Kant's Philosophy of Science: The Transition from Metaphysics to Science Robert E.

Butts PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1984, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. (1984), pp. 685-705.
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Kant's Philosophy of Science:

The To Science
- Transition From MetapTysics -Robert E. Butts The University of Western Ontario

1. Historical Stagesetting
For many of us nurtured in idealist ways inclining us to unwavering
acceptance of Kantian principles, 1951 was a bad year. We read in Reich-
enbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy of the "disintegration of the
synthetic a priori". Kant had taught us that there are very general
principles--each one connected to a prilr~al category of thought--that are
necessary in the formation of mathematics and physics and are express-
ible in nonanalytic propositions. However, since Kant's death in 1804
both mathematics and physics have developed revolutionary traits: non-
euclidian geometries, new development~ in symbolic logic, relativity
physics, and finally, quantum mechanics, sealed the negative fate of
Kant's high principles. Henceforth we must accept that there are no non-
empty claims about reality that can be counted as necessary or indispen-
sable to mathematics and scjence. Kant's attempt to offer a new episte-
mological guarantee of the three-dimensionality of space, and of the
Newtonian character of physical motions, thus failed in the deepest
sense: As a philosophy of science it turned out to be an anthropomorphic
curiosity. Kant's epi stemic formal ism might we1 1 apply to macroscopic
objects undergoing macroscopic movements and observed within the appar-
ent three-dimensional limits of our human visual space. It fails to ap-
ply in any other domains. Kant's objects of possible experience are ob-
jects too limited for purposes of recent mathematics and physics.
Some proponents of positivism and logical empiricism strengthened this disintegration or dissolution of the synthetic a priori, of the central need of the Kantian system. The reigning orthodoxy in philosophy of science had no further interest in Kant's failed programme. But some of us crawled on through the dark corridors of Kant exegesis to the beat of different philosophical rhythms. We remembered C. I . Lewis' (1929) masterwork and its argument for a functional a priori, for acceptance of conceptual forms on pragmatic grounds. We remembered Arthur Pap's (1946) application of this theory to a new reconstruction of the relationship of Kant to Newton, one based on taking all Kantian synthetic a prioris to have only regulative employments. In Korner (1955, pp. 103-104) a similar view is expressed in his suggestion that Kant's synthetic a priori judgements can be construed (along lines adumbrated by Kant himself)

PSA 1984, Volume 2, pp. 685-705 Copyright @ 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

as rules or imperatives for construction of sciences of a certain kind.2

For some earlier interpreters, like Cassirer, revisions in reading Kant
stemmed from taking seriously for the first time the relationship be-
tween the Critique of Judgement and the first Critique (See Cassirer
1921). Leanings in the direction of the imperativistic interpretation
are to be found in Beck (1960, pp. 191-194) and later in Beck (1981, pp.
458-459). Butts (1984) is a sustained argument for this interpretation.
These shifts in interpretation of Kant were paralleled by the appearance of the first detailed attempts to study his philosophy of science since Adickes (1924) : Vuil lemin (19551, Plaass (1960). However, for most of us who had taken a continuing interest in Kant as a philosopher of science, Buchdahl's (1969 and many related essays) set the stage for a really thorough investigation of the whole range of Kant's scientific interests, and for a determined attempt to fix the limits of his philosophy of s~ienceagainst the backdrop of his critique of traditional metaphysics. Interpretations of Kant's views on science are now appearing regularly; but some authors lose sight of the fact that there are central parts of his programme that any interpretation must accommodate. Attempts to understand his views on the philosophical status of science--the very same is true of attempts to understand his views on the philosophical status of morality, art, or anything else--are constrained by at least the following large parts of Kant's programme, parts that cannot be interpreted away without losing complete sight of Kant, without coming to see ghosts, creatures much feared by Kantians.

2. Central Tenets of Kant's Programme

I take it that one is not studying Kant unless he takes Kant to have
believed at least the following propositions to be systelnatically sacro-
sanct:

1) Knowledge has a dual source in sensibility and understanding: To know is to conceptualize sense-contentful intuitions of objects in space and time under the categories. 2) That which we know about space and time, the categories, pure schemata or rules of meaning, mathematical constructions, and pure principles instancing the categories, is what we can know a priori in the domain of the theoretical: We can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them." (Bxviii ) . 3) Objects of possible experience (knowables) are just those objects structured by the schematized categories; "experience" is categorially idealized sense-contentful intuition. 4) Concepts natively apply only to evident sense-contents (or to constructs, in the case of mathematics); thus no conceptualization of that which transcends the realm of possible experience (the phenomenal) is possible. 5) Ideas are sense-contentless forms having application in logic (in thinking, not in knowing); ideas do not present objects of possible experience (knowables). 6) Traditional metaphysics separates ideas from the dual sources of knowledge, relying solely upon appeal to logical possibility; it follows that there can be no metaphysical knowledge that derives from ideas-there can be no knowledge of an s i c h reality; no a priori knowledge of

t h i n g s as t h e y a r e i n themselves. 7 ) Metaphysical i d e a s t h u s have a m e r e l y r e g u l a t i v e employment; t h e y g u i d e r e s e a r c h and c o n d i t i o n s y s t e m a t i c e x p e c t a t i o n s ; t h e i r proper employment encourages us t o s t a y w i t h i n t h e bounds o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e - - i n e f f e c t , t o s e t t l e f o r t h e k i n d o f knowledge t h a t p o s i t i v e s c i ence y i e l d s . Perhaps many of us c o u l d accept a programme as general as t h i s one, as E i n s t e i n seems t o have encouraged Reichenbach t o do i n t h e exchange i n t h e E i n s t e i n S c h i l p p volume. D i f f i c u l t i e s emerge when we t r y t o a p p l y t h i s general system t o t h e s p e c i f i c s of Newtonian ( o r any o t h e r ) s c i ence. The problems stem f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e seven general theses, Kant a l s o wants us t o accept t h a t a f a i r number o f nona n a l y t i c p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e t r u e a p r i o r i ; f o r example: a) b) c) d) e) Space i s 3-dimensional (as a " f a c t " about s p a t i a l i t y ) . A l l i n t u i t i o n s a r e e x t e n s i v e magnitudes. A l l e v e n t s a r e Second Analogy c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d . With r e g a r d t o a l l changes o f c o r p o r e a l n a t u r e , t h e q u a n t i t y o f m a t t e r t a k e n as a whole remains t h e same, unincreased and undiminished. Every change o f m a t t e r has an e x t e r n a l cause.

However t r o u b l i n g i t may be t o us now t o accept these more s p e c i f i c s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i s , no s e r i o u s s t u d e n t o f Kant can deny t h a t he accorded them such a s t a t u s . a) i s something we know a p r i o r i about our space; i t i s e v i d e n t f r o m our i n a b i l i t y t o c o n s t r u c t i n a p r i o r i i n t u i t i o n any f e a t u r e s o f a space t h a t i s n o t 3-dimensional. b) and c ) a r e s t r o n g synt h e t i c a p r i o r i p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e Transcendental A n a l y t i c ; b ) t e l l s us how a l l o b j e c t s o f p o s s i b l e experience must be " c o n s t i t u t e d " . c ) t e l l s us t h a t whenever something d y n a m i c a l l y comes i n t o b e i n g o r passes o u t of being, t h e e v e n t s t r u c t u r e of i t s e x i s t e n t i a l m o d a l i t i e s can be e x p l ic a t e d c a u s a l l y . Thus a ) , b ) , and c ) a r e proper p a r t s o f K a n t ' s a p r i o r i e p i s t e m i c f o r m a l i s m . What about d) and e ) ? These a r e what Kant r e f e r s t o i n MAN ( a b b r e v i a t i n g D i e bfetaphysische Anfangsgriinde d e r Naturwissenschaften) as t h e f i r s t and second laws o f mechanics. I f t h e s e a r e known because of what we o u r s e l v e s p u t i n t o t h e concept o f m a t t e r , i t b e g i n s t o l o o k as i f a p r i o r i t y i n t r u d e s i n t o t h a t which l o o k s more and more e m p i r i c a l as we go. Unhappily, t h e r e i s more t o c o n s i d e r . Look a t t h e s e : f) g) h) i)
j)

k)

M a t t e r i s t h e movable i n space. M a t t e r i s t h e movable i n s o f a r as i t f i l l s a space. M a t t e r i s t h e movable i n s o f a r as i t i s has as such a moving force. M a t t e r i s t h e movable i n s o f a r as i t can as such be an o b j e c t o f experience I f no (unbalanced) e x t e r n a l f o r c e s a c t upon a body, i t w i l l continue i n i t s s t a t e o f r e s t o r motion w i t h uniform velocity i n a straight line. F=ma.

f ) - i ) are t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f matter introduced i n K a n t ' s treatments of, r e s p e c t i v e l y , phoronomy ( k i n e m a t i c s ) , dynamics, mechanics, phenomenology, i n MAN. j) and k ) a r e Newton s f i r s t and second laws o f motion. No-

tice that it would be quite possible to hold (as do Vuillemin Plaass) that f)-i) are pure a prioris on a par with principles of understanding b) and c), and to argue that both Kant's d) and e) Newton's j) and k) are empirical propositions, requiring appeal to pirical data for substantiation.
3. Relating the Epistemic Formalism to Science

and the and em-

Theses 1-7 above oversimply summarize the general features of Kant ' s epistemology. A conceptual system is entailed by this epistemology, one having as essential elements the a priori forms of sensuous intuition, or space and time, the categories, and general semantical rules of application called schemata. The a priori conditions of knowing apply only to sense-contentful intuitions (1 -7 are supposed to guarantee this) . But what, exactly, is the re1 ationship between this epistemic formalism and observational and experimental science? Late in his life Kant will begin to write about the transition from metaphysics to physics; in what does that transition consist? Kant refers to the principles of the formalism as necessary laws of nature, and as specifying a general "metaphysics" (where, of course, by "metaphysics" Kant now means those and only those principles that can be genuinely known a priori: his epistemology reveals these "metaphysical" principles). The four definitions of matter in MAN are principles of a "special metaphysics"; namely, the metaphysics of external objects, or of objects empirically discovered to be moving in space, and empirically discovered to be subject to forces of action and interaction. The special metaphysics, ln other words, is an application of the general metaphysics to matter. What needs to be shown, Kant tells us, is how category-dependent concepts of matter yield objects of possible experience, how the science of matter can be objective. Since the specific empirical claims about material objects are required to be mathematical in form, we are further required to construct a priori in intuition the idealized cases to which the special metaphysics will apply. Otherwise, given the epistemology of 1-7* there could be no objective content to the applied special metaphysics. In order to highlight the issues, let us limit ourselves to discus-
sion of Kant's treatment of mechanics. Mechanics takes its start from
the principle:

M: Matter is the movable insofar as it has as such a moving

force (p. 536)

If we give Kant his two oft insisted upon claims that both motion and force are discovered empirically (motion as simple observation of change of position of an object over time, and force as felt resistance), then M can be taken as a definition (ErkZdrung; see KRV, A728-730/8755-758) of matter in Kant's technical sense. In mathematics, the only discipline in which there are, properly speaking, definitions, concepts are made; that is, constructed a priori. The trick is to show how ordinary experiences of motion and felt resistance can be rendered objective; and this, for Kant, now means, mathematized. The tools required for analysis of motion will not be (to use one of Kant's favourite phrases) "borrowed from" experience. The special metaphysics introduced by taking matter in motion to be an instance of the schematized categories must instead "borrow from" general metaphysics. Indeed, the very 1 awl i keness of mechanical principles will depend upon the strong lawlikeness conditions

laid down by the categories.

4. A Digression: Points about Lawlikeness

The space/time, schematized category structures yielded by 1-7 (call this conceptual system SC) produce a concept of Nature (capital " N u ) : "Nature is the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to universal laws" (Prolegomena, p. 294). The universal laws are the synthetic a priori pure laws of the understanding corresponding to each category. But there is also nature (lower case "n") as "the complex of all objects of experience" (~rolegomena,p. 295); in other words, as the set of idealized constructs made possible by application of SC. If nature [n], or some subset of [n] is going to turn out to be lawlike, it will have to achieve this by virtue of some relationship to nature [N]. If regularly associated units of observation are to be law candidates, the warrant cannot be empirical, but must come from what Kant calls the "affinity" between items sensed in the realm of appearance, and items thought in the domain of understanding. That Kant's concept of affinity is crucial to his theory of the linkage between SC and Newton's physics has been noted by some commentators, but none have offered the required explication. I hope to do so below.
5.

Return to the Question of Moving from the A priori to the Empirical

If the definitionally a priori M is to be applicable, it must render possible analysis of moving forces in mathematical terms. In brief, what is at issue is that in mechanics physical objects enter into and pass out of various determinate states in space in accordance with quantities of impressed force. Kant has an a priori machinery for dealing with changes in modalities of existence: the analogies. The regulative significance of M begins to emerge when the following instantiating moves are made:
Al: In all changes of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished. (First Analogy ) MI: With regard to all changes of corporeal nature, the quantity
of matter taken as a whole remains the same, unincreased and
undiminished. (Kant's first law of mechanics)
A2: All alterations take place in conformity with the law of
the connection of cause and effect. (Second Analogy)
M2: Every change of matter has an external cause. (Every body
remains in its state of rest or motion in the same direction
and with the same velocity unless it is compelled by an ex-
ternal cause to forsake this state.) (Kant's second law of
mechanics)
A3: All substances, in so far as they can be perceived to co-
exist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity. (Third
Analogy)
M3: In all communication of motion, action and reaction are
always equal to one another. (Kant's third law of
mechanics)

Kant's arguments for the correctness of these instantiations are

quite straightforward. Universal metaphysics proclaims that anything
that is genuinely substantial in appearance cannot be increased or di-

minished in quantity. Here it is matter as substance that is at issue; therefore M1 instances Al, and shares its synthetic a priori character. M2 instances A2 (and shares its synthetic a priori character) because changes in physical state, like all changes, are caused, and the only causes available to us in observation of external objects are external causes. The argument for M3 as an instance of A3 is a little less direct and uncomplicated, but it is clear that Kant wants all cases of motion of objects in space to be represented as reciprocal, and if this is so, then again M3 will share the synthetic a priori character of A3. So far, we have the following structure:

M: the mechanical definition of matter explicated as follows:

Al, A2, A3 as principles of SC (general metaphysics=laws of Nature [N])
MI, M2, M3 as instances of Al, A2, and A3 (special metaphysics=cases of
laws of Nature [N]=laws of mechanics)
This articulated a priori structure is to apply to (form and inform) empirical instances in a second sense of 'empirical' (one quite different from 'empirical' in the claims that motion and force are discovered empirically). I noted above that Kant's claim that motion and force can only be discovered empirically appeals to a very ordinary sense of "empirical" referring to my experience of objects changing position in time, and to my experience of felt resistance. On the other hand, the "empirical" instances of a priori principles of pure physics are contingent descriptions of frequently noted regularities of certain sorts; they are what came to be known as phenomenal laws. SC+LM (a priori laws of mechanics) must somehow relate to empirical content in this sense if it is to be seen to form and inform a physical science. Such empirical content generalizations are thus the phenomena to be saved. Kant tells us (MAN p. 544) that the possibility of natural science (physics) rests entirely on M1 and M2 (Kant's statement of the law of inertia). One would suppose that this natural science would at some level possess relatively clear cases of empirical descriptions, and that these descri ptions would serve as the content formed by SC+LM. Kant makes it clear that what is' to issue from application of SC+LM is a justification of the 1 awl i keness of the Newtonian phenomena (Kepler 's purely descriptive laws of planetary motion (KLs); Galileo's acceleration rate law (GL)) and the law of universal gravitation (LUG). What we would like to have (and what Buchdahl repeatedly reminds us
Kant does not intend to give us) is a deductive structure in which in-
ferential moves from SC through LM to the descriptions of the phenomena
and universal gravitation are perspicuously valid. However, if the com-
bined propositional resources of SC and LM are deductively to entail
KLs, GL, LUG, then the structure SC+LM must itself have empirical con-
tent, and this is exactly what a structure of synthetic a priori princi-
ples cannot have. It may seem paradoxical to suggest that Kant thought
so outrageous a thought, but it seems to me that he held in all serious-
ness the view that SC and LM have no empirical consequences, in the

strict sense of not deductively entailing any specific observational

consequences. This being so, it does not follow, as Buchdahl wants us to

believe, that the connection between SC, LM and the empirical descriptions involves a "looseness of fit" that permits SC to survive all changes in the foundations of sciences like physics. SC may be programmatic and "hard core" in some restricted sense for Kant, but given his insistence in MAN that LM laws do instance SC and that no other LM laws

are conceivable (constructible), it seems to me to be unwise to attribute to Kant's philosophy of science the extremely generous looseness Buchdahl insists upon. Before proceeding to discuss what I take the connection between SCtLM and the descriptive laws to be, let me make some further brief remarks on Buchdahl's interpretive programme.
6. Additional Thoughts about the "Looseness of Fit" Interpretation
In the paper he delivered at the 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Salzburg, Austria (July 12, 19831, Buchdahl seems to me to have so complicated and loaded the "loosen$ss of fit" interpretation that it simply sinks under its own weight. In a figure that accompanied his paper, Buchdahl sketched the "methodological components of scientific theory", and he suggested in discussion that complete mastery of the diagram will give all that Kant's philosophy of science yields, and will show that no arguments exist in Kant that link the components. Buchdahl's reading now commits Kant to three "ontologies" and to such a host of general and special rules as to make almost any alterations in the substructures falling under SC justifiable, even to the point of receiving a Kantian transcendental justification of developments in alternative geometries and quantum physics. The typescript contains this extraordinary passage (pp. 23-24) : However, this 'looseness of fit' which surrounds the rela-
tions between the phenomenological and the ontological aspects
of [the probative, explicative and systemic components of a
Kantian scientific theory], and indeed, between these three com-
ponents themselves, has the advantage of not bringing the cen-
tral themes of Kantian transcendentalism crashing down every
time there is a change in the paradigms of natural science. Lack
of appreciation of the 'looseness' has led most Kant scholars--
we need only think of the case of Reichenbach--to the opposite
conclusion. Against this, Kant's transcendental approach, in its
application to both the ontology and the phenomenology of theory
construction, turns out to be something much more informal, much
more subtly and messily articulated, more tentative and general,
than the usual, more formal, elucidations of the so-called
'transcendental argument' would lead us to expect. Evidently it is not so much a matter here of any formal deductions, or of the demonstration of the uniqueness and necessity of this or that 'a priori' condition; still less ...should Kant be saddled with the absurdity of having wanted to prove the 'a priori certainty', of, for instance, Newtonian mechanics; after all, he did say, in nis CpR (A480/B508), that "in natural science ...there is e!es conjecture, and certainty is [here] not to be counted upon.

I applaud, and have tried to stress in (1984), the implications for a

partially pragmatic reading of Kant's intentions at one level (teleolog-
ical judgement) that Buchdahl's stated position yields. But surely Buch-
dahl has gone too far. We have already seen that there is a close fit
between what I have been calling SC and LM, and I will develop other as-
pects of close fit below. Furthermore, although we may not prefer a Kant
who limited his view to the sciences and the philosophical resources of
his day, I am bound by historical candor to have to say that Buchdahl is
mostly wrong in what he says in this passage, one that I take it summar-

izes his position as of the date of the Salzburg Congress. There are two
sources of error, each one important in its revelation of truths about
Kant's philosophy of science.
Before identifying what I take these errors to be, I will partially concede an important related point. I think the best argument for the "looseness of fit" interpretation is given in Buchdahl (1969, p. 657ff). Here it is suggested that Kant needs an argument for the credentials of science that is not fully binding because he needs room to move from man as observer to man as actor. The resolution of the second and third antinomies of the first C r i t i q u e , and of the antinomy of the third Crit i q u e , and Kant's requirement of freedom in morality, all become suspect if the links in the chain between transcendental epistemology and any particular empirical scientific programme are twisted too tightly. However, I should point out that I do not think the tensions Buchdahl alludes to require his "looseness of fit" moves. In (1984, Ch. 1x1, I produce a complex exegetical argument starting from the fact that the third C r i t i q u e antinomy is resolved by showing that requirements of both mechanism and teleology are regulative, rather than constitutive of nature. I then apply this admission to Kant's resolution of the fourth antinomy (there is a necessary being/there is no necessary being), one again based on appeal to antinomial differences as regulative. Finally, I argue that the resolution of the third antinomy (freedoddeterminism) is itself a case of the resolution of the fourth, so that ground is already prepared for the resolution of the third C r i t i q u e antinomy in Kant's resolutions of the third and fourth antinomies in the first C r i t i q u e . The point is that all three antinomies are resolved by reformulating what look like substantive epistemic clashes between propositions as methodological clashes between arguments for adopting or rejecting rules. If these moves are correct, then Kant's attempt to validate Newtonian physics at the level of special metaphysics in no way threatens his full philosophical programme. The problem of how tight or loose is the fit between transcendental principles and pure principles of physics (and empirical science), is thus an irrelevant question once we see that for Kant it is all a matter of formulating the arguments for recommending adoption of these rules (SC rules) for constituting possible objects of experience, rather than others. And those arguments have entirely to do with elimination of the case for classical rational metaphysics; in short, with elimination of appeals to logical possibility as the test of truth, and replacement with appeals to what can in principle be empirically or mathematically instanced in ways that human observers can be said to understand. To return to what I take the revealing errors to be, note first that Buchdahl Is position fails to locate what for Kant can be the only "ontology", and it is an ontology of physical objects, of bodies empirically ascertained to be in motion in three-dimensional space. This is stated clearly in C r i t i q u e of Judgement (pp. 181-182), although it had already been established as a stable consequence of the programme in KRV. At the cited place, Kant distinguishes between transcendental principles as principles representing a priori the universal conditions under which objects can be cognized by us, and metaphysical principles, or principles representing a priori the conditions under which objects whose concepts are given empirically "may be further determined a prio r i " (emphasis supplied). Thus he states that we can hold as true transcendentally that all bodies as substances change always for cause; but

i t i s a m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t such causes a r e always e x t e r n a l . Now--and t h i s i s c r u c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t - - i n t h e former case, bodies a r e t h o u g h t o n l y t h r o u g h what Kant c a l l s " o n t o l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e s ' ' (and he s t a t e s t h a t t h e s e a r e t h e pure concepts o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g z t h e c a t e g o r i e s ) ; i n t h e second, o r metaphysical, case, t h e concept o f a movable t h i n g i n space i s i n t r o d u c e d . However, once t h i s f u l l e r concept o f body i s on t h e scene, " i t may be seen q u i t e a p r i o r i t h a t t h e l a t t e r p r e d i c a t e (movement o n l y by means o f an e x t e r n a l cause) a p p l i e s t o body". I have sketched above t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e pure concept (Second Analogy c a u s a l i t y ) and t h e p r i n c i p l e o f i n e r t i a . I n t h e f u l l e s t sense t o be found i n t h e w r i t i n g s o f Kant, b o t h t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l and t h e metaphysical p r i n c i p l e s are synthetic a p r i o r i . S t i l l , i t may seem g r a t u i t o u s t h u s t o suggest t h a t K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o n t o l o g y i s l i m i t e d t o what we can know a p r i o r i o f b o d i e s . What o f t h e s o u l ? I have no space t o r e p e a t here my account o f K a n t ' s r e j e c t i o n o f any o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s f o r t h e soul (see Chapter V i n 1984). Perhaps i t w i l l s u f f i c e i f I r e f e r t o h i s statement i n MAN (pp. 542-543) i t h a t because t h e t h o u g h t "I" s n o t a concept a t a l l , b u t an i n n e r p e r c e p t i o n , we cannot c l a s s i f y t h e thought o f t h e s o u l as a substance, and hence n o t as permanent. K a n t ' s p o i n t i s c l e a r : "Substance i s p o s s i b l e o n l y i n space and a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f space, and hence i s p o s s i b l e o n l y as o b j e c t o f t h e e x t e r n a l senses". L i k e i t o r n o t , t h e values o f t h e o n t o l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e s i n Kant ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l system can C o n l y have bodies moving i n space as i n s t a n c e s . And i f t h e forms o f S a r e o n t o l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e s , and LM laws a r e cases o f S p r i n c i p l e s , t h e n C I do n o t see how wf can w i t h reason argue t h a t S and LM f a i l t o share C t h e same o n t o l o g y . And when t h e o n t o l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e s n a t i v e t o SCtLM a r e f u l l y a r t i c u l a t e d , as Kant t r i e s t o do i n MAN, i t i s e q u a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t t h e f i t i s as t h o r o u g h l y l o o s e as Buchdahl wishes. T h i s i s n o t t o argue t h a t K a n t ' s f o u n d a t i o n s f o r p h y s i c s a r e s t u r d y charact e r s t h a t w i l l always stand up, b u t i t c e r t a i n l y does s u s t a i n t h e t r u i s m t h a t Kant t h o u g h t p h y s i c s has f o u n d a t i o n s , and t h a t t h e s e must be syst e m a t i c a l l y and o n t o l o g i c a l l y beholden t o g e n e r a l metaphysics o r t r a n scendental epistemology.

7.

Return t o t h e Q u e s t i o n o f R e l a t i n g Foundations t o E m p i r i c a l Science

That which m o t i v a t e s B u c h d a h l ' s second mistake--now f o r m u l a t e d as a m i s r e a d i n g o f what f o l l o w s f r o m f a i l u r e o f d e d u c t i v e c o n n e c t i o n s t o h o l d between statements c o n t a i n i n g o n t o l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t e s and those c o n t a i n i n g e m p i r i c a l o n e s - - i s h i s i n c l i n a t i o n t o t h i n k t h a t t h e sentences maki n g up t h e p a r t s o f t h e K a n t i a n programme f o r p h y s i c s a r e a l l o f t h e same l o g i c a l t y p e . Kant i s o f course h i m s e l f r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a c e r t a i n amount o f m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e s u l t i n g f r o m h i s t a l k about p r o p o s i t i o n s as judgements. I f we t r a n s l a t e 'judgement' as t h e more manageable ' p r o p o s i t i o n ' , and t h e n t h i n k t h a t K a n t ' s system i s a n e s t o f d e d u c t i v e l y a r ranged p r o p o s i t i o n s r u n n i n g f r o m t h e pure p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e understandi n g , t h r o u g h t h e a p r i o r i laws o f pure p h y s i c s , down t o t h e e m p i r i c a l laws t h a t a r e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f n o t e d r e g u l a r i t i e s , we a r e bound t o have problems. As I suggested above, we cannot o b t a i n t h i s d e d u c t i v e n e s t i n g u n l e s s t h e p u r e p r i n c i p l e s become impure. So Buchdahl i s r i g h t about t h e r e b e i n g no c l e a r d e d u c t i v e r o a d f r o m S t o e m p i r i c a l p h y s i c s . But C i n s t e a d o f c o n c l u d i n g a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t looseness o f f i t i s t h e o r d e r of t h e day, he ought t o have l a t c h e d o n t o t h e second way i n which Kant t a l k s about concepts and p r i n c i p l e s ; namely, as ruZes. T h i s would have

led him to a correct account of the relationship between SCtLM and the empirical laws of physics, and to appreciation of the further point that it is not deductive connection, but affinity, that Kant places at the center of his account of the relationship between formal rules and empirical descriptions. I will now develop each of these points in turn.
I suggested in the opening section of this paper that what we might call the dreaded Reichenbach threat can be countered by appeal to some other resources supplied by his fellow positivists. Schlick and Mach both began to think of the various sentences used to formulate scientific laws as being of different logical types, and Pap explicitly proposed that we distinguish between regulative principles employed to develop systems of various kinds, and the descriptive sentences formed by application of the rules. I mentioned that a similar view was expressed by Korner. I propose now to outline what Kant's philosophy of physics looks like if we take this imperativist line (one that underwrites my interpretation of Kant's philosophy of science in my 1984). We have seen the following structure articulated by Kant (limiting ourselves again to discussion of mechanics) : SKETCH I
LEVEL I: M
LEVEL 11: Al, A2, A3
LEVEL 111: MI, M2, M3
. . LEVEL IV: KLs, GL, LUG

What a staunch rationalist will want is for Levels I1 and 111 deductive-
ly to entail level IV empirical generalizations. In the absence of such
connection, what is the systematic relationship between the empirical
Level IV and higher levels? I propose that we think of Kant's system,
not as a logically connected set of propositions, but as a structure
with two types of sentences: rules and descriptive generalizations. This
procedure will be consistent with two things Kant says often: categories
and space and time are a priori forms organizing empirical contents; and
concepts and principles can be viewed as rules. Now what we get is this
variant on Sketch I:
SKETCH I1
SC=a set of general rules for the construction of any objects
that can be humanly knowable; universally applicable rules
of formation for statements about the worldtthe general
semantics supplied by the schemata (Butts 1984, pp. 151-168)
LM=Kantls pure laws of mechanics now construed as rules for
analyzing motiono in ways compatible with the general
constraints of SC
KLs, GL, LUG as empirical descriptions (general statements, not
rules) formed by application of the synthetic a prioris of SC
and LM as regulative principles. Schematically, %etch I1 looks
like this:
RULES OF FORMATION: SC
LM
CONSTRUCTIONS: MCs

SC and LM rules tell us how to arrive at the empirical laws, how to proceed in formulating them. As Pap suggests, we can think of the law of inertia as being synthetic a priori (and in a limited sense immune from revision) in the functional or pragmatic sense of a priority. Together with Nf~ton's second law "F=maU, it defines a method of analyzing motions. From the standpoint of methodology, Newton's first and second laws are of quite different types from, say, the law of universal gravitation. Indeed, the laws are used in the derivation of the law of universal gravitation fron~ Kepler's laws of planetary motion. One helpful way of formulating the point at issue is offered by Pap:
[Newton's] second law can be formalized as a conjunction of
two general statements, of which the first is a real definition
and the second an existential statement: 'F=ma4,and 'they are
forces which are relatively simple functions of distance. The
existential component of the second law is a general statement,
an existential quantifier occurs in it. The law of gravitation,
now, is a verifier of this general postulate, in that it indi-
cates a definite force, viz., gravity, which satisfies the con-
dition of being a relatively simple function of distance. Gravi-
tational attraction is a value substitutable for the argument of
the function 'relatively simple function of distance.' (1946, p.
48).
My interpretation of the relationship between a priori principles and empirical descriptions finally construes a1 1 a priori principes as rules; the interpretation confirms that Kant's interest was methodological: All that we contribute a priori to things we use in the service of ever more detailed investigation of the phenomenal. In thus suggesting that Kant's a priori principles have all of them only regulative employment, I am mindful of his distinction between constitutive and regulative employments of principles, but on my reading this distinction does work only within objectively constituted experience. Kant's ontological predicates, in other words, specify an ontology that is never an sich, but is always operative only within the domain of the phenomenal.

This interpretation of judgements or principles as rules is not novel

(I have mentioned some of those who earlier urged this emphasis). What
has not been sufficiently emphasized (and what the bewildering detai 1s
of Buchdahl's working out of his correct insight obscure) is that the
transition from metaphysics to physics is for Kant based on appeal to
methodological considerations. This appeal is first made in Critique of
Pure Reason, and is worked out still further in Critique of Judgement.
In the Opus postwmun (GesmeZte Schriften XXI, XXII) Kant refers to the
methodological 1 ink as the doctrine of scientific research (Nuturfor-
schung=scrutatio naturae), a doctrine that would set forth the subjec-
tively valid principles for conducting research. Such principles would
be valid a priori (in my language, would finally receive their warrant
from SC) (XXI, p. 168, p. 360; XXII, p. 312). The only discussion I know
of in English of Kant's fragmentary treatment of the transition in these
volumes is in Werkmeister (1980, Ch. VI). This discussion is itself
fragmentary, but, as usual, Werkmeister's references are scrupulously
complete and helpful. In my discussion of affinity below, I will refer
to one of Kant's own specific examples of how this methodology works. In
general, the strategy always takes the form of reconstituting an empty
idea of reason as a rule for conducting systematic (logic governed) re-

search.
8. Affinity: the Linchpin of Kant's Methodology
I want to end this essay by close discussion of some methodological
matters only briefly sketched in (1984). If what I urge above is right,
there is no direct deductive connection between the principles of the
schematized categories, the pure 1 aws of natural science, and observa-
tional and experimental laws. Questions remain: What is the connection
between the rules and the descriptions? What, if anything, guarantees
that the rules will apply? How can we know, if at all, that Nature [N]
universally and necessarily structures nature [n]? One thing is abun-
dantly clear: For Kant the answers to these questions cannot be gotten
by consulting experience. The lawlikeness of descriptive laws is not em-
pirically justified. Laws of (empirical) association are fully contin-
gent. That some regularly associated sets of events and objects enter
into full natural laws cannot ever be a consequence of the associations
themselves, however strong and recurrent they may be.
Indeed, in the first edition of KRV Kant suggests that empirical association is a "mere consequence" of a higher form of composition of t$ manifold of appearances: a consequence of transcendental affinit2. When we postulate that in some cases at least regularly associated sets of appearances require us to have fixed expectations about the course of nature [n], we do so on the basis of the "affinit2 of the manifold" (A113, 114). Transcendental affinity is thus a compel 1 ing logical feature of apperception: That all appearances must be united in one consciousness is the logically necessary precondition of the objectivity of any possible experience. From which Kant appears to conclude that there must be objects with constant qualities, and events with repeated features, in nature [n]. But this is only to repeat a fact of logic about transcendental apperception: In order for there to be objective knowledge all predicates must unite in a single logical subject. And this condition, although clearly necessary for any regularity at a1 1 (including lawlikeness in nature [n]), is just as clearly not sufficient to warrant the strong conclusion that transcendental affinity has empirical affinity as a "mere consequence". What would the sufficient condition have to be? Kant goes on at A114 to suggest that the connection between transcendental and empirical affinity only holds by virtue of the fact that we have to deal with aggregates of appearances, suggesting therefore that in addition to the necessity of apperception, we would require noumenal regularity--what we cannot ever have for Kant: Knowledge of regularities connecting things as they are in themselves. Beck suggests (1981, p. 4571, and I think the suggestion is correct, that this threatened line of metaphysical retreat may be the reason why the section I am discussing was deleted by Kant from the second edition. And so again we raise the question: What warrant have we, if any,
that affinity at the level of logic is captured by affinity at the level
of empirical happening? What common source or ground weds empirical law
with transcendental principle, nature [n] with Nature EN]? What catalyst
links these dissimilars? The short answer: The common principle unifying
particular empirical laws and a priori principles is the
subjectively necessary, transcendental presupposition that
this dismaying, unlimited diversity of empirical 1 aws and this

h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f n a t u r a l forms does n o t b e l o n g i n n a t u r e [ n a t u r e [n]], t h a t , i n s t e a d , n a t u r e i s f i t t e d f o r e x p e r i e n c e as an emp i r i c a l system t h r o u g h t h e a f f i n i t y o f p a r t i c u l a r laws under more g e n e r a l ones. (First Intro, p. 2 0 9 ) . That t h e r e can be a l e g a l m a r r i a g e o f t h e d i s s i m i l a r s r e p r e s e n t e d b y emp i r i c a l laws and by a p r i o r i S laws i s a r e g u l a t i v e l y presupposed conC d i t i o n o f assurance t h a t we can c a r r y o u t t h e s c i e n t i f i c programme, t h a t t h e p r o j e c t i n i t i a t e d by S (and t h e p u r e laws o f p h y s i c s ) can be sucC c e s s f u l l y pursued. W have no access t o knowledge t h a t n a t u r e [ n ] i s an e sich l a w l i k e ( t h a t God i s i n h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t heaven and a l l i s w e l l w i t h t h e s c i e n t i f i c w o r l d ) , and l o g i c a l o n e cannot g i v e us any assurance o f a n i e t a p h y s i c a l l y grounded m a r r i a g e o f f o r m and m a t t e r . R i g h t s o f k i n s h i p a r e h e r e e s t a b l i s h e d as r e g u l a t i v e o n l y ; t h e y a r e r i g h t s we r e q u i r e o f o u r systems, n o t , as Kant says, o f o u r n a t u r e [ n l . R e g u l a t i v e a f f i n i t y as a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l concept had been d i s c u s s e d by Kant i n KRV i n t h e p i v o t a l appendix "The R e g u l a t i v e Employment o f t h e Ideas o f Pure Reason" (A657-663/B685-691). Three i d e a s o f reason y i e l d maxims ( p r i n c i p l e s t h a t a r e s u b j e c t i v e l y necessary i n t h e a t t e m p t t o r e a l i z e t h e i n t e r e s t s o f r e a s o n ) t h a t govern o u r search f o r taxonomies o f n a t u r a l forms, o u r phenomenal s c i e n t i f i c p r o j e c t s : t h e i d e a s o f homog e n e i t y , v a r i e t y and a f f i n i t y . The c o r r e s p o n d i n g p r i n c i p l e s a r e t h o s e o f homogeneity, s p e c i f i c a t i o n and c o n t i n u i t y . The f i r s t b i d s us seek u n i t y i n v a r i e t y ; t h e second, v a r i e t y under u n i t y ; t h e t h i r d , u n i t y i n v a r i e t y and v a r i e t y under u n i t y "as a l l s p r i n g i n g f r o m t h e same stem". The p r i n c i p l e o f a f f i n i t y u r g e s upon us r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t i n a p r o p e r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f n a t u r a l k i n d s s t r i c t r i g h t s o f k i n s h i p must be observed. The p r e s c r i b e d c o n t i n u i t y o f forms i s , however, an i d e a , n o t a concept app l i c a b l e t o o b j e c t s . I t i s a r e q u i r e m e n t on t h e f o r m o f o u r s y s t e m a t i c p r o j e c t s i n , $ o i n g science; i t i s n o t a f e a t u r e o f e i t h e r N a t u r e [N] o r nature [ n l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , N a t u r e [N] forms a s e t o f u n i v e r s a l laws. To h o l d t h a t n a t u r e [ n ] has an a f f i n i t y f o r N a t u r e [N] i s t h u s t o say o n l y t h a t we must proceed as i f a l l o f t h e l o g i c a l parsimony and s i m p l i c i t y possessed by N a t u r e [N] can be f o u n d t o be shared by t h e two n a t u r e s , because we r e q u i r e t h a t t h e r e be s i m p l e laws f o r t h e sake o f d o i n g e m p i r i c a l s c i ence. The common ground f r o m which s p r i n g b o t h N a t u r e [N] and n a t u r e [ n ] i s t h u s t h e o r d e r o f l o g i c as s y s t e m a t i c f i t . The p r i n c i p l e o f a f f i n i t y , a t t h i s h i g h l e v e l , i s a p r i n c i p l e which, i f v i o l a t e d , l e a d s t o u n c l e a r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l b l o o d l i n e s and b l u r r e d m e t a p h y s i c a l r i g h t s o f possess i o n . I n a w o r l d o f humans made so t h a t t h e y can know God d i r e c t l y , God would t u r n o u t t o be t h e source and goal o f t h e a f f i n i t y . I n K a n t ' s w o r l d , t h a t source and g o a l i d e n t i f y o n l y t h e focus imaginarius. But t h e i d e a l o f reason g i v e s good f o c u s indeed. I f we t h i n k o f t h e K a n t i a n system as a taxonomy o f what can be known, one whose p r i n c i p l e s a r e t h o s e o f t h e schematized c a t e g o r i e s a p p l i c a b l e o n l y t o sense i n t u i t e d s , t h e n there is no good reason n o t t o e x t e n d S e x p e c t a t i o n s t o t h o s e p r i n c i C p l e s i n s t a n t i a t e d by m a t t e r i n motion; and there is no good reason n o t t o suppose t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f laws o f p u r e p h y s i c s i n t h e f o r m a t i o n of e m p i r i c a l laws cannot y i e l d a l a r g e number o f such laws a l l h a v i n g t h e same l a w l i k e n e s s f e a t u r e s as t h e laws o f S and o f p u r e p h y s i c s . C Here t h e a f f i n i t y r u n n i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e e p i s t e m o l o g y as a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme i s a c o n t i n u i t y o f k i n d s o f forms o f laws w i t h i n c r e a s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s o f e m p i r i c a l c o n f i r m a t i o n as t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a l m a n i f o l d

i s specified ( i n Kant's technical sense). Because of t h e assumption of continuity of forms, t h e r e will never be a point a t which we a r r i v e a t t h e infima species, and t h a t t h e r e will always and forever be more law forms t o write down increases t h e likelihood t h a t we can someday get confirmations ( o r di sconfirmations) of lower level descriptive laws having t h e required form. And so t o construe t h e epistemological taxonomy as t h e never-ending generator of more and more laws of g r e a t e r and greater s p e c i f i c i t y (and commonness of forms) i s t o render i t t h e equiva l e n t of Kant's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t we lose nothing i f we s e t t l e f o r a t tempts, in principle never-ending ones, t o explain t h e phenomenal domain t o which a l l genuine knowledge claims a r e d i r e c t e d . The s t r i k i n g thing about Kant's regulative principle of a f f i n i t y i s t h a t we can e a s i l y produce h i s t o r i c a l cases t h a t exactly f i t what he had i n mind a t t h e level of methodology. I t may be t h a t f i n a l l y even sympat h e t i c readers of Kant will continue t o balk a t t h e demand (thought t o be q u i t e excessive) t h a t we employ SC principles (and principles of pure physics as w e l l ) as the only ones applicable in the production of empirical science. An a l t e r n a t i v e i s so t o generalize the principles as t o make them vacuous and uncontentious. This has been done, f o r example, by those p o s i t i v i s t s who, l i k e Arthur Pap, suggest t h a t t h e principle of c a u s a l i t y of t h e Second Analogy be viewed as transformable i n t o t h e regu l a t i v e dema?$ t h a t we investigate nature on t h e assumption t h a t i t will y i e l d laws. I think the Second Analogy does give warrant f o r t h i s r u l e , but t h a t i s not a l l Kant intended. These matters of large-scale i n t e r p r e t i v e emphasis aside, as a f i n a l point about t h e continuing int e r e s t of Kant's discussion of l o f t y regulative p r i n c i p l e s , I want t o turn a t t e n t i o n t o his own example of how t h e assumption of a f f i n i t y , t h e assumption of common source or l i a b i l i t y t o f i t a common pattern of unit y , portrays a methodological strategy of great i n t e r e s t and importance. The p r i n c i p l e of a f f i n i t y gives us subjective assurance of t h e s t a bi l i t y of things grouped under kinds, and a l s o assurance of s t a b i l i t y y: properties of things and t h e forces or powers t h a t hold them together. In an example, Kant has us begin with t h e imperfect empirical observat i o n t h a t the planets move in c i r c u l a r o r b i t s . Subsequently, we notice deviations from c i r c u l a r o r b i t i n g , and we " t r a c e the deviations t o t h a t [force] which can change t h e c i r c l e , in accordance with a fixed law, through a l l t h e i n f i n i t e intermediate degrees, i n t o one of these divergent o r b i t s " ( t h e discussion of Kant ' s example follows A662-663/B690691). This i s t o assume t h a t the movements of the planets t h a t a r e not c i r c u l a r will approximate t o the properties of a c i r c l e , and t h i s y i e l d s t h e idea of an e l l i p t i c a l o r b i t . [In l a t e r language, one might suggest t h a t we a r e here " c o l l i g a t i n g " t h e paths of c e l e s t i a l objects under t h e idea of c i r c u l a r path.] W now observe t h a t comets deviate even f u r t h e r e from t r u e c i r c u l a r paths, and by application of the same reasoning--assuming a f f i n i t y of kinds of motion under a common principle ( i n t h i s case, t h e same force t h a t causes t h e deviations)--we conclude t h a t they move in parabolic courses. What we are doing, Kant thinks, i s discovering, by employment of t h e principle of a f f i n i t y , "a unity in the generic forrlls of t h e o r b i t s , and thereby a unity i n the cause of a l l t h e laws of planetary motion, namely, gravitation." W then go f u r t h e r i n our a t e tempt t o explain by t h e same principle a l l observed variations and departures from t h e discovered r u l e s . And Finally, we even go on t o make additions s u c h as experience

can never confirm, namely, t o conceive, i n accordance w i t h t h e r u l e s o f a f f i n i t y , h y p e r b o l i c p a t h s o f comets, i n t h e course o f which t h e s e bodies e n t i r e l y l e a v e o u r s o l a r system, and passing f r o m sun t o sun, u n i t e t h e most d i s t a n t p a r t s o f t h e u n i v e r s e , a u n i v e r s e which, though for us unlimited, i s t h r o u g h o u t h e l d t o g e t h e r by one and t h e same moving force. (emphasis s u p p l i e d ) .
C o l l i g a t i o n l e a d s t o " c o n s i l i e n c e " . Reasoning under t h e g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e o f a f f i n i t y b r i n g s p h y s i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n t o t h e common p o i n t , t h e f i x e d law, t h e source o f a c o n f i r m e d e x p l a n a t i o n . I n t h i s r o l e , a f f i n i t y i s an i n d u c t i v e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e p a r e x c e l l e n c e , and one d i s c u s sed w i t h approval under o t h e r names. Thus we see t h a t , f o r Kant, a f f i n i t y even p e r m i t s us, as a m a t t e r o f j u s t i f i e d s c i e n t i f i c procedure, t o i n f e r beyond t h e l i m i t s o f already given consequences o f c o n t r o l l e d o b s e r v a t i o n and experiment. Indeed, i t w a r r a n t s i n f e r e n c e beyond t h e l i m i t s o f any possible such consequences (as i n t h e case o f i n f e r e n c e t o u n i v e r s a l g r a v i t a t i o n ) ; b u t never, o f course, beyond t h e l i m i t s o f p o s s i b l e experience. ( R e c a l l : t h e subject i v e necessity o f the r u l e o f a f f i n i t y constrains research strategies, i n c l u d i n g s t r a t e g i e s o f i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e ; i t does n o t e n t i t l e us t o f l i g h t s o f c o n s t i t u t i v e metaphysical f a n c y . No r u l e o f method speaks t o t h e r e a l i t y o f o b j e c t i v e f i n d i n g s . ) The c o n f i d e n c e i n o u r i n d u c t i v e cap a c i t y t o i n f e r beyond t h e l i m i t s o f p r e s e n t and i n p r i n c i p l e c o n f i r m a t o r y e x p e r i e n c e does n o t , then, r u n c o u n t e r t o K a n t ' s t h e s i s o f t h e post u l a t e s o f empirical thought i n general: o n l y as Our knowledge o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h i n g s reaches f a r as p e r c e p t i o n and i t s advance a c c o r d i n g t o e m p i r i c a l laws can extend. (A226/B273). I n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e s grounded i n assumed a f f i n i t y do depend upon r e l a t e d c l u s t e r s o f e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s ; i t i s t h e postulated c o n t i n u i t y of forms o f laws t h a t l i c e n s e s i n f e r e n c e beyond t h e known c l u s t e r . For t h o s e r e q u i r i n g something o t h e r t h a n t h e s u b j e c t i v e assurance o f t h e v i a b i l i t y o f m e t h o d o l o g i c a l maxims, Kant can o n l y o f f e r h i s b r i e f comments on what he c a l l s " d o c t r i n a l b e l i e f " , commitment t o t h e c o r r e c t ness o f t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m s t h a t i s analogous t o "pragmatic b e l i e f " i n t h e r e a l m o f t h e p r a c t i c a l (A823-825/B851-853). I n t h e i n t e r e s t o f h e l p i n g h i s p a t i e n t , a p h y s i c i a n must a c t even i n those cases where he does n o t know t h e e x a c t n a t u r e o f t h e i l l n e s s . The touchstone o f h i s b e l i e f i s a q u e s t i o n o f how much he w i l l b e t on an expected outcome o f h i s act i o n . Analogously, t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t must o f t e n f a c e t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which he t h i n k s h i m s e l f t o have s u f f i c i e n t t h e o r e t i c a l grounds f o r b e l i e v i n g a c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n , even though t h e r e e x i s t no p r e s e n t means o f o b t a i n i n g c e r t a i n t y , as i s always t h e case a t t h e l e v e l o f cont i n g e n t e m p i r i c a l science. Here i t i s a p p a r e n t l y a q u e s t i o n o f how much one i s prepared t o r u n conceptual r i s k s : how much o f o n e ' s p u t a t i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d s c i e n c e one i s prepared t o j e t t i s o n i f t h e outcome were t o t u r n o u t t o be o t h e r t h a n what one d o c t r i n a l l y b e l i e v e s . K a n t ' s example i s t h i s one:
I s h o u l d be ready t o s t a k e my a l l on t h e c o n t e n t i o n - - w e r e i t p o s s i b l e by means o f any e x p e r i e n c e t o s e t t l e t h e q u e s t i o n - - t h a t a t l e a s t one o f t h e la nets which we see i s i n h a b i t e d . Hence I

...

say that i t i s not merely opinion, b u t a strong belief, on the correctness of which I should be prepared to run great risks, that other worlds are inhabited. Kant was prepared to hazard a great deal in those cases where what one hypothesizes about the course of nature [nl conforms to the conditions of S knowing. I think i t i s for t h i s reason that he takes so serC iously the question of a priori foundations of knowing in natural s c i ence. In the absence of the subjectively necessary maxims of method with their limited a priori guarantees, w run the large risk of losing cone ceptual sanity. I t i s one thing to hypothesize categorial p o s s i b i l i t i e s that are out of range of what w now know; i t i s quite another delibere ately to exaggerate those p o s s i b i l i t i e s , betting, as does the c?$ssical metaphysician, too l i t t l e on outcomes too important to underbid. W have seen that Kant appears t o be content to s e t t l e for a marriage e of formal law and descriptive law that i s , in a l i t e r a l methodological sense, a marriage of convenience. The principle of causality and the law of universal gravitation are kith and kin only because, though dissimil a r , they are similarly focused. T bring them together in any more meto aphysically compelling way would require that the focus of our scientifi c imagination turn into that big double-barreled shotgun in the sky, threatening to spray the not-yet-united lovers with an i n f i n i t e collection of forever diverse and variegated noumenal buckshot. Kant taught us, to his everlasting c r e d i t , that the ammunition chambers of that imagined gun are phenomenally empty, nu1 1 and meaningless--in principle and always.

Notes ' ~ o tthat t h i s was the f i r s t philosophical expression of dissatisfaction with Kantian synthetic a prioris; for example, the Reichenbach-Einstein exchange in Schi lpp (1949, p p . 289-311 ; 676-679) had already neatly arranged the relevant debating points.

fr he sources were rich ones: Lewis and Dewey, Mach and Schlick. I t became clear by the 1950s that w were going to have to get used to very e different styles of thinking about the a p r i o r i .
3~ s t a r t was made at the Third International Kant Congress; see the papers by Buchdahl and Palter, and m comments, in Beck (1972, p p . 149y 199). Brittan (1978) makes a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of some aspects of Kant's philosophy of science; Kitcher (1983) repays very careful study; all of us eagerly await publication of the res u l t s of Michael Friedman's study of Kant's philosophy of physics (presented in seminars at University of Western Ontario in Spring 1984). Kant's philosophy of mathematics has been studied by Hintikka (eg., 1969), Parsons (1971) and Kitcher (1975). Palter ( i n Beck 1972), Harman (19821, Okruhlik (1983) and Duncan (1984) deal with Kant's Die metaphysi s c h e Anfangsgriinde der Baturwissenschaften. Harper (1981) contributes much to our understanding of the logic of the Second Analogy. These selective references do not exhaust the good work that has been done recently.

4~ant mentioned the p o s s i b i l i t y of a second special metaphysics, t h a t of "objects" of internal sense, or of t h e soul. However, he required of a proper science t h a t i t s subject matter be mathematizable; contents of inner sense a r e not mathenlatizable; therefore a science cannot be developed on t h e basis of t h e special metaphysics of the soul. Only bodies moving in space can be objects of proper science. I argue elsewhere t h a t t h i s accounts f o r Kant's c l i n i c a l and nosological i n t e r e s t in psychical phenomena: H replaces t h e impossible science of t h e soul with a behave i o u r i s t i c psychopathology, one whose nosology of mental disorders groups deviations from normal schemati zed category knowing i n t o c l i n i c a l syndromes (Butts 1984, pp. 298-310). 5 ~ h e n s i s t e n c e t h a t natural science must be e s s e n t i a l l y mathematical i i s c l e a r l y s t a t e d in MAN, p . 470. That a l l objects of possible experience must be mathematical i d e a l i z a t i o n s ( c o n s t r u c t s ) of appearances i s a central claim of the transcendental programme. See KRV A162-176/B202218; A142-43/B182-83. 6 " ~ e t a p h y s i c a land Internal Realism: t h e Relations between Ontology and Methodology in Kant ' s Philosophy of Science". Typescript copies were d i s t r i b u t e d t o those who attended t h e session. 7 ~ a n ti s here talking about empirical natural science, not about t h e metaphysica2 foundations of natural science, as he makes c l e a r in what follows t h e quoted l i n e . Conjecture i s typical of t h e former, a p r i o r i c e r t a i n t y i s a f e a t u r e of the l a t t e r , as we have seen. 8 ~ h i sdiscussion necessarily bypasses what i s a t another level a cruc i a l problem f o r Kant: What about the ontological s t a t u s of moral agents? or persons? Since practical reason can only postulate such "obj e c t s " on analogy with objects r e s u l t i n g from schematized categories, what ontological s t a t u s can be accorded them: useful f i c t i o n s ?
' ~ 0 t h S and LM require t h a t objects of proper science be mathematizC able; mathematics constructs i t s objects; hence we must have a s e t of M s (mathematical constructions) yielding t h e physical meaning of each C LM. For example, the second Kantian law of mechanics ( t h e principle of i n e r t i a ) provides part of t h e ontology of bodies by allowing construct i o n of motion as an object of possible experience through provision of a "geometrical curve whose direction a t each point i s determined by the tangent ( t h e geometrical representation of t h e f i r s t derivative, which i s i d e n t i c a l with velocity, i f the horizontal axis of t h e coordinate system represents the time) ; and the physical meaning of the tangent i s j u s t i n e r t i a l motion." (Pap 1946, pp. 43-44). Constructions are of course required f o r each of the Kantian p r i n c i p l e s in pure physics; they provide i n t u i t i v e warrant f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y or i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the concepts involved. There i s no space here t o deal with the c r u c i a l l y important Kantian idea of constructions in any d e t a i l .

' O ~ a n t does not l i s t "F=man as a law of motion, although h i s discussion i n d i c a t e s t h a t he accepts "ma". Did he r e a l i z e t h a t the law of ine r t i a i s a special case of "F=maU, where F=O? See Okruhlik (1983, pp. 252-253) f o r a brief discussion of Kant's f a i l u r e t o mention e x p l i c i t l y Newton's second law. I suspect t h a t Kant's f a i l u r e t o record acceptance of t h e i d e n t i t y has t o do with h i s conviction t h a t forces are not f u l l y c o n s t r u c t i b l e , hence cannot be f u l l y available f o r mathematical t r e a t -

ment. Throughout his career he wanted t o r e t a i n the idea of some kind of empirical access t o f o r c e s , and f o r him forces manifested in the motions of objects given in space and expressed as external r e l a t i o n s between such objects were f i n a l l y t h e best candidates. Such "transeunt" forces replaced the empirically inaccessible immanent forces of Leibniz. ''some words about the word. Kant uses both Affinitdt and Verwandtschaft in f i r s t Critique. In AnthropoZogie (Sect. 31, 31c) he uses Verwandtschaft and the Latin affinitas. Affinitas means relationship through marriage ( a s in the Church of England Comon h.ayer "Table of Kindred and A f f i n i t y " ) . Verwandtschaft shares these connotations; Affinitdt should probably be construed as Kant's preferred technical term, although he uses Affinitdt and Verwandtschaft interchangeably and without d i s t i n c t i o n in f i r s t Critique ( f o r example, A657-663/8685-691). In Anth. 31c h i s examples are c a t a l y t i c i n t e r a c t i o n of chemical substances and marriage. Affinity names a kind of r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i s s i m i l a r s , and unites through a common ground or source. In methodological contexts the r u l e of a f f i n i t y enjoins us t o search f o r what Whewell called "cons i l i e n c e " : systematic unification achieved by a convergence of i n i t i a l l y unrelated inductions. Shortly we will see t h a t Kant's favourite example of systematic unification or consilience i s one shared by Whewell: universal g r a v i t a t i o n .
l L 1 cannot develop the point here, but what I a saying about systemm a t i c organization of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n schemes as Kant viewed i t seems t o m t o confirm Kitcher's (1983) claim t h a t f o r Kant a s c i e n t i f i c theory e i s a "projected order of nature". Much t h a t I argue f o r in (1984) depends upon accepting K i t c h e r ' s correct i n s i g h t .

13''1n so f a r as t h e term ' s c i e n c e ' e s s e n t i a l l y connotes an a c t i v i t y aiming a t t h e discovery of laws, t h e principle of c a u s a l i t y , interpreted as an imperative, may, indeed, be said t o be presupposed by the very p o s s i b i l i t y of science: science i s the successful response t o the impera t i v e expressed by the p r i n c i p l e of c a u s a l i t y . O t h i s point philoson phers as widely opposite in t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards Kant's c r i t i c a l idealism as Schlick and Cassirer seem t o agree." (Pap 1946, p. 6 8 ) . Kant does suggest t h a t the Second Analogy i s grounded in the principle of s u f f i c i e n t reason: "The p r i n c i p l e of s u f f i c i e n t reason i s thus the ground of possible experience, t h a t i s , of objective knowledge of appearances in respect of t h e i r r e l a t i o n in the succession of time" (A201/8246). However, as we have seen, i n s t a n t i a t e d by matter in motion, t h e p r i n c i p l e of c a u s a l i t y leads us t o have strong expectations about t h e specific explanatory framework t h a t will c o r r e c t l y explicate cases of observed motion. The agreement a t t r i b u t e d t o Cassirer and Schlick thus seems of l i t t l e consequence. 1 4 ~ tth i s stage s p e c i a l i s t s in the thought of Kant will want t o remind us t h a t t h e problem of property s t a b i l i t y i s important f o r Kant in a number of r e l a t e d contexts. A t A90/8123 he recognizes the problem: "Appearances might very well be so constituted t h a t t h e understanding should not find them t o be in accordance with t h e conditions of i t s unit y . Everything might be in such confusion t h a t , f o r instance, in the s e r i e s of appearances nothing presented i t s e l f which might y i e l d a r u l e of synthesis and so answer t o t h e concept of cause and e f f e $ t . This concept would then be altogether empty, n u l l , and meaningless. Even empirical memory (reproductive imagination) requires s t a b i 1i t y of properties:

"If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, sometimes heavy ...my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when representing red colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar." (A100-101). At least some of these specialists will also want to hold that Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction yields justified objective grounds for stability of properties. I think, however, that here we must score one for Buchdahl. Lawlikeness of empirical laws presupposes stability of properties, but the assumption of stability of properties rests on the principle of affinity--a subjectively valid regulative principle. Here there is a "messy" articulation, rather than a clinching argument. In the absence of an sich realist convictions, it is extremely difficult to argue into existence a stable and epistemologically reliable external world. 15~fterpresentation of the paper, my colleague Margaret Morrison reminded me of the passage in which Kant states that principles like affini ty "carry their recommendation directly in themselves" (KRV, A661/8689), and warned that unless I can give an appropriate reading of Kant's claim here, the appeal to a pragmatic justification of subjective principles is unavailing. This is a well-taken point, and one worth careful development. My suggestion is that Kant is here pointing out that the success of the principles as methodological components of Newton's (essentially correct) physics is one that can be universalized by being "represented as objective" in much the same way as are aesthetic judgements of taste. This would be consistent with Kant's belief that Newtonian physics (including its methodology) is the best exunrple of successful science. The suggested reading a1 so brings judgement of the acceptability of methodologies within the ambit of judgements of taste. Thus we might say that one who rejects the described Newtonian methodology is guilty of poor "epistemic" taste. This exegetical line, one that brings Kant's thought closer to that of Nelson Goodman and (perhaps) to that of Putnam, is one that obviously requires more extensive working out than can be accomplished here. Kant's suggestions concerning universal izabi lity of subjective maxims and public consensus are at (KRV, A820-22/B848-501, and at ( c r i t i q u e of Judgement, Sect. 40).

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