Electoral Democracy and Poverty, Uneasy Companions

1. Executive Summary:
Democracy (or more accurately, the holding of elections) may have become the worlds new universal religion1 but the consolidation of democratic practices faces enormous challenges. While elections might have become the norm, the meaning and integrity of elections remain contested. This is particularly the case in low-income countries. The precarious existence of electoral democracy in these countries has prompted statements like poverty breeds dictatorships2 and poor people provide poor support for democracy.3 Despite successes in low-income countries such as India and Mali4, overall, endemic poverty provides a hostile environment for democratic consolidation. Despite the lack of consensus on the direction of causality, historical data seem to suggest that endemic poverty is bad for democratic consolidation. For instance, between the 1960s and 2004 sustained democratizations tended to occur in countries with per capita income greater than US$ 2,618 (in 2006 dollars). This is almost three times higher than the average income level of young democracies that experienced reversals to autocracy ($866).5 Furthermore, low-income democracies that survive tend to remain illiberal and with dubious records of electoral integrity. Elections in these countries are oftentimes marked by technical difficulties, fraud, violence, un-competitiveness, no rule of law, and failure to entrench accountability of elected officials. As a result of their questionable integrity, elections in low-income countries have failed to deliver in terms of representation of popular interests, respect for human rights, economic justice and basic physical security. These failures have in turn depressed participation, and in some instances contributed to the overthrow of democratic government itself. This is not to say that poor people are less democratic. The uneasy relationship between democracy and endemic poverty obtains largely because of structural conditions in lowincome countries that make democratic consolidation difficult. Citizens of low-income countries are neither authoritarian nor politically inactive.6 It is the failure of democratic government to deliver on basic political and economic rights that motivates the apparent lack of vigorous support for democracy in low-income countries. When

1 2

Cited in Chu, 2011 Przeworski, et al., 2000: p. 273 3 Krishna, 2008; Przeworski et al., 2008 4 It is important to note that even Malian democracy might be on the decline. The ADEMA collapse in the midst of the Konare succession battle in 2002 created a situation in which the new president, Traore, could coopt most of the opposition. As a result the presidents coalition won nearly 71% of parliamentary seats in 2007. This does not bode well for democratic consolidation as Mali appears to be on the path towards a hegemonic party system (See Levitsky and Way, 2010 p. 299). 5 Kapstein and Converse, 2008 6 Krishna and Booth, 2008 p. 148

elections lack integrity they not only foreclose on the realization of citizens dreams but also threaten the very existence of democratic government. In light of the reality sketched above, international support for electoral democracy must be accompanied with caution and sensitivity to local particularities. Such support must also be aimed at long-term institutional strengthening and capacity development.7 In addition, focus should be on both seismic and incremental changes. Indeed the empirical evidence suggests that the mere holding of elections has contributed to significant improvements in governance in a number of African countries.8 In the words of former president Bush, it is the practice of democracy that makes a country ready for democracy.9

2. Problem Statement:
Two strands of challenges hamper the integrity of elections in low-income countries. The first strand is logistical and technical due to the lack of resources and capacity. The second strand is political and related to the structural problems associated with young democracies in low-income states.

2.1. Technical Challenges:

2.1.1 The cost of elections: Running elections requires large economic and human capital investments. According to the UN Administration and Cost of Elections (UN ACE), new democracies face higher costs of elections than their more established counterparts. The cost is highest in post conflict elections (between US$10-30 per registered voter). The 1993 elections in Cambodia, for instance, cost $45 per elector. Many young democracies average between US$3.7 and $7 per registered voter.10 A 2004 survey by the Cost of Registration and Elections (CORE) Project found ranges in cost per voter between $0.81 (Switzerland, 2004) and $15 (Palestinian territories, 2004).11 The costs can sky rocket even in non post-conflict elections. For instance, the cost of the 2007 elections in Kenya was US$20.4 per registered voter (and $29 per cast ballot). Despite the high costs only 71% of potential voters were registered, while over 1.2 million dead people remained on the registers.12 In addition women and voters between the ages of 18 and 30 years were significantly under-registered.13
7

ACE Focus On, International IDEA 2008 See Lindberg, 2006? George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the 20 th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, 6 November 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-3.html 10 Lopez-Pinto and Fischer, 2005 11 Fischer, Jeff. 2004. Election cost survey results, ACE 12 Kenya National Reconciliation Accord, Basic Documents 13 Disregarding the entire the election cycle and only focusing on the period 2006-7 the figure is $13.74
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Election costs can be divided into integrity costs and core costs. Integrity costs associated with ensuring that elections are fraud-proof, voter education, etc tend to be highest in young democracies. Core costs associated with institutionalization and professionalization of electoral management bodies (EMBs) and the electoral process initially increase but then stabilize as democracies consolidate. It is important to note that in young democracies core costs including salaries and per diem sometimes far outweigh the integrity costs. This was the case in Guatemala in 2004 and Kenya in 2007. The major lesson from the raw cost of elections data is that election aid should focus not just on expenses but also efficiency. The aim should be both to finance and lower costs of elections by improving efficiency. 2.1.2. The state of voter registers: The poor state of voter registers in low-income countries is a constant complaint in election monitoring reports.14 Ghost voters, under-registration and general lack of confidence define the state of voter registers in many low-income countries. In general the lack of transparency and legitimacy of the voter registration process has caused a lack of acceptance of election results in a number of countries. 15 For instance, in Bangladesh it emerged in January of 2007 that as many as 12 million voters were illegally on the electoral role.16 This represented over 16% of the registered voters at the time. 17 In addition, the lack of a rolling voter registration process ensured that at least 3 million voters who turned 18 after registration ended were not registered. Similarly in Namibia the integrity of the voter register preceding the 2009 elections came into question after its rolls were decreased by 30%.18 The European Union (EU) observer mission for the 2008 Cambodian elections concluded in its final report that there were a significant number of mistakenly disenfranchised voters in the 2008 elections.19 In Kenyas 2007 elections 29% of eligible voters were not registered.20 In Zambias 2001 election the number was 44%. The technical shortcomings in voter registration highlighted above oftentimes are politically motivated. In some cases incumbents deliberately delayed the registration processes and the availability of voter registers for scrutiny for political reasons. An example is Bolivia, where despite a law requiring that registration be completed 90 days before elections ostensibly to allow for political parties to scrutinize voter registers registration for the 2009 elections were completed only a few days before elections.21
14
15

See the commonwealth observer mission reports: [website?] EISA Observer Mission Report, Namibia 2009 (p. 25) 16 UNDP Report: Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia, 2011 17 Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, 2008 18 EISA Observer Mission Report, Namibia 2009 19 European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report, Kingdom of Cambodia National Assembly Elections, 27 July 2008 (p. 2) 20 Kenya National Reconciliation Accord, Basic Documents 21 Final Report of the Observation Mission of the Bolivia Voter Registration 2009. The Cater Center.

Related to the problems of voter registration is the collection and consolidation of results. In many young democracies in low-income countries the collection and consolidation of results after polling has ended have been marked by allegations of fraud. In addition, too much delay in the announcement of results has raised suspicions, further undermining the legitimacy and integrity of electoral results in the eyes of the public. 2.1.3. Voter education: Elections in low-income countries have also been marked by evidence of low levels of voter education. High incidences of spoilt ballots are commonplace in elections in lowincome countries. Examples include, Mozambique (11.25%, 2009) and Indonesia (14%, 2009).22 A study of the incidence of invalid ballots in Latin America between 1980-2000 found wide variations in the average incidence of spoilt ballots. The worst performers on this measure included Brazil (33.29), Peru (24.3%), Ecuador (22.51) and Guatemala (11.72).23 While the causes of invalid voting are related to both socio-economic and political factors, voter education could go a long way in reducing the high incidences. This is especially true for low-income countries where literacy rates still remain high. The high rate of spoilt ballots in low-income countries constitutes a de facto disenfranchisement of poor voters. Voter education in low-income countries continues to be limited by the lack of funds. For example, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Mozambique lacked funds to conduct adequate voter education for the 2009 elections. In some instances polling staff resorted to providing on the spot voter education.24 Turnout in these elections were a paltry 44.63%. 11.25% of the ballots cast were invalid. The same applies to the 2007 Lesotho elections in which stakeholders attempts at voter education was hampered by challenges in raising funds and organizing themselves effectively enough.25

2.2. Structural Challenges:

The integrity of elections in low-income countries is not only challenged by the technical problems highlighted above but also by, broadly defined, the failure of elections to deliver. When elections do not result in adequate representation of citizens interests, improvement in material conditions, or respect for political freedoms, among other failings, the electorate begins to lose faith in the electoral process. 2.2.1. Partisan electoral management bodies: The integrity of Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) is critical to the management of elections. Different countries have different modes of staffing the bodies. In some EMBs are independent parts of the civil service staffed by non-partisan individuals of high repute. In others EMBs are staffed by presidential appointees while in others they are
22 23

EISA Observer Mission Report, Mozambique 2009 and Ufen, 2010 Power and Garand, 2007 24 EISA, Mozambique 2009 25 EISA Observer Mission Report, Lesotho 2007 (p. 18)

appointed by the major parties in the political system. Regardless of their mode of staffing, if elections are to be deemed free and fair, EMBs must be seen to be impartial. Unfortunately in many low-income countries they are not. Several observer mission reports have highlighted the lack of independence and professionalism in the EMBs of low-income states such as Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka, Guatemala, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, among others.26 Partisan EMBs directly challenge the integrity of elections, oftentimes prompting the opposition to boycott elections. The failure to guarantee the integrity of EMBs can have worse consequences. The post-election violence in Kenyan in 2008 was partly due to a discredited electoral body that lacked the confidence of the public. In the run-up to the election the President appointed 19 commissioners, including his former personal lawyer, to the 22-member Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). This was in direct contravention of a gentlemans agreement from 1997 that required equal representation of major parties at the ECK. The lack of confidence in the ECK caused many to believe that the 2007 elections were rigged, resulting in violence that caused of the loss of over 1000 lives and displaced hundreds of thousands. 2.2.2. Lack of stable party systems: Political parties are indispensable in democracies. Parties serve to articulate and aggregate citizens choices, represent those choices in government and when they win elections form governments. The sorry state of party development in young democracies in low-income countries should therefore be a cause for concern. In the words of Carothers, political parties are at once inevitable and the weakest link in the democratic consolidation process in young democracies.27 In most of these countries, political parties are leader-centric and lack programmatic platforms. They are mere electoral vehicles and only engage voters during the election season. Due to their being leader-centric, many of them lack internal democracy, a fact that contributes to their further weakening. The dire state of political parties has had dire consequences for the integrity of elections in particular and democratic development in general. Problematic party development has resulted in inadequate representation of citizens interests, a failure of education and socialization of citizens into the democratic process and (among incumbent parties) poor fulfillment of governmental function. Party weakness has also contributed to the entrenchment of ruling parties and a decrease in the competitiveness of elections.

see commonwealth observer mission reports [website] Carothers makes the argument that a key explanatory factor in the development of parties in young democracies is the fact they emerged in an electoralism-from-the-start environment. This made it hard for them to develop beyond being mere vehicles for achieving political office. In contrast, parties in mature democracies emerged before universal electoralism and consolidated first as interest groups.
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The direct consequences of this have been voter apathy and distrust of the political process. Carothers articulates the standard lament against about parties thus (paraphrased): Parties are self-interested organizations dominated by power-hungry elites who do not care for the interests of ordinary citizens Parties only become active during election time, the rest of the time you never hear from them Parties are ill-prepared for governing the country and do a bad of it when they take power, either in the executive or legislature

The case of Mozambique is instructive. In the early 1990s the donor community established a RENAMO Trust Fund to help the former rebel group transform itself into a political party. This effort yielded significant, albeit short-term, gains. RENAMO won 33.74 % of the presidential vote and 44% of seats in parliamentary. Mozambique was deemed a success story in post-conflict democratization. But years of internal leadership squabbles, lack of democracy and resource constraints have left RENAMO a shell of its old self. In the 2009 elections the party experienced internal fracture and garnered a paltry 16% of the vote. As a consequence the ruling party FRELIMO won 75% of the presidential vote and 76% of the seats in parliament. RENAMOs decline has brought with it a decrease in voter participation in the electoral process. Voter turnout in 2009 was a merely 45%, compared to 88% in 1994.28 Related to the problem of weak party institutionalization is the lack of proper regulation of political parties in low-income countries. Legal regulation can be used to create incentives for a more stable political system. The Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPAC) in Papua New Guinea has been touted as a success in stabilizing PNGs parliamentary politics.29 That said, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of formal regulation of political parties. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, despite laws against ethnic parties politicians continually run as independents and then caucus along informal clan networks. In the 2000 election independents won 73 of 105 seats in parliament.30 2.2.3. Inappropriate electoral systems The type of electoral system has consequences for the evolution of political competition. It follows therefore that the choice of electoral system should be sensitive to prevailing structural and socio-political conditions in a given country. For instance, it might make more sense to have a proportional representation system in an ethnically divided country instead of a first past the post, winner take all system. Unfortunately, many low income countries have tended to adopt the electoral system of their former colonial rulers. As a

28

Similar assistance was offered, with limited success to the FMLN in El Salvador (Kumar and de Zeeuw, 2008). 29 Okole, 2008 30 Collins, 2004

result, many ethnically divided societies in Africa and Asia have ended up with systems that provide incentives for zero-sum political competition that is prone to violence. The choice of electoral system also influences the development of party systems. Permissive electoral systems allow for the proliferation of parties while restrictive ones limit the number of effective political parties.31 For instance, changes I the electoral law in Thailand in 1997, mainly aimed at curbing vote-buying and reducing the influence of money in politics failed because of a lack of a credible enforcement mechanism. The reforms however reduced the effective number of parties from an average of 6.2 to 3.1 in 2001. 2.2.4. Lack of strong institutions to regulate democratic competition: The integrity of electoral democracy hinges on a set of indispensable supporting institutions such as courts, the police, and the observance of the rule of law. In the absence of these institutions, electoral competition creates not democracy but, as Paul Collier has put it, democrazy.32 The spread of elections in weakly institutionalized states many of them low-income - results not in accountable governance but delegative democracy.33 These electoral democracies are characterized by the lack of limits on the power of the winners of elections. In addition, electoral contests are zero-sum games not subject to enforceable rules of conduct. As a result, violence, vote-buying, weak or non-existent regulation of political parties conduct and finances, and the threat of military intervention in politics are part and parcel of political competition in many of these countries. As Huntington noted decades ago, peaceful competition is impossible in the absence of strong state institutions.34 Needless to say, this situation creates significant challenges to the integrity of elections in these countries. Below we shall look at some of these factors in more detail. 2.2.5. Electoral Violence: Electoral violence characterizes many an election in low-income countries. In the recent past the world has seen the horror of such violence manifest itself in Kenya, Nigeria, India, Cote dIvoire, Philippines, among other places. A statistical study by Collier and Rohner (2008) concluded that, below an income threshold (around $2,700 per capita) democracy increases proneness to political violence. The logic behind this is that democracy appreciably reduces a governments capacity to repress open protest. When this happens in the absence of strong institutions to regulate political behavior the result is an increased ability of disaffected groups to resort to violence to express their grievances.

31 32

See Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, 2008 Collier, 2009 (p. 15) 33 ODonell, 1994 34 Huntington, 1968

It is important to note that electoral violence is not a monopoly of incumbents. Realizing the potential efficacy of violence and intimidation, opposition parties also engage in the practice such as in Serbia (1997), Senegal (2007), and Peru (2000), among others.35 Statistical evidence from Latin America suggests that weak institutionalization is a key cause of electoral violence. States that are institutionalized have their policy choices influenced less by political protests and more by institutional channels such as legislatures. In brief, in the absence of strong institutions politicians are more likely than not to resort to the dangerous political game of, in the words of former Ivorian president Gbagbo, my street against your street.36 The cynical role of politicians in fomenting electoral violence in low-income democracies cannot be gainsaid. In many instances politicians tactfully employ violence both as a mobilization tool and a way to gerrymander the voting patterns in swing electoral districts.37 And it works. From India to Nigeria to Kenya, the strategic use of violence has been empirically shown to be effective in intimidating opponents and suppressing voter turnout.38 In addition to the role of political parties and politicians, state security forces and other non-state armed groups also play a role in determining the level of electoral violence. Disproportionate responses by state security forces to election-related protests in Kenya (2008) and Thailand (2010) led to several civilian deaths. Illicit armed groups who are essentially thugs for hire are also key perpetrators of election violence. For example in Kenya, the Philippines and Indonesia hired thugs have been used by both the government and opposition groups to consolidate votes in chosen electoral bases and to threaten rival political groups. 39 These gangs have established no-go zones for rival political parties e.g. in Cambodia and Zimbabwe, which defeats the purpose of competitive elections. A key tenet of democratic competition is that all parties must be allowed to campaign to the entire electorate.40 2.2.6. Vote buying: Vote buying is rampant in low-income democracies. This is due to 1) the failure of party development highlighted above and 2) perverse incentives to voters and politicians alike in the context of high levels of poverty. Vote buying is a threat to the integrity of elections because it creates doubts over whether electoral outcomes actually reflect the will of the people. In addition, vote buying disproportionately favors incumbents who can use state resources to influence voters against under-funded opposition parties. Most studies of vote buying arrive at the conclusion that poverty exacerbates the problem. In low-income countries, clientilistic relations trump programmatic appeals in getting out the vote.41 A 2007 survey in Nigeria revealed that at least 20% of the electorate is
35 36

Carothers, 2010, p. 30 Quoted in Mcgovern, 2011, p. 2 37 See Wilkinson, 2004; Kasara, 2009 and UNDP Report, 2011 38 See Wilkinson, 2004 and Collier and Vicente, 2008 39 see UNDP Report, 2011; Anderson, 2002; and Branch and Cheeseman, 2008 40 Levitsky and Way, 2010, p. 8 41 Owen, 2009

exposed to vote buying.42 Weak institutions foreclose on politicians ability to credibly promise to deliver programmatic goods to voters.43 In addition, from politicians perspective, buying votes, especially among the poor,44 provides a bigger bang for the buck than investing in long-term policies.45 This creates the undesirable situation in which commitment to democracy is not unwavering but merely contingent on electoral outcomes. Voting blocs invest in having their man/woman in office so they can receive club goods, further eroding the legitimacy of elections. Vote buying is also inimical to the consolidation of transparent democratic practices because it disproportionately favors incumbents. The use of state resources for the purposes of elections is endemic among low-income countries. For instance in the February 2011 elections in Uganda, barely halfway through the fiscal year the central government requested for a supplementary budget of $267.6 million. Some ministries had already spent nearly 90% of their annual budgets. Some even transferred their fund allocations back to the office of the president. Widely cited reports show that President Musevenis reelection might have cost upwards of $300 million.46 The case of Thailand is illustrative of the consequences of vote buying on the integrity of elections. After the 2006 election the yellow shirts took to the streets protesting Prime Minister Thaksins victory at the polls partly due to Thailands culture of money politics.47 The urban yellow shirts rubbished the support that Thaksin got from the mostly rural red shirts because they believed that the former were likely to sell their votes to the highest bidder.48 Eventually the military stepped in and overthrew the Thaksin government in September of 2006, marking the fourth failed attempt at democratization in Thailand.49 2.2.7. Lack of rule of law: The above problems are aggravated by the absence of rule of law in many low-income democracies. In many of these countries, laws exist that proscribe anti-democratic practices such as vote buying and political violence. Yet these laws continue to be flouted without any negative consequences. Both the law enforcement and judicial institutions in these countries are oftentimes compromised or lack the capacity to carry out their functions. The failure to enforce existing laws encourages a culture of impunity that further corrodes the trust in institutions, including those associated with electoral democracy. The inability of citizens to realize their aspirations through constitutional means creates
42 43

Bratton, 2008 Keefer, 2004. For an extended discussion see Bratton (2008) 44 A survey of the 2007 elections in Nigeria revealed that 68% of people were offered money, 26% food or clothing and 6% jobs (see Bratton, 2008). 45 Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004 46 Barkan, 2011; See also Izama, 2011 47 Dressel, 2010 48 Lintner, 2009 49 Converse and Kapstein, 2008

incentives for citizens to use extra-constitutional means such as coups and popular revolutions - of influencing governance. As Aguero points out, military or security forces today are more likely to endanger democracy by lessening its quality and depth than by threatening its outright and swift overthrow.50 In the recent past coups have rocked young democracies in low-income and middle-income countries ranging from Mauritania, to Honduras, to Thailand. The specter of extra-constitutional change of power diminishes the integrity of elections. Lastly, the failure of democratic electoralism to limit the power of incumbents is a direct challenge to the integrity of elections. Limited government is one of the pillars of sound governance. It is only in countries with high levels of accountability of elected officials that the fruits of electoralism material well-being and improvement in human rights are readily realized.51 In many low-income countries superpresidentialism is a constant threat to democracy and the integrity of elections.52 It is hard to guarantee the integrity of the electoral process in the context of unlimited presidential power.53 2.2.8. Perceived failure of democracy to deliver: When all is said and done democracy, as a technology of government, must be seen to deliver. Top on many citizens agenda is the need for democracy to guarantee material well-being, broad-ranging civil liberties and respect for human rights. Unfortunately, in many low-income countries, democracy has failed to deliver on these economic and political goods. This has diminished citizens revealed support for democracy. In nonperforming democracies electoral turnout and other measures of citizen participation show a downward trend. Empirical evidence from 1960-2004 shows higher rates of democratic collapse in societies with high levels of economic inequality than their more equal counterparts. Over the same period, the average poverty rate of countries that experienced democratic collapse was twice (40%) of those that survived (20%). Other measures of well-being such as infant mortality rates also show similar patterns. All things considered, the extent to which economic development has benefited all citizens may be a key factor in determining how democracy fares.54 Going beyond individual economic well-being, it is important for democracy to be seen to deliver economic goods equally across different groups. When certain groups are disproportionately at a disadvantage in the political and/or economic market (thus creating horizontal inequalities) it might be a source of political violence and instability.
50 51

Aguero, 2009 Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005 52 Collins, 2011 53 One example is the ability of presidents to control the electoral cycle for their advantage. In Zambia, for instance, President Banda announced the official election date for the 2011 general elections barely two months before the September elections. See Zambias Banda sets date for elections, Daily Nation, July 28th 2011 54 Converse and Kapstein, 2008, p. 61

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Since individual welfare is oftentimes tied to group welfare, democracy must be seen to provide equal access to political and economic resources to all social groups present in a given polity.55 In the same vein, the failure to protect human rights is a threat to democracy and the integrity of elections. Studies have shown that democracies below a certain threshold of democratic quality condone the abuse of human rights. Electoral competition alone does not guarantee the protection of human rights.56 In addition, empirical evidence shows that weak states regardless of regime type have worse human rights records than strong ones.57 Some scholars have also made the argument that certain institutional arrangements like smaller districts, for instance are better at guaranteeing the protection of human rights as compared to large district PR systems.58 Lastly, as the UN Centre for Human Rights has noted, elections themselves are human rights events.59 When elections come with the curtailment of freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression and information they become instances of human rights violation. 2.2.8 Over-centralization Most low-income countries have highly centralized systems of government. Overcentralization creates three main problems for democratic government: i) it diminishes politicians responsiveness to their constituents ii) It limits the adaptability of democratic institutions. Failure in the centre oftentimes means a failure of democracy in general. This then serves to reduce peoples belief in democracy as a form of government.60 And lastly iii) Over-centralization limits the extent to which institutions of national governance can check the president (and executive in general). In light of these observations, it is imperative that the process of democratization be accompanied by a genuine attempt at decentralization. This means decentralization of both political and fiscal management. Sub-national jurisdictions must be allowed to elect their own governors and have meaningful control of their own budgets. In this sense, democratization achieves a modular characteristic in which case failure at the national level doesnt necessarily affect the entire political system, making democracy more likely to succeed under federalism than under a unitary system.61 The empirical evidence from Africa, Asia and Latin America tend to support this view. Countries that have had both fiscal and political decentralization including Brazil,
Stewart, 2001 See Butler, Gluch and Mitchell, 2007; Puddington, 2011; Davenport, 2007; and Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005 57 Englehart, 2009 58 Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010 59 UN Centre for Human Rights: Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on the Legal, Technical and Human Rights Aspects of Elections. Professional Training Series No. 2 60 Diamond, 1989? 61 Myserson, 2006
55 56

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Bolivia, India and Indonesia have seen improvements in political and economic conditions. In Bolivia, a quantitative and qualitative analysis of decentralization provides evidence that it caused striking compositional shifts in accordance with local needs and that it made public investment more responsive to the real local needs of Bolivias citizens and shifted resources toward poorer, mostly rural districts.62 When decentralization has failed it is because the central government has maintained the authority to control the budgets and appoint the leaders of sub-national governments. In this sense decentralization has become a tool for the consolidation of autocratic rule. The case of Uganda and China is illustrative of this fact.63 Despite these two cases, the overall picture appears to point towards a consensus that, if done well, decentralization can benefit the poor, increase political representation and participation and deliver economic results. Decentralized states do better on metrics of governance. They are politically and economically freer and have less corruption than their unitary counterparts.64 2.2.9 Foreign Interference: Many low-income countries are dependent on foreign budgetary support in one form or another. As a result, foreign donors - both governmental and non-governmental - have enormous influence on the affairs of these states. The extent of foreign interference on domestic politics and policy has implications for the integrity of elections. When elected officials are beholden not to their citizens but to foreign powers democratic electoralism begins to lose its integrity. When foreign donors signal support for incumbents regardless of their electoral practices they indirectly sanction violation of basic levels of electoral fairness. In the recent past blatantly unfair elections in Belarus (2010), Rwanda (2010), Uganda (2011), and Ethiopia (2010), among others have been condoned by influential foreign powers for geopolitical reasons. The unconditional foreign backing of these countries creates disincentives for reforms towards improving the integrity of elections.

3. Recommendations:
Given the challenges facing the integrity of elections in low-income countries, this report recommends the following actions: 1. Electoral assistance should last the entire electoral cycle: This includes assistance for continuous updating of voter registers, training and professionalization of EMBs, and voter education. This should also be extended to include support for professional domestic election observation throughout the electoral cycle. 2. Independence of EMBs should be non-negotiable: Support for elections conducted under partisan EMBs in effect endorses vote rigging. International
62 63

Faguet, 2006 P. 147 Bardham and Moorhkerjee, 2006 p. 47; See also Azfar, Livingstone and Meagher, 2006 64 Kincaid, 2008 p. 97-101; see also Baiocchi, 2006

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

electoral assistance must insist on the principals of integrity, expertise and political independence when it comes to staffing EMBs. More robust party aid: The assistance offered to political parties should go beyond seminars and insistence on internal democracy to more political issues. This includes enabling parties maintain their membership through material assistance. The so-called RENAMO Trust Fund can be a model to be emulated. In addition, party aid should not be constrained by the mythical model of parties in established democracies.65 Instead, focus should be on ensuring that the main political parties broaden their support and survive the electoral cycle in the context of prevailing local conditions. The horizontal learning initiative started by International IDEA and NDI to facilitate regional interaction of political parties is a good idea. Party aid should also be aimed at bridging the gap between parties and civil society groups.66 Electoral support should be open to the full range of institutional design/arrangements available: Instead of a cut-and-paste approach, institutional design in young democracies must be sensitive to local socio-economic conditions. Political party regulation must be emphasized: Electoral assistance should be conditioned on the enforcement of existing regulation of political parties. Transparent management of party finances and internal democracy must also be emphasized. Electoral violence should not be tolerated: Violators of the codes of conduct of elections must be punished in order to limit electoral violence. Politicians must be held individually accountable for political violence carried out in their name. Electoral support should also include deliverables: The integrity of elections cannot be divorced from the deliverables of the electoral process. Democracy is only meaningful if it works for the people. International support for democracy must also focus on the issue of economic justice as well. The end of democracy must be made to be the equal access to economic and political resources for all individuals and social groups within a given polity.

References:
65 66

Carothers, 2006 p. 123 Carothers, 2006

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