EMMA DE JUAN VS ATTY.

BARIA Facts: The complainant changed the respondent for negligence in handling her labor case theater against Person. Because a Atty. Baria did not failed to file an motion for reconsideration on the decision of the NLRC which reversed the decision of the labor arbiter in favor of her labor case. (Illegal termination without Notice of explanation) Respondent, upon the investigation of the IBP denies the allegations that he advice from the beginning that he was only a new lawyer as such. He lacks on legal experience, thus, he failed to file a motion for reconsideration. The respondent also averred that the complainant negligence was the reason why he did not file a motion for reconsideration. The IBP recommend that the respondent be suspended for 3 mos. Issue: Whether or not a lawyer can abandon his client due to the failure of his client to inform him Held: A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client. A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by law and he may expect his lawyer to assert such remedy or defense.

Feliza D. De Roy vs. CA Facts: A fire wall of the burned out building owned by the petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents resulting injuries and death of a members of the private respondents. The trial court rendered a decision on June 30, 1986, finding the petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal by the petitioners the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto on August 17, 1987. The petitioners receive a copy of decision on August 25, 1987 on September 9, 1987 the petitioners filed a motion for extension, of time to file but was denied. The petitioners seeks that in habaluyas cases that decision should be published in the official gazette. Issue: whether or not a lawyer should always be aware on the facts and circumstance of the every case promulgated by the Supreme Courts in the advance reports. Held: It was ruled in the habaluyas case that the 15 day period for appealing or filing a Motion for reconsideration cannot be extended the petitioners filed an extension after 1 yr after the expiration of the grace period. Considering the length of period petitioner cannot seek refuge in the ignoranceof their counsel regarding the said rule for theircounsel regarding the said rule for their failure to file a MR within the reglamentary period. It is the bounden duty of the counsel and as a lawyer in active practice of law to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advanced reports of the Supreme Court.

DIMARUCOT v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts:

Petitioner is the accused for Frustrated Murder in the Regional Trial Court After trial, on September 11, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner of frustrated homicide Upon receiving the notice to file appellants brief, petitioner thru his counsel de parte requested and was granted additional period of twenty (20) days within which to file said brief but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, his counsel admitting that he was at fault in failing to file the appellants brief due to personal problems emanating from his *counsels+ wifes recent surgical operation. It was thus prayed that the CA allow petitioner to file his appellants brief which counsel undertook to submit within seven (7) days or until October 4, 2007. Issue: whether or not a mistake of a counsel is a valid defense Held: Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and negligence of his lawyer allegedly beset with personal problems and emotional depression. The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of ones property or liberty through a technicality. However, in this case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule. The admitted inability of his counsel to attend fully and ably to the prosecution of his appeal and other sorts of excuses should have prompted petitioner to be more vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said counsel with a more competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued to allow his counsel to represent him on appeal and even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of moving this Court with a fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for reason of petitioners age and medical condition. Verily, diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from their clients. Negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the appellants brief within the reglementary period.

APEX MINING vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioners through their retained counsel filed an answer denying the material allegations in the complaint and alleging that the claims of private respondents were without factual and legal bases since they constructed the tunnel within the mining claim area of APEX without any authority from or approval of the latter. During trial on the merits respondents presented three witnesses who were cross-examined by the petitioners' retained law firm through Atty. Gerardo C. Olaguer, a partner of the firm. After private respondents rested their case, petitioners' counsel filed a demurrer to evidence, which was denied by the trial court and set the reception of evidence for the defendants. when the case was called petitioners' counsel did not appear. the trial court issued an order declaring defendants to have waived their right to present evidence in their defense. Despite due notice of the order, counsel for petitioners did not move for reconsideration of the order, the trial court rendered a decision finding APEX liable for damages. the trial court rendered a decision finding APEX liable for damages. the petitioners appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, it was subsequently dismissed by the CA. for failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period. Again, despite due notice, counsel for petitioners did not move for reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal. Accordingly, the resolution became final. Issue whether or not actions of a lawyer is binding upon the client Held: It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client. However, the application of the general rule to a given case should be looked into and adopted according to the surrounding circumstances obtaining. Thus, exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require, and accord relief to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer's gross or palpable mistake or negligence.

RASMUS G. ANDERSON, JR vs. ATTY. REYNALDO A. CARDEO Facts: Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., an American citizen from Kodiak, Alaska, USA, filed an action before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), to recover title and possession of a parcel of land against the spouses Juanito Maybituin and Rosario Cerrado, and Fernando Ramos. The case was dismissed by the trial court, which declared the defendants the true and lawful owners of their respective portions of the land in question. when Atty. Cesar S. de Guzman died. Anderson, Jr. was now without a counsel to represent him. Upon referral by a friend, Anderson, Jr. engaged the services of herein respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeo. Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., filed an administrative complaint before this Court wherein he alleged that respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeo caused "the loss" or the adverse ruling against him in the aforementioned case before the RTC. Complainant concludes that Atty. Cardeo abused his clients trust and confidence and violated his oath as a lawyer in failing to defend his clients cause to the very end. Complainant prays that Atty. Cardeo be disbarred. Issue: Whether or not a lawyer should always owes fidelity on his client Held: SUSPENDED (6) months and WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely. Thus, respondents defenses that the complainant was "uncooperative" as a client, that the voluminous records turned over to him were in disarray, and that the complainant did not disclose to him certain particulars of the case, are all unavailing. Thus, in view of the fact that he remained counsel of record for the complainant, it was highly irregular for him to entrust the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to other people who did not lawfully appear interested in the subject litigation. As a lawyer representing the cause of his client, he should have taken more control over the handling of the case. Respondent should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioner Lagrada was a owner of the parcel of land which the private respondents entered upon the failure of lagrada to sign the agreement the private respondents filed a complaint before the RTC in Quezon City Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February 26, 1985. 2 However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision favoring the private respondents. Copy of said decision was duly served on counsel for the petitioner but he did not take any action. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. Issue: Whether or not a lawyer should render adequate preparation in handling a case Held: A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public. Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. It is not only a case of simple negligence as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was deprived of her property without due process of law.

Sambajon, et. al. v. Suing Facts: The labor arbiter renders a decision in favor of the complainant for the alleged illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. The labor arbiter renders in favor of the complainant and ordered the Microplast Inc. to pay the sum of money to them. Upon the payment of the sum of money the counsel for the Company Atty. Suing stated that the complainant already signed the quitclaim in his presence the complainants thus, instituted an action against Atty. Suing complaint for Falsification against respondent before the prosecutor office and disbarment before the IBP . Issue: Whether or not A Lawyer should act towards the administration of justice and deal with his clients within the bounds of law. Held: As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character. In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr. the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession."

LETICIA ADRIMISIN vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. JAVIER Facts: Complainant alleges that on 12 July 1983, she was introduced by her cousin, Pablo Adrimisin, to respondent. She needed the help of a lawyer in having her son-in-law, Alfredo Monterde ("Monterde"), who was charged with the crime of qualified theft, released from the Caloocan City Jail. Complainant claims that respondent advised her to file a bail bond. Complainant informed respondent that her only money was P500. Complainant contends that respondent received the money, issued a receipt and promised that Monterde would be released from jail the following day. Complainant also alleges that respondent failed to keep his promise in having Monterde released. Complainant went to respondent's office several times but it seemed that respondent was avoiding her. Monterde was later released upon settlement of the case with his employer. Complainant claims that she demanded for the return of the P500 but respondent failed to return this amount. Respondent did not file any comment or answer. He only appeared in the investigative hearings conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG"). Respondent, in his testimony, claims he was not hired by complainant as legal counsel. Respondent alleges complainant only asked his help to secure a bail bond. Respondent admits he received P500 for the bail bond and called up Carlos Alberto ("Alberto"), an insurance agent. Respondent claims he gave the P500 to Alberto. However, the amount was not sufficient to pay for the bond. Respondent denies that he promised to have Monterde released immediately. Respondent claims he advised complainant to get back her money directly from Alberto. Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated canon 18.03 of CPR Held: The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 16 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). The Code mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Consequently, a lawyer should account for the money received from a client. The Code also enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent himself admitted the receipt of P500 from complainant as payment for the bail bond as shown in his testimony and in Exhibit "A". By his receipt of the amount, respondent agreed to take up complainant's cause and owed fidelity to complainant and her cause, even if complainant never paid any fee. Lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

VALERIANA U. DALISAY vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR Facts: On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled "Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent," pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused. Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that "for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office." She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed. Issue: Whether or not the Respondent acts with neglect with her duty as a lawyer Held: It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

Peter D. Garrucho vs. Court of Appeals Facts: the petitioner requested then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Andrea Domingo to issue Hold Departure Orders against Ramon Binamira and Faustino Roberto. This was in connection with the investigation being conducted by the Department of Justice involving anomalous transactions in government securities affecting the PTA which entailed the loss of someP161,000,000.00. Commissioner Domingo granted the request and issued Hold Departure Order Nos. 333 and 334 against Binamira and Roberto on the said date. Roberto requested the lifting of the order, and Secretary Garrucho opposed the same in a Letter dated August 22, 1990.1awphi1.ntRoberto then filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against petitioner Garrucho and Commissioner Domingo in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Binamira, for his part, filed a complaint-in-intervention in the case. the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Binamira. The petitioner and Commissioner Domingo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed. Due to the failure to deliver the copy many times because the petitioner and his counsel moved out without informing the court. Thus, the court rendered a judgment in favor again to Roberto thus, upon the implementation of the writ of execution petitioner recourse for the SC. Issue: Whether or not a lawyer should inform the court should the counsel or the client change its residency Held: The records show that the counsel of the petitioner in the trial court was the law firm of Remollo & Associates with offices at Suite No. 23, Legaspi Suites, 178 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. Under Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the counsel of the parties in the court of origin shall be considered as their counsel in the CA. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel unless served upon the party himself is ordered by the trial court. Notice or service made upon a party who is represented by counsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel of record is not notice in law. The rule admits of exceptions, as when the court or tribunal orders service upon a party or when the tribunal defendant is waived. In the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record. It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his address. It is also the responsibility of a party to inform the court of the change of his address so that in the event the court orders that an order or resolution be served on the said party to enable him to receive the said resolution or order. In the present case, the law firm of Remollo & Associates, the petitioners counsel of record, moved out from their office at the Legaspi Suites to Dumaguete City without informing the court of such fact. Based on its records, the CA believed that the law office of the petitioners counsel was still at the Legaspi Suites and sent copies of its resolutions to the counsel of the petitioner at the said address.

ESTELA ANASTACIO-BRIONES vs. ATTY. ALFREDO A. ZAPANTA

Facts: Complainant averred that on October 25, 2002, she showed respondent a copy of "Discharge and Appearance of Counsels with Ex-parte Motion to Cancel the October 25, 2002 Hearing" she intended to file that day. She claimed that even prior to the hearing, she informed respondent of her joint venture agreement with a real estate developer who offered the services of its own counsel. Complainant added that respondent requested her not to file it and he would submit a withdrawal of appearance instead. Complainant also informed respondent that she could not attend the hearing on January 6, 2003 because of other commitments. Respondent allegedly assured her that he would be present in the hearing. On January 6, 2003, both respondent and complainant failed to appear in the hearing. As a result, the trial court declared them to have waived their right to present further witnesses and directed them to file their formal offer of evidence within ten days from notice. The trial court noted that respondent received its Order on January 24, 2003, but respondent did not act on it within the ten-day period. Instead of filing a formal offer of evidence, respondent filed a withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003. On March 10, 2003, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. On May 5, 2003, complainant learned that the cases were dismissed and that respondent did not attend the January 6, 2003 hearing and did not file a formal offer of evidence. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for abandoning her case and withdrawing his appearance as counsel without her knowledge. In his Comment dated June 10, 2004, respondent countered that he was discharged as complainants counsel after the October 25, 2002 hearing. Respondent added that he prepared a withdrawal of appearance on October 30, 2002 but complainant ignored his several requests to sign it in his office. Nevertheless, he claimed he filed a withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003 without complainants conformity. Issue: whether or not respondent liable for negligence in the performance of his duties as counsel Held: Atty. Alfredo Zapanta was suspended by the Supreme Court for three months for his failure to follow the proper procedure for withdrawal in a case, which resulted in the dismissal of his clients case. The Court held that until Zapantas dismissal or withdrawal was made of record, any judicial notice sent to him was binding upon his client even though as between them the professional relationship may have been terminated. Thus, unless properly relieved, respondent is responsible for the conduct of the cases and his failure to attend the hearing and comply with the trial courts directive to file a formal offer of evidence constitute inexcusable negligence.

VALERIANA DALISAY vs. ATTY. MAURICIO FACTS: This is the case against Batas Mauricio, the TV host. Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and received exorbitant attorneys fees but did not take any action on Valeriana Dalisays case. Initially, she paid P25T as acceptance fee. In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) the balance might be a combination of the ff: Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a discount should she pay in cash. P3, 000.00 as appearance fee notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service. She terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents. Mauricio refused. The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the case against Mauricio should be dismissed. HELD: No. He should be suspended for 6 months. When respondent accepted P56, 000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with competence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion. But there is nothing on record that Mauricio entered his appearance as counsel of record. He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she terminated his services. Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docket fees for other cases): there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case. when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees. WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision.

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO

FACTS: On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1 was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing attorneys fees. According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B2610. Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Respondents admission that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases. WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

SHIRLEY LORIA TOLEDO and ROSIE LORIA DAJAC vs. JUDGE ALFREDO E. KALLOS FACTS: For our resolution is the verified complaint, written in the vernacular and dated 21 August 2002, of siblings Shirley Loria Toledo and Rosie Loria Dajac against respondent Judge Alfredo E. Kallos, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 10, for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. Prior to his appointment as a judge in March 1995, Judge Kallos was complainants counsel of record in Civil Case No. 4879 filed with the RTC of Legazpi City, Branch 4, involving the recovery of hereditary shares with damages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to, among other things, turn over to herein complainants, the plaintiffs therein, the possession and ownership of the total area of 4,514 square meters of lot 2082 Albay Cadastre. On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executory on 16 December 1985. Several years thereafter, or in February 2002, the respondent filed in the same action, Civil Case No. 4879, before the RTC of Legazpi, Branch 4, an Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the issuance an order constituting in his favor an attorneys lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in favor of the complainants representing his attorneys fee. He based his motion on a written contingency agreement on attorneys fees for professional services rendered whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would be awarded to the complainants. He claimed that this agreement had already been implemented when one of the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff to answer for the award of damages was given to (him) as his one-third share while the other two lots went to the plaintiffs as their two-third share *as+ evidenced by the Definite Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-77728, T-77458 and T77459. However, he misplaced a copy of said written agreement. In the meantime, or on 5 September 2002, the complainants filed before this Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, the subject verified complaint. Here, complainants pray for three things. First, they pray for an order directing the respondent to stop demanding his 1/3 share attorneys fees. They assert that the respondent has no basis for his claim because he failed to show in court proof of the alleged written contingency fee agreement. They also belie respondents insistence in his Omnibus Motion that the said agreement had already been implemented when, on execution, one of three lots levied upon by the sheriff was given to him as his 1/3 share. They emphasize that all the lots levied by the sheriff were given to them. However, the respondent forced them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale on 16 January 1990 involving a parcel of land valued in the document at P10, 000, but actually worth more than P500, 000, in payment of his attorneys fees. While they did not want to sign the document because respondent appeared in their case only during execution, they were constrained to do so for fear that something adverse might happen to their case, as the respondent so warned them. The latter told them that they would not have won the case were it not for his services. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code.

HELD: Foremost of these principles is that the act of demanding attorneys fees for services rendered is not a ground for an administrative sanction. On the contrary, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility allows lawyers to charge fair and reasonable fees. As long as a lawyer honestly and in good faith serves and represents the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for his service. Lawyers are thus as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice on the part of

their clients as the clients are against abuses on the part of counsel. The duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Hence, with or without a contingency agreement between the complainants and the respondent, the trial court must determine the propriety of respondents claim for attorneys fees and the reasonable amount thereof. No evidence was presented to prove respondents alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge. The complainants do not dispute the fact that the respondent was not yet a judge when the assailed action or conduct was allegedly committed by him. As such, and to that extent, there is no reason to bind him by the strict standards of the Code of Judicial Conduct for acts committed as counsel to a case prior to his appointment as a judge. WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED for being premature and for lack of merit.

VALERIANA DALISAY vs. ATTY. MAURICIO FACTS: This is the case against Batas Mauricio, the TV host. Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and received exorbitant attorneys fees but did not take any action on Valeriana Dalisays case. Initially, she paid P25T as acceptance fee. In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) the balance might be a combination of the ff: Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a discount should she pay in cash. P3, 000.00 as appearance fee notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service. She terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents. Mauricio refused. The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the case against Mauricio should be dismissed. HELD: No. He should be suspended for 6 months. When respondent accepted P56, 000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with competence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion. But there is nothing on record that Mauricio entered his appearance as counsel of record. He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she terminated his services. Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docket fees for other cases): there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case. when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees. WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision.

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO

FACTS: On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1 was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing attorneys fees. According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B2610. Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Respondents admission that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases. WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

DOY MERCANTILE, INC., vs. AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE and ERNESTO RIOVEROS FACTS: On June 1, 1990, petitioner Doy Mercantile, Inc. (DOY) through its then counsel, respondent Atty. Eduardo P. Gabriel, Jr., filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a Complaint for Annulment of Contract, Damages with Preliminary Injunction against AMA Computer College, Inc. (AMA) and one Ernesto Rioveros. Petitioner alleged that it owns Lots 2-A and 2-B, and the improvements thereon, located at No. 640 Osmea Boulevard, Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 68951 and 68952. DOY assailed the Deed of Conditional Sale supposedly executed by one of DOYs directors, Dionisio O. Yap, in favor of AMA. Dionisio allegedly sold the properties to AMA without proper authorization from DOYs Board of Directors. DOY also questioned the Secretarys Certificate which was executed by DOY Corporate Secretary Francisco P. Yap, authorizing Dionisio to sell the properties and to sign the contract in behalf of DOY. Through Atty. Gabriel, Jr., DOY filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order, which was granted by the RTC on June 14, 1990. On June 23, 1990, Atty. Gabriel also filed an Answer to Defendants Counterclaim. On July 2, 1990, he filed DOYs Formal Rejoinder to AMAs Opposition for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He also filed on July 24, 1990, an Omnibus Motion seeking (1) the reconsideration of the order denying DOYs application for a writ of preliminary injunction, (2) the setting of the case for pre-trial and trial on the merits, and (3) the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to Atty. Winston Garcia, who notarized the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Secretarys Certificate. On August 31, 1990, Atty. Gabriel also filed a Rejoinder to AMAs Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, etc.During this period, that is, before pre-trial, DOY filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (CA-G.R. S.P. No. 22727) with the Court of Appeals. It questioned the Order of the RTC dated July 5, 1990, denying DOYs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and dissolving the temporary restraining order previously issued. DOY also assailed the Order dated August 10, 1990, which denied DOYs Omnibus Motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the reasonable attorneys fees cannot be justified based on quantum meruit. HELD: Petitioners contention that the appellate court should also have taken into account the importance of the subject matter in controversy and the professional standing of counsel in determining the latters fees is untenable. Although Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility list several other factors in setting such fees, these are mere guides in ascertaining the real value of the lawyers service.8 Courts are not bound to consider all these factors in fixing attorneys fees. While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees,9 no hard and fast rule maybe set in the determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is not. That must be established from the facts in each case.10 As the Court of Appeals is the final adjudicator of facts, this Court is bound by the formers findings on the propriety of the amount of attorneys fees. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

VINSON B. PINEDA vs. ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY. EMMANUEL MARIANO FACTS: On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano. During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights over their minor child and the separation of their properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner and both parties subsequently filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by the trial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared null and void. Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated. They, including their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioners dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million as "full payment for settlement."Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court a motion for payment of lawyers fees for P50 million.On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500, 000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees and (2) Whether or not respondents were entitled to additional legal fees. HELD: First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of the main action in which his services were rendered or in an independent suit against his client. The former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits. The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, had jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal fees. Respondents sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding was additional payment for legal services rendered in the same case. Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by the principle of quantum meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves." The recovery of attorneys fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where there is no express agreement for the payment of attorneys fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself. Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it. In the case at bar, respondents motion for payment of their lawyers fees was not meant to collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.

ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO MERCADO vs. ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA FACTS: It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney. In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbar for malpractice and misconduct HELD: Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

REBECCA J. PALM vs. ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR. FACTS: Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of computer software development. From February 2003 to November 2003, respondent served as Comtechs retained corporate counsel for the amount of P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September to October 2003, complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate matters, including potential amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003, respondent suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow participation during board meetings, through teleconference, of members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines. Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant became uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent effective November 2003. In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy for Gary Harrison (Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members of the Board of Directors, were present through teleconference. When the meeting was called to order, respondent objected to the meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven and Deanna Palm could not participate in the meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet been amended to allow teleconferencing. On 24 March 2004, Comtechs new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to return or account for the amount of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized disbursements when she was the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April 2004, Comtech received Soledads reply, signed by respondent. In July 2004, due to Soledads failure to comply with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutors Office. In the proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as Soledads counsel. Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in the case for Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he became a consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the criminal case was not related to or connected with the limited procedural queries he handled with Comtech. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Violate the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship HELD: We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainants consultations, respondent obtained the information about the need to amend the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. Respondent himself admitted this in his Answer. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the

clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of merit.