PETER SINGER NOT FOR HUMANS ONLY (pages 55-63) KEY: APC = Anthropocentrism (human-centered) 1.

. HISTORY OF APC LOGIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

1.1. When we change the environment although we often harm ourselves, we usually bring MORE harm to all living beings
including animals.

1.2. He reprises the west's history of APC views Aristotle, Christianity, Augustine, Aquinas, pope pious IX, martin Luther,
Kant, even Francis of Assisi basically for the past 2,500 years the "west's" (antiquity & Christianity) view regarding our ethical obligations toward animals is that we should not be cruel to animals for APC reasons (b/c being cruel to animals increases the likelihood that we'll be cruel to other humans). So Singer thinks that western culture has pretty much failed to locate any intrinsic value in animals...

1.3. Today this APC mentality with respect to animals continues although indirectly and is best seen in policy decisions
with environmental development animals, ecosystems are only given consideration for APC reasons thus a wildlife preserve is "protected" for b/c it can bring us the leisure-pleasure of duck hunting OR bird watching - both are weighted equally despite the fact that duck hunting has very different consequences for ducks than does bird/duck watching.... For Singer this just shows that there is no recognition today of intrinsic value of animals, ecosystems, etc.

1.4. Animals here are not included in the utilitarian equations...

2. SINGER'S SUFFERING ARGUMENT: any animal, human or otherwise, that is capable of suffering deserves our moral
consideration.

2.1. The logic that says, "it's ok to ignore the suffering of a being if it's NOT human" is the SAME logic that was used,
historically, to justify slavery and racism - because X-that-suffers is not a member of my group (whether species or race), then X does not enjoy equal moral consideration Since we (most of us!) REJECT this logic when applied to slavery/racism we should also reject this logic when applied to non-human creatures that are capable of suffering.

2.2. OBJECTION: but wait, isn't it ok to link our moral treatment of being-X to that being's set of talents, capacities, etc.?
And since individual beings VARY with respect to talents and capacities, shouldn't we extend MORE moral consideration to some and less to others depending on how intelligent, clever, conscious, et they are?

3. SINGER'S RESPONSE: but these differences are themselves not a reason to not extend EQUAL CONSIDERATION OF
INTERESTS... to certain types of living creatures (see below)

4. KEY TERM: INTERESTS =

at a minimum, interests are the subjective desire to avoid pain and get pleasure; rule is: if x is conscious; has conscious preferences, has subjective experience then x has interests. CONSCIOUSNESS = SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE = HAVING AN INTEREST

4.1. thus plants, trees do not have interests because there's nothing there that has subjective experience (he rules out
requirements for basic functioning because this would then lead to autos having interest)

5.

CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCERS (ie, SCALE OF INTEREST-BEARERS):

5.1. DEFINITELY: MAMMALS, BIRDS 5.2. PROBABLY: ALL VERTEBRATE ANIMALS 5.3. VERY DOUBTFUL: Insects, crustaceans, mollusks, etc 5.4. EXTREMELY UNLIKELY: Plants, soil, rocks 5.5. There thus exists in nature a range of individuals with varying degrees of interests depending on the degree of consciousness...
although there are grey areas these shouldn't paralyze us. We can clearly distinguish between certain and very doubtful interests...

6. HOW TO RESOLVE DILEMMA SITUATIONS OF COMPETING INTERESTS: VALUE IS WEIGHTED PROPORTIONATE TO

DEGREE OF INTEREST (so equal interests = equal value; unequal interests = unequal value).

6.1. If clash exists between a VERY CERTAIN interest vs very doubtful (ie, between a bird and a grass hopper), the very
certain interest should be protected by assigning it a higher VALUE (so feed the grass hopper to the bird).

6.2. Some very certain interests have higher value than other very certain interests. Fully functioning human > fully
functioning dog > grossly mentally defective human with no family/friends to grieve for loss of defective human

6.3. EXTENSION OF INTERESTS: NON-EXCLUSIVE, NOT ARBITRARY all forms of existence are considered equally even
though the value-weight we assign will vary (p. 58 left side)

7. SINGER'S RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS TO HIS SUFFERING ARGUMENT:

7.1. OBJECTION #1 Since it's nearly impossible to measure subjective pain states of various animals, then it is impossible
to distinguish between different interests and thus impossible to WEIGHT different interests or assign value to interests.

a. SINGER'S REPLY: Well, we do this all the time (tax on the rich vs. tax on the poor; we weigh the competing
interests of our children despite the inherent vaguess/roughness of the comparisons, in real life, we do this all the time and it works so we can reliably measure different interests

8. SINGERS ANIMAL RIGHTS ARGUMENT - Kant and Aquinas were wrong we DO have direct duties to members of other
species.

8.1. SINGER SUPPORTS CONSIDERATION OF INTERESTS RIGHTS Definition #1 to receive equal consideration
of interests from another.

a. While this is more foundational than a right in itself, an important right is derived from this: i. If a being has interests then it should NOT be the recipient of gratuitous/unnecessary pain... ii. Thus ANIMAL RIGHTS exist via Definition #1 8.1. SINGER REJECTS RIGHTS AS EXCLUSIVELY CONTRACTUAL Definition #2 Contractual Rights one has rights
ONLY if one is a member of a community whose individuals agree to honor one anothers rights as agreed to in a given CONTRACT.

a. Thus most nonhuman animals have no rights. b. But contractual rights are much narrower than the rights we use today in America. i. If we ONLY relied on a contractual model of rights then infants, the mentally defective, and young children
would have no rights because incapable of entering into such contracts...

ii. Instead OTHER non-moral or non rights-based theories are used to ensure that we protect children such as
prevention of pain (utilitarianism)

9. SINGER: IF REJECT ANIMAL RIGHTS DONT WORRY, WELL STILL GET GOOD ANIMAL TREATMENT VIA
UTILITARIANISM.

9.1. Even if you don't accept that animals have rights there are other appeals that can be made for treating animals
ethically:

a. Utilitarian considerations of overall pain ad pleasure. 9.2. Lets not quibble over semantics if you dont like rights talk then focus on animal TREATMENT; focus on animal
rights becomes distracting

9.3. HOW TO APPLY UTILITARIANISM IN EVERYDAY CASES a. If action X will cause animals to suffer, that suffering must count EQUALLY with a similar amount of suffering by
humans (and we just do our best to make rough comparisons).

9.4. Applying this principle to real situations will be difficult/hazy vs. clear. a. Situations in which we have a clear sense of the suffering caused to other animals by ourselves: i. Pest Control applied to RABBITS: agonizing deaths from artificially introduced disease, myxomatosis; from
poisons (10-80)

ii. Pest Control applied to COYOTES/WILD DOGS: cyanide poisoning; LEG-HOLD TRAP (equals thirst, hunger,
fear, mangled limb)

iii. Timber industry: clear cutting destroys the living area of wild animals in a very short time period and thus
creates enormous suffering for wild animals

9.5. UTILITARIAN-BASED ANIMAL ETHICS would ask that we develop ALTERNATE forms of pest control: a. Sterility pill which could be eaten by rabbits or coyotes (yes, more expensive but much, much less suffering). b. Selective harvesting cut only selected mature or dead trees, leaving htge forst substantially intact (more
expsnive).

10. SINGERS OTHER TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR HIS INDIVIDUALIST ANIMAL ETHICS
10.1. SUFFERING KILLING: Suffering of human vs non-human counts EQUALLY; Killing does NOT count equally. Human
Killing > Nonhuman killing

a. Humans suffer more when other humans are killed (funerals, grieving, etc.) b. Animals dont fear for their own lives when fellow animals are killed c. More is lost when a human is killed i.e. future projects... ; capacity for future planning is cut off via death (not
the case with other nonhuman animals).

10.2. OBJECTION #1 TO SINGER: Albert Schweitzer claims that life organisms have equal value (HOLISM/INTRINSIC
VALUE); all life is sacred

a. SINGERS REBUTTAL TO SCHWEITZER: it doesnt make sense to say that an organism's life it all-important to it if it
is not aware that its life is all-important to it...

i. One CAN IMAGINE LIVING two different lives with conscious and without (or with a lot and with a little), and
then one achieves an impartial position from which to judge which life counts as more.

i.i As for beings with no consciousness, the issue is moot since they have no consciousness, they have no experiences, no interests, no intrinsic value, and thus no moral value intrinsically.

ii. Schweitzer himself couldnt live up to his own philosophy: he killed germs and parasites in order to preserve
human lives (Schweitzer was an MD who devoted hi s life to helping the poor, especially in Africa).

10.3. OBJECTION #2 TO SINGER: If one cannot say HOW MUCH LESS seriously we should we regard the killing of
nonhumans, or if it is impossible to QUANTIFY how many nonhuman deaths = # of human deaths, then Singers argument fails.

a. SINGER'S RESPONSE: theres enough evidence to require us, ethically, to do our best to minimize loss of animal life
(esp. birds and mammals). With environmental destruction often comes great animal suffering:

i. Many animals suffer slow, painful deaths if environment is destroyed ii. Mammals who suffer loss of mates experience emotional distress... iii. Birds mate for life and if they lose their mate often they will never re-mate iv. Infant mammals left motherless will starve miserably v. Death of just one group member can cause considerable disturbance, especially if the dead animal is a group
leader

11. SPECIES VS INDIVIDUALS; HOLISM > INDIVIDUALISM CHALLENGES TO SINGER: Concern for nonhuman animals
is only required when the entire species is endangered, not when only individual animals are threatened

11.1. HUNTING IS THUS PERMITTED BY MANY ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AS LONG AS THE SPECIES IS NOT
THREATENED:

a. National Wildlife Federation prevented US Dept of Transportation from building an interstate frequented by rare
Mississippi sandhill crane BUT NWF supports hunter-sportsman who crops surplus wildlife. (61)

b. National Audubon Society fights to protect rare birds but opposed efforts to stop annual killing of 40,000 seals on
Pribilof Islands of Alaska because this seal-harvest is sustainable

c. Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, World Wildlife Fund all support or refuse to opposing hunting. 11.2. SINGERS REPLY (AND CRITICISM OF MANY ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS): Hunting makes animals suffer as no
hunter kills instantly every time

11.3. OBJECTION TO SINGER: Even if ALL hunting is wrong, are there DEGREES of wrongness here? Is it worse to
hunt/kill animals of endangered species than plentiful species?

a. Example: Should NWF put MORE EFFORT into stopping shooting of Mississippi crane than stopping duck-hunting? 11.4. SINGERS REPLY: WE GENERALLY RELY ON ANTROPOCENTRIC, NOT INTRINSIC VALUE, ARGUMENTS FOR
PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES

a. If we allow species to become extinct we are then deprived, as well as our descendents, of observation pleasures
of observing all of the variety of species that we can observe today.

i. Most of us regret never having seen a GREAT AUK b. We may never know what ECOLOGICAL ROLE a given species plays or may play under some unpredictable
change of circumstances

i. Many examples in which X human organization got rid of Y animal/pest only to discover that Y animal was the
chief resistance to some worse pest, Z animal/pest

ii. Even a present species is relatively insignificant, it may be crucial to a new, emerging ecosystem. c. WILD GENE POOLS CAN STRENGTHEN DOMESTIC SPECIES: The overall GENE POOL is depleted once a given
species goes extinct; gene pools are important, especially wild strains, for re-introducing new characteristics, ie, resistance, to existing domestic species

11.5. SINGER: Species are not conscious entities and so do not have interests beyond the interest of individual
member animals.

a. At the level of individual animals the interest of a rare animals is the same as the interest of a common animal if
both have same capacity for suffering

b. The rarity of a blue whale does not cause it to suffer more when harpooned than the more common sperm
whale.

c. Give preference to preserving animals of endangered species if this will have indirect benefits for nonhuman
animals.

d. But still this gives no INTRINSIC ground for preservation.

12. SINGERS CONCLUSION: HE CAN FIND NO SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO WHY WE SHOULD GIVE PREFERENCE TO
PRESERVING ANIMALS OF ENDANGERED SPECIES RATHER THAN NON-ENDANGERED SPECIES.

12.1. OBJECTION: ART ANALOGY destruction of an entire species is analogous to destroying a GREAT WORK OF ART a. Thus destroying a species is to create an act of vandalism (destroying the Mona Lisa) b. SINGERS REPLY: there is no way to show that art has intrinisic value. i. If the LAST MAN set fire to the Louve, would it matter? Singer says NO but is open to the intrinsic value
argument if it can be made to work for art, then for nature too?

12.2. Although Singer thinks that there is no intrinsic value to species per se (there is for individual animals of *some*
species), this should not undermine environmental arguments or positions

a. The APC reasons for preservation are strong b. Issue that hes focused on in this section is preference for endangered vs non-endangered species; its still
good to defend endangered species!

c. Defending species serves to protect the individual animals within that species. d. So just because we successfully protect an endangered species should not lull us into lazily accepting the killing
of individual animals of non-endangered species. (63)