; and their attendance rate has been 86%. The Federation has already demonstrated some achievements. In water management, the Federation is involved in equitable water distribution by preventing water theft. The Federation has already experienced a few cases of dispute resolution. One of the dispute cases was the result of illegal conduct (blockage) in a watercourse. The Federation acted like a court by summoning the two parties involved, and the conflict was resolved in a peaceful manner. Although the Irrigation Department has the responsibility for dispute resolution15 , they could not fulfill the official duty due to the credibility gap between farmers and government officials. Collective expression is most important for the organization, and they are making requests to the government for more participatory activities. The Federation insists on participation in crop assessment16 , done now by the government to assess water fees, so that they can eliminate corruption17 (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1997; Project Directorate OFWM 1998). The Federation also wants to carry out water fee collection and spend 70% of the collected amount, after giving 30% to the government agencies. The Federation asked the Irrigation Department to privatize canal maintenance work, done every year at the annual canal closure time. The maintenance work has been done under a contract between the Department and a company. This work will become cheaper if the farmers do it by themselves. There has been a precedent for farmer participation in the maintenance work, where farmers mobilized their resources, including their own tractors, at the 1997 - 1998 annual closure time (the end of December to January). The Federation has been requesting transfer of authority over the distributary system, but the Irrigation Department has not agreed to the request by early 1998. This is because the Department has not yet completed making rules and regulations to run the irrigation systems under the new Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority Act. The Federations achievements are more than just water management. For example, the Federation opened a joint bank account, collected money from shareholders to buy cottonseed, and distributed the seeds to the farmers for cultivation. When empty bags for the harvest were not available at a government procurement center, the farmers collectively approached the government and obtained the empty bags. The farmers have participated in the training for water measurement and other O&M related activities.

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4.2 Social Pressure for Internal Rules After formation of the organization, the farmers observed the water distribution rule owing to social pressure and social monitoring as a manifestation of collective action. The farmers, along a watercourse, belong to the same societies and villages, and many of them are relatives18 . Upstream farmers along a distributary at present obtain more water and pay less money than the due amount, under the authority of an irrigation officer. But after the distributary is transferred in the near future, they expect unfair payment of water fees to decrease. This is because there is social or community pressure, as many people live in the same or nearby villages and know who is doing what. They would face social sanctions for misbehavior.19 Moreover, the farmers organization will have the power of sanctioning. However, to reduce possible conflicts in the organization, it is important to consider social factors, such as Biraderi, tenancy status, and villages, to design the structure of the organizations since the distributary serves many villages. In the process of the reform, with Federation control over the distributary, the organization will have to establish internal rules in the absence of an external power, i.e., the Irrigation Department. The merits of mutual proximity and participation, with removal of the external authority, will help create the necessary internal rules under the current situation of water scarcity (Nakashima 1998). If this is realized, water distribution will become more equitable. Internal rules will be created through a democratic process, as every farmer has an equal voting right. Influential farmers are small in number, and the democratic process will favor the small farmers. A feudal power could make tenant farmers follow a large landholder or an influential farmer. However, they are few in number, 5 to 10%, and the farmers organizations will be able to improve the situation. 4.3 Lessons Farmers are Capable The Water Management Training Institute started farmer training in 1976 to promote the OFWM program. The main goal of the training was efficient use of irrigation water. The most important lesson learnt by the Institute is that farmers are capable of managing the irrigation system and assertions of farmer incompetence due to illiteracy and lack of education are not valid20 . Lessons were also found in the IIMI and Agriculture Department experiences of implementing the pilot projects. First, people said it would be impossible to organize farmers in rural Pakistan, but the projects have succeeded in organizing farmers and showed concrete proof of the viability of PIM, as introduced earlier. Second, problems and obstacles were reduced by meetings between farmers and government officials, implying the vital importance of overcoming the credibility gap through communication between the two groups. Third, the development process was not a blueprint that could be followed without field modification (Bandaragoda et al. 1997). It was necessary to take a process approach or an adaptive approach and develop the farmers organization by adapting to the varying social situations (World Bank 1996; Gill 1998). We should make much of the development process but not the initial blueprint. An encouraging sing for the future is that neighboring farmers are already interested in the pilot projects. When the neighboring farmers are convinced of the benefits of the new approach, i.e., PIM, they can organize themselves with less external assistance and fewer resources than the pilot projects. Therefore, the most important lesson is identifying the signs of validity of PIM in Pakistan.

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5. Conditions for a Sustainable User Organization

It is too early to say that the farmer organizations, introduced as a case in the previous section, will continue to function in the future. The case does not guarantee successful farmer organizations in other distributaries, but it is merely encouraging evidence of PIM. Functioning WUAs as effective as this case are rare in Pakistan, and it may take a decade to create so many effective organizations in all the irrigation systems. Successful farmer organizations are only one key factor, but a focus of this paper, for successful progress in the institutional reform. There are many other factors that are discussed elsewhere for example by Ostrom (1992) and not discussed here. There have been, in many countries, numerous unsuccessful experiences in sustaining farmer organizations. Based on the past and recent experiences, a few necessary conditions, certainly not inclusive ones, for sustainable farmer organizations are discussed hereinafter. 5.1 Water Users Organizations -- Foundation for Social Equity and Empowerment A water users organization is the basic element required for institutional reform. Through these organizations, people can gain the power to negotiate internally with members or externally, for example, with governments, to cope with uncertainties and to overcome poverty. Therefore, a farmers organization should be looked upon as a vehicle for social empowerment, which helps enhance social welfare and equity (Chambers 1995). As mentioned earlier, the government rejected the concept of water market, which assumes an idea of treating water as a private good by separating land and water. The author considers a water-right market21 resulting from such idea is not feasible at present (Nakashima 1993). There are groundwater market (Kurosaki 1996), and even in the pilot project area, there already exist water transactions in the form of exchanging water turns and as well as purchase and sale of water turns(Cheema, et al. 1997). These transactions, however, are very local and only temporal ones effective in one crop season or between successive two seasons. Treating water as a private tradable good, which is a premise of water right market, means totally neglecting the present warabandi water right system22 . Such a fundamental change in the legal system of natural resource uses requires very careful consideration, and this is not discussed here. After farmers obtain autonomy over the water at the secondary level, however, there may emerge larger scale water transactions in case distribution infrastructure allows for it. Moreover, even if water transactions are not permanent, there may emerge various types of transactions within or outside the current legal constraints. In these cases, without a social mechanism guaranteeing equity, equitable water allocation would be prevented and the influential farmers may monopolize the water. A market mechanism alone will expand the gap between the rich and the poor, and there has to be a supplementary mechanism to safeguard the poor for social stability. A water users organization has the potential to build the mechanism to protect social equity, through manifestation of collective action and empowerment. Such a mechanism should be created by the organizations as rules for water allocation. Therefore, a farmer organization is a vital part of the social infrastructure to realize social welfare, and this is the fundamental reason for its importance. Design principles for creating such rules are introduced later. 5.2 Autonomy and Property Rights Autonomy can make farmers more capable of using water with greater efficiency and equity. -8 -

Autonomy includes both rights and responsibilities, and the two should always go together. The incentive for accepting and wanting reform on the side of farmers must be to gain control over the resources of water, infrastructure, and finances. This includes distributing water by and for farmers themselves. The responsibilities are paying and collecting water fees, taking care of the resources, i.e., funds, irrigation facilities, and water, and working for the organization. Such autonomy is guaranteed by legal protection (Directorate Command Water Management Project Punjab 1991; Bandaragoda et al. 1997). Property rights or usufructuary (use) rights to irrigation canals (distributary) has to belong to the farmers organization, in order to create a sense of ownership and get people to take care of the facilities. The sense of ownership is gained spiritually by committing the farmers own efforts to the resources and legally by obtaining such property rights. However, a necessary condition is that the organization cannot sell the property, although the organization can add property to the existing facility. Between the PIDA and the farmers organizations, there has to be an agreement, as part of the property rights, about the quantity of water to be allocated for each period of time in a year and also about how to share the financial resources from the water fees. Mexicos irrigation management reform implemented by the National Water Law includes a legal framework, granting a title of concessions to WUAs. Such experiences offer useful information for Pakistans irrigation reform (Nakashima 1998). 5.3 Putting Farmers First Autonomy is an essential condition for organizational sustainability, and there are a few other conditions as well. First among those conditions is an incentive or motivation for farmers to start and continue the organizational activities. The OFWM in the past adopted a project-oriented approach, such as improving a watercourse, where a project brought a gift from the government. There has to be a change from such a project-driven incentives to a farmer's own internal motivation, brought for example by a sense of ownership or by a need for collective action as in the pilot projects. The difference is equivalent to a top-down approach and a bottom-up approach. The farmers will leave their organization and the organization would disappear if the reform is promoted only by the top-down approach with such an external incentive. The second is to provide skill training. Once the power to manage the distributary is given to a farmers organization, then farmers can organize and develop themselves with necessary skill training, to be provided mainly by government agencies. Together with skill training by the agencies, dissemination of skills from farmer to farmer is an efficient approach (Gill 1998), and using this approach the government can provide less input than in the pilot projects. The third condition of sustainability is transparency of information. Provision of information is of vital importance. For example farmers first need to know how much water they can get and the timing of delivery. Only then can they plan for managing their resources. Without knowing about their resources, they cannot do much other than just passively waiting for them to come. Without transparency of information, the organizational decentralization (reform) would bring disintegration of irrigation management. The advantage of transparency in selecting the leaders of farmer organization is previously introduced in the case of pilot project in the Punjab.

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5.4 Design Principles for Sustainable Institutions Organizing farmers is only a beginning. Sustainable user organizations require sustainable institutions as rules-in-use. Water users organizations have to be governed by rules and regulations for distribution and management of water, operation and conservation of the infrastructures, individual rights of water users, members participation in system management, and sanctions for failure to comply with members obligations. Those institutions will have to be crafted according to the change in the ownership of resources. The distributary systems have been the state property managed by the Irrigation Department. After the government transfers the responsibility to farmer organizations in the reform process, the infrastructure and water at the secondary level will become common property resources. Governing common resources by a users organization has been discussed extensively by many researchers. Ostrom (1990, 1992), for example, presented design principles that characterize robust institutions for common property resources. The principles are concisely summarized and they are shown in Table 1. She discusses the principles in detail in the literature and does not claim they are the necessary conditions for designing the institutions. Although there would be no general rules applicable to any irrigation system in all situations, these principles must be useful reference, as they are derived from many cases of long-enduring and self-organized irrigation systems. Associated with Pakistans institutional reform, some remarks may be added to the table. The present rules, in warabandi, are expected to serve the basis for such water use institutions as specifying the amount of water allocation and monitoring23 to be crafted by the design principles 2 and 4. It may also be noted that the pilot projects, introduced previously, already started developing institutions related to the design principles 3 and 6. It is important to find or discover rules-in-use already in the field rather than copying successful water use institutions somewhere in the world. Table 1 Design Principles for Self-organized Irrigation Systems -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. Clearly defined boundaries: Both the boundaries of the service area and the individuals or households w ith rights to use w ater from an irrigation system are clearly defined. 2. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs: Rules specifying the amount of water that an irrigator is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules requiring labor, materials, and /or money inputs. 3. Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by operational rules are included in the group that can modify these rules. 4. Monitoring: Monitors, who actively audit physical conditions and irrigator behavior, are accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves. 5. Graduated sanctions: Users who violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated

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sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or both. 6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 7. Recognition of rights to organize end-users themselves: The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities. 8. Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Ostrom 1990, p.90; and Ostrom 1992, pp.69-76. There will be no sustainable and permanent institutions that are designed only on a desk. Water-use institutions will have to be tested, modified, and evolved on the field through various events of natural and socio-economic hardships such as droughts or economic slumps. For example, a drought incidence will inevitably cause conflicts to share scarce water among users, and then institutions for conflict resolution will be improved and developed further by trial and error efforts. Therefore, it will take time and even require long time to develop sustainable institutions.

6. Conclusions
The Pakistani government started in 1998 the institutional reform of irrigation sector. The reform requires a water users organization at a distributary (secondary level) as well as at a watercourse. Associated with the institutional reform policy, the pilot projects have been implemented by IIMI and the Agriculture Department to organize farmers at the distributary level. Despite pessimistic predictions, the results of the pilot projects are positive and already showing some evidence of effective collective action through the organizations. Conditions of progress in the reforms involve the roles of the water users and the government. It is necessary for water users (farmers) to empower themselves to take over some government duties, including particularly management of the secondary irrigation systems. For the users to be empowered by rights and responsibilities, the government has to delegate the responsibilities to the users organizations. Organizational sustainability, a critical issue from past experience, depends on the autonomy of water users organizations, which is guaranteed by a legal means to substantiate devolution of the government power.

Acknowledgment
I am grateful to the following government organizations and their officials: Ministry of Water and Power of Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Irrigation and Power Department of Government of the Punjab, Agriculture Department of Government of the Punjab, for valuable assistance to this study. I am also thankful to officials and researchers in International Irrigation Management Institute, Water Management Training Institute, and Asian Development Bank. I

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am most indebted to people of Water Users Associations, Water Users Federations, Kissan Board Pakistan, Farmers Associates Pakistan, Chamber of Agriculture Punjab, and consultants. However, the ideas and thoughts stated in this paper do not necessarily reflect official opinions of the organizations above, but include personal opinions of the author. Finally, I express many thanks to the Pakistan Office of Japan International Cooperation Agency, which greatly facilitated my study logistically. I would like to thank Hiroshima City University for the Grant for Special Academic Research (International Studies). The field study was conducted in Pakistan under this Research Grant.

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References
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Notes
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Irrigation institutions are the rules-in-use for supplying and using irrigation water in a certain place. Annual cropping intensity for Bhukan Distributary was 150% in 1993 (Project Directorate OFWM 1996/97). This intensity puts a too much load on the canal system as the whole irrigation system was designed for only 60%-crop intensity. 3 The watercourses get their share of water through outlets in the irrigation channel. Distribution of water from a watercourse is effected through a time-schedule called warabandi, under which each farm gets water for specified period generally once a week (Gill 1998). 4 A long period of this behavior results in a syndrome of anarchy, which is a product of mutual mistrust between the water users and the operating staff. The users lack the confidence that if they refrain from stealing water or breaking the structure, they will get their entitled water on time, while the officials lack the confidence that, if they apply rules properly and provide water on time, the users will refrain from breaking the rules (Bandaragoda et al. 1997). 5 Along any given irrigation canal, there is generally inequity in water use between the upstream and downstream sections. Such inequity is pronounced in Pakistan. 6 Pakistan is in a semi-arid climate and water is essential for agriculture. If water were traded and removed from the land, the land would become useless and farmers could not live there. Now 77% of farmers in Pakistan are cultivating only 28% of the land, and a majority of farmers are poor. If water trade were permitted, poor farmers who are in need of money would sell their water rights to rich farmers. A water market would benefit only rich farmers. The rich would obtain more water, and there would be more problems with equity. The water market would create water monopolies, and the monopoly will raise water prices when water is in short supply (Nakashima 1999). The poverty issue is too important to ignore in Pakistan. Water trade in a large scale is not feasible also from a technical viewpoint: the canal systems are designed for 60%-crop intensity, and it is not appropriate to carry more and/or less water than the design capacity, since changes in velocity and depth will upset the hydraulic regime in a canal. This irrigation system is called supply based, as it is not feasible to accommodate varying demands. 7 The irrigation system in Indus Basin consists of: from upstream to downstream, rivers and barrages (primary system), main and branch canals (primary system), distributary and minor canals (secondary system), and watercourses (tertiary system). 8 Biraderi is a kinship group or subdivision of a caste group. 9 The term influentials is often used in Pakistan to refer to rich landowners who often use political power against farmers and the government. 10 The main objectives of PIM are as follows: a) strengthening of farmer institutions, i.e., WUAs into federations and canal councils; b) providing farmer institutions a stronger voice in operation and maintenance of irrigation systems, and developing a framework for addressing related legal and social constraints; c) improving irrigation scheduling for better water deliveries to match crop water requirements through introducing improved operation and management; and d) introducing appropriate cropping pattern, cultural practices, and input management (Project Directorate OFWM 1998). 11 The farming community was divided into several conflicting groups due to bad experiences with political parties, governments, cooperative societies, Fertilizer Committees, etc. They lost trust in any new move to organize them. 12 The extent of participation varied by head, middle, and tail of each distributary, relating to inadequacy, inequity and variability of irrigation water. It was also related to land tenure as tenants and lessees are relatively less interested in long-term solutions of irrigation management (Bandaragoda et al. 1997). 13 Voting can be another means for electing executives, but it can separate people into factions and create conflicts among members. 14 The land holdings of Federation executives are rather large: 30 acres for the president, and 20 to 50 acres for others executives. In another Federation of the Hakra 4-R distributary, the president has 14 acres of farmland, and other executives have 42 acres and 8 acres. The majority of land holdings is less than 5 acres. 15 Most of the disputes were settled within the premises of their village by the intervention of the village elders. Irrigation Department interferes when farmers have a dispute and cannot solve it by themselves. In such a case, the farmers go to the Irrigation Department for help in deciding rules of water

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distribution. However, credibility gap between farmers and the Department hinders proper mediation. The Irrigation Department makes crop assessments 4 times a year. The assessment results are sent to the Revenue Department for water fee collection. Farmers pay the water fee for irrigation based on the crop assessment. 17 To eliminate corruption, the farmers organizations need the following powers: a) to inspect water distribution records, b) to conduct crop surveys, c) receive the full collected water fees, and d) disconnect irrigation service temporarily for defaulters. 18 Number of farmers along a watercourse is generally small, about 45 on the average. 19 Most water users believe that getting organized would be helpful to ensure equity, justice and fair irrigation benefits, but only if the water users organization act in a transparent manner. They would operate the system fairly as they would have to be accountable to the community (Bandaragoda et al. 1997). 20 According to the authors interview at the Training Institute, the officers were very confident based on past experience with the capability of farmers irrigation water management. 21 There is a case of implementing a market for water rights in Chile since 1981, and it has been working reasonably well (Brehm and Qioroz 1995). However, Pakistans social and economic situation in rural setting is too different to compare with the case in Chile. 22 Although the traditional warabandi is not strictly observed any more, the basic warabandi principle is still there, i.e., water allocation is measured by time based on the individuals landholding. 23 The end of each water turn is expected to be monitored by the user receiving water for the next turn.
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