Ajp 4

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
ALLIED JOINT LOGISTIC DOCTRINE AJP-4
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4
AJP-4
ALLIED JOINT LOGISTIC DOCTRINE
JULY 1999
I ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
II ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS) NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION
July 1999
1. AJP-4 - ALLIED JOINT LOGISTIC DOCTRINE is a NATO UNCLASSIFIFD publication. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2182. 2 AJP-4 is effective upon receipt.
A. GRONHEIM Major-General, NOAF Chairman, MAS
III ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

RECORD OF CHANGES
Change Date
Date Entered
Effective Date
By Whom Entered
IV ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
Response Date: 4.01.99 STANAG 2182 (Edition 1) RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS STADE DE RATIFICATION ET DE MISE EN APPLICATION
ALLIED JOINT LOGISTIC DOCTRINE - AJP-4 NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION/MISE EN APPLICATION IMPLEMENTING INTENDED DATE OF DATE IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENT/ IMPLEMENTATION/ WAS ACHIEVED/ DATE PREVUE POUR MISE DATE REELLE DE MISE EN DOCUMENT EN APPLICATION APPLICATION NATIONAL DE MISE EN NAVY ARMY AIR NAVY ARMY AIR APPLICATION MER TERRE MER TERRE GSA 99/3865 IF 134 DOP DOP DOP of/du 18.01.99 + + + 6M 6M 6M 2441-2182 (J4 Log Doc 3-2) STANAG 1.99 1.99 1.99 of/du 26.11.98 NATIONAL RATIFICATION REFERENCE DE LA RATIFICATION NATIONALE 9806410-007 of/du 12.01.99
NATION
BE *
CA CZ DA* FR GE*
F SVI Az 31-10-05-40 of/du 4.01.99 FN.060/1/121194/E.193 of/du 05.03.99
STANAG
GR
DOP + 6M DOP + 6M 10.99
DOP + 6M DOP + 6M 10.99
DOP + 6M DOP + 6M 10.99
HU IT LU NL* NO
143/40318/2-4522-2182 of/du 29.04.99 IAS/1999/6694/NU of/du 11.03.99 MAS-1/99/HGDEFCOM NOR/OPS/ST2182 of/du 7.01.99
AJP-4
AJP-4 DOP + 2M DOP + 2M DOP + 2M
DOP
DOP
DOP
PL PO SP TU*
NOROPE: 065/2182/011D of/du 06.09.99 Gn.P.P:2307-57-99/And.D. MAS.S./2182 of/du 5.02.99 D Def Sys/330/182/NMST of/du 9.04.99 SAUS-IA-DSA-A Of/du 26.10.99
AJP-4 HAVSTANEM 805-1 AJP-4 JP 4-08 DOP + 6M DOP + 6M
10.99
10.99
10.99
UK US
DOP DOP
DOP DOP
DOP DOP
* See reservations overleaf/Voir rserves au verso

V ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
+ See comments overleaf/Voir commentaires au verso X Service(s) implementing/Armes mettant en application
VI ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
RESERVATIONS BE: If the principle of a Logistics Evaluation and Assessment (LEAP) is generally acceptable, the implementation terms and the scope are no clearly defined. Consequently, Belgium reserves the right not to implement Chapter 2, Section V. Denmark has reservations to the Joint Rear Area Component Command (JRACC). Ratification of this area will await the development of a BI-MNC Rear Area Doctrine, in order to ensure that operational logistic doctrines are developed fully to complement each other. 1. GE does not yet support using the term "Joint Rear Area Component Command" for NATO's operational concepts, doctrine or plans (AJP-4, Page 1-6, Paragraph 0107.e.). Rationale: NATO's "Joint Rear Area Concept" hitherto is not agreed by Germany and other nations as well. 2. GE does not support the assignment of logistic organisations/units under control of a MJLC (AJP-4.4, Page 1-24, Paragraph 0112.c.(3)(c)). Rationale: The MJLC has no command function. The command authority over logistic forces assigned to a multinational role normally rests with the Regional/ CJTF Commander, a Component Commander or a national commander of a lead nation/role specialist nation. If required, the MJLC may be authorised to task these units on behalf of the respective commander within the MJLC's area of responsibility. 3. GE does not support the requirement for a "dedicated medical communications system" (AJP-4, Page 3-13, Paragraph 0323.e.). Rationale: The information exchange for all military functions, including the provision of dedicated channels for specific purposes, should be accomplished within the capacities of a common user communications system (e.g. ACCIS/LOGFASS). NL/ The Netherlands reserves its position on all references to rear area operations and related command and control. At this moment, there is not yet an agreed concept for rear area operations. Also MAS decided to include such concept in AJP-01. a. Turkey will use the undermentioned names as: Cyprus: Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Republic of Macedonia. Page 1-18, para. (4)(a) second sentence to be changed as follows: "in Article 5 operations, contracts are to be prepared and awarded by related external forces under HNN assistance.
DA:
GE:
TU:
b.
VII ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-4
VIII ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-4
FOREWORD The successful planning, execution and support of military operations requires a clearly understood doctrine, and this is especially important when operations are to be conducted by Allied, multinational or coalition forces. Allied Joint Publication-01 (AJP-01) provides the capstone doctrine for the planning, execution and support of Allied joint operations. Although AJP-01 is intended primarily for NATO forces, the doctrine could be applied, with adaptations where necessary and agreed by participating nations, for operations under the umbrella of the Western European Union, or a coalition of NATO and non-NATO nations within the framework of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Thus no distinctions are drawn within the document between solely NATO operations, non-Article 5 operations by Allied forces and CJTF operations. AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine is one of the most significant accomplishments in the area of NATO Logistic publications during the past two years. The initial outline for the document was developed at the BI-MNC Logistic Co-ordination Board Meeting in November 1996. Drafts were distributed in May and October of 1997, and comments were discussed and incorporated into each follow-on draft. The Co-ordination Draft of the AJP-4 was distributed at the Jan 98 Logistic Staff Meeting (LSM), in order to provide an opportunity for review prior to the April 98 Senior NATO Logisticians Conference (SNLC). This third and latest draft was distributed at the SNLC for national review under silence procedure. Inputs from Nations were straightforward improvements, easily incorporated without disrupting the core doctrine that NATO and National logisticians so fiercely agreed upon. The result is this AJP-4 dated September 1998 for official distribution by the MAS and ratification by the Nations. Ratification was achieved in April 1999. AJP-4 is emergent NATO Logistics Doctrine emphasising multinational support. IFOR brought a ground swell within the policy and logistics communities to develop joint and combined logistic doctrine for NATO, expanding beyond simply national self-support policies. With all the nations having downsized their Combat Service Support (CSS), NATO would have to accept some level of multinational logistics in order to support Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. To encourage a sense of ownership, nations and subordinate commands participated in developing the outline and all three formal AJP-4 draft publications distributed in the past months. We are extremely grateful for your contributions and insights that have allowed us to expeditiously produce AJP-4. The best innovations in this new AJP-4 Multinational Logistic Doctrine are: NATO co-ordination of multinational logistics (but only in functional areas where it makes sense and creates efficiencies, i.e., Movements & Transportation, Medical, Allied-Joint Support, Host Nation Support (HNS), Central Contracting and Infrastructure Engineering). Article 5 or Non-Article 5 Support Options (i.e., Role Specialisation, Lead Nation and National Stovepipe Support) and Support Enablers (i.e., HNS, Mutual Support Arrangements, In-Country Resourcing, and Centralised Contracting).
IX
AJP-4
Logistics C2 under the CJTF (i.e., Standing Up a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC)). MJLC is no longer a concept, it is doctrine. Logistic Forces under the CJTF (National versus Multinational Integrated Logistic support Units - MILUs). NATO Co-ordination and Co-operation (with the WEU, UN, OSCE, NGOs and PfP countries).
Of note was the co-operation between the MAS and the Strategic Commands (SCs) in the development of this new multinational logistic doctrine. As a matter of course, AJP-4 (Jan 98) is already accepted and used in NATO and PfP countries. In fact, we have seen whole sections of AJP-4 lifted into an Apr 98 U.S. Joint Staff Initial Draft Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations. If it is to be useful, AJP-4 has to be a living document and be amended regularly. Under the auspices of the BI-SC Logistics Co-ordination Board (Bi-SC LCB), AJP-4 will be reviewed and the contents updated annually, aware that new concepts regularly emerge. Therefore, change proposals are welcome anytime. They can be sent to either SC Logistics Branch for consideration during the annual review and editing conference.
AJP-4 -TABLE OF CONTENT
CHAPTER 1 - THE ALLIANCES CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT Section I - Introduction

Introduction Purpose Applicability / Scope Principles Page 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-2
Section II - NATOs Logistic Support Concept

Vision Outline of NATO Logistic Support Concept Roles and Responsibilities Logistic Support Considerations 1-5 1-5 1-9 1-14
Section III - Combined and Joint Logistic Command and Control

Introduction Operational Considerations Command, Control and Co-ordination Modular MJLC Structure (Figure 1-1) Modular Joint Rear Area Component Command Structure (Figure 1-2) Logistic C2 Information Systems 1-20 1-21 1-22 1-29 1-30 1-30
Appendix A - Roles and Responsibilities

1-33
CHAPTER 2 - LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANNING Section I - Introduction

Introduction Capabilities References 2-1 2-1 2-1
Section II - Logistic Planning within Alliance Defence Planning

Section Overview Defence Planning Defence Planning Disciplines Force Planning Logistics Planning Armaments, Resource and CIS Planning Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Capability Packages (CP)
XI
2-3 2-3 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-7 2-7 2-7
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED Relationship between Defence Planning and Operational Planning AJP-4 2-7
Section III - Logistic Force Generation

Introduction NATO Precautionary System Mission-Related Force Generation in Peacetime Force Identification System (FIDS) Selected Participation Logistic C2 Structure Earmarked Logistic Task Force
Page 2-8 2-8 2-8 2-8 2-9 2-9 2-10
Section IV - Logistics Support Planning for Operations and Exercises

Planning Process Co-ordination of the Planning Process Objective NATO Operational Planning Process (OPP) Logistic Support Planning Product Harmonisation and Transparency Movement Planning for Operations and Exercises Deployment Planning Process (Figure 2-1) Medical Planning for Operations and Exercises Role of HNS in Logistic Support Planning Funding Participation of Non-NATO Nations Logistic Planning Conferences Product of the Logistic Planning Conferences Concluding the Campaign Exercise Planning Exercise Reporting 2-10 2-10 2-10 2-11 2-11 2-11 2-12 2-13 2-14 2-15 2-16 2-16 2-17 2-19 2-19 2-20 2-21
Section V - Logistic Assessment and Evaluation

Introduction Logistic Evaluation and Assessment Programme (LEAP) 2-21 2-21
Section VI - NATO-Owned Equipment

Introduction Accountability Disposition 2-23 2-23 2-23
CHAPTER 3 - LOGISTIC FUNCTIONAL AREAS Section I - Introduction Section II - Supply, Maintenance and Repair
XII
3-1
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Supply, Maintenance and Repair 3-1
Civil Resources and Dual Use Classes of Supply Provision of Supplies Supplies Suited for Multinational Provisions Support Suited for Multinational Provision (Table 3-1) Maintenance and Repair Battle Damage Repair Cross Servicing Asset Tracking Standardisation Stock Level Management Supply Systems and Replenishment Supply Procedures POL
Page 3-1 3-1 3-2 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-4 3-5 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-7 3-8 3-8
Section III - Movement and Transportation

General Levels of Mobility Modes of Transport Tasks and Responsibilities Communications and ADP Support 3-10 3-10 3-10 3-12 3-12
Section IV - Medical
General Medical Support Doctrine Medical Co-ordination Evacuation Aeromedical Evacuation 3-12 3-12 3-13 3-14 3-14
Section V - Contracting
General Host Nation NATO Co-ordination Functions Funding Organisation Contracting Concept (Figure 3-1) 3-15 3-16 3-16 3-16 3-16 3-17 3-18
Section VI - Budget and Finance

Introduction
XIII
3-18 NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED General Sources of Funding Funding Considerations Procedures Organisation and Responsibilities AJP-4 3-18 3-18 3-19 3-19 3-19
Section VII - Infrastructure Engineering

General NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) Capability Package Host Nation Support Contract Support NATO Operational Infrastructure Engineering Engineering Co-ordination Centre (ECC) Organisation (Figure 3-2)
Page 3-20 3-20 3-20 3-21 3-21 3-22
Section VIII - Real Estate

General Functions Responsibilities Property Condition Standards Procedures Organisations 3-22 3-22 3-23 3-23 3-23 3-24
CHAPTER 4 - CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION Section I - Introduction

Authorities Structures Generic Agreements Mutual Support Agreement (MSA) 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1
Section II - Partnership for Peace (PfP)

Introduction PfP Structure The Partnership Co-ordination Cell Interoperability in PfP Logistic Relations with Co-operation Partners Logistic PfP Activities 4-2 4-2 4-3 4-3 4-4 4-4
Section III - Relationship with the Western European Union (WEU)

Background WEU Planning Cell Logistic Co-operation of NATO with the WEU Logistic Co-operation of the WEU with NATO
XIV
4-5 4-5 4-5 4-5
Section IV - Relationship with the United Nations (UN)

General Concepts of UN Logistic Support System UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) Reimbursement UN Responsibility Supply 4-5 4-6 4-7 4-8 4-8 4-8 Page 4-9 4-9 4-9
Letter of Assist Procurement UN Summary
Section V - Relationship with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
General OSCE Mission NATO Support OSCE Summary 4-9 4-9 4-9 4-10
Section VI - International Organisations

European Security Structure Security Structure Diagram 4-10 4-11
Glossary of Abbreviations
Abbreviations-1
Glossary of Terms & Definitions
Glossary-1
Reference Publications
References-1
XV
CHAPTER 1 THE ALLIANCES CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Section I - Introduction 0101. In response to changing national force structures and NATOs evolving enhanced mission spectrum, and in an effort to optimise effectiveness of limited support forces, NATO logistic and support concepts are changing significantly. Some of the most important differences which we can expect to impact on logistics support operations in the future are: a. The additional logistic and communications support needed to deploy and operate in non-Article 5 operations, separated from Alliance infrastructure. The possible need to integrate non-NATO forces. The need to maximise efficiency and cost effectiveness by considering, when appropriate, the implementation of the concept of multinational joint logistics as outlined in this document.
b. c.
0102. In light of the Alliances New Strategic Concept (MC400/1), CJTF doctrine (MC 389) and NATO Force Structures (MC317), logistics was reviewed and NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics (MC319/1) established. In essence, this review emphasised that nations and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for logistic support of NATOs multinational operations. Prior to this, when nations were solely responsible for logistics, long standing defence plans of NATO territory and robust national logistic force structures, extensively supported through host nation support, allowed for support areas and lines of communications (LOCs) to be allocated to nations. This left NATO with little or no responsibility for logistic support. With the risk now omni-directional and logistic responsibility shared, NATO must develop a logistic support concept and appropriate organisations to facilitate execution of these new responsibilities and tasks. 0103. Purpose. The purpose of this document is to establish NATOs logistic support doctrine. It details NATO logistic principles and policies, with an operational level focus, to foster common understanding and co-operative logistic planning among NATO military authorities (NMA), nations and NATO agencies. This NATO logistic support doctrine is the basis for the conduct of multinational logistic operations and serves to facilitate the NATO commander in the achievement of his mission. 0104. Applicability / Scope. a. This document is applicable to peace and the full spectrum of potential NATO operations (Article 5 as well as non-Article 5) from crisis through conflict. While much of the doctrine is focused toward the more probable scenarios of mid-intensity and peace support operations, the doctrine is equally applicable to other operations. Within 1-1 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 the text of this document, where the type of operation necessitates changes to a significant aspect of the logistic support concept, these differences are highlighted. b. This document is applicable to NATO operations including those conducted in cooperation with the United Nations (UN), the Western European Union (WEU), and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It is also applicable for non-NATO nations participating in NATO led operations. While this publication focuses on the commonly understood areas of logistics such as supply, maintenance, transportation, and medical, significant other areas critical to support of operations are also embodied in this document. Areas such as centralised contracting, infrastructure engineering, real estate management and funding must also be closely co-ordinated with logistics and are therefore included.
c.
0105. Principles. In order for the NATO commander to execute his responsibilities for logistics efficiently, certain logistic principles must be observed. These must be in line with the General Principles for Joint and Combined Operations, as defined in AJP-01(A), and must also be consistent with those logistic principles presented in MC319/1, MC 326 and MC 336/1. Important principles taken from these documents and drawn from NATO operations and experience, developed with an operational focus, are listed below. a. Primacy of Operations. Logistic support must be focused towards ensuring the success of the operation, as defined by the NATO commander. Logistics must function as an effective force multiplier, and it should be seamlessly integrated into the operational structure. One key to achieving this goal is having a clear and unequivocal chain of command and co-ordination, with the NATO commander having clearly defined authority to establish a support organisation tailored to suit the operational situation. Responsibility. Nations and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for logistic support of NATOs multinational operations. This principle builds on the General Principles of Unity of Effort and having a Common Objective on which all operations and efforts must be focused. However, nations retain ultimate responsibility for logistic support of their deployed units, and may elect to maintain full responsibility for such support. Non-NATO nations are not precluded from joining the NATO collective support organisation, but if they do so, they must accept the basic principles outlined herein. Collective responsibility also implies that NATO commanders assume responsibility for the logistic support for assets under their control. Authority. NATO commanders must be given sufficient authority over logistic resources to enable them to employ and sustain forces in the most effective manner. Authority must be aligned with responsibility. Thus, if a NATO commander has been assigned responsibility for operations in a particular theatre or area of operations, he must also be given the authority to prioritise his support so as to ensure he maintains the ability to accomplish his mission. These same authorities and responsibilities should also apply to non-NATO commanders participating in a NATO led operation. Nations may 1-2 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 be expected to limit the extent to which they are prepared to authorise the commander to control national resources, due to either national imperatives or legal restrictions. The extent to which nations limit this authority will depend on national considerations and the type of operation. d. Co-operation. Co-operation, the founding principle of NATO, is also one of the cardinal principles of logistics support, both among individual nations and within NATO. In this context, co-operation is not limited to the transportation and provision of other logistic support, but also includes financing, contracting and engineering. Co-operation is particularly important when operations are conducted in concert with non-NATO nations and requires a clear division of responsibilities, implying in turn a clear understanding both of the various national capabilities, limitations and legal restrictions, as well as the NATO logistic support concepts. In addition, co-operative procedures must be in place to ensure that allies do not compete for scarce resources. Where possible, it is expected that nations will co-operate, either bilaterally or through other cooperative approaches, to optimise the provision and use of limited resources. Cooperation also extends to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and elements of the UN, WEU and/or OSCE, which may operate alongside NATO organisations. Co-ordination. Co-operation at all levels ensures economy of effort, but must be coordinated to be effective. This may require the appointment of national representatives or liaison officers at several levels within the support organisation to ensure that nations are aware of and react appropriately to both national and NATO priorities, and that such priorities are harmonised. Provision and Sufficiency. MC 319/1 shows Provision and Sufficiency as separate principles, however, they are closely linked. Nations must ensure, either individually or through co-operative arrangements, the provision of adequate logistic resources to support their forces allocated to or operating with NATO during peace, crisis and conflict. This also applies to non-NATO nations working with NATO in combined operations. There are a variety of mechanisms through which support may be provided, including multinational and bilateral agreements/arrangements which are defined in greater detail later in this chapter. At the same time, national levels of logistic resources must be sufficient to achieve designated standards of readiness, sustainability and mobility to provide the required military capability during peace, crisis and conflict. Any support structure must recognise the fact that the availability of material stocks and tactical and strategic lift assets may be a constraint. Flexibility. Operational plans must be established with the knowledge that unexpected events will dictate changes to the plan and concept of execution. As a result, flexibility is important particularly when developing logistic plans, which must respond quickly and efficiently to even minor changes in the operational scenario. Further, no single support concept will suit all situations; concepts must allow for unexpected or unusual scenarios. For instance, despite the advantages often provided through multinational logistics, it is possible that the most appropriate support concept for a particular operation may be 1-3 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
e.
f.
g.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 through national support structures, the logistic concept must be flexible enough to allow for this. Thus, formal structures and plans must be developed generically, with sufficient flexibility built-in to allow tailoring to match the changing requirements of different theatres or missions. h. Simplicity. Simple plans and orders, and uncomplicated mission-oriented logistic organisations minimise confusion and help ensure the support provided meets the operational commanders requirements. Further, simple reporting mechanisms ensure the accurate and efficient dissemination of information to all those who require it. Timeliness. Developing and implementing an effective logistic framework requires considerable planning and co-ordination between NATO and nations. Since the most critical phase of logistic execution is deployment and initial operational set-up, it is essential that national and multinational logistic command and control elements and enabling forces be approved and in place well before deployment begins. Economy. Logistic assets are often expensive and in short supply. Accordingly, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that they are used in the most effective and efficient manner possible, keeping in mind operational imperatives. This includes ensuring that in-theatre stocks are maintained at the minimum level commensurate with the expected operational tempo, capability of lines of communications, and expected lead times. Mutual support structures and mechanisms, such as multinational logistic organisations and HNS, should be in place to achieve economies of scale, increase reserve capacity/capability and improve the overall quality support. The goal is to achieve these advantages while simultaneously minimising procurement and operational costs. Visibility. Prior to an operation, the NATO commander must have access to information which relates to preparedness, deployability, and sustainability of units that will come under his command. This requirement will extend to national logistic assets when they are designated to provide logistic support to declared units. In preparation for an operation the NATO commander must have access to information on the status of all assets under his control, including, in the case of equipment temporarily out of commission, an appreciation of the time to repair. He must develop a clear and accurate picture of available logistic infrastructure. This requires a complete and easily interpreted logistic reporting mechanism which takes advantage of the potential offered through state of the art ADP support. It also requires the capability of easily passing information between military and civilian national and NATO authorities. Additionally, as a means to gain necessary visibility of critical assets, the NATO commander is authorised to require reports and inspection of specified logistic assets as a method of tactical evaluation or to assess operational readiness in accordance with MC 319/1. Synergy. Not a principle per se, synergy is the expanded benefit achieved by applying logistic principles simultaneously. Synergy results when nations contribute to a common goal with the net benefit being greater than the sum of the separate contributions. To be 1-4 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
i.
j.
k.
l.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 truly effective, any multinational organisation must build upon the strengths of the component parts. Multinational logistic support in the overall concept should be oriented to the particular logistic strengths of the Contributing Nations (CNs). This serves to provide more efficient support to the overall force and thereby creates a more robust logistic concept. An effective multinational logistic concept requires that NATO planners and CNs recognise this synergy and the resulting net benefits. Without an obvious net benefit, nations will be less willing to participate at optimal levels. Section II - NATOs Logistic Support Concept 0106. Vision. NATOs logistic support concept will meet the demands of the joint commanders operational concept, assist in exploiting operational success, and achieve efficiencies and economies of scale resulting from the effective co-ordination of national logistic elements and integration of multinational logistics. The logistic planner will look to all phases of the operation beginning with deployment through redeployment and will be especially aware of the complex logistic issues surrounding the conclusion of the campaign. During all phases, nations will be ultimately responsible for supporting their own forces by providing their own logistic capabilities, or arranging for this support from other nations or by using local resources. The NATO commander will ensure that the overall force is capable of supporting itself and will co-ordinate support among CNs and with the host nation to ensure this capability. A variety of command and control options and support arrangements are available under NATO's multinational support concept to implement the overall logistic support concept, the essence of these are highlighted below. 0107. Outline of NATO Logistic Support Concept. a. The main principles that underpin the logistic support concept are Co-operation, Coordination, Primacy of Operations, Flexibility, and Synergy. That is to say, the concept must meet the mission, be flexible enough to facilitate a variety of national approaches, take advantage of national strengths and clearly indicate that it is beneficial to both the CNs and NATO authorities. The co-ordination of the logistic effort, and under certain restrictions, authority to negotiate Host Nation agreements/arrangements, and redistribute supplies and equipment, must be balanced with the ultimate responsibility for provisioning of forces remaining with the contributing nation. Nations come to the operation with what is required to support their own forces, or they arrange for it with other nations or through contracts or other arrangements during the planning process. The NATO commander co-ordinates the overall logistic effort to best support his operational plan. This responsibility requires the establishment, within the NATO command and control structure, of co-ordinating bodies to ensure proper co-ordination of the logistic effort. Logistic co-ordination bodies will normally be integral elements of the CJ 4 staff. Extended co-ordination requirements, i.e. field of contracting, real estate management and multinational logistics, may require the establishment of a central co-ordination entity 1-5 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 known as a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC). This generally will apply to Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) operations, particularly if beyond NATOs area of responsibility. d. If a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC) is employed, a clear focus must be maintained to separate the functions of execution and logistic policy. The latter, including the general co-ordination responsibility, remains with the Regional Command (RC)/CJTF CJ 4. In a non-Article 5 scenario, the CJTF may assume responsibility for rear area security, a task normally undertaken by the host nation. This function is usually under the staff supervision of CJ 3. However, it might be appropriate due to geographical considerations to link these functions with logistic functions and to establish a CJTF Joint Rear Area Component Command (JRACC) (Figure 1-2), which includes an operational element and the MJLC, established under the ACOS Support, as its core. Methods to sustain and facilitate the force will be selected from options ranging from purely national support to multinational integrated logistic support controlled by NATO. To ensure that CNs do not compete for resources, the RC/CJTF should be used as a single point of contact for co-ordination and for support from the Host Nation(s) and common contracts as required by mission and scarce resources. In order to effect the co-ordination and potential command of the logistic effort, communications links to National Support Elements (NSE), host nation support elements, the United Nations and non-governmental organisations, as appropriate, is vital. This communication may include the use of liaison elements in addition to established electronic communication means. While the main focus of the NATO commanders responsibility for logistics is a coordination effort, there are instances where Multinational Integrated Logistic support Units (MILU) may be formed to take advantage of economies of scale and to provide maximum support. A variety of types of MILUs may be established as the mission dictates. Examples include multinational transport, engineering, port support or services units. Lead nation principles should be considered in developing these units. Component Support Concepts: While NATOs logistic concept embraces jointness, each component, due to the nature of their missions, has a slightly different approach to implementing the multinational logistic concept. While the specific methods of supporting deployed multinational units do vary, their support requirements are very similar. That is, support elements must be flexible, mobile and responsive to the requirements of the component commander. Where efficiencies can be gained, jointness should be maintained down to the lowest level practicable. In general terms, this means that operational level support elements may have a geographical area of responsibility to provide support to a joint force. At the tactical level, however, support elements will 1-6 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 likely be focused at supporting, on a functional basis, specific component elements. A broad synopsis of the component support concepts is provided below: (1) Maritime. (a) Support to a deployed Multinational Maritime Force (MNMF) has two facets, namely shore support, and afloat support. Afloat support is the responsibility of the commander at sea who controls all assigned logistic assets in the afloat force. Shore support encompasses the logistic activities in direct support of an MNMF. To ensure the appropriate focus, the shore support organisation must be responsive to the afloat commanders requirements. In a large operation, the chain of command from the shore support organisation may be through a separate Multinational Logistic Command - Maritime (MNLC(M)), while in a smaller operation, the shore support commander may report directly to a maritime element embedded in the MJLC. The fundamental precept of the maritime logistic support concept is to provide shore centralised distribution and support sites to support the units at sea. While the concept is flexible and specific capabilities and organisations will be mission dependent, generally it calls for multinational Advanced Logistic Support Sites (ALSSs) that may provide a variety of life support, e.g. supply, distribution, medical, damage repair, in support of the entire force. Smaller, more mobile, Forward Logistic Sites (FLSs), located closer to the supported force, are employed as final distribution points for Personnel, Mail and Cargo (PMC) flowing from the larger, more capable sites. As stated earlier, these support sites may be joint in nature or may be collocated with other component support elements. In all cases, however, they are manned on a multinational basis through national personnel and equipment contributions. Further detail on maritime logistic support concepts and their implementation may be found in ALP 11 Multinational Maritime Force Logistics.
(b)
(2)
Land. (a) In the layout of the battlefield, there must be a clear understanding among the nations that national logistic organisations exist in a multinational framework in support of combined operations. Combined logistics was traditionally described within the context of the various zones of battlefield. On the modern, non-linear battlefield or even during peace support operations, these zones may not be well established or defined. Over the entire spectrum of conflict, modern military operations make flexibility and mobility key aspects of successful operations. 1-7 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 The land component support concept is designed to ensure the support of either national or multinational forces, taking their different structures and multinational composition into account. Logistic support will be based on national provisions and may include degrees of multinational support as agreed by CNs. While each nation takes responsibility for the provision of support to its forces, HNS if available, lead nation, role specialisation, mutual assistance, and use of MILUs may be employed when determined to be more advantageous. The land component commander establishes requirements and sets priorities for support of forces in accordance with the overall direction given by the Theatre Commander. He co-ordinates logistic operations with CNs, and joint/theatre level logistic structures. The land component commander will exercise co-ordinating authority over those NSEs operating in his Area of Responsibility (AOR). Additionally, the land component commander controls road movement in his AOR. Further detail on land logistic support concepts and their implementation may be found in ALP 9(C) - Land Forces Logistic Doctrine.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(3)
Air. (a) A NATO air commander within a region has a three-fold mission, to contribute to the defence of the region, to reinforce other regions as directed, or to stand up an Air Component Command within a CJTF, when tasked by the appropriate Strategic Command (SC). For Article 5 operations logistics support uses in-place national stockpiles. NATO Aircraft Cross Servicing (ACS) enables operational Commanders to enhance the flexibility and mobility of air power and to respond effectively to a developing crisis. ACS is however, a force multiplier for Article 5 operations only and is applicable only to operations supported from NATO territory. For operations beyond NATOs area of responsibility, the air component AOR is unlikely to coincide precisely with other component AORs. Multinational air assets may be located well to the rear of any area of conflict and may use tactical airfields within the land AOR. Air assets will be collocated on multinational air bases with on-base logistic support being centrally co-ordinated by either a host nation or lead nation. Some air assets such as Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) may be deployed within a land component AOR and be reliant on the Land Component Command for logistic support. Air logistic support should maximise use of the principle of common user resources, however, aircraft maintenance and repair will remain a national 1-8 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
(b)
(c)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 responsibility. NATO co-ordination of the multinational air logistic effort will be conducted through the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) logistic staff supported by National Logistics Liaison Teams and Host Nation air logistics staff. The specific nature of logistics for air units is unlikely to require the establishment of a Multinational Logistics Centre (Air) [MNLC(A)] for the co-ordination of air logistics support. (d) Further detail on air logistic support concepts may be found in ALP 13 Air Forces Logistic Doctrine (to be published).
0108. Roles and Responsibilities. a. In the area of multinational logistics there is potential for overlap and confusion in the delineation of responsibilities between NATO commands, NATO CNs, the HN, and non-NATO nations operating under NATO command. It is essential to the establishment of a coherent logistic concept that guidelines be established to outline the responsibilities of each element as they relate to planning and conducting multinational logistic operations. Key and essential roles and responsibilities are outlined in Appendix A, in matrix form as a quick reference. These are not all inclusive, but outline important basic responsibilities. The following are general responsibilities which are considered to be important to the understanding of NATOs multinational logistic concept, and particularly applicable to the organisations and levels of command listed below. Responsibilities may be tailored to the specific circumstances of each operation, as agreed by the participating nations and commands involved. (1) Nations. (a) Support of Contributed Forces. Nations may contribute to the support of a NATO operation via a variety of means as described throughout this publication. However, the ultimate responsibility for the support of contributed forces remains with the contributing nation. If nations elect to support contributed forces through a national support system, it remains vital, just as in multinational logistic operations, that they interface with the NATO multinational logistic co-ordination entity. Nations are also responsible for the strategic deployment and the medical support of their forces. Contribution of Resources. Except when NATO provides maintenance and limited NATO purchased resources, all personnel and equipment required to conduct an operation are provided by CNs. These resources are dedicated, either through planned allocation of forces through the Force Planning Process, or through requirements identified in the contingency operational planning process. Under NATO 1-9 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
(b)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 procedures, nations will transfer some level of authority (TOA) over their national force contributions to NATO at an agreed time. This transfer includes logistic forces that nations nominate through the force generation process co-ordinated by the SC. The actual logistic concept for a NATO operation will be dramatically affected by the type and amount of logistic forces, and the TOA limitations imposed on contributed forces. This is especially applicable to non-Article 5 missions where nations greatly influence the logistic concept through their contributions in the force generation process. (c) Planning. Nations are involved in the logistic planning process from the strategic down to the tactical level. In developing the initial logistic concept of operations it is vital that nations be involved from the outset. This includes the development of the logistic architecture (including C2), establishment of mutual support arrangements, and the conclusion of HNS agreements/arrangements. Inclusion of national influence in the concept and plan development is essential to avoid shortfalls and misunderstandings during the force generation process. This is especially crucial for non-Article 5 missions, where force contributions by nations are voluntary and more likely to be made during crisis planning, vice Article 5 missions, where nations have committed, through the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) process, forces required to support an established Contingency Operation Plan (COP). Lead Nation or Role Specialisation missions. Nations may be called upon to co-ordinate and plan, as well as to provide actual support, in a single or in a number of functional areas to other national forces in an operation. In all cases the assumption of these missions is voluntary and co-ordinated in the logistic planning process. Role Specialisation and Lead Nation are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. Host Nation Support. Nations may provide Host Nation support, including basing privileges, equipment and materiel support to Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. Establish National Support Elements (NSE) with the following functions: (i) Performance of national logistic support co-ordination functions for their respective CNs. NSEs are organised and located at the levels dictated by their CNs. Co-ordination with, and reporting as required, to multinational logistic command and control organisations to ensure continuity of the total logistic effort. 1-10 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
(d)
(e)
(f)
(ii)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 (2) NATO Headquarters. (a) Policy and Guidance. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) provide, through the International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS), broad strategic logistic guidance. This may take the form of general policy guidance in MC documents or specific planning guidance for the establishment of plans and orders. Funding. The Senior Resource Board (SRB), Military Budget Committee (MBC) and the Infrastructure Committee (IC), under guidance from the NAC, provide funding for NATO common funded projects and establish the funding policy to support operational requirements. Oversight and Approval. In addition to policy and guidance, the NAC and DPC provide plan review and approval for all SC level NATO plans, including the logistic concept of operations. Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC). (i) The SCEPC consists of nine sub-committees that provide civil experts to assist the NATO commander. The sub-committees advise on policies, capabilities, availability of assets and the feasibility of support desired. Depending on the severity and urgency of the crisis, the SCEPC may activate the Civil Emergency Crisis Cell (CECC) and request civil or military experts to assist with the civil management problem in accordance with established procedures.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(ii)
(3)
NATO Strategic Commands (SC). (a) Strategic guidance and doctrine. (i) SC Europe and SC Atlantic provide the strategic level plan. Their planning and conceptual development is done in cooperation with the national and Regional Command (RC) level planning as much as possible. The NATO Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) develops the plan based on guidance from the SCs. Their work is particularly relevant to strategic planning in support of COPs. After the planning is complete, the SC is responsible for obtaining NAC approval of the strategic level plan before execution can begin. 1-11 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 (ii) SCs will develop NATO logistic doctrine and procedures in coordination with the IS, the IMS and Nations. SCs will review and approve RC plans. The SC may, in conjunction with the RC and CN, prepare and negotiate HNS agreements, Transit Agreements and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). For Article 5 missions, HNS agreements/arrangements will focus on facilitating COPs. For non-Article 5 operations, however, standing agreements will probably not exist. In these cases the SC must move quickly to put into effect timely agreements. The development of generic agreements can accelerate that process substantially.
(iii) (iv)
(b)
Force generation. The SC will allocate resources to include funding, to support the NATO commander's operational plan through the force generation process in concert with the nations. This is especially applicable to non-Article 5 missions, where nations do not firmly commit forces in NATO's Five Year Force Plan. Support of forces. SCs may assist in the co-ordination of support to CNs for specific national requirements identified either before or during the execution of a NATO operation. Logistic command and control. (i) The SC will assist in developing the logistic C2 organisation and arrangements in co-ordination with the RC/CJTF and nations during the initial planning stages of an operation. Management of Movement. The end product of deployment/movement planning will be a multinational Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP) co-ordinated and de-conflicted by an Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre (AMCC) to meet the NATO Commanders operational requirements. The AMCC will track the progress of the deployment based on national inputs.
(c)
(d)
(ii)
(e)
Stockpile Planning. For Article 5 operations, SCs and nations are responsible for stockpile planning. Each RCs respective Stockpile Guidance is listed in the References section at the end of this document. NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP)/Capability Packages (CPs). NSIP covers the process and procedures from conception of 1-12 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
(f)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 required capabilities including logistic support requirements through package definition, resource analysis, investment proposal, implementation, acceptance and management to deletion and removal from NATO inventory. In context of this programme (Reference: CM(93)38 (Final) - Renewal of the Infrastructure Programme), the Capability Packages serve as a visible means of linking future infrastructure planning to operational needs. Based on the responsibility for developing defence planning and operational planning guidance, the SCs are to develop valid and achievable requirements and to establish CP topics in co-operation with Users, Host Nations, RCs, NATO Agencies, and NATO HQ. (g) Reporting. The SCs maintain national reports provided in accordance with the Bi-MNC Reporting Directive Volume V.
(4)
Regional Commands (RC) / CJTFs. (a) Contingency planning. RC/CJTF planning is conducted concurrently with the SC strategic plan. There should be constant dialogue between the two levels in order to provide transparency of planning efforts. Identify support requirements. The conduct of mission analysis and the identification of support requirements will be essential. These requirements include information, communications, CPs, HNS (nonArticle 5), Transit Agreements, SOFA, logistic forces and funding. Logistic command and control. (i) Based on the logistic planning process and associated planning conferences, the RC/CJTF will detail the C2 organisation during the planning and subsequent force generation process, described in detail under Section III of this chapter. During this process the detailed logistic C2 architecture will be established and resourced. Movement and Transportation Architecture. The movement and transportation architecture on RC/CJTF level is described in detail in section III of this chapter.
(b)
(c)
(ii)
(5)
JOINT SUB-REGIONAL COMMAND (JSRC). May be used in a supporting command role to include providing personnel augmentation or establishing multinational logistic headquarters. In RC Europe, every JSRC may well receive the be prepared to mission with regard to activating a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC). The MJLC is described in detail later in this chapter. 1-13 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 (6) NATO Agencies. Agencies such as the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) and the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) are responsible for providing support for operations within their area of competence.
0109. Logistic Support Considerations. a. Theatre Aspects. (1) General. (a) Logistic support options for the NATO commander range from a totally integrated multinational logistic force to purely national support. Normally, the NATO force will be supported through a combination of the various options available. Regardless, however, of the options used for a particular mission, CN as well as the NATO force commander, maintain responsibility for the sustainment of the forces involved. In all cases the logistic support options used should be tailored to meet mission requirements as well as to follow the logistic principles set forth in Section I, of this publication. There are some major differences in the method and terms of reference for support options between Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions. One of the main differences, from a logistic standpoint, stems from the relationship of NATO forces to the nation from which the operation is conducted or supported.
(b)
(2)
Article 5. In Article 5 operations each HN has specific responsibilities, for assisting in the co-ordination and sustainment of NATO forces, including reinforcing and prepositioned forces. These responsibilities will vary according to the scenario. HNS arrangements for Article 5 operations are normally prearranged and agreed under a standing NATO HNS agreement. Non-Article 5. (a) Non-Article 5 missions by their very nature occur in regions where agreements do not normally exist between NATO and the supporting nation or nations. This situation leads to the following alternatives, among others, for meeting support shortfalls. The first and preferred method is the establishment of a HNS agreement. If a legitimate government exists and there is sufficient time to negotiate an agreement, the implementation of HNS under an umbrella MOU is necessary. In this case, the SC will, in conjunction with the CNs prepare a HNS 1-14 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
(3)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 agreement on behalf of all NATO and Non-NATO forces that are part of the NATO force package. (b) A second method is used primarily in cases where formal HNS agreements are not practical. This may be true because an agreement could not be reached with the HN, or in some cases, because no legitimate government exists with which to negotiate an agreement. In cases where no HNS agreement is in place, resources may still be obtained locally. In these cases, local contracts are made between the NATO commander and individual civilian providers, rather than the national government acting as a guarantor of support. In practice there are many similarities between HNS and local contracting. Most significantly, resources are usually obtained in both methods through contracting, under the co-ordination of a NATO contracting co-ordination activity. For non-Article 5 operations the logistic planner can expect to use local contracting, at least until an HNS agreement can be established.
(c)
(4)
Article 5 - Non-Article 5 Comparison. Another potentially significant difference between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations is that when limited HN capabilities exist (as is more likely to be the case in non-Article 5), creation of a CJTF JRACC to co-ordinate designated rear area functions should be considered. This HQ may co-ordinate the rear area security mission (and other designated functions) through its Operations Division and the logistic mission through its MJLC which is embedded under the ACOS Support.
b.
Support Options. (1) Role Specialisation (RS). Each NATO nation has unique logistic strengths and capabilities that, when combined with the capabilities of the other members of the alliance, can serve to make the whole of the logistic capability stronger than its individual parts. Taking advantage of each national strength, tailored to a specific operation, is the essence of Role Specialisation. For example, in a particular operation, common supplies and services may most efficiently be procured and / or may be provided to all or a portion of the force from a single designated nation that has unique and qualifying capabilities. Under the provisions of MC319/1 a single nation may procure resources and provide specified support to the entire, or a portion of, the force with customer nations compensating the Role Specialist Nation (RSN) for the support provided. Procedures for this compensation will be executed in accordance with MSAs or appropriate Standardisation Agreement (STANAGs) as far as possible. The nation providing the support is known as the RSN. Examples of candidates for role specialisation include common user or standardised support such as fuels, rations as well as certain medical services such as aeromedical evacuation. In all 1-15 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 cases where an RSN is designated, the support is co-ordinated by the NATO commander. National laws concerning the transfer of military goods and services must be considered before designating a RSN. (2) Lead Nation (LN). A nation may, if it agrees, be designated as a LN in supporting NATO logistic operations. (a) LN support involves a nation assuming responsibility for co-ordinating and/or providing specified support and other functions, (i.e. air/sea/rail port operations, security, movement control, route maintenance and medical support) within a defined functional or regional area to other CNs. Normally reimbursements to the LN will be a part of this arrangement. A LN mission is similar to a RSN mission with the main difference being that the LN mission is wider in scope and normally a LN will assume responsibility for the co-ordination of a portion of logistics support to other CNs within its regional area of responsibility. In a NATO operation more than one lead nation could be designated to provide a specified range of support. In some instances, command of a MILU may be accomplished by a lead nation, particularly if a single nation is providing a majority of the resources or support.
(b)
(3)
National Logistics. National logistics support will flow from national sources, usually based in the home nation, forward to their most forward deployed national units in the AOR. While there may be significant advantages to using multinational logistics, nations may, for a variety of reasons, choose to use national logistics to support their forces. In this way a nation assumes the total mission of providing for and transporting supplies and services to their individual units. Even when CNs rely solely on national logistics, the NATO commander retains the responsibility to co-ordinate the overall logistic effort. National Support Elements (NSE). Regardless of the level of multinational or national logistics a nation employs, it is likely to employ an NSE to support the forces it contributes to an operation. The level at which these are employed will depend on the nations commitment to the multinational force. These NSEs can be located in and/or out of the theatre of operations to include intermediate sites between the CN and the most forward location of their contributed force. Each CN must ensure that the actions of their NSEs are in consonance with the NATO commanders concept of operations and intent. Further, it is necessary for them to co-ordinate with NATO logistic organisations as specified in NATO operations orders. NSEs operating within the NATO commanders area of responsibility will be subject to the MOUs, SOFA and other HN arrangements. NSEs, while remaining within their national chains of command, will provide 1-16 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
(4)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 reporting of critical operational assets and critical logistic activities in accordance with the Bi-MNC Reporting Directive, Volume V, Logistics Reports. (5) Multinational Integrated Logistic support Units (MILU). To take advantage of economies of scale, support may be provided by units composed of several nations. This is an attractive support option when a single nation is capable of providing the nucleus of the unit and/or the command structure, which is augmented by other nations to provide common support. Pooling of assets, common funding, cost sharing, reimbursement or provision free of charge arrangements should be agreed to as a part of MILU participation.
c.
Support Enablers. (1) HNS. HNS is a cornerstone of the overall support concept. A variety of HNS agreements/ arrangements have been negotiated between NATO nations and between the SCs and NATO nations. NATO nations extensive HN support capabilities can relieve much of the logistic burden from the NATO commander in developing a viable concept of logistic support. SC negotiation of HNS agreements allows for command prioritisation for limited HNS assets and offers the advantages of economies of scale to the HNS process. To avoid competition, the use of NATO negotiated HNS agreements is preferred to bilateral agreements/arrangements by individual nations. However, a bilateral Joint Implementation Plan at the final stage of the HNS process is required. Negotiation of agreements should begin as soon as possible in the planning process in co-ordination with CNs. This is particularly important in non-Article 5 operations where it is likely that no HNS work has been conducted previously. The HNS planning process is clearly an integral part of the logistic planning process and is discussed in more detail in Chapter II of this publication. Mutual Support Agreements (MSA). In addition to the use of HNS, RSN and LN concepts for the provision of specified support to the NATO force, CNs have the option to develop mutual support arrangements, bi-laterally with other nations, to ensure provision of their forces. This is especially useful when CNs have small force contingents collocated with the forces of another nation that have the capacity to support them. By working together and sharing resources (especially services capabilities), CNs can achieve economies of scale in their logistic operations. Another benefit of these arrangements is the overall reduction of redundant deploying forces, all requiring support of their own during their deployment and employment. MSAs are a natural extension in the hierarchy of CNs working together to best support the force and achieve the logistic goals outlined in Section I. Even though these arrangements are essentially bi-lateral, NATO visibility of such arrangements is essential and when appropriate the agreements may be established by a NATO commander on behalf of CNs. This co-ordination ensures the support arrangements fit into the overall NATO concept of support. 1-17 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
(2)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 (3) Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs), Allied Publications (APs) and Exercise Tactical Publications (EXTACs). As fundamental documents which provide agreed policy and standards among NATO nations, STANAGs, APs and EXTACs contribute an essential framework for specific support concepts, doctrines, procedures and technical designs. They also establish guidelines for standardisation of equipment, supplies and policies. In addition to providing the above for NATO nations, non-NATO nations will, unless otherwise specified, be expected to comply with releasable NATO publications during operations conducted with NATO. Contracting. (a) Contracting is an important part of the multinational logistic concept and may be used in a wide range of operational scenarios. In Article 5 operations, contracts are facilitated by the Host Nation through the HNS process. In situations where no legitimate government exists, support is likely to be received through local contracting, negotiated individually with local vendors. Contracting capability is dependent on the resources available in the area and the reliability of the local and out of area commercial organisations. The legal and operational considerations of allowing non-local contractors in the area of operations must be considered as part of the planning process. But in all cases where a formal HNS agreement is not made, local contracting should be considered in meeting part of the NATO force requirements. Contracting of support for NATO forces will be used by the NATO commander and CNs where the use of commercial contracts support the military mission. The NATO commander and CNs will adjust the extent of reliance on contracting based on the situation. The assistance of NAMSA should be considered for NATO operations when contracting is contemplated. However, as NAMSA services are provided on a reimbursable basis, specific arrangements for NATO funded contracting must be set in place prior to each operation. Such arrangements must be detailed in the context of an MOU, to be negotiated and executed by the SC, and its cost included in the OPLAN budget. Since NATO common and centralised funding is limited to specific categories of goods and services, most contract actions will be funded nationally. However, NATO will co-ordinate national contracting efforts to ensure enhancement of the contract process, reduction of competition between CNs, and realisation of economies of scale. The co-ordination 1-18 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
(4)
(b)
(c)
(d)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 of contract activities and the co-operation of CNs are essential to good contract operations. (e) To gain economies of scale and limit competition between nations, bilateral and multilateral agreements between CNs for the purchase of common goods and services are encouraged. Consolidated contracts, where practical, will allow for blanket type contractual agreements to the benefit of the NATO force. The use of contracting by CNs should build on the requirements and capabilities of the HN, where applicable, and not interfere or compete with their efforts. Co-ordination should be accomplished at the highest appropriate level. In non-Article 5 missions, the requirement to co-ordinate contracting actions by CNs and the NATO commander is very significant. CNs may choose to purchase as much of their requirements in-country as possible, even to the extent of being willing to pay more than the normal commercial value for goods and services. In the extreme, uncoordinated contracting actions, especially in a poorly developed or ravaged environment, could lead to dramatic price escalation leading to further hardship on the local populace and severely inhibiting CN and NATO commanders operations.
(f)
Section III - Combined and Joint Logistic Command and Control 0110. Introduction. a. A flexible command and control structure must be established to co-ordinate national and multinational logistics and support the NATO commanders concept of operations. Command and Control activities must be organised based on the operational mission and co-ordinated with nations to obtain support and manning for the structure. The combined joint logistic C2 structure must also provide the NATO commander with visibility over logistic implications that will impact on operations. The communications and information systems between NATO, national and multinational logistic staffs must provide efficient and compatible interfaces. Action must be taken to ensure reliable communication among participating non-NATO nations and other organisations such as the UN, OSCE, WEU and NGOs as required. A mutual understanding of strengths and weaknesses provides the foundation for cooperation and trust which is vital to the planning and successful execution of logistic operations. Active liaison and joint and combined training at the multinational level facilitate this requirement. The greater the degree of standardisation of equipment, procedures and doctrine, the greater the degree of co-operation, mutual understanding and mission success. This principle is particularly important in non-Article 5 operations that employ non-NATO forces under NATO command. 1-19 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 c. Other than permanent NATO HQ logistic staffs, NATOs deployable logistic C2 activities are established during crisis planning in response to an actual commitment of NATO forces or for exercises. Short planning lead times and increasing demands for logistic responsiveness may well dictate that NATO examine establishing standing deployable logistic C2 elements under the framework of the CJTF concept.
0111. Operational Considerations. a. The type of operation (Article 5 or non-Article 5) will impact significantly on the concept of the logistic operation and the specific C2 organisations that are implemented. Specifically, in an Article 5 operation, the in-place NATO MSCs and JSRCs, and their organic logistic organisations, in conjunction with the host nation military and civil authorities, will co-ordinate the logistic operation. An MJLC could be activated to assist in co-ordinating multinational logistic operations. However, if implemented for an Article 5 operation, the MJLC may have responsibilities different to those for a non-Article 5 operation. In a non-Article 5 operation, these differences will include the need for increased support co-ordination because of the absence of a geographic command structure, adequate inplace infrastructure and HNS. The CJTF command and control structure will need to take account of increased co-ordination requirements in the following areas: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Host Nation Support. Civil/Military Co-operation (CIMIC). Movement and Transportation. Engineering. Contracting. Force Protection.
b.
0112. Command, Control and Co-ordination a. SC Elements. (1) Joint Operations Centre (JOC) / Strategic Direction Centre (SDC). SCs have established crisis management organisations to be activated for NATO operations: the JOC and the SDC. These organisations are manned from a core of permanent staffs and augmentees from the emergency establishment. The JOC and SDC have established logistic cells to co-ordinate the strategic level logistic considerations and requirements. Both the JOC and SDC, when 1-20 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 activated, will be in close contact with the national logistic liaison representatives in the Bi-SC Logistic Co-ordination Centre, which provides the strategic level interface between nations and the SC. The specific organisation of each of the centres varies according to the operation. The role of the organic SC logistic cell, within the JOC/SDC, begins with the receipt of an initiating directive for an operation and continues through planning, execution and redeployment. The focus of the mission shifts with the phase of the operation but the general tasks of the logistic cells are to: (a) (b) Advise the NATO commander on all aspects of logistic support. In co-ordination with the Nations, establish strategic logistic requirements and co-ordinate strategic level logistic planning. Co-ordinate, prioritise and deconflict national logistic plans in a multinational NATO operation. Initiate bilateral and multinational negotiations, with the consent of CNs. Initiate and co-ordinate LN and RSN responsibilities. Monitor status of resources and logistic operations.
(c)
(d) (e) (f) (2)
Bi-SC Logistics Co-ordination Centre (LCC). The Bi-SC LCC is the senior logistic forum at the SC level and is activated in crisis or conflict by a specific precautionary measure. Besides being the liaison agency co-ordinating national surpluses, deficiencies and processing requests for emergency material assistance, the Bi-SC LCC provides the focus for liaison between SCs, MSCs, and CNs on logistic matters. It is also the forum for examining and proposing solutions and / or offering advice to logistic issues affecting more than one nation. Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre (AMCC). The AMCC is the SC body responsible for the management of strategic movement. In this respect, the AMCC co-ordinates national plans for deployment, transportation for sustainment (resupply) and redeployment into multinational plans and resolves strategic lift shortfalls in co-operation with nations and civil agencies. The AMCC is a crisis management organisation activated by either SC.
(3)
b.
RC Elements. (deploying elements are addressed under CJTF Elements below) (1) Joint Movement Co-ordination Centre (JMCC). (a) For Article 5 operations the JMCC may be established. It will be responsible for the management of operational movements within an MSCs assigned AOR in conjunction with the HN movement control 1-21 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 organisation. The JMCCs are established in RCs and augmented under the crisis establishment. (b) For non-Article 5 operations, the MSC forming the CJTF will contribute the nucleus of the Joint Theatre Movement Staff (JTMS).
c.
CJTF Elements. (1) CJ 3. The CJ 3 establishes the overall operational concept and priorities for the conduct of the operation in accordance with the commanders intent for the operation. This determines the parameters under which the CJ 4 establishes the logistic policy and concept of support. Of specific importance to the movement function will be the commanders priorities for force deployment, build-up, sustainment and redeployment which will drive requirements and priorities (a) Joint Theatre Movement Staff (JTMS). The CJTF commander has the freedom to subordinate the JTMS under the CJ 3 or CJ 4. Regardless of location, the JTMS must co-ordinate closely with both the CJ 3 and CJ 4 on the broad range of logistic issues that relate to transportation. The JTMS develops theatre movement directives, movement and transportation plans, and prioritises movement requirements in theatre.
(b)
(2)
CJ 4. Logistic policy, planning and co-ordination will be conducted by the CJ 4 and, if the situation dictates, by the MJLC or JRACC, discussed in detail later in this chapter. In addition, judgement is also used in determining the need for separate MNLCs or to building capabilities into the MJLC to conduct the component co-ordination missions. Regardless of the structure, however, there must be a clear delineation between the responsibilities of the CJ 4, the MJLC, and the MNLCs established in the concept of the operation and resulting plan. (a) General. The CJ 4 develops the commanders policy and planning while the MJLC or JRACC and MNLCs conduct the detailed planning and execution. The MJLC or JRACC will be responsible for co-ordinating logistic support between the components and nations; the latter will also, when delegated, provide command and control over designated MILUs. The MNLCs (when established) will have responsibility for coordinating the logistic support for forces assigned to the component commands. To reduce layered command and control structures and enhance efficiencies, first consideration should be given to establishment of an MJLC to assume MNLC functions. Functions. CJ 4 functions include: 1-22 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
(b)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 (i) Preparation of operational level logistic plans in support of operations. Providing staff supervision and oversight of the theatre logistic effort. Translation of the operational level NATO commanders intent into logistic policy and direction for the force. Acting as the theatre level logistic co-ordination authority. Providing assessments of logistic capabilities and constraints, evaluating the impact on current and planned operations and provide feedback to the NATO commander. Establishment of logistic reporting requirements. There are certain areas that do not specifically fall under the responsibility of the CJ 4, but that must be considered by the logistic staff, as they cross staff boundaries and are vital to successful support of the plan. These include setting of movement priorities, engineering, infrastructure, and rear area security. Operational commanders may organise these staff functions under CJ 3 or CJ 4, as desired, depending upon the specific operation, but in any case the CJ 4 must be involved in co-ordinating these functions.
(ii)
(iii)
(iv) (v)
(vi) (vii)
(c)
Mechanism. The mechanism used by the CJ 4 to co-ordinate logistic policy and planning among CJ staff elements, Support Command, service components and the nations are routine and special meetings of a Combined Logistic Centre (CLC). The generic CLC is defined in the Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
(3)
Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC). The MJLC offers a multinational logistic C2 capability to co-ordinate theatre logistic issues at the direction of the CJ 4. While the MJLC may be used in both Article 5 and nonArticle 5 operations, it is likely to be a more robust organisation with broader missions when employed in a non Article 5 operation. Additional details on the establishment and employment of the MJLC, beyond those provided in this document, are found in the Bi-SC Directive for the Planning and Activation of an MJLC (or its successor document). (a) MJLC Employment Considerations.
1-23 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 The decision as to the need for an MJLC, its size and actual authorities will depend on the logistic concept of the operation, and the size, complexity and component participation as well as the force contributions of the nations. In the initial planning of an operation, as the logistic concept is developed, the decision is made if multinational logistic C2 can be accomplished within the existing NATO structure. If it is established that the requirement exceeds the existing structure, first consideration is given to augmenting the existing CJ 4 staff (either CJTF or other NATO command). If the mission is beyond the capability of an augmented staff, then an MJLC will be established from a designated parent NATO HQ to fit the needs of the mission. If needed, the MJLC may be supplemented by component MNLCs. Clear delineation of responsibilities must be made in order to ensure that there is no duplication of effort at multiple command levels. Where possible, the co-ordination of the components logistic missions should be conducted through the MJLC. An MNLC (Land) and MNLC (Air) are unlikely to required. Components still have a logistic policy responsibility, through their appropriate C 4 sections.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(b)
Organisational Options. Within the overall CJTF command and control organisation, the MJLC itself should be considered a module that is flexible in adapting to different requirements and C2 structures as the situation dictates. In principle, the MJLC can be deployed or used in the following options: (i) Establish the MJLC capability in the CJTF HQ - CJ 4 by augmenting the CJ 4 staff. As an MJLC integrated in or collocated with the CJTF HQ or other supporting HQ. As a module placed within the Joint Rear Area Component Command (JRACC) structure. Examples of possible MJLC organisation and employment options are provided at Figures 11 & 1-2.
(ii)
(iii)
(c)
MJLC Mission. The mission of the MJLC is to co-ordinate or control the logistic activities of designated organisations in order to provide support to the operational commander. This mission may be supported through the following tasks: 1-24 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 (i) Co-ordinate support between the components, NSEs, HNs and NGOs interfacing with the CIMIC centres. Co-ordinate the implementation of HNS agreements / arrangements with the HN. Co-ordinate and arrange the provision of common supplies and services, as authorised by CNs. On behalf of the command authority, task MILU(s), if allocated. When a JRACC is established, the MILUs will be OPCON to the JRACC, with their missions being tasked and co-ordinated by the JRACC ACOS. Co-ordinate and administratively support national, NGO, and host nation liaison staffs within the MJLC.
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(d)
MJLC Elements. Co-ordination centres will be established within the MJLC as required. These may include a Joint Logistic Co-ordination Centre (JLCC), a Joint Transport Co-ordination Centre (JTCC), an Engineering Co-ordination Centre (ECC), a Theatre Allied Contracts Office (TACO), a Medical Co-ordination Centre (MEDCC) and a Host Nation Support Co-ordination Centre (HNSCC). These centres are established as required based on the MJLC mission. The general roles of each are listed below: (i) JLCC. Co-ordinates and manages the sustainment and services support operations within the theatre. This includes coordination and prioritisation of the overall sustainment effort and mission tasking of any multinational logistic units, if assigned. The JLCC is responsible for liaison with NSE representatives. The decision as to how to specifically organise the JLCC depends on the complexity of the sustainment mission and the level of assigned MILU. JTCC. If established, the JTCC will (a) manage NATO transportation assets provided for common use and co-ordinate transportation requests from NGOs validated by the CIMIC Centre; and (b) gather movement information and report to CJTF HQ. The JTCC will compliment, not duplicate, JTMS responsibilities. ECC. Overall engineering co-ordination within the CJTF is the responsibility of the Theatre Engineer, a special staff function 1-25 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
(ii)
(iii)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 under the CJTF Commander. His primary role is to affect centralised direction and decentralised execution of the engineering effort and to ensure a unified and efficient use of the commands engineering resources. He may, when necessary, conduct this co-ordination by forming an ECC to provide development and force execution of NATO funded, multinational engineering, environmental and public works projects. (a) If established, the ECC will normally be assigned to the MJLC. If no ECC is assigned to the MJLC, an engineer liaison will be provided to co-ordinate logistic related engineering efforts. If a JRACC is established under the CJTF, the director of the ECC, under the guidance of the Theatre Engineer, may be dual hatted to serve as the Chief Engineer of the JRACC. The JRACC Chief Engineer is responsible for co-ordination of the construction and combat engineering efforts in the JRACCs designated area of operations and serves as the director of the ECC. As Director of the ECC, he is responsible for civilian contract development under the guidance of the Theatre Engineer.
(b)
(iv)
TACO. The TACO is the central co-ordinating authority for the theatre contracting support effort. Its duties include the establishment of theatre contracting policy and the deconfliction of acquisition requirements of other NATO and national contracting agencies in theatre. The chief of the TACO will be the Theatre Head of Contracts (THOC). Regional Allied Contracting Offices (RACOs) subordinate to the TACO are established as required. MEDCC. Co-ordinates medical and health service support to include treatment and evacuation of patients, medical logistics, preventive medicine and environmental health. HNSCC. Co-ordinates HNS between the NATO force and the HN. Regional Detachments subordinate to the HNSCC are established as required.
(v)
(vi)
(4)
Shown below is the basic Modular MJLC Structure at figure 1-1. A modified MJLC structure incorporated within a JRACC is shown at figure 1-2. 1-26 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
MODULAR MJLC STRUCTURE

RC / CJTF
CJ4 CJ3 Theatre Surgeon CJ8
Director MJLC
MJLC COS Special Staff
Components
JLCC
LAND COMP MNLC(L) AIR COMP MNLC (A) MARITIME MNLC(M) (LOG OPS)
HNSCC
HNS Coord Centre Dets
ECC
(Engineering)
JTCC
(Movements)
MEDCC
(Medical)
TACO
(Contracting) RACOs
OTHER
as Required
MILUs
Mission Tasking and Coordination
This diagram represents a modular generic MJLC with co-ordinating component MNLCs and MILUs. MILUs are assigned only as agreed on during the planning phase with the consent of CNs. Normally, MILUs will be OPCON to a JRACC. However, when only small MILUs are assigned, they will be directly tasked by the MJLC. The JTCC may be assigned under the MJLC, however, it receives its mission taskings through the JTMS. The MEDCC takes technical guidance from the Theatre/Force Surgeon. The TACO takes guidance from CJ 8. MNLC(L) / MNLC(A) are unlikely to be required. Additional sections may be added or deleted as the mission dictates.
FIG 1-1
JOINT REAR AREA COMPONENT COMMAND (JRACC) STRUCTURE

Shown with rear area protection mission and assigned Multinational Integrated Logistic support Units (MILU) and a generic modular MJLC.
RC / CJTF CJ8 JRACC Cdr
LEGAL PIO POLAD
CJ4
CJ3
COS
FUND MANAGER
MED AD
CIMIC
ACOS OPS
ACOS SUPPORT OPS
Mission tasking and coordination from CJ4 or CJ3 as appropriate.
ENGR
INTEL
MILITARY POLICE
REAR AREA
JLCC
(Log Ops)
HNSCC
HNS Coord Centre Dets
MEDCC
(Medical)
TACO
(Contracting) RACOs
JTCC
(Movements)
ECC
(Engineering)
OTHER
as Required
CIS
MILU
MJLC MODULE
Mission tasking and coordination
The ACOS Support OPS is dual-hatted as the Director MJLC. MNLCs are not shown.
FIG 1-2
d.
HN Elements National Movement Co-ordination Centre (NMCC). The HN(s) should establish a NMCC to approve, co-ordinate and control air, sea and inland surface movements within its territory, in support of the operation. The MSC/JSRC or CJTF and the nations involved (e.g. NSEs) must liaise with the NMCC to ensure that all movements will be executed in accordance with national requirements and the NATO commanders operational requirements. If an NMCC is not established, a TMCC may be required. CN M&T Elements. A national M&T organisation within the NSE will be positioned in the area of operations / theatre when required. The NSE will support reception, onward movement, and transportation for sustainment and redeployment of national forces. A NSE can act on behalf of, or provide assistance to, another nation by bilateral agreement. Theatre Movement Co-ordination Centre (TMCC). The agency to conduct, either partially or totally, the tasks and responsibilities of a NMCC, where no host nation authority exists or when the host nation is unable to accomplish those tasks.
e.
f.
0113. Logistic C2 Information Systems and Tools. NATOs primary automated logistic systems are packaged as a Logistic Functional Area Sub-System (LOGFASS) under the Automated 1-28 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Command and Control Information System (ACCIS). The current components of the LOGFASS are Logistic Database (LOGBASE), the Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS), the ACE Resource Optimisation Software System (ACROSS), and the Logistic Reporting System (LOGREP). a. LOGBASE. This database was originated as a logistics information source, but is now under enhancement into an expanded core database related to assets, forces, geography, infrastructure, medical, movements, supplies, and targets. Interfaces to other models and databases will be established. LOGBASE supports the management of these operational and logistic data and provides NATO and National commanders with real time information on capacities and capabilities for Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions. On a need-to-know basis the appropriate headquarters staff can rely upon accurate updates for assessment and evaluation. LOGBASE is designed for application in the wide range of logistic activities from daily operations up to force planning. The main tools to operate LOGBASE are currently ADAMS, ACROSS and LOGREP. Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS). ADAMS is used for planning, evaluating and simulating movement and transportation operations in support of NATO missions. ADAMS assists movement and transportation planners in developing deployment plans and testing their feasibility by enabling the rapid preparation, deconfliction and dissemination of plans between nations and NATO commands. In addition during execution, planners are able to monitor, with support of ADAMS, the progress of planned activities and adjust plans to meet operational objectives. ACROSS. The ACE Resources Optimisation Software System (ACROSS) supports the stockpile planning efforts of the SC and nations in the areas of land and air operations. This automated system uses a threat-related methodology. Threat capabilities are modelled against alliance combat capabilities to yield the necessary munitions stockpiles required to defeat this threat by conventional means LOGREP. The Logistic Reporting system provides the ADP tool in support of the information exchange requirements as stated in the Bi - MNC Reporting Directive, Volume V, Logistics Reports. LOGREP supports ADAMS and ACROSS, and is the tool for nations to provide the data for population and subsequent updates of the LOGBASE. Related to operations LOGREP is the means for timely provision of logistic updates and mission tailored information about all functional areas in logistics. NATO and National Commanders at appropriate HQs will gain visibility for logistic assessment and planning in peace, as well as, for logistic support of any operation. Stock Holding & Asset Requirements Exchange (SHARE). SHARE is an automated tool that permits subscribers to exchange information on material asset availability and present and future requirements. SHARE establishes a NATO Stock Exchange whereby parts can be redistributed when material asset requirements of one force can be met with assets from another. Such matching can either be as a result of a "stock beyond need situation" or as a result of mutual emergency support decision. 1-29 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
d.
e.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 f. Medical Resource Guidance (MRG) Model. The ACE Medical Resource Guidance (MRG) Model is a computer program developed by SHAPE and designed to calculate detailed medical support requirements. The MRG is used by NATO commands and nations to evaluate medical support requirements as stipulated in various NATO directives. The MRG is composed of two major parts; casualty calculation and medical resource calculation. There are within these two parts four sub-modules: first, casualty calculation according to capability related medical support planning; second, conventional war battle casualty calculation; third, personnel requirements for role 3 hospitals; and finally, bed requirements for role 3 and 4 hospitals. Logistics Processor Medical (LPX-MED). The LPX-MED models the functions of a medical network by simulating the flow of patients through the system. Simulation of these activities at a sufficient level of detail permits logistics and medical planners to make real time decisions about the employment of forces and allows interaction with operational planners in three ways: first, to test different courses of action from a projected patient perspective; second, to assess the impact of delays in the arrival of critical forces or assets and test alternate solutions; and third, to optimise the effectiveness of the total force by taking advantage of strengths of the logistics concept and minimising the weaknesses. In summary, LPX-MED is a simulation of the medical processes that would occur within a theatre of operations. It provides a laboratory environment to investigate medical activities and their interaction with associated combat processes. Medical Analysis Tool - 2 (MAT-2). A planned update of LPX-MED (paragraph g above) which will also incorporate the functions of MRG (paragraph f above).
g.
h.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Appendix A - Roles and Responsibilities LEVEL/HQ NATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES Support of Forces Resource Multinational Logistics (subject to appropriate agreements / arrangements) Participate as LN or RSN as appropriate Report as required Provide Own Strategic Lift Participate in Development of Support Plan Develop and Disseminate National Policy Redistribution Force Contribution Level of Integration Approve Support Plan Requirements Force Generation Provision Own Forces Equipment Materiel Fund Provision of Medical Support Provision of HNS Approve Agreements MSA HNS (as applicable) SOFA Provide Strategic Policy and Planning Guidance Co-ordinate Approval: Logistic Support Plan Resource Requirement/Funds Review Requirements and Plans Approve plans Define Mission Develop Logistics Doctrine Develop Strategic Plan and assist in development of Logistic C2 Provide Planning Guidance to RC/CJTF Review/approve Subordinate Plans Develop Concept of Operations Develop Support Plan/Budget Develop and Consolidate Requirements Bilateral Multilateral Negotiate: 1-31 NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED MECHANISMS National Support Elements National military and civil resources
STRATEGIC NATO HQ
NAC/DPC (Initiating Directive) MBC/IC MC SC Logistic Staffs Bi-SC LCC ALC AMCC SDC JMCC
SC
ORIGINAL
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 MECHANISMS
LEVEL/HQ
OPERATIONAL RC/CJTF
RESPONSIBILITIES Mutual Support Agreements HNS SOFA / Transit Agreements Resource Allocation Co-ordinate with Nations and Operational Command Strategic Movement Co-ordination Co-ordinate SPG process Co-ordinate CP Process and develop CPs Maintain Logistic Core Database Develop Operational level Logistics Plan Detail Logistic C2 Organisation Provide Planning Guidance Budget Provide Fund Management Develop and Consolidate Requirements Prioritise and Apportion Requirements Interface With Strategic and Tactical Levels of Operation Co-ordinate Operational Movement Control Identify Information Requirements Identify Contract Requirements Risk Management Route Protection Redundancy Co-ordinate Host Nation Support Identify Infrastructure Requirements Co-ordinate and Deconflict National Requirements Co-ordinate and Deconflict Theatre Movements Co-ordinate National Support Elements Co-ordinate Medical Evacuation Carry out Patient Regulation Identify logistic shortfalls and initiate, in coordination with nations, actions to remedy the situation. Maintain Infrastructure and Facilities Maintain Secure Operating Base (When Applicable) Route Maintenance and Control
CJ 4 MJLC - JLCC - JTCC - MEDCC - ECC - HNSCC - TACO JTMS
Appendix A - Roles and Responsibilities 1-32 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
CHAPTER 2 LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANNING

Section I - Introduction 0201. Introduction. In adapting requirements to the new security environment, logistic planning must incorporate the timely build up, deployment, employment and re-deployment of assigned forces in order to support the Commanders concept of operations. Plans must also take account of the potential need to reinforce in-place forces quickly and with the appropriate capabilities, and to integrate contributions from non-NATO nations when applicable. Logistic support concepts, structures and procedures must be tailored, therefore, to the respective forces and their related employment options. 0202. Capabilities. Logistic planning integrates nations and NATOs ability to deploy, receive, onward move, sustain and redeploy forces by incorporating national, NATO and in-theatre resources, as authorised. It involves both civil and military authorities and encompasses material, service support, transport of personnel and infrastructure. HNS and/or the use of local resources is a vital and indispensable part of that planning process. Overall, logistic planning provides a significant input to both the defence and operational planning processes. 0203. References. The basic documents relevant to the logistic planning in sequence of hierarchy are the following: a. Policy Documents. (1) MC Documents. Military Committee (MC) document 319/1/1 formulates NATO principles and policies for logistics, with MCs 299, 326, 327, 334, 336 and 389 providing guidance on Defence Planning, Medical, Peace Support Operations, HNS, Movements and the CJTF concept, respectively. MC 55/3 Readiness and Sustainability Factors. MC 55/3 provides a system for categorising the readiness of forces allocated to NATO, and provides guidance for determining sustainability requirements and stock levels. their
(2)
b.
Doctrinal Documents. (1) Allied Joint Publications (AJP). AJP-01 Allied Joint Operations Doctrine, Chapter 20 Logistics summarises logistic principles and factors affecting logistic support planning, the logistic responsibilities and authorities, and provides guidelines for logistic co-ordination and co-operation.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Allied Logistic Publications (ALP). ALPs give guidance for the planning and preparation of HNS agreements/arrangements and covers the logistic subconcepts of force components as well. ALPs 9, 11, 12 and 13(TBP) provide information on land, maritime, HNS and air logistic concepts respectively.
(2)
c.
Procedural Documents. (1) Bi-MNC / Bi-SC Directives. These cover logistic implementation matters such as procedures and responsibilities for HNS, logistic reporting and the manning of Multinational C2 structures. Force Standards. They establish uniform military standards of readiness, sustainability and operational capabilities in amplification of MC 55/3. These standards provide operational and logistic capability requirements and, where applicable, performance criteria for nations to plan and train forces they allocate to NATO.
(2)
d.
Planning Documents. (1) The Bi-MNC Guidance for Defence Planning. These documents provides guidance to national and NATO defence planning staffs on the mission driven approach to defence planning. Volume 1 identifies the SCs principal requirements for planning activity and Volume 2 provides details of each Military Function (MF) with background information on the principal planning activities. MF 09 Logistics is particularly important for logistic planning. Defence Requirements Review (DRR). The Defence Requirements Review is the initial part of the Force Planning Cycle. The DRR process takes into consideration the most current intelligence assessment (MC 161), the most current Ministerial Guidance, and other pertinent documents to formulate the generic force levels required by NATO. This force level becomes the basis for supporting planning processes such as stockpile planning and infrastructure planning. In effect, these are the forces to be supported, related to the planning situations upon which they are derived. The Bi-MNC Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). The GOP has been approved by the MC and provides guidance to NATO subordinate commanders and nations on the strategic considerations and planning methodology necessary to prepare for the defence of the command area. Information peculiar to their areas of responsibility is produced by the RCs and JSRCs in their Regional Planning Guides (RPGs) and Specific Planning Guides (SPGs), respectively. Details of how to translate broad policy and principles into operational plans are provided in the Functional Planning Guides (FPG).
(2)
(3)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Bi-MNC Functional Planning Guide Logistics (FPGL). One of the FPGs developed as an extension to the Bi-MNC GOP is the FPGL. Logistic plans are to be based on the guidance provided in the body of the FPGL and are to be structured in accordance with the appropriate annexes. The FPG for Exercises should be referred to when planning logistic support for NATO exercises. Contingency Operations Plans (COPs). The COPs are plans developed for specific operations and agreed by the nations. Detailed Logistics and Movements information is contained in Annexes R and S respectively. Generic Plans (GEPs). GEPs are plans developed for possible operations where some of the planning factors have not yet been fully identified or cannot be assumed. The respective Annex (Logistics) provides a description of the logistic support structure which will enable the task force to sustain the types of operations contained in the GEP.
(4)
(5)
(6)
Section II - The Role of Logistic Planning in the Defence Planning Process 0204. This Section describes: a. b. Alliance Defence Planning, including Force Planning and Logistic Planning The Relationship between Logistic Planning, Defence Planning and Operational Planning.
0205. Defence Planning. The objective of NATO defence planning is to provide a framework within which national and NATO Defence planning can be harmonised, with the aim of meeting the military needs of the Alliance in the most effective manner. Ministerial Guidance MC 299 - MC Guidance for Defence Planning, provides a basis for the identification of Alliances required military capabilities. NATO defence planning procedures are outlined in the SCs Guidance for Defence Planning. 0206. Defence Planning Disciplines. The principal mechanisms through which NATO executes its defence planning are the disciplines: Force Planning Logistic Planning Armaments Planning Resource Planning CIS Planning Civil Emergency Planning Nuclear Planning (not addressed further in this document) 2-3 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Logistic planning, movement and transportation planning, and medical planning are integral parts of defence planning and must be consistent with force planning and also with NATOs operational planning. 0207. Force Planning. Although a separate planning discipline, logistic planning is closely related and, in part, integrated in the force planning process. It makes a vital contribution to the force proposal/force goal development. Logistic capabilities, including those to support non-Article 5 operations, should be identified within the force planning process and the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). a. Force Planning Elements. The NATO force planning process is based on three main elements: (1) Ministerial Guidance Force Proposals/Force Goals Annual Defence Review Ministerial Guidance. Ministerial Guidance provides the fundamental political guidance for Alliance planning activities, through an evaluation of political, economic, technological, and military factors which could affect the implementation of NATO strategy and the deployment of NATO forces. It is issued every two years. Force Proposals/Force Goals. The force goal process builds on Ministerial Guidance to produce collectively agreed specific planning targets for individual countries to meet, in order to provide the Alliance with the overall level of forces and capabilities necessary to implement NATO strategy. Force proposals are submitted biennially by NATO Military Authorities (NMAs). They should comply with the concepts provided in Alliance strategic concepts. Annual Defence Review (ADR). The ADR provides the means by which NATO monitors national defence plans to assess their compliance and progress in meeting the force goals. The main tools to measure a nations contribution are the: b. Defence Planning Questionnaire / DPQ Reply Country Chapters Suitability and Risk Assessment (SRA) General Report
(2)
(3)
Logistic contributions. These contributions to the force planning process are: (1) The development, revision and co-ordination of:
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 logistic inputs to Ministerial Guidance / MC 288 - Military Input to Ministerial Guidance logistic inputs to Alliance strategic/operational concepts and plans logistic requirements/force proposals
(2)
The Provision of logistic assessment for: SCs DPQ / DPQ Reply Assessment Suitability and Risk Assessment (SRA) Force Effectiveness Report (FER)
This has to be done by NATO HQ and SCs in co-operation and co-ordination as well as in consultation with nations. SCs must ensure timely and proper inclusion of logistics in the force planning process as well as the participation of the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) in order to assure a close link and harmonisation between logistic planning and force planning. c. PfP Planning and Review Process. The PfP Framework Document commits the Alliance to develop a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying, preparing and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by partners for multinational training, exercises and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces. It is a voluntary programme in which participating partners first submit to the Alliance a response to a Survey of Overall PfP Interoperability. This includes a description of national forces available for operations, training and exercises within the context of PfP, together with an estimate of their availability and readiness in terms of relevant transport, sustainability, command, control and communication capabilities. NATO staffs, including the Partnership Co-ordination Cell (PCC), produce a draft planning and review assessment based upon each Partners survey response and develop Interoperability Objectives (IO) for the planning period. The aim of the IO is to identify specific shortfalls in Partners ability to operate with Alliance forces, and recommend measures to alleviate those shortfalls.
0208. Logistic Planning. In contrast with the other defence planning disciplines, logistic planning involves consideration of a wide spectrum of planning elements. These elements include: logistic standards and guidance logistic force goals and advice on armament or infrastructure goals co-ordination of logistic requirements and plans movement and transportation (M&T) planning medical planning the availability of HNS
Of the above, logistic standards and guidance are the key elements of logistic planning. They provide the common basis for both the force planning and operational planning activities of NATO and national logistic planners. They are the means to ensure that national plans support 2-5 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 NATO objectives and SCs missions. These logistic standards supplement and further define Ministerial Guidance and other planning documents. a. Sustainability. Sustainability is the ability of military forces to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to fulfil their mission in Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. Logistic planning in this area focuses on ensuring that equipment and other material is available in sufficient quantity and quality for NATO operations. The main logistic elements to be covered are: b. mission decisive equipment munitions POL medical support movement and transportation
Stockpile Planning. Stockpile Planning is an important part of logistic support. It provides for maintaining stocks of expendable and non-expendable supplies by nations to sustain combat by their forces in support of NATO against the full range and strength of potential adversaries as identified in MC 161 series and assessed by the SCs in accordance with political guidelines. The assessment will be harmonised among SCs and promulgated as Bi-SC Risk Assessment in support of the respective Defence Requirements Review (DRR). Nations ensure the adequate provision of resources by: stocks industrial production lines bi/multilateral agreements and/or other means which enable forces stockpile requirements to be met within the preparation time of individual readiness categories.
Stockpile Requirements are to be determined by the SCs in consultation with the nations and are published as SHAPE Guidance for Stockpile Planning in ACE and NATO Maritime Stockpile Guidance respectively. They apply to the calculation of munitions, POL, and other materiel. However, different methodologies will be used, including the target related methodology for munitions, which is based on an agreed mathematical model, the ACE Resource Optimisation Software System (ACROSS). In ACLANT, the NATO Maritime Stockpile Guidance is used. c. ACE Force Standards. The ACE Force Standards provide further detailed guidance on readiness and sustainability standards required to ensure effective and efficient logistic support.
0209. Armaments, Resource and CIS Planning. In addition to force planning, logistic planning is also linked to armaments planning, resource planning and CIS planning. Logistic planners will establish logistic requirements for standardisation of materiel, resource and CIS support, and will advise on the logistic aspects of Capability Packages. 2-6 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 0210. Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). NATOs strategic concept places great importance on military readiness and the use of civil resources. While CEP is primarily a national responsibility, CEP is essential to the implementation of NATOs strategy and the actions of the Alliance must be based upon maximum co-operation between nations and NATO. The senior NATO body involved is the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC). SCEPC co-ordinates and gives planning guidance to the activities of nine planning boards and committees: Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport (PBEIST) Joint Medical Committee (JMC) Civil Aviation Planning Committee (CAPC) Food and Agriculture Planning Committee (FAPC) Industrial Planning Committee (IPC) Petroleum Planning Committee (PPC) Civil Communications Planning Committee (CCPC) Civil Defence Committee (CDC)
CEP is based on the Ministerial Guidance from which the Works Programmes for the above committees are derived. Further details and references may be found in the NATO Logistics Handbook. 0211. Capability Packages (CPs). Each CP is a combination of national and NATO funded infrastructure to include facilities, equipment, and other specifics. They are associated with running costs which, together with the military forces and other essential requirements, enable a NATO commander to achieve a specific NATO Military Required Capability. The progress of the CPs will influence plans which may have to be modified to reflect logistic enhancements 0212. Relationship between Defence Planning and Operational Planning. The relationship between defence planning and operational planning is influenced by the following: a. The Force Planning Process. This process determines overall forces structures. It is the most important and influential discipline of defence planning because it provides the baseline on which to establish the contribution of the other planning disciplines. Force Planning encompasses a biennial Force Goal process with a six year planning horizon and Annual Defence Review (ADR) process, culminating in Ministerial agreement of NATOs Five Year Force Plan. For the first year of this five year period, nations make a firm commitment regarding their force contributions to NATO. Operational Planning. This timeframe overlaps the defence planning time frame and deals with the optimum use of actual national contributions from the DPQ and agreed in the ADR. Review of short-term requirements identifies shortfalls for inclusion in future Defence Planning cycles.
b.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Section III - Logistic Force Generation 0213. Introduction. In order to provide a military response in any situation affecting NATO, NMAs must be able to generate Reaction Forces (RF), Main Defence Forces (MDF) and Augmentation Forces (AF) as appropriate. The readiness of these forces, negotiated between nations and NMAs, should enable such forces to be generated in a timely manner to meet operational requirements. Forces will be generated upon approval by the NAC/DPC. 0214. NATO Precautionary System. The aim of the NATO Precautionary System (NPS) is to provide for the overall preparedness to support military action. Precautionary measures cover counter-surprise and counter-aggression measures and can be split into subject areas including logistic matters. Details may be found in the NPS Manual. While the NPS is primarily designed to meet the needs of Article 5 operations, they cover a wide spectrum of crises and can also be adapted to non-Article 5 operations. MC 319/1 requires that the readiness and availability of logistic units and personnel should be adapted to the force they support. For Article 5 operations, nations will have formalised procedures for the mobilisation of reservists to meet this requirement which are dovetailed to the NPS measures. It will also be necessary to ensure that nations have a legal and effective mechanism for ensuring that they can provide logistic units and personnel for non-Article 5 operations in a timely manner. The absence of such procedures would both prolong and complicate the Force Generation Process. 0215. Mission-Related Force Generation in Peacetime. In peacetime, mission related force generation is an important aspect of planning for non-Article 5 operations. Therefore, logistic force requirements must be established at an early stage and, in consultation with the nation, take into account the need to man the force continuously in the event of a protracted operation. NonNATO nations should be integrated into the force generation process at the earliest opportunity. 0216. Force Identification System (FIDS). FIDS will, as part of the SCs proposed operational architecture, be the process by which NATO, in close consultation with nations, identifies forces and capabilities for both advance and implementation planning. It will be structured to balance future capabilities with missions and tasks. It will be a computer based application assisting the identification of forces and capabilities provided by the Defence Planning Process for use over the full spectrum of operations. The system will specify all forces, which might be available to NATO, and will be prepared in co-ordination and close co-operation with NATO military and civil authority and nations concerned. 0217. Selected Participation. NATO commanders must take into account that nations may withdraw logistic forces and capabilities for national purposes at any time. In addition, some nations may not have the resources required for a particular operation, especially non-Article 5. Thus, in order to discharge their commitments and based on the principle of collective responsibility, nations may be invited by the NATO commander to underwrite a multinational logistic architecture. This may include the establishment of a multinational integrated logistic formation under operational control (OPCON) of the NATO commander. 2-8 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 0218. Logistic C2 Structure. a. Article 5 Operations. The existing logistic C2 structure in all standing NATO and national HQs is designed to meet the requirements of Article 5 operations. The NATO Commanders logistic responsibilities will be performed through the existing chain of command. Additionally, the CJTF concept can be used for Article 5 operations, when appropriate. Even if a CJTF is not formed, an MJLC can be used. Non-Article 5 Operations. For non-Article 5 operations, it may be difficult to meet the Statement of Requirements (SOR) for logistic troops and assets. To avoid a shortage of expertise and to assure that an appropriate logistic C2 element can deploy earlier than the combat force, the following approach should be considered in the framework of the CJTF concept. (1) MJLC Shadow CE. It is necessary that the MJLC or modules of the MJLC can be established on short notice. To avoid ad hoc arrangements and a time consuming force generation process, SCs will develop and maintain, in close coordination with the nations, an MJLC Shadow CE, with generic modules for all sections within the MJLC. It will also have to be determined from where the necessary augmentees should come. The development of generic modules should abide by the principle that manning must be adequate to fulfil all tasks and responsibilities with no excess. NATO HQs and nations will then be required to earmark augmentees for the multinational logistic staff elements in their own Peacetime Establishment (PE) to ensure the readiness of these personnel. Parent NATO HQs. The designation of Parent NATO HQ(s) for the MJLC is essential to ensure that expertise in all necessary disciplines can be drawn from these designated NATO HQs. A nucleus staff is required that can be expanded or augmented quickly by additional earmarked personnel in the face of a crisis. Permanent Logistic Staff. In the long term, to further improve responsiveness and flexibility of the logistic C2 structure in support of NATO operations, the establishment of a permanent MJLC logistic staff should be considered.
b.
(2)
(3)
0219. Earmarked Logistic Forces. Logistic troops and assets should be identified, earmarked and committed on a rapid response basis during the planning process for the respective operation by the nations. If such provisions are made for the multinational joint logistic effort, the Statement of Requirements (SOR) and the sourcing process for the operation will be much shorter.
Section IV - Logistic Support Planning for Operations and Exercises 0220. Planning Process. Planning is an iterative process that starts from a common baseline and develops, through successive refinements. In this way, guidance to planners is harmonised and 2-9 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 will ensure optimum use of Alliance resources. After development of OPLANs/COP, subsequent iterations will progressively refine the requirements, as each successive analysis will identify the corrections needed to ensure all required capabilities are included. This includes lessons learned from actual operations and maturing COPs, which will be incorporated by force planners in the following force planning cycle once the resulting surpluses / shortcomings have been correlated with the Force Goals. Timely logistic inputs are therefore essential. The principal logistic inputs may include: establishment and maintenance of operational lines of communication integration of civil and military requirements movement and transportation requirements for HNS and infrastructure pre-positioning of material POL, ammunition and spare parts establishment of an effective logistic C2 structure medical evacuation stockpile planning
0221. Co-ordination of the Planning Process. The NATO commander will ensure that the efforts of planning staffs at all levels and the contributions to the planning process from nations are properly co-ordinated. This may also involve other agencies such as the OSCE or WEU. In order to achieve this, there must be a single point of contact for logistic planning purposes at each level of command. For example, at the strategic level, co-ordination of logistic planning effort takes place within the Bi-MNC Logistic Co-ordination Cell which is specifically designed to receive liaison officers from nations and other agencies. At the operational level, it would take place within CJ 4. 0222. Objective. The overall aim of logistic support planning for operations and exercises is to: a. b. c. Define the logistic support concept. Determine the organisation and structure required for logistic support. Identify the requirements, shortfalls and necessary arrangements to support and sustain NATO operations. Determine the availability of and requirements for HNS or local contracting. Identify the requirements and necessary arrangements for the redeployment of forces, to include the preparation for and recovery of formations, individuals and materiel from the area of operations to their home bases.
d. e.
0223. NATO Operational Planning Process (OPP). Full details of the NATO operational 2-10 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 planning process are contained in GOPs, Volumes I through IV. However, in essence, it is a co-ordinated, joint staff process designed to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned operational tasks or planning for possible future tasks. There are five phases to the OPP: a. b. Initiation - Receipt of the task. Orientation - Conduct of mission analysis, identification of constraints, requirements and objectives. Concept Development - Development and selection of course of action. Plan Development - Preparation and issue of the plan. Plan Review - Validation, updating and review of the plan.
c. d. e.
The ultimate purpose of the OPP is to produce a COP, OPLAN or OPORDER which is designed to produce a desired end-state and to achieve a task that has been assigned to a commander. 0224. Logistic Support Planning Product. The product of logistic support planning is the provision of detailed Annexes to the OPLAN and OPORDER for any given operation (in accordance with the Guidance for Operational Planning and STANAG 2014). In addition, the logistic planner will be required to provide similar Annexes for Generic Plans and Contingency Operation Plans. Details are provided in the FPGL. 0225. Harmonisation and Transparency. Inherent in the planning process is the requirement to involve all contributing nations (CNs) and appropriate NATO HQs from the outset. This will ensure that the planning process is transparent to all levels of the NATO command structure and to all participating nations. Adoption of this policy will ensure that logistic plans conform with the principles of co-operation and co-ordination and it will also assist in achieving the maximum economy and unity of effort. These factors are of particular importance for non-Article 5 operations due to the likely time constraints, especially when non-NATO nations are involved. It should be noted that agreement by nations to provide data on available forces and capabilities for planning purposes does not constitute a commitment for their use in a specific situation. 0226. Movement Planning for Operations and Exercises. Movement planning is part of the OPP. The development of movement plans in support of NATO operations will be an iterative process and may begin with limited military guidance or political clearance. Force planning should identify all forces needed to fulfil operational requirements which have been established in the concept of operations, in order to arrange the arrival of these forces into the area of operations in accordance with the NATO Commanders priorities and timelines. The end product of deployment/ movement planning will be a multinational Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP), co-ordinated and deconflicted by an AMCC to meet the NATO Commanders 2-11 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 operational requirements. Sequentially, the main deployment planning documents and activities are: a. The Statement of Requirement (SOR). The SC will, with the designated NATO Commander, provide the SOR to the nations. The SOR lists the forces required by the NATO Commander for the mission. The SOR is normally refined in consultation with the TCNs at the Force Balancing Conference. A unique SOR Serial Number, cross reference to ADAMS, will identify each specific force requirement. The National Force Contribution (NFC). Based on the SOR, the nations identify and offer forces they can provide in support of the mission. These offers become the National Force Contribution (NFC). The SOR Serial Numbers then identify the specific units the nations offer to fill the SOR requirements. Nations may also identify forces needed for national support in their NFC. The Allied Forces List (AFL). When combined by the SC, the NFCs become the AFL. The AFL provides the information contained in the NFCs and also includes movement characteristics for each unit (combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units). The Allied Disposition List (ADL). The ADL is an expression of the time phased requirements for deploying the units listed in the AFL. The ADL specifies the NATO Commanders operational requirements by listing the NATO Commanders Required Date (CRD), priority, APOD/SPOD, and final destination for each unit. Its development should take into account, to the extent possible, time phasing based on known/available throughput capacities The ADL specifies the CRD with reference to an operational day Based on the ADL and identified constraints, nations develop their national DDP considering: Force Packaging Time Phasing Lines of Communication (LOCs) Modes of Transportation (MOT) Assignment of Transportation Assets Reception and Onward Movement
b.
c.
d.
e.
National DDPs are then combined by the AMCC into a multinational DDP and deconflicted, as required by the AMCC, in conjunction with the designated NATO Commander(s), TCNs and HN(s) as appropriate. National DDPs can also be very useful to assist NATO deployment planners in advising the SC and the NATO Commanders on constraints to the operational plan. Reception and onward movement planning is an integral part of the deployment planning process. The HN, in conjunction with the TCNs and NATO Commander, will conduct reception and onward movement 2-12 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 planning to maximise the throughput capacity of the APODs and SPODs; reception, marshalling, staging and assembly areas; and routes to final destinations to meet the CRD. In this respect, the early identification of HNS and infrastructure capabilities is essential. The deployment planning process is summarised in Figure 2-1 as follows.
MNC CONCEPT OF OPERATION

MNC OPLAN STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
SOR (FORCE REQs)
NATIONAL FORCE CONTRIBUTION (NFCs)
DESIGNATED NATO COMMANDERs REQUIREMENTS
ALLIED FORCES LIST (AFL) SUSTAINMENT & TRANSPORTATION CONSIDERATIONS
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
ALLIED DISPOSITION LIST (ADL)
NATIONAL DEPLOYMENT PLANS
CO-ORDINATION
FIG 2-1: DEPLOYMENT PLANNING PROCESS
DE-CONFLICTED DDP
f.
A series of SC (AMCC) chaired Movement Planning Conferences will be held to support the iterative process to develop a multinational deconflicted DDP. Deconfliction should take place as early as possible to assist further national planning. Sequential simulations and evaluations of planned national movements using ADAMS will determine initial gross feasibility, provide data for analysis and refinement of the movement flow, and identify any shortfalls for resolution in subsequent planning cycles. Reception and onward movement capability and the availability of M&T resources are key elements and may necessitate the refinement of national DDPs. Other issues during those conferences will be an agreement of the movement concept as defined in the operational plan, to include the movement architecture, command and control and the definition of agreed responsibilities (framework and lead nation). During planning and deployment, nations will continue to provide DDP updates to the SC (AMCC).
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 0227. Medical Planning for Operations and Exercises. Medical Planning is an integral part of the overall OPP and influences all of the J-Staff functions. It is an iterative process that shifts in emphasis as the operational and intelligence situation changes. The commanders most important operational medical imperatives are force protection through the preservation of combat strength by preventive medical measures, and to sustain the force with medical support for casualties by providing emergency medical and surgical services. The end product of medical planning will be a plan that outlines the requirements, policies and the support to be provided to forces throughout all phases of an operation. The plan must provide medical capabilities throughout the force structure which are in balance with the size of the deployed force and the assessed risk. In both Article 5 and Non- Article 5 operations, planning must ensure that the standard of medical care is maintained as closely as possible to peacetime medical standards, taking into account the operational environment. The achievement of this aim requires in theatre availability and coordination of a complete range of military medical skills, equipment and supplies. Factors to be considered in medical planning include: a. Medical C2 Structure . The medical C2 structure, including SC Medical Advisor, Theatre Surgeon and MEDCC are addressed in Chapter 3, but are key considerations in the planning process. Casualty Rate Proje ction. The key element of medical planning is casualty rate projection. Casualty rate projections are an operational staff process and responsibility assisted by the medical and intelligence staffs. Baseline casualty rates agreed by the nations are outlined in AD 85-8, ACE Medical Support Principles, Policies and Planning Parameters for land and air forces and in the Maritime Medical Planning Guidance for NATO (MMPG) for forces afloat. Projected casualty rates for assigned forces are then matched with NATO doctrinal requirements for medical support outlined principally in MC 326, Medical Support, Precepts and Guidance for NATO. However, casualty rate projections are a dynamic process that must be developed in conjunction with the intelligence picture and operational assessments. Thus, the medical staff must have direct access to operations and intelligence staffs. Multinational Medical Support. Medical assets are expensive to procure and difficult to obtain at short notice. Medical assets which are under-employed in one theatre may not be available in another and all medical facilities, especially Role 3, require a lot of logistic and engineer support to sustain them even when not in use. Therefore, while planning to provide medical support to the standards acceptable to CNs, economies of scale may be achieved by applying multinational medical support concepts. Such concepts could result in the reduction of competition for scarce resources, the optimal use of scarce assets such as Mobile Surgical Teams (MSTs), armoured ambulances and aeromedical facilities, and the enhanced ability to sustain an operation and push emergency medical care as far forward as possible. Medical Capabilities. There are three key elements in providing a medical capability. First, the forces must have adequate numbers of qualified medical personnel in the required disciplines. Second, medical equipment and supplies (including blood) must be 2-14 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
d.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 provided in sufficient quantity to meet prescribed casualty rates and must be resupplied rapidly since military medical support for combat casualties is supply intensive. Third, medical personnel and equipment must have both fixed and mobile infrastructure and facilities in which to work. e. Area Support. In general, a concept of area support should be considered possible to produce an even distribution of medical assets. when
f.
Communications. Communications throughout the medical structure is addressed in Chapter 3, but is also an important consideration in planning. Evacuation and Aeromedical Evacuation. Evacuation and aeromedical evacuation are addressed in Chapter 3, but are key considerations in the planning process. Surge Capacity. Redundancy, to a certain extent, is a distinctive feature of medical support. Thus, unused capacity must be maintained for prompt employment in case of medical emergency or mass casualty situations. To cope with these events, the unused capacity may be reduced to some extent if effectiveness can be ensured by the NATO commander directing assets and regulating patients.
g.
h.
0228. Role of HNS in Logistic Support Planning. Guidance on HNS planning is contained in MC 334, ALP 12 and the Bi-MNC Directive - Procedures for NATO HNS Planning for Multinational Operations. The availability of HNS is a key factor in Logistic Support Planning. It will determine the size and scope of support required and will contribute significantly to the overall planning process. HNS planning should be conducted concurrently with the preparation of operational plans. The availability of existing HNS agreements, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Bilateral agreements will need to be considered in the development of plans. At the outset of any operation, close co-operation will be required between all interested parties in order to determine the extent of all such agreements and the need for supplementary agreements. NAC or MC taskings to SCs may include full authorisation for the appropriate SC to negotiate HNS agreements / arrangements on behalf of NATO and Sending Nations with their prior concurrence. Sending Nations will, in the first instance, be responsible for identifying HNS requirements to the appropriate SC. Negotiations should aim to achieve consistency between all HNS agreements. Normally SCs will establish and lead teams negotiating MOUs with the appropriate RC being responsible for regional planning and the negotiation and conclusion of more detailed Technical Arrangements (TAs), Joint Host Nation Support Plans (JHNSPs) and Joint Implementation Plans (JIPs). All negotiations should be conducted by an experienced team of personnel covering all disciplines including CIMIC, infrastructure, finance, purchasing and contracting, engineering, medical, transportation, real estate as required. 0229. Funding. For Article 5 planning, current budgetary policies can be applied. However, for nonArticle 5 and CJTF operations there might be a need for commonly funded and centrally controlled logistic assets and resources such as airports, seaports and lines of communication. Specific funding and budgetary policies will need to be developed and subsequently approved 2-15 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 by the NAC on a case by case basis. Such policies must take into account of the involvement of any participating non-NATO nations and related political implications. Early agreement by the nations is fundamental to the success of the operation and will permit further detailed logistic planning related to HNS, contracting, infrastructure engineering and development of the most appropriate and economic logistic support systems. In many cases, it will be most cost effective if some services and supplies are provided centrally by the theatre command and/or the HQs of a multinational commander. It may be appropriate therefore that those HQs make available upfront funds for central purchasing. The SCs will have to take appropriate preparatory measures to ensure that the associated funding requirements can be identified at an early stage of operational planning and force generation. These requirements will have to be forwarded through the MC to the NAC for approval. 0230. Participation of Non-NATO Nations. The participation of non-NATO nations in NATO led operations is likely to increase. This highlights the need for a high level of cooperation and co-ordination to ensure that those nations unfamiliar with NATO procedures are integrated as quickly and as fully as prevailing circumstances permit. This must start with the planning process. Non-NATO nations should be brought in to the force generation process at the earliest possible stage and, where appropriate, their logistic capabilities should be identified within the force planning process and the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), as appropriate. The certification of potential non-NATO participants in any operation should be completed as early as possible in order to enhance mutual confidence. This will allow the timely confirmation of available logistic assets and completion of logistic planning. Adherence to this policy of maximised and timely integration will also permit non-NATO nations to commence work on any bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements needed to support their deployed forces. 0231. Logistic Planning Conferences. Logistic Planning Conferences are a principal tool by which planning is co-ordinated and transparency is achieved. The responsibility for the planning process outlined above is shared by the appropriate NATO headquarters and staffs (which could include SCs, CJPS, RCs) and nations. Much of the planning will be facilitated through a series of logistic planning conferences. The type of planning (e.g. Advance Planning to develop COPs or Implementation Planning) will dictate the timing and frequency of conferences. Specialist conferences may also be necessary, e.g. HNS, M&T and Medical. However, the following sequence is an overarching logistic template which considers the requirements of all logistic disciplines and which can be modified to prevailing circumstances: a. Initial Logistic Planning Conference (ILPC). (1) (2) (3) This is a SC level conference with participation of nations and RCs. It is usually to be held when the concept of operations is developed. The purpose of the ILPC is: (a) To inform nations about the mission and concept of operations. 2-16 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 (b) To analyse and evaluate all factors influencing the logistic planning. To adjust the logistic principles for that operation. To refine the logistic concept. To review the basic logistic architecture and C2.
(c) (d) (e) (4)
The result of this conference will be to enable the SC to develop the logistic annex to the OPLAN as well as to provide nations with the information to commence national logistic planning.
b.
Main Logistic Planning Conference (MLPC). (1) (2) This is a SC level conference, involving nations and RCs. It is to be held when the first draft of the RC operations plan is available including the first draft of force requirements. The purpose of the MLPC is: (a) (b) (c) To explain and discuss the operation plan. To identify the logistic requirements. To identify common logistic functions and procedures as well as HNS, funding and legal issues. To commence the logistic force balancing process. To resolve any issues outstanding from the ILPC.
(3)
(d) (e) (4)
The result of this conference will be that the RC can finalise the OPLAN and develop the detailed force requirements, and that the SC/RC can initiate HNS negotiations and address funding and legal issues. In addition, nations should be in a position to further develop and detail national logistic plans.
c.
Operations and Logistic Review Conference (OLRC). (1) This is a SC level conference with the involvement of nations and RCs.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 (2) This conference is optional and will only be held if changes in the military situation require fundamental adjustment of logistic plans, or if the identified logistic shortfalls could jeopardise the mission. The purpose of the conference is: (a) (b) To resolve the deficiencies and/or To review and adjust the logistic concept and/or operational/ logistic plans.
(3)
(4) d.
The result of this conference should be an executable operational plan.
Final Logistic Planning Conference (FLPC). (1) (2) This is a SC or RC level conference with nations. It is to be held after nations formal commitment of forces, but before the Activation Order (ACTORD). The purpose of the conference is: (a) (b) (c) (d) To finalise and confirm logistic planning. To optimise the overall logistic support of the operation. To confirm the logistic C2 architecture. To resolve any remaining deficiencies or outstanding logistic issues.
(3)
(4)
The result should be a balanced and harmonised system of SC, RC and national logistic plans.
This series of conferences is sufficient to address the requirements for nations participation in the contingency and crisis planning process for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations and can be called by either SC. 0232. Product of the Logistic Planning Conferences. The logistic planning conferences will determine: a. b. The logistic command and control architecture. The optimal methods of logistic support to be employed, e.g. role specialisation, lead nation, multinational pooling, centralised contracting and national support. 2-18 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 c. d. The harmonisation of logistic plans at all levels of command. The resolution of any deficiencies or outstanding logistic issues.
These options would be discussed with nations during the logistic planning conferences in order to obtain a consensus view as to the preferred methods. 0233. Concluding the Campaign. Planning for the conclusion and long term consequences of the operation must be considered from the outset, together with the means to achieve it. Failure to organise and conduct an orderly end to the campaign can result in loss of money, equipment, morale, public support and goodwill. More importantly, lives may be unnecessarily lost if, for example, ammunition is not properly repacked. Any recognition from a successful operation can be undermined by the negative publicity of a poorly planned and chaotic conclusion. The final phase of the operation must be planned, properly commanded and conducted. The logistic planning will have to centre upon two main activities: a. Re-deployment. Re-deployment is a discrete phase of an operation, within which the physical movement of units and formations will take place. Re-deployment is likely to require significant external resources. The introduction of fresh support forces with experts in, e.g., environmental issues, real estate management, repackaging of ammunition, stocks and equipment will speed re-deployment. Units and formations must process through an orderly sequence of preparatory activities before departing. The scale and complexity of the operation should not be underestimated, because much of the recovery will have to take place in parallel with mandate related activities. The Logistic planning for re-deployment will have to cover: Plans for transfer of equipment and facilities logistic support plan for withdrawal logistic C2 structure and arrangements for re-deployment, including communication requirements inventory of the various categories of equipment required date to initial movement - "M-Day" and "order of march" guidance on disposal of NATO owned equipment funding requirements for environmental restoration at NATO sites plans for medical cover throughout the re-deployment guidance on multinational occupancy of Lead Nation administered sites, the apportionment of responsibility for real estate management and possible claims preparation of a force generation conference to cover critical logistic assets (e.g., container handlers, cranes, traffic control units, Rail and Air Port of Debarkation (APOD) / Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) units) deconflicted movement plans and transportation requirements (multinational DDP for re-deployment)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Post Operation Activities. Post operation activities in the logistics area tend to be focused on environmental clearance and remaining engineer tasks such as the removal of war bridges. In the long term, military involvement is not necessary and appropriately trained civilians can be contracted to undertake the task. The required funds will have to be assessed and a requirement for funds to be forwarded to the IC / MBC. Even though the work is done by contractors, there may be a need for theatre closure elements responsible for monitoring the contractors and to function as a claims office. The logistic planning will also have to take account of any multinational or bilateral support arrangements concluded with other NATO or non-NATO nations.
b.
0234. Exercise Planning. The overall aim of NATO military exercises, as established in MC 94/3 NATO Military Exercises, is to improve the capability of NATO and national forces, headquarters and agencies to execute NATO operations. The aim of the logistic participation in exercises is to integrate the logistic play as closely as possible into the exercise so that it assists to best support and validate the overall operational concept. Logistic planning has a full and important role to play in exercise planning and it is essential that logistic planners are involved in the planning cycle described in the Functional Planning Guide Exercise Planning Guide (EPG) from the outset. The logistic conference planning process for exercises follows the same procedures as logistics planning for operations, as outlined in Section IV above. Logistic participation has to be planned for the following exercises with distaff input as appropriate: Command Post Exercises (CPX) Computer Assisted Exercises (CAX) Live Exercises (LIVEX) Exercises Study Crisis Management Exercises (CMX) Mobility Exercises (MOBEX) Logistic Seminars and Training Conferences Synthetic Exercises (SYNEX) Command Field Exercises (CFX) Interoperability Exercises (IOX)
0235. Exercise Reporting. The reports (First Impression Report and Final Exercise Report)on logistic aspects provide an important tool for the logistic planners in identifying lessons learned for future exercises and in order to contribute to the development of logistic concepts, policy and procedures, as appropriate.
Section V - Logistic Evaluation and Assessment 0236. Introduction. NATO commanders validate national logistic support to declared units through operational evaluations and assessments. However, these tools examine only the support of a unit at its home base or deployment base. Under the new NATO strategy, and taking into 2-20 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 account the changed conditions for force generation (e.g. in peacetime and for PSO), an enhanced information exchange may be needed to allow the NATO commander timely visibility over the deployability and sustainability of units that will come under his command. Therefore, a Logistics Evaluation and Assessment Programme (LEAP) will be established in order to identify information needs, to develop appropriate tools and to describe procedures for information exchange and evaluation of logistic capabilities. 0237. LEAP. LEAP is an essential part of Logistic Support Planning. Each CN is required to deploy their forces with a robust logistic capability such that they are self sustaining or have made sufficient arrangements for the required support by other means (e.g. HNS and bi-lateral agreements). SCs need either to be reassured that CNs have this capability, or are able to identify shortfalls which require correction in advance of troops being accepted into an operation. Similarly, SCs need to be aware of the state of NATO infrastructure and to be able to assess and evaluate sites for future use, such as Advanced Logistic Support Sites (ALSS) identified in contingency plans. There are a number of ways of acquiring the data necessary to assess and evaluate the logistic situation which can be broadly divided into the following areas: a. Reporting. The critical reporting requirements to gain visibility on logistics are as follows: (1) Logistic reports are required to provide information on logistics for planning purposes prior to TOA. The logistic reporting system has to be flexible and adaptable to both CNs, NATO and non-NATO. Timely provision of data is mandatory for proper planning and assessment in the logistic arena. The most effective way to meet those requirements for planning and execution of an operation is to use the support provided by the Automated Data Processing (ADP) tool - LOGBASE.
(2)
(3)
b.
Logistic Capabilities. The identification of national shortfalls is addressed by the DPQ process. Core Logistic Information. In accordance with the Bi-MNC Reporting Directive Volume V, the SCs are responsible for establishing and maintaining a Logistic Core Data Base (CDB) containing information on stockpiles of specific equipment and consumable materiel held by National Forces declared to NATO, as well as specified equipment and materiel held by Nations in support of such forces. In peacetime, the CDB will be maintained by means of the LOG-UPDATE message (detailed at Section 2 of the BiMNC Reporting Directive), which will be rendered annually by Nations, or as changes to stocks of ten percent or greater occur. In crisis, conflict and military operations other than war LOG-UPDATES may be called for prior to or after TOA as determined by the appropriate NATO Commander. 2-21 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
c.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Operational Reporting. During any operation the NATO Operational Commander needs to be kept fully informed of the status of the Logistic assets within his area of responsibility. This is achieved through a number of formatted message reports which are detailed in the Bi-MNC Reporting Directive, Volume V. Where applicable the established theatre logistic data base will be updated automatically. Inspections. Regular inspections of NATO Infrastructure, equipment, sites, airfields and so on should be carried out by SCs and appropriate HQs staffs to ensure that they are kept in good working condition. Evaluations. Depending on the outcome of the LEAP assessment described in the introduction above, provisions for evaluations beyond the national level will be addressed. Assessments. Where it is intended to use sites not already earmarked for use by NATO, such as Advanced Logistic Support Sites (ALSS), Forward Logistic Sites (FLS), APODs, and SPODs, the SCs and appropriate HQs staffs should be sent on fact finding missions to establish the suitability of such sites for inclusion in logistic plan. It is imperative that logistic personnel be included in the fact finding team in order to provide the necessary expertise to assess the logistic capabilities and to identify shortcomings. Certification of Non-NATO Troop Contingents. To participate in NATO-led nonArticle 5 operations, non -NATO troop contingents have to pass a certification process. The purpose of certification is to ensure that the nation understands the NATO procedures which will be used on operations and can integrate successfully into the logistic systems which the Alliance uses. As the PfP process matures and the level of understanding between PfP Nations and NATO increases, the need for certification will reduce. Certification visits will be conducted under arrangements made by the SC, and will usually involve Staff Officers from an RC. The Certification Team should include a Logistician. If medical support is to be provided by the troop contingent being certified, the team must include a medical officer. General guidance on the conduct of the Certification will be contained in the Annexes to the relevant OPLAN. If a Nation indicates its desire to contributes troops to an impending operation, the visit will take place between the Firm Offer and the accession to the Participation Agreement. Final accession will be dependent upon a successful certification visit.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
Section VI - NATO Owned Equipment 0238. Introduction. There are two basic sources of NATO owned equipment which will be used in any operation. In both cases there are categories of equipment which are purchased by NATO funds.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Equipment which is taken from an existing NATO Table of Organisation and Equipment (TOE), either by the `owning headquarters or on loan from another headquarters. Items which are required in a particular operation and are therefore purchased at the time. These may not be on any NATO property authorisation document at the time of purchase and must be accounted for on appropriate property books.
a.
b.
0239. Accountability. All transactions involving NATO equipment and property should take place in accordance with the rules and procedures set out in ACE Directive (AD) 60-80 - Property Accounting and Control, and related publications, whenever the situation allows. The general rule should be to ensure that accountability and responsibility are formally delegated to responsible persons and that they maintain a verifiable record of their actions. Operational situations may demand local decisions, but any such decisions must be justifiable and will be questioned. Items which are bought, or acquired, during the operation should be brought to account and immediately evaluated in terms of the likelihood that they can subsequently be recovered. 0240. Disposition. If an item or category of items are assessed as not economically recoverable, then a recommendation should be forwarded to the appropriate SC at the earliest opportunity. The recommendation will be considered by the SCs CMRB and, if approved, the Properties Accountable Officer (PAO) will be authorised to arrange local disposal. At a time before planned re-deployment or withdrawal, the SCs JOC / SDC will call for a complete inventory of NATO owned materiel and equipment which: a. b. Has been acquired during the operation and is not on an existing TOE. Is likely to be re-usable and recoverable in a cost effective manner.
This list of re-usable and recoverable items will then be circulated to RC who will be invited to bid for items which can be used to fill shortfalls in existing or proposed TOE. The JOC / SDC of the appropriate SC will then elicit decisions on how the re-usable items are to be allocated. Once the bids have been screened and the items have been allocated, it will fall to the gaining RC/JSRC to arrange collection of the items in advance of planned re-deployment. Costs should be ascribed to the operation.
CHAPTER 3 LOGISTIC FUNCTIONAL AREAS
Section I - Introduction
0301. This chapter details the concept of direction and co-ordination of the selected functional areas vital to NATO's logistic concept. A comprehensive understanding of these particular functional areas are warranted given the greater role that the NATO commander plays in their execution and their expected importance in future operations. For further information regarding planning of these and other functional logistic areas see the FPGL.
Section II - Supply, Maintenance and Repair

0302. Supply, Maintenance and Repair. These are the primary logistic functions to ensure the sustainability of NATO forces. Supply covers all materiel items used in the equipment support and maintenance of military forces. Maintenance means all actions to retain materiel in or restore it to a specified condition. Repair includes all measures taken to restore materiel to a serviceable condition in the shortest possible time. 0303. Civil Resources and Dual Use. In times of limited defence expenditure, the effective management of both civil and military resources capable of supporting forces is essential and must be pursued by nations and NATO commanders in the planning and execution of operations. Efforts should be made to maximise the availability of civil resources. Contracting of supplies and services is a means to serve this aim and is outlined later in this chapter. 0304. Classes of Supply. NATO classes of supply are established in the five-class system of identification as follows: Class I Items which are consumed by personnel and animals at an approximately uniform rate, irrespective of local changes in combat or terrain conditions, e.g. food and forage. Class II Supplies for which allowances are established by tables of organisation and equipment, e.g. clothing, weapons, tools, spare parts, vehicles. Class III Fuel and lubricants for all purposes, except for operating aircraft or for use in weapons such as flame-throwers. e.g. gasoline, fuel oil, greases, coal and coke. Class III a Aviation fuel and lubricants.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Class IV Supplies for which initial use allowances are not prescribed by approved issue tables. Normally includes fortification and construction materials, as well as additional quantities of items identical to those authorised for initial issue (Class II) such as additional vehicles. Class V Ammunition, explosives and chemical agents of all types. Note: Some nations use different classes of supply. A table of correspondence can be found in NATO Standardisation Agreement (STANAG) 2961. 0305. Provision of Supplies. Nations have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the provision of sufficient supplies and services to adequately sustain their forces in NATO operations. However, under the premise of nations and NATO commanders sharing a collective responsibility for the logistic support of NATOs operations, the NATO commander will assume extended authority concerning the control of Multinational Integrated Logistic support Units (MILU) and commonly provided supplies and services. 0306. Supplies Suited for Multinational Provision. In the field of supplies, multinational support arrangements can usually be considered for the provision of food, water (bulk and bottled), bulk fuel, some ammunition types and medical supplies. Table 1-1 provides examples of supplies and services, and possible methods of provision. The supplies and services to be provided by multinational logistics will be determined in concert with nations prior to commencement of the operation and will depend on the degree of standardisation and interoperability within the force. This is the vital and common effort to be achieved in the logistic planning conferences and the HNS planning conferences.
SUPPORT SUITED FOR MULTINATIONAL PROVISION

Ser Class of Support National HNS/Contracting (d) Multinational (e) MILU Multinational Lead Nation (g) Role Specialisation (h)
(a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 25
(b) Class I Fresh Class I Combat Bulk Water Bottled Water Class II Class III Bulk Class III Oil/Lubricants Class IV Class V Transport Port Operations Maint/Repair Maint/Recovery Laundry & Bath Environmental Hygiene Postal Care of Death Sanitation/ Refuse/Salvage Troop Welfare Labour Resources Storage Materiel Handling Equipment Blood/Products Pharmaceuticals/ Medical Materials Medical Support Aeromedical Evacuation Printing
(c)
(f)
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x (3) x x x (4)
X(5)
x x
x
X X X
x x
x x
x x x Table 3-1
x x x
x x
Notes: 1. Where a supply or service is indicated as being suitable for multinational provision, options for role specialisation, lead nation, or multinational integrated logistic support unit (MILU) and/or HNS and contracting are shown in the shaded area. 2. Many services whether national or multinational, can be sourced from host nation or contracted suppliers. These are indicated in column (d). 3. Co-ordination on a multinational basis, execution on a national contracted basis. 4. Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE), although normally an element of the national transportation and/or supply systems, could be provided multinationally for specific missions. 5. Such multinational provision of medical supplies, especially pharmaceuticals, is subject to multiple laws, regulations and certification requirements.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 0307. Maintenance and Repair. The operational effectiveness of NATO forces will depend to a great extent on a high standard of maintenance, in peacetime, of the equipment and associated material in use. In crisis or conflict, an efficient maintenance organisation, composed of NATO and / or national repair facilities, is an essential component of NATOs capability. Therefore, nations should be encouraged to make bilateral/ multilateral agreements in peace to cover use of national repair facilities in both peacetime and wartime. This will facilitate the transfer of repair loads from one nations facilities to another and will exercise cross-servicing facilities and procedures. Whenever weapon systems are used by more than one nation, a co-ordinated approach to logistics is recommended. Not only can logistic resources be shared, but by consolidating supply and maintenance requirements, unique opportunities are created to reduce investment and operating costs. Although addressed separately above, the NATO definition of Maintenance includes the associated supply and repair actions. 0308. Battle Damage Repair (BDR). BDR is designed to restore materiel to a battle worthy condition, irrespective of the cause of the failure, as quickly as possible. The likely success of BDR may be improved by peacetime training, testing of techniques for the assessment of damage and for rapid repair, assembly of appropriate stocks (materiel, spare parts, equipment), the exchange of experience at all levels, and the design of BDR tools and materials. Cooperative and/or HNS arrangements may improve BDR capabilities. a. BDR (Air). This covers the arrangements for the best possible repair taking into account the resources and time available, the environmental conditions, and operational requirements. To achieve this it is necessary to carry out sufficient repairs to the aircraft to enable it to fly at least one additional sortie, to carry out repairs in the shortest time scale possible, and to remove dangers arising from non-critical damage. Weapon System/Equipment BDR (Land). NATO is developing a number of STANAGs which will help collectively to intensify the co-ordination/co-operation of available civil/military repair and recovery resources. BDR (Maritime). Includes arrangements for the best possible repair and post-repair maintenance checks of maritime units, considering the availability of repair facilities in the area, resources available and operational requirements. Airfield Damage Repair (ADR). This covers responsibilities for engineering, reconnaissance, explosive ordnance disposal, repair of minimum operating strip and other parts of the minimum aircraft operating surface, and the restoration of services essential to sortie generation. In principle, ADR is a host nation responsibility; however, where no capability exists, incoming forces using an airfield for operations are responsible for providing the equipment, personnel and material required to establish an ADR capability either through their national resources, or through bi/multilateral support arrangements with the host or other nations.
b.
c.
d.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 0309. Cross Servicing. A NATO aircraft cross-servicing system enables aircraft of one NATO nation to be serviced at the airfields of other NATO nations. Because of the different technical equipment required, (specialised refuelling equipment, calibration sets and so on), the system does not allow all NATO aircraft to be serviced at all NATO airfields. It does, however, indicate which airfields can provide facilities for specific aircraft through publications that are regularly updated. Aircraft cross-servicing falls into two categories: a. Stage A Cross Servicing. The servicing of aircraft on airfields/ships which enables the aircraft to be flown on another mission, without change to the weapon configuration. The servicing includes the installation and removal of weapon system safety devices, refuelling, replenishment of fluids and gases, drag chutes, starting facilities and ground handling. Stage B Cross Servicing. The servicing of aircraft on airfields/ships which enables the aircraft to be flown on an operational mission. The servicing includes all Stage A services, plus the loading of weapons and/or film/videotape and the replenishment of chaff and flares. This includes the processing and interpretation of exposed film/videotape from the previous mission.
b.
0310. Asset Tracking. The topic of asset tracking is relatively new to NATO and much work lay ahead in developing NATOs policy and direction for standardising asset tracking. The operational requirement for asset tracking in NATO is as follows: a. Logistic asset information is essential for the efficient management and co-ordination of support to NATO forces. From wherever this information may originate, nations and NATO have a collective responsibility for ensuring that the appropriate level of authority has access. This is particularly so for mission critical items and the major cost drivers. This information is required to enable them to: (1) (2) (3) Determine the location, condition, quantity, and availability of materiel. Control and co-ordinate lines of communication. Cross service materiel between units, formations, components and, when appropriate, nations. Determine the location of materiel in-transit. Re-assign and re-distribute consignments, when appropriate. Manage the repairable loop. Monitor priorities and apportionment.
(4) (5) (6) (7) b.
Asset tracking will significantly improve the quality and timeliness of asset information. Less those assets owned by NATO, the vast majority of assets within a NATO force 3-5 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 are nationally owned and will directly realise the benefits of asset tracking. By association, NATO commanders will equally benefit in that asset tracking will provide: (1) Greater harmonisation and co-ordination of materiel management, thus improving logistic effectiveness and enhancing combat power. (2) Less risk in materiel management, enabling the more efficient use of assets and reduction of stock holdings, resulting in more flexible and mobile logistics at all levels of operation. (3) Timely and accurate data against which logistic support decisions can be based. c. The benefit of collective use by Allied nations constitute NATOs primary operational requirement for asset tracking. Although by comparison the operational enhancements of NATO owned and operated asset tracking are secondary, similar benefits pertain to: (1) NATO owned equipment, specifically in NATO commands and units with parent CJTF HQ responsibilities. (2) The operational use of NATO controlled multinational units.
(3) Contingent plan infrastructure which if beyond that reasonably expected to be provided by a nation. 0311. Standardisation. The NATO Standardisation programme provides the direction for standardisation of materiel, services and procedures. Standardisation has a direct impact on sustainability and combat effectiveness and should therefore be attained as soon as possible. a. Nations have agreed to share requirements information during the development process for new equipment. This sharing of information provides options and opportunities for efficiencies and savings through co-production, sale of existing or developing equipment of one nation that may satisfy another nations requirements. When nations use NATO standardisation guidelines for material, supplies and consumables, resupply and maintenance are made easier. Consequently, some nations have decided to have some equipment managed commonly by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), which has developed the Common User Item List (CUIL) of equipment in order to enable nations to quickly locate possible sources of critical items of materiel in emergencies. Nations have agreed to enhance interoperability, and in the supply of materiel, this enhancement is realised through common consumables such as fuel and ammunition, rations, tools and equipment. Additionally, STANAG procedures should be incorporated in national doctrine to the extent that forces know how to transfer consumables, at a minimum. The existence on the battlefield of standard or interoperable materiel and consumables is of limited value if forces are unable to execute 3-6 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 sufficient co-ordination to affect a needed transfer. Interoperable national supply systems and operations will facilitate the NATO commanders ability to redistribute specified supply assets when required and agreed by nations. 0312. Stock Level Management. The stock criteria in terms of days of supply will be determined based on the Sustainability Statement agreed by contributing nations for the particular operation and published in the logistic annex to the operation order (see the Bi-MNC FPGL). Stocks for sustained operations will include organic stocks of units plus additional stocks, maintained at support levels, necessary to cover the order-ship time for supplies. The actual positioning of supplies will be dependent on the operational situation and the ability of the strategic and tactical transportation to move supplies forward into theatre. Other factors that will influence stock levels and locations include the political situation, the risk to which the stocks will be exposed, and the cost effectiveness of deploying stocks forward versus moving stocks from home bases. 0313. Supply Systems and Replenishment. a. The flow of supplies into an operational area must begin prior to or concurrently with the flow of units and personnel, and be fully synchronised. After the build-up of stocks required in-region and in-theatre, a continuous flow of resupply is to be established to avoid peak loads and to minimise the risk of losses. The movement of these supplies remains a national responsibility, however, the co-ordination and prioritisation rests with the NATO commander. There are within the Alliance two basic methods of operating the supply system: (1) Push-System. The logistic organisation operates a push-system when the replenishment is based on anticipated requirements or standard consumption rates. Generally, in such a system, the supplies are shipped (pushed) as far as possible to the customer. To avoid the creation of large stockpiles seamless coordination between operational and logistic planners is required as well as effective use of technology such as Command, Control and Information Systems (CCIS) and Asset Tracking Systems. Pull-System. The logistic organisation operates a pull-system when the resupply is based on requisitions from the supported unit. Under specific conditions this system may offer economic advantages, but when contact with the enemy is imminent, a lower risk approach may be needed, due especially to the time constraints.
b.
(2)
c.
Under both of these methods, supplies may be distributed by supply point or unit distribution, or a combination of both. Supply point distribution moves supplies to a central distribution point where receiving units arrange their own delivery. Unit distribution describes a delivery system which moves supplies forward to the user unit, eliminating the individual unit delivery arrangements requirement.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED d. AJP-4 In practice, an amalgamation of all existing frameworks and methods will be used to support a combined/multinational operation and will vary for each campaign and phase of operation. Commanders will have to adapt and compromise, creating an efficient supply chain and an effective regeneration loop.
0314. Supply Procedures. Supply transactions between nations or national forces may take the form of pre-planned logistic assistance, emergency logistic assistance in crisis and conflict, multinational support, or redistribution under the provisions of MC 319/1. The relevant supply procedures are standardised in STANAG 2034. The compensation for delivered or redistributed supplies should be executed in accordance with STANAG 3381. Nations should implement the provisions of these STANAGs in their national doctrine and procedures to enhance the efficient execution of mutual support. 0315. Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) - Class III a. General. The provision of POL is a national responsibility, however, it is the class of supply which lends itself most easily to multinational initiatives. Centrally arranged contracts are normal for bulk fuels as these ensure consistent quality and achieve the best price for the nations. The usual means of letting the contracts is through a Role Specialist Nation (RSN), Lead Nation (LN), Host Nation (HN) or through a Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) which may be negotiated through the MJLC or logistic staff. Where there is a RSN, LN or HN, the nation concerned may also offer common services to those who choose to obtain their supplies through the central contract. These services may include the provision of Quality Assurance and Quality Surveillance (QA and QS) laboratory services, assessments of authorised alternative products from the local market and arrangements for direct delivery. When operations are mounted in most European NATO nations, fuel may also be supplied directly from the NATO Pipeline System. NATO Pipeline System (NPS). (1) The NPS consists of nine separate and distinct military storage and distribution systems running through twelve host nation countries in Europe: Italy, Greece, Turkey (two separate systems), the United Kingdom, Norway, Portugal, the North European Pipeline System (NEPS) located in both Denmark and Germany, and the largest system, the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The NPS in total consists of approximately 11,500 km of pipeline with its associated depots, connected air bases, civil airports, pump stations, refineries and entry points. Bulk distribution is achieved using these facilities provided from the NATO common-funded Security Investment Programme. The networks are controlled by national organisations, with the exception of the CEPS which is a multinational system. In cases of Article 5 operations, the normal means of meeting military bulk fuel requirements will be from depots and other facilities of the NPS. Nations can 3-8 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
(2)
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 however, make alternative arrangements with the HN through bilateral agreement if it better suits the needs of the operational situation. c. Single Fuel Concept (SFC). The aim of the concept is to maximise equipment interoperability through the use of a single fuel, namely F-34, on the battlefield for land based military aircraft, vehicles and equipment. This means that only one bulk fuel type (F-34) will be supplied. In operations short of war, nations may elect to use diesel (F54) or commercial equivalent or a mixture of F-34 and F-54 which is designated F-65, however, bulk gasoline will not normally be supplied. For some minor equipment where it is impractical to install anything other than a gasoline engine, the fuel will normally be supplied in packed form and is a national responsibility. Tactical Fuel Handling Equipment (TFHE). Many NATO nations and PfP nations have considerable stocks of TFHE, but there is a long standing and unresolved problem of inter-connection. Interoperability is vital on the battlefield and in peacekeeping operations, and each nation must ensure that it provides adapters and couplings which conform to STANAG 3756. War Damage Repair (WARDAM) Equipment. A number of nations maintain WARDAM equipment to repair and support their NPS. This equipment becomes an available resource if an NPS is used to support a NATO mission.
d.
e.
Section III - Movement and Transportation

0316. General. a. Movement and transportation include the whole spectrum of infrastructure, organisations, facilities and equipment which is necessary for the deployment, reception, onward movement, sustainment and re-deployment of NATO forces during the execution of a mission. A flexible and responsive movement and transportation concept is required to implement the Alliance Strategic Concept and requires a integrated and balanced system of movement control, modal and terminal operations. The multinational character of Alliance forces and the limited availability of movement and transport resources require co-ordination and co-operation between military and civil agencies in order to deconflict movements based on priorities established by the NATO commander. The flexibility inherent in the selection of NATO forces and the undetermined nature and location of potential areas of operation limit the capability for detailed pre-planned movement and transportation. This places a great reliance upon the ability of Alliance forces to deploy timely and requires close co-operation among the Nations. The requirement for flexibility does not remove the need for pre-planning. The movement requirements of all deployable units should be calculated and recorded by the nations. 3-9 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 0317. Levels of Mobility. a. Strategic Mobility. Strategic mobility is the capability to move forces and their associated logistic support quickly and effectively over long distances. This can be between theatre (inter-theatre), between regions (inter-regional), or beyond NATO Area of Responsibility. Operational Mobility. Operational mobility is the capability to move forces and their associated logistic support quickly and effectively within a region (intra-regional). It also embraces the capability to concentrate regional forces against the major enemy thrust and to counter-concentrate operational reserves. Tactical Mobility. Tactical mobility is the quality or capability to concentrate regional in-place forces up to division level against the major local enemy thrust and to counterconcentrate tactical reserves.
b.
c.
0318. Modes of Transport a. There are two types of transportation modes (air and surface) available for the conduct of military operations. The air mode consists of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The surface mode includes sea, road, rail and inland water transport. The transportation mode used depends on the existing geography and developmental infrastructure available. Selecting the mode of transport for a particular mission, regardless of the level of war, requires the consideration of certain criteria. The criteria are priority of the requirement, required delivery date, type of cargo, special restrictions, economy and efficiency, available resources and security. The type of military involvement may also influence mode selection. A multinational approach and redundancy of modes enhances the flexibility of the transportation system, making it more responsive to changing situations. Intermodality. Intermodal capability is the ability of modes to transfer shipments from one to another with minimum handling requirements. It involves more than the mode or transport; it also includes the container, packaging, or other preparations. The positioning of the appropriate materials handling equipment (MHE) to handle the cargo is very important in intermodal operations. Also crucial is the preparation of cargo to guarantee acceptability by the succeeding mode. Air Transport. Air transport is a flexible and essential element of the transportation system. Fixed-wing air transport moves personnel, high-priority equipment and supplies to, from and within the theatre of operations. Rotary-wing air transport provides a more rapid and flexible system of transportation within the theatre of operations. Sea Transport. Sea transport is the essential element of the transportation system to move the majority of equipment and supplies. It provides the capacity to move commodity in large volumes in the most economical manner over long distances. Sea transport is relatively slow and limited by the adequacy of port facilities and beaches. 3-10 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
d.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 e. Road Transport. Road transport because of its flexibility is the key element in the integrated transport system. It provides a connecting link between receiving units, major aerial and seaports, supply centres and rail and inland waterway terminals. It provides the transhipment capability between other modes of transport and is the primary means of support to combat forces. Rail Transport. Rail transport is the primary inland mode for sustained flow of large quantities of equipment and supplies over long distances. It is both resilient and economical. Rail transport is limited by having fixed routes and restricted outside clearance. Inland Water Transport. Inland water transport is another inland mode for sustained flow of large quantities of equipment and supplies over long distances. It is an economical mode of transport. Inland water transport is limited by having fixed routes and is relatively slow.
f.
g.
0319. Tasks and Responsibilities. NATO and nations have a collective responsibility for movement and transportation support to NATO operations. Specific responsibilities are: a. NATO Responsibility. NATO Commanders are responsible for initiating, prioritising, co-ordination and deconflicting the deployment, transportation for sustainment (resupply), and re-deployment of their respective forces. This must be done in cooperation with nations. Nations Responsibility. Sending Nations have the primary responsibility for obtaining transportation resources to deploy, sustain, and re-deploy their forces. They also have primary responsibility for planning and controlling the movement of national forces, national components of multinational forces, and where a nation has accepted lead nation responsibility of a multinational headquarters group. This principle must be tempered by the need for co-operation, co-ordination and economy, and may include bilateral and/or multi-lateral co-operative arrangements. The host nation has the ultimate authority for movement on sovereign territory.
b.
0320. Communications and Automated Data Processing (ADP) Support. a. Interoperable, and where required, secure communications and ADP facilities are necessary to support the acquisition of movement and transportation resources and to enable appropriate planning, control and co-ordination. To be viable, the communications and ADP systems must provide commanders with timely information concerning status of force deployment, availability of transportation resources, and the status of the lines of communication. ADAMS is the ADP tool and its use is described in paragraph 0113 b. 3-11 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
Section IV - Medical
0321. General. It is primarily a national responsibility to provide for an efficient medical support system that includes the maintenance of health and the prevention of disease, the holding, treatment and evacuation of patients, the resupply of blood and medical materiel, to minimise man-days lost due to injury and illness, and the return of casualties to duty. An effective medical support system is thus considered a potential force multiplier. General medical support precepts and guidance for NATO are provided in MC 326. Medical support must meet standards acceptable to all participating nations and provide a standard of medical care as close as possible to prevailing peacetime standards, taking into account the operational environment. 0322. Medical Support Doctrine. Medical support doctrine is embedded within and is consistent with the overall logistic support doctrine and embraces both multinational and joint medical support concepts. Further detail on the medical doctrine is provided in supporting doctrine publications. The ultimate aim of this doctrine is to provide nationally acceptable medical standards, in order to facilitate overall readiness and effectiveness of medical support with a minimum essential logistic/medical footprint. Co-ordination, and in some circumstances, integration, of medical assets and capabilities will optimise the provision and use of limited resources. The planning of co-ordinated multinational medical support must be flexible, however, and will vary depending on the circumstances of the operation. It must also consider the willingness of CNs to participate in any aspect of integrated medical support. 0323. Medical Co-ordination a. Terms. Multinational medical support is the overarching term for methods of medical support for operations other than purely national support. Joint medical support is provided when more than one service participates. Methods of Support. Nations are ultimately responsible for provision of medical support for their own forces. Medical support and national medical systems of care and evacuation should be retained as much as possible. Nevertheless, multinational and integrated medical services should be used when advantages of economies of scale can be achieved. Medical support options include: role specialisation, lead nation, bilateral and multilateral mutual support agreements, HNS, and multinational integrated medical facilities both for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. Medical C2 Structure. For most Article 5 operations, the agreed CE medical staff organisation will be used. For CJTF operations, the following arrangements will normally be used: (1) Chain of Command. A medical advisor and staff must be appointed at all levels of command during an operation. The technical medical chain will extend from the SC Medical Advisor through the Theatre Surgeon and the Formation 3-12 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Surgeons to all medical assets in theatre. At every level, the Surgeon / Medical Advisor must have direct access to the commander. (2) Theatre Surgeon (Group). The Theatre Surgeon, with an appropriate staff element, will be included in the CJTF HQs. The Theatre Surgeon is the Theatre Commanders Medical Advisor. As a special staff officer, he maintains direct access to the commander. The Theatre Surgeon is responsible for setting the Commanders theatre medical policy and provides medical input to logistic planning. Medical Co-ordination Centre (MEDCC). The MEDCC works under the technical direction of the Theatre Surgeon and co-ordinates multinational, joint and multifunctional medical issues, including aeromedical evacuation. The MEDCC will normally be assigned to the MJLC, when formed. When an MJLC is not formed, the MEDCC will normally reside as a part of the CJ 4 staff at the CJTF HQs. The principle function of the MEDCC is the execution of medical plans and implementation of medical policies set by the Theatre Surgeon.
(3)
d.
Reporting. Successful co-ordination of medical assets in theatre requires maximum visibility of those assets. Collective responsibility requires the NATO commanders oversight of all logistic issues within his AOR. Therefore, once in the theatre and for the duration of the operation, all medical units will report their capabilities in a timely manner up the chain of command. Medical assets may be visited and evaluated in order to ensure the theatre commander of their readiness and capabilities. Communications. Maximising the effectiveness of the medical support system requires a reliable medical C2 system and an interoperable reporting and patient tracking system. Because of its significance, medical connectivity is an extremely important requirement. For this reason, a dedicated medical communications system is highly desirable. Each medical element should be able to reliably communicate with their national elements and their respective formation commanders, as well as other members of the medical technical chain, to ensure the timely passage of medical information and expertise throughout the medical structure.
e.
0324. Evacuation. The availability and the type of transport assets to be utilised, length of the evacuation route and the operational environment will determine the size and the capability of medical facilities at intermediate levels. Evacuation policy will be established by the operational commander after consultation with the medical planning staff and in concert with the operational and logistic staff and contributing nations. Evacuation resources will be provided appropriate to a particular mission. 0325. Aeromedical Evacuation. In many situations, whether in peace, crisis or conflict, aeromedical evacuation has proven the fastest and most desirable form of casualty movement. When aeromedical evacuation is possible, it has many advantages over other forms of patient movement. In the past aeromedical evacuation, like all medical issues, has been considered 3-13 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 strictly a national responsibility. Experience in recent operations and exercise has clearly shown potential benefits from various forms of multinational co-operation in this field, to include lead nation and role specialisation concepts. The potential for multinational aeromedical evacuation must be carefully evaluated during the planning process. a. Patient movement. Aeromedical evacuation is the expedient movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. It may include up to three complementary phases: (1) Forward Aeromedical Evacuation. That phase of evacuation which provides airlift for patients between points within the battlefield, from the battlefield to the initial point of treatment and to subsequent points of treatment within the combat zone. Tactical Aeromedical Evacuation. That phase of evacuation which provides airlift for patients from the combat zone to points outside the combat zone, and between points within the communication zone, also called intra-theatre aeromedical evacuation. Strategic Aeromedical Evacuation. That phase of evacuation which provides airlift for patients from overseas areas or from theatres of active operations, to the home base, to other NATO countries, or to a temporary safe area, also called Inter-theatre Aeromedical Evacuation.
(2)
(3)
b.
Aeromedical Evacuation Requirements. A proper aeromedical evacuation system requires: (1) An aeromedical organisation staffed with specialised aeromedical personnel to prepare patients for evacuation and to manage them en-route. One or more aeromedical staging facilities (ASF). Aircraft that are appropriate for the task, particularly to carry stretchers (standard, non-standard or improvised) securely and to enable medical management en-route. The aircraft must be readily available to the medical personnel who must have a high priority for their use if they are not dedicated solely to medical use. Specialised medical equipment cleared for in-flight use.
(2) (3)
(4)
Section V - Contracting.
0326. General. Contracting has become increasingly important to the conduct of NATO operations, particularly in non-Article 5 missions. As the brief outline of contracting in Chapter One of this document illustrates, contracting is a significant tool that may be employed 3-14 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 to gain access to local resources, and other necessary materials and services. During operations, the SC Head of Contracts (HOC) will exercise technical supervision and oversight of all procurement activities associated with the NATO operation. In addition to maintaining liaison with participating nations, the SC HOC will: a. Establish practices and procedures as required to ascertain functional control and assess efficiency of activities with contractual implications. Establish liaison with participating nations via national liaison representatives as required for procurement issues. Co-ordinate and deconflict SC wide issues associated with procurement management regarding support to the ongoing NATO operation.
b.
c.
0327. Host Nation. While contracting may be an important component for any type of NATO operation, it is likely that the bulk of co-ordinating Article 5 contracting activities will rest with the HN. The HN will certainly be most familiar with the optimal local sources for required resources. To ensure the NATO commander's priorities are reflected in the contracting for scarce resources, a NATO contracting team should be collocated with the host nation contracting element. 0328. NATO Co-ordination. Non-Article 5 operations will typically require a much greater effort by the NATO commander to co-ordinate the contracting effort. The probable lack of pre-existing HN support agreements will place an additional burden on the NATO force to provision support and these potential shortfalls must be supported. Some of this shortfall may be alleviated by contracted local civilian resources. This situation may be compounded by the lack of infrastructure in areas where these types of operations may be conducted, resulting in competition between contractors for scarce resources. Finally, there may be situations where a legitimate host nation government does not exist to assist with co-ordination of the contract effort. In such cases, the CJTF HQ is designed to be self-sustaining in terms of contract support. 0329. Functions. The following are the general functions required by a NATO contracting activity when established as part of the support structure. This activity is usually sited in the MJLC and referred to as the Theatre Allied Contracting Office (TACO). While these functions may be executed to one degree or another in all types of operations, they are most likely to be particularly important in non-Article 5 missions. a. b. c. Establishment of procurement and contracting policy and procedures for the operation. Synchronisation and co-ordination of contracting for in theatre civilian resources. Deconfliction of contracting requirements for resources in accordance with the commanders priorities. Establishment of contracts on behalf of CNs and NATO Commands. 3-15 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
d.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Accounting for expenditures in co-ordination with the Theatre Financial Controller (TFC) and his staff. 0330. Funding. The TACO facilitates the contracting requirement on behalf of Contributing Nations and NATO commands, and ensures the NATO commander's priorities for support are maintained as the contracts are executed. This does not imply, however, that NATO funds the requirements. In fact, for most operations, the preponderance of requirements will be funded by contributing nations participating in the contract even though the TACO actually establishes the contracts. Additionally, there will also be items contracted for NATO activities/organisations as common funded requirements. This dual funding chain must be recognised and appropriate accounting procedures implemented to keep the process co-ordinated but separate. Figure 3-1 illustrates an example of this dual funding process. 0331. Organisation. As with most elements co-ordinating logistic functions, the organisation of the TACO must remain flexible. If an MJLC is established, the TACO will be a subordinate support cell, and the central activities collocated with the MJLC. In addition, to observe an important principle of providing contracting and purchasing support down to the level where operations are being conducted, it is important that the contracting policies and procedures be standardised and applied consistently at each level. a. In establishing the contracting organisation, consideration should be given to utilising the technical expertise available (on a reimbursable basis) from NAMSA. They offer experience and familiarity with complex contracting requirements, having flexible regulations that may be beneficial in operating a contracting organisation. In keeping with the principle of extending contracting support to the lowest possible levels consideration should be given to establishing local contracting centres at the location of the command being supported. This is especially important for large operations spread over great geographical distances. e.
b.
Figure 3-1 illustrates the contracting concept.
CONTRACTING CONCEPT
CENTRALISED MANAGEMENT
NATO FUNDED REQ

CONTRACTORS
CN FUNDED REQ
CONTRACTORS
CONSTRUCTION TACO THEATRE BUDFIN RENTAL VEH SNOW REMOVAL PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS THEATRE HQ MJLC CJTF HQ SELECTED ENG PROJ
BOA & BSVA TACO
DELIVER GOODS SVCS
PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS
CN NSE
FIG 3-1
Section VI - Budget and Finance

0332. Introduction. The areas of budget and finance impact virtually every aspect of NATO logistic operations. These areas tend to be very focused and require a working knowledge of a broad range of technical regulations and other publications. These technical publications cover adequately the daily operations of the budget and finance systems within NATO. The purpose of this section is not to mirror these technical publications, but to provide an overview of NATO's approach to financing potential NATO operations. 0333. General. The funding and budget policies covering each specific NATO operation are unique. A guiding principle, which applies to NATO and non-NATO nations alike, is that costs lie where they fall. Common funding will normally be restricted to the deployment and sustainment of the NATO HQs in theatre and the mission related costs to the NATO HQs supporting the operation. Contributing nations will bear all costs associated with deployment and sustainment of their forces. Exceptionally, the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) may elect to fund specific theatre-wide infrastructure or communications improvement projects. The specifics of each operation will determine the type and amount of NATO funding allocated for support. 0334. Sources of Funding. If approved, NATO funding will normally be provided through the NATO Military Budget (MB) and/or the NSIP. A screening process occurs, by the SC Crisis Management Resource Board, of all projects proposed for NATO funding in support of the operation. If approved, the funds are then requested in the form of operational budgets submitted to the Military Budget Committee (MBC) for approval (which are funded on the basis
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 of credit ceilings by account categories), or in the context of specific projects submitted to the Infrastructure Committee (IC) for approval, on the basis of project allocations. 0335. Funding Considerations. Typically, items considered for NATO funding in support of an operation include support of various NATO headquarters and theatre wide infrastructure improvements. The purchase or funding of NATO owned equipment must be properly documented, as discussed in chapter 2, Section VI. 0336. Procedures. NATO funding for non-routine operational requirements should be expected to be very limited and subject to extreme scrutiny. Funding requirements must be identified, with full justification, early in the planning process. The Theatre Commander's Financial Controller will either approve the request or forward it to the appropriate SC Financial Controller/Resources Division for validation and approval, or forwarding to the MBC or IC, as appropriate. 0337. Organisation and Responsibilities. While each operation may vary slightly in the organisation established to execute financial responsibilities, the general tasks and organisational structures discussed below should be considered for all NATO operations. The organisation for nonArticle 5 and Article 5 operations may differ given that a Financial Element may be established to support the CJTF Commander, but where established, NATO commands will provide support from existing, or augmented, financial staffs. In addition, for CJTF operations, the specific command and control arrangements will dictate the level of involvement and responsibilities of the supporting financial staffs. a. Theatre Financial Controller (TFC). The TFC will be the CJTF Commander's primary financial advisor. The TFC will be responsible for the correct and efficient application of all international funds approved for use in the theatre in support of the operation. In addition, he will co-ordinate theatre funding requirements with the appropriate SC for validation and incorporation into the overall theatre budget. The following represent additional responsibilities of the TFC: (1) Establishment of detailed operating plans and procedures relating to accounting, reporting, budget, management, and procurement. Establishment of the theatre financial organisation and institution of financial controls, and the provision of support to operational elements, as required.
(2)
b.
SC Infrastructure/Resources Division/Branch. This organisation provides support for the development and execution of projects approved by the IC. It monitors acceptance and close out of NSIP funded projects and maintains liaison with the Infrastructure Committee and the Senior Resource Board. SC Financial Controller. The SC Financial Controller exercises authority as budget holder for all OPLAN funding on behalf of the SC commander, and exercises technical supervision and oversight of all financial management activities associated with the NATO operation. In addition to maintaining liaison with funding nations as represented in the MBC, the SC Financial Controller will: 3-18 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
c.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 (1) Conduct audits as required to ensure financial control and assess the efficiency of financial activities. Establish liaison with contributing nations via national liaison representatives as required for financial issues. Co-ordinate and deconflict SC wide issues associated with financial management regarding support to the ongoing NATO operation.
(2)
(3)
Section VII - Infrastructure Engineering

0338. General. Infrastructure Engineering is not purely a logistic function, however, it is critical to achieving the logistics mission. Close co-ordination between the disciplines is essential to facilitate and maintain open lines of communication and to the construction of support facilities. The engineering mission bridges the gap from logistics to operations and is closely related to the ultimate success of both. 0339. NSIP Capability Package. The principal Alliance infrastructure planning mechanism is the NATO NSIP CP. In support of Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations, NATO infrastructure staff analyse missions with operational planners, subject to ministerial guidance, to determine the Alliance's ability to conduct mandated operations. This analysis includes examination of existing national military and civil (both Allied and possible HN) and NATO-owned infrastructure for use in supporting multinational operations. When existing infrastructure assets are insufficient to meet operational needs, NSIP projects may be developed. 0340. Host Nation Support. In the past, a large portion of the infrastructure required to conduct Article 5 operations was available from existing or slightly expanded Allied nation assets. NATO's new strategic concept, embracing non-Article 5 operations beyond the traditional alliance territory, requires logisticians to depend more upon HNS / local resources and mobile, flexible, reusable infrastructure to support forces. In many remote areas where Alliance forces could be involved in operations, HNS / local resources will be minimal. In these cases, the NATO commander must prioritise the utilisation of limited support. Deliberate planning by both Alliance operations and logistic staffs should recognise these infrastructure deficiencies and channel national and NATO resources to meet the shortfall, using the CP processes described above. 0341. Contract Support. In some cases, infrastructure shortfalls for specific regional operations may be met by Bi or Multilateral contracts. In addition, emergency NSIP procedures exist for common funding of mission critical infrastructure requirements. 0342. NATO Operational Infrastructure Engineering. The following are areas of focus regarding NATO's co-ordination of the Infrastructure Engineering Function in support of operations:
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 a. Responsibility. Engineering functions are generally a national responsibility, coordinated by the NATO commander. Factors Affecting Infrastructure. NATO's focus on infrastructure engineering, much like contracting, will be greatly influenced by the type of operation (Article 5 or nonArticle 5) being conducted. Non-Article 5 operations are likely to require increased NATO direction and co-ordination because of the less robust host nation engineering capability. NATO infrastructure engineering involvement will also be enhanced when the mission or operational areas dictate significant infrastructure investment. NATO will normally limit the infrastructure investment to those areas required by the mission and defined by the support requirements. This may include the repair of roads, runways, support facilities, bridges or other lines of communications. Additionally, operations may generate infrastructure requirements for support of forces operating out of the theatre. Funding. It is likely that projects as those described above will, at least in part, be NATO funded. There will be close co-ordination between the ECC, where established, and the appropriate SC Resource Division and their Infrastructure offices. It is through the SC Resources Division that co-ordination occurs and requests are processed to the NATO IC. Organisation. In a CJTF operation, a Theatre Engineer will be assigned as a special staff officer to the Commander. The Theatre Engineer may direct an ECC to coordinate the engineering functions in theatre. In instances where a JRACC is established, a staff engineer may be assigned. The organisation of the ECC will vary depending on the specific type and the level of engineering co-ordination required The organisation shown below in figure 3-2 offers a general template and functional areas that should be considered when constructing the ECC.
b.
c.
d.
ECC ORGANISATION
CJTF HQ
DIRECTOR MJLC
CHIEF ENGINEER
ADMIN
ECC
PLANS OPERATIONS PROJECT MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT MINES
PROGRAMS & FINANCE REO REO TEAMS REO
TEAMS
TEAMS
REO = REGIONAL ENGINEER OFFICE
FIG 3-2
Section VIII- Real Estate.

0343. General. The management and co-ordination of real estate and related property issues is of prime importance in multinational logistic operations. In an Article 5 operation much of this responsibility will be assumed by the host nation. The NATO commanders role may be relatively minor, focusing on the allocation of space and facilitating any required inspections and claims in co-ordination with the host nation. In a non-Article 5 operation, however, the real estate function is likely to be much more complex and present a larger challenge to the NATO commander. In these cases, the NATO commander must be prepared to co-ordinate the real estate functions that will develop as the operation is conducted. 0344. Functions. There are essentially three basic functions in the area of real estate management that predominate. a. The allocation of real estate in the theatre is an operational issue that is co-ordinated by the CJ 3. However, once the sites have been allocated, management falls to the occupying nation, a LN (for sites such as commonly funded concentration areas) acting on behalf of NATO, or a NATO HQ itself. In practice therefore, the management of NATO sites becomes a CJ 4 matter.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED b. AJP-4 Establishment and monitoring of environmental and maintenance standards for real estate and facilities to be occupied. Processing and execution of Claims for damage to any property or facilities.
c.
0345. Responsibilities. There are certain responsibilities that apply in the management of real estate, regardless of the type of operation. a. National Responsibility. Nations remain responsible for the taking over and handing over of property and real estate occupied by troops contributed by their nations. Further, the costs of occupation and the settlement of claims arising due to that occupation are a national responsibility. NATO Responsibility. NATO will take the responsibilities of a nation, as described above, in respect to property or real estate of International or multi-nationally manned military headquarters and sites. In general, this means that if a facility or site is provided through NATO common funding (IC or MBC), NATO will have a responsibility in respect to claims or costs which arise.
b.
0346. Property Condition Standards. All occupied sites will be turned back to the HN in a condition comparable to that at the time of occupation. Particular attention must be given to environmental standards of property. Any deterioration in environmental conditions should be documented and addressed before property is turned back to the HN. 0347. Procedures. In order to protect the nations and NATO common funds from excessive and spurious claims, the following will apply: a. Archiving. A central archive will be established in order to hold copies of surveys, documents and claims in relation to the operation. This should be in theatre and located either with CJ 4 or the Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC). Pre-Occupation Survey (POS). Each nation, or the NATO commander for sites at which NATO acts as the responsible authority, will conduct a POS at the time of occupying a site. One copy of this survey is to be retained in the central archive and one copy remains with the site commander. This establishes the base standard which claims will be judged against when the site is vacated. Post-Occupation Survey. Each nation, or the appropriate NATO commander will conduct a Post Occupation Site Survey on departure, including occasions when the site is handed over to another CN. Again, one copy is to be retained with the central archive. Representation. It is important that the owner, or his legally appointed representative, is present during the conduct of both surveys. It also serves the best interests of the nations that the same person is invited to both surveys. 3-22 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
b.
c.
d.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 e. f. Claims. Whenever possible, claims should be settled before departure. Retention of Documents. After an operation, the central archive of site surveys will be an important protection for the Alliance and nations. It should therefore be retained in the SC or RC which mounted and/or commanded the operation.
0348. Organisation. At least one specialist team, known as a Real Estate Advisory Team (REAT) will be established to manage real estate functions. The specific organisation of the REAT will remain flexible to be dictated by the size and complexity of the real estate mission, and it will normally be sited in the MJLC, when established. The REAT will be deployable in order to facilitate its advisory mission to CN contingent commanders on any matters relating to real estate management and environmental issues. It will support the pre and post occupation surveys, advise NATO commanders on the state of the sites and remedial action, keep the records (central archives) and trouble shoot when claims are submitted. It will liaise closely with the TACO, legal branch and claims office. In addition, it is available to assist CN commanders and NSEs on request. It will have photographers (both still and VCR) available on call, legal advisers, contracting officers and claims specialists.
CHAPTER 4 CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION

Section I - Introduction 0401. Authorities. MC 319/1 and MC 327/1 -Logistic Support to Peace Support Operations, both emphasise the importance of co-operation and co-ordination within the planning and execution of operations with Partnership for Peace (PfP) and other non-NATO nations, the UN, WEU, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and NonGovernment Organisations (NGOs). This chapter provides guidance for logistic co-operation with the above nations and organisations. The presence of Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCN), numerous NGOs, and organisations like the UN, OSCE and WEU in a non-Article 5 operation increases the need for procedures for co-operation and co-ordination. 0402. Structures. Within a non-Article 5 operation, it is most likely that besides military headquarters, there will be a number of headquarters of other organisations like the OSCE, UN, NGOs and governmental organisations. It is essential to establish a clear working relationship and liaison with the staffs of those organisations as soon as possible. The military and civilian implementation plans must complement each other. There will be a need for bilateral liaison arrangements between civil and military authorities at every level of command, including the entire logistic C2 structure. Co-operation with other international and NGOs in non-Article 5 operations will be enhanced by a better understanding of the roles, capabilities, planning and operational procedures of such organisations. Future liaison requirements are being studied by the IS and IMS. 0403. Generic Agreements. Participation Agreements provide an overarching and binding document within which a number of generic agreements will be embodied. Generic agreements are an important way of improving co-operation within an operation. The generic agreements described in this section can be formal agreements, arrangements or statements of intent. The main areas to be covered are: a. b. c. Agreements for common funding, cost sharing or reimbursement. The theatre Mutual Support Agreement. The NATO system of Real Estate Management and surveys (addressed in Chapter 3).
0404. Mutual Support Agreement (MSA). The theatre MSA differs from STANAGs in that it applies to operations only. It provides a simple and flexible way of ensuring that nations involved in a NATO operation can support one another without the need to negotiate individual bi-lateral
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 agreements. CNs will decide whether or not to sign up to the MSA. The two principles of mutual support are: a. No person or equipment belonging to a CN within a NATO led force shall be denied support from another CN, provided that the support is available and can be provided without unacceptable operational risk to the donor. Any CN whose personnel and equipment receive support from another shall make restitution, in cash or in kind, for the goods or services that they receive.
b.
These principles are not intended to preclude or remove the need for higher level and more formal treaties, agreements or the like. Rather, the principles allow mutual support from the outset of an operation and cover unforeseen problems which may arise during transit or routine re-supply and sustainment. It is also intended that payment from one CN to another should be made in theatre between the NSE, or contingent commanders. Therefore NSEs or contingent commanders must have the financial authority to agree to and make such payments in cash or by some other mutually acceptable arrangements.
Section II - PfP 0405. Introduction. PfP is a key element in NATOs political and military co-operation programme. The framework document, M-1(94)2 of 10 January 1994, supported by MC 328/1 NATOs Military Co-operation Guidance, establish the high level guidance and overall objectives of PfP. 0406. PfP Structure. PfP is managed through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and various NATO Committees. The EAPC, as the successor to the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), is the co-operative mechanism forming a framework for enhanced practical co-operation under PfP. The principal PfP bodies are the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) and the Military Co-operation Working Group (MCWG). The PMSC helps formulate the policy for PfP (to include funding), screens the programme, initiates NATO + 1 dialogue, and advises the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and EAPC on PfP. The MCWG advises the MC in much the same way, but is a working group rather than a policy making group. Other key instruments of PfP are: a. Partnership Work Programme (PWP). The formal mechanism of PfP activities is vested in the PWP. The PWP consists of two main sections: the Generic Section lays down those areas in which Partners should strive to achieve interoperability; the Specific Section lays down the next years programme of activities and projections for the following years according to details available. This latter programme is further split into areas of co-operation such as logistics, medical, training, exercises, standardisation and civil emergency planning.
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED b. AJP-4 Individual Partnership Programme (IPP). Each Partner nation will decide which activities from the PWP they need to attend. From these, each Partner constructs an IPP in concert with NATO which lays down their forecast of events for the year and also states what forces they will assign to PfP. PARP. The specific PWP, and hence the IPP events, are constructed on co-operation activities. MNC Interoperability Requirements (MIRs) and MNC Tasks for Interoperability (MTIs) determine Interoperability Objectives (IO), cover the full spectrum of non-Article 5 operations and act as PfP Force Goals. Approximately half of all Interoperability Objectives (IOs) established by NATO HQs are logistics-related. In PfP terms, PARP is intended to be used as the NATO defence planning process for the Partners who have signed up for the PARP. Bi-MNC Concept. The Bi-MNC Concept for Implementation of the Military Aspects of Partnership for Peace is a working document providing PfP guidance to RCs / JSRCs and Partners alike. The concept addresses interoperability and how to build a programme to support its achievement. This concept supplements PARP and defines the MTIs necessary to achieve MIRs. The SCs have established a co-ordinated programme of general education and training, exercises, and supporting activities to achieve the military objectives. In the Spirit of PfP. There may be national activities which are not directly related to IPPs, or which in other respects do not meet all the criteria established for their inclusion in IPPs, but which are nonetheless relevant to and consistent with the aims of Partnership. These activities, which may include national activities between Partners will not qualify as PfP activities per se. However, nations involved should be able to volunteer information under the heading of activities within the spirit of PfP.
c.
d.
e.
0407. The Partnership Co-ordination Cell (PCC). The PCC co-ordinates PfP military activities with NATO staffs and Partner Nations. It is an advisory body; it is not a part of SHAPE and is not in the chain of command, so it should not be tasked directly by the SHAPE or ACLANT staffs. The PCC operates under the authority of the NAC [PO (96) 146 (19/09/96)]. It administers and co-ordinates the routine work of the Partners Liaison Teams, NATO Liaison Officers/Teams, and keeps track of In the Spirit of PfP activities. 0408. Interoperability in PfP. Partner interoperability with NATO requires: Personnel and units trained in NATO doctrine, procedures and practices. Equipment which interfaces with that of NATO, complying wherever possible with NATO standards, including C3 interoperability. Staff officers trained in NATO doctrine and procedures. Such officers should be capable of filling appointments within a NATO HQ, the HQ of a NATO-led operation or national posts dealing with NATO/Partnership matters. The capability to integrate units declared for PfP missions with NATO forces in a NATO-led formation. 4-3 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 0409. Logistic Relations with Co-operation Partners. Logistic contacts with Partners continue to grow as the list of logistic issues in the PWP are further evaluated. Logistic policy issues concerning partner nations are discussed with them at the Senior NATO Logisticians Conference (SNLC). 0410. Logistic PfP Activities. To strengthen the logistic co-operation between the Alliance and the Partners, logistic activities take place at all NATO formation levels and include training offered by Alliance Nations to support the PWP. Logistics is a key area of co-operation for the SCs and their subordinate commanders. Activities within the logistic area, derived from the MTIs, fall into three categories: a. High Levels Visits. Visits undertaken, normally at the request of the Partner Nation, for a NATO speaker or presenter at War College or MOD level to promote a greater understanding of NATOs logistic infrastructure. Logistic Exercises and Supporting Activities. The aim of the exercise and supporting activities programme is to familiarise and train Partner Armed Forces in NATO practices, to evaluate Partner forces in order to determine future education and training, and to train multinational NATO/non-NATO HQs and formations to work with each other. SCs, RCs and JSRCs are offering a wide range of Partnership participation in logistic seminars and training through exercises. A series of annual NATO/PfP exercises have been established, the purpose of which is to introduce Partners to NATOs concept of operation in general, and specifically to introduce Partners to the Alliances concept for logistic support of multinational operations. These exercises are conducted in seminar form and exercise play, in integrated NATO/Partner teams. Logistic Training and Education. The aim of the programme is to familiarise Partners with NATOs military structure, principles, organisation and working practices. (1) SHAPE has established two Logistic Courses for Partners, one covering general logistics and the other covering NATO logistic at the multinational level. A compendium of logistic courses available is produced by SHAPE and issued on an annual basis to Partner Nations. This details courses open to all nations participating in the PWP. NAMSA has established a series of seminars and training packages to enable PfP Nations to take part in Alliance logistic affairs.
b.
c.
(2)
(3)
Section III - Relationship with the WEU 0411. Background. In order to give more concrete support for the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance, NATO Foreign Ministers stated in the Berlin 4-4 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Communiqu (1996) that they would prepare, with the involvement of NATO and WEU, for WEU-led operations, including the planning and exercising of command elements and forces. This included the identification within the Alliance of separable capabilities, assets and support assets. These could be made available for missions as laid down in the Petersburg Declaration and described in the illustrative profiles handed over to NATO for planning purposes. The WEU and the composition of its military structure is under revision. 0412. WEU Planning Cell. The WEU Planning Cell is responsible for the interface and planning of the associated doctrines to support the Berlin Communiqu. The WEU Logistic Group (WELG) is the body which provides the necessary logistic input. The ten full members of the WELG (plus three associate members and one observer nation) are also members of NATO. The three new members of NATO are also WELG associate partners. The aim of the WELG is to foster closer collaboration and to promote greater efficiency and harmonisation in logistics between WEU Nations in support of WEU missions. The WELG has a steering group and subgroups covering land, sea and air logistics. 0413. Logistic Co-operation of NATO with the WEU. NATO IS, IMS, SCs and CJPS are all accorded observer status at WELG Steering Group meetings. This provides the forum for WEU doctrine and conceptual papers to be aligned with current NATO doctrine. All logistic sub-groups are also provided with NATO observers for the same reason. Meetings are held twice a year, hosted by individual WEU Nations. 0414. Logistic Co-operation of the WEU with NATO. Observers from the WEU Planning Cell are invited to NATO logistic meetings where the interests of WEU and NATO overlap in order to ensure that there is no conflict. This is particularly necessary in the development of future illustrative missions. The WEU sits at the SNLC, the Bi-MNC Logistic Co-ordination Board (Bi-MNC LCB) and the SCEPC with observer status and provides representation to the BiMNCs LCB Doctrine Committee.
Section IV - Relationship with the UN 0415. General. The UN definition of Logistics is the Art of Transporting, Housing, Supplying and Providing Technical Support to military troops, including civilian personnel such as Observers or Members of other UN Agencies. Logistic support of Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) is very specialised, controlled, systematic. Within the PKO, there is a mix of civilian and military responsibility for logistics which is quite unique and complex. Logistic procedures are outlined in UN Logistic Directives (LogDir) or Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) designed for each specific mission. An extensive UN Operation Support Manual (OSM) released in 1996 covers all principles and philosophies about logistics in UN missions. This section provides the most basic aspects of the OSM as it may apply to NATO. Support relationships will be agreed between UN HQs and the appropriate HQ of each nation involved in the mission. These agreements are arrived at through a process of bilateral negotiations covering authorisation of personnel and equipment levels to be deployed subject to UN reimbursement, and the allocation
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 to the UN or the nation of various elements of contingent support. This agreement may be different for each national contingent in the mission area.
0416. Concepts of UN Logistic Support System. a. The UN does not have standing logistic units, but a UN Logistic Base (UNLB) was established at Brindisi in the heel of Italy in 1994 to replace the limited storage and logistics support capacity of the UN depot at Pisa, IT. The role of the UNLB is to: (1) Enhance economy and efficiency by storing reusable assets from liquidated field missions, and maintaining in a serviceable condition. Thus these assets are available for the initial provisioning of new missions or for the sustainment of existing missions. Therefore, the UN receives a better return on their equipment investment, while minimising the requirement for new procurement. Enhance effectiveness by preparing and maintaining two mission start-up kits, each designed to provide the basic support requirements for100 personnel for three months in a bare base environment anywhere world-wide. Acts as a satellite communications link between UN HQ and peacekeeping operations in Central Asia, the Middle East and the former Yugoslavia.
(2)
(3)
b.
Additionally, the UN is deploying a Field Assets Control System (FACS). Based on existing UN logistics and communications interfaces, FACS will: (1) Provide seamless integration and transfer of assets data between missions and UN HQ. Enable standardisation by UN HQ / UNLB for inventory data. Provide data sharing and data transfer between missions and UNLB. Provide global transparency of inventory tracking between missions and within the mission area. Enable asset life-cycle tracking from receipt and inspection to disposal. Provide the inventory, status and location of peace keeping assets.
(2) (3) (4)
(5) (6)
0417. UN PKOs. PKOs may precede, follow, or take place concurrent with NATO non-Article 5 operations. Each international organisation establishes or continues to operate its own unique logistic support system. In those extraordinary circumstances where a mutual support agreement is necessary, a strong sense of co-ordination and co-operation prevails. There are two types of UN PKOs: 4-6 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 a. Observer Missions. Military Observers report to the mission area equipped with basic items of personal clothing and equipment only. Throughout their tour, a Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) is furnished to feed and accommodate them at their main base area. The UN provides logistic support from an operational point of view only by the UN civilian Field Service. It provides such services as construction of Observation Posts (OPs), transport, communications, and maintenance. In certain cases, the host nation may provide some services. The logistic back-up for Observer Missions is operation specific and non-military. Mixed Missions. The UN support system relies on self-sufficiency within its forces for a minimum period of 60 days before the deployment of specialised logistic units. CNs which are sending infantry forces are requested to supplement their unit organisation with a limited scale of second-line support as would normally be provided from brigade/regimental sources for: Support Maintenance Engineering Personnel (i.e. mine clearing and demolition experts; special tradesmen) Medical Communications Transport Weapons/Ammunition Clothing Rations Stores and Equipment
b.
Recommendations to supplement support are made in an Aide-Memoire distributed to CNs. Subsequent to the issuance of the Aide-Memoire, a Co-ordinating Conference will be held at UN HQs in New York City between the (military) representatives of the CNs and the UN Secretariat. In requesting a specialised Logistic Battalion, the UN will specify to the CN(s) the range of service support which the unit(s) will be expected to provide. The request will be based on a detailed assessment of the mission. If a single CN cannot provide the full range of support, other member state(s) will be asked to supplement the Logistic Battalion. Items considered essential by a CN, but not covered in the Aide-Memoire, must be approved by the UN Field Administration and Logistic Division. Extra items brought to the mission area without consultation will not be the financial responsibility of the UN. Military equipment and stores brought to the mission area with prior agreement of the UN Secretariat becomes a UN responsibility and are referred to as Contingent Owned Equipment (COE). 0418. Reimbursement. Nations providing equipment and stores will be reimbursed for the depreciation of COE at a rate of 10 percent per year over a ten year period. The actual amount of reimbursement is based on an in survey done when the unit enters the mission area and an out survey conducted just before leaving. These surveys are carried out by UN experts who assess the value of the equipment/stores. Subject to prior agreement, the UN may reimburse 4-7 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 nations for specified extraordinary costs they incur in assembling a contingent for service in a UN area of operations. Subsequent contingents replacing initial units will be allowed to bring personal items as agreed with the UN. However, major items of equipment, weapons and ammunition, will be taken over by the incoming contingent. Again, subject to prior UN agreement, contingents may bring in additional equipment for which a need arose after initial deployment. Once a contributing nations troops have entered the mission area, all supplies required for their operational support involving a charge to the UN must be requested through the UN PKO logistic system. 0419. UN Responsibility. By prior agreements with governments, UN HQs may assume responsibility for: Special equipment or supplies requested by the Force Commander and approved by UN HQs for procurement. Expendable items, in accordance with approved scales of issue. Spare parts, maintenance costs and POL (petroleum, oil & lubricants) for motor transports and other mobile equipment authorised as part of the support establishment. UN uniforms in accordance with approved UN scales of issue. Communications services directly related to the UN PKO. Ammunition consumed in genuine operational use (including weapon testing). Costs for transporting and issuing supplies and authorised equipment. Billeting and rations, including rental and maintenance of the premises (but not including cooking utensils and cookers which are authorised parts of every contingents establishment).
0420. Supply. Supplies can be classified under two distinct categories: a. b. Consumable expendable items (e.g. food, POL and office supplies). Non-expendable items (a capital value with an operational life of 5 years or more).
The issue of consumable items is governed by an assessed entitlement known as a scale of issue. Amounts in excess of entitlement can be sought if particular needs arise (e.g. increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) or disease outbreak). The UN supply system is flexible enough to react to increased demand provided requirements are documented and authorisation granted by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). Non-expendable will be issued as required on incident, subject to availability. Controlled stores will require high level approval. 0421. Letter of Assist. If essential items are not available through the UN logistic system, but are available from a CN, a Letter of Assist (LOA) is instituted. The LOA is a contract issued by the UN to a Nation, authorising it to provide goods or services to a PKO, with reimbursement by the UN. 0422. Procurement. The procurement organisation is manned by UN civilian personnel from Force HQs. They are responsible locally and internationally for the procurement and delivery of 4-8 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 supplies and services. Supply levels for all items are set initially, if possible, before the PKO is deployed. Procurement is undertaken from many sources; contracts in theatre, local contracts, LOA and local hire. Contingents must maintain accountability for stores and equipment, with separate accounts for UN-owned and nationally-owned property. 0423. UN Summary. For the United Nations, their biggest breakthrough in logistic support is the development of standard procedures in the form of an Operational Support Manual (OSM). The OSM is a single document detailing logistic procedures for UN field missions. This will provide for a much improved transition to NATO forces and NATO standards in all logistic aspects of future non-Article 5 operations.
Section V - Relationship with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 0424. General. The OSCE does not have military forces to bring to the contingency area. Therefore, if military forces are involved, they will be a WEU force, UN, or most likely NATO forces. The missions assigned to the OSCE complement those assigned to NATO. The OSCE does not have an organic logistic tail. Therefore, OSCE missions may require some logistic support from deployed NATO forces. 0425. OSCE Mission. A most likely OSCE mission in a non-Article 5 operation is to re-establish a recognised, functional Central Government. The sole democratic way to do so is to plan, coordinate and supervise elections that have the support of the populace. 0426. NATO Support. NATOs ability to provide logistic support may come to bear on the OSCE election effort. Prior to the elections, NATO may be called upon to provide engineering support to the host nations transportation infrastructure if needed. As the announced elections near, NATO logistics may then gear up (and temporarily build up) for the actual election period(s) within a contingency operation in order to provide: Transport of OSCE Election Officials - Possibly Thousands travelling among Hundreds of Polling Places. Accountability and Security of Voting Ballots. Freedom of Movement for Voters - Begins with Route Repairs (road/bridges/rail), followed by Physical Security of Voters enroute to and from Election Sites. Security at Polling Places.
0427. OSCE Summary. NATO movements and transportation, infrastructure and security support are key elements to the ultimate success of the OSCE. There may also be other areas of NATO logistic support required, depending on the specifics of the operation. Therefore, co-ordination and co-operation by NATO forces with the OSCE is critical and is fully understood as NATO policy. The ultimate goal of NATO and the OSCE is mutual, to transform chaos and blood shed into stability and democracy.
Section VI - International Organisations 0428. European Security Structure. Shown on the next page is a diagram depicting nations membership in various International Organisations, including the WEU, NATO, PfP, OSCE and others. Note that membership changes from time to time.
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
This Glossary contains abbreviations and acronyms used in this document as well as others commonly used in joint and combined operations. A comprehensive list of NATO abbreviations is contained in AAP-15. AAP ACCIS ACE ACLANT ACO ACOS ACROSS ACS ACTORD ADAMS ADL ADM ADP ADR ADR AF AFCENT AFL AFNORTHWEST AFSOUTH AJF AJODWG AJP ALP ALSS AMCC AMF(L) AOO AOR AP APOD ARRC ASF ATMCT ATO BDR BOA BSVA Allied Administrative Publication Automated Command and Control Information System Allied Command Europe Allied Command Atlantic Allied Contracts Office Assistant Chief of Staff ACE Resources Optimisation Software System Aircraft Cross Servicing Activation Order Allied Deployment and Movement System Allied Disposition List Administration Automated Data Processing Annual Defence Review Airfield Damage Repair Augmentation Forces Allied Forces Central Europe Allied Forces List Allied Forces Northwest Europe Allied Forces Southern Europe Allied Joint Force Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group Allied Joint Publication Allied Logistic Publication Advanced Logistics Support Site Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre ACE Mobile Force (Land) Area of Operation Area of Responsibility Allied Publication Airport of Debarkation ACE Rapid Reaction Corps Aeromedical Staging Facilities Air Traffic Movement Control Team Air Tasking Order Battle Damage Repair Basic Ordering Agreement Basic Servicing Agreement Abbreviations-1 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 BUDFIN CAOC CAPC CAX CCIS CCPC CDB CDC CE CECC CEP CEPS CFX CHOD CIMIC CIS CJ CJPS CJTF CLC C-M CMRB CMX CN COE COMAJF COMMZ COP COS CP CPX CRD CS CSS CTF CUIL C2 C3 C3I DDP DOS DPC DPQ DRR DSARP Budget and Finance Combined Air Operations Centre Civil Aviation Planning Committee Computer Assisted Exercise Command, Control and Information Systems Civil Communications Planning Committee Core Data Base Civil Defence Committee Crisis Establishment Civil Emergency Crisis Cell Civil Emergency Planning Central Europe Pipeline System Command Field Exercise Chief of Defence Civil/Military Co-operation Communication and Information Systems Combined Joint Combined Joint Planning Staff Combined Joint Task Force Combined Logistic Centre Council Memorandum Crisis Management Resources Board Crisis Management Exercise Contributing Nation Contingent Owned Equipment (UN term) Commander Allied Joint Force Communications Zone Contingency Operations Plan Chief of Staff Capability Package Command Post Exercise Commanders Required Date Combat Support Combat Service Support Commander Task Force Common User Item List Command and Control Command, Control and Communications Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence Detailed Deployment Plan Days of Supply Defence Planning Committee Defence Planning Questionnaire Defence Requirements Review Deployability, Sustainability and Regeneration Potential Abbreviations-2 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 EAPC ECC EPG EXTAC FACS FAPC FER FIDS FLC FLPC FLS FPG FPGL FSII GBAD GEP GLC GOP HN HNS HNSCC HOC HQ HSS IC ILPC IMS IO IOX IPC IPP IS JFACC JHNSP JIP JLCC JMC JMCC JOC JRACC JSRC JTCC JTF JTMS LCC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Engineering Co-ordination Centre Exercise Planning Guide Exercise Tactical Publications Field Assets Control System (UN term) Food and Agriculture Planning Committee Force Effectiveness Report Force Identification System Force Logistic Co-ordinator Final Logistic Planning Conference Forward Logistic Sites Functional Planning Guide Functional Planning Guide Logistics Fuel System Icing Inhibitor Ground Based Air Defence Generic Plan Group Logistic Co-ordinator Bi-MNC Guidelines for Operational Planning Host Nation Host Nation Support Host Nation Support Co-ordination Centre Head of Contracts (MNC) Headquarters Health Service Support Infrastructure Committee Initial Logistics Planning Conference International Military Staff Interoperability Objectives Interoperability Exercises Industrial Planning Committee Individual Partnership Programme International Staff Joint Forces Air Component Commander Joint Host Nation Support Plan Joint Implementation Plan Joint Logistics Co-ordination Centre Joint Medical Committee Joint Movement Co-ordination Centre Joint Operation Centre Joint Rear Area Component Command Joint Sub-Regional Command/Commander (formerly PSC) Joint Transport Co-ordination Centre Joint Task Force Joint Theatre Movement Staff Logistic Co-ordination Centre Abbreviations-3 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 LEAP LIVEX LN LOA LOC LOGBASE LOGFASS LOGREP LPX-MED M&T MAT MAT-2 MB MBC MC MCT MCWG MDF MEDAD MEDCC MF MHE MILU MIR MJLC MLPC MMPG MNC MNL MNLC(A) MNLC(L) MNLC(M) MNMF MOBEX MOD MOT MOU MP MRG MSA MSA MSC MTI NAC NACC Logistics Evaluation and Assessment Programme Live Exercises Lead Nation Letter of Assist (UN term) Lines of Communication Logistic Data Base Logistics Functional Area Sub-System Logistic Reporting System Logistic Processor - Medical Movement and Transportation Medical Analysis Tool Medical Analysis Tool - Version 2 Military Budget Military Budget Committee Military Committee Movement Control Team Military Co-operation Working Group Main Defence Forces Medical Advisor Medical Co-ordination Centre Military Function Materiel Handling Equipment Multinational Integrated Logistic support Unit MNC Interoperability Requirements Multinational Joint Logistic Centre Main Logistics Planning Conference Maritime Medical Planning Guidance Major NATO Command/Commander (to be replaced w/SC) Multinational Logistic Multinational Logistic Centre (Air) Multinational Logistic Centre (Land) Multinational Logistic Command (Maritime) Multinational Maritime Force Mobility Exercises Ministry of Defence Mode of Transportation Memorandum of Understanding Military Police Medical Resource Guidance Mutual Support Agreement (or Arrangement-UK) Mission Subsistence Allowance (UN term) Major Subordinate Command/Commander (to be replaced w/RC) MNC Tasks for Interoperability North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Co-operation Council (replaced by EAPC) Abbreviations-4 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 NAMSA NATO NCS/O NC3A NEPS NFC NGO NIS NMA NMCC NNTCN NPS NPS NSE NSIP NTF NTG OLRC O&M OOA OP OPCOM OPCON OPEVAL OPLAN OPORD OPP OPTEMPO ORBAT OSCE OSM PAO PARP PBEIST PBOS PCC PC PDO PE PECC PfP PKO PMC PMSC POD NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Naval Control of Shipping Organisation NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency North European Pipeline System National Force Contribution Non-Governmental Organisation NATO International Staff NATO Military Authority National Movement Co-ordination Centre Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations NATO Precautionary System NATO Pipeline System National Support Element NATO Security Investment Programme NATO Task Force NATO Task Group Operations and Logistics Review Conference Operations and Maintenance Out of Area Observation Post Operational Command Operational Control Operation Evaluation Operational Plan Operational Order Operational Planning Process Operational Tempo Order of Battle Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Operational Support Manual (UN term) Properties Accountable Officer PfP Planning and review Process Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport Planning Board for Ocean Shipping Partnership Co-ordination Cell Personal Computer Property Disposal Officer Peace Establishment Patient Evacuation Control Centre Partnership for Peace Peace Keeping Operations (UN term) Personnel, Mail and Cargo Political-Military Steering Committee Port of Debarkation Abbreviations-5 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 POL POS PPC PSC PSC PSO PWP QA QS RACO RALCC RAMCC RAS RC RC RCO REAT REO RF ROE RPG RRF RS RSN S&S SACEUR SACLANT SC SC SCEPC SDC SFC SHAPE SHARE SIP SN SNLC SOFA SOP SOR SPG SPG SPOD SRA SRB Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants Pre-Occupation Survey Petroleum Planning Committee Principal Subordinate Command/Cdr (to be replaced w/JSRC) Personnel Support Command Peace Support Operations Partnership Work Programme Quality Assurance Quality Surveillance Regional Allied Contracting Office Regional Airlift Control Cell Regional Air Movement Control Centre Replenishment at Sea Regional Command/Commander (formerly MSC) Resource Centre Regional Contracting Office Real Estate Advisory Team Regional Engineer Office Reaction Forces Rules of Engagement Regional Planning Guide (MSC) Rapid Reaction Force Role Specialisation Role Specialist Nation Supplies and Services Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Strategic Command/Commander (formerly MNC) Support Command (replaced with JRACC) Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee Strategic Direction Centre Single Fuel Concept Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Stock Holding and Asset Requirements Exchange Security Investment Programme Sending Nation Senior NATO Logisticians Conference Status of Forces Agreement Standard or Standing Operating Procedures (AAP-6) Statement of Requirements Stockpile Planning Guidance (MNC) Specific Planning Guide (PSC) Sea Port of Debarkation Suitability and Risk Assessment Senior Resource Board Abbreviations-6 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 STANAG SYNEX TA TACEVAL TACO TBD TCN TFC TFCC TFHE TFMCC THOC TMCC TOA TOE TOO UN UNLB VCR WARDAM WELG WEU Standardisation Agreement (NATO) Synthetic Exercise Technical Arrangements Tactical Evaluation Theatre Allied Contracting Office To Be Determined Troop Contributing Nation Theatre Financial Controller Task Force Control Centre/Cell Tactical Fuel Handling Equipment Task Force Movement Co-ordination Centre/Cell Theatre Head of Contracts Theatre Movement Co-ordination Centre Transfer of Authority Table of Organisation and Equipment Theatre of Operations United Nations United Nations Logistic Base Video Cassette Recorder War Damage Stocks Western European Logistic Group Western European Union
Abbreviations-7 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

allied joint operation An operation carried out by forces of two or more NATO nations, in which elements of more than one service participate. (AJODWP 96) combat service support The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1) combined logistic centre (CLC) The CLC serves as the recognised focal point for co-ordination of national logistic issues appropriate to the level of command in which the CLC is formed. A CLC will consist of representatives of the NATO Commanders logistic staff, augmented to meet the range of potential NATO operations by national logistic representatives (from both NATO and non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations) and territorial authorities of the respective levels of command. combined joint operation An operation carried out by two or more military forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. command 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. A unit, or units, an organisation, or an area under the command of one individual. To dominate by a field of weapon fire or by observation from a superior position. To exercise a command. commander (AAP-6)
co-ordinating authority The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for co-ordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1) Glossary-1 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 cross-servicing That servicing performed by one service or national element for other services or national elements and for which the other services or national elements may be charged. (AAP-6) doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (AAP-6) enabling forces National and multinational support forces necessary to facilitate the deployment and initial employment of combat forces. force surgeon - see theatre surgeon host nation support Civil and military assistance rendered in peace and war by a host nation to allied forces and NATO organisations which are located on or in transit through the host nations territory. The basis of such assistance is commitments arising from the NATO Alliance or from bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between the host nation, NATO organisations and (the) nation(s) having forces operating on the host nations territory. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1) infrastructure engineering The construction or repair of facilities for the support and control of operational forces. interoperability The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and to accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1) joint force commander A general term applied to a commander (e.g. COMAJF) authorised to exercise command authority or operational control over a joint force. lead nation For logistics, when one nation assumes responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force and/or headquarters. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. The lead nation may Glossary-2 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 also assume the responsibility to co-ordinate logistics of other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility. (MC 319/1) logistics The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with: a. b. c. d. e. design and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health service support. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1)
maintenance 1. All action taken to retain materiel in or to restore it to a specific condition. It includes: inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding, and reclamation. 2. All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission. (AAP-6) medical advisor A medical officer (doctor) with wide medical, military and staff experience, assigned to a command HQs staff in order to ensure proper consultation on, and recognition of, all matters affecting medical operational planning and the forces health. The Medical Advisor has at all times the right of direct access to the HQ Commander. Also see Theatre Surgeon. movement Movement is the activity involved in the change in location of equipment, personnel or stocks as part of a military operation. Movement requires the supporting capabilities of mobility, transportation, infrastructure, movement control and support functions. (MC 319/1) movement control The planning, routing, scheduling and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communication. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1) multinational forces Forces of more than one nation under a NATO commander or non-NATO commander within a NATO-led operation. (MC 319/1) multinational integrated logistic support Glossary-3 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Two or more nations agree to provide logistic assets to a multinational logistic force under operational control of a NATO commander for the logistic support of a multinational force. (MC 319/1) multinational integrated logistic support unit (MILU) The resulting military organisation(s) when two or more nations agree to provide logistic assets to a multinational logistic force under operational control of a NATO commander for the logistic support of a multinational force. multinational logistics The overarching term for the different modes to logistically support operations other than purely national, such as Multinational Integrated Logistic Support, Role Specialisation Support and Lead Nation Logistic Support. (MC 319/1) mutual support agreement (MSA) A way of ensuring that nations involved in a NATO operation can support one another without the need to negotiate bi-lateral agreements with all other TCNs, or to face lengthy delays while higher level legal documents are exchanged. The two principles of theatre mutual support: (1) That no person or equipment belonging to a TCN within a NATO led force shall be denied support from another TCN, provided that the support is available and can be provided without unacceptable operational risk to the donor, and (2) That any TCN whose personnel and equipment receive support from another shall make restitution, in cash or in kind, for the goods or services that they receive. national logistic support A nation takes full responsibility for procuring and providing logistic support to her forces. This support can be provided on a solely national basis and/or through bilateral or multilateral agreements with other nations, NATO or other organisations as appropriate. (MC 319/1) national military authority The government agency, such as a ministry of defence or service ministry, empowered to make decisions on military matters on behalf of its country. This authority may be delegated to a military or civilian group or individual at any level appropriate for dealing with allied commanders or their subordinates. (AAP-6) national support element (NSE) Any national organisation or activity that supports national forces which are part of the NATO force. NSEs are OPCON to the national authorities, they are not normally part of the NATO force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. NSEs are asked to co-ordinate and co-operate with the NATO commander and the host nation. If the operational situation allows for a reduction, greater co-operation and centralisation of services among NSEs could produce significant savings. Glossary-4 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 operational control The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1) operation order A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the co-ordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6) operation plan A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation plan is usually used instead of order in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (AAP-6) reallocation The provision of logistic resources by the military forces of one nation from those deemed made available under the terms incorporated in appropriate NATO documents, to the military forces of another nation or nations as directed by the appropriate military authority. (Note: AD 85-3 addressing Reallocation is rescinded, being superseded by MC 319/1.) (AAP-6 & MC 319/1) redistribution The utilisation of logistic resources after Transfer of Authority (TOA) necessary for the fulfilment of the commanders combat missions. The logistic resources are designated in peacetime and will become assigned to the NATO commander in crisis and conflict. (Note: The definitive source addressing Redistribution is MC 319/1.) (MC 319/1) resupply The act of replenishing stocks in order to maintain required levels of supply. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1) role specialisation One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring a particular class of supply or service for all or a part of the multinational force. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. (MC 319/1) Glossary-5 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 sending nation A NATO nation requesting the use of a host nations logistics and administrative support. (May also be called requesting nation, reinforcing nation, user nation, or providing nation depending on the particular situation.) (MC 334) support The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force. (AAP-6) STANAG The record of an agreement among several or all the member nations to adopt like or similar military equipment, ammunition, supplies and stores; and operational, logistic, and administrative procedures. National acceptance of a NATO allied publication issued by the Military Agency for Standardisation (MAS) may be recorded as a Standardisation Agreement (STANAG). (AAP-6) standardisation Within NATO, the process of developing concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of compatibility, interoperability, interchangeability and commonality in the fields of operations, administration and materiel. (AAP-6) stovepipe A common term used to refer to national logistic support. strategic mobility The capability to move forces and their associated logistic support quickly and effectively over long distances. This can be between theatres (inter-theatre), between regions (inter-region), or beyond NATOs AOR. (MC 319/1) sustainability The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1) theatre The geographical area where a military operation is being conducted. (AAP-6) theatre surgeon (synonymous with force surgeon)
Glossary-6 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 A medical officer assigned as Medical Advisor to the Theatre Commander. In addition to his responsibility and capacity as a Medical Advisor, he sets the medical policy for the operation, provides medical input to operational and logistic planning, gives technical directions to the MEDCC and supervise/co-ordinates medical issues throughout the theatre. transportation The means of conveyance to move forces, equipment, personnel and stocks, including the requisite materials handling equipment. (MC 319/1) war reserves Stocks of materiel amassed in peacetime to meet the increase in military requirements consequent upon outbreak of war. They are intended to provide the interim support essential to sustain operations until resupply can be effected. (AAP-6 & MC 319/1)
Glossary-7 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS
MC 55/3 MC 94/3 MC 161 MC 288 MC 299 MC 317 MC 319/1 MC 326/1 MC 327/1 MC 328/1 MC 334/1 MC 336/1 MC 343 MC 389 MC 400/1 AAP-6 AAP-15 NATO NATO AJP-01 ALP-9 ALP-11 ALP-12 Bi-MNC Bi-MNC Bi-MNC Bi-MNC Bi-MNC Bi-MNC Bi-SC ACLANT ACLANT ACLANT AD 60-70 AD 60-80 AD 85-2
Readiness and Sustainability Factors NATO Military Exercises The General Intelligence Estimate Military Input to Ministerial Guidance MC Guidance for Defence Planning NATO Force Structures for the Mid - 1990s and Beyond NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics Medical Support, Precepts and Guidance for NATO NATO Concept For Peace Support Operations NATOs Military Co-operation Guidance NATO Principles and Policies for HNS Planning The Movement and Transportation Concept for NATO NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations CJTF - Combined Joint Task Force Military Implementation of the Alliances Strategic Concept NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Logistics Handbook Precautionary System (NPS) Manual Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Land Forces Logistic Doctrine Multinational Maritime Force (MNMF) Logistics Guidance for the Planning and Preparation of Host Nation Support Agreements/Arrangements Concept for Implementation of the Military Aspects of PfP Directive on Procedures for NATO Host Nation Support (HNS) Planning for Multinational Operations (MNC/MSC Coord Draft) Functional Planning Guide Logistics (FPGL) (Draft) Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) Operational Directive for the Planning and Activation of a Multinational Logistic Command (MNLC) (AD 80-62/SD 01-96) Reporting Directive, Volume V - Logistic Reports Directive for the Planning and Activation of a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC) (Draft) (may be succeeded in another format) Infrastructure Manual Maritime Medical Planning Guidance for NATO (MMPG) NATO Maritime Stockpile Guidance Procurement of Military Budget Funded Property and Services Property Accounting and Control Rescinded and superseded by AJP-4 References - 1 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED
AD 85-5 AD 85-6 AD 85-8 SHAPE UN OSM
ACE Mobility Management Directive Organisation and SOP of the ACE Logistic Co-ordination Centre ACE Medical Support Principles, Policies and Planning Parameters Stockpile Planning Guidance (SPG) United Nations Operation Support Manual
References - 2 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

Ajp 4

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ajp 4

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

ALLIED JOINT LOGISTIC DOCTRINE AJP-4

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

ALLIED JOINT LOGISTIC DOCTRINE

I ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

II ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

A. GRONHEIM Major-General, NOAF Chairman, MAS

III ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

IV ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

F SVI Az 31-10-05-40 of/du 4.01.99 FN.060/1/121194/E.193 of/du 05.03.99

DOP + 6M DOP + 6M 10.99

DOP + 6M DOP + 6M 10.99

DOP + 6M DOP + 6M 10.99

AJP-4 DOP + 2M DOP + 2M DOP + 2M

AJP-4 HAVSTANEM 805-1 AJP-4 JP 4-08 DOP + 6M DOP + 6M

* See reservations overleaf/Voir rserves au verso

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

+ See comments overleaf/Voir commentaires au verso X Service(s) implementing/Armes mettant en application

VI ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

VII ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

VIII ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

AJP-4 -TABLE OF CONTENT

CHAPTER 1 - THE ALLIANCES CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT Section I - Introduction

Section II - NATOs Logistic Support Concept

Section III - Combined and Joint Logistic Command and Control

Appendix A - Roles and Responsibilities

CHAPTER 2 - LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLANNING Section I - Introduction

Section II - Logistic Planning within Alliance Defence Planning

2-3 2-3 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-7 2-7 2-7

Section III - Logistic Force Generation

Page 2-8 2-8 2-8 2-8 2-9 2-9 2-10

Section IV - Logistics Support Planning for Operations and Exercises

Section V - Logistic Assessment and Evaluation

Section VI - NATO-Owned Equipment

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4 Supply, Maintenance and Repair 3-1

Section III - Movement and Transportation

Section VI - Budget and Finance

3-18 NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

Section VII - Infrastructure Engineering

Page 3-20 3-20 3-20 3-21 3-21 3-22

Section VIII - Real Estate

CHAPTER 4 - CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION Section I - Introduction

Section II - Partnership for Peace (PfP)

Section III - Relationship with the Western European Union (WEU)

4-5 4-5 4-5 4-5

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

Section IV - Relationship with the United Nations (UN)

Letter of Assist Procurement UN Summary

Section VI - International Organisations

Glossary of Terms & Definitions

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

CHAPTER 1 THE ALLIANCES CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

(d) (e) (f) (2)

1-23 ORIGINAL NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED AJP-4

MODULAR MJLC STRUCTURE