Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 03/2010
ISSN 1653-8994
SUMMARY
The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement ment and its results. Firstly, Korean auto- tion in Europe rather than to export from
(EUKOR) is the most ambitious FTA mobile manufacturers only have a small Korea to Europe at high transport costs.
negotiated by the European Union. It share (12 percent) of imported cars to If anything, the trade deal with Korea
is clear that the EU has negotiated an the EU. Korean cars compete principally is likely to have a positive effect on the
agreement with emphasis on getting in one segment of the market – small scale of Korean auto FDI in Europe.
new market access rather than exposing cars – and compete to a large extent Thirdly, European auto exports to Ko-
domestic industries to greater competi- with other foreign producers. All the rea stand to benefit as Korea not only
tion. The EU receives market access in other segments of the auto market are eliminates its tariffs on vehicles, but also
almost all its key sectors, including ag- largely unaffected by Korean competi- reduces its NTBs significantly. A study
riculture, automotives, pharmaceuticals, tion. suggests an increase of over 400 per-
electronics and services. Non-Tariff Bar- Secondly, export of heavy goods cent – albeit from very low levels.
riers (NTBs) in Korea will be cut in sec- (cars) concentrated to a small number Finally, the biggest myth is the notion
tors where the EU has export interests. of firms (Hyundai and Kia) will to a large that saying no to the agreement is a cost-
Yet there is a fear that the deal may extent be substituted by foreign direct in- free option. A rejection of the agreement
be rejected by the European Parliament, vestment. This is already a pattern in the would undermine Europe’s credibility in
primarily because of EUKOR’s effect on sales of Korean car brands on the EU trade talks, and is not likely to make Ko-
the automotive sector. But the notion of market. Concentrated to two brands, it rea more amenable to re-write the agree-
a Korean car invasion is a myth. Critics has proven much more efficient for Ko- ment in Europe’s favour.
have grossly misrepresented the agree- rean automotive firms to locate produc-
the benefits are typically not substantial when there are date – there are again mounting fears that the process in
only two parties involved in a trade agreement, and the the European Parliament will be difficult and that new
inherent discrimination provokes (sometimes profound) political demands will have to be taken on board to get
trade diversion.1 the acceptance of the Parliament.
Despite such concerns, it is easy to understand Europe’s Yet, the opposition to EUKOR is surprising – even to
desire to negotiate new FTAs with other countries. Firstly, chastened political cynics. One could have seen a mate-
the impetus for global trade liberalisation – in the context rial rationale for opposing the agreement if it had been
of negotiations in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – ventured by free-trade ideologues with deep affinity to
had slowed down remarkably in the middle of the nough- multilateralism, or simply sceptical of its liberalising
ties.The Doha Round had already had serial collapses and coverage. Such criticism is partially warranted. The EU-
the prospect for improvements was bleak. It does not look KOR is a good distance away from free-trade purism. Its
better today. Regardless of the fate of the Doha Round, it structure and motivation is closer to “soft mercantilism”
is reasonable to think it will be long before the full set of than free trade. It is clear that the EU has negotiated an
WTO members in a post-Doha world can coalesce around agreement with emphasis on getting new market access
an all-encompassing trade agreement which substantially rather than exposing domestic industries to greater com-
liberalises trade. A diligent actor, then, will not pause its petition – with smaller than potential dynamic gains from
trade strategy till that moment arises, if it ever will. It the agreement as a consequence.There are critics arguing
seeks, and rightly so, other means to achieve trade liber- that the EU has not negotiated as much new market ac-
alisation that brings economic benefits. cess as it should have. It is correct that the deal does not
come close to reducing or eliminating as much barriers
Secondly, there are trade barriers that are very unlikely as would have been ideal. Perhaps it is also correct to say
to be liberalised multilaterally, even under the assump- that the EU could have done a better job bending up Ko-
tion that the Doha Round will resurrect and the WTO rea’s market. But that is an unknown – even an unknown
will regain its centrality in global trade policy. Non-tariff unknown. What we know, however, is that EUKOR goes
barriers (NTBs) – which are far bigger than tariffs and much farther in reducing barriers to trade than most oth-
increasing– are one of those barriers, but they are not er FTAs on record. This, however, is not the immediate
alone. Rightly pursued, bilateral trade negotiations can concern of the free-trade purist. It is rather that EUKOR
reduce NTBs – often in a non-discriminatory fashion, does not provoke as much import competition as would
bringing the benefits to a larger set of countries. have been possible.
Thirdly, many emerging markets still have significant The surprising part is that most critics of EUKOR are
trade barriers and in some markets these are prohibitive offspring of the same trade ideology and profess mercan-
and severely restrict the ability of European firms to in- tilism, soft or hard, as the guiding principle for trade ne-
crease sales or investment to them. In emerging markets gotiations. By that standard, the EU has negotiated a good
whose economic size is already substantial, it is impera- deal.The mercantilists overall got what they desire.Yet it
tive that improvements of market access move faster than is they who want to throw the deal in the dustbin.
the speed of multilateral trade liberalisation. South Ko-
rea ticks all of these boxes and should be a candidate for Their opposition to EUKOR is, however, largely based
a trade agreement with the EU. The United States also on a number of myths. Premier among them is the no-
thought of Korea in similar terms and negotiated an FTA tion that EUKOR will deal a hard blow to the European
with Korea a few years ago.2 Yet the EUKOR agreement automotive industry, threatening substantial volumes of
has run into opposition – mainly from small but vocal sec- production and jobs. At a time when the European auto-
tor interests. One member state vetoed the agreement, motive industry is already battling with collapsing sales,
and the start date of the agreement had to be postponed and many firms have survived only through government
to get its support. As it was proved possible to open up support, it is alleged that EUKOR will have a menacing
the agreement again – even if only on the issue of starting effect, far greater than it would have had in normal times.
The purpose of this paper is to dispel myths about EU- EUKOR is fairly modest in the use of exemptions for
KOR. Other scholars have given full presentations of the politically sensitive goods. The EU has largely chosen to
agreement and estimated the gains and losses from it.3 make transition arrangements for sectors in which Ko-
These need not to be rehearsed in this paper. The paper rean firms have already invested in factories and jobs in-
rather looks at the agreement in the broader perspective side the EU, notably automotives and electronics. Tariff
of EU trade strategy – without too much jargon or the elimination in these sectors will be phased in over 3-5
usual sales pitches for the agreement – and addresses in years. Meanwhile, Korea’s political sensitivities and ex-
greater detail the effects of the agreement on certain sec- ceptions are focused on limited agricultural products
tors, the automotive sector in particular. It aims at giving (such as milk, bovine meat and tobacco) and enjoy transi-
a dispassionate account of what is likely, and what is not tion arrangements between 5-15 years, while rice – the
likely, to be the consequence of EUKOR. culturally important crop for Korea – and its derivative
products are exempted.
come into play once one of the two most overprotected • Regulatory convergence approach based on
economies in the developed world (second only to Ja- UNECE standards
pan) opens its borders. Current market share of imported • Positive list of products that will be recognised as
cars in Korea stands at 6 percent, which is only second to complying with importing party’s regulations on
Japan, where the share of imported cars is just above 3 entry into force.
percent. The case for improved market access for Euro- • EU list: 74 items or rules
pean cars is clear, and the effects from scaling back NTBs • Korean list 51 items or rules; OBF and Emissions
exceed the effect of tariff eliminations.While the Korean for Gasoline engines: transitional quota system until
tariffs amount to 8 percent, the NTBs are estimated to be 2013
around 90 percent.14 • Certain positively listed regulations shall be harmo-
nised with UNECE within 5 years, i.e. 1 EU regula-
tion and 29 Korean regulations
Judging by number of imports, the extent of burden-
• Revisions of list of products every 3 years
some regulations in Korea appears almost prohibitive.
The severity of NTBs prompts two questions. Firstly, has • Ban on introducing new regulations that diverge
from UNECE, unless proven that they do not fulfil
the offensive interests, i.e. exporters concerns, been ad- safety concerns
equately addressed in EUKOR in order to unleash the
• MFN treatment on internal taxes and emission
export potential? Secondly, could an effective dismantling regulations
of Korean NTBs lead to such increase in EU exports as
• Products with new features shall be allowed unless
suggested - and can the Korean market realistically ac- demonstrated that it creates risks for health, safety,
commodate such growth? environment; obligatory notification if product taken
out of the market
The answer to the first question seems to be affirmative. • Establishment of a working group on motor vehicles
As the box below shows, the NTB reforms negotiated by and parts
the EU are significant and comprise most of the NTBs • Chapter Fourteen (FTA dispute settlement system)
that the EU car industry has reported to be seriously pre- applies, accelerated procedure]
venting market access.
The second question is, more precisely, whether the FTA, TABLE 1: KOREAN AUTOMOBILE MARKET
providing an effect equivalent to such discount, could ac- Growth Rate of Imported Growth Rate of
Year Cars Share Domestic Market
tually lead to the rise in EU exports up to five times to-
2000 61.54% 16.13%
day’s levels? It goes without saying that such effects are
rare. But they are neither impossible nor unprecedented. 2001 71.43% 0.71%
In fact, the predicted growth is in line with the histori- 2002 80.56% 15.03%
cal development of EU exports to Korea in the past ten 2003 46.92% -18.23%
years, which multiplied by more than 13 times while the 2004 38.74% -14.36%
domestic growth rate over the period was approximately
2005 23.40% 6.48%
29 percent (Table 1) – in fact, a growth rate of 32 percent
2006 26.91% 2.42%
would be sufficient to reach the stipulated growth of 400
percent during the five year transition period while the 2007 23.61% 5.42%
actual growth has actually been even higher in the past ten 2008 17.74% -2.79%
years. EU exporters effectively outgrew Korean domestic 2009 -18.21% 22.52%
producers, thanks to changing attitudes and regulatory
Source: KAMA; KAIDA.
reforms that are minor compared to the package of re-
forms that the FTA will introduce.
cc (from 18.4% to 24.5%). The structure of imports Of a cylinder capacity exceeding 1,000 cc
870322 0.013
suggests that imports are becoming more balanced for but not exceeding 1,500 cc
100%
6.50%
90%
16.50%
80%
24.50%
18.40%
70%
60%
~
4,000
cc
50%
38.40%
42.40%
3,000
cc
~
4,000
cc
40%
2000
~
3,000
cc
30%
~
2,000
cc
20%
30.50%
10%
22.70%
0%
2000
2009
Source: KAIDA
2005 1000000
2551.701 611.136 36485.718 US
Autos
Total
2006 800000
1988.294 997.623 133484.81 Japan
Autos
Total
2007 10943.803
600000
811.81 231321.77
EU
Autos
Total
2008 400000
16192.17 859.084 265604.32
2009 16357.498
200000
225.458 292924.31
0
200000
US
Diesel
Cars
150000
Japan
Diesel
Cars
100000
EU
Diesel
Cars
50000
0
1995
1997
1998
1999
2001
2005
2007
2008
2009
1994
1996
2000
2002
2003
2004
2006
Source: COMTRADE
The historic development of EU exports to Korea, and exceed the EU27 average by 2012.15 However, Korea has
its comparative advantages, shows that EU manufactur- some features that are still similar to emerging markets,
ers have the pre-requisites to expand their exports. But and one example is the remarkably low car density. With
could the Korean market accommodate that growth? The 254 cars per 1000 inhabitants, Korea is still far behind
suggested growth of 400 percent is equivalent to a to- Japan or the EU and it puts the country closer to mar-
tal market share in Korea of 16-17 percent for European kets like Russia and Brazil (graph 3) – emerging markets
manufacturers.This is a reasonable level for an open mar- where the prospects for exporters are high for European
ket, especially given that it starts from a very low level. car producers.16
There are other factors that come into play, such as ex- investing in production facilities inside the EU to serve
change rate instability of the Korean Won that could have the EU market.
strong detrimental effect on imports, even potentially
wipe out the effects of the FTA. Consumers in Korea have Yet substitution of trade by FDI is less likely to be wide-
also shown tendencies to be import averse, although the spread amongst EU exporters as European industrial
increase of auto imports from the EU show preferences relations are vastly different than in the auto industry
are rapidly changing. However, these systemic errors have elsewhere. Many of the European auto manufacturers are
been constantly present throughout the past decade of subject to strong political pressure, partly expended by
growth, and EU export to Korea has multiplied despite government subsidies or past political favours. For these
them. firms, a move of production to Korea would be politi-
cally costly. Also, a certain production volume is required
It is clear that the gains of the FTA cannot be reaped in the to initialise production elsewhere. While Korean sales in
first year after ratification due to transitional provisions the EU are largely concentrated to one company group
in the agreement. The distribution and services network (Hyundai-Kia), the increase of EU volumes in Korea will
that are needed to meet such increase in demand will also be divided over several competing European company
be established gradually over several years. However, it groups, where each one of them may not reach sufficient
should be clear that the FTA will, at least, support recent volumes. This makes it more likely that the EU will con-
growth of exports. If the effect is not bigger than that, it tinue its export or possibly initiate joint ventures with
still represents a significantly bigger increase in exports Korean manufacturers. Korean manufacturer, however,
than professed by EU sectoral interests. are more likely to locate production for the EU market
in Europe.
A final complication with recorded trade should be ob-
served. European manufacturers might wish to serve in-
creasing Korean demand by production in Korea rather IS EUROPEAN AUTO MANUFACTURING UNDER
than elsewhere. Such a scenario is not unlikely given that THREAT?
market proximity is an important factor in automotives
and as it would further increase the profit margins of EU But what about EU imports of Korean automotives,
exporters. So far only one manufacturer in the EU, name- which is the more controversial element in the current
ly Renault, has chosen that strategy in Korea (as well by debate in Europe. In the wake of consolidation and re-
acquiring the ailing motor division of Samsung). But this structuring of the European car market, EU imports have
coin has two sides: Korean manufacturers are increasingly contracted significantly. According to ACEA, the sales of
0.00
Of
a
cylinder
capacity
between
1,000
cc
-‐
US$
1000
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
1,500
cc
-‐500000.00
Of
a
cylinder
capacity
between
1,500
cc
-‐
3,000
cc
-‐1000000.00
Of
a
cylinder
capacity
exceeding
3,000
cc
-‐1500000.00
Africa-‐others
Russia
0.20%
0.20%
Europe-‐others
0.20%
16000000
14000000
12000000
Newly
registered
passanger
cars
in
10000000
EU25/27,
Qty
EU
imports
World
(HS8703),
Qty;
8000000
%
of
newly
registered
cars
Graph
6000000
6b:
Korean
imports
on
European
Auto
Market,
Quantity EU
Imports
Korea
(HS8703),
Qty;
%
of
newly
registered
cars
4000000
EU
ImportsKorea
EU
imports
(HS8703),
oEU
f
Kiorean
mport
Qty light
of
Korean
cars
(870331,
non-‐light
870321),
cars,
QtyQty
20.1%
341365 21.0%
22.0%
21.1%
2003 402312 16.8%
60947
2000000
14.6%
14.7%
2004 518564 65764 452800
5.1%
4.8%
2005
0
2.7%
3.5%
756215 117961 638254 4.3%
3.1%
2.1%
2006 2003
737311
2004
123890
2005
2006
6134212007
2008
2009
2007 662038 111560 550478
Source: ACEA, COMTRADE
2008 447277 99571 347706
2009 301906 100406 201500
800000
700000
600000
EU
ImportsKorea
(HS8703),
Qty
500000
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: ACEA, COMTRADE
8. CEPII/ATLASS (2010)
Public Money for Public Goods: Winners and Losers from Assessing International Trade in Healthcare Services
CAP Reform ECIPE Working Paper No. 03/2009
ECIPE Working Paper No. 08/2009 By Lior Herman
By Valentin Zahrnt
ECIPE Working Paper No. 07/2009 ECIPE Working Paper No. 02/2009
By Arastou Khatibi By Lucy Davis
The Trade Effects of European Antidumping Policy A Blueprint for Reform of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
ECIPE Working Paper No. 07/2009 ECIPE Working Paper No. 01/2009
By Arastou Khatibi By Valentin Zahrnt
The European Centre for International Political Economy and benefits, and to present conclusions in a concise, readily
(ECIPE) is an independent and non-profit policy research think accessible form to the European public. We aim to foster a
tank dedicated to trade policy and other international economic “culture of evaluation” – largely lacking in Europe – so that
policy issues of importance to Europe. ECIPE is rooted in the better public awareness and understanding of complex issues
classical tradition of free trade and an open world economic in concrete situations can lead to intelligent discussion and im-
order. ECIPE’s intention is to subject international economic proved policies. That will be ECIPE’s contribution to a thriving
policy, particularly in Europe, to rigorous scrutiny of costs Europe in a world open to trade and cross-border exchange.
www.ecipe.org
Phone +32 (0)2 289 1350 Fax +32 (0)2 289 1359 info@ecipe.org Rue Belliard 4-6, 1040 Brussels, Belgium