Political Culture and Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations of Chinese and Taiwanese International Students in Manila

Emil L. Samaniego MA Political Science Major in Global Politics Department of Political Science Ateneo de Manila University

Abstract This paper comparatively describes the political culture of Chinese and Taiwanese international students in Manila and their perspectives on crossstrait relations and conflict. Using the framework devised by Almond and Verba, Political Culture is measured using the following indicators: interest in politics, support for liberal democratic/socialist and communist values and attitudes, and satisfaction with the status of the present form of government and trust in institutions. Based on these indicators, the respondents are categorized whether they fall under Parochial, Subject and Participant Political Culture. Lastly, the study devised and offered a theoretical framework which argues that national (ethnic) identities as intervened by political culture can determine the present and future political attiudes and behaviour of Chinese and Taiwanese with regards to cross-strait relations and conflict.

Introduction It is time to redress the balance in social analysis. - Ronald Inglehart, The Renaissance of Political Culture, 1988 In retrospect, these are powerful words quoted from 2011 Johan Skyte Winner in Political Science Ronald Inglehart, which lamented the popularity of Rational Choice theory as a mode of analysis in explaining political phenomena thereby deemphasizing cultural factors to unrealistic degree (Inglehart, 1988). These words from Inglehart have also challenged generations of budding and seasoned researchers to revive their interest in the field of political culture as championed by Almond and Verba since the 1960s after the publication of their pioneering study- The Civic Culture. Since then, the field has continually witnessed its re-emergence or as what Gabriel Almond, the dean of contemporary culture theory (Crothers and Lockhart, 2000), puts it, the return to political culture (Diamond, 1993). Russel Dalton, during the first year of this century, observed what he called the renaissance to political culture (Dalton, 2000). He argued that cultural studies have been especially important in the study of democratization, as analysts tried to identify cultural requisites of democracy (Dalton, 2000) during and before the third wave of democratization. He cited Ingleharts 1981 World Value Study which demonstrated the congruence between broad political attitudes and democratic stability for 22 nations (Dalton, 2000), Putnams (1993) research on regional governments in Italty, lastly, he also referred the works of Inglehart, 1997; Jackman & Miller, 1996; Reisinger, 1995; Tarrow, 1996 as indicators of what he called the general renaissance in cultural studies (Dalton. 2000).

The previous decade also hosted several important researches on political culture in the 21st century; some of them have drawn their analyses from exactly the same model devised by Almond and Verba in 1963. Gaiser, Gille, Rijke and Sardei-Beimanns (2007) research on the variation of political culture of young East and West Germans between 1992 and 2003, and Gvozdanovics (2010) research on the political culture of university students in Croatia both employed the following indicators of political culture that were derived from Almond and Verbas theoretical framework: interest in formal politics and political involvement, attitudes in political order/support for democratic values and attitudes, and trust in institutions. (See also, Moten, 2011; Omodia, 2011, Iliin, 2007, Betarlanic, 2006; Welzel and Inglehart, 2005) This study is yet another response to the challenge posed by Ronald Inglehart on the utility of political culture in mediating our understanding of certain political phenomena- in our case the perspectives of Chinese and Taiwanese international students on cross-strait relations and conflict. Political culture in this sense is a crucial intervening variable (Inglehart, 1990). This treatment to political culture can be traced back to the works of Lipset (1981), Inkeles and Diamond (1980) as well as Inglehart (1990) who empirically demonstrated political culture as an important intervening variable between economic development and democracy (Bertalanic, 2011). In this paper, I argue that national (ethnic) identity as intervened by political culture shapes the present and future political behaviors and attitudes of Chinese and Taiwanese respondents with regards to cross-strait relations and conflict. This function of political culture to determine expected behavior of individuals in a possible conflictual situation is in fact a foundation of a wellknown theory of democratic peace which postulates that democracies never go to war with each other- an essentially political-culturalist proposition (Molchanov, 2002: 11). Though this paper is not in any way aimed at discounting and disproving rationalist assumptions on cross-strait relations and conflict, it wishes to offer and highlight a political-cultural approach on this

seemingly unresolvable issue which haunts cross-strait scholars and policy makers for decades now. We are living in a rapidly changing world; globalization increases crosscultural contacts that continually shapes and reshapes the identities, cultural and political orientations of Chinese and Taiwanese youth. Globalization or the opening of national boarders has also brought greater mobility of (Chinese and Taiwanese) international students (Levin, 2006); this has opened opportunities for comparativist researchers to study in micro scale the impact of their ethnic and national identities to their perception on Cross-Strait relations as mediated by their political culture. This perception takes the form of political attitudes and behavior. In a more general sense, the present study is drawing on the variation and interrelationship of identities, culture, values, attitudes and behavior of Chinese and Taiwanese international students in Metro Manila.

Statement of the Problems The study endeavors to examine the relationship among the respondents national and ethnic identification as explanatory variable, political culture as intervening variable and the respondents perspectives on cross-strait relations and conflict as outcome variable. Reference is also made to respondents age, gender, religion, level of religiosity and years of stay in the Philippines as confounding or extraneous variables. Specifically, below are the puzzles that the study attempts to unravel:
1. What are the classifications of the respondents based on their

demographic profiles, ethnic and national identification, political culture and their perspectives on Cross-Strait relations and conflict?
2. Is there a significant difference or similarity on respondents political

culture in reference to their ethnic and national identification?

3. Is

there

significant

difference

or

similarity

on

respondents

perspectives on Cross-Strait relations and conflict in reference to their ethnic and national identification? Null Hypothesis: There is no significant similarity between the respondents National and Ethnic Identification, Political Culture and Perspectives on Cross-strait relations and conflict.

Theoretical Framework

AGE

GENDER YEARS OF STAY IN RP RELIGION & LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY

ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

CHINESE

TAIWANE SE
POLITICAL CULTURE

INTEREST IN FORMAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT HIGH

LOW

SUPPORT FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND ATTITUDES HIGH

LOW HIGH LOW

SUPPORT FOR SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST VALUES AND

SATISFACTION IN GOVERNMENT AND TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS HIGH

PAROCHIA

SUBJECT

PARTICIPAN

PERSPECTIVE ON CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS AND CONFLICT (-)NEGATIVE/PESSIMISTIC POSITIVE/OPTIMISTIC (+)

MILITAR Y SOLUTIO ONE CHINA, TWO SYSTEM S MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO, UNIFICATI ON IN THE FUTURE INCREASE ECONOMIC AND MAINTAI POLITICAL N THE INTERDEPE STATUS ND-ENCE QUO FOREVE

MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO, INDEPENDEN CE IN THE

MEDIATIO MAINTAIN THE N BY USA STATUS QUO, OR OTHER DECIDE STATES WHETHER The history of culture as a political concept is a bittersweet UNIFICATION OR INDEPENDENCE emergence, decline and re-emergence. It was hailed and celebrated LATER

Conceptual Framework

the 1960s, attacked in all fronts during the 80-70s but has gradually reemerged since the 90s until today. Its modern conception can be traced back from Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verbas seminal work, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (1963). The study contended that the institutions and patterns of action in a political system are closely linked to the political culture of the nation (Dalton, 2000). Traditionally, the term political culture includes subjective relatedness towards to politics (interest, of information, political order communication), attitudes different models

(democracy, socialism) and, finally, the evaluation of what politics achieve (satisfaction with democracy, trust in institutions) (Gaiser et. al., 2007: 288). Hence, political culture is defined as peoples predominant beliefs, attitudes,

MEDIATION BY UNITED NATION AND OTHER INTERNATION AL ORGANIZATIO NS

tale of

during

TWO CHINA TWO SYSTEMS

values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in the system (Diamond, 1993: 7). The components of political culture which can be classified into three pyscho-social orientations are cognitive orientation, involving knowledge of and beliefs about the political system; affective orientation, consisting of feelings about the political system; and an evaluational orientation, including commitment to political values and judgments (making use of information and feelings) about the performance of the political system relative to those values (Almond and Verba, 1963: 15). According to Zver (2002) political culture cannot be measured through everyday expressions of public opinion. He adopts an operational model that emphasizes culture as a sum of values and behaviors that can be empirically measured. Through the application of this approach we can measure political culture on three distinctive levels of expression: - Declarative level: opinions regarding the political system, structure and processes; - Implicit value level: choices among (opposite) sets of values; - Behavioral or participative level: measuring levels of political participation or abstinence. (Bertalanic, 2006) Political Culture can also be empirically measured using the following indicators derived from Almond and Verbas theoretical framework: interest in formal politics and political involvement, support for Liberal Democratic values and attitudes/Socialist and Communist values and attitudes, and trust in institutions and satisfaction with the present form of government. Interest in formal politics is considered to be an essential part in the input dimension of the political system (Gaiser et. al, 2007: 288). It involves the assessment of the individual about the importance of politics among other areas of life (Religion, Culture, Family etc.), his willingness to take at least a cognitive approach to politics and to obtain political information and

knowledge (Gaiser et. al, 2007: 288), and his active involvement in political activities. Support for Liberal Democratic values and attitudes/Socialist and Communist values and attitudes belongs to the system dimension of political culture. Values are ideas or beliefs regarding desirable goals and behaviors that can be organized in systems (Gvazdanovic, 2010: 468). Also, they direct our attitudes and behaviors (Feri and Kamenov, 2007). The output dimension of political system is analyzed using the command indicator trust in institution and satisfaction in the present form of government. This indicator is part of the evaluative orientation of political culture. Political evaluations are addressed concerning the way citizens see themselves as active and influential participants in the political process (internal efficacy) and the conviction that political leadership is open and responds to the population (external efficacy) (Gabriel, 1994, p. 118). Table 1.1 Dimension of Political Orientation (Almond and Verba, 1963: 15) 1. System as General Object 2. Input objects 3. Output objects 4. Self as object

Cognition Affect Evaluation Table 2.1 tells us that the political orientation of an individual can be tapped systematically if we explore the following: 1. What knowledge does he have of his nation and of his political system in general terms, its history, size, location, power, constitutional characteristics, and the like? What are his feelings towards these systematic characteristics? What are his more or less considered opinions and judgments of them? 2. What knowledge does he have of the structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved in the upward flow of policy making? What are his feelings and opinions about these structures, leaders and policy proposals? 3. What knowledge does he have of the downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals and decisions involved in these processes? What are his feelings and opinions of them? 4. How does he perceive himself as a member of his political system? What knowledge does he have of his rights, powers, obligations and of strategies of access to influence? How does he feel about his capabilities? What norms of participation or of performance does he

acknowledge and employ in formulating political judgments, or in arriving a opinions? (Almond and Verba, 1963: 15-16) Political Culture based on the evaluation of its indicators can be classified into three major categories: Parochial, Subject and Participant. Individuals with Parochial Political Culture are characterized by very low cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations towards the political system. A parochial orientation also implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system. The parochial expects nothing from the political system (Almond and Verba, 1963: 17). Furthermore, the government is seen as the enforcer of its own rules and consequently, the realm of politics is seen as one to be avoided whenever possible (Lecture 4_politicalcuture.pdf: 17). The second major type of political culture is the Subject Political Culture. Here there is a high frequency of orientation towards a differentiated political system and towards the output aspects of the system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active participant, approach zero (Almond and Verba, 1963: 17). This tends to be manifested in a citizenry that expects positive action from government, but that does not tend to be politically active themselves. They, too, see politics as an elite domain only to be engaged in by those with power and influence (Lecture 4_politicalcuture.pdf: 18). The third model of political culture is the Participant Political Culture wherein individuals have high cognitive, affective and evaluative orientation towards the political system. It is one in which the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the political ad administrative structures and processes; in other words, to both the input and output aspects of the political system (Almond and Verba, 1963: 18). Societies which possess this type of political culture tend to have citizens with high expectations of government and of personally participating in politics, if at no other time than voting in an election (Lecture 4_politicalcuture.pdf: 19).

Table 2 Types of political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963: 16) 1. System as General Object 0 1 1 2. Input objects 0 0 1 3. Output objects 0 1 1 4. Self as object 0 0 1

Parochial Subject Participan t

Political Culture is passed on from one generation to the next through the process of political socialization. Political identity is formed through the political socialization process and the influence of social and political institutions like the family, education system, mass media, religion, the government and other states institutions. This political identity in turn determines our political values, attitudes and behavior. Political identity takes the form of national [ethnic] identity. According to Kholocharova (2011) political and national identity are quite tightly interwoven, and it is not always possible to decide precisely where the boundary between them run. However, when nation is interpreted as a political community, the concepts of national and political identity intersects only partially because not every national (ethnic) community can be called political, and not every political entity assumes a commonality of an organic and cultural character. Molchanov (2002) observed that political culture and national identity of a country are mutually complimentary aspects of the same phenomena. Since nationality is politically shaped and reflects the national traditions of governance, political culture must be seen as an important aspect of national identity. Reciprocally the process whereby national identities are formed also lays the groundwork for political development along nationally specific lines, hence for political culture defined on a national basis. Political culture can be seen as a form of historical memory of a nation which organizes political behavior according to the lessons drawn by the nation from its earlier

experience.

Springboard (2003) postulated that national political identities

are fluid and reflect shifts in power relations between social groups and the dynamics of political institutions to include specific groups and exclude others.

Empirical Basis The quantitative data used in this study were collected by the researcher in the period of February to March, 2012. The number of samples collected are N=24 (10 Chinese and 14 Taiwanese respondents), these were stratified according to respondents national (ethnic) identification, demographic attributes (age, gender, years of stay in the Philippines, religion, level of religiosity), political culture and perspectives on cross-strait relations. Political culture was measured through the following indicators: interest in formal politics and political involvement, support for Liberal Democratic values and attitudes/Socialist and Communist values and attitudes, and trust in institutions and satisfaction with the present form of government. Univariate and bivariate data analyses were employed. The first was used to determine the answer distribution and the latter for calculating the significance of differences/similarities by using the 2 test and correlation using r. Demographic Profiles Table 3: Demographic Profile Gender Male Female Total Age F 10 14 24 F P 41.7 58.3 100.0 P

17-20 21-24 25-28

11 7 6

45.8 29.2 25.1 100 P 54.2 29.2 16.6 100 P 4.2 20.8 20.8 16.7 37.5 100.0 P 37.5 50 8.3 4.2 100.

Total 24 Years of Stay in the F Philippines 1-5 13 6-10 7 10-20 4 Total Religion Confucianism Buddhism Catholicism Protestantism No religion Total Level of Religiosity Religious No Answer Less religious Extremely less religious Total 24 F 1 5 5 4 9 24 F 9 12 2 1 24

Out of N=24 respondents surveyed, there are a total of 10 males and 14 females. Their ages range from 17-28. Majority of respondents (54%) have stayed in the Philippines for a period of 1-5 years, 45.9% have stayed for a period of 6-20 years. Majority of respondents (37.5) have no religion, Catholicism and Buddhism tie at 20.8%, followed by Proiotestantism (16.7%) and Confucianism at 4.2%. In summary, western religions (Catholicism and Protestantism) account for a total of 37.5%, significantly higher than eastern religions (Buddhism and Confucianism) which account for 25% of the respondents. Accordingly, half of the respondents surveyed have no answer on the question how religious are you, 37.5% are religious, 8.3% are less religious and 4.2% are extremely less religious.

National and Ethnic Identifications 41.7% of respondents identified themselves as Chinese and 58.3% identified themselves as Taiwanese. Majority of Chinese respondents believed that when they say our country it refers to Peoples Republic of China (Mainland China and all administrative regions including Taiwan, Spratly Islands, Tibet and all other territories claimed by PRC). However, no one referred their country as Communist China. For Taiwanese respondents, all of them referred their country as simply Taiwan. On the question of territory, majority of Chinese respondents referred to it as Zhongguo [Mainland China and all administrative regions (Hong Kong Macau) including Taiwan, Tibet, Group of Islands in South China Sea (Spratlys etc.) and all other territories claimed by PRC], on the other hand, majority of Taiwanese respondents referred to their territory as simply Taiwan. On the question When we say people of my country, to which of the following do you refer? Majority of Chinese respondents answered people of Zhongguo (Mainland China, administrative regions and other territories claimed (Taiwan etc.) by PRC) and majority of Taiwanese respondents answered simply as people of Taiwan. Lastly, a great majority of Chinese and Taiwanese respondents identified themselves as ethnically pure Chinese and pure Taiwanese, respectively. Based on these data, it can be inferred that both of the Chinese and Taiwanese respondents hold a clear and distinctive understanding of their ethnic and national identities. Table 4: National Identification Frequen cy 10 14 Percent 41.7 58.3

Chinese Taiwanese

Total

24

100.0

Table 5: Ethnic Identification 1. Please complete the sentence: I am ____________? Frequenc y 8 11 1 2 2 24 Percent 33.3 45.8 4.2 8.3 8.3 100.0

1. (Pure) Chinese 2. (Pure) Taiwanese 3. Both Chinese and Taiwanese/Taiwanese and Chinese 4. Chinese first then Taiwanese 5. Taiwanese first then Chinese 6. Others Total Political Culture A. Interest in Formal Politics

As an input dimension of Political Culture, interest in formal politics measures the respondents assessment of importance of politics as juxtaposed to other areas of life. Based on the survey, both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents ranked Family as the most important areas of life followed by Economy. Politics, though it lags behind other areas of life is still treated as an important area of life with average mean of 2.2 for Chinese respondents and 1.9 for Taiwanese respondents. Table 6: How important to you personally is each of these areas of life on this list? Nationality Chinese Taiwanese Economy Chinese N 9 14 9 Mean t-value 1.000 -1.170 0 1.142 -1.472 9 1.555 1.284 6 Sig .255 .165 .213 Interpretat ion Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho

Family

Taiwanese Politics Chinese Taiwanese Religion Chinese Taiwanese Culture Chinese Taiwanese Social Values Chinese Taiwanese Environment Chinese Taiwanese Science & Tech Chinese Taiwanese

14 9 14 9 14 9 14 9 14 9 14 9 14

1.285 7 2.222 2 1.928 6 3.111 1 2.071 4 1.888 9 1.785 7 1.777 8 1.714 3 1.777 8 1.500 0 1.555 6 1.571 4

1.251 .733 .763 2.195 2.079 .266 .264 .193 .203 .896 .848 -.055 -.053

.229 .472 .455 .040 .056 .792 .795 .849 .841 .380 .411 .957 .958

Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho

Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho

Table 7:

How strong is your interest on politics?

Nation ality Chines e Taiwan ese

N 9 14 10 14 10

Mean 2.666 7 3.000 0

tvalue -.799 -.833

I understand politics pretty well.

Chines e Taiwan ese

3.000 1.236 0 2.571 1.383 4 2.900 1.322 0

I find politics complicated for a normal person to

Chines e

sig . 43 3 . 41 5 . 22 9 . 18 2 . 20

Interpretat ion Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho

understand.

Taiwan ese

14

2.428 1.448 6

0 . Reject Ho 16 2

Both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents exhibit an intermediate interest on politics with an average mean of 2.6 and 3.0, respectively. On their understanding of politics and their perception of it as complicated for a normal person to understand, both of the respondents answered sometimes true with average mean of 3.0/2.9 for Chinese respondents and 2.57/2.4 for Taiwanese respondents. Table 8: How often do you do the following? Nationa lity Chinese Taiwane se Chinese Taiwane se Chinese Taiwane se Chinese Taiwane se Chinese Mea n 2.000 0 2.000 0 1.800 0 2.214 3 1.900 0 2.428 6 1.900 0 1.928 -.100 6 1.600 0 1.219 1.928 6 1.291 2.000 0 1.833 3 .731 .745 pvalu Interpreta e tion 1.00 Reject Ho .000 0 1.00 Reject Ho .000 0 Accept Ho .028 2.359 Accept Ho .029 2.363 Accept Ho .050 2.075 Accept Ho .070 1.953 Reject Ho -.103 .919 .921 .236 .210 .473 .465 Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho tvalu e

A. Talk about politics with parents at home B. Talk with friends about politics and society C. Discuss politics in school and the classroom D. Read daily and weekly newspapers, news websites and other online news source E. Watch local or international (cable) news

Taiwane se F. Keep yourself informed and up Chinese to date about political issues in Taiwan (For Taiwanese respondents) and China (For Taiwane Chinese Respondents) se

G. Follow local politics in the Philippines H. Follow the development of the conflict between China and Taiwan I. Follow other international issues that concern China or Taiwan (eg. News on Foreign Policy) Total Mean

Chinese Taiwane se Chinese Taiwane se Chinese Taiwane se Chinese Taiwan ese

2.100 0 2.071 4 2.100 0 1.571 4 2.000 0 1.785 7 1.93 1.96

.103 .100 2.380 2.339 1.163 1.143

.919 .921 .026

Reject Ho Reject Ho

Acce pt Ho Acc .031 ept Ho Reject Ho .257 .268 Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho

Based on the above table, both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents exhibits intermediate scores and no general significant difference on how they talk, discuss, garner information and follow news about politics. However, there slight variation on how Chinese and Taiwanese respondents follow the development on conflict between China and Taiwan, the latter put more interest on it than the former.

Table 9: What are the current issues in Taiwan (for Taiwanese Respondents) and in China (for Chinese Respondents) that for you is the most important down from the least important (rank the following based on their degree of importance for you, 1-highest 6lowest) DECISION Reject Ho

Economy, trade and business

Nationality Chinese

Mean 3.5556

t-value 1.527

sig .142

Taiwanese Government and politics, corruption, Foreign policy; Taiwans independence from China or Chinas claim to Taiwan etc. Environment, global warming, climate change Society, poverty, crime, social divides Culture, art, lifestyle and leisure Chinese Taiwanese Chinese Taiwanese Chinese Taiwanese Chinese Taiwanese Chinese Taiwanese

2.3077 3.5556 3.3333 3.7778 3.7500 4.4444 2.3333 2.8889 3.3333 3.5556 3.5000

1.450 .265 .268 .029 .028 2.817 2.864 -.612 -.615 .070 .071

.169 Reject Ho .794 Reject Ho

.792 Reject Ho .977 .978 .011 .010 .548 Reject Ho Reject Ho Accept Ho Accept Ho Reject Ho

.546 Reject Ho .945 Reject Ho

.944 Reject Ho

Based on the table above, Taiwanese respondents ranked economy, trade and business as the most important issue in Taiwan today, closely followed by Environment, global warming and climate change. Government, politics and corruption and Society, Poverty and Social Divides tied with the same average mean of 3.33. Foreign policy issues particularly cross-strait conflict ranked the lowest with 3.7 average mean. On the other hand, Chinese respodents ranked Socieym poverty, crime and social divided as the most pressing issue on China today, closely followed by Economy, Trade and Business and Government, Politics and Corruption with the same average mean of 3.5. Foreign policy (cross-strait conflict and realtions) ranked as second to the very least important issue which is Environment Global Warming and Climate Change for Chinese respondents. In summary, there is yet again no significant difference on the data derived from both of the respondents. Table 10: In China and Philippines foreign relations (for Chinese Respondents) and Taiwan and Philippines foreign relations (for Taiwanese respondents), which do you think is the most down to the

least important areas of cooperation that shall be addressed by both countries? (Rank the following, 1- most important 5- least important) tDECISION Nationalit valu y N Mean e Sig Trades, Business and Investment Chinese Reject Ho 2.300 10 1.07 .297 0 6 Taiwanes Reject Ho 3.000 e 9 1.07 .297 0 6 Human Rights, Democracy. Chinese 3.111 Reject Ho 9 .667 .514 1 Taiwanes 2.600 Reject Ho 10 .672 .510 e 0 Foreign policy Security Issue; Chinese 2.600 Reject Ho 10 -.126 .901 Spratly Issues, One 0 China Policy etc Taiwanes 2.700 Reject Ho 10 -.126 .901 e 0 Environment, global warming, Chinese 4.000 Reject Ho 9 .725 .479 climate change 0 Taiwanes 3.444 Reject Ho 9 .725 .479 e 4 Labor Migration (ei. OFW, Chinese Reject Ho 3.333 Chinese/Taiwanese 9 1.40 .178 3 8 expats etc.) Taiwanes Reject Ho 4.555 e 9 1.40 .180 6 8 Cultural cooperation Chinese Reject Ho 2.777 9 1.41 .176 8 4 Taiwanes Reject Ho 3.888 e 9 1.41 .177 9 4 Based on the table, Chinese respondents ranked Trade, Business and Investment as the most important area of cooperation between their respective country and the Philippines while Taiwanese respondents ranked Human Rights and Democracy. For Chinese respondents Trade, Business and Investment is closely followed by Foreign Policy and Security issues, Cultural Cooperation, Human Rights and Democracy, Cultural Cooperation, Labor

Migration and lastly Environment, Global Warming and Climate Change, while for Taiwanese respodents, Human Rights and Democracy is closely followed by Foreign Policy and Security issues (same to Chinese), Trade, Business and Investment, Environment and Global Warming, Cultural Cooperation and lastly, Labor Migration. It is important to note that both of the Chinese and Taiwanese respondents ranked Labor Migration as a least important area of cooperation between their respective county and the Philippines. Interestingly, Table 11 reveals that there is great propensity for both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents to engage in political actions. Table 11: On the list are some political actions that people engage in, please tell me if you have done, might do or will never do the following nationality Total Chines taiwan e ese 0 2 2 8 7 15 2 3 5 0 1 1 5 7 12 5 4 9 0 7 3 4 6 1 6 3 1 5 6 7 5 0 7 5 1 12 9 11 11 1 13 8

A.

Signing in petition Joining in Boycotts Attending Lawful Demonstrations Joining unofficial strikes Occupy building or factories

B.

C.

have done might do Never have done might do Never have done might do Never have done might do Never have done might do Never

D.

E.

Table 12 shows that Democratic Progressive Party garners the most support from Taiwanese respondents followed closely by the ruling party

Kuomintang. Table 13 reveals that an overwhelming majority of Chinese respondent support the Communist Party of China. Table 12: (For Taiwanese respondents) Which of the following political parties do you follow/support? Freq uenc y Percent Valid kuominta ng Dpp Npsu None Total Missing System Total 3 5 2 3 13 11 24 12.5 20.8 8.3 12.5 54.2 45.8 100.0

Table 13: (For Chinese Respondents) Do you follow or support the Communist Party of China? Freque ncy Percent 8 33.3 2 8.3 1 11 13 24 4.2 45.8 54.2 100.0

Valid

yes no i dont know Total Missing System Total

In summary, under the indicator Interest in Formal Politics, it can be concluded that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents exhibit an average/intermediate interest in actively engaging itself in the political system.

B. Support for Liberal Democratic Values and Attitudes/Socialist and Communist Vales and Attitudes

As a system dimension of political culture, the respondents support for Liberal Democratic/Socialist and Communist values and attitudes are presented by Table 14 and 15 below. Interestingly, Table 14 reveals that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents have very strong agreement/support for Liberal and Democratic Values. Chinese respondents very strongly agree to the belief that every person must be given equal access and equal protection of the law it was contrasted by their partial agreement on the belief that Everyone has the right to express their sentiments and convictions (on the streets or and other venues) against the government or policies of the government, meanwhile, Taiwanese respondents very strongly agree on their beliefs on the importance of Compromise and Free and Fair elections in a society and county. It was contrasted by their partial agreement on the belief that a vibrant opposition is good for the country/society. Table 15 shows a strong (yet not very) agreement of Chinese respondents to Communist and Socialist values and attitudes as attested by the total mean of 2.14. Table 14: Please tell me the degree of your agreement or disagreement to the following statements. Encircle the number that corresponds to your answer. nationalit y 1. An individual shall be given Chinese freedom to live his life according to his will provided that it does not step taiwanes on (harm) the rights of the e others 2. Every person must be given Chinese equal access and equal protection of taiwanes the law e 3. We must uphold the Chinese supremacy of our democratic laws. Every individual must follow the law at all times. taiwanes e 4. Every individual has the right Chinese Mean 1.600 0 1.642 9 tpvalue value -.142 -.144 .888 Reject Ho .887 .141 .106 .767 .761 Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho .300 .308 .192 Decision Reject Ho

1.200 0 1.526 1.642 9 1.693 1.800 0 1.714 3 1.700

.849 Reject Ho

to express his opinion. 5. Everyone has the right to express their sentiments and convictions (on the streets or and other venues) against the government or policies of the government. 6. A vibrant opposition is good for the country/good for society.

taiwanes e Chinese

0 1.642 9 2.300 0

.196 .905 .946 -.841 -.935 .209 .210 .386

.847 .375 .354 .409 .361 .836 .836 .703

Reject Ho Reject Ho

taiwanes e Chinese taiwanes e Chinese

2.000 0 2.200 0 2.571 4 2.000 0 1.928 6 1.900 0 1.785 7 1.700 0 1.714 3 1.800 0 1.642 9 1.800 0 1.571 4 1.800 0 1.928 6 1.700 0

Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho

7. Every individual has the right to follow and exercise their own religious convictions or the lack of it. taiwanes e 8. Every citizen has the right to Chinese join or form political parties, civic organizations, labor union and other organizations that may oppose taiwanes or check the abuses of the e government. 9. Every individual has the right Chinese to life, liberty and property. It must be protected at all times. taiwanes e 10. Every citizen has the right to Chinese elect their government taiwanes representative. e 11. Free and fair elections are Chinese important. It is good for society and the taiwanes country. e 12. A free and uncensored Chinese press/media is important and is good for society and the country. taiwanes e 13. Economic development can Chinese be achieved through opening

Reject Ho .409 -.045 -.047 .497 .492 .717 .754 -.338 -.368 -.905 .687 Reject Ho .965 .963 .624 .628 .481 .459 .738 .716 Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho

.375 Reject Ho

up our market and joining in free trade. 14. A persons views and preferences must be respected even though it contradicts the opinion of the majority. 15. Even if you are right in a political argument, you should try to achieve a compromise. Total Mean

taiwanes e Chinese taiwanes e Chinese taiwanes e Chinese Taiwane se

2.000 0 1.004 2.000 0 2.071 4 -.177 -.193

.327 .861 .849 .043 .038

Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho

2.200 2.144 0 1.571 2.211 4 1,66 1.82

Table 15: (For Chinese Respondents Only) N 1. Goods and services must be equally distributed in society. 2. States wealth and resources must be equally distributed to all people in the society. 3. Housing ,recreational facilities, health, education, sport, cultural activities, and livable income must be available to all and are equally distributed 4. Every citizen must actively participate in the workplace and community assemblies. 5. There must be no division 10 Mean 2.100 0 1.700 0 1.666 7

10

10

2.100 0 2.500

10

between rich and the poor. 6. Strict discipline must be exercised in following the rules and policies of the Communist Party and National Peoples Congress. 7. The economy must be governed by a central authority. Decision with regards to business and trade must emanate from these central economic planners. 8. There must be strict adherence to the norms and culture of the society. 9. The collective interest is greater than my. own personal want. Total Mean

0 10 2.300 0

10

2.300 0

10

2.100 0 2.500 0 2.14

10

In summary, both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents score high in the system dimension of political culture. C. Satisfaction with the Status of the Present Form of Government and Trust in Institutions This is the last indicator of political culture which comprised of the output dimension of political system. Table 18 reveals that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents are satisfied with the present status of their respective governments and its forms. Likewise, both of the respondents exhibit a slightly average political efficacy as shown in question number 5, 6, 7. Table 16: nationalit y 1. (For Taiwanese Respondents) Are you satisfied with the present status of Taiwans government? Chinese N 0(a) 14 Mean . 2.357 tvalue sig

taiwanes

2. (For Taiwanese respondents): Are you satisfied with democracy in Taiwan? 3. (For Chinese Respondents) Are you satisfied with the present status of Chinas government? 4. (For Chinese Respondents) Are you satisfied with the present form of government (Communist/Socialist, State Capitalism etc.) of the Peoples Republic of China? 5. Nothing I do seems to have any effect upon what happens in Philippine politics.

e Chinese taiwanes e Chinese

1 0(a) 14 . 1.928 6 1.857 1 3.223 3.333 3 3.488 2.125 0 .012

taiwanes e Chinese

.020

taiwanes e Chinese taiwanes e Chinese

0(a)

. 2.500 0 2.500 0 2.625 0 2.500 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 .770 .770

8 8 8 8

.000 .000 .298 .298

6. I dont believe that politicians care a lot about what people like taiwanes me think e 7. In our country there are a few powerful people; all the others have no influence on what the government does. Chinese

8 taiwanes e

3.000 1.821 0 2.250 1.821 0

.090

.092

Table 17 and 18 indicate the trust rating of Taiwanese and Chinese respondents on different institutions in their respective country. Both of the respondents ranked Family as the number one most trusted institution, followed by Army and Police (for Taiwanese) and Peoples Liberation Army (for

Chinese). Interestingly, Taiwanese respondents ranked their President and Chinese ranked state media as their least trusted institution. The level of trust of Chinese and Taiwanese respondents to their institutions are on the same level with total means of 2.25 and 2,17, respectively.

Table 17: Please rate the following institutions according to how you trust each of them. For Taiwanese Respondents Mini Maxim Interpreta Rank N mum um Mean tion 1. President 13 1.00 5.00 2.6154 15 2. Premiere 14 1.00 4.00 2.3571 11 3. Legislative Yuan 14 1.00 3.00 2.2857 9 4. Political Parties 14 1.00 3.00 2.3571 11 5. Judicial Yuan 13 1.00 3.00 2.2308 8 6. Control Yuan 14 1.00 3.00 2.2143 4.5 7. Examination Yuan 14 1.00 4.00 2.2857 13 8. Army 14 1.00 3.00 1.9286 2.5 9. Police 14 1.00 5.00 1.9286 2.5 10. Media 14 2.00 4.00 2.9286 16 11. Labor Unions 14 1.00 3.00 2.3571 14 12. Non-governmental 6.5 14 1.00 3.00 2.1429 Organizations 13. Family 14 1.00 3.00 1.7857 1 14. Church 14 1.00 4.00 2.2143 4.5 15. Corporations and 11 other large 14 1.00 4.00 2.3571 companies 16. Religious and 6.5 charitable 14 1.00 3.00 2.1429 institutions Total Mean 2.25

Table 18: Please rate the following institutions according to how you trust each of them. For Chinese Respondents Minim Maxi Mean Interpretati Rank

1. President 2. Communist Party of China 3. Politburo 4. Peoples Liberation Army 5. National Peoples Congress 6. State Council 7. Central Military Commission 8. Supreme Peoples Court 9. Supreme Peoples Procuratorate 10. Family 11. Private Corporations and Businesses 12. States Owned Corporations 13. Non Governmental Organizations 14. Religious and charitable Organizations 15. States Media Total Mean

um mum 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 5.00

on 1.9000 2.3000 2.2000 1.7000 2.5000 2.3000 1.9000 2.2000 2.2000 1.6000 2.1000 2.0000 2.7000 2.2222 2.8000 2.17 3.5 11.5 7 2 13 11.5 3.5 7 7 1 6 5 14 10 15

In summary, Chinese and Taiwanese respondents both scored high on the output dimension of political culture. D. Synthesis for Political Culture Computing their scores based on the three indicators of political culture, it can be said that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents fall under the Subject political culture. This kind of political culture rank high for both the system and output dimension but ranks lower to input dimension. Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations Among the possible courses of action to resolve cross-strait dispute, Chinese and Taiwanese respondents diverge on 1) Acceptance of the principle

of One China Two Systems, 2) Two China, Two Systems (or Independent China and Independent Taiwan), 3) Maintenance of the status quo and move toward
independence of Taiwan in the future, 4). Mediation by United Nation and 5) Mediation by United States of America. On the other hand, they converge on 1) disagreement on the use of Military Solution, 2) Maintainance of the status quo and move toward unification of China and Taiwan in the future and 3) Maintainance of the status quo and decide either unification or independence in the future. Table 19 shows an in depth analysis of the results. Table 19: Please tell me the degree of your agreement or disagreement to the following proposed course of actions to resolve the dispute between China and Taiwan? A. Military Solution
nationality Chinese N 10 taiwanese 14 3.6429 -.289 .776 Mean 3.5000 t-value -.287 sig .777 Interpretat ion

Reject Ho Reject Ho
Accept Ho

B. Acceptance of the principle of One China Two Systems or Taiwan will become an autonomous region or province of China (similar to Hong Kong and Macau) C. China is independent. Taiwan is independent. (Acceptance of the principles of Two China. Two systems or China abandoning its claim to Taiwan) D. Maintain the status quo and move toward unification of China and Taiwan in the future

Chinese 10 2.0000 -3.507 .002

taiwanese 14 Chinese 10 3.3000 2.811 .010 3.3571 -3.637 .001

Accept Ho

Accept Ho

taiwanese 14 chinese 10 taiwanese 14 2.7857 3.5000 -1.286 3.846 .212 .001 2.2000 -1.212 .238 1.8571 2.745 .013

Accept Ho

Reject Ho Reject Ho
Accept Ho

E. Maintain the status quo and move toward independence of Taiwan in

Chinese

10

the future
taiwanese chinese F. Just Maintain the status quo and decide either unification or independence in the future taiwanese 14 2.6429 1.459 .159 14 1.9286 3.625 .002 Accept Ho

10

3.2000

1.383

.180

Reject Ho Reject Ho
Accept Ho

G.Mediation by United Nation and other international organization organizations. H.Mediation by the United States of America and/or other countries.

chinese 10 taiwanese chinese 10 taiwanese 14 4.3000 2.3571 4.767 4.818 .000 .000 4.0000 4.505 .000

13

2.2308

4.244

.001

Accept Ho Accept Ho

Accept Ho

Table 20 shows that both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents perceived the proposition an increasing economic dependence of Taiwan to China will eventually lead to unification of the two countries in the future with slight uncertainty as attested by their means, 2.9 and 2.42, respectively. On the other hand, both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents favor the move to open up the boarders of China and Taiwan for more Chinese and Taiwanese tourists and visitors thereby increasing cultural ties of the two countries. However, they are again slightly uncertain when asked if they agree that increasing cultural and economic ties between China and Taiwan are both beneficial to both countries and will lead to an improved cross-strait relation. Lastly, both Chinese and Taiwanese respondents exhibit optimism that the
future of the conflict between China and Taiwan will get better in the years to come. However, they differ on their perception that the conflict will be peacefully resolved in the foreseeable future. Chinese respondents tend to be more optimistic than the Taiwanese respondents, as attested by their means, 1.4 and 2.4 respectively.
Table 20: Decision , Nationality Chinese N 10 Mean 2.9000 t-value 1.083 sig .291

1. Please indicate the level of your

Reject

agreement/disagreement to this statement: An increasing economic dependence of Taiwan to China will eventually lead to unification of the two countries in the future? 2. Do you favor the move to open up the boarders of China and Taiwan for more Chinese and Taiwanese tourists and visitors thereby strengthening the social and cultural ties of the two countries? 3. Please indicate the level of agreement and disagreement to this statement: Strengthened economic and cultural ties between China and Taiwan are both beneficial and will lead to an improved relation of the two countries. 4. Are you optimistic that the future of the conflict between China and Taiwan will get better in the years to come?

Ho
Taiwanese 14 chinese 10 taiwanese 14 chinese 10 taiwanese 14 chinese 10 taiwanese 14 2.0000 -1.179 .253 1.6000 -1.194 .245 2.4286 -.262 .797 2.3000 -.278 .784 2.3571 -.527 .605 2.1000 -.549 .588 2.4286 1.068 .299

Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho

Accept Ho

5. Do you think that the conflict between China and Taiwan will be peacefully resolved in the foreseeable future?

chinese 10 taiwanese 1.4000 -2.760 .011

14

2.4286

-2.811

.011

Conclusion This paper reveals that although Chinese and Taiwanese international students in Metro Manila possess distinct national and ethnic identities, they seem to have shared the same political culture which might explain the convergence and divergence of their perspectives on cross-strait relations and conflict. However, the data presented here are only a portion of what are needed to be discussed and analyzed in order to thoroughly prove the theoretical framework devised by the researcher. Likewise, the statistical techniques

employed are not sufficient to prove these theoretical claims. Thus, this study is of introductory and exploratory nature.

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