PR S

BOLIVIA

Vol. XXXIII, No. 6 June 2011

Political Risk Letter

World Business Opportunities
In This Issue

Group

essential information for strategic global planning

Highlights from New Reports ................................................................................................... 2 PERU No Mandate for Radicalism POLAND Tusk Risks Being Too Cautious SWEDEN Minority Status Limits Scope for Reform UNITED ARAB EMIRATES So Far, So Good

Pressure for Populist Policies CUBA Reforms Move Forward, Slowly FINLAND Bailout Issue Will Test Coalition Unity INDIA Stalled Agenda INDONESIA Yudhoyono Losing His Mojo

Updates to Recent Reports....................................................................................................... 6 BANGLADESH Pressure to Deliver BULGARIA Borisov Expected to Ride out the Storm DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Decits Cloud Outlook HONDURAS Return to Normalcy JAMAICA Unwelcome Distractions

Political & Economic Forecast Table ........................................................................................... 8

Political Risk Letter

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

Jun-2011 1

Highlights from New Reports

Managing Editor: Benedict F. McTernan Production Manager: Patricia Elliott Special Adviser: William D. Coplin, Ph.D. Senior Advisers: Goodwin Cooke
Professor of International Relations, Syracuse University

BOLIVIA
Pressure for Populist Policies President Evo Morales has suffered a series of political setbacks in recent months, the most notable being his U-turn on planned fuel-price hikes in the face of widespread protests at the end of 2010, and, in April 2011, an acrimonious and sometimes violent 11-day strike over wages by the countrys main labor organization. The walkout was ended with minor concessions from the government, but produced lingering resentment among the unions. The confrontations are evidence of Morales loss of credibility among the organizations that have provided the bedrock of his support throughout his tumultuous presidency, a development that is corroborated by his plummeting approval rating, which according to one recent poll has fallen to near 30%. All of which poses a dilemma for the president, as his willingness to acquiesce in the face of strong public pressure will likely encourage other aggrieved groups to aggressively press their demands, and his declining popularity will make it that much more difcult for him to resist such pressure. The governments position is not immediately threatened, as MAS still controls a two-thirds legislative majority. However, both the president and his party have taken a major hit to their popularity, and the possibility of destabilizing tensions within the governing party cannot be ruled out. In a bid to repair ties with his base, Morales has declared his intention to dismantle the market-based regulatory framework established by decree amid an economic crisis in 1985. The planned changes will require the overhaul of rules for investment and trade, as well as revisions to the regulations affecting key industries, including hy-

Robert Hardgrave, Ph.D.

Professor of Political Science, University of Texas, Austin

Llewellyn D. Howell, Ph.D.

Emeritus Professor of International Studies Thunderbird, The Gavin School of International Management Adjunct Professor of Economics, Brandeis University

Jane Hughes, M.A. (Emeritus)

drocarbons, mining, power generation, banking, and telecommunications. A massive new gas find holds the potential to attract sizeable new investment from those foreign companies that have remained aloof since Morales declared state ownership of the countrys hydrocarbons deposits in 2006, but the uncertainty created by the proposed remaking of the regulatory framework may dampen interest in the near term. Likewise, suggestions that the government is prepared to renationalize mining operations that were privatized in the 1990s could deter investment in that sector, with negative implications for the governments plans to exploit its substantial lithium reserves.

Richard Hull, Ph.D. (Emeritus)

President, African Consulting Associates

CUBA
Reforms Move Forward, Slowly A PCC congress held in April 2011, the rst in 14 years, conrmed the governing partys commitment to moving ahead with a program of economic liberalization aimed at realizing President Ral Castros stated goal of perfecting socialism by transitioning from an economic model based on centralized state control to a mixed economy with a signicant private sector that operates according to market principles. Participants approved more than 300 changes to existing economic guidelines that, if fully implemented, will ultimately reduce the states role in non-strategic sectors to that of regulator. At the same time, while the plan envisions the maintenance of a substantial social safety net, the government will no longer guarantee lifetime employment, housing, and access to basic goods and services at heavily subsidized prices. However, the government is moving forward with a great deal of cau-

Christopher McKee, Ph.D

Editor-in-Chief International Country Risk Guide

Richard L. Millett, Ph.D. Emeritus Professor of History,

Southern Illinois University

Larry A. Niksch, Ph.D.

Specialist on Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service Library of Congress

Bernard Reich, Ph.D.

Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University

Daniel Wagner
Strategy & Business Development

visit www.prsgroup.com

2011, The PRS Group, Inc. Political Risk Letter (ISSN: 0887-7629) is published monthly. An annual subscription, 12 monthly issues, costs $489. Reproduction without written permission from the publisher is strictly prohibited. All rights reserved. Direct all inquiries to Patti Davis, 6320 Fly Road, East Syracuse, NY 13057-9358, U.S.A. TEL: +1 (315) 431-0511. FAX: +1 (315) 431-0200. (Business Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time.) We can also be reached with comments on our Internet site: http://www.prsgroup.com, or send e-mail to custserv@prsgroup.com. Printed in USA.

2 Jun-2011

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

Political Risk Letter

tion. Tellingly, a plan to lay off some 500,000 state workers by the end of March 2011, rst announced in September 2010, has been put on hold, as policy-makers instead focus on establishing the legal foundation for a rapid expansion of the private sector, which will be crucial to absorbing the large pool of unemployed Cubans created by what amounts to a 20% reduction of the public-sector work force. Although more than 220,000 new private business licenses have been issued since the rules for obtaining the permits were relaxed last fall, the government remains rmly in control of the manufacturing sector, and the tiny scale of many of the new businesses, which are concentrated in the dining, retail, and personal services industries, limits their potential to generate a large number of jobs. No doubt with such limitations in mind, the government has also discussed the possibility of transferring responsibility for the delivery of some state services to the private sector. Officials have also stepped up efforts to attract foreign investment in key economic sectors, especially in tourism, where a signicant rise in investment would generate rapid growth of construction jobs in the near term, while also creating the potential for a large number of permanent jobs in a variety of enterprises catering to foreign travelers. The government will have little choice but to court foreign partners for nickel mining and oil exploration, both of which will require outside expertise, capital, and technology if they are to be developed successfully. However, in areas where foreign involvement is not deemed essential, the government will continue to play a dominant role.

FINLAND
Bailout Issue Will Test Coalition Unity The center-right KOK won a narrow victory at the April 17 general election, securing 20.4% of the vote,

compared to a 19.1% share obtained by both the center-left SDP and the nationalist PS, which took advantage of strong anti-incumbent sentiment and a collapse in support for KESK, the lead party in the previous government, to position itself as a legitimate contender for political power. KOK leader Jyrki Kateinens task of forging a majority coalition was greatly complicated by the refusal of the PS to abandon its adamant opposition to any consideration of further bailouts for debt-burdened euro-zone countries and the clear vote of no-condence in KESK, which effectively made the inclusion of either party a less-than-ideal prospect. After prolonged and intense negotiations, Katainen managed to pull together a six-party coalition that includes the left-leaning SDP and VAS, the VIHR and the SFP (both of which participated in the previous KESKled government, and the conservative KD. The unwieldy and ideologically diverse coalition, which took ofce in late June, has committed to implementing an economic program that includes a mix of tax hikes and spending cuts aimed at restoring scal discipline, along with tax cuts designed to spur job growth and stimulate economic activity. Responsibility for implementing the governments scal consolidation program falls to SDP leader Jutta Urpilainen, who was appointed minister of nance, the post held by Katainen in the previous government. Beyond catching the inevitable ak produced by the tax increases and spending cuts, she will also have to face down the unions over wage restraint, which will be essential to boosting the countrys competitiveness. But Urpilainen will face a more immediateand potentially more signicanttest of her political leadership over the issue of extending a second nancial lifeline to Greece. During the campaign, the SDP pledged that Finlands support for future bailouts would be conditioned on ensuring that private creditors shared at least some of the cost (and the risks) of propping up the debt-burdened peripheral eurozone states. Given the enormous risks
Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

associated with a strategic default, the SDP will likely face pressure to retreat from that position, and it is far from clear that Urpilainen possesses the leadership skills required to ensure that her party acts accordingly.

INDIA
Stalled Agenda The strong showing of the UPA bloc of parties at the 2009 general election freed Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs government from its dependence on the Communist-dominated Left Front, boosting expectations that the regimes reform efforts would gain momentum during its second term. However, those hopes faded amid rising tensions between the dominant INC and its smaller coalition partners, and the results of a recent round of state elections appear to have all but eliminated any chance of progress on reform measures that are seen as crucial to Indias economic development. Although the INCs generally disappointing performance in the state contests does not necessarily portend the partys defeat at the general election that falls due in 2014, the results in West Bengal, where the Trinamool Congress crushed the incumbent Communist government, and in Tamil Nadu, where the DMK was trounced by its main rival, suggest that Prime Minister Singh can expect difculties with two of the more important junior partners in the federal coalition over the coming months. The Trinamool Congress has not been an especially cooperative partnerit has consistently opposed efforts to loosen restrictions on state land acquisition for economic developmentand there is little reason to expect that the party will become more of a team player after having been so generously rewarded by voters for its independent stance. For its part, the DMKs post-defeat soul-searching will no doubt include serious consideration of whether the party has anything to gain from continuing its partnership with the INC. Jun-2011 3

Political Risk Letter

Even if the collapse of Singhs government were to trigger an early election, there is little evidence to suggest that the main opposition BJP is prepared to take advantage of the INCs troubles, and the poor showing of the Communists at the recent state elections indicates that the chances of a Left Front victory are slim to none. The diminished appeal of both the INC and the BJP points to the potential for greater fragmentation of political power following the next general election, with smaller regional parties gaining at the expense of the two dominant rivals. Such a scenario implies not only greater political instability, as achieving a parliamentary majority will require the formation of ever more unwieldy coalitions, but also the risk that federal elections could be decided on the basis of local issues, a development that would make it increasingly difcult to achieve consensus on a national agenda.

INDONESIA
Yudhoyono Losing His Mojo Public dissatisfaction over high unemployment, rising commodity prices, and a lack of progress in efforts to battle government corruption have contributed to a slide in popular support for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whose approval rating has fallen below 50% for the rst time in his presidency. Yudhoyono has repeatedly back-pedaled on reforms in the face of threats to the unity of his six-party coalition, with the result that only 17 of 70 targeted bills were passed in Parliament last year. All six parties signed on to a new coalition agreement in late May that is designed to promote cohesion and enforce discipline, but a provision requiring the unanimous consent of the coalition partners to any Cabinet reshufe suggests that the pact will do little to improve the governments productivity. At the same time, there is a growing risk of at least a partial reversal of the domestic security gains made 4 Jun-2011

under Yudhoyono. The government has succeeded in weakening the JI terrorist network, but smaller extremist groups operating independently of JI are growing in number, and appear to be foregoing high-prole attacks on foreign targets in favor of more limited operations designed to exacerbate sectarian tensions. To the extent that the change in tactics poses a threat to broader internal stability and social harmony, the development has negative implications for the risk to foreign businesses, especially if the presidents loss of popular support discourages an aggressive response to the threat. What the president might do to improve public perceptions of his governments handling of the economy is unclear, as the fundamentals are actually quite strong and the economy is performing at a high level. Solid growth of private consumption, xed investment, and exports contributed to real GDP growth of 6.5% (year-onyear) in the rst quarter of 2011, only slightly off the 6.9% pace of expansion in the nal quarter of 2010. The disruption of trade with Japan will dampen growth in the second and third quarters, but the economy is nevertheless forecast to expand by close to 6% this year.

PERU
No Mandate for Radicalism On June 5, Peru held a presidential run-off election that pitted Ollanta Humala, the candidate of the left-wing Peru Wins alliance, against Keiko Fujimori, the leader of the right-leaning Force 2011. In a contest that for many Peruvians was an exercise in determining the lesser of two evils, Humala prevailed, winning 51.5% of the vote. Having lost the 2006 presidential election after being linked in the minds of moderate voters to Venezuelas controversial leftist president, Hugo Chvez, Humala this time made a point of toning down his leftist rhetoric. During the run-off campaign, he pivoted away from the more radical elements of his campaign platform, such

as nationalization of strategic industries, focusing instead on more broadly appealing promises of social inclusion and improved public services. Although the strategy worked, the international business community (along with many Peruvians) is waiting to see which Humala will take ofce in late July. Will it be the radical nationalist whose party platform initially included a pledge to nationalize key industries, or the more moderate Humala, who promised during the run-off campaign to achieve socialist ends by implementing market-based economic policies? The legislative arithmetic suggests that it will be the latter. The Peru Wins alliance, headed by Humalas PNP, won just 47 seats in the 130-member Congress. The new government can only achieve a majority with the support of centrist and center-right parties, none of which will endorse a radical departure from the liberal policy course established over the past decade. Moreover, Humala lacks anything approaching a popular mandate for radical reform. The fact that the two most extreme candidates advanced to the run-off election was wholly attributable to the division of the centrist vote among three candidates, who won a combined 45% of the rst-round vote. In short, most of the signs point to Humala steering a relatively steady policy course. His government may be more accommodating of pressure from labor unions and his sensitivity to the grievances of the indigenous population could have negative implications for investors in the extractive sectors. However, in general, Humalas government is not expected to deliberately provoke or alienate international mining rms, whose production will continue to be the lifeblood of the economy.

POLAND
Tusk Risks Being Too Cautious Prime Minister Donald Tusk has made it clear that action on promised

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

Political Risk Letter

administrative and labor-market reforms will not be a high priority ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2011, and doubts are growing as to Tusks willingness to meet the challenge head-on, even in the likely event that the main governing PO secures another term. Tusk has adopted a similarly relaxed approach to laying a foundation for long-term scal stability, as the government will rely on solid growth and proceeds from privatization to narrow the budget shortfall in the near term. There is already widespread skepticism that the government will meet its obligation to reduce the decit to less than 3% of GDP by the end of next year. The EU has criticized the governments reliance on one-off revenue measures, and is pressing for spending cuts, so far to no avail. The prime minister is taking a rather big risk. Failure to quickly rein in the budget decit, which expanded to 7.9% of GDP in 2010, would increase the potential for a slide in the value of the zloty against the euro, a development that would not only hurt indebted households carrying eurodenominated mortgages, but would all but certainly push the total public debt burden above the 55% of GDP threshold at which the constitution requires the implementation of painful austerity measures. Indeed, the debt level is already dangerously close to the threshold, and could surpass it by the end of 2011 even if the zloty holds rm. Longer-term fiscal stability will require aggressive steps to contain the growth of non-discretionary spending, which accounts for more than twothirds of all state expenditures. The present stable economic conditions have inclined investors to give Tusk the benet of the doubt, but it is widely understood that far-reaching reform of the pension and health systems is essential, and there is a risk that condence will weaken if Tusk downplays the need for structural reforms during the upcoming campaign.

SWEDEN
Minority Status Limits Scope for Reform The handicap created by the minority status of the center-right Alliance for Sweden government headed by Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt has been compounded by a decline in the coalitions popularity and a revival of support for the center-left Red-Green bloc of opposition parties. In midMarch, the opposition dealt the Alliance its rst legislative defeat since the September 2010 election by securing parliamentary approval of legislation blocking the sale of government stakes in mortgage lender SBAB, utility Vattenfall, the post ofce, and telecom operator TeliaSonera. The setback points to difculties implementing other key items on the governments agenda, including tax cuts and labor-market reforms. A major test will come in September, when the government submits its 2012 budget for parliamentary approval. If the budget becomes hung up in the Parliament, Reinfeldt will come under pressure to call an early election. Poll data showing increased support for the Sweden Democrats is a potential silver lining for the Alliance, as the center-left parties will be wary of provoking an early election that might result in further gains for the far-right party. However, the probability is growing that Reinfeldt might seek to bolster his governments position by reaching an agreement under which the Sweden Democrats would support the Alliance on condence issues in return for the governments endorsement of legislation tightening immigration restrictions, similar to the arrangement that has kept a minority center-right government in power in Denmark since 2001. A combination of weaker external demand, inventory drawdown, and monetary and scal tightening will slow the pace of real GDP growth to 3% this year. The Riksbank has hiked interest rates five times since July 2010, and monetary authorities have signaled that the pace of tightening

will increase over the coming months. In addition to slowing the torrid pace of investment and inventory accumulation, higher interest rates will reinforce upward pressure on the krona, with negative implications for export competitiveness.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

So Far, So Good Domestic conditions in the UAE have remained remarkably stable in 2011, in contrast to the ongoing upheaval elsewhere in the region. In a gesture aimed at pre-empting calls for sweeping political reform, federal ofcials have agreed to expand the franchise for elections to the Federal National Council (FNC) later this year, but any expansion of voting rights will be too limited to have a signicant effect on the composition of the FNC, which in any case is only an advisory body. President Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who is also the emir of Abu Dhabi, can count on the unwavering support of the other emirs in the Supreme Council of Rulers, and there is little evidence to suggest that anti-government sentiment is so widespread as to create a real danger of mass protests on a scale that might produce serious political instability. Notwithstanding Dubais highly publicized debt troubles, the federal government has enormous nancial resources at its disposal, and will respond at the rst hint of trouble with an increase in already generous state spending, an approach that should be sufcient to keep a lid on unrest. That said, the UAE has cracked down on those expressing even mild dissent and has lent military assistance to the besieged regime in Bahrain under the auspices of the GCC, a clear indication that the royal leaders in the UAE are taking nothing for granted. Dubai has made progress toward addressing the debt troubles of stateowned conglomerates, most notably Jun-2011 5

Political Risk Letter

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

in the form of a deal to restructure nearly $25 billion of debts owed by Dubai World. Even so, some $18 billion of debt is due to mature in 2011, and especially troubled rms will face nancing obstacles. A prime candidate for difculties is Dubai Holding, a nancial services unit of state-owned Dubai Group, which was forced to restructure a $550 million loan in De-

cember 2010, after missing a payment the previous month. The federal government has pledged to implement the reforms required to obtain an emerging-market designation from MSCI, which is crucial to salvaging the countrys hopes of becoming a regional hub for equity investors. However, ofcials have conditioned moves to ease restrictions

on foreign ownership in some sectors on the agreement of participants in the Doha Development Agenda, a freetrade initiative sponsored by the WTO, to reduce tariffs on the federations key exports, including petrochemicals and aluminum. Whether the necessary progress might be made before the MSCI next takes up the UAEs case for a status upgrade is debatable.

Updates to Recent Reports

BANGLADESH
Pressure to Deliver Political stability is unlikely to be threatened to any signicant degree in the near term, as the governing Grand Alliance claims more than twothirds of the seats in the 330-member National Assembly, and the dominant position of Prime Minister Hasina Wazeds Awami League, which controls a majority of seats on its own, all but rules out the danger that divisions among the governing parties might endanger the survival of the regime before the completion of its term in January 2014. That said, rising public dissatisfaction over chronic power shortages and high ination has made the government more vulnerable to a campaign of political protest organized by the main opposition BNP. The chief concern in that regard lies not in the threat of generalized upheaval (although that possibility cannot be ruled out), but rather the possibility that fear of provoking street protests could discourage Hasinas government from pursuing the reforms required to create a more inviting business climate, which is essential to the regimes chances of even partially making good on its pledge to reduce poverty. The government has taken steps to boost the power supply, but efforts to contain ination will fall short as long as global food and fuel prices remain high. Financial support from the IMF 6 Jun-2011

and other multilateral agencies will reduce the risk of a sharp slide in the local currency. However, inevitable pressure from unions for steep wage increases to offset the erosion of purchasing power will create the potential for scal slippage that could jeopardize the timely disbursement of funds, with potentially signicant implications for both currency stability and ination.

BULGARIA
Borisov Expected to Ride out the Storm Although the opposition parties know full well that there is little chance of toppling Prime Minister Boyko Borisovs minority government as long as he retains the backing of a bloc of independent allies in the Parliament, the BSP and the ethnic Turkish DPS are applying heavy pressure on the government as voters prepare to elect a new president in October. Whether that strategy will undermine the governing partys chances of winning the presidency, or boost the oppositions chances of returning to power when parliamentary elections are held in 2013, is an open question, but it will certainly create an obstacle for the prime minister as he seeks to rebuild his badly dented popular support. Regardless of how the presidential election turns out, Borisov will be happy to see the departure of the
Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

incumbent, Georgi Parvanov, a former leader of the BSP. Parvanov has thrown obstacles in the path of Finance Minister Simeon Djankovs proposal to enshrine a commitment to strict scal discipline in the constitution. Following a meeting with the president to discuss the proposal in early June, Djankov announced that a parliamentary vote on his plan would be delayed until after the October elections. But neither Borisov nor Djankov can blame an ideologically hostile president for their failure to revive Bulgarias struggling economy, which is the main reason for the governments slumping approval rating. The administration has drawn re over its abysmal absorption of EU funds, and there is reason to doubt that a Cabinet reshufe carried out in May will lead to an improvement.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Decits Cloud Outlook With the withdrawal of First Lady Margarita Cedeo from consideration for the governing PLDs presidential nomination, the upcoming primary contest is almost certain to be won by Danilo Medina Snchez, who is expected to face off against the opposition PRDs Hipolito Meja in a replay of the 2000 election. Meja won the previous matchup, but barring

Political Risk Letter

a fatal misstep by the PLD candidate, a major scandal within President Leonel Fernndezs administration, or a crippling economic downturn, none of which is likely, the positions of the two candidates are very likely to be reversed this time around. Medina has implored PLD supporters to put aside their disappointment over the unfullled promises of the incumbent administration, and instead focus on what they stand to lose if Meja is returned to the presidential residence. That is likely to be a central theme of next years election campaign, given the Fernndez governments failure to make much headway in tackling the chronic problems of electricity shortages and corruption, boosting investment in education, or reversing the tide of violent drugrelated crime, all of which were assigned high priority at the start of the current term. The one undeniable bright spot for the government has been the robust growth of the economy, which expanded at an average rate of 7.1% during 20062010, even posting comparatively strong growth of 3.9% amid a global recession in 2009. But unemployment, while falling, has remained stubbornly high, inows of FDI have been trending downward, and both the scal and current account decits remain uncomfortably large. The failure to hit the 2010 scal target and delays in achieving structural benchmarks resulted in a delay in completing the fth review under the governments standby agreement with the IMF, but the combined fth and sixth reviews were initiated in May. A positive review by the IMF will clear the way for the release of a $171 million disbursement that had been expected in March, and will also be essential to the success of a $500 million bond issue approved by the legislature in late May. Any further delays could jeopardize the countrys credit rating, which received a boost in January, when Fitch changed the credit outlook from stable to positive, signaling a possible ratings upgrade in the coming months.

HONDURAS
Return to Normalcy Although it has taken nearly two years, the political tensions generated by the forced removal of President Manuel Zelaya in June 2009 have nally begun to dissipate. Key recent developments in that regard include the countrys restoration to membership in the OAS, and the success of a joint effort by Venezuela and Colombia to broker a political agreement that has cleared the way for Zelayas return home. But while these are welcome developments, President Porfirio Lobos agreement to pursue constitutional reforms demanded by Zelayas supporters creates the potential for renewed political conict in the second half of his term. Economic policy will focus on satisfying the terms of an 18-month, $202 million standby agreement concluded with the IMF in October 2010. If fully implemented, the required scal and nancial-sector reforms hold the potential to bring an added measure of macroeconomic stability while freeing up resources to be applied toward productive investment. Even so, security concerns and corruption will continue to pose an obstacle to attracting foreign investment. Even assuming a combination of favorable weather, steady world prices for major exports, and sustained economic aid, real GDP growth will fall well short of the level required to reduce the economic hardship endured by a substantial proportion of the population.

JAMAICA
Unwelcome Distractions More than a year later, the botched effort to apprehend a drug kingpin that resulted in 73 deaths continues to cause political problems for Prime

Minister Bruce Golding, whose effective exoneration by a commission investigating wrongdoing on the part of the government may not be enough to dispel popular suspicions that the entire asco was caused by the governing JLPs attempts to shield a criminal with ties to the party. Goldings government now faces the challenge of repairing its damaged reputation, a task that will be complicated by extensive local press coverage of the contents of some of the condential US diplomatic cables made public by Wikileaks, highlight many of the aws in the countrys political system that have long troubled Jamaican voters, including a lack of political courage on the part of the countrys leaders and the lack of condence in either the JLP or the opposition PNP among key interest groups, most notably the domestic business community. Polls indicate that the PNP is not beneting from the JLPs troubles, but Goldings diminished credibility has contributed to a signicant drop in support for the government. If the JLP does win another term (the probability is no better than even) in 2012, the likely reason will be the turnaround in the economy, which is showing signs of life after contracting for 14 consecutive quarters. In mid-March 2011, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) unveiled a strategy for inducing growth over the medium term. The plan calls for tax reform to free up resources for economic development, steps to lower the cost of energy and capital, enhanced cooperation among business sectors, improvements to infrastructure, a program of community renewal, and public-sector modernization. The PIOJ has noted that implementing such a plan will require forceful leadership and a strong political will. It is debatable whether either Golding or PNP leader Portia Simpson Miller is capable of meeting those requirements.

Need More Detail? Order a Country Report

Get it now at www.PRSgroup.com

Political Risk Letter

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

Jun-2011 7

Political & Economic Forecast Table

Next to each country name is the date of our last economic update, followed by the 18-month (2nd line) and 5-year (3rd line) political forecasts: the REGIMES most likely to hold power and their PROBABILITIES, risk ratings for TURMOIL (low to very high), and risk ratings (A+ the least to D- the most) for nancial TRANSFER, direct INVESTMENT, and EXPORT to the country. When a forecast has changed, the previous rating appears in parentheses. An asterisk means a nonincumbent regime. Our most recent economic data and forecasts include a previous ve-year average, a one-year forecast or estimate, and a ve-year forecast average. REAL GROWTH of GDP and INFLATION are expressed as percentages, and CURRENT ACCOUNT gures are in billions of US dollars.
COUNTRY REGIMES AND PROBABILITIES TRANSFER INVEST MENT REAL GDP GROWTH CURRENT ACCOUNT

TURMOIL

EXPORT

INFLATION

Algeria Bouteika 45% *Reformist Coalition 45% Angola MPLA 85% MPLA 85% Argentina Divided Government 45% Divided Government 50% Australia Minority ALP 50% *ALP 45% Austria SP-VP 65% SP-VP 50% Azerbaijan YAP 60% YAP 50% Bangladesh AL-led Coalition 75% AL-led Coalition 60% Belgium *Center-Left Coalition 40% *Center-Right Coalition 40% Bolivia Morales 60% Center-Left Coalition 55% Botswana BDP 85% BDP 65% Brazil Center-Left Coalition 60% *Divided Government 40% Bulgaria Center-Right Minority 55% *Center-Right Coalition 55% Cameroon RDPC 85% RDPC 75% Canada Minority CPC 55% Minority CPC 50% Chile Divided Government 50% *CPD 45% China Pragmatists 80% Pragmatists 75% Colombia Centrist Coalition 60% *Divided Government 55% Congo PCT-led Coalition 85% PCT-led Coalition 80%

2/01/11 Very High Moderate 5/01/11 Moderate High 4/01/11 Moderate Moderate 5/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 Low Low 3/01/11 High High 6/01/11 High High 3/01/11 Low Low 6/01/11 High High 4/01/11 Low Low 3/01/11 Moderate Moderate 6/01/11 Low Low 3/01/11 Moderate High 4/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 High High 5/01/11 High Moderate 6/01/11 Moderate Moderate AB BB B+ B BB B BBB B B+ B BBBAAAAAAA+ A A A+ A+ A B+ B B+ BB BAB+ A AB+ B+ B BB+ B B BB+ B+ A AAB+ B BBC BBB+ AAB+ AAC+ C+ C+ C BC+ B B BBB B A A+ A A A A A+ AAA A AC+ C BBC C+ BBB BBBB B+ C BBB

2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016

2.9 3.5 4.1 12.1 7.3 6.9 6.8 6.0 4.1 2.8 2.4 3.0 1.5 1.7 1.8 16.9 3.8 4.6 6.2 5.9 6.0 1.1 1.4 1.6 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.1 5.8 5.0 4.5 4.2 3.6 2.8 2.5 3.6 2.8 3.0 3.8 1.2 2.2 2.5 3.3 5.8 4.9 11.3 8.5 8.3 4.3 4.5 4.8 5.4 8.2 6.0

4.3 4.8 5.0 13.2 14.8 11.1 9.0 11.2 9.5 2.9 3.3 2.6 1.9 2.6 1.9 10.6 6.4 5.2 7.7 9.7 7.1 2.0 3.1 2.2 6.6 9.5 7.0 9.3 8.2 6.0 4.7 6.3 4.8 6.7 4.5 3.0 3.5 3.3 3.0 1.7 2.0 2.1 3.9 3.9 3.4 3.0 4.5 4.1 4.7 3.8 4.0 5.4 5.7 4.4

20.08 7.30 8.50 4.27 3.10 1.40 7.67 3.60 1.30 -44.37 -33.90 -42.60 12.45 5.40 8.50 11.07 21.70 17.80 1.81 0.85 -1.30 2.11 4.10 -1.30 1.33 0.76 1.35 0.70 0.10 0.45 -16.97 -63.10 -78.40 -6.80 -1.50 -3.10 -0.41 -1.15 -0.65 -9.31 -41.70 -34.30 4.02 -0.43 -3.40 332.31 290.00 300.00 -5.97 -8.20 -11.40 -0.50 2.30 0.35

8 Jun-2011

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

Political Risk Letter

COUNTRY REGIMES AND PROBABILITIES

TURMOIL

TRANSFER

INVEST MENT

EXPORT

REAL GDP GROWTH

INFLATION

CURRENT ACCOUNT

Congo DR Kabila Majority 65% Kabila Majority 65% Costa Rica Divided Government 70% Divided Government 65% Cte dIvoire *National Unity Coalition 60% *National Unity Coalition 50% Cuba Ral Castro 70% Ral Castro 55% Czech Republic Center-Right Coalition 50% Center-Right Coalition 40% Denmark *Center-Left Coalition 50% *Center-Left Coalition 40% Dominican Republic PLD 55% PLD 55% Ecuador Correa 50% Correa 45% Egypt *Military-Civilian 45% *Military-Civilian 40% El Salvador Left-Right Coalition 45% *Divided Government 55% Finland Broad Coalition 55% Broad Coalition 45% France *Divided Government 40% *Divided Government 45% Gabon Reformist PDG 50% Reformist PDG 50% Germany Center-Right Coalition 55% *Grand Coalition 40% Ghana NDC 60% NDC 50% Greece PASOK 65% PASOK 45% Guatemala Divided Government 60% Divided Government 60% Guinea *Broad Coalition 55% *Broad Coalition 45% Guyana PPP-C 65% PPP-C 65% Haiti Divided Government 65% Divided Government 55% Honduras PN 55% PN 45%

2/01/11 High High 5/01/11 Low Moderate 4/01/11 High High 6/01/11 Low Moderate 5/01/11 Low Low 3/01/11 Low Low 6/01/11 Moderate Moderate 5/01/11 High Moderate 6/01/11 High Moderate 6/01/11 Moderate Moderate 6/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 Low Low 3/01/11 Low Moderate 6/01/11 Low Low 6/01/11 Moderate Moderate 3/01/11 Moderate Low 6/01/11 High High 6/01/11 High High 6/01/11 Moderate Moderate 6/01/11 High High 6/01/11 High Moderate BBB BB BBC+ BC C+ C+ BB B BBBD+ CBBCC BC+ B+ BB BC+ BAB B BC+ BB B BBB+ AAB+ A AB B+ B+ B+ B B+ B B AB+ AB A+ A AA A ABBB BB B BBB BB BCC+ C CC C+ BC B+ BBC+ AA+ B B+ AAB+ AA A AB+ DC+ C C+ D+ C+ BBBBC+ BB B AB AB BC+ C C+ C+ C+

2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016

5.0 6.1 5.8 4.5 4.0 4.3 2.3 -1.4 3.5 5.4 2.2 3.7 2.7 1.6 3.1 0.4 1.8 1.9 7.1 4.2 4.8 3.6 3.1 3.5 6.2 1.8 5.0 1.8 1.8 2.9 1.1 3.1 2.2 0.7 1.3 1.4 2.7 5.9 4.3 1.2 2.6 2.0 6.6 9.3 7.0 0.9 -3.6 1.0 3.6 2.8 3.0 2.2 3.6 4.2 4.2 3.3 3.8 0.8 4.3 2.0 3.5 3.5 3.8

23.9 15.6 13.5 9.6 5.8 6.3 2.9 6.5 3.0 3.6 3.6 3.9 2.8 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.2 6.4 8.3 5.5 4.5 3.3 4.0 11.7 13.8 8.9 3.5 3.3 3.4 1.9 3.2 2.3 1.5 2.3 1.5 2.3 3.9 3.3 1.6 2.2 1.8 13.6 12.3 9.2 3.2 3.1 1.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 20.9 15.9 10.4 6.4 5.1 6.0 8.6 9.0 6.8 6.8 7.5 7.1

-1.36 -2.70 -1.90 -1.45 -1.65 -2.40 0.75 0.12 0.40 -0.33 0.15 -0.45 -3.98 -7.20 -6.40 9.99 17.30 11.70 -2.91 -5.45 -3.70 0.50 -0.77 -0.60 -0.77 -11.30 -4.70 -0.86 -0.72 -1.05 8.41 4.40 4.90 -39.82 -58.90 -75.10 1.79 2.20 1.40 207.38 118.00 136.00 -2.11 -1.80 -1.30 -38.65 -17.30 -5.30 -1.22 -2.30 -2.75 -0.40 -0.48 -0.75 -0.21 -0.22 -0.20 -0.45 -1.50 -0.95 -0.94 -1.25 -1.40

Political Risk Letter

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

Jun-2011 9

COUNTRY REGIMES AND PROBABILITIES

TURMOIL

TRANSFER

INVEST MENT

EXPORT

REAL GDP GROWTH

INFLATION

CURRENT ACCOUNT

Hong Kong Limited Autonomy 85% Limited Autonomy 80% Hungary Fidesz-MPS 80% Fidesz-MPS 55% India UPA-led Coalition 50% UPA-led Coalition 40% Indonesia Yudhoyono Majority 55% *Reformist Coalition 50% Iran Conservative 50% Conservative 45% Iraq National Unity Coalition 65% National Unity Coalition 45% Ireland Fine Gael-Labour 80% Fine Gael-Labour 55% Israel Right-Wing Coalition 45% *National Unity Coalition 40% Italy Center-Right Coalition 50% Center-Right Coalition 55% Jamaica JLP 50% JLP 50% Japan Divided Government 50% *DPJ Coalition 40% Kazakhstan Nazarbayev 70% Nazarbayev 65% Kenya *Divided Government 45% Broad Coalition 40% Kuwait Al-Sabah Family 60% Al-Sabah Family 55% Libya *Military 50% *Military-Civilian 50% Malaysia UMNO-led Coalition 75% UMNO-led Coalition 65% Mexico *PRI 70% *PRI 60% Morocco Mohamed 75% Mohamed 70% Myanmar Military-Civilian 60% Military-Civilian 45% Netherlands *Center-Right Minority 50% *Broad Coalition 45% New Zealand National Minority 50% National Minority 50%

3/01/11 Low Low 6/01/11 Low Low 6/01/11 High Moderate 6/01/11 Moderate Moderate 3/01/11 High High 2/01/11 Very High High 3/01/11 Low Low 2/01/11 High High 5/01/11 Moderate Moderate 6/01/11 High Moderate 6/01/11 Low Low 6/01/11 Low Moderate 3/01/11 High High 3/01/11 Moderate Low 3/01/11 Very High High 6/01/11 Low Low 6/01/11 High Moderate 4/01/11 High Moderate 3/01/11 Moderate Very High 3/01/11 Low Low 4/01/11 Low Low AB+ AAAB+ A+ A A A A B+ D+ C C+ D+ CCC+ BB B BB B BB+ B B B B A B+ B+ AAC C D+ CD+ C A A B B+ AAB+ BB C B C+ BB- (B) BB C+ B- (B) AA AAA+ A C+ C AB B C+ BBAB B BB+ B B+ B B+ B B B AB+ ABC+ C+ C C C C+ C CC CC CBB B B+ B B+ BB B B B B BBB+ B+ B+ B A+ A+ A A A+ A

2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016

3.9 5.0 4.2 0.0 2.5 3.0 8.4 8.3 8.4 5.7 5.9 6.1 4.2 2.5 3.0 4.8 5.0 5.5 -0.1 -1.3 1.1 4.0 3.9 4.4 -0.4 0.6 1.0 -0.2 1.3 1.6 0.2 -1.0 1.4 6.2 5.6 5.8 4.5 3.9 5.0 2.8 4.0 4.8 4.6 -11.0 3.8 4.5 5.0 5.1 1.9 4.8 3.6 4.9 3.9 4.5 3.6 3.3 3.8 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.5 3.0

2.3 4.3 2.9 5.4 4.2 3.0 8.7 8.2 5.9 8.6 6.3 6.5 15.6 18.7 15.3 17.4 4.9 5.7 1.5 -0.4 1.0 2.7 4.3 2.8 1.9 2.5 1.9 12.4 8.1 8.8 -0.1 0.5 1.0 10.2 7.2 6.6 12.8 7.8 6.5 5.4 6.2 4.6 5.0 7.8 8.4 2.7 3.3 3.0 4.4 4.2 3.8 2.2 2.9 2.8 19.5 17.9 13.4 1.5 1.9 1.6 2.8 4.5 2.9

22.47 21.70 24.30 -5.47 -0.40 -3.80 -29.14 -57.00 -52.40 7.59 10.30 12.70 20.81 12.70 6.50 -1.92 -6.20 7.10 -9.91 4.30 5.40 5.28 3.50 9.10 -63.29 -78.00 -69.40 -1.63 -1.85 -1.30 175.12 175.00 195.00 -0.79 5.30 8.70 -1.61 -2.95 -1.65 44.18 60.40 49.20 23.14 4.80 8.80 30.81 30.30 39.70 -8.43 -20.10 -31.30 -2.77 -10.40 -4.80 0.68 0.68 0.20 47.68 45.80 35.20 -7.57 0.30 -8.30

10 Jun-2011

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

Political Risk Letter

COUNTRY REGIMES AND PROBABILITIES

TURMOIL

TRANSFER

INVEST MENT

EXPORT

REAL GDP GROWTH

INFLATION

CURRENT ACCOUNT

Nicaragua Divided Government 45% Divided Government 45% Nigeria PDP Majority 55% PDP Majority 40% Norway Center-Left Coalition 65% Center-Left Coalition 50% Oman Qaboos 75% Qaboos 75% Pakistan PPP-led Coalition 45% PPP-led Coalition 40% Panama Centrist Coalition 60% Centrist Coalition 50% Papua New Guinea NAP Coalition 50% *Unstable Coalitions 60% Paraguay Divided Government 75% Divided Government 55% Peru Divided Government 55% Divided Government 55% Philippines Reformist Coalition 55% Divided Government 60% Poland Center-Right Majority 60% Center-Right Majority 60% Portugal *PSD Coalition 40% *PSD Coalition 40% Romania *Left-Right Coalition 50% *Left-Right Coalition 45% Russia United Russia 85% United Russia 75% Saudi Arabia Older Al-Saud 60% Older Al-Saud 55% Singapore Lee Hsien Loong 85% Lee Hsien Loong 80% Slovakia Center-Right Coalition 55% Center-Right Coalition 45% South Africa Pragmatic ANC 55% Pragmatic ANC 45% South Korea GNP 45% GNP 45% Spain *PP Minority 45% *PP Minority 50% Sri Lanka SLFP-led Coalition 85% SLFP-led Coalition 80%

3/01/11 Moderate Moderate 5/01/11 Very High Very High 3/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 Very High High 4/01/11 Moderate Moderate 4/01/11 Moderate Moderate 4/01/11 Moderate Moderate 6/01/11 Moderate Moderate 6/01/11 Moderate Moderate 6/01/11 Low Low 4/01/11 Low Low 2/01/11 Moderate Low 4/01/11 Moderate Moderate 5/01/11 High Moderate 6/01/11 Low Low 6/01/11 Low Low 4/01/11 Moderate Moderate 4/01/11 Moderate Moderate 5/01/11 Moderate Moderate 4/01/11 Moderate Moderate C+ C+ B+ B+ B B B BB+ B+ B+ B AB B B B B B BB BB+ BAAA A- (A) AB+ A+ A+ AA A+ A+ A AB BAAB B C+ C+ B BBBAB+ B+ B B B AB+ B+ B BB A B+ AB BBB BBBB (B+) B B (B+) B- (B) B- (B) B- (B) B+ B B+ BB B BB B BBB B+ BAB+ B+ B D+ D+ BC CCA A+ AAA A A+ A+ B+ AA+ A+ C+ C C+ C C C B+ BB+ BB+ B-

2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016

2.6 3.8 3.3 6.7 5.8 6.4 1.2 1.5 2.1 6.2 4.2 5.2 4.4 2.3 3.8 8.4 5.8 5.3 5.8 6.7 5.7 5.7 5.0 4.2 7.3 5.6 5.4 4.9 5.2 5.3 4.7 4.0 3.7 0.6 -1.6 0.2 2.5 0.3 4.0 3.5 4.3 4.4 2.8 5.7 4.6 6.4 4.2 5.2 4.9 3.5 4.0 3.2 3.5 3.8 3.8 4.5 4.0 0.9 -0.3 1.2 6.4 8.0 7.3

9.8 8.3 7.8 10.1 12.7 9.9 2.3 2.6 2.4 5.7 4.6 4.2 12.8 11.1 7.5 4.2 5.7 4.4 5.4 7.3 5.6 7.0 9.5 6.2 2.8 3.5 2.7 5.1 5.5 4.8 2.9 4.3 2.8 1.8 2.6 1.3 6.2 5.0 3.7 10.3 9.1 7.1 5.3 8.3 4.9 2.6 4.5 2.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 6.9 5.0 4.7 3.0 4.3 3.1 2.4 1.4 1.5 11.4 8.4 6.2

-1.00 -1.00 -1.25 25.79 34.00 22.90 60.03 56.20 55.10 3.85 4.50 3.30 -7.35 -4.20 -7.30 -1.51 -3.30 -3.60 0.16 0.03 0.10 -0.10 -0.53 -0.39 -0.51 -3.20 -4.80 6.67 7.20 9.50 -16.14 -19.10 -15.90 -24.69 -15.30 -10.30 -14.65 -9.40 -14.40 79.34 89.70 51.70 83.42 117.90 44.80 40.04 43.90 46.70 -4.01 -3.10 -3.40 -15.14 -19.80 -18.30 15.27 29.40 23.10 -111.13 -51.20 -55.70 -1.96 -2.70 -3.40

Political Risk Letter

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

Jun-2011 11

COUNTRY REGIMES AND PROBABILITIES

TURMOIL

TRANSFER

INVEST MENT

EXPORT

REAL GDP GROWTH

INFLATION

CURRENT ACCOUNT

Sudan *Unstable Transition 60% *Military-Civilian 60% Suriname MC-led Coalition 55% MC-led Coalition 45% Sweden Center-Right Minority 55% *Center-Right Coalition 40% Switzerland Centrist Coalition 60% Centrist Coalition 60% Syria Assad 55% Assad 50% Taiwan KMT 60% KMT 60% Thailand Unstable Coalition 65% Unstable Coalition 50% Trinidad & Tobago UNC-led Coalition 70% UNC-led Coalition 55% Tunisia *Reformist Coalition 45% *Reformist Coalition 40% Turkey AKP 55% AKP 55% Ukraine PR-led Coalition 75% PR-led Coalition 60% United Arab Emirates Union 85% Union 85% United Kingdom Conservative Coalition 55% *Conservatives 40% United States Divided Government 80% Divided Government 45% Uruguay FA 65% FA 50% Venezuela Chvez 65% Chvez 55% Vietnam CPV Mainstream 55% CPV Mainstream 55% Zambia MMD 50% MMD 40% Zimbabwe National Unity Coalition 45% National Unity Coalition 40%

3/01/11 High High 6/01/11 Moderate Low 6/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 Low Low 4/01/11 High Moderate 3/01/11 Low Low 3/01/11 Moderate Moderate 3/01/11 Moderate Moderate 5/01/11 Moderate Moderate 5/01/11 Moderate High 3/01/11 Moderate Moderate 6/01/11 Low Low 3/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 Low Low 4/01/11 High High 6/01/11 Low Low 5/01/11 Moderate Moderate 6/01/11 High High DD CCD+ CB+ BB+ B B+ BC+ BBB B BCCCD+ CCB+ B+ A AAB+ B BAB+ AB B+ B+ A B+ A B A- (A) A (A+) AAA (A+) A- (A) C C B BC+ C C CB+ BBC+ C+ B B B+ C+ B A AB+ B A ABB B B BB AA+ AA AA C C+ C+ C+ C C+ A+ A+ AAA A A+ A A A A A B B+ BB B+ B C C+ BC+ C C+

2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016 2006-2010 2011 2012-2016

7.5 10.6 3.8 12.0 4.6 8.3 4.2 7.8 5.0 12.3 2.8 9.0 1.5 1.6 3.8 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.0 0.9 1.6 1.0 1.7 1.3 4.9 7.4 3.4 7.4 4.0 5.7 4.2 1.2 3.8 2.2 4.1 1.7 3.6 3.0 4.2 4.0 4.5 2.6 3.4 9.2 1.8 7.3 3.3 6.0 4.5 4.1 1.0 5.1 4.0 3.5 3.3 8.9 4.1 7.5 5.3 5.6 1.3 14.5 4.3 11.9 4.1 8.6 3.4 7.0 3.5 2.6 5.4 2.9 0.4 3.1 1.2 3.9 1.5 3.2 0.9 2.2 2.4 1.3 2.2 2.3 6.5 7.2 5.5 7.9 4.7 6.5 3.7 24.3 0.9 29.4 2.8 27.6 7.0 11.0 6.2 15.2 7.0 9.3 6.4 10.7 6.5 7.3 5.7 6.7 -2.9 1005333371.1 3.0 5.2 2.2 17.0

-3.72 -5.20 -4.40 0.31 0.75 -0.10 36.10 30.10 27.70 48.47 62.40 41.20 -0.30 -2.30 -0.80 34.50 35.40 34.90 11.11 10.20 12.40 5.13 3.10 3.70 -1.32 -3.90 -2.40 -35.09 -44.60 -54.50 -4.85 -4.80 -5.70 19.41 26.00 19.20 -56.80 -52.40 -41.40 -607.65 -630.00 -610.00 -0.41 -0.70 -1.20 20.97 18.40 15.20 -5.56 -4.20 -7.20 -0.55 -0.32 -0.85 -0.86 -0.38 -0.50

Additional Data is available online for all countries covered in the Political Risk Letter at www.prsgroup.com. Current and historical nancial, economic, and social data is just a click away.

12 Jun-2011

Reproduction without written permission of the publisher is strictly prohibited.

Political Risk Letter