ALVAREZ vs.

RAMIREZ FACTS: Maximo Alvarez is accused of Arson for setting on fire the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez. Susan Ramirez, the Respondent, called on Esperanza the estranged wife of Maximo who has been separated de facto from him for 6 months, to testify against him. Petitioner Alvarez initially did not raise an objection. In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed uncontrolled emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings. Then, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to the rule on marital disqualification. Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses. RTC rule in favor of Alvarez. Aggrieved, Ramirez sought nullification of the RTC ruling via Certiorari. CA granted certiorari. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in said Criminal Case. HELD: Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. The reasons given for the rule are: 1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife; 2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

JOSE GUERERO et al. vs. ST. CLARE REALTY CO. LTD, et al. G.R. No. L-58164. September 2, 1983. Facts: Petitioners' original and amended complaints alleged that during their lifetime, spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of a parcel of land located at San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, with an area of 42,299 square meters, more or less. The spouses had six children, named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and ordained that the questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, the other children having been assigned other lots. Accordingly, upon the death of Isidoro Guerrero, Andres Guerrero physically possessed the lot and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador Ramirez. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owner's share in the harvests. The arrangement between brother and sister was that Cristina Guerrero could continue in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the owner's share in the produce for as long as she needed the property. Dominador Ramirez continued his tenancy until shortly before the death of Andres Guerrero. Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died and survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and their children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero. Sometime during the latter part of 1971, certain people, who introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the land, approached plaintiffs in order to secure their consent to the sale of the property. Plaintiffs were informed that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero. Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered that Manuel Guerrero was able to have the lot titled in his name on the basis of a 'Deed of Sale of Land' purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero. According to the original and amended complaints, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero was fraudulent, simulated and falsified for the reason, among others, that Cristina Guerrero was not the owner of the land at the time she purportedly sold it. On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes testified that her mother, Cristina Guerrero, had been sick for a long time before she died in 1948; and that her mother could walk only inside their house; that the money spent for the illness of her mother came from Manuel Guerrero; and that, through her children, Cristina Guerrero could ask money from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that Andres Guerrero had lent to her. The defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of

the New Rules of Court. The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs. The trial court granted the motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as other witnesses similarly situated, disqualified to testify in the case. ISSUE Whether or not Laura Cervantes and other witnesses similarly situated are disqualified to testify. RULING Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, provides: "Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated: (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such became of unsound mind." Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were made in error. The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero. Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man's rule. "It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word 'against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.' It should be noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative follows, which means that the word 'representative' includes only those who, like the executor or administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words 'against the estate of such deceased persons', which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of such representative."

ABRAHAM, et al. vs. Intestate Estate of JUAN YSMAEL, PRISCILLA RECTO-KASTEN GR. No. L-16741. January 31, 1962. Facts: On September 3, 1943, Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham Sr. in the amount of P12,500.00 in Japanese currency notes, and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter promising to pay the loan within 90 days with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The note was executed in the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom thereof as a witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the note, a demand was made for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay. On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate on April 23, 1952 leaving the note still unpaid. In the Special Proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, petitioners filed a pleading entitled "Reclamacion" demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. Because no regular administrator of the estate had yet been appointed by the court, the "Reclamacion" was not acted upon. However, as soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, the claimants reproduced their "Reclamacion" before the lower court. The reception of evidence was delegated to a commissioner. During the hearing before the commissioner, the counsel for the administratrix interposed a general and continuing objection to the testimony of Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the provisions of Section 26 (c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. However, after the claimant had testified, he lengthily crossexamined her on the very matters against which he interposed a general objection. The lower court allowed the claim against the intestate estate of Juan C. Ysmael. The appellate court reversed the trial court. ISSUE Whether or not the testimony of Florencia is barred by the Dead Man Statute. RULING Section 26 (c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides: "(c) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind;" However, there was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratrix extensively cross-examined the witness on the very matters subject of the prohibition. It was for this reason that the trial judge eventually overruled the counsel's previous general and continuing objection and admitted the testimony of the witness. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the counsel's lengthy cross-examination on the prohibited matters was merely

for the purpose of establishing the "motive, prejudices and predilection" of the witness. In this connection, it has been said: ". . . The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate as to what his examination of a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of two courses which he may pursue, he has no light, after he discovers that the course selected is not to his advantage, and after he has put the opposite party to the expense, and has consumed the time of the courts in a trial of the case in accordance with the course selected, to change his position and make another and different selection. Such course would be unfair both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be countenanced in any court of justice..

On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted before the then Court of First Instance. Among the properties included in the inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. The day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed and the estate of the late Praxedes Villanueva delivered to his heirs, private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental against petitioner Goi in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva. In his complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 2990, private respondent Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24, 1949. The trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendantsheirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente. On appeal, CA affirmed with modification the above-decision. Hence this petition.

GOI vs. CA Facts: The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally owned by the TABACALERA. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessorin-interest of petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to Villegas. Allegedly because TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. Either because the amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the purchase price of the three haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by private respondent Vicente, Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner Genaro Goni as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. Private respondent Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount was debited from Vicentes account. The difference was supposedly paid by Vicente to Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such payment was presented in court, this fact was disputed by petitioners. It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell, Villanueva was able to raise funds. He thus went to private respondent Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the contract/promise to sell however, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already been debited from private respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a period of five (5) years, said rent to be deducted from the money advanced by private respondent and any balance owing to Villanueva would be delivered by Vicente together with the lots at the end of the stipulated period of lease. On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva.

Issue: MAY RESPONDENT GASPAR VICENTE TESTIFY ON MATTERS OF FACT OCCURRING BEFORE THE DEATH OF PRAXEDES T. VILLANUEVA, WHICH CONSTITUTES A CLAIM OR DEMAND UPON HIS ESTATE. IN VIOLATION OF RULE 123, SEC, 26, PAR. (C), NOW RULE 130, SEC. 20 PAR. (A)? MAY NOT A WRITTEN PROMISE TO SELL DATED OCTOBER 24,1949 BE NOVATED INTO A VERBAL AGREEMENT OF LEASE DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PROMISSOR, WHOSE DEATH OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 12, 1951, BY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SUBSTANTIATED BY COMPETENT ORAL EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE?

Rulings: We find that neither the trial nor appellate court erred in ruling for the admissibility in evidence of private respondent Vicente's testimony. Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente 8 would be disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows: Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated: (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of

such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. 9 It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living. Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. 12 It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person. Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. 13 The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goi could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goi testified that the same was subsequently novated

into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a verbal agreement of lease was clearly and convincingly proven not only by the testimony of petitioner Goi, but likewise by the acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, after the milling season of crop year 1949-50, only fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 were subsequently registered in Villanueva's name and mortgaged with the RFC. Villanueva likewise executed a deed of sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas. All these were known to private respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any steps toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 either by demanding during the lifetime of Villanueva that the latter execute a similar document in his favor, or causing notice of his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of title of said lots. If it were true that he made demands on Villanueva for the surrender of field no. 3 as well as the execution of the corresponding deed of sale, he should have, upon refusal of the latter to do so, immediately or within a reasonable time thereafter, instituted an action for recovery, or as previously observed, caused his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of title. Considering that field no. 3, containing an area of three (3) hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, is the biggest among the three lots, an ordinary prudent man would have taken these steps if he honestly believed he had any right thereto. Yet, private respondent Vicente did neither. In fact such inaction persisted even during the pendency of the intestate proceedings wherein he could have readily intervened to seek exclusion of fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 from the inventory of properties of the late Praxedes Villanueva. Both the trial and appellate courts chose to believe in the contract/promise to sell rather than the lease agreement, simply because the former had been reduced to writing, while the latter was merely verbal. It must be observed, though, that the contract/promise to sell was signed by petitioner Goi as attorney-in-fact of the late Praxedes Villanueva, an indication, to our mind, that final arrangements were made by petitioner Goi in the absence of Villanueva. It was therefore natural for private respondent Vicente to have demanded that the agreement be in writing to erase any doubt of its binding effect upon Villanueva. On the other hand, the verbal lease agreement was negotiated by and between Villanueva and private respondent Vicente themselves. Being close friends and relatives 17 it can be safely assumed that they did not find it necessary to reduce the same into writing. In rejecting petitioners' contention respecting the verbal lease agreement, the appellate court put much weight on the failure of petitioners to demand an accounting of the produce of fields nos. 4 and 13 from 1950 to 1954, when the action for recovery of property was filed. Petitioners, having clearly and sufficiently shown that the contract/promise to sell was subsequently novated into a verbal lease agreement, it follows that they are entitled to a favorable decision on their counterclaim.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARCELINO TONGCO represented by JOSEFA TONGCO vs. ANASTACIA VIANZON GR. No. 27498. September 20, 1927. FACTS: Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1894. The first named died on July 8, 1925, leaving the second named as his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was named administratrix of the estate. It appears that shortly before the death of Marcelino Tongco, he had presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death. In the cadastral case, the widow began action on April 28, 1926, when she presented a motion for a revision of certain decrees within the one-year period provided by the Land Registration Law. Issue was joined by the administratrix of the estate. A decision was rendered by Judge of First Instance Rovira concluding with this pronouncement of a judgment: "Therefore, and by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of Act. No. 496, decrees Nos. 191390, 191504, and 190925, relative to lots Nos. 1062, 1263, and 491 of this cadastral record, as well as the original certificates of title Nos. 3247, 3298, and 3297 in regard thereto, and hereby annulled and set aside, and it is ordered that in lieu thereof new decrees and certificates of title be issued for lots Nos. 1062, 1263, and 491, as the exclusive property of Anastacia Vianzon, of legal age, widow, and resident of Orani Bataan, free from all encumbrances and liens. On July 19, 1926, the administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia Vianzon for the recovery of specified property and for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the widow is admissible. RULING: Yes. Anastacia Vianzon is competent.

The law twice makes use of the word "against." The action was not brought "against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. The action is one by the administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-examine the interested person with respect to the prohibited matters. TESTATE ESTATE OF RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS represented by MARCIAL LICHAUCO vs. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA GR. No. L-2016. August 23, 1949 Facts: Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila when the Pacific war broke out on December 8, 1941. As such president he was receiving a salary of P3,000 a month. He held 1,000 shares of stocks, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for which he had executed promissory notes in favor of the company aggregating P245,250, at the rate P450 a share. Soon after the Japanese army occupied Manila in January, 1942, it seized and took possession of the office and all the properties and assets of the appellant corporation and interned all its officials, they being American citizens. Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, in the Santos Tomas interment camp, and special proceeding No. 70139 was subsequently instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of his estate. The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila resumed business operation in March, 1945. The company filed a claim against the estate of Richard T. Fitzsimmons which included among other personal overdraft of P63,000 in his current account against the company. The Appellant Company included in evidence the testimony of Santiago Inacay and Modesto Flores, chief accountant and assistant accountant, respectively, of the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila. (It is admitted that all the prewar books and records of the company were completely destroyed or lost during the war.) They also presented Mr. Henry J. Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy, vice-president-treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company, to testify on the status of the personal account of the deceased Fitzsimmons with the company as of December, 1941; but upon objection of the administrator the trial court refused to admit their testimony on that point on the ground that said witnesses were incompetent under section 26(c) of Rule 123, they being not only large stockholders and members of the board of directors but also vice-president-treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company. (Actually naa pa P868.67 na claim pero giexclude nako kay di na relevant)

It is true that by reason of the provisions of article 1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the property of the spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. But even proceeding on this assumption, we still think that the widow has proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it would, unless we are forced to disregard her testimony. No reversible error was committed in the denial of the motion for a new trial for it is not at all certain that it rested on a legal foundation, or that if it had been granted it would have changed the result.

The object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. The law however was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or administrator of a deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to

any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person, under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court? 2. Whether appellant's claims of P63,000 have been established by satisfactory evidence? ADDITIONAL ISSUE (Im not sure if part of the topic but still related to evidence) 3. Whether the inventory of assets and liabilities (Exhibit 1) exhibited by Mr. Fitzsimmons is admissible?

The appellee admits in his brief in those states where the "dead man's statute" disqualifies only parties to an action, officers and stockholders of the corporation, have been allowed to testify in favor of the corporation, while in those states where "parties and persons interested in the outcome of the litigation" are disqualified under the statute, officers and stockholders of the corporation have been held to be incompetent to testify against the estate of a deceased person. The weight of authority sustains appellant's first assignment of error. Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, we are constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person. It is not necessary, however, to remand the case for the purpose of taking the testimony of said witnesses because it would be merely corroborative, if at all, and in any event what said witnesses would have testified, if permitted, already appears in the record as hereinabove set forth, and we can consider it together with the testimony of the chief accountant and the assistant accountant who, according to the appellant itself, were "the only ones in the best of position to testify on the status of the personal account" of the deceased Fitzsimmons.

Held: 1. It results that the trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of Messrs. Belden and Garmezy.

Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court, which provides: Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. This provision was taken from section 383, paragraph 7, of our former Code of Civil Procedure, which in turn was derived from section 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California. In the case of City Savings Bank vs. Enos, the Supreme Court of California, interpreting said article 1880, said: . . . The provision applies only to parties or assignors of parties, and Haslam was neither the one nor the other. If he was a stockholder, which it is claimed he was, that fact would make no difference, for interest no longer disqualifies under our law, Civ. Code Proc. sec. 1879. Appellant cites section 14, Civ. Code, to the effect that the word "person" includes a corporation; and claims that, as the corporation can only speak through its officers, the section must be held to apply to all who are officially related to section must be held to apply to all who are officially related to the corporation. A corporation may be conceded to be a person, but the concession does not help appellant. To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to materially amending the statute by judicial interpretation. Plainly the law disqualifies only "parties or assignors of parties," and does not apply to persons who are merely employed by such parties or assignors of parties. It neither disqualifies parties to a contract nor persons in interest, but only parties to the action (Code Civil Procedure, sections 1879, 1880); and thus it has been held that one who is cashier and at the same time a stockholder of a bank was not disqualified, it being said: "to hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to materially amending the statute by judicial interpretation." It is concluded, therefore, that our statute does not exclude from testifying a stockholder of a corporation, whether he be but a stockholder, or whether, in addition thereto, he be a director or officer thereof.

2. No. The evidence of appellant company composed only of oral testimonies however Lichauco presented an inventory of the assets and liabilities of the conjugal partnership prepared by Mr. Fitzsimmons himself pursuant to the divorce decree issued by court. The liabilities presented by Mr. Fitzsimmons did not include any amount payable to the company. Realizing the frailty and unreliability of human memory, especially with regard to figures, after the lapse of more than five years, we find no sufficient basis upon which to reverse the trial court's finding that this claim had not been satisfactorily proven. 3. It is admissible. A self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to the interest of the declarant. It is not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted. "The vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay character. Furthermore such declarations are untrustworthy; to permit their introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and perjuries." On the other hand, a declaration against the interest of the person making it is admissible in evidence, notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant and the declarant has died, become insane, or for some other reason is not available as a witness. "The true test in reference to the reliability of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem motam, as is the case with reference to some classes of hearsay evidence, whether the declaration was uttered under circumstances justifying the conclusion that there was no probable motive to falsify." Insofar, at least, as the appellant was concerned, there was no probable motive on the part of Fitzsimmons to falsify his inventory Exhibit 1 by not including therein appellant's present claim of

P63,000 among his obligations or liabilities to be deducted from the assets of the conjugal partnership between him and his divorced wife. He did not know then that he would die within one year and that the corporation of which he was the president and one of the largest stockholders would present the claim in question against his estate. Neither did he know that the books and records of that corporation would be destroyed or lost. Yet, although he listed in said inventory his obligations in favor of the Peoples Bank and Trust Company and the Philippine Bank of Commerce aggregating more than P30,000, he did not mention at all any obligation in favor of the corporation of which he was the president and one of the largest stockholders. ENRIQUE RAZON v. IAC, ET AL. G.R. No. 74306. March 16, 1992 Facts: Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc., for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, manila. A stock certificate for 1,500 shares of stock was issued and paid for in the name of Juan Chuidian. Chuidian, then Razon, were elected as directors of the corp. Razon never questioned the ownership of Chuidian of the shares and had never brought any action for the cancellation of the certificate of stock, which was in the possession of Razon, who refused to deliver said shares to Vicente Chuidian, the son of the deceased Juan, unthe surrendered it and deposited it in a safety box. Razon claims that the late Juan had personally delivered the certificate covering the shares to the Corporate Secretary, and since then, Razon had been in possession of the certificate, even during the lifetime of Juan. It was alleged that Juan had delivered the certificate to Razon because it was Razon who paid for the subscription of the shares upon the understanding that he was the owner of said shares and was to have possession of the same until such time as he was paid therefore by the other nominal incorporators. The IAC, however, refused to admit Razons testimony on the ground of incompetency under Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Should the Dead Mans Statute have been applied in this case? Held: No. The Dead Mans Statute is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representatives of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. Here, the IAC exluded Razons oral testimony regarding an alleged oral agreement between him and Juan as regards the ownership of the shares of stock. Such case was filed by the administrator of the estate of Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc., allegedly owned by Juan. Razons testimony therefore clearly does not fall within the prohibition of the Dead Mans Statute. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. In any case Vicente never objected to Razons testimony. Moreover, Razon was subjected to cross-examination by Vicentes counsel regarding the same testimony. Hence, there is waiver of the prohibition under the Dead Mans Statute. Doctrine: The Dead Mans Statute is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representatives of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.

MENDEZONA V VIUDA DE GOITIA March 11, 1930; VILLAMOR, J.

FACTS Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been duly appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Benigno Goitia Benigno Goitia was the representative and attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs in the joint-account partnership known as the Tren de Aguadas, of which the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista Goitia, owns 180 shares worth P18,000, and the plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7,200 Prior to 1915, Benigno Goitia, at that time the manager of the copartnership, collected the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he remitted to them every year. That the usual dividends which Benigno Goitia forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona each year were P540, and to plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal, P216 From 1915 until his death in August, 1926, Benigno Goitia failed to remit the dividends Some time before his death, more particularly, in July, 1926, Benigno Goitia, who was no longer the manager of the said business, receive as attorney-in-fact of both plaintiff, the amount of P90 as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor Mendezona's shares, and P36 upon Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal's stock During the period from 1915 to 1926, Benigno Goitia collected and received certain sums as dividends and profits upon the plaintiffs's stock in the Tren de Aguadas in his capacity as representative and attorney-in-fact for both of them, which he has neither remitted nor accounted for to the said plaintiffs Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the committee of claims and appraisal of the estate of Benigno Goitia, and, upon their disallowance, appealed from the committee's decision by means of the complaints in these two cases. The court below ordered the defendant, as judicial administratrix of Benigno Goitia's estate to render a judicial account of the intestate estate of the deceased Benigno Goitia, to render an account of the amounts collected by her aforesaid husband as attorney-in-fact and representative of the plaintiffs in the copartnership from 1915 to July, 1926, within thirty days from notice of this decision Defendant, reiterating her exception to the court's decision enjoining her to render accounts, manifested that after a painstaking examination of the books of account of the copartnership and several attempts to obtain data from Ruperto Santos, the manager and administrator thereof, she has found no more evidence of any amount received by her late husband than a book of accounts where she came upon an item of P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and another of P36 for Valentina Izaguirre. The court ordered the defendant, as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased Benigno Goitia, to pay the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona the sum of P13,140 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, and to pay the plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre P5,256 likewise with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, and moreover, to pay the costs of both instances. The defendant appealed from this judgment. The appellees made depositions before the American consul at Bilbao, Spain, in accordance with section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions, and he did not suggest any other interrogatory in addition to the questions of the committee. When these depositions were read in court, the defendant objected to their

admission, invoking section 383, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Her objection referred mainly to the following questions: 1. Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of your partnership in the "Tren de Aguadas?" Yes, until the year 1914. From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno Goitia send you any report or money on account of profits upon your shares? He sent me nothing, nor did he answer, my letters. Did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your account Yes, several times by letter, but I never received an answer.

them, as was the decedents's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or by other similar evidence. The appellant admits having found a book of accounts kept by the decedent showing an item of P90 for the account of Leonor Mendezona and another of P36 for the account of Valentina Izaguirre, which agrees with the statement of Ruperto Santos, who succeeded Benigno Goitia in the administration of said partnership, to the effect that the deceased attorney-in-fact had collected the amounts due the plaintiffs as dividends on their shares for the months of May and June, 1926, or P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and P36 for Valentina Izaguirre, amounts which had not been remitted by the deceased to the plaintiffs. Disposition Judgment affirmed

2.

3.

ISSUE WON the appellees' depositions are admissible. HELD YES. The first of these questions tends to show the relationship between the principals and their attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia up to 1914. Supposing it was error to permit such a question, it would not be reversible error, for that very relationship is proved by the Exhibits . - As to the other two questions, it is to be noted that the deponents deny having received from the deceased Benigno Goitia any money on account of profits on their shares, since 1915. We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a certain fact occurred before the death of their attorney-in-fact Benigno Agoitia does not come within the legal prohibitions (section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure). The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the estate of a decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before the death of the deceased. The underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate from fictitious claims. But this protection should not be treated as an absolute bar or prohibition from the filing of just claims against the decedent's estate. The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo differ from those in the case at bar. Maxilom vs. Tabotabo: the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the deceased Tabotabo during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in his favor and against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency. The liquidation was signed by both Maxilom and Tabotabo. In spite of this, some years later, or in 1906, Maxilom filed a claim against the estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37alleging that P750 which included the 1899 liquidation had not really been received, and that therefore instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation should have shown a balance of P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is evident that in view of the prohibition of section 383, paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could not testify in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as to alter the balance of the liquidation made by and between himself and the decedent. But in the case before us there has been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs and the deceased Goitia. They testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals those of the other," would be to exclude all possibility of a claim against the testamentary estate. This was the legislator's intention. The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took place before their representative's death, but on the contrary denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they denied that a liquidation had been made or any money remitted on account of their shares in the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim. It was incumbent upon the appellant to prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition was true, either by bringing into court the books which the attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep, or by introducing copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew

PEOPLE vs. CARLOS (1925) Facts: It appears from the evidence that the victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, in Mary Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments. after her release there from she was required to go several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the operation. The defendant states that on one of the visits, Doctor Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the wife. The defendant further states that his wife informed him of the outrage shortly after leaving the clinic. While defendant was confined in the hospital for stomach trouble, he received a letter from doctor sityar demanding for the immediate settlement of the account for the professional services rendered his wife. DeFendant went to doctor sityar's clinic several times but didnt find him there. In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again went to the office of the deceased and found him there alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed him thrice. The doctor died. The defendants made his escape but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening of the following day. Defendant admits the killing but argued that it was self-defense. He explains that he went to Doctor Sityar's office to protest against the fee charged; that during the conversation the deceased insulted him by telling him that he could send his wife to the office as she was the one treated; that this statement was made in such an insolent and contemptuous manner that the defendant became greatly incensed and remembering the outrage committed upon his wife, he challenged the deceased to go downstairs with him and there settle the matter; that the deceased thereupon took a pocket-knife and attacked him; that the defendant, making use of his knowledge of fencing, succeeded in taking the knife away from the deceased and blinded by fury stabbed him first in the right side of the breast and then in the epigastric region, and fearing that the deceased might secure some other weapon or receive assistance from the people in the adjoining room, he again stabbed him, this time in the back. Assuming defendant's testimony is true, it is very evident that it fails to establish a case of self-defense and that, in reality, the only question here to be determined is whether the defendant is guilty of murder or of simple homicide. RTC ruled for murder. Such finding was made in consideration of exhibit "L", a letter written to the defendant by his wife and seized by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated May 25, 1924, two days before the commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.

Issue: whether the letter to the defendant by the wife was is admissible? Ruling: Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore not admissible in evidence. The numerical weight of authority is, however, to the effect that where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. (28 R.C.L., 530 and authorities there cited.) Such is the view of the majority of this court. Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows: For documents of communication coming into the possession of a third person, a distinction should obtain, analogous to that already indicated for a client's communications (ante, par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged (for otherwise the privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for written communications); but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's consent, the privilege should cease. (5 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd ed., par. 2339.) The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged. The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter. As we have already intimated, if Exhibit L is excluded, there is in our opinion not sufficient evidence in the record to show that the crime was premeditated. Guilty of simple homicide. Penalty reduced. James D. Barton vs. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., Ltd. 46 Phil 938 March 22, 1924

valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt products. William Anderson, the general manager of Leyte Asphalt, wrote a letter to Barton authorizing the latter to sell the products of Lucio Mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand upon a scale of prices indicated in said letter. The authorization that Barton relies on contained the following stipulations (among others): Barton is given the sole and exclusive sales agency for the bituminous limestone and other asphalt products of the Leyte Asphalt in Australia, Saigon, Java, New Zealand, India, China, Tasmania, Sumatra, Siam, the Strait Settlements, USA and Hongkong until May 1, 1921. No orders for less than 1,000 tons will be accepted except under special agreement with Leyte Asphalt. It also contained a breakdown of prices per ton. If the sales in the above territory equal or exceed 10,000 tons in the year ending October 1, 1921 then in that event the price of all shipments made during the above period shall be P10 per ton, and any sum charged to any of your customers or buyers in the aforesaid territory in excess of P10 per ton shall be rebated to Barton.

Barton also had full authority to sell the Lucio Mine products for any sum he saw fit in excess of the prices quoted above and such excess in price was to be his extra and additional profit and commission. All ships, steamers, boats or other carriers were to be loaded promptly with not less than 1,000 tons each 24 hours after March 1, 1921, unless there was to be prior notice. It was also stipulated that Leyte Asphalt shall not be required to ship orders of 5,000 tons except on 30 days notice and 10,000 tons except on 60 days notice. Barton entered into subagency agreements in San Francisco and Australia. In San Francisco, he entered into an agreement with Ludvigsen & McCurdy. Ludvigsen & McCurdy was instituted as subagent and given the sole selling rights for the bituminous limestone products of Leyte Asphalt for 1 year. Barton had also gone to Australia where he instituted Frank Smith as his sales agent. On February 5, 1921, Ludvigsen & McCurdy advised Barton of an order of 6,000 tons of bituminous limestone which Barton accepted. Anderson informed Barton that Leyte Asphalt was behind construction so it could not handle big contracts as of the moment. The two met in Manila on March 12 and Barton told Anderson about the San Francisco order. Anderson said that, owing to lack of capital, adequate facilities had not been provided by the company for filling large orders and suggested that Barton had better hold up in the matter of taking orders. Despite Andersons response, Barton wrote a notification to Leyte Asphalt for the company to be prepared to ship 5,000 tons of bituminous limestone to San Francisco. He also made additional orders for Smith in Australia. Leyte Asphalt acknowledged the orders for Australia and San Francisco but stated that no orders would be entertained without a cash deposit. The CFI absolved Leyte Asphalt from 4 of the 6 causes of action. The CFI allowed Barton to recover $202,500 from the 1st cause of action and $405,000 from the 4th cause of action. Among the evidence presented was a carbon copy of a letter written by Barton to Atty. Ingersoll, his lawyer. In the said letter, Barton wrote that his profit from the San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of 85 cents per ton. When the letter was offered in evidence by the lawyer for the defendant, the counsel for the plaintiff announced that he had no objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured.

Facts: James Barton is a US citizen residing in Manila while Leyte Asphalt is a Philippine company which has its principal office in Cebu. Barton sought to recover the sum of $318,563.30 in damages from Leyte Asphalt due to breach of contract along with a judicial pronouncement that he was entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales agencies specified in the contract. Leyte Asphalt appears to be the owner of the Lucio Mine in Leyte, a

The lawyer for the defendant informed the court that he received the letter from the former lawyers of the defendant without explanation of the manner in which the document had come into his possession. Bartons lawyer then made an announcement that unless the defendants counsel explained how the letter came to the defenses possession, he proposed to object the letters admission on the ground that it was a confidential communication between client and lawyer. The trial judge excluded the letter. Issue: WON the letter should be excluded. Held: NO. When papers are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor will it form a collateral issue to try that question. Even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse party and it makes no difference how the defense acquired possession. The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. According to Wigmore: Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in the clients hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communication, whether with or without the clients knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in original or copy. Judgment was reversed, the defendant was absolved

Pertinently, Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case. Due to the said events a complaint of perjury was filed against Paredes but was dismissed due to prescription of action. Nonetheless, Paredes was thereafter hailed before the Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Sansaet was Paredes' counsel of record therein. Tanodbayan recommended the criminal prosecution of Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for Paredes, moved for reconsideration alleging that respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the MTC of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same evidence . . . but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice. Thus the filing of the case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent. A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan charging respondent Paredes with a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription. On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. He claimed that certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge were simulated. These falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy. Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice. The prosecution moved for the discharge of Atty. Sansaet for the reason that he will become a state witness which was opposed by Paredes since there exist an attorney-client relationship between Sansaet and Paredes. ISSUE Whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege RULING Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997. FACTS: Respondent Paredes was then Governor of Agusan del Sur and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse. Sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of respondent Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court nullified said patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application.

client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. U.S. vs. Gordon-Nikkar C.A. Fla. 1975, 518 F. 2d 972 Nickname: Exception to Attorney-client privileged communicationwhen communication is made in presence of other non-clients and used to commit an illegal act. FACTS: Appellant Ana Gordon-Nikkar was convicted of a crime for possession with intent to distribute and actual distribution of 4 kg. of cocaine. Brenda Marchand (a Veneuelan) on the one hand is a co-accused with Nikkar who later on became a state witness against Nikkar. Marchand testified that at a meeting with Estrumsa, Nikkars counsel, the participants, agreed to give perjured cover-up testimony at trial to the effect that none of them had possessed the cocaine, but instead merely happened to be at a party where the cocaine was discovered. Not all of these participants including Marchand herself are clients of Estrumsa. Issue: WON the statements during the meeting with Nikkars counsel are protected by the Attorney-Client privileged communication. Ruling: The jury panel is correct in admitting the testimony of Marchand about the perjured cover-up testimony. There were at least five persons present at Estrumsa's office on this occasion; at least one of the persons, Brenda Marchand, and perhaps others, were not clients of Mr. Estrumsa. A communication divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential communication between attorney and client. Therefore, this communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. But even if it appeared that the communication in question were otherwise privileged (i. e., that the communication was considered confidential despite the presence of a stranger), the testimony was

nonetheless admissible. The conversations in question dealt with plans to commit perjury so as to hide the criminal activity of appellant and others. It is beyond dispute that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications regarding an intended crime. The policy underlying the attorney-client privilege is to promote the administration of justice. It would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to protect communications designed to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to conceal past misdeeds. (NB: A question as to the absence of Cuban descent jury member was raised thereby depriving Nikkar of fair trial was raised. This was not given merit by the court. Not related to the topic. Please read the full-text IF u hav tym.) U.S. vs. McPartlin 595 F. 2d 1321, C.A. Ill., 1979 Nickname: (1) Attorney-client privilege still applies to disclosures in confidence to a co-partys counsel, even to that counsels agent for a common purpose. (2) Hearsay Rule: Business records as exceptions to the rule with certain conditions. Facts: The appellants were convicted, in a nine-week jury trial, of conspiring to violate the wire and travel fraud statutes and of substantive violations of those statutes.

The indictment charged that defendant Frederick B. Ingram, chairman of the board of the Louisiana-based Ingram Corporation, had paid defendant Robert F. McPartlin, an Illinois legislator of the Democratic party, defendant Valentine Janicki, a trustee for the Metropolitan Sanitary District, and others more than $ 900,000 to secure for the Ingram Corporation a multi-million dollar sludgehauling (sludge= a by- product of sewage treatment by the sanitary department) contract with the District. Defendants Franklin H. Weber, a businessman, and Edwin T. Bull, president of a towing company, were alleged to be intermediaries through whom many of the payments were made. William J. Benton, vice president of Ingram Corporation, was an unindicted co-conspirator who played a major role in the conspiracy and testified as a witness for the prosecution. The defendants were convicted of numerous violations of the Travel Act, and the Wire, Radio, Television Fraud Act, and of conspiracy. Presented as evidence during the indictment is a business diary kept by Benton (state witness) giving details of the transactions. Since Benton's diaries corroborated so much of his testimony, it was imperative from the standpoint of all defendants that an effort be made to discredit them. From the results of the tests conducted so far, it appears that at least two of the suspicious diary entries relate to alleged payments of money to Mr. McPartlin.

Contentions: INGRAM (co-defendant): the statements of Mcpartlin given to an investigator can be presented since they are codefendants having the same purposeto discredit Benton. Since the statement is given to an investigator and not to an attorney of Mcpartlin, he cannot properly invoke the attorney-client privilege.

MCPARTLIN: The attorney-client privilege can be invoked. (The statements of Mcpartlin regarding the payments to him is obviously prejudicial on his part) Issue: (1) WON the statements by Mcpartlin given to an investigator acting for Ingrams counsel is protected by the attorney client privilege. (Ingram and Mcpartlin are co-defendants having different counsel) (2) WON the business diaries (desk calendar) of Benton is admissible since this is somehow a private diary and the entries are not even in order. (3) WON Weber may introduce the testimony of his accountant, as well as the accountant's copy of the bank statement recording the bribe money deposit. Ruling: (1) McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorneyclient privilege, because his statements were made in confidence to an attorney for a co-defendant for a common purpose related to both defenses. They were made in connection with the project of attempting to discredit Benton, a project in which Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys were jointly engaged for the benefit of both defendants. Ingram acknowledges that communications by a client to his own lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently shares them with co-defendants for purposes of a common defense. Uninhibited communication among joint parties and their counsel about matters of common concern is often important to the protection of their interests. In criminal cases it can be necessary to a fair opportunity to defend. Therefore, waiver is not to be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co-party's attorney for a common purpose. The privilege applies to communications by a client "to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest. The third type of communication occurs in the "joint defense" or "pooled information" situation, where different lawyers represent clients who have some interests in common. The rule does not apply to situations where there is No common interest to be promoted by a joint consultation, and the parties meet on a purely adversary basis. The privilege protects pooling of information for any defense purpose common to the participating defendants. Cooperation between defendants in such circumstances is often not only in their own best interests but serves to expedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial preparation. Ingram also seems to argue that the communication was not privileged because it was made to an investigator rather than an attorney. The investigator was an agent for Ingram's attorney, however, so it is as if the communication was to the attorney himself. "It has never been questioned that the privilege protects communications to the attorney's . . . agents . . . for rendering his services." The attorney who thus undertakes to serve his client's co-defendant for a limited purpose becomes the codefendant's attorney for that purpose. (2) Admissible, it falls under the business record exception of the hearsay rule. These diaries clearly fulfilled all the requirements which justify the admission of business records. These records were kept as part of a business activity and the entries were made with regularity at or near the time of the described event. Most importantly these diaries satisfied the central rationale of the business records exception: since Benton had to rely on the entries made, there would be little reason for him to distort or falsify the entries. Even if it is not in order it was shown that the entries were made at or near the time of the happening of the event, Ingram failed to rebut this matter. Even if any of the defendant's arguments were sufficient grounds to prevent admission of these diaries under the business record exception, they would be admissible under two other exceptions.

First, they would be admissible under the "residual" exception. A number of factors combine to demonstrate the reliability of the entries: the highly self-incriminatory nature of the entries themselves, the regularity with which they were made, Benton's need to rely on the entries. Where evidence complies with the spirit, if not the latter, of several exceptions, admissibility is appropriate under the residual exception. Second, these calendars would also be admissible as statements "by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Since these entries were made so that Benton could rely on them in carrying out his scheme, they aided and were "in furtherance of" the conspiracy. (3) In an offer of proof Weber indicated that the accountant would testify that in 1973, two years after the deposit of the bribe money, Weber told him, in connection with his preparation of an IRS audit, that the funds were obtained from Weber's mother. The records made by Weber's accountant are not trustworthy; they were prepared as a matter of his judgment and discretion; they were not produced as part of any regular system; there was no reliance on these notations by the accountant or others to guard against error or misstatement. If anything, the records in this case are less trustworthy since these notations were the product of Weber's own representations for the purposes of the audit, thereby furthering the possibility of misstatement.

NELLY LIM vs. CA and JUAN SIM G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992. FACTS: Private respondent sought to annulment his marriage with petitioner on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own behalf. Among such witnesses is the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Petitioner's counsel opposed on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity. The trial court allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado was only asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had prescribed. ISSUE Whether or not the testimony of the Doctor is confidential in nature or privileged. RULING Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence reads:

"SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient." The four fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit: "1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." Dr. Acampado did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is no showing that Dr. Acampado's answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. Furthermore, Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the latter's ailment and the treatment recommended therefor. MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN vs. CA and EDGAR KROHN, JR. G.R. No. 108854. June 14, 1994. A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report. On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the martial strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.

In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely. At the hearing , Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient. The trial court and the CA admitted the evidence. ISSUE Whether or not the evidence is covered by the doctor-patient relationship. RULING Lim v. Court of Appeals lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil cases; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient." In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.

BLUE CROSS HEALTH CARE, INC., Petitioner, vs. NEOMI* and DANILO OLIVARES, Respondents.

Facts: Respondent Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health care program with petitioner Blue Cross Health Care, Inc., a health maintenance firm. In the health care agreement, ailments due to pre-existing conditions were excluded from the coverage. Barely 38 days from the effectivity of her health insurance, Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted at the Medical City. She incurred hospital expenses amounting to P34,217.20. She requested from the representative of petitioner at Medical City a letter of authorization in order to settle her medical bills. But petitioner refused to issue the letter and suspended payment pending the submission of a certification from her attending physician that the stroke she suffered was not caused by a pre-existing condition.

Petitioners refusal to pay, constrained respondent spouses to settle the bill. They thereafter filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner in the MeTC. In a letter to petitioner dated February 14, 2003, Dr. Saniel stated that: This is in response to your letter dated February 13, 2003. [Respondent] Neomi T. Olivares called by phone on January 29, 2003. She stated that she is invoking patient-physician confidentiality. That she no longer has any relationship with [petitioner]. And that I should not release any medical information concerning her neurologic status to anyone without her approval. Hence, the same day I instructed my secretary to inform your office thru Ms. Bernie regarding [respondent's] wishes. The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the RTC, in a decision, reversed the ruling of the MeTC and ordered petitioner to pay respondents and held that it was the burden of petitioner to prove that the stroke of respondent Neomi was excluded from the coverage of the health care program for being caused by a pre-existing condition. It was not able to discharge that burden. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Contentions: Petitioner argues that respondents prevented Dr. Saniel from submitting his report regarding the medical condition of Neomi. Hence, it contends that the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced should apply in its favor. Respondents counter that the burden was on petitioner to prove that Neomi's stroke was excluded from the coverage of their agreement because it was due to a pre-existing condition. It failed to prove this. Issue: Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by a pre-existing condition and therefore was excluded from the coverage of the health care agreement Ruling: We agree with respondents.

Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow the presentation of Dr. Saniel's report was justified. It was privileged communication between physician and patient.

Furthermore, as already stated, limitations of liability on the part of the insurer or health care provider must be construed in such a way as to preclude it from evading its obligations. Accordingly, they should be scrutinized by the courts with extreme jealousy and care and with a jaundiced eye.Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to liability, it should have made its own assessment of whether respondent Neomi had a pre-existing condition when it failed to obtain the attending physician's report. It could not just passively wait for Dr. Saniel's report to bail it out. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not meet the strict standard required under our jurisprudence. xxx

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 29, 2005 decision and September 21, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84163 are AFFIRMED. Treble costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Petitioner never presented any evidence to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was due to a pre-existing condition. It merely speculated that Dr. Saniel's report would be adverse to Neomi, based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This was a disputable presumption at best. Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx xxx

(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.