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AFGHANISTAN
RESOURCE DESK
February 2012
he economy of Afghanistan is, according to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), highly donor dependent. That is, the economy and government of Afghanistan rely upon resources injected by foreign countries. A US Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) report from 2011 noted that the level of international aid for Afghanistan is equivalent to 97% of Afghanistans gross domestic product (GDP). Analysts from the World Bank issued a report in November 2011 which concluded that a decline in foreign civilian and military assistance in the coming years could severely undermine economic gains made over the course of the past decade. Hence, as numerous studies and reports from the World Bank and others have noted, it is increasingly important to promote forms of economic growth which are self-sustaining and not overly dependent upon foreign aid. In producing this paper, the author attempted to balance two forms of sustainable economic growth: (i) macroeconomic growth as measured by indicators such as GDP and (ii) the micro-economic conditions of Afghan households. The former includes broad-based growth reflected in GDP figures while the latter includes issues such as poverty, food security, employment, inflation and so on. This division is based on research findings, demonstrated in a 2007 article on Interrelationship between Growth, Inequality, and Poverty, that economic development and poverty alleviation do not necessarily correspond in all circumstances. Hence, agreements and projects which raise the overall GDP, for instance, may have relatively little impact on agriculturally-dependent rural communities or the proportion of the population living in poverty. Supporting this point, the World Bank Afghanistan Economic Update from October 2011 notes that the expansion of mining in Afghanistan is likely to lead to significant income for the Afghan government but only modest gains in employment. This document is organised into three sections. The first focuses upon the current status of the Afghan economy and briefly notes how economic conditions have changed over the course of the past decade. The second section addresses agreements which may have a bearing upon self-sustaining economic growth. The final section then looks at projects and programmes which reportedly have the potential to promote long-term growth and poverty
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alleviation. Each of the sections is influenced by and takes into consider the Afghan governments preliminary economic transition strategy, entitled Towards A Self-Sustaining Afghanistan, which was launched in the days before the December 2011 Bonn Conference.
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean3
2
Gross National Income (GNI), Atlas method The downturn in 2008 resulted from crop failure, which negatively affected the economy. 3 For years in which data is available 4 In year-on-year terms 5 This is the amount used by the Afghan government and the NRVA to calculate the poverty level in Afghanistan. Households in which the members live on less than AFN 1,255 per month are considered to be in poverty. For a household of six people, this would correspond to a total household income of less than AFN 7,530 (USD 155.84).
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above the poverty line. Accordingly, inflation or poor harvests have the potential to dramatically increase the number of Afghans officially classified as impoverished, notes the World Bank. While GDP growth, inflation and other indicators show a high degree of variability, some other and relatively more consistent indicators are also becoming evident. After a strong improvement in the years immediately following 2001, trade has declined significantly in relation to GDP since 2006. Imports into Afghanistan have gone from 96% of GDP in 2006 to 57% in 2010/11, according to the World Bank. Afghan exports have also declined from 26% of GDP in 2006 to 18% of GDP in 2010/11. In addition, the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) notes a sharp decline in investment from 2006 to 2008, the last year for which AISA published official data. A prominent World Bank study on Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 20146, issued in November 2011, provides a perspective on the short-to-medium-term prospects for economic growth. The report indicates that, presuming a carefully managed reduction in aid, significant growth in the mining sector and maintained security levels, the Afghan economy will grow by 5-6% after 2014. However, it indicates that population growth of 2.8% per year and inflation may mean that growth will have a relatively muted impact. If mining revenues fail to materialise, the World Bank predicts that GDP growth would be 3-4%; if security worsens or aid is withdrawn quickly, the post-2014 economy could perform even worse, failing to keep up with population growth and exacerbating poverty. As the World Banks study on Transition in Afghanistan states, there is a need to identify other means of promoting economic growth in Afghanistan once international spending on security, development and basic service delivery is no longer assured. This document now turns to those agreements which may prove invaluable in developing a sustainable economy for Afghanistan.
Relevant Agreements
Afghanistan has numerous agreements concerning economic cooperation with neighbouring countries in Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East as well as with the United States and several European countries. It is a member of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) and, by extension, is part of a regional system of trade preferences. Afghanistan is also a member of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programme operated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and regularly deepens its commercial ties at the recurring Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA).
Only the executive summary of this report has been released at the time of writing.
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agreement has been held up due to disagreements over how best to prevent the agreement from being taken advantage of by smugglers. In addition, the agreement in some ways complicates trade between Afghanistan and India given that Afghan containers, according to the full text of the agreement, can only ship items to the IndoPakistani border but not deliver them to their intended destinations within India. In addition, the Afghan containers are not permitted under the APTTA to carry Indian goods back to Afghanistan.
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However, experts have raised concerns about the ultimate impact of these mining deals, particularly those awarded to the Chinese. A report from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) suggests that the Chinese bid was not only generous, it may have been unrealistic. Kenneth Katzman, writing for CRS, indicates that MCCs bid was generous to the point where it might not be commercially profitable. The transnational railway proposed by China would cost approximately USD 6 billion, according to figures cited by the Asia Times. In addition, royalties of 20% on copper ore are more than five times the average for similar, private-sector mining projects. A report from the Carnegie Endowment indicates that China has, in other developing countries, offered exceptionally high bids and then re-negotiated the terms with national governments several years later. In addition, analysts have highlighted that mining will not likely begin at Aynak for several years beyond the ongoing transition process and will only occur if security conditions improve and if infrastructure to export copper ore is in place. Furthermore, the Carnegie Endowment report indicates that large-scale mine operations generally require seven to 20 years in order to become profitable. Hence, with a feasibility study for the transAfghan railway having been launched only last year, according to The Times of India, near-term progress on extraction at Aynak appears unlikely. The same holds true for the Hajigak deposit where the Indian consortium of companies plans to start extraction after 2016, according to LiveMint. Substantial revenues from Aynak, Hajigak and other major mineral deposits may thus take several years to develop.
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long-term support. Rather than focusing upon input (e.g., seed and fertiliser) distribution and short-term solutions, AREU indicates that efforts must be focused upon organising farmers and building value chains so that the industry can move beyond its primarily subsistence role.
Conclusion
As this document demonstrates, Afghanistan has undergone rapid economic development over the course of the past decade. GDP growth has, in particular, been strong thanks to large in-flows of foreign aid, though issues such as employment and poverty alleviation has reportedly proved more challenging to improve. Plans are currently being developed, and regional agreements are being developed and signed in order to help ensure that the forthcoming reduction in foreign development assistance for Afghanistan does not produce a disruptive economic shock.
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