Philosophy of Science Association

Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology Author(s): Richard Boyd Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1980, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1980), pp. 613-662 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192615 Accessed: 16/10/2009 08:31
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Scientific

Realism

and Naturalistic

Epistemology

Richard Cornell

Boyd

University

1,

Introduction

realism" philosophers mean the doctrine By "scientific ordinarily that non-observational terms in scientific theories should typically be interpreted as putative and that when the expressions, referring semantics of theories is understood that way ("realistically"), scientific theories whose (approximate) embody the sorts of propositions truth can be confirmed by the ordinary experimental methods which scientists There are as many possible versions of scientific employ. realism as there are possible accounts of how "theoretical terms" refer and of how the actual methods of science function to produce knowledge. What I will do in this paper is to explore the consequences of one such version of scientific a version which embodies the imrealism, as well as the implications of the realist plicatures slogan that is prior to thought. What I have in mind is a dialectical and reality naturalistic of how scientific conception language works and how scientific a conception knowledge is achieved, according to which not only scientific as knowledge, but the language and methods of the sciences hard-won victories in a continuing to accomwell, represent struggle modate our intellectual to the structure of an independently practices world. In broad outline, the picture of science which this existing conception presents goes like this: In the first the world has a quite place, ture, and many of its most important features unaided senses. causal struccomplicated are unobservable to the

Scientific and the unobknowledge extends to both the observable servable features of the world, but it is achieved by a process of successive and over time, the operation of approximation: typically, the scientific method results in the adoption of theories which provide increasingly accurate accounts of the causal structure of the

PSA 1980, Copyright

Volume 2, pp. 613-662 1981 by the Philosophy (

of Science

Association

614 world. If we think of beliefs or theories as being "accommodated" to the world insofar as they are accurate of some of its descriptions then scientific features, procedes knowledge by accommodation by successive approximation. What is true of scientific is also true of scientific knowledge as well. scientific must provide us language Adequate terminology with the descriptive to describe the (typically machinery necessary of natural features unobservable) fundamentally important phenomena, and to classify them in ways which reflect the complex causal properties which these Scientific must provide phenomena possess. language us with the descriptive to "cut the world at its machinery necessary This sort of accommodation between scientific joints". terminology and the causal structure of the world is, like scientific knowledge, achieved this is accommodation Moreover, by successive approximation. not merely a matter of the introduction of new terms to reflect new discoveries and the deletion of terms which reflect the influence of refuted theories. Nor is the process of accommodation subsequently a matter of these with the progressive remerely processes together finement of usage of existing that too is impor(though terminology The very mechanisms of reference--the tant). ways in which scientific is connected to features of the world--undergo a developterminology in the direction of a closer fit and "tighter" between ment--typically of features and the important causal scientific (in use) terminology not only in that its is prior to thought structure reality. Reality is largely in that of what we believe, but also the very independent of thought at any rate, of the public of (or, machinery expression of a accommodation to the structure continuous thought) undergoes causal largely independent reality. and language Not only do theories accommodate to the world by successive so do the scientific methods and epistemologiapproximation: cal principles is achieved. Methods in particular by which knowledge accommosciences are theory-dependent, and they become more closely dated to the structure of the world as the theories upon which they of parnot only the methods Moreover, depend become more accurate. of scientific or the more general features ticular sciences but also to the causal accommodation method develop experimental by successive a priori method possesses of the world. No inductive structure justiof the scientific feature For any significant fication. general in which it would be worlds it is possible to imagine method, possible but in which some alternative strategy methodological inappropriate, characThe methods of knowledge would make the acquisition possible. the proworld reflect in the actual of scientific teristic rationality and epistemoof our methodological accommodation practices gressive which our world posstructure standards to the particular logical to the corto thought not only with respect is prior sesses. Reality in which of the language rectness of theories and the appropriateness to the standards but also with respect by which they are expressed, of thought is to be assessed. the rationality Finally, the accommodation of theory, language and method to the

615 it is also a world is not only a matter of successive approximation, In the first the general tenplace, process. profoundly dialectical theories over time to become progessively dency of accepted scientific more accurate depends on the fact that later scientific theories are, of earlier in the almost always, refinements or modifications theories considerations. The effect light of new evidence or new theoretical of such modifications is (again, and over time) to preserve typically while eliminating and extend the grains of truth in preceding theories errors. the process of accommodation between scientific Similarly, a dialectical of the world reflects process language and the structure of refinement and modification of linguistic and a correspractice, in the development of scientific methodponding dialectic operates of it. Moreover, these three processes ology and our understanding of mutual dependence: of accommodation display a dialectical relationship new theoretical knowledge leads to improvements in scientific language and in methodology; better methodology leads to greater theoretical knowledge, and so forth. If this picture of science is approximately then an adeaccurate, of science must be realistic since it must reflect quate philosophy the fact that knowledge of "theoretical entities" is possible. It must also be naturalistic (in the sense that it sees not only theoretical but linguistic and epistemological issues as well, as issues, issues depending for their solution on a posteriori broadly empirical in the sense just it must be dialectical, considerations); finally, discussed. Now, the picture of science which I have just sketched is --at least in its pre-analytic formulation--commonsensical. (I do not mean to say that it is the commonsense view of science; what is commonsensical is a matter of the current climate of opinion and there is no doubt that some skeptical mixture of logical and relatipositivism vism is also now commonsensical.) this version of sciNevertheless, entific realism--if it is developed and articulated into a systematic in the philosophy I believe, of science--has, some important position but controversial for our understanding of scientific implications knowledge. In this paper I will explore some of these implications which bear on outstanding I will also say of science. issues in the philosophy something about what this version of realism does not imply; I am persuaded that the attractiveness of anti-realistic in the phipositions that realism losophy of science often stems as much from the belief has unacceptable as from the (very powerful) verificaconsequences tionist considerations which are the traditional basis epistemological for the rejection of realism. I will content myself with In general, rather brief discussions of the doctrines I shall defend. I have defended most of the doctrines so have a number elsewhere, and, often, of other philosophers. The reader who wishes to see a fuller defense of these doctrines cited. may consult the references 2. Outline Realism of a Naturalistic and Dialectical Version of Scientific

616 2.1. The Theory Ladenness Dictum, Nagel's istic of Science Epistemology of Method and the Natural-

One dimension differences verbetween along which we may discern sions of scientific realism concerns the extent to which their general accounts of scientific is compatible with that of nonmethodology in the empiricist realists tradition. One view of the matter is that realists instrumentalists share a common basic of and, say, conception the logic and methods of science, but that about whether they disagree those methods are adequate to establish of unobservable knowledge phenomena. is stated This conception with admirable clarity by Nagel of course concludes--as a realist would not--that the dis(who also and logical between realists about the semanagreement empiricists tics of scientific and the extent of scientific is knowledge language "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that when verbal). merely of theories are stated the two opposing views on the cognitive status into not with some circumspection, each can assimilate its formulation the primary matter subject only the facts explored by exconcerning the relevant facts the logic but also perimental concerning inquiry and procedures of science. In brief, between these the opposition of speech." over preferred mode views is a conflict 1961, (Nagel pp. 151-152). and their An alternative realistic position might hold that realists about the methodology by which instrumental empiricist opponents agree methoin believing that and that they agree this is obtained, knowledge to establish theoretical is insufficient Realists, knowledge. dology or methodologiadditional on this must propose view, epistemological is their claim that theoretical cal principles to justify knowledge seems to be the one which J.J.C. Smart adopts; This position possible. are philosophical he appears to think that the additional principles of scientific evidence than principles rather (Smart 1963, principles methoOf course, one might hold that the additional I and II). Chaps. in whatever the relevant were also, sense, prindological principles none of these If I am right, of experimental apmethodology. ciples is correct. of science to the epistemology proaches reliabilsome terminology: Let me introduce By the "instrumental to provide mean its I will (given ability theory ity" of a scientific accurate suitable predictions approximately "auxiliary hypotheses") knowlof observable about the behavior By "instrumental phenomena. that they theories about particular mean the knowledge edge" I will about oband the concomitant are instrumentally knowledge reliable, of methodologiservable reliability" By the "instrumental phenomena. to the production to contribute I mean their cal principles, capacity of instrumental knowledge. that of science uncontroversial Now it is almost among philosophers it but actual. is not only possible instrumental Similarly, knowledge methods some of) the actual that uncontroversial is almost (at least are these claims reliable. of science are instrumentally Moreover, consensus. of current matters not merely They have been presuppositions

617 of science of the philosophy of empiricist (and, importantly, philosof the discipline. One of the from the beginnings ophy of science) effects of these has been to introduce ininteresting presuppositions to the philosophiral works of logical and their successors positivists an empirical or naturalistic strain out of keeping with their entirely oft proclaimed to the distinction between allegiance empirical inquiry and the sort of logical and conceptual characteristic inquiry properly of philosophy. reconstruction" meant the positivists By "rational task of identifying the sound features and explicating of actual scientific and the well-confirmed features of actual scientific methods, theories. Rational in the hands of logical reconstruction, positivhas two distinct careful examination of the actual ists, components: methods and findings in the sciences, and the application to those methods and findings of some version or other of anti-metaphysical verificationist While the second of these was principles. components to represent and logical supposed considerations, conceptual purely the first was evidently to detailed tied of the work of consideration actual scientists. it was by no means the case that the first of these Furthermore, was always to the second components (as it might have been subsidiary if the examination of actual scientific had been a mere practice "heuristic" device to aid in the discovery of methodological or conwhich would later be defended on purely ceptual principles conceptual and logical it was (and is) routine for Instead, grounds). utterly the results of a prioristic the foundations of reasoning concerning science to be abandoned when found to be incompatible with actual scientific to such considerations see Hempel (for an appeal practice considerations of this sort have been the 1965, chapter 4; in fact, decisive force in the development of recent of science). philosophy the intrusion of such precursors of naturalistic Indeed, epistemology into of science was not limited to features of empiricist philosophy method. Causal theories of measurement to philosophical analogous causal theories of perception to some extent, causal theories of (and, were recurring, if obscure, themes the 1950's, reference) throughout in the work of Feigl see also (see Feigl especially 1956; MacCorquodale and Meehl 1948, which was obviously influenced and strongly by Feigl, in which the doctrines of this section are anticipated). I have elsewhere defended forth(see Boyd 1972, 1973, 1979, 1980, the view that the naturalistic elements (a), (b)), coming forthcoming of the strategy of rational reconstruction the basis actually provide not only for the defense of scientific realism various veragainst sions of logical but also for the articulation of an acempiricism, count of the epistemology of science which represents a fundamental break with the empiricist and with the conception of realtradition, ists' dictum and by the alternaepistemology represented by Nagel's tive offered What I have sought to establish is the followby Smart. No scientifically of the instrumental ing claim: plausible explanation of actual scientific methods is possible which does not reliability those methods as reliable for the acquisition of theoretical portray as well. the reliability or knowledge Moreover, (instrumental

618 of scientific methods be at a given time will theoretical) typically bethat the existing theoretical explicable only on the assumption for its rewhich form the background are (in relevant liefs operation is The basic idea which I have defended true. spects) approximately inare so heavily that theoretical considerations and so crucially in the operation volved of actual the only way scientific method that to explain even the instrumental of that method is to porreliability as well. with respect to theoretical tray it as reliable knowledge I want to examIn order view can be defended how this to indicate of ways in ine the epistemological role of three of the many sorts which theoretical influence our scientific considerations practice. be useful to introduce two additional techniIt will in this regard cal terms. I will respect respect sequences (a) tion of call two theories T1 and T2 observationally equivalent with

with scientific theories to an existing (i.e., body of accepted if the same observational conto an existing "total science") sciences": "total from each of the two following would follow modified as it would be by the adopthe existing total science T1 existing total science modified as it would be if T2 were

(b) the adopted.

be infinitescience there will total Given any plausible initial One way of putting under this relation. classes ly many equivalence of scientific method is of the instrumental the problem reliability each time classes one of these In fact we choose this: equivalence of finitely a theory, and we do so on the basis we accept many obserwith observational than consistency criteria So some other vations. criteria. the "extra-experimental" Call these data must be at work. In the criteria Whatever these are, they work. extra-experimental theories. run we get quite good predictive (but not very long) long work? criteria Why do these sort of extra-theoretithe most commonplace discuss Let me first have recognized of science which philosophers cal criterion [roughly, which theories take seriously only those entrenchment]: We, in fact, of their in respect theories our existing resemble closely relatively theories We prefer and the laws they contain. commitments ontological enat least entities"--or "theoretical over familiar which quantify in some cases, ones familiar tities appropriate (or, very much like which preditheories we prefer of familiar constituents entities); at least familiar entities cate of theoretical propproperties--or whose laws are--if new theories we prefer like familiar erties ones; comleast we have previously not consistent with those adopted--at laws of most of our previously with the maintenance accepted patible we reject theory as approximations. any proposed outright Generally, a real unless best confirmed which contradicts the laws we consider crisis new theories even then we will is at hand--and strongly prefer

619 which preserve the old laws as approximations.

Two points about these criteria are important. extra-experimental of preference In the first these for theoretically criteria place, are the real basis for the judgments theories which are traplausible as judgments of "simplicity": our preference for ditionally glossed in the first a preference for theotheories is, instance, "simpler" ries which represent modifications of our existing "simple" relatively theories. this of simplicity has an epistemological notion Moreover, we prefer of existing those features to preserve theories component: which seem best confirmed and to accept in features whose evichanges dential is less In particular, status secure. is not a "simplicity" neutral are profoundly theory notion; simplicity dependent judgments on the existing and they rest theoretical tradition, upon episteof confirmation" of various comabout the "degree mological judgments of that tradition, which are--as we shall see--themponents judgments selves theory-dependent. A second which has been emphasized is the folpoint, by Putnam, In the course of scientific research about some particular lowing: of theories handful are "in the field" at any one issue, only a small time. If this weren't efforts would not be so narso, our research focused as they are. rowly and carefully (that "Simplicity" judgments of theoretical form the criteria is, judgments plausibility) by which the field is narrowed. One consequence of this is that narrowing, of alternative classes only a few of the infinitely many equivalence modifications to our existing total science are taken seriously with to any given issue. It is from this small handful respect that, by observation or experiment is also a judicious (where judiciousness theoretical we make our choice. We ignore notion), many infinitely classes of our existing modifications of) alternative (equivalence total which have never been tested science, (much less refuted) by direct This "narrowing down" experiment. And, we get away with it! of our options seems to contribute of to the instrumental reliability the scientific rather than to detract from it, as one might method, reliable with respect to the task expect. Why? Why is this strategy of finding reliable theories? instrumentally Another theory-laden methodological is that which countenances commonplace fication or extension of procedures of "theoretical" entities and magnitudes. even more striking instrumental thing, Suppose that T1 (t) is a well which is almost as principle theoretical modicriticism, measurement and detection for This principle if anyhas, consequences. theory containing the

confirmed

theoretical term t, and supported by observations that "measurements" of t have thus far Suppose measurement m whose ml, ..., using procedures serted by "mini-theories" M, ..., M .

in some class D. been possible only is asreliability

620 Now imagine T1, is confirmed that some new theory different T2(t), only distantly related T2 has suitable the range for of the the to happy "mea-

by entirely that

observations. mr+1 is outside

consequence, surement"
tion of ml,

Mr+1, of t under
..., mr.

a new procedure well

circumstances

applica-

Under ported

these

circumstances, evidence,

if

T1 and T2 are we shall

each

quite

well

supT1 (t) with

by experimental

confidently when

expect

to yield true (or approximately the new measurement procedure

true) mr+l.

predictions

employed

its

And we get away with it! and what Why? What is "measurement", which would permit relation to theory, us to be confident that true observational even if no nonpredictions (T1A Mr+l) yields

is

from this has ever been trivial observational prediction conjunct about as I will this tested before? later, [Actually, puzzle suggest is a special and its case of a general measurement theory-dependence of unirole of science" and the epistemological about "unity puzzle theoretical terms.] vocality judgments regarding of experimental consider the question Suppose Finally, design: are tests Which experimental that T is a suitably plausible theory. observaits to warrant our accepting and expecting sufficient it, to be approximately Which finite true? tional (and typipredictions can we count as suitably tests number of experimental small) cally of T? of the predictive for an assessment reliability representative asthat we are actually to make it more interesting, [Remember, just not of T taken jointly with other--perhaps the reliability sessing As an answer, hypotheses.] auxiliary yet discovered--well-confirmed I propose the following: The Fundamental Rule of Experimental Design:

of the criticism. T to theoretical 1. [Ask, in the light Subject are to the mechanisms/ there what alternatives best available theories, known on the baWhat mechanisms, or required by T. posited processes of the mechawith the operation sis of other theories, might interfere of T depend Does the plausibility or requires? nisms which T posits now on a theory rest which themselves considerations upon theoretical in T? Etc.] in dispute? What weakness might that indicate 2. After you have subjected a public of course, typically T under circumstances then test indicate as criticism retical wrong. criticisms T to theoretical [this is, rather than an individual activity], of those which theorepresentative where it might plausibly go places

621 That is how we do it. And that's as theory-dependent as you can indicates And it works--the that very success of our practice get. the use of theoretical criticisms enables us to pick finitely many so that the theorepresentative, experiments which are sufficiently ries which we do accept turn out to be very good predictive instruments indeed. Why does this principle work?

there is a neat point to Before we answer these three questions, and the third of these principles are related be made. The first in that both require that a theory be tested against plausible rivals. Some philosophers have treated the first as purely pragprinciple matic. We are only able to think up a few theories, which, in turn, seem natural to us because they resemble theories we have already got. We test these out first, not because we have reason to believe that one of them will work, but because it is pragmatically sound to test chose theories It is like picking out a hamyou already have first. mer--you see if the ones at the local hardware store work before ordering something more esoteric. We can already see that this tral issue unsettled: since we esoteric theoretical hammers (of why do we so often hit the nail leaves a cenpragmatic justification almost never send away for one of the which there is an infinite variety), on the head?

Better yet, however, is the observation that the third principle that a proposed predictive instrument be tested against requires even when those rivals are mere "hunches". We may plausible rivals, have an alternative to a proposed theory T which suggests that it circumstances might go wrong under experimental C, even though our alternative makes no specific The about C whatsoever. prediction relevant alternatives to T need not be predictive at instruments all! is very much unlike hammer buying. Theory testing A satisfactory naturalistic answer regarding the instrumental reof each of these methodological if is available liability principles one assumes that they apply in a situation in which the relevant backare already approximately true [as well as instruground theories On this assumption, the reliability of each of mentally reliable]. the principles in question with respect to the acceptance of predicreliable theories can be explained in terms of its contribution tively to the overall of scientific with respect to the reliability practice of theoretical and laws which are not only preacceptance principles reliable but approximately true as well. dictively Thus the first constrains to accept us, prima facie, principle whose laws and ontologies resemble the laws only theories closely and ontologies of theories If those theories, in already accepted. accurate picture of the "furniture of turn, provide a sufficiently the world" and how it works, then the operation of this principle will serve to make it more likely that theories which we take

622 seriously are themselves approximately true.

if well-confirmed theories are approximately true of Similarly, real and if "measurement" entities and "detection" of theoretical enare measurement tities and detection, then there is no epistereally about the legitimacy of theoretical modification or mological puzzle extension of measurement of the sort described. procedures Adopting the detection countenanced is no procedures by such modifications more problematic than applying the lens-makers epistemologically equations to design a microscope and then using the microscope to observe bacteria. the theory of experimental Finally, dependent principle design, if it operates the background of a sufficiently and accurate against total will tend to isolate these suitably complete science, respects in which a proposed is (speaking to most likely theory evidentially) if it is going fail to fail at all. I propose that these (and I have argued elsewhere) explanations in fact, the only scientifically for the are, plausible explanations of the theory-laden in question, reliability methodological principles once it is remembered that the operation of these does principles work and that a purely of them treatment epistemological pragmatic the vital about the instrumental of questions ignores reliability scientific a reliability which even the most ardent contemmethod, do not question. porary empiricists Thus Nagel's is false: no adequate of the logic dictum account and methods of of science can be neutral with respect to the issue to and this remains true even if one restricts one's concern realism; which those facts about the logic and methods of science explaining to be Smart's anti-realistic What appears empiricists accept. uniformly is not of the status is likewise false: of realism there conception knowlone set of methodological for instrumental principles appropriate knowlof theoretical and an additional to the sort set appropriate edge, for theodefend. the methods Instead, edge which realists appropriate reof our instrumentally retical are essential components knowledge liable methods. 2.2 Some Epistemological Lessons.

account of the reliability and realistic If the naturalistic of then several is approximately sketched method just scientific right, for our understanding which are significant of follow consequences of science for that matthe epistemology (and epistemology generally, in science theoretical considerations are In the first ter). place, of preferring The methodological evidential considerations. practice contributes theories more plausible, that is, theoretically "simpler", of the scientific and theoretical to the instrumental reliability is theothat a proposed the fact because method precisely theory that it is (releto believe provides good reason retically plausible true. of a theory The theoretical vantly approximately) plausibility

623 constitutes theory. genuine (if "indirect") evidence for the truth of that

considerations that theoretical "indithe fact provide Moreover, evidence is no indirather evidence than "direct" rect" experimental that these are fundamentally cation different sorts of evidence. The is crucially of "direct" evidence assessment dependent experimental evidential which reflect "indirect" conon theoretical considerations in science, decisive are typically siderations. results Experimental but their decisiveness (and evidential) judgments depends upon prior of the questions to the theoretical about the relation at issue traof observation and experiment dition. with the results Consistency is not the sole in the "experimental method". evidential criterion We can put this same point in another What we have in the way: totalscientific method is a theoretical-presupposition-dependent for deciding science a procedure or strategy modification procedure, which modifications or additions to make to our existing body of acis releIf the total with which we begin theories. science cepted of this true and comprehensive, then the operation vantly sufficiently method will are successively tend to ensure later sciences that total more accurate and more comprehensive. of this We may further the epistemological explore consequences of scientific it and contrasting conception by comparing knowledge with the epistemological positions represented by the traditional of knowledge causas justified and by more recent true belief analysis of this For the purposes I al theories of knowledge. comparison, will take as representative of received of knowlcausal definitions that knowledge is reliably true belief [see edge the claim produced Goldman 1967, 1976]. Both the traditional of knowledge definition and more recent causto provide an account of the nature of knowlare intended al theories a definition of knowledge sorts which satisfactorily edge by providing cases of belief into of knowledge cases and cases of non-knowledge. What I want to argue in the remainder of this the section is that--if of scientific in the preceding sketched section conception knowledge is sound--then this in epistemology is fundamentally unsound. strategy It is not possible to draw the distinction of knowlbetween instances of non-knowledge in a philosophically edge and instances way revealing is so not merely because there will be some "border(and this always line to draw such a distinction are likecases"). Moreover, attempts rather than to reveal certain fundamental ly to obscure absolutely features of knowledge. It will some background work in exrequire the similarities and differences between the realistic conploring of knowledge sketched earlier and the more traditional acception counts before a defense of this claim can be mounted. Let us of theory naturalistic first consider the question in what sense the realistic scientific of the first is a causal section knowledge Two sorts of dissatisfaction with the theory.

or

624 traditional definition of knowledge seem to be the primary factors which have made causal or naturalistic seem attractive. In theories the first are cases there in which justification seems to be place, too weak a condition to belief and truth) for knowledge. (in addition There are cases in which one has an instance of justified true belief, but in which the justification belief which at issue rests upon another is defective in some way: it is false, or not itself known, or insufficiently justified. A second class of cases shows that the requirement of justification as well. These are cases in which the role may be too strong assigned to a justification is played into the traditional according analysis stead of the matter which is relevant to the reliable by some fact of belief, but not to justification as it is ordinarily production understood. Here the clearest case is that of perceptual knowledge where the fact the role that the senses are reliable detectors plays which the traditional definition would assign to a justification. clear of cases is the more imIt is pretty that the second class for an understanding of the essential and of causal features portant of knowledge. theories how to try, at naturalistic It is obvious of the the traditional definition cases to modify to handle least, if they really indicate that first sort. Cases of the second sort, a brute sometimes fact the role plays by the traditional assigned to the definition to a justification, a far deeper represent challenge of the nature of knowledge traditional and the task of episconception the traTo a good first we may characterize temology. approximation, ditional are certain view this there beliefs which have an episway: about the content these temically position; privileged might be beliefs of sense for example, or beliefs which have some appropriate experience, to be of universality it is a matter sort or innateness. At any rate, All instances decided a priori of belief have this status. what sorts or beliefs which follow of knowledge are either in this class beliefs of reasoning; from such privileged beliefs principles by appropriate these is that--although the significant here again, principles point are a priori of reasoning deductive--there are not themselves always reaof "inductive" rules which show that they are the right arguments belief for a given The standards by which the justification soning. a priori. are to be assessed are themselves defensible from or causal of knowledge theories The new naturalistic depart of a priori to the role with respect this traditional prinpicture whatever In the first in factual episteplace, ciples knowledge. their beliefs certain status privimay have, privileged mologically of about the reliability of contingent fact is a matter status leged of a than the result rather belief mechanisms the relevant producing lethe epistemic More importantly, considerations. perhaps, priori or of inductive of inductive of rules procedures reasoning, gitimacy or not, is not a matter of whether reasoning they involve generally, but instead a matter of those the a priori strategies, justifiability in the of those fact about the reliability of contingent strategies of a substantial This abandonment world. actual part of the a

625 elements in prioristic features two essential traditional represents epistemology of naturalistic epistemology. one of the

of naturalism in epistemology is the essential feature The second in the analysis of knowledge. notions to causal unreduced appeal which surround the of the epistemological because problems Largely has treated of causal traditional epistemology question knowledge, notions as in need of (epistemologically causal motivated) explication of knowledge itself. On in an analysis than as ingredients rather tradition the empiricist almost (which includes epistemological grounds of science) has insisted all philosophy contemporary English-language of causal on a non-realistic treatment powers: phenomena and causal to talk about reguis thought about causation to be reducible talk breaks with in nature. larities Naturalistic utterly epistemology causal to unreduced this tradition: not only does it appeal notions, with causal associated the epistemological knowledge, despite problems itself. it employs such notions of knowledge in the analysis of These two definitive of naturalistic features are, epistemology of the epistemological related. the question Consider course, closely of those of our inductive status features by which we discern strategy in nature. On the traditional the justification account, regularities of these is ultimately it an a priori matter. Moreover, strategies is a constraint of knowledge on empiricist and of causation analyses the analysis that the a priori principles underlying epistemological of factual for obtaining should explain knowledge why our procedures of regularities in nature is to cauthere (which is all knowledge sal knowledge on an empiricist or justifiable. are reliable view) On the naturalistic of regularities view, by contrast, knowledge in nature need not be all is to knowledge of causal relations there an unreduced to causal rather than an and, moreover, notions, appeal to a priori the episteis required to explain appeal considerations, of our strategies status for discerning in namological regularities ture in the first Thus the two central of naturalistic features place. of a priori for the evaluaabandonment standards epistemology--the tion of inductive and the employment of unreduced causal strategies notions in the analysis of knowledge--are of the same coin. two sides We may, I believe, take that coin to be definitive of the safely or causal naturalistic to epistemology. approach We are now in a position of scito see why the realistic account entific offered in the preceeding is a naturalissection epistemology tic one. In the first to the realistic acplace since, according of the evidence for a particular will count, any evaluation theory theoretical acthe realistic account depend upon prior commitments, the possibility that a scientific belief knowledges might be true and even though its theories rested justified justification upon background so thoroughly false that it should of as an instance not be counted as the insufficiency of justification for Thus, insofar knowledge. true belief) a reason a natufor adopting knowledge (given provides ralistic of the realistic account a variety epistemology, provides

626 of this as we shall examples phenomenon. Indeed, see, are much more significant this sort for the naturalism tic account than more ordinary of insufficiency examples are for the defense of naturalistic cation epistemology of examples of the realisof justifigenerally.

to the issues raised of the necessity of Turning by the question for knowledge, we see at once that if naturalistic theojustification ries of perception, are correct then these theories will have to say, be incorporated the realistic into of scientific account knowledge insofar as that account addresses the role of observation in science. Much more importantly, of the realistic the rest account however, meets the criteria which we have seen as definitive of natufully ralistic of epistemology. like The realistic conceptions account, other naturalistic of inholds that the epistemic status accounts, ductive is not an a priori The actual inductive matter. strategies which we employ at a given of sciin the history strategies point ence will reflect of that commitments characteristic theoretical and these will be reliable time, (even instrumentally strategies are nearly commitments theoretical reliable) only if the relevant Since the truth and comprehensiveenough true and comprehensive. ness of a body of scientific theories be decided a priori, cannot there are no a priori for the epistemological standards sufficient of actual assessment scientific methods and practices. Another same point is this: It is not the aim of way to put this the realistic of scientific are account there to deny that knowledge of cases if by lots in which justification for knowledge, is necessary one means, of a particular exthe justification justification say, considerations. What the to theoretical perimental design by appeal on is that the standards realistic account insists by which such themselves are not (or, not wholly) are to be assessed justifications on theoretia priori. The reliability of our practice of insisting of experimental on the approximate cal justifications designs depends which of relevant truth and that is not a matter theories, background of justificaa priori. When we treat the giving can be determined of its in science as a natural the question tions episphenomenon, is not an a priori temic contribution to science question. satisfies of scientific also The realistic account epistemology to unrecriterion for naturalistic the appeal the other theories, is reduced causal Recall notions. that if one says that knowledge the about in answer to questions true belief, then, liably produced to one will of inductive status appeal epistemological strategies, rather of reliable belief the unreduced causal notion production, The realistic aca priori than to purely principles. epistemological if anything, more overt in its count of scientific is, epistemology reliathe causal notions. causal It explains to unreduced appeal to instrumental of scientific method with respect knowledge bility that the relebut by assuming to a priori not by appealing principles are the method's theories which determine vant background operation of the unobservable true and comprehensive descriptions approximately of observable the relevant which underlie causal factors properties

627 Whereas the empiricist observable tradition to proposes phenomena. causal reduce talk of underlying to talk about powers or mechanisms in nature, on the grounds that knowledge of underlying regularities the realistic account maintains that our knowlpowers is impossible, in nature of unis parasitic edge of regularities upon our knowledge mechanisms. derlying the abandonment of a priori in favor considerations of Actually, to unreduced in the realistic causal notions runs even deeper appeals account. Consider the fundamental of experimental principle design in the preceding If the realistic discussed account is section. this cannot be defended a priori its reli because principle right, on what one might call a "take-off a point depends ability point", in the development of the relevant at which scientific discipline the accepted theories are sufficiently true background approximately and comprehensive. When such a point has not yet been reached, the science total of which the fundamental modification strategy, principle of experimental is a part, will the sort not typically design possess of reliability which is characteristic of scientific We knowledge. cannot offer a priori of the principle in question (or justification of the other of the total-science characteristic modifiprinciples cation because we cannot show a priori that a take-off strategy) has been, or even will point be, reached. It might seem, however, that we could of a sort give a different defense of these We might, for example, be able to priori principles. show a priori that the fundamental of experimental is principle design a best for factual and that no theory-inpossible principle inquiry, which do not depend on take-off are posdependent principles points sible. But we cannot do this. We can certainly show that there are circumstances under which this is best possible particular principle our own circumstances are of this (since sort and we can show that But it is easy to imagine worlds in which very they are). possible and theory-independentprinciplesof would suffice to simple projection obtain reliable instrumental and in which efforts to obtain knowledge, theoretical and to apply the principles which characterize knowledge our scientific would result in utter We can even failure. practice worlds in which nothing will imagine resembling experimental inquiry be instrumentally reliable but in which instrumentally laws reliable who to those revealed Thus are, say, pray in some appropriate way. we cannot offer an a priori defense of our take-off dependent prinas best nor can we find a methociples (or even as good), possible which is defensible a priori and which has our take-off dology dependent methodology as a special case. what I have just said is not, true. Actually, strictly speaking, What is true is that issues about the epistemic of methods reliability or inductive are a posteriori so that epistemology strategies issues, is one of the natural and methodological advances at sciences, are, least from advances in theoretical or fundamentally, indistinguishable Since theories about the reliability of methods practical knowledge. are ordinary scientific we can, in fact, a metaformulate theories,

628 which is take-off in the sense that its reliadependent methodology in guiding our methodological would depend upon the bility practice of suitably true and comprehensive emergence approximately epistemotheories. The maxim, "Use whatever is best suited logical methodology to obtaining true beliefs" is such a meta-methodological principle. Once a take-off in epistemological has been reached this point theory, maxim will dictate the adoption of more specific prinmethodological which are themselves reliable. I can see, this ciples And, for all a priori defensible it mightbe principle meta-methodological provided is understood as a take-off dependent principle. is no reason to believe that this But, there meta-principle explains about the reliability of our actual scientific method. There anything is no reason to believe that we have reached a take-off with repoint to epistemology. Our methodological are theory-despect practices and it is true that epistemological theories termined, help to shape our methodological But it is by no means clear that these practices. theories have contributed of to the reliability particular positively scientific In the last of physicists, for example, method. generation a great of operationalism and other many were persuaded positivist If the realistic doctrines. account of scientific epistemological method is correct, these doctrines are profoundly and they probfalse, contribution to the reliability of actual scienably made no positive as embodying tific If we think of methodology discoveries practice. about how the world works (in particular, true about how approximately of the methodology of beliefs can be obtained), then the development modern science must be seen as one of those in the history of cases in which tacit science far outstripped explicit knowledge knowledge. is that such tacit [It is worth remarking knowledge epistemological the sort of phenomenon which warrants Kuhn's insistence that paradigms in science the explicit theories amount to more than just they embody. [See Kuhn 1970.]] is coraccount At any rate, if the realistic emerges, epistemology natural a posteriori as the largely rect, study of a very complex and of successively more accurate reliable phenomenon--the development and unobserand beliefs, about both observable theories comprehensive to see whether the complexity of the world. It remains vable features with the traditional of the subject is compatible matter itself project cases sort of seeking of knowledge which will a definition fruitfully and cases of non-knowledge. of belief into cases of knowledge a problem for the philosopher That scientific poses knowledge two this task can be seen by considering sets out to accomplish In troublesome. of beliefs is especially whose classification of the sort the trouble from more complex versions arises case, true is not (given which suggests that justification situation in which true belief cases sufficient for knowledge, lief) viz., an epistemologically from beliefs which have, arises themselves, lematic status. The first sort of belief consists of (approximately) true who sorts each of beprob-

beliefs

629 on in the development of some particular scientific which arise early at the take-off at which the relevant backpoint discipline, roughly in the field become sufficiently true approximately ground theories It would seem that a reliable and comprehensive methodology emerges. in order if we require be reliably that beliefs to that, produced of sufficiently true becount as knowledge, then the first generation in any scientific would not count as instances liefs of discipline of knowlsomewhat more traditional theories If, knowledge. following of knowledge we count beliefs as instances only edge in this regard, not only true but if they are grounded in beliefs which are themselves of beliefs also then even the second known (or justified), generation in an emerging as non-knowledge. To make science might be classified of the location of the the question matters even more complicated, take-off which will to itself issues prove difficult point may raise resolve. about In the first there is some room for dispute place, of methodological we should what level take as indicajust reliability of the emergence tive the of scientific More importantly, knowledge. of method in a relatively new science need not be uniform: reliability the relevant theories and comprehensive may be accurate background in some investigations, while reliable as highly enough to serve guides those in guiding same theories reliable other of sorts may prove less of the take-off dimensions the location investigation. Along several point may seem indeterminate. The second of cases includes those which reflect the "multiclass of knowledge attributions (Pastin 1978). perspectivicality" Suppose that we are considering in a mature science whose takedevelopments off point is long past. t a Theory T is that at sometime Suppose and is subjected to all the right sorts of experimental test, proposed that all the sorts of tests which the fundamental of exis, principle the background theories at perimental dictates, design given accepted t: Even in a mature science it could happen that at some substantially later time t', new theoretical are made whose effect discoveries is to an alternative to T which could not have been anticipated at t. suggest The fundamental of experimental at t', will principle applied design, that T be tested this new alternative. that require against Suppose it is so tested, and that it remains well also confirmed. Suppose that it is in fact true. a group of specialists in the Now, imagine field about the old days, and considering the question of talking at t, scientists knew" that T. One side maintains whether, "really that the earlier scientists did know that T since T was true certainly and since their was impeccable. The other side methodology replies that the earlier scientists' evidence for T would not be experimental standards because of their acceptable by current (quite non-culpable) failure to exclude the more recently considered alternative to T, and therefore these earlier did not "really scientists know" that T. The two sides evaluate the methodology of the earlier scientists from different Each side its own perperspectives. applies correctly But it may well seem indeterminate which of these two perspective. if either, is appropriate to answer the question at issue. spectives, it certainly seems clear whichever side we might take Moreover, that,

630 to have won the important cally the other side is on to an epistemologiargument, fact about the history of the theory at issue.

It is perhaps worth remarking that there are interesting cases which are intermediate between cases involving multiperspectiviand those which reflect about the location of the cality questions take-off I mentioned, cases in which the relevant point. earlier, in a discipline theories and accurate background might be sufficiently to reliably some investigations, but might be less comprehensive guide reliable with respect to others. It is also that within a possible of investigations) the relevant back(or class single investigation some features of the investigations ground theories may reliably guide the identification of the significant causal in factors (like, say, some sorts of natural but be inadequate to guide other feaphenomena) tures of the same investigations elucidation of the details (like, say, of the reaction mechanisms the causal at issue). In factors involving cases such as these, our overall assessment of the reliability of the belief will mechanisms in the discipline depend on which feaproducing we wish to emphasize. Here tures of the research in the discipline there will in which it seems indeterminate be cases which feaagain tures are most significant if one wishes to decide whether the belief mechanisms are sufficiently reliable to produce producing knowledge. It remains to show that these of apparent are cases indeterminacy to cases of indeterminacy, to show that it would be a mistake that is, look for theories of knowledge which will resolve them satisfactorily one way or another. of knowledge If I am right, theories which attempt or underestimate such a resolution the imwould have to either ignore of the dialectical in scientific elements portance By way knowledge. of seeing what modifications in the formulais so, consider why this tion of causal are dictated theories of knowledge by the naturalistic and realistic which we have been disaccount of scientific knowledge cussing. knowIn the first in scientific it is clear that the issue place, which The reliability of beliefs. ing is not the reliable production of how beliefs are is not so much a matter scientific displays practice but of the tenor even of how they are initially accepted, produced to be sustained only if they are approxidency over time for beliefs of closer in the direction to be modified true and for beliefs mately is reliaWhat is at stake to the truth. and closer approximations rather than reliain the regulation of belief time) (over bility or acceptance of particular beliefs. in the initial production bility of everyI think that this will Indeed, prove to be true in many cases as well. day belief role in the no significant truth of exact the notion plays Secondly, The of scientific account of the reliability realistic methodology. truth of the scientific method does not depend on the exact reliability of that method typically nor does the operation of background theories, true. beliefs which are, Indeed, exactly strictly speaking, produce that we know now that all for the truism there evidence is considerable

631 the theories we accept are in some respects false. true theoExactly are utterly in scihave been any at all, if there exceptional ries, in those of everyday in which stateence (and, areas indeed, knowledge ments of great are made). precision to the sort of It follows, we refer that if by "knowledge" therefore, and scientific to aspire thing which careful everyday investigations and sometimes defended later achieve of reference in (as the theory for knowledge. this truth is not necessary (exact) essay suggests),then for knowledge, and that corOne might argue that truth is necessary true to every case of (say) responding reliably regulated approximately there is the real in question is apthat the belief belief, knowledge of the true. in the whole naturalistic account But since, proximately no reference to exact truth cases which we ordinarily count as knowledge, or it is difficult to see why a naturalistic role, plays any explanatory in causal of knowledge as necessary treat truth should (exact) theory this Not even in a usefully of scientific idealized way. conception will truth condition. Indeed an idealknowledge emerge as a necessary which portrays exact truth as necessary for knowledge would ization obscure the deepest facts about scientific inquiry. epistemological These last two points are really both reflections of the dialectical character of the scientific for method (and of everyday reasoning that matter). It is mistaken to define in terms of exact knowledge truth or in terms of reliable at belief (or justification production a time) because the natural in which knowledge phenomenon precisely is manifested a dialectical involves of successive process approximation to the truth, whose reliability consists in a tendency over time for the successive to be increasingly accurate. Both approximations the traditional definition of knowledge and the version of the causal we are examining a picture are inadequate each presents because theory of knowledge which is static than dialectical. rather does a dialectical and naturalistic account of knowlHow, then, of the the question of the classification edge help us to understand first or second a of (approximately) true theories within generation of classification scientific or the question which discipline, given arises from multi-perspectivicality? I beThe surprising answer, is that the lesson draw from examining we should the naturallieve, and dialectical of scientific is that it istic aspects knowledge should not be the aim of a theory of knowledge to effect such a classification at all. If the aim of epistemology is to say what knowlthen it should not be part of the aim of epistemology is, edge really to resolve such disputes about the boundary between those beliefs which are instances of knowledge and those which are not. Episteshould abandon this not primarily because there are mology project of tricky lots "borderline of knowledge, cases" but rather because, if knowledge is a dialectical then the project is basically matter, misconceived. Several begin with, considerations we already seem to me to dictate this know what knowing is when it conclusion. is considered To as a

632 natural it is reliably If we ask how process: regulated believing. a particular belief to the processes of reliable belief might relate several In the first become clear. if we regulation, points place, are concerned with the way in which these on the processes impinge belief in question or modification), then (its acceptance, rejection, there will in general, be a time at which the possibility of funot, ture acceptance, or modification is finally excluded. Our rejection, assessment of the evidence for or against a theory or other belief will reflect the particular beliefs which are themalways background selves at the time the assessment Since is made. these beaccepted liefs our evidential standards change over time, change as well. It is just this sort of change in standards which gives rise to the of multiperspectivicality. This very dialectical evolution of puzzle evidential standards is central to the reliability of the scientific method. As successively more accurate are accepted, our evitheories dential standards become successively more reliable, thus facilitating the adoption For any particular of more accurate and so on. theories, and any particular we can "freeze" if we this belief, time, process want to, and inquire to the evidenhow the belief fares with respect tial at that time. standards But the answer to this will question in general, be epistemologically the not, Or, rather, significant. answer may be quite for example, the time of the (if, significant "freeze" is the present), but the answer will be of no help if our aim is to resolve of belief classification the problems raised by the in genissue of multiperspectivicality. For a given belief there is, no special in the history of science such that the evieral, point is the dential of the belief at that point assessment it) (or after definitive Nor is there any ahistorical epistemologically judgment. can be from which an epistemologically assessment stance privileged is nothing more to of view there made. From an epistemological point Indilemma. which pose the presumed say than to lay out the facts is nothing more to say is the fact that--in such cases--there deed, of scia reflection of the dialectical and cumulative features itself entific method upon which its reliability depends. of multiperspectiviin treating such cases Thus, we are justified is that there of indeterminacy. To insist as genuine cases cality the "dilemma" of the matter which settles fact some epistemological of a to insist on the reality one way or another would not be merely It would have to be drawn arbitrarily. distinction which would in fact of view of from the point a phenomenon which, as puzzling be to treat is entirely and dialectical naturalistic straightforward; epistemology, a question which is in fact misconceived. to treat as a dilemma, of the with respect to the question A similar situation obtains sciof particular in the history identification of the take-off point and secof classification raised and the question ences, by the first the question Consider ond generation in emerging sciences. theories first attains the rescience of a particular of when the methodology method Scientific of scientific characteristic knowledge. liability the since modification a total science constitutes moreover, strategy;

633 method itself is theory-dependent, it embodies a procedure for its own of the scientific The epistemic method at a modification. reliability as a total science modifitime is manifested not only its reliability as a methodcation strategy, but also in its (consequent) reliability strategy. ology modification the question of There are thus two important reasons for treating the location of the take-off The point in a science as indeterminate. problem is not that there would have to be some degree of arbitrariness in any decision of the take-off The about the location point. two related dimensions--scientific method is problem is that--along less static In the first than the question at hand suggests. place, there is something misleading of about asking about the reliability the scientific charactime: method at a particular the reliability teristic of the successful method is disoperation of the scientific played over time, in the operation of a dialectical process of total science One can ask, at a particular time and for a parimprovement. ticular how successful the scientific method is at scientific field, that time in guiding the acceptance of new or modified theories, but such a static of the reliability of scientific assessment methodology will not, generally of its reflect an accurate assessment speaking, accurate theories. longer-run tendency to produce increasingly The fact that the scientific method also functions as a methodoladds an additional dimension of indeterminacy ogy improvement strategy to the question of when a particular field's methodology becomes reliable Part of the reliability enough to count as fully scientific. of methodology within a field may consist in the extent to which the theoretical countenanced by that methodology lead to imdevelopments In this case too, the static provements in the methodology itself. the methodology of a field is, at a particuquestion of how reliable lar time, with respect to the production of methodological progress, is misconceived: the sort of reliability in question, when it obtains, is manifested in a dialectical Thus, just as development over time. in cases of multiperspectivicality, the epistemologically relevant facts about the emergence of the scientific method within a discipline are exhausted by a recitation of those facts which, seen from a nondialectical would seem to pose the challenging perspective, question of when the discipline became fully scientific. Here too, the issue is indeterminate not because any answer to the question would have some aspects of arbitrariness, but rather because the very question a mistakenly of knowledge. static presupposes conception With respect to the question of whether the first or second generation of approximately true theories within a scientific are discipline instances of knowledge, the situation is even more favorable to a diWe have already seen that the relevant agnosis of indeterminacy. epistemic relation between a scientific theory and methodological practice is a continuing and dialectical one, and that there is a misconception in the view that there will always be a cogent answer (even a partly answer) to the question of whether a theory or other belief arbitrary is an instance of knowledge at a particular We have seen, time.

634 sort of indeterminacy that this moreover, in theoretical are significant shifts there characteristic of the which is certainly We discipline. gence of a new scientific in the question an indeterminacy involved takes place. emergence best when exemplified of the sort understanding in the emerearliest stages is seen that there have also of when such disciplinary is

not be to show that it should These considerations no doubt suffice at of classification the aim of epistemology to answer the questions dictate this which also But there are further considerations issue. are certain theoretical there In the first conclusion. developplace, of a scientific on in the history ments which occur early discipline of reliable and which are essential to the establishment methodology. or of Newtonian of matter, of the atomic The acceptance say, theory in chemin the evolution of reliable mechanics was crucial methodology is thus a conand physics. When the acceptance of a theory istry of the question of reliable stituent of the establishment methodology, comis even more dialectically its relation to reliable methodology was whose adoption asked about theories than the same question plex of a reliable "normal science" less to the establishment crucial (see of the emerthe naturalistic Kuhn 1970, interpretation 1-5; chapters different of course, offered here is, quite gence of normal science the case that it is typically from Kuhn's interpretation). Moreover, confirmation and (re-?) evidential evaluation the subsequent rigorous dea reliable research of the theories which thus establish paradigm which are made and experimental developments pend upon theoretical The best continuing adoption. original possible only by the theories' from arises of substantial we have for theories evidence scope often of of the research articulation successful the continued paradigms is Kuhn's, the terminology which they form the basis. (Here, again, discussion for a further is non-relativistic; but the interpretation and paradigm establishment of paradigm to the notion of this approach of account if the realistic see Boyd 1979.) articulation Finally, which the accepthe contribution is correct, scientific methodology of a reliable makes to the establishment of a theory methodology tance of the truth for the approximate some of the evidence itself provides and most general is true not only for the earliest this theory--and but for theories within a paradigm, theories generally. in the case of questions indicate considerations All of these that, as in cases scientific of early status theories, about the epistemic are facts relevant the epistemologically of multiperspectivicality, is an belief the relevant of whether those which make the issue just No further or not seem so intractable. of knowledge instance episteand the complex such an issue; can resolve considerations mological of It does not follow, is to say. is all there dialectical story or otherwise) of a belief that we can never say, (scientific course, at of knowledge an instance is definitely that the belief and a time, are Such classifications is not. or that it definitely that time, do not refor such classifications But the standards often possible. I would be of scientific features flect the most important knowledge; and complex if the same were not true for interesting surprised quite

635 non-scientific for example, or intuitive knowledge, knowledge--moral At any rate, if the dialectical and knowledge of human psychology. realistic of scientific then the conception knowledge is correct, fundamental aim of epistemology should be the naturalistic elucidation of the mechanisms of reliable rather than the formubelief regulation lation of a general definition of knowledge, considered as a property of individual beliefs. Consider an actual case in the history of science: Suppose someone asks whether 17th-century mechanists "knew" that the corpuscular theory of matter which they advocated was (approximately) true, or whether the 16th- and 17th-century founders of modern physics and chemistry invented "the scientific method" as we now know it. If the epistemological which I have articulated here is correct, we should answer perspective roughly as follows: The scientific method is theory-dependent and it regulates believing with the reliability we think of as typical only when the relevant are sufficiently accurate. background theories complete and sufficiently The reliable of believing of scientific deregulation typical practice pends not only on our employing a rigorous method, but also upon our true theories to start with. Before that happens, having approximately is possible. nothing like what we think of as modern science revolution cannot be a triumph Thus, the triumph of the scientific of a method which excludes presuppositions. Furthermore, the triumph of the scientific revolution can't be a triumph of method alone, anycentral in science is way. What makes the 16th- and 17th- centuries not just a change in the importance accorded to experiment and observaand mechanistic theories tion, but also the fact that atomistic emerged and that they happened to be relevantly true. approximately We cannot say the mechanism of Descartes, Newton or Boyle was dictated by rational scientific method as we now know it--because the relevant true background theories were largely absent approximately until such scientists as these proposed them. What we call the scientific method didn't have its truth-generating capacity until scientists hit upon enough relevantly correct theories. This is not to say that 17th-century mechanists were irrational-their guess was a natural extension of laws governing obviously mechanical phenomena. But neither were "Renaissance naturalism" in chemistry and talk about the "dormative powers" of opium then irrational. Here then is a case in which it is reasonable to doubt whether temology should sort knowledge from non-knowledge: Boyle's corpuscularism was in some respects the possibility true. of scientific knowing epis-

It was central in chemistry.

in establishing

636 But was Boyle's itself theory scientific no, since reliability possible adoption. by its On the of "occult constituted in a sense, Well, produced? reliably in chemical was only made methodology

other since mechanistic hand, in a sense, yes, suspicions to produce in fact it--and such suspicions powers" helped a reliable belief principle. regulating these suspicions reliably produced? Well, in a sense... matter

But were We are was composed

a way--to right--in of small particles,

as we do, "Boyle knew that say, which he called 'corpuscles'."

We are also right--in sometime do, "Boyle didn't ter was true."

a different way--to say, as philosophers of know that the atomic theory really

mat-

Almost decide these alternatives? Should epistemology between honorific-not. is a relatively non-specific certainly "Knowledge" honor with it there are clear cases of beliefs which we warrantedly in cases For the interesting and clear cases where we deny the honor. of the tale tell will the naturalistic between, simply epistemologist of the beliefs in question the dialectical relation to such reliable There or unreliable of belief as are relevant. features regulation will It will even be possible be nothing more to say. not generally as knowledge to treat the classification true beliefs of approximately or non-knowledge of scientific as a matter of degree. The features reliable which make it epistemologically (when it is reliable) practice soundness are quite of background diverse: truth theories, approximate on observational/experimental of experimental method, emphasis design, the anti-"animistic" of metaphysical "hunches" (like appropriateness freedom from prejudicial of 17th-century hunches politimechanists), stuof graduate cal interference, of the indoctrination reliability and as yet unarticulated to the more "intuitive" dents with respect refeatures are all these features of the "paradigm", etc. Although do not repand causally--they and epistemologically lated--logically of resent dimension a single like along which the reliability anything beliefs of classifying The problem belief can be assessed. regulation are border-line that there is not merely as knowledge or non-knowledge of bethe reliable is that cases. The problem, instead, regulation a in too complex lief has too many important dimensions, interacting way. chains molethe question--"Are Consider single very long polymer the various chemist will cules?" The sophisticated ways in explain is similar of polymers which the micro-structure to, and different She will not get molecules. of typical the micro-structure from, or apply to withhold about whether discussion in a pointless caught is to there is all The micro-structural the term "molecule". story say. Mechanisms of reliable belief regulation are the micro-structure

637 of knowing. Like polymer chemists, often find that a micro-structural naturalistic story is all epistemologists there is to say. will

of knowlOne remaining point must be made regarding the conception account of scientific epistemoledge which emerges from the realistic maintain that all factual knowledge is emogy. Logical empiricists pirical knowledge, that all factual knowledge is grounded in the results of observation and experiment. Empiricists deny that any factual statements can be known a priori; they deny that there are any factual of our knowledge which are immune, in principle, from presuppositions refutation In no respect whatsoever does evidence. by experimental the realist of scientific knowledge offered here challenge conception
these doctrines.

Where realist is in and empiricist accounts of knowledge differ their understanding of the nature of experimental evidence and "inductive" inference. The empiricist tradition takes the epistemic primacy of observation and experiment to entail that evidence for a factual must (when it exists at all) consist hypothesis only in the confirmation by observation or experiment of certain of the observational conat issue (together with "auxiliary sequences of the hypothesis hypothThe realist that: asserts eses"). conception, by contrast, in science are also evidential: considerations (1) Theoretical judgments of the "simplicity" of a theory or of the support it receives in virtue of its theoretical the same (which are, roughly, plausibility are judgments about the evidence for or against the theory. thing), There are no theory-neutral standards of "direct" experimental (2) evidence for a theory. The evidential disconsupport (or potential conwhich a theory receives from tests of its observational firmation) on theory-mediated evidential considerasequences depends crucially tions. The reliable of the scientific method depends on the (3) operation of suitably (contingent) disciplines emergence in various scientific true theories. After the emergence of such theories, approximately the scientific method displays its characteristic epistemic reliability. It functions as a theory-dependent total-science improvement strategy whose operation outto, revisions of, and, often, produces additions which form laws and theories right disconfirmation of, the particular our total science at any particular time. This conception of factual from different knowledge is fundamentally the empiricist in its emphasis on the role of conception, especially in the reliability factors of scientific contingent method, and in its dialectical But it does not deny that all factual emphasis. knowledge is empirical or experimental It portrays all scientific knowledge. and experiment. It does not knowledge as grounded in observation countenance the existence of a priori factual It does not knowledge. of scientific research are immune from say that the presuppositions refutation. it provides an explanation of the very method Instead,

638 by which wesubjectourtheoreticaland orous experimental test. Insofar edge rests knowledge, attractive. knowledge, instrumental conceptions to rig-

as the attractiveness of the empiricist of knowlconception that factual must be empirical upon the conviction knowledge in that respect, the realistic be equally will, conception of experimental Their dispute is not over the primacy nature. but over its

advanced it might seem that the realistic methodology Similarly, here is less than that which would be countenanced by logi"rigorous" cal empiricism. The empiricist accepts only "direct" experimental as relevant evidence to the acceptance or rejection of a proposed as is reflected in the confirmathat is, theory; only such evidence tion or disconfirmation of one of the theory's observational prediccontions. The realist, on the other theoretical hand, countenances to theory confirmation: siderations as providing evidence relevant a theoretical of the plausibility evidence assessment which reflects Even if in the light of previously theories. of a theory accepted exas "indirect" is portrayed evidence this sort of theory-mediated which theories since it rests evidence, upon background perimental acit might seem that its have themselves been experimentally tested, After of less standards. would reflect the adoption ceptance rigorous successful observational the empiricist counts predicall, only its count whereas the realist tions as evidence for a theory, might also evias additional theoretical the theory's confirmatory plausibility evidence of confirming source this additional dence. Countenancing of evidence. standards in less will result rigorous inevitably between realThe issue is mistaken. of the issue This conception of evidential is not over the appropriate and empiricists ists degree In the first of such rigor. one over the nature but instead rigor, of can count for the disconfirmation theoretical considerations place, so that it is by no means as for its a theory as well confirmation, consideratheoretical that countenancing even prima facie plausible to be for a theory would make it easier relevant as evidentially tions of scientific account if the realistic confirmed. More importantly, or theory-mediated then "indirect" here is correct, method presented to the rigorous essential are absolutely considerations evidential This is a proposed for or against of the evidence assessment theory. are essential considerations evidential true because theory-mediated under which a proposed conditions in identifying the experimental assessment be possible. that a rigorous in order must be tested, theory of experimental The fundamental precisely requires design principle which are themalternatives a proposed that we test theory against conevidential or theory-mediated selves by "indirect" supported such "indirect" which did not countenance A methodology siderations. would be one in which rigorous considerations evidential experimental would be impossible. of theories testing Analogous unfavorable considerations of comparison a rebuttal permit with logical realism to a closely empiricism. related It is

639 to hold that empiricists are more rigorous at any (or, plausible than realists more cautious) because, any body of given rate, just will be inclined to count more bethe realist evidence, experimental each might take the as confirmed the empiricist liefs than will (since of certain theories to have been confirmed, instrumental reliability truth to have been conand the realist would take their approximate and dialectical firmed as well). if the realistic On the contrary, then the empiricist who method is correct, of scientific conception from employdoes not accept theoretical would be disbarred knowledge of the scientific method upon which empirical ing the very features rigor depends. Of course, an empiricist adopt the theory-dependent might simply and dialectical while that theoretical method of science, denying in science of the world. Such an empiriprinciples embody knowledge cist a if what I have said here is correct, be employing would, method whose reliable could not explain. The risk of (s)he operation of false at the cost theoretical be eliminated belief would thereby would not and could not the employment of a method which the empiricist the very understand. There would be, for such an empiricist, fully issues serious risk of error with respect to crucial methodological whose successful of an accurate would require resolution understanding the way in which the scientific method actually works. Thus, the emwe are envisioning of error would run a long term risk with piricist to instrumental from a defective understandrespect knowledge, arising method itself. The suggestion that such a long ing of the scientific term risk would arise from rejection of realistic methodological prinis hardly as the history of behaviorism in Americiples speculative, can psychology testifies. it is by no means clear even in the short that, run, the Finally, we are considering would improve ratio of his/her peculiar empiricist true beliefs to significantly false ones. The scienapproximately tific method is not, more reliable at producing generally speaking, instrumental than at producing theoretical Deknowledge knowledge. on the particular and the particular historical pending discipline, the empiricist we are considering period, might end up with an account of nature which was, on balance, less accurate as well as less comthan that accepted more realistic plete by his/her counterpart. Thus scientific realism differs from empiricism neither in the extent of its commitments to the experimental nor in the rigor method, of its evidential nor in the degree of inductive caution standards, it recommends. the dispute is over the nature of the experiInstead, mental of evidential and of inductive caution. method, rigor,

2.3.

Natural

Kinds

and

Scientific

Knowledge

According we classify do not "cut

to traditional the kinds into which accounts, empiricist natural are largely Our categories phenomena arbitrary. the world at its or sort to their joints" things according

640 "real essences". the boundaries of our categories are deInstead, termined definitional conventions by arbitrary and, perhaps, by innate of similarity standards which reflect the structure of the human mind rather than the structure of external The traditional (and reality. the contemporary) for this are largely arguments position epistemological: the unobservability of "real essences" or "joints" in nature is seen as precluding classification of natural knowledgeable phenomena into the categories which they allegedly define. The decline of verificationism has been associated with the emerand naturalistic of the issue treatments of gence of more realistic kinds and classification. These treatments have fallen into roughly two groups. Some treatments Putnam 1975) have emphasized that (e.g., we sometimes to what might be called their classify things according real essences: the fundamental unobserexplanatory (and, perhaps, or underlying mechanisms which must be invoked in vable) properties successful of their observable or causal explanation properties powers. Other treatments 5) hold that the "naturalQuine 1969, (e.g., chapter ness" of some kinds in their consists for successful appropriateness inductive The realistic and naturalistic generalization. conception of knowledge in the previous sections the basis presented provides for a fruitful of these two perspectives. The integraintegration tion in fact, in the empiricist tradition. is, anticipated very early in Book Four of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke, reaches the striking of the sensiconclusion that general knowledge ble properties of bodies is impossible of their inwithout knowledge sensible structure. corpuscular of senses acute whilst we are destitute "...But enough to discover of their the minute of bodies, and to give us ideas mechaniparticles cal affectations, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation; nor can we be assured about them any further than some few trials But whether we make are able to reach. they will This hinders we cannot succeed be certain. time, again another material bodies: our certain of universal truths concerning knowledge matters and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular of fact." 25). IV, iii, (Locke, Essay, (See Book part also I, 2, 131. 29; IV, vi, IV, iii, 14; IV, iii, IV and XIII; sections Hume, III, Chapter Section V, part 2). Also Inquiry, Hume, Treatise, Section IV,

Part of the remedy to Locke's knowledge general regarding pessimism of substances is provided by Hume and, in tongue-in-cheek) (probably a more serious and sophisticated treatment, by Quine: is a kind of pre-established harmony between Here, then, and of our ideas; and the succession the course of nature by which the former is governed though the powers and forces and conceptions have be wholly unknown to us yet our thoughts with other works of we find, still, gone on in the same train

641 nature... .(Hume, Inquiry, Section V, part II).

the part that asks One part of the problem of induction, in nature at all, can, I why there should be regularities That there are or have been regularities, think, be dismissed. and we fact of science; for whatever reason, is an established cannot ask better than that. Why there have been regularities for it is hard to see what would count is an obscure question, as an answer. What does make clear sense is this other part of the problem of induction: why does our innate subjective accord so well with the functionally spacing of qualities tend relevant groupings in nature as to make our inductions to come out right? spacing of qualWhy should our subjective have a special ities purpose in nature and a lien on the future? If people's innate There is some encouragement in Darwin. is a gene-linked then the spacing trait, spacing of qualities that has made for the most successful will have inductions tended to predominate through natural selection. Creatures inbut praisehave a pathetic advertently wrong in their inductions their kind. worthy tendency to die before reproducing

He [man] has risen above it [his innate of qualities] modified systems by developing standards for scientific modified similarity he has trial-and-error process of theorizing into new kinds which prove to lend themselves tions better than the old.

subjective spacing of kinds, hence purposes. By the re-grouped things to many induc-

A theoretical kind need not be a modification of an intuitive one. It may issue from theory full-blown, without antecethe kind which comprises positively dents; for instance, charged particles. We revise our standards of similarity or of natural kinds on the strength, as Goodman remarks, of second order inductions. New groupings, of a adopted at the suggestion hypothetically to inductions and so become growing theory, prove favorable 'entrenched'. We establish the projectibility of some prediit. In induccate, to our satisfaction, by trying to project tion, nothing succeeds like success. (Quine 1970, pp. 126-129). as Quine's allow us to avoid Although such naturalistic replies Locke's extreme scepticism regarding general knowledge of bodies, there are, nevertheless, two important grains of truth in Locke's treatment of the issue of inductive if our generalFirst, generalization. izations of bodies are to be reregarding the sensible properties then there must--often liable, enough--be an important non-

642 about the categories which we employ in formulating arbitrariness our these in some appropriate must correspond generalizations: categories the relevant features of the miway to whatever causally determining crostructure of bodies are. The (or functional etc.) arrangements, of Quine's to natural and to cultural evolution is to inpoint appeal dicate that a correspondence of this sort or need not be mysterious of the relevant even when it does not arise from knowledge magical features. underlying in the preIf the account of the epistemology of science offered then the second, and more surprising, sections is correct, ceding of of truth in Locke's of induction is that knowledge treatment grain for sucof matter is required microstructural properties determining of matcessful about the sensible inductive properties generalization if such generalizations are to have the scope and precision ter, to think of mature sciences. In particular, Locke was right typical in chemistry would depend that successful inductive generalization of structure of the "corpuscular" crucially upon further knowledge to think that such of course, chemical substances (though wrong, In general, classificamore acute would require senses). knowledge unobserof their on the basis of knowledge tion of sensible things and sophisticated for successful is a prerequisite vable properties their observable inductive properties. regarding generalization for an integration of the two naturalistic Here then is the basis essences" of kinds. Kinds characterized by "explanatory conceptions inof view of inductive are also kinds from the point generalization; in characterized in mature sciences, kinds which are explicitly deed, of cases essences are the overwhelmingly terms of explanatory typical from the point of view of kinds. Kinds natural natural inductively natural be explanatorily need not always successful induction kinds, unobto the (perhaps in relevant but they must correspond respects the obdetermine which causally and mechanisms servable) properties of empirical of the subjects servable generalizations. properties and mechaof such determining an understanding properties Moreover, kinds which natural for identifying nisms is the procedure inductively and cultural The social of scientific is characteristic inquiry. the since evolution of our inductive (especially proceeds categories in the explanatory kinds of natural 17th-century) by the discovery sense [see Boyd 1979]. is right, and categories of kinds If this naturalistic understanding it In the first follow. then several place, consequences interesting the clear but especially of kinds, is clear on either given conception to kinds are relative that "natural" of these conceptions, integration A scheme of of inquiry. or contexts tasks inductive disciplines, and micro-explanatory which is inductively classification appropriate of inquiry or one sort to one set of questions, with respect may be of different in which, context in another aspects say, inappropriate or ecological micro-structure (or functional organization, underlying under study. to the factors relevant are causally Thus, ...) setting, are partly and practices human interests, in a certain projects sense,

643 of natural kinds. But this sort of dependence of kinds definitive and human inquiry is fully compatible with the upon human interests is prior to thought and prior to human acrealist idea that reality of idealism or of social tion in general. No implication construction of reality what is indicated is the complexity of follows. Instead, the causal structure of the world to which we must accommodate our intellectual and social practices. The theory-dependence of those schemes of classification which are either inductively or explanatorily fruitful also helps to explain why, as Quine insists, there are no (or, perhaps very few) terms in natural Such terms would cordefinitions. languages which possess analytic whose boundaries would be in an imporrespond to kinds or categories tant sense arbitrary, since they could not be revised in the light of further evidence or theoretical discoveries. But it would be sheer luck if a conceptual scheme in which such categories predominated would be useful either for inductive or for explanation. generalization Thus there are very strong reasons to believe that only the most inteltrivial terms in a successful lectually language could possess unrevisable definitions. In a similar the naturalistic account of kinds allows us fashion, to see the defects of a certain of philosophy as "rational conception reconstruction". in philosOne of the standard research strategies certain ophy is to seek to discover--for important concepts--necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the class which they define. One justification for such a strategy is that such conditions will be uncovered when the relevant definitions are made exanalytic But even philosophers who are uncomfortable with the analyticplicit. distinction to synthetic may hold that it is the task of philosophy reconstruct our conceptual schemes so that such conditions rationally can be articulated and borderline cases resolved. Even if this is a it might be argued, still it is part of partly empirical enterprise, the task of philosophy to clarify and refine our concepts in this way. Against this quite plausible view, it may be argued that there will be cases in which the "fuzziness" of our (pre-philosophical) concepts not the lack of suitable but the reflects, philosophical subtlety, actual complexity and multi-dimensionality of the underlying causal structures of or inductive) upon which the "naturalness" (explanatory our categories In such cases, boundary-resolving rational depends. reconstruction would obscure, rather than clarify, the "essences" of the kinds in question. It is precisely this sort of situation which, I have argued, obtains in the case of the concept of knowledge. Thus a naturalistic treatment of natural kinds and categories vindicates some of the more peculiar features of the naturalistic account of in this essay. knowledge offered earlier consideration of Quine's treatment of natural kinds afFinally, fords us a significant example of an important tension in recent nonof science. who have rejected positivist philosophy Philosophers and who are sympathetic verificationism to some version or other of

644 realism often to a conception scientific subscribe of the epistemology of science which conforms to what I have been calling dictum. Nagel's In their treatment of methodological issues so they are not nearly realist as they are with respect to ontological isstraightforwardly sues. in some perfectly a sciNow, Quine is, sense, straightforward entific realist--a to accept the theoretical of willingness posits current a hallmark is almost of his views about sciphysical theory in the essay ence. he gives of we are discussing the example Indeed, the class of (presumably unobservable) particles positively charged as the example of a theoretical kind. when Quine describes the method by which theoretical Nevertheless, are discovered, kinds he follows Goodman in describing the process as "second-order To be sure, is right--scientists this do induction". are apinductions about which categories and kinds make second-order for (first-order) the induction. But, as Quine recognizes, propriate is by paying kinds attenthose theoretical way in which they identify tion If the account offered here is to theoretical considerations. in the first the theoretical inferences which they make are, correct, of theoinductions about the causal first-order instance, properties of their secondretical entities. The reliability (and observable) of order inductions is almost upon the reliability entirely parasitic is to abanBut to say this these theoretical inductions. first-order tradon Nagel's dictum and to break fundamentally with the empiricist of science. dition on issues in the epistemology Quine's preference for the less of these inferences as characterization realist overtly effect I believe, the residual second-order inductions illustrates, of empiricist on the work of scientific in epistemology doctrines here defended of scientific realists. If the conception epistemology of partly has the effect is correct, residual influence this obscuring of scieninto the nature some of the most important realist insights tific methodology.2 2.4. On Reference, Univocality and "Unity of Science"

in fact, in 2.1 is, discussed The second methodological principle which logical a special case of the methodological positivprinciple to this of science". called ists any principle, According "unity disfrom quite theories well-confirmed number of different [perhaps with the exscientific employed disciplines] may be jointly parate deduced from them will the observational that predictions pectation it is an epistemological be accurate. principle: Unity of science observational about which inferences preregarding says something an epistemologiIt is also or reliable. are justifiable dictions with an antifor philosophers especially principle, cally puzzling offered often bent. Indeed, positivists 20th-century metaphysical materialism. of metaphysical reconstruction" it as part of a "rational To see what case of "unity theories): the puzzle of science" is all consider about, (special only because the following to it refers special only two

645 from whatever If T' and T'' are any two well-confirmed scitheories, if no observational then--even test has yet been entific disciplines, made of a prediction deduced from their is reasonable conjunction--it deduced will be (apto expect that predictions from their conjunction true. proximately) The predictive of (T'AT'') Here we can see a puzzle: reliability be assessed even though none of its can apparently observational preto observational or experidictions whatsoever have been subjected mental test. In order to see the issue in order to get the principle it is necessary to recognize two modifications. raised more clearly--and, by this puzzle of unity of science formulated right-as stated, that the principle, requires

are some circumstances in which we there (i) In the first place, are in a position to be pretty sure that the conjunction of two wellestablished T' and T'', will not be predictively reliable. theories, Such cases occur whenever we have good reason to believe that T' and T'' are each approximations, in different circumstances, applicable to some more general which has not yet been formulated. The theory of unity to be amended to exclude such of science needs principle cases. More important for our purposes here is the following:

In stating of science" we must recognize (ii) "unity explicitly which is taken for granted when the principle is applied something that each of the theoretical terms practice, (and observational viz., terms too, in T' and T'' should for that matter) which occur be univocal in its occurrences in their conjunct.

in

That such a condition on applications of the unity of science prinis necessary must be obvious; without we would be committed ciple it, to the conjoint of well-confirmed of 'force', theories even reliability when some of these theories are about military force and others about, force. say, mechanical That a requirement ence principle isn't work which mological univocality surprising. of judgments of must be part of the of interest What's is must do. univocality of sciunity the episte-

From the fact that T' has been suitably tested (not experimentally T'' as an auxiliary let us say), and the fact that using hypothesis, T'' has been similarly tested T' as an auxiliary (not using hypothelet us say), and the fact that no term occurs in sis, ambiguously we are supposed to be justified (T'A T'') in expecting the conjunct to be a reliable instrument. What must univocality judgments predictive be judgments of in order to play this sort of epistemological role? It will hardly be surprising that an answer is readily available

646 the answer offered earlier when the issue of revision which extends or of measurement was at issue: extension for procedures Univocality to the view of logical theoretical terms (contrary is positivists) of unity of science of reference. sameness The principle works because true background as before) if theories, etc., (assuming approximately T' and T'' are well confirmed then each is likely to be approximately entities which they are true of the "theoretical" (and observational) If none of their terms occurs about. constituent (that ambiguously with more than one referent) in (T'AT'') and if the respects in is, which T' and T'' approximate the truth are suitably then compatible, will in turn, is why also be approximately true and that, (T' A T'') its true. observational will be approximately consequences of the principle of of the reliability account The naturalistic of science is--in a certain offered above, sense--incomplete unity of reference. of the nature a corresponding account without Moreover, offered here and in section the naturalistic and realistic accounts for "theoof reference 2.1 impose constraints on theories (at least is between a theorelation Whatever the referential retical terms"). or magnitude) kind (or property, retical term t and a theoretical k, it must be such that: and maintained (1) It can be established by scientists account in the sort of practices which a realistic gaging tific recommends,and methodology (2) narily judgments make must of univocality be reliable of the indicators which scientists sorts of co-referentiality. who are enof scien-

ordi-

for a moment and look of reference Let us turn from the question of reliable-belief more closely at the "micro-structure" regulation kind (or magnitheoretical to a particular in science as it relates or property) k. tude, of scientific account and naturalistic If the realistic are typical then the following is correct, earlier sketched social reliable which make possible of causal factors sorts of beliefs about k: Certain (i) perception, perception, which are understood of the circumstances in of k(s) or measurement detection are, of k(s). or measurement detection epistemology of the regulation

the the

to be apt fact, apt

for for

(ii) certain of tive (iii) fact

which are taken to Some of the circumstances in fact, of k(s) or properties features are, of k(s). or properties features those Certain produced significant by k(s). effects attributed to

of be indicative indicatypically

k(s)

by experts

are

in

Some of the most central (iv) true of k(s). approximately

of

the

accepted

laws

about

k(s)

are

647 (v) There distinguishes is some generally it (them) from recognized community accepted description other kinds, about k(s) experts whose beliefs about of k(s) which

The socially (vi) bers of an organized regulated. All able these k-belief

are, k(s)

in fact, memare reliably

and others factors, That regulation.

like to guarantee them, serve that: is, they tend to ensure

reli-

The sorts of considerations which rationally lead to modi(vii) fications or additions k-theories and of, to, existing are, typically over time, indicative of respects in which those theories can be modified so as to provide more nearly accurate of k(s). descriptions Consider now the following term t and a kind k: relations which might obtain between a

of the circumstances Certain are understood (i') orprocedureswhich be apt for the perception, or measurement detection of t(s) in are, or measurement detection fact, of typically apt for the perception, k(s). [Operationalism]. and in (Here, mention distinction. (somewhat tedious) (ii') certain typically of k(s). other entries on this I have abused the uselist, The reader will have no difficulty in providing but correct reformulations of these points.)

to

Some of the circumstances which are taken to be indicative of features or properties of manifestations of t(s) are in fact indicative of those features or properties of manifestations [Operationalism].

Certain effects attributed to t(s) (iii') significant by experts are in fact of theoproduced typically [Putnam's by k(s). example retical term introduction of typical see effects; by the citation Putnam 1975]. Some of the most central laws (iv') true if they are understood proximately cluster" of meaning]. theory There is some (v') t which is in fact ["Disguised magnitude. of the term involving to be about k(s). t are [The ap"law-

definite generally accepted putative description true of k(s) and of no other or kind, property definite of meaning]. theories description"

The socially (vi') form an organized comrecognized t-experts are so regulated that they tend to be true when munity whose t-beliefs to be about k(s). they are understood "division [Putnam's of linguistic labor"; see Putnam 1975]. (i')-(vi') a significant are related extent with in that, respect when many or all of them obtain to to a term t and a kind k, they will

648 tend to bring it about that:

The sorts of considerations which rationally lead to modi(vii') fications theories the term t of, or additions to, existing involving and over time, indicative of respects in which those are, typically theories can be modified so as to provide more nearly accurate descripwhen the term t is understood as referring to k(s). tions, I have indicated after theories of meaning (i')-(vi'), above, reference for theoretical terms which focus on relations between and kinds of the sort in question. It will not have escaped the to the micro-constituents er that are nicely (i')-(vi') parallel reliable belief indicated in (i)-(vi). Indeed (i')-(vi') regulation re-state as constraints on the linguistic behavior of the (i)-(vi) entific if t refers to k. community or terms readof sci-

It will be a surprise that I now propose that are (i')-(vi') hardly of the relation micro-constituents of reference a term between typical t and a kind k. I suggest the sorts of relations between a Indeed, term t and a kind k, which would tempt us to say that t refers to k, themselves form a "natural kind" just in virtue of the fact that they are the sorts of relations between the social uses of a term, t and of a kind k which--when manifestations enough of them are manifested-tend to bring it about that reliable of the sort t-belief regulation described in (vii') obtains. I have elsewhere called relations like relations (i')-(vi') access" and I have suggested such that it is just "epistemic which are the constituents of reference see also [Boyd 1979; (b)]. coming In the context of the of science, way: discussion preceeding the epistemic-access of the of relations Boyd forth-

epistemology be put this

theory

naturalistic of reference

can

THE CONSTITUENTS OF RELIABLE BELIEF REGULATION ARE THE SAME AS THE AND REFERENCE (BETTER: KNOWING CONSTITUENTS OF REFERENCE. KNOWLEDGE AND REFERRING) HAVE THE SAME "MICRO-STRUCTURAL" COMPONENTS. satisIt is evident account of reference the epistemic access that how scientific fies the constraint indicated above that it explain of the sort desired. A relations of reference establishes practice satisfies the constraint moment's will show that it also reflection are indicaof univocality that it explain standards why our ordinary of uniindicators of co-referentiality. Each of the standard tive of "opliterature in the philosophical (sameness vocality suggested to erational sameness of "law-cluster", etc.) corresponds definition", access. an important of epistemic component the same lexiLet T'(t) and T''(t) be two theories containing of occurtwo sorts of whether these The question term t. cographic of whether-amounts to the question rences of t are co-referential

649 in the practice of the relevant scientific communities--there is a access to k in single kind k such that this term t affords epistemic both the sort of research enterprise which gave rise to T' and the sort of research enterprise which gave rise to T''. If theoretical at all, then it is no mystery that we can answer knowledge is possible this sort of question reliably. It is an intended consequence of the epistemic access account of reference that--under certain circumstances--relations of epistemic access can obtain between a term t and more than one kind and that such terms can come to be "disambiguated" as a result of the subseof this fact. Field's notions of "partial denotation" quent discovery and of "denotational refinement" [Field 1973, 1974] are thus special cases of the doctrine Moreover, it is a consequence presented here. of the present account that relations of epistemic access can obtain --and thus establish a reference-like relationship--even though it would be odd to say that full-blown reference obtains. Thus the present account can explain the grain of truth in such statements as: "When, in pre-scientific societies, people talk about various sorts of gods, it's really natural laws that they are talking about." It remains to see that the phenomenon of reference the displays accommodation by successive pattern of dialectical approximation which is characteristic of scientific methodknowledge and scientific In the first the phenomena of partial denotation and ology. place, refinement illustrate the fact that the "tightsubsequent denotational ness" of fit between language and the world increases as the dialectical process of theory refinement The possibility of episteproceeds. useful referential relations weaker than full-blown refmologically in the last paragraph, provides a furerence, of the sort illustrated ther illustration of this phenomenon. there is a dialectical between the referenceSecondly, relationship relations for various different scientific terms establishing epistemic which is partly obscured by the abbreviated of the epistemic formulation access account which I have offered here. I have suggested that relations like (i')-(vi'), when they obtain to a significant tend extent, to establish the sort of reliable belief indicated in (vii'). regulation What is in fact true is that to establish for any particular (vii') term t and kind k, relations like (i')-(vi') must obtain with respect to a large number of terms and kinds. [This is just to repeat the claim that successful induction in science depends upon a body of relecorrect background theories and beliefs.] Thus vantly approximately there are complex relations of mutual dependence between the referencerelations for the whole range of theoretical terms in sciestablishing ence (and in everyday life, for that matter). consider the case in which at a particular time a term t Finally, refers to a kind k but the relevant scientific community makes certain as yet undiscovered errors of classification, systematic classifying as ks certain to things which do not belong to k. It is reasonable ask what makes it true that t then refers to k rather than to the

650 of all those things which would nominal kind consisting the under t. sified After all, at the time in question, between t and this nominal kind might seem to be closer nection between t and k. Why is it to k that the use of then affords epistemic access?

then be clasconnection than the conthe term t

beThe answer lies in the character of the mechanisms of reliable It is because those mechanisms (which lief regulation themselves. a are the mechanisms of epistemic access) depend upon, and establish, bedialectical approximation process of accommodation by successive of and the causal structure tween our actual classificatory practices of these mechanisms depends the world, and because the reliability crucially upon such a process of accommodation, that we are justified in thinking of those mechanisms as connecting t to k rather than to we describe when we say the nominal kind in question. The relation reladialectical that a term refers to a kind just is the relevant tion of accommodation. 3. Applications to Issues in the Philosophy of Science

I will describe ways in which the acIn the following sections, can sections count of scientific knowledge sketched in the preceeding of science. be brought to bear on a number of issues in the philosophy in and are intended only to indicate will be brief, These discussions of that account are related features broad outline how the distinctive issues. to more specific philosophical 3.1. The Refutation of Verificationism

The standard verificationist argument against realism goes (roughLet T be any scientific theory which appears to dely) like this: There will always be some other theory scribe unobservable phenomena. as T, and which, if consequences T', which has the same observational a different picture of unobservable realistically, presents interpreted Since each theory would be equally well supported by any phenomena. no evidence could determine which of these observational evidence, the correct account of unobservable theories phenomena. presents scientific Therefore, knowledge cannot extend beyond knowledge of observables. to this sort of argument: (1) It There are two standard rebuttals in theory to take account of the role of "auxiliary fails hypotheses" that T and T' might yield to recognize and thus it fails confirmation, when (perhaps as yet undiscovered) observational different consequences auxiliary hypotheses are employed; (2) It depends upon a distinction and unobservable between observable phenomena; but no sharp distinction of that sort can be drawn. Neither of these rebuttals really conthrust of the verian adequate reply to the epistemological stitutes ficationist argument. The first verificationist because the standard is inadequate of these rebuttals in so that the theories argument can be reformulated

651 are "total that is, so that the theoretical sciences"; question scientific of the entire theories at mitments body of accepted of a predictively with those ticular time are to be contrasted a rival theoretical lent alternative embodying body of theories all their Since "total contain own auxiliary sciences" ception. Such a total-science the first has no force. rebuttal potheses, of rival ficationism to the consideration can even be extended retical traditions (Boyd 1973). coma parequivaconhyveritheo-

The second the signifiin the first rebuttal fails because, place, cance of the verificationist does not depend upon a sharp argument is a principled, All that is required observation-theory dichotomy. if fuzzy, distinction atoms and "elementary" which treats, say, paras unobservables. are at least two episteticles there Moreover, for this One candidates distinction. plausible principled mologically can either take as observable only those phenomena which are plainly observable to the unaided or one can extend of the notion senses, to those entities which can be detected when the senses observability are aided whose relevant can be understood withby devices operation out reference to theories which themselves employ suspect terminology, and like and light microlike, telescopes optical magnifying glasses, when these in a theoretically unsoinstruments are employed scopes manner (e.g., without phisticated spectroscopy equipment, polarizing if one already Of course, knows that realism is sound, etc.). filters, then even this will but it is certainly distinction seem arbitrary, well-motivated with respect to the epistemological concerns which veriin the verificationist ficationism and its addresses, application argument is not rebutted that if that argument is unsuccessful by showing then the distinction is ill-motivated. What is wrong with the verificationist ifthe account of argument, scientific defended here is correct, is that--under the epistemology considerations envisioned in the verificationist theoargument--the ries T and T' are not necessarily well (or total sciences) equally The evidential for a theory evidence. supported by scientific support --or the evidence it--is not captured against just by the confirmation or disconfirmation of the theory's observational Plausipredictions. in the light of the theoretical is also tradition bility evidential; indeed considerations of theoretical of this sort are esplausibility sential in assessing the strength of more "direct" eviexperimental dence. not just tradition will do: the Furthermore, any theoretical of the experimental method depends reliability upon its operations true theoretical tradibeing governed by a relevantly approximately tion. If T is the actual current total and T' is an alternascience, tive total science which is profoundly in the light of T, implausible then there are evidential reasons for preferring T to T'. The two total sciences are not equally well evidence. supported by available The standard verificationist argument but mistaken of the (true) interpretation in observation. edge is always grounded rebuttal to this contingent interpretation rests upon a highly plausible doctrine that factual knowlIt is the naturalistic and which constitutes the

652 deepest 3.2. rebuttal to verificationism.3 of Causal Relations

The "Humean" Account

The most durable doctrine in the philosophy of science empiricist must be the analysis of causal statements to which the meanaccording that one event, event caused another e2, is, ing of the claim el, roughly, (or that a statement asserting about the the subsequent probability occurrence of of occurdecone2

some appropriate

statement

e2's 2

can rence) scriptions ditions.

be deduced from natural of el's occurrence, prior

with suitable laws, together and of relevant background

What makes this Humean is that it follows analysis contemporary the view that causal relations are to be understood Hume in rejecting as manifestations of natural or of the operation of causal necessity, for The contemporary mechanisms. powers or underlying justification what's is verificationist: a regularity of causal relations analysis or in terms of natural causation necessity wrong with understanding natural nor causal causal is that neither powers are necessity powers the is also Humean: it captures Such a justification observable. or psychological) reasons (but not the conceptual epistemological for the ancestor of the current doctrine. which Hume offered a peculiar of causation bears The contemporary "Humean" analysis emit is quite often relation to its verificationist justification: to with respect stance who adopt a realist ployed by philosophers it is not uncommon for the Humean "theoretical entities"; indeed, are themin question in cases where the events to be applied analysis of the verificationist The abandonment selves unobservable! justifireduced its for the analysis seems not to have substantially cation acceptability. from a realist is unacceptable the Humean analysis Nevertheless, and their entities of unobservable If we have knowledge perspective. their about atoms, we know, say, unobservable something properties--if we do have knowlconstituents--then and their sub-atomic properties which manifest causal powers or mechanisms edge of the underlying of constitutions" Such "secret natural powers" and "inner necessity. causcase of the sort of alleged been the paradigm matter have always of causal relations has al reality which the Humean account against for There is no longer been directed. justification any philosophical of causation. the regularity analysis It might seem puzzle: Suppose the following Consider even to a realist. otherwise, is and we know that matter are right that realists

653 with various unobservable composed of various micro-constituents, and magnitudes and obeying certain (perhaps statistical) properties how the various properties and magnitudes laws. These laws indicate correlations between various sorts of They establish vary over time. But don't we need something like the states. microscopic physical our saying in order to justify Humean analysis of causal statements that these correlations Wouldn't we anyway need some alare causal? in order to exof the meaning of causal statements ternative analysis of any sort laws and theories plain why we can understand scientific as being causal, If one replies or as describing causal relations? is causal bethat the relation states between the relevant physical the the laws in question describe cause, realistically understood, interactions of matter and their respecbetween various constituents since the tive properties wouldn't that be circular, and magnitudes, notion of interaction a causal notion? is itself our holding that the laws and The answer is that what justifies relations in question are causal is--at least primarily--that paradigm as being cases of macroscopic causation are described by our theories between the micro-constituents of matter and composed of interactions their various properties. It is true that both the notion of interaction and the notion of composition (at least as it is employed here) are themselves Thus the answer offered here would be causal notions. circular if it were offered as a reductive definition of causation in non-causal terms. and their constituents But, if causal relations are real phenomena (as realism suggests), thenthere is no reason to believe that any such definition is possible. Indeed, it is doubtful that there are analytic definitions of central causal notions, even in terms of other causal notions. What we can reasonably expect is not an analysis of causation (in the philosopher's sense) but rather an an account of the sorts of causal factors there assay of causation, are in the world and of how they interact. That is the task of the various special of which philosophy is only one. sciences, 3.3. Theoretical Reduction and Theoretical Equivalence

often need to ask what it is for two theories to be Philosophers to--in some sense--say the same things about the world. equivalent, They must also ask what it is for one theory to be subsumable under to say only things about the world which the other theory alanother, There is a standard answer in the positivist tradition to ready says. these questions: What it is for a theory T' to be subsumable under another theory T'' is for T' to be syntactically to T'', reducible for all the sentences in T' to be deducible from T'' when T'' i.e., is supplemented by a suitable set of definitions or "reduction sentences" the vocabularies of the two theories. Two theories relating are equivalent if each is syntactically reducible to the other. of equivalence Questions regarding relations tween theories arise in a number of philosophical the issue is ontological: what is at issue is, or subsumption becontexts. In some, at least roughly,

654 the entities whether countenanced would exist in a by one theory world in which the other is true, of this sort arise in the Questions of science in at least different two quite In philosophy settings. the first it has been a standard concern of philosophers of place, to explicate science materialist doctrines mental of, e.g., phenomena, or biology. It is plausible to hold that a significant of component such doctrines is the claim of certain that the theories scispecial ences are ontologically under the laws of fundamental subsumable physics.

of ontological of theories also arise in cerQuestions equivalence discussions about limitations on possible theoretical knowledge. sometimes whether there might be theories which Philosophers inquire are in some respect or other but which inequivalent ontologically could not be distinguished evidence. Now, the standard by theoretical verificationist in 3.1 addresses discussed this and issue, argument finds that such situations are ubiquitous. But one need not adopt a verificationist or a non-realistic of scienperspective conception tific evidence It is entirely to raise such a question. compatible with the sort of realism defended here that there should be some theoretical issues as a consequence of features of the actual laws which, of nature, could never be resolved (Moreby scientific investigation. to conclude that such an issue is not to is thus unresolvable over, use of stance towards as some careless it, adopt a "non-realistic" seems to suggest.) philosophical terminology tain and antithere is a respect in which verificationist Nevertheless, of ontoin such discussions realist issues obscure the real positions of notions matters. of the relevant The analysis ontological logical and equivalence in terms of syntactic is--if reducibility subsumption scientific Consider the realism is correct--a mistake. significant of the subsumption of a theory T' under a theory ontological question of the enT''. What is at issue is whether or not the interactions and causal events, by powers described magnitudes tities, properties, T'' realize or constitute the entities, events, magnitudes, properties, the inin T', in the way in which, and causal say, powers described countenanced teractions of the entities, etc. by physical magnitudes, a chair, a table, or a thunderstorm. or manifest constitute theory at of constitution or manifestation that the notion Now, it is clear of this sort is if ontological is a causal issue notion; subsumption of causation, the result to the "Humean" account according analyzed reducible of the claim that T' is syntactically will be some version of materialist theories reconstruction" to T''. the "rational Indeed, of the special sciences as doctrines about the syntactic reducibility reconstruction of to physics case of verificationist is the paradigm scientific doctrines. that the "Humean" analysis of to believe But we have good reason like relations Causal causal relations is mistaken. constitution, of natural are real or manifestation phenomena, aspects composition In additalk. to non-causal and talk about them is not reducible that syntactic to believe reasons are more specific there tion,

655 is not an adequate analysis in these cases. In the first reducibility there are mathematical reasons for doubting that deductive subplace, sumption under a law adequately captures the notion of causal determination even in cases where strict determinism obtains (Boyd 1972). Moreover, there is good evidence to suggest that the syntactic of ontological in just those cases which analysis subsumption fails it was designed to account for. There is very strong evidence favorclaims of materialism in biology, and substantial ing the ontological evidence favoring such claims about mental phenomena. But there is at the same time evidence that neither biological terms nor psychological are physically definable in the way which syntactic reduction requires (Fodor 1974; Putnam 1967; Wimsatt 1976, 1979). Thus, the "Humean" reconstruction of these materialist doctrines transforms them from wellconfirmed scientific into doctrines which are almost cerhypotheses There is no reason to believe that the "Humean" recontainly false. struction of theoretical in terms of mutual syntactic reequivalence is any more satisfactory. ducibility 3.4. Realism, Paradigms, and Paradigm Change

In addition to straightforwardly verificationist arguments against the role of theoretical there are considerations realism, involving paradigms in science or the character of changes in paradigm which have scientific seemed to some philosophers to mitigate realism. against neo-Kantian conSome of these considerations Kuhn's distinctly reflect (Kuhn 1970) whereas others are less neo-Kantian than ception of science It is beyond the scope of this essay to survey these just anti-realist. in any detail considerations treatment of (see Boyd 1979 for a fuller Kuhn's positions), but I will sketch the outline of a realist response to three of these anti-realist arguments: is the methodology of normal science (1) So paradigm-dependent that, if it's a procedure for discovering facts about supposed to represent the world, then the world had better be paradigm-dependent as well. The change in world-view is revolutions (2) during major scientific so great that both the meanings and the referents of theoretical terms change, so that the realist picture of science as producing successive to the truth cannot be sustained. approximations Even if a suitable account of referential for terms (3) continuity in successive scientific theories is available, it will still turn out that the changes in world-view during scientific revolutions are so notion of approximate truth great that there will be no non-contrived which will permit us to describe earlier theories as approximately true and to sustain the picture of scientific progress by successive approximation as the realist of science requires. conception features of Kuhn's anti-realist (1) and (2) seem to be central position. maintained from chapter IX on, in Kuhn 1970, (2) is explicitly and is most carefully articulated and defended in the well-known

656 discussion of the alleged deducibility stein's (Kuhn 1970, (2) p. 101-102). thread in Kuhn. epistemological is of Newton's laws of my rendering from Einan important

the sort of anti-realist which might be ad(3) represents argument vanced by someone concerned with the dramatic character of recent theoretical in physics innovations or not she adopts a neo-Kantian whether in the philosophy on of science. (3) might be defended Thus, position the following to the classical atomic matgrounds: theory, According ter is composed of discrete fundamental which possess particles, quite definite and which are quite indynamical properties unambiguously dividuated. The quantum mechanical a of matter conception presents Not only do the classical very different ontological picture. dynamical variables to lack simultaneous but it is hard appear sharp values, to see how the quantum mechanical interas it is usually formalism, a theory as realreflects at all. of discrete preted, If, particles as an apwe are to take the quantum mechanical ists picture insist, of reality, then it is hard to see faithful proximately representation the previous classical was also also how, as realists insist, theory an approximately true description of the same unobservable reality. The ontological is theories presented picture by the two successive too different. to be approxiwhat it is for a theory Worse yet, just true is for it to say approximately true things about the enmately there tities which it countenances; but on the quantum mechanical view, are no such fundamental as the classical theory accepts. particles one can defend non-standard an appropriate Thus, unless interpretation of the quantum mechanical realism seems to be refuted. formalism, The account in this of scientific realism essay permits presented to see insights while simin each of these anti-realist arguments, of scientific the realist conception progress. ultaneously defending that a here concurs to (1), offered With respect the realist account of the profoundly for the reliability is required special explanation mature sciences. which characterizes methodology paradigm-dependent of a relein the contingent It sees the explanation as lying emergence than in rather theories true body of background vantly approximately the paradigm-dependence of the world which scientists study. us a version in maintaining for (2) consist Kuhn's arguments largely and meaning of theoretical of the law-cluster of the reference account features of the relevant central terms according to which certain parato fix of theoretical terms and serve digm are part of the meaning feain these their that changes referents. Kuhn holds paradigmatic ofof reference The account tures indicate a change in reference. are of the paradigm features fered that the fundamental here concurs the these are just since the relevant mechanisms, reference-fixing access acto in the epistemic mechanisms appealed belief-regulating of reference account the naturalistic But because count of reference. connection a causal as establishing mechanisms offered here sees these rather than as embodying terms and their between theoretical referents, the parathat from that account it does not follow truths, conceptual of the relevant correct digm must embody exactly descriptions

657 theoretical entities. cate a change in the Therefore, referents of a change in the relevant need not indiparadigm theoretical terms.

With respect to (3), and naturalistic the dialectical account of the progress of scientific in the present offered knowledge essay us to say in just what respects the scientific realist permits should, the process of successive to be reprima facie, expect approximation in the transition flected in a mato its successor from one paradigm ture science: for the (a) The terms of the preceeding should, theory most part, sometimes to correspond systematically ambiguously) (though real features or aspects of reality, and thus to features or aspects of the phenomena which the successor (b) the recountenances; theory lation of correspondence should be constituted of episby relations temic access of the sort which the realist sees as constituents of the mechanisms of reliable belief of (c) the existence regulation; this should the (instrumental and theoretical) correspondence explain success of scientific under the earlier (d) the methodology paradigm; theoretical which is reflected in the preceding paradigm knowledge should both how its was discovered successor and how help to explain it was confirmed: that the theoretical embodied in the is, knowledge earlier should the reliability of the belieftheory help to explain mechanisms which governed the transition between the pararegulating which are themselves (e) finally, digms; (a)-(d), claims, empirical should be features of the picture of reality afforded by the successor with the relevant historical and philosophical theoparadigm (together ries). No novel or non-standard of any recent scientific interpretation revolutions is necessary in order to defend the sort of theoretical The "overlap" between successive continuity represented by (a)-(e). in the 20th-century, for example, is of exactly the sort reparadigms for their defense. there is an important quired Nevertheless, insight behind the third to realism which we have been considering. objection It appears to be the case that--as a matter of fact--we are not (or, not yet) the fundamental of features perhaps, very good at identifying at least in physics. Features of reality which are treated nature, by one theory as fundamental are often treated successors as asby its of much more complex Terms which seem to correspond pects phenomena. to quite definite to aspects or properties may turn out to correspond features of some more complex sort of physical state. terms Similarly, which seem to correspond to discrete and clearly individuated entities refer to aspects of a more complicated Insofar may instead reality. as we think of "fundamental as seeking to describe the ultiphysics" mate and fundamental features of physical then its efforts reality, to have been, thus far at least, unsuccessful. Whatever appear the for that there is no reason explanation from the refailure, however, cent history of physics to deny that the methods of physicists are reliable with respect to the discovery of approximate truths about real unobservable features of matter. Whenever, features in this scientists and philosophers century, of existing theories which seem physical have examscientifically

ined

658 or philosophically puzzling or which suggest that our deepest theories of may be in some respect inadequate or incomplete as descriptions some of them have been tempted to see the underlying physical reality, as dictating an abandonment apparent inadequacy of our current theories of scientific realism. The abandonment of realism is a great theoretielimination if theories are never supposed to cal-puzzle strategy: describe underlying reality, then it's no puzzle that the current ones don't seem fully adequate to the task. Indeed. The abandonment of realism is the abandonment of theoretical Even without the inquiry. makes instrumental knowlepistemological picture presented here--which on theoretical cure seems worse than the edge parasitic knowledge--the If the epistemological disease. conception of the present essay is the sound, then the abandonment of theoretical inquiry would entail abandonment of the search for instrumental knowledge as well. Nothing in the recent history of4science would justify the abandonment of either sort of inquiry. Notes I The views in this paper were developed over the last decade. had the opportunity to profit from discussions with have, therefore, a great many people, some of whom will not even remember our conversations. I want especially to thank William Alston, Ned Block, George Norman Daniels, Boolos, Sylvain Bromberger, Richard Cartwright, Hartry Kristin Carl Ginet, Alvin Goldman, Alex Goldstein, Field, Alan Gilbert, Barbara Koslowski, Guyot, Harold Hodes, Paul Horwich, Hilary Kornblith, Thomas Kuhn, Richard Miller, Henry Newell, Andrew Ortony, Mark Pastin, William Provine, Hilary Putnam, Israel Scheffler, Sydney Shoemaker, Howard Stein, Nicholas Sturgeon, Robert George Smith, Robert Stalnaker, Weingard, William Wimsatt and David Zaret. Various parts of this paper were presented in graduate seminars at at Case-Western Reserve UniverCornell and at M.I.T. and in colloquia The Rockefeller University, Princeton, Rutgers, The State Unisity, of New York at Oswego, Syracuse University, Tufts, The University of of Chicago, The University of Minnesota, The University versity of Illinois at Urbanaand the University at Chicago Circle, Illinois for their Champaign. I thank the audiences at these presentations comments and criticisms. helpful to a natural rehearsed here provide a rebuttal The considerations The natural reto the argument for realism offered in 2.1. objection which characThe methodological buttal goes like this: principles acterize mature science are as paradigm dependent as the realistic seems and their reliability count of scientific epistemology suggests, to depend upon their paradigm dependent features. But, all we can conresearch Scientific inductive clude is the following generalization: research conscientific conducted according to such a method (i.e., would recommend) is, and will be, instrumentally ducted as a realist realist What is unwarranted is the "metaphysical" reliable.

explanation

of this

659 generalization.

The realist the issue of projectability for the replies by raising of scientific characterization acmethodology which the non-realist There are infinitely which cepts: many possible "methodologies" would have recommended the finitely many methodological judgments which have characterized of science thus far, but which the practice differ about future methodological What recommendations. (pairwise) reason have we to believe that the sort of description of methodology inductive about inducemployed in the non-realist's generalization tion is the appropriate sort of description? What reason have we to believe that this sort of description captures the reliability-making of past scientific features It's true that other characpractice? terizations of scientific method to date would be arbitrary, or silly, but what would their arbitrariness or silliness consist in? The answer, I suggest, is that our initial confidence in the description in question already rests upon the common-sense, pre-philosophiof the principles and of the cal, realistic understanding involved, reasons why they are justified. The second-order inductive generalization about inductive methods offered by the non-realist rests upon a of descriptions of past methodological judgment about projectability which itself reflects a tacit acceptance of the sort of practices first-order theoretical inductions involved in 2.1. When this tacit support is withdrawn, the burden of proof rests upon the non-realist to justify her proposed identification of the reliability-making features of previous scientific practice. It is worth remarking that what is illustrated here is a quite general feature of anti-"metaphysical" empiricism. Empiricists deploy would cast doubt skeptical arguments which, if consistently developed, The exceptions upon all general knowledge whatsoever. they make for general knowledge of observable phenomena are ultimately unjustifiable within empiricist (see section 3.1). epistemology This rebuttal to verificationism reflects an important difference between the strategy for defending realism employed in 2.1, and a more common strategy for defending realism which philosophers of science often employ. realism is defended According to this second strategy, for particular scientific that the best explanaby arguing, theories, tion for their instrumental is the approximate truth of reliability the laws they contain. This latter strategy provides us with good reasons to believe that realism is true, and that there is, therefore, something wrong with the verificationist epistemological arguments the possibility of theoretical It does not, howagainst knowledge. ever, tell us what is wrong with verificationist epistemology. The argumentative of 2.1, by contrast, strategy provides an epistedefense of realism, a distinctly mological permits us to articulate realistic of the epistemology of science, and makes it understanding to say just what is wrong with the central possible epistemological

660 argument of verificationism. It should be noted that neither the argument of 2.1 nor the discusentail that the sion of approximate truth in 3.4 (nor both together) methods of actual science would lead to exactly true theories as an "asymptotic limit" if science were pursued long enough. Nothing in the arguments for realism presented here is meant to preclude the posthat there are true theories which we could never discover, sibility or issues we would never get exactly right. Over successive approximations to the truth could be "bounded away" from the exact truth for causal limitations limitations, any number of reasons--intellectual on access to data, for example, or some systematic and irremediable or theoretical What I do insist defect in our conceptual framework. have is that--contrary to what logical have claimed--we positivists lots of approximate knowledge about unobservable phenomena and our to improve our instrumental parasitic ability knowledge is largely to improve our theoretical upon our ability knowledge. not some sort The account of science offered here is, therefore, of truth as the of realist's version of the pragmatic definition In the language scientific case of rational investigation. limiting of Putnam 1978 (see Part Four) exact truth is "radically non-epistemic", which truth can be defined a la Tarski--is even though reference--from exact truth) is disTruth (or, rather, an epistemic notion. itself and methods in a way in which reference connected from our rational to William Wimsatt and (I am grateful approximate truth are not. of this note.) which led to the inclusion Howard Stein for discussions

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