Russias security policies in the South Caucasus and Russian Armenian Strategic Relationships: 2000-2008

Supervisor: Zhijun Zang Ph.D

Done by: Vazgen Hovhannisyan .

Abstract
The dynamics Russian security policies in the South Caucasus were over V. Putins presidency tenure (2000-2008) were significantly increased in its scope, resource basement, regional engagement capabilities and institutional backing. Augmented economic capacities coupled with centralized pattern of foreign policy making under V. Putins twin Administrations and conceptual transformations within the new political elite markedly widened the clout of security concerns of Russian state to include, notably, energetic expansion imperative. In comparative perspective, the newly formulated course of Russia pursued towards the states of CIS was structured along much more unified modus operandi paradigm as reflected in the Administrations efforts to institutionalize bilateral and multilateral formats of relationships, stronger economization and pragmatically oriented cooperation dynamics. In the South Caucasus, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Armenia has been the only strategic ally of Russia in the region. Relations between the two states over the 2000s have been upgraded to level of strategic partnership being more institutionally augmented within the multilateral setting of Russian-centered Collective Security Treaty Organization (2002) with Armenias accession to the membership. Simultaneously, over the same period under consideration, Russian-Armenian relations were substantially enriched by economic component being majorly driven by an active expansion of Russian capital and energy corporations in the region, and specifically in Armenia. Here two long-term structural factors played serous background role in shaping the modalities of Russias prospective security dynamics : (1) The Persistency of huge resource asymmetry between RF and the states of the region, including Armenia. (2)The Structural dependency links on the

side of the regional states upon Russia extrapolated not only in conventional security sphere, but also in social-economic and energy domains. Understanding the peculiarities and characteristics of the contemporary Russian strategy at the regional arena could be of a special value in predicating the currencies of global politics in Eurasia. Although the initial period of post-Soviet transformations were geared forward by the bunch of factors belonging to the path dependency specifics and residual influences of the processes accompanying the demise of the Soviet Union, the new formats of the Russian foreign policy-making and the new quality of multi- and bilateral relations between RF and the newly independent states in the 21st century, at least from the academic standpoint, deserves to be scrutinized and tested against the basic theoretical as well as empirical assumptions. From that perspective, employment of comprehensive and objective methods of academic research, scrupulous study of Russian-Armenian political and strategic partnership, analysis of the ideological and political development trajectories as well as chronological periodization of the foreign and security policy might be of a particular interest for comparative research. Key Words: Russian Federation, the South Caucasus, Security Complex, National Security Concept, Russian-Armenian Relations, Strategic Partnership, Regional Energy Strategies in the Caspian region, Military-Technical Cooperation, Russian Economic Expansion, Collective Security Treaty Organization, CIS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization

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Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... I Contents .......................................................................................................................................... III INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER I: Conceptual Dimension of Russian Foreign and Security Policies in the CIS in the 2000s......... 8 1.1 Conceptual Transformations in Russian Foreign Policy-making: the Legacy of the 1990s and the New Trends in Strategic Thinking of Russian Foreign and Security Establishment ................... 8 1.2 V. Putin Administrations Political Approaches to the Integration Processes in the CIS area .25 1.3 Caspian Region in the Security and Defense Planning Framework of RF (2000-2008) ...........42 CHAPTER II: Russian Military and Political Strategy in the South Caucasus 2000-2008 .............................66 2.1 Caucasian Security Complex and Russian Strategic Interests: Dynamics of Transformations over the post-Soviet period............................................................................................................66 2.2. The South Caucasus in Russian Energy Strategy: interplay of global and regional factors .....80 2.3. Russias Role in the Regional Conflict Resolution Processes ...................................................96 PART III: Russian Armenian Strategic Relationships in the Regional Security Context: 2000-2008 ......117 3.1. Russian Armenian Military and Political Partnership and its Implications on Regional Security Dynamics ........................................................................................................................117 3.2 Russian Industrial and Energetic Expansion in the Region and the Dynamics of RussianArmenian Economic Interaction: Strategic and Political Implications .........................................136 3.3. Social-Cultural and Humanitarian Aspects of Russian-Armenian Relationships ...................151 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................................163 Literature and Sources .............................................................................................................................171 Official Documents, Statements, Testimonies, and Speeches .....................................................171 Books, Monographs and Collection of Articles ............................................................................175 Media Sources (Newspapers, Info Agencies, Internet Resources)...............................................180 III

Journals and Magazines, Reports, Research and Analytical Papers, Conference Proceedings, and Statistical Data ..............................................................................................................................186

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INTRODUCTION

The option of the research topic for my PhD thesis on Russias regional security policy centered on Russian-Armenian strategic relations over the course of the V. Putins two presidential administrations (2000-2008) is premised on several assumptions. The first argument is bound upon the novelty of the proposed research agenda. Though the aspects of the Russian-Armenian relations contextualized within the broader framework of Russias security policies in the South Caucasus are widely reflected and analyzed in a variety of academic and expert-level surveys and monographs, yet we can rarely meet the comprehensive and systematic research works devoted to the Russian security policy analysis over the prolonged period of the current historical stage. The comparative edge of the proposed research is rest on theoretical and practical necessity to contrast and understand the conceptual and on-ground policy-driven transformations that occurred in Russias foreign policy since the V. Putins administration came to power while shifting the earlier foreign and security priorities that dominated the Russian politics during the 1990s. One of our major academic tasks has been to explore the alterations that were surfaced up in the strategic thinking of Russian policy-making (including decision-making top brass of executive politicians and leaders) elite, to reflect those driving forces that shaped the main venues of change as well as structural patterns that underlay and stimulated transformations in conceptual domains of Russian foreign and security-thinking at the beginning of the 21st century. More specifically, here, basically employing toolkits of content-analysis, the main attention is on researching the conceptual triangle of Russian strategic (foreign and security) thinking the key conceptual documents (Foreign Policy Concepts, Defense
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Doctrines, National Security Concepts) assessment and change capabilities of the major conceptual decisions and directions concerning Russian policy-making on the post-Soviet space (CIS, Commonwealth of Independent Countries). Actuality of the proposed research initiative is predetermined by several factors. At the global level, implications of the Russian foreign and security policies within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union are one of the trend-setters in configuring future parameters of global security, including energy security. Understanding the peculiarities and characteristics of the contemporary Russian strategy at the regional arena could be of a special value in predicating the currencies of global politics in Eurasia. Although the initial period of post-Soviet transformations were geared forward by the bunch of factors belonging to the path dependency specifics and residual influences of the processes accompanying the demise of the Soviet Union, the new formats of the Russian foreign policy-making and the new quality of multi- and bilateral relations between RF and the newly independent states in the 21st century, at least from the academic standpoint, deserves to be scrutinized and tested against the basic theoretical as well as empirical assumptions of the leading schools of IR theory. Here, our methodological preferences be more oriented towards the employment of important thesis of rational actor theory to delve into the essence of pragmatic approaches behind the modern Russian strategies in the CIS with more specific focus on Russian regional policies in the South Caucasus, while, on the other, to address comparativistic prerequisites in assessing policy-making processes. From that perspective, again, employment of comprehensive and objective methods of academic research, scrupulous study of Russian-Armenian political and strategic partnership, analysis of the ideological and political development trajectories as well as chronological periodization of the foreign and security policy might be of a particular interest for comparative research.
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Theoretical and Practical significance of the proposed PhD topic concerns the both the academic imperative and practical implications assessment of Russian policies in the Caucasian region and Russian-Armenian relations. Theoretical level analysis presupposes the necessity to test and critically comprehend the basic propositions of the leading paradigms of IR as branch of political science, yet mainly those with positivistic outlook, as a conceptual toolkit for explaining the major features of RF strategies in the region as well as analyzing political and on-ground policy-making repercussions of sustaining strategic partnership relationships between Russia and Armenia in a wider regional equation, address the issues of the new regional modus operandi put in practice under the V.Putins administration, hypothesize how the power asymmetry variables on the post-Soviet space (on the example of Russian-Armenian relations) find their reflections in the context of the new phenomenon of building and sustaining hierarchical relations in the CIS, and to understand and attest as to what degree Russias role has been principle in the efforts to create regional security complex in the South Caucasus. The practical significance of the research work is based upon the assumption that the research outcomes can be useful in drafting and compiling the educational and learning programs (syllabi, readers, etc.) of those interested in the contemporary period of regional geopolitical developments evolving in the strategic region of the South Caucasus, academic circles engaged in study of the newest history of international relations on the former postSoviet space, including the aspects related to the particular domains of security complex formation, analysis of dynamics of deterrence and balancing strategies employed by the main regional actors. Research Methodology. The methodological core of the dissertation work is premised upon the academic principle of unbiased and objective study of the raised
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problematic. Though the PhD dissertation bears mainly politological character, we have been guided by the interdisciplinary approaches also, including methodological orientations such as historical and social-cultural, neoinstitutional approach, and systemlevel analysis. Amongst the narrower research methods should be mentioned eventanalysis, content-analysis and analytical mapping. The main aims and objectives of the research: Study conceptual basement of Russias security policies on post-Soviet space, with a special focus on the South Caucasus; explore the features and peculiarities of the main conceptual documents regulating and shaping the guidelines of Russian foreign and security policies during 2000-2010. Explore the larger Russian foreign policy domain of engagement into the geopolitical and geo-economic processes in the Caspian region under V. Putins presidency, delve into the interplay of Russian macro-regional interests in conjunction with Russian-Armenian multifaceted partnership on the both levels bilateral and multilateral. Analyze political and strategic aspects of Russian Armenian relationships in conjuncture with Russias effort to sustain and develop regional security complex in the South Caucasus over the first decade of 21st century. Based on empirical policy-analysis, hypothesize and test the political-economic implications of economization trends that emerged in paradigm of RussianArmenian strategic partnership, explicate the dynamics of Russian-Armenian humanitarian and social-cultural dialogue within the broader context of the partnership.

In the context of Russian Armenian relationships and Russias regional policy to explore the specifics of emergent security dilemma, types and forms of deterrence strategies-in-making employed by RF.

Regional Security Complex and Structure of Russian Foreign Policy

The major research focus has been on exploring the specifics of regional security dynamics in the South Caucasus after the demise of Soviet Union with special emphasis on Russian security policies in the region over the course of V. Putin twin presidential administrations (2000-2008). Specifically, within the boundaries of the subchapters, elaborated are region-specific working principles of Russian policy (interplay of security issues affecting Russian domestic area of North Caucasus and the South Caucasus; conflict management, primacy of isolating the regional security complex from the third parties engagement), as well as conceptual and situational policy-driven transformations in Russian foreign and defense politics and its impact on Russian-Armenian security relationships. At the macro level, the main dimension we have concentrated on is structural patterns of the foreign policy-making. At the same time, the holistic approach is to highlight broader meaning of security - both as a material and positivist reflection of power-balance realities centered on the notion of national interest and the premise of common security as applied to the current regional situation. A comparatavist edge of the research has engaged a policy analysis to be pivoted around the dynamic aspects of Russian security polices, including transformations in key strategic areas of policy-making during the different administrations in power.

Conceptual Changes in Comparative Perspective

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Here the guiding methodology is based on content analysis of the basic official documents of the two countries such as Concepts of Foreign Policy, National Security Concepts, and Defense Doctrines. Within a comparative analysis are revealed transformations in security thinking and conceptual modalities that have affected both countries mutual relations and their common responses to rising regional challenges. On separate footing are discussed factors that geared conceptual and cultural motivations in outlining the key areas of strategic thinking, their normative, operational and long-term orientations.

Structural interdependencies in Regional Interstate Relations: Political and

Strategic aspects of Russian-Armenian bilateral relations

The guiding idea here is to address and explore the relatively new geopolitical phenomenon that emerged after the collapse of Soviet Union: power asymmetry between the Caucasian states and Russian Federation and its institutional implications on bilateral and multilateral relations in the region evolving on the background of formally sovereign interstate framework. The major topics addressed here are the pattern of relational domination/authority strategy and structural dependency on Russia in key areas of regional development; Armenias Foreign policy agenda setting and Russian factor; Multilateral security institutions in CIS (CSTO, Collective Security Treaty Organization) as well as Armenia defense posture. Interplay of bilateral and multilateral security factors and its influence on internal strategic development plans.

Security Dilemma and Strategic Responses at the Regional level

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This part of the proposed research is premised on neorealist understanding of security dilemma which is to be scrutinized in the context of Russian role in shaping and sustaining the regional power balance. Characteristics of zero-sum game in the region are considered not only as a derivative of broader strategic condition and policy-making instrument, but also as feature/ factor that reflects the traits of political culture conceptualized in policy images and thinking patterns. Particularly, a special attention has been paid to the set of issues concerning domestically-driven factors in Russia and Armenia foreign and security policy making, including the domain of bilateral relations between those two. Discrete topics of study include comparative review of operational response to emerging security threats, political communication venues in responding to those threats, normative and value-laden interests in formulating strategic responses; within both - ad hoc and institutional arrangements.

CHAPTER I: Conceptual Dimension of Russian Foreign and Security Policies in the CIS in the 2000s
1.1 Conceptual Transformations in Russian Foreign Policy-making: the Legacy of the 1990s and the New Trends in Strategic Thinking of Russian Foreign and Security Establishment

V. Putin Administration accession in 2000 to the top political power in Moscow signifies a start of serious transformations in Russian foreign and security policies both globally and at the regional level. Though during the initial period of V.Putins presidency those changes were as salient and tangible as they appeared in a later period and, to the certain degree, reflected the inertia of structural and political patterns-in-play that had shaped Russian foreign and security policies over the erratic time-spam of the 1990s, several factors predetermined the forthcoming conceptual and policy-making

reexamination of Russias foreign and international strategy. Among the most substantial factors that in fact underpinned the initiation of transformative adaptation of RF policies were the following.
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First, from the beginning of the 2000s Russian economy started to recover after the 1998 economic crisis, while the budget stabilization largely based on favorable price configuration in oil and gas markets internationally attached a significant dimension of assertiveness to Moscows positions vis--vis Europe and post-soviet space; augmented material resource-base of Russias foreign posture necessitated not only reevaluation of previously eclectic and often contradictory aims and goals of RF on international and regional arena, but also highlighted the demand for conceptual and doctrinal redesign of foreign policy1. A basic domestic consensus was formed to recover the international image of Russia as a stable partner freed from financial and credit debt burden owed to Western donor states and institutions. In a stark contrast to the situation of the 1990s, the budget allocations to foreign policy realization in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) registered a significant surge in 2001 onward. Though over the later period Russias foreign policy expenses decreased, nevertheless the overall actual oversees expenses dedicated to foreign policy domain leveled off at the significantly higher point as compared to the cash-strapped 1990s.2 Secondly, one of the most important strategic priorities of the new Administration that formed the twin pillars of domestic consolidation process under V.Putins both terms centralization of political authority and executive power projection capacities, enhancing policy-making coherence and restoring the political-administrative order in the country by crushing forcefully in one case (Chechnya) and undermining in other case the potentially dangerous separatist tendencies within federal framework has had a very serious

V. Putin, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium in Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, ed. A. Melville and T. Shakleina, CEU Press, Budapest and NY 2005, pp. 221-234. 2 .. , , , 6, 2006 (www.globalaffairs.ru).
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implications on the dynamics of Russias foreign conduct3. Foreign and security decisionmaking process has been structured along the centralized pattern, yet the political and economic plurality of foreign policy-making typical to B.Yeltsins period was dropped off in favor of unified paradigm of foreign strategy-making. Two dimensions have altered in a fundamental way the pattern and the ideological basement of Russias foreign and security policy under V. Putin: reshaping of domestic interest groups and their visions of the nucleus of Russian strategic interests and the contextual ongoing changes within international setting of Russia4. Thirdly, arrival of the new leading elite at the helm of Russian state created an opportune momentum in refreshing political relations with the major regional and international actors in the West and in Asia, providing conducive background to reevaluate and sketch up the perspectives of building bilateral and multilateral relations with the main power centers. Economic revival in Russia coupled with the new leaderships propensity to start up novel round of positive sum dialogue with the major power centers created conducive political stimuli in reshaping bilateral relationships5. Fourthly, consistent with proclaimed goal of reviving Russias status as both global and regional player in international arena, foreign policy under V. Putin acquired much more multidimensional character. Moreover, the new establishment under V. Putins stewardship invested a serious political capital to move the states foreign and security policies out of vicious circle of unpredictability and stagnation, to prove Moscows ability to raise its international profile to the level congruent with stable and normal great power that possesses a set of strategic choices and interests in a wide range of regional and

Samuel Charap, Inside Out: Domestic Political Change and Foreign Policy in Vladimir Putins First Term, DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 2007, pp. 335-352. 4 A.Tsygankov, New Challenges for Putins Foreign Policy, Orbis, Winter 2006, p.157. 5 D. Trenin, Russia is Back, Kommersant Vlast, 29.01.2008.
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international issues.6 The institutional anarchy in foreign policy drafting and policy-making typical to the 1990s transformed to centralized, methodical, and more professional conduct. Fifth, two indirectly interrelated strategic aspects of Russian foreign policy became some sort of credo; subserving status of Russian external policy agenda to successful realization of domestic reforms and functional economization of foreign policy. Creating some nexus of social-economic reforms inside and foreign economic relations with the outside world latter on was formulated as a crucial element of the new modus operandi in making. Profit considerations and promotion of the new patterns of external influence like energy toolkits were geared forward as the new paradigm of security provision7. The initial conceptual paradigms that dominated the Russian foreign and security thinking during the first post soviet years rested on historically unusual perceptions of external environment and acknowledgment of feasibility of the new political instruments for retaining and finding Russias place after the Cold war. At the doctrinal level, the new approaches of Russian democratic leadership were premised upon the thesis about the secondary character of military threats to state security and the wide opportunities being opened up to settle down all the conflict situations by means of purely political tools and methods. Publically, the necessity to develop and sustain the multilevel relationships between Russia and the newly independent states were not questioned as something self-evident. Yet, according to dominant optimistic worldview propagated by the first wave of Russian democrats, it was believed that the temporal isolation of Russia necessitated by urgency to consolidate the internal resources in perspective would eventually being transformed,
Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, RIIA Chatham House, London 2003, pp.1-5. Soft Power? The Means and Ends of Russian Influence, REP Seminar Summary, 31 March, 2011, Chatham House, London.
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while opening the new room for Moscow to take the leading political and economic role within the CIS. The same logic was also apparent in Russian official statements that were typical for the early 1990s about inadmissibility of employing the military-political leverages as the policy means. In practice, however, Russias lazier faire attitude toward the CIS area which was usually being referred in official political discourse as creating belt of good neighborhood, in fact, meant an absence of positive agenda of developing relations with the former Soviet republics. The first signs signaling Russia departure from those isolationist tenets surfaced up by the beginning of 1993. The failure of successful and rapid modernization of the country and deepening economic crisis had shaken not only the domestic viability of the liberal political elite personified by the former RF prime-minister Y. Gaidar, but seriously affected the liberal-minded foreign policy course too. Several factors predetermined those structural and conceptual changes in Russian foreign and security policies. First, emergence of Russian Defense Ministry that took up the role of institutional and unified actor in crucial position of defining Russias military and security in former Soviet space altered the parameters and overall understanding of Russian identity and interests externally8. Created by Russian initiative in May 1992 the CIS Collective Security Treaty, besides conferring de facto status of CIS external security provider to Russia, provided

military-political leverages in controlling and distribution of former Soviet military ammunitions, weapons and commodities among the republics of CIS (except for the Baltic states)9.

. , : 90- , , N 7-8, .5-18. ., , , 1993, N9, . 5-15. 9 S. Foye, End of CIS Command heralds new Russian defense policy?, RFE/RL Research Report, 2:27, 1993, p.48.
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Secondly, for the first time president B. Yeltsin officially put in direct correlation reintegration prospects in the CIS and the success of domestic reforms in Russia itself. Thirdly, despite internecine rivalries and institutional contradictions in the realm of foreign policy making, in 1993 were adopted RF Foreign Policy Concept and RF Military Doctrine; both of those documents ushering a new, longer term thinking about persistent interests of Russia externally. Specifically, the postulate was being formulated that Russias paramount strategic interests required preventing the potentially dangerous involvement of the third parties in the post-soviet space. Moreover, the prospect of NATO enlargement and US attempts to dictate the new terms of international relations were considered unacceptable. For Russia, these developments meant exclusion from involvement in both European and international processes10. Proceeding form the logic of centrist consensus achieved within Russias foreign and security policy-making community, in 1994 B.Yeltsin in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of RF noted that the Russian state has not yet assumed a worthy place in the world community11. Two aspects saliently were

crystallized in Moscow foreign and security thinking over the second half of the 1990s: Russias identity and perspective of international standing should have to be based upon its unique Eurasian geostrategic position, while the structure of international relations must be shifted toward real multipolar world order. Geopolitical considerations were acquired much higher profile, though value-laden factors that shaped the overall image of the countrys foreign policy conceptual basement did not take on confrontational anti-Western bias12. Despite major leitmotivs elaborated earlier continued consistently to guide Russia foreign and security thinking over the time-spam of V. Putin two administrations, yet the
B.Hansen, P.Toft and A.Wivel, Security Strategies and American World Order, Routledge: 2009, pp.30-32. .: , , 25,02,1994. 12 Y. Primakov, International Relations on the Eve of the 21st Century: Problems and Prospects in Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, pp. 207-219.
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scope and coverage of Russia strategic interests abroad as well as the correlation or interplay between domestic and external factors in shaping the major conceptual approaches of the political elites towards the profile of Russias global and regional posture witnessed significant alterations. In contrast to B.Yeltsin Administration period, significant though not cardinal transformations emerged in motives, methods as well as basic aims of Russian external strategy. At least at the conceptual level, existence of negative foreign and security policy agenda had been discarded as an outdated pattern of state behavior; accepting an apparent lack of coherence between hard and soft security paradigms as structural problem of the 1990s, Russian leadership under V. Putin proclaimed an imperative of attaining traditional geopolitical aims of Russia via modern means a selfevident priority. In other words, correlation between social-economic and geostrategic prerogatives of policy-making was seriously upgraded. By the end of 1990s, when new political elite under V. Putins leadership started to shape its strategic orientations and paradigm of institutional and structural parameters of Russias posture globally and at the regional level, a novel consensus emerged within Russian foreign and security community. Concerning the processes underway in the postsoviet space, the backbone of that consensus was rest on the assumption that the time had come to develop a qualitatively new strategy towards the CIS countries with a particular focus on the Southern belt of the Eurasian neighbors of Russian Federation. Still in late 1999 V. Putin publically stated that Russia continues to remain Eurasian Power; an approach that alluded the necessity of reexamination of the both, evolving geopolitical and geostrategic setting surrounding Russia at the beginning of the 21st century as well as reevaluation of Russian national interests in a longer run. Spatially, as was correctly noted by the expert, Moscow continued to consider Russian territory as a strategic pivot for pursuing a policy that would be both global (through activism within international
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institutions) and bilateral in terms of reaping more tangible results from its geostrategic position vis--vis its immediate neighbors13. The major aspect of the new establishments political course that was consequently elevated to the level of conceptual and practice-oriented stratagem became the imperative of securing a favorable external context that would eventually provide much required timeframe for revival and domestic consolidation of Russia. Yet, the newly elaborated stance did not presuppose locking up Russia into the isolationist fashion and repulse the major challenges from within in a best tradition of defensive realism. On the contrary; new leadership acknowledged the necessity of proactive course with regard to the CIS space and wider international arena, though with seriously reshaped modus operandi. As Richard Sakwa points within the framework of what we call a new realism, Putin sought to craft a policy that asserted Russias national interests while integrating into the world community14. One of the principle decisions taken under V. Putins presidency was the necessity to eliminate the breach between the real capacities of Russian to influence, let alone to guide international and regional processes and the great power rhetoric that was typical to the 1990s. Functionalism and rationalism as modes of practical policy-making and, in a larger context, as variables defining the renovated role and status perception of Russias in external world were chosen as working principles. Typical division across the spectrum of foreign policy orientations (westerners, Eurasianists, liberals, etc.) of the 1990s sounded as artificial as the new political class and economic stratum interconnected to

Dr. T. Gomart, Russian Foreign Policy: Strange Inconsistency, UK: Conflict Studies Research Center, March 2006, p.3. 14 R. Sakwa, Putin: Russias Choice, second edition, Routledge, NY 2008, p.267.
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the new team in Kremlin embarked on qualitatively new approaches in fostering Russian national interests; devoid of ideological preferences15. The initial political push that guided the first steps of V. Putin administration on the international arena was premised on the need to relinquish the older days pattern of existential competition with the West (it concerns competition and we must be competitive16). The requirement of finding a sustainable equilibrium between the real capacities of Russia on the international stage and the pragmatic aims was considered a crucial element of returning to normalcy. As president V. Putin asserted in 2002, the Russian foreign policy will be structured along the strictly pragmatic basement in future, proceeding from our capabilities and national interests strategic, economic and political. Also, it will take into consideration the interests of our partners, first of all CIS partners17. Concentration of resources, centralization of foreign and security policy conduct and maintaining internal order were being considered as important venues of restoring Russias image globally. At the beginning of 2001, Putin put forward his criteria: a clear definition of national priorities, pragmatism and economic effectiveness18. In 2000 three key long-term documents were being elaborated and adopted under the new political team at the helm of Kremlin Foreign Policy Conception of Russian Federation, the Military Doctrine of Russian Federation and National Security Conception of RF19. Later, in 2003, a Defense White paper by MoD of RF emerged to accentuate certain transformations in military and security thinking in light of 9.11 events in the US and the antiterrorist campaign that started to unfold in Eurasia from 2001 onward. Those official

15L.

Selezneva, Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: Between Doctrine and Pragmatism in Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. R. Fawn, University of St. Andrews, Frank Cass, London 2003, pp.16-22. 16 BBC Monitoring, 21.04.2000. 17 , 2002,www.kremlin.ru 18 . , , , 2002, N 2, . 4. 19 The texts of all the mentioned documents are available at the official web portal of Russian President: www.kremlin.ru.

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documents, though the elaboration being started well before V. Putin ascendency to power, were called upon to reflect the strategic priorities of the new Administration signifying by themselves not only formal power shift occurred for the first time in Russia since the breakup of USSR, but also structural changes in assessment and planning contingencies under V. Putins presidency. One of the venues reflecting the dynamics of the conceptual changes in Russias foreign policy in comparative perspective were the annual Addresses to Federal Assembly of RF by the president. Those year-to-year programmatic documents represent a valuable source in understanding the alterations that evolved in assessment of the Russian states foreign policy aims, evaluation criteria, methodological and policy-driven factors in approaching Russias identity, its international role and future-oriented planning. While the abovementioned official documents reflected the doctrinal fixture of the new establishments strategic policies, the annual addresses, the major trend-setting decisions as well as declarations by the top members of V. Putins team were to represent dynamic aspects of change in scope and scale of foreign policy change. The first annual address by V. Putin in 2000 contained much more sober-minded evaluation of the social-political and strategic currencies encompassing the state at the beginning of 21st century. It was frankly admitted that Russia had faced a system level challenge to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, while certain forces from outside striving to reshape the geopolitical global order. Yet, in major terms, Russian external strategy was proclaimed to be subordinated to the national revival internally. Economic efficiency and pragmatism got the catchwords of V. Putins team. Later on, in 2001, along the domestic political and power consolidation trends, has been formulated one of the main working principles of Russia proactive engagement internationally to raise Russias

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competitiveness in all dimensions, while making the European choice a long-term strategic orientation. A steady economic recovery and profit accumulation owing to high oil prices provided more self-confident context for external assertiveness and creating some background for institutional involvement in international labor division schemes: membership in WTO on favorable provisions was claimed to be realistic in the V. Putins 2001 Address. Russias readiness to enlarge the scope and the scale of Russian engagement on institutional footing became a persistent aspect of the Russian leaderships new strategic thinking. Already in 2002 the task of forming of unified economic space with Europe and bolstering the global strategic stability were elevated to the high-profile operational agenda of RF. Yet, alongside with certain shifts registered in advocated approaches from geo-economic to geostrategic priorities and taking into account the US unilateral decision on starting a military operation in Iraq, development of internationally recognized instruments and collective mechanisms for neutralizing the global threats was emphasized as a strategic necessity20. Moreover, given the fact that in global competition were actively employed political, economic and informational leverages, the Russian president alluded that Moscow too could embark on a more sophisticated toolkit of foreign conduct. According to the Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2000 The threat of a global nuclear conflict has been minimized. While military power retains its significance in international affairs, an ever greater role is played by economic, political, scientific and technological, environmental, and information factors.21 In general, three major instrumental strands can be discerned in Russian leading elites strategic thinking concerning the foreign and security policies over the time-span of
.. , ! (2000-2008.), , 12.10.2009, . 12-14. 21 , 2000, no. 8, pp. 311.
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V.Putin two presidential terms that reflected the complex correlations both inside poweryielding governing circles inside Russia and the changes of external environment that influenced the countrys foreign policy. The first practical policy-oriented strand in Russian foreign and security policies was bound to the concept of multipolarity. The major rationale behind Moscows stance to gear forward concerted efforts to restrain US/NATO unilateralism in world affairs was pivoted around reciprocal understanding among other major power centers to devise and enforce certain international and/or regional mechanisms and formats, often short of formal institutionalization, to change the rules of game that featuring after the Cold War international reality. Here a special attention and emphasis was laid on international organizations and, particularly, on UN where Russia enjoyed a veto power in the UN Security Council, and intensification of political, economic and security dialogue with the key international players like China, India as well as Asia-Pacific region partners22. During the first part of the 2000s Russias search for multipolar equilibrium was not premised on harsh balancing or to be at the expense of key relationships with the West23. However, the second presidential term of V. Putin indicated a growing realization that Russia can afford to be more assertive and less clearly aligned at the international level without any immediate repercussions. Since 2005-2006 Russias assertiveness to position itself a capable actor of international and regional arenas was bolstered politically and practically. For instance, on July 7, 2006, the Federation Council endows the Russian president with special powers to use Russian special services and military groups abroad for the purposes of fighting terrorism. It adopts a resolution permitting the head of state in accordance with Russian Federation legislation to use formations of the Russian Federation armed forces
E. Rumer, Putin's Foreign Policy - A Matter of Interest in Adelphi Paper, 47:390, London, IISS, May 2007, pp.40-42. 23 A. Tysgankov, Russias Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.
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and special-purpose subunits outside the territory of the Russian Federation in order to suppress international terrorist activity against the Russian Federation, or against citizens of the Russian Federation or persons without citizenship permanently resident on the territory of the Russian Federation24. The potential modalities of strategic interaction with the main power centers were being framed in the terms of power balance and an imperative of symmetric response to the rising domestic and external challenges to Russian security; political discourse undertones were basically in line with a blunt domestic stance of V. Putins administration to suppress the Chechen insurgency. Also, securitization of foreign policy pattern emerged as a principle venue of addressing the complicated external environment, echoing, at the practical policy-making level, the necessity of resources concentration and policycentralization priorities of the administration. The National Security Concept of RF (2000), the document with an apparent long-term horizon, emphasized those momentum, unequivocally stating that Russias concerns over the lack of legally and strategically binding checks and balances against the US unilateralism in global affairs: The second trend is manifested in the attempt to establish a structure of international affairs based on the domination of the US-led developed western nations over the international community, and is designed to provide unilateral solutions to the key problems of global politics, above all through the use of military force, in circumvention of the fundamental norms of international law25. Secondly, one of the most important discursive tenets of Russian international stance that held an ideological dimension in itself was the emerged shift from the survivability to sustainability of Moscows positions in regional and global affairs.
A Russian Foreign Policy: A Chronology July-September 2006, Conflict Studies Research Center, UK MoD, Sundhurst, 2006, p.24. 25 , , 2000, N2, . 3-13.
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During the initial years of the 2000s, the major guiding principle of Russias return to international policy-making agenda was the need to institutionalize the relationships with the main global protagonist at the organizational level. Two such key players

occupied especially important place in overall Russian foreign policy NATO and EU. A particular focus of Moscows efforts to handle the problem of Western enlargement to the East was on securing the independent stance on strategic decision-making agenda concerning the whole spectrum of security and social-economic issues that best the relations after disappearing of the so called buffer zone between Russia and the West, geopolitically symbolized by Eastern and Central Europe26. Regarding NATO, the first major step in this direction was undertaken still in 1997 by signing NATO-Russia Founding Act that had envisaged a certain privileged framework of relations that politically and structurally differed from the statuses of the Alliances formal members as well as from those that held NATO partner countries. Under V. Putins government the framework was upgraded; in 2002 NATO-Russia Council was established heralding the transformation from previous 19+1 to 20 format. According to the new arrangement, Russia obtained the right to participate in the decision-making process of NATO concerning several key areas like conflict resolution, antiterrorism, arms control, air defense, and joint rescue operations. Yet, Moscow could use its right to veto regarding those issues of common concern being included into the NATO agenda if only no single NATO member would regard Russian potential interference as threatening its national interests. The same logic of institutionalization was vigorously pursued with regard to European Union. In balance, V. Putin administration was quick to realize and accept the fact

., : 21- : , : , 2009, .57.

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that EU was to occupy substantial and practical place in Russias external strategy. Moreover, political economics of Russian policies toward the EU was correlated with the long-term calculus of integrationist schemes on the post-soviet space where Moscow continued to yield dominant positions. Ideally, Russian macro-regional vision of perspective development was based on the double-pronged institutionalization on the continent. On the one hand, the administration was eager to put on institutional track relations between the EU/NATO and multilateral structures under Moscows control within the CIS space (Eurasian Economic Community and the Collective Security Treaty Organization) 27 . On the other hand, Russian leadership was no less interested to institutionalize the interactions between RF proper, and the NATO/EU. After his nomination as presidential candidate for 2012 elections, V. Putin came forward with the programmatic article on the perspectives and vision of Eurasian Union creation where he evidently interlinked the processes of pan-European integration with the organizational and institutional sustainability of Russian-perpetuated structures on in the CIS space: Still in 2003 Russia and the EU agreed on formation of common economic space, coordination of economic activities rules without established supranational structures. [] Those

proposals have not hung into the air; those are scrupulously being discussed with the European colleagues. Now the dialogue participant with the EU will become the Custom Union and later on the Eurasian Union. Thus, entering into the Eurasian Union, besides the direct economic profits, will allow each member to integrate into Europe faster and with stronger positions28. Another long-term strategic implication of deepening and

T. Casier, The Clash of Integration Processes? The Shadow Effect of the Enlarged EU on its Eastern Neighbours in The CIS, the EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration, ed. by K. Malfliet, L. Verpoest and E. Vinokurov, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, NY 2007, pp.86-90. 28 . , , , , 5.10.2011.
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institutionalizing the relationships with the EU was deemed to be structural dependency links between the two entities Russia and the EU29. Conceptually, the pragmatic foreign policy course elaborated by the V. Putins two administrations rested upon the idea of sovereign democracy that entailed several practice-oriented implications in real politics. The thesis of sovereign democracy that was originally coined by V. Surkov, a prominent and influential presidential aide, ushered a new, somehow crystallized understanding and the matrix of RF national interests after the Cold War period. The ideological mindset encompassing the concept was called on to signify the strategic parameters of long-term development vision, and referred to the both dimensions of policy-making domestic and foreign domains. Partly reflecting Russias grumbling discontent with color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and subsequent loosening of control over the political and domestic developments in Russias backyard, the concept of managed democracy or a special Russian model of democracy was not geared by enforced isolationist strand or fortification stratagem. On the contrary, it held that there was no sovereignty without sustainable economic basement, while the geoeconomic dynamics of Russia during V. Putins years in Kremlin was set on active capital and infrastructural engagement in the several key regions of Eurasia and world economy, in general. Yet in general terms, conceptual strand that dominated Russian foreign policy thinking over the first presidential term of V. Putin was mainly biased toward political instruments of Russias engagement and protection of its national interests abroad. Nevertheless, unilateralism of US policy in Iraqi campaign from 2003 onward as well as fastened run of EU eastward enlargement coupled with political problems emerged between in RF EU over the energy and Kaliningrad transit issues as well as developments
29

Strategic Survey 2004, IISS (International Institute of Strategic Studes), London, 2004, pp.101-104.

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underway in the European part of the CIS altered the established paradigm of relations and impacted Moscows perceptions and conceptual approaches of its foreign and security policy aims. On the part of the West, Russias drive to position itself a self-sustainable sovereign democracy sparked certain concerns and was among the factors that contributed to emergence of some strain in relationships. A clear indication of the new climate in Moscow came in a speech by Defense Minister S. Ivanov in October 2003: We cannot absolutely rule out the preventive use of force (outside Russian borders) if Russias interests or its obligations as an ally make this necessary30. In general, it can be argued that over the period of 2000-2008 political mentality and world outlook of Russian military-political elite acquired much more technocratic nature. The former ideological dichotomies were dropped off as practically irrational, while the bolstering of the format of political relationships premised on the approach the state is Putin significantly conduced to that outcome. The new domestic interest groups were emerged sufficiently empowered to exert influence over the Kremlins centralized decision-making formats. Generically, those groups could be identified and differentiated along the structural and power sources criteria: (1) siloviki (representatives of power ministries and bodies), (2) technocrats, (3) liberals31. At the same time, siloviki were the most hierarchically organized group featuring a special pragmatism in defending their own economic interests32. On the other hand, in the new political milieu the classical liberal approaches typical to the views of the first wave liberals of B.Yeltsins period lost their attractiveness and rationale for the new liberal-minded elite consolidated upon the idea of
Le Figaro, 25.10.2003; Dr. S.J.Main, J.Sherr and Dr. M.A.Smith, The Pattern of Russian Policy in the Caucasus & Central Asia, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK, Occasional Brief N101, December 2003, p.3. 31 I. Bremmer, S. Charap, The Siloviki in Putins Russia: Who They Are and What They Want? in The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2006/2007, pp.83-92. D. Trenin and Bobo Lo, The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Carnegie Endowment 2005, Moscow, pp. 9-19. 32 Strategic Survey 2008, Russia/Eurasia, Routledge: London, 2008, p. 192. Simon Saradzhyan and Nabi Abdullaev, Alternative futures for Russia: the presidential elections and beyond, EU Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper, May 2011, N92, pp.9-10.
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Russia as liberal empire: the contemporary Russian liberals have not been disposed any more to postulate the necessity of distancing Russia from the social-political processes underway in the former Soviet Union republics. On the contrary, the Russian neoliberals (A. Kudrin, G. Gref, A. Chubais) became the staunchest proponents of Russian state-centric and economically viable interventionism, yet accepting the base-line universal economic rules of market economy as the backbone of Russias structural engagement in the CIS33. It was notable that at the ideational level (but not in personal or inter-elite relations) the formers approaches had certain commonalities with the technocrats (D.Medvedev, A. Miller) premised on imperativeness of rejecting the costly foreign policy: representatives of the both groups forwarded the idea of government-backed active involvement and structural consolidation in the Russias neighboring areas. Both fractions supported pragmatic and rational account of Russias economic interests. In the aggregate form, the conceptual outlook and the patters of the new strategic thinking of those powerful elites was being reflected in a comprehensive document prepared by Russian MFA in March 2007 Overview of Russian Federation Foreign Policy34. To the certain degree, the Overview was a sort conceptual summary of RF foreign policy under V. Putins administration. 1.2 V. Putin Administrations Political Approaches to the Integration Processes in the CIS area

In comparative perspective, several political strands dominated Russian approaches to the integration processes within the CIS space and the modalities of interactions with the post-soviet states during the two presidential terms of Vladimir Putin, finding their practical manifestations in policy-making process at the both levels bilateral and
33 34

F. Hill, Moscow Discovers Soft Power, Current History; Oct 2006, pp. 341-347. , , 2007. (www.mid.ru)

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multilateral. Some of those strands appeared as persistent trends of the Russian foreign and security policies under the new leadership. Being shaped by the novel structural features elaborated and practiced by V. Putins foreign policy team, they retained their consistent character despite the dynamic transformative developments underway in the external milieu and in Russia itself. On the other hand, Russian policies toward the CIS states also bore an imprint of reactive and situational motivations that were being contingent on military-political and social-economic changes on the ground. From the strategic point of view that included long-term military-political and geoeconomic policymaking calculus, the CIS space continued principally to constitute a zone of special responsibility and privileged interests of Russian Federation. Yet, taking into consideration that since the beginning of the 2000s Russian political, economic and military clout on regional and international agenda outside of FSU area were extended significantly while Moscows drive to embolden its status of independent pole at the international stage gained a substantial momentum, the member-states of CIS and the subregional groupings inside the CIS became an important variable in configuring and implementing the wider goals of Russian foreign policies35. At the official-doctrinal level, RF Foreign Policy Concept (2000) outlined four regional priorities of Russia: the CIS, the EU, the USA and Asia. Regional integration within the CIS framework was highlighted as of primary importance to the Russian national interests. According to the Concept, emphasis had to be put on the development of good neighborly relations and strategic partnerships with all CIS member states. Practical relations with each of them, read the Concept, should be structured with due regard for reciprocal openness to cooperation and readiness to take into account in a due manner the

J. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Council on Foreign Relations, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009, pp.241-282.
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interests of Russia. The emphasis put on integration dynamics within the post-soviet space was stipulated by the need to accelerate Russias engagement into the world economy as a prerequisite for its own economic growth and sustainable development, yet also fixed up, secondly, as a national security priority. The National Security Concept (2000) echoed those preferences outlining a mid-term strategic vision for Russia to create a single economic space with the CIS countries. From the overall national security perspective, the NSC of RF denoted the CIS integration as a countermeasure against wide array of threats and potential risks36. Still at the beginning of the 2000s an official document entitled Basic Directions of Development Relations between Russia and CIS member states at the current stage was published to confirm the previously adopted provisions that the longer-term interests of Russia and CIS countries were tightly interwoven, while preserving Russia presence in all dimensions of regional development was considered a strategically important task37. A special emphasis was being made on economic and energy dimensions of integrationist processes within CIS framework. In general, a prevailing focus of the renovated strategic course was placed upon adequate interplay between geopolitical and geo-economic goals of Russian state in the near abroad provided with more nuanced and instrumental modes of engagement. Regained confidence and assertiveness to attain and harvest more tangible outcomes out of reinvigorated engagement in the FSU was primarily rest on significantly augmented resources base of Russian foreign policy. Specifically, by 2007, the economy of RF reached the level of 1990 in terms of GDP, and since 1999 grew about 7 percent annually. The overall size of the economy increased about 6 times - from $200 billion to
, , 18.01.2000. ., : , , , , N1(25), 2003, .85.
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$1.3 trillion. Russias per capita GDP quadrupled to nearly $7,000, and about 20 million people have been lifted out of poverty38. From the normative standpoint of Russias external strategy-making, it was obvious that Moscow would not give up its centuries long developed geopolitical perceptions of strategic necessity of upholding and augmenting the structural preponderance over the space of the former USSR. However, the domestic dynamics, coupled with power concentration inside and revived allure to reposition previously lost status of great power as independent pole in the system of international relations, altered somehow Russian political attitudes and policy-driving motives concerning the CIS towards more instrumental bias39. As such, the rational and the focal points of V. Putin administration approaches to the integration processes within the CIS were pivoted around several operational-level considerations: Functionality. V. Putin himself and other key governmental officials made clear from the onset that Russia was no longer intent to approach the post-soviet space as unique geopolitical construct and the Russian backyard that must be guarded off and retained under the Russian control by any means and at any cost40. This political position was later on confirmed, during V. Putins Armenian visit in March 2005: The stated aims were one thing, but in reality the CIS was formed in order to make the Soviet Unions collapse as civilized and smooth as possible and to minimize the economic and humanitarian losses it entailed, above all for people41. Moreover, though fully understanding and accepting that

Russia Turns from Debtor into Creditor Country: Medvedev, Itar-Tass, January 27, 2007; Guy Chazan, Lighting a Spark: Fueled by Oil Money, Russian Economy Soars, Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2007. 39 A. Monaghan, An Enemy at the Gates or from Victory to Victory: Russian Foreign Policy, International Affairs 84: 4 (2008), pp. 725-727. 40 A. Zagorski, Russia and the Shared Neighborhood in What Russia Sees, ed. D. Lynch, Chaillot Paper, N 75, Jan.2005, pp.68-69. 41 www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2005/03/25. [Official web portal of Russian President]
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Russia would stay the natural nucleus of Commonwealth integration, the Russian president noted that integration itself is not our own policy. We dont need it as a policy. It has to be really useful for our country and our citizens for us to accept it42. The same political logic was put forward by the Russian foreign minister S. Lavrov at the Collective Security Treaty Organization meeting, while being echoed by the Organizations secretary-general N. Bordyuzha: This [post-Soviet space] term is political jargon that we should get rid of. As from today, the term post-Soviet space is to be removed from all official CSTO documents43. Instead, the preference was given to bilateralism and reduced integrationist organizations within the FSU as the most optimal and functional formats to address Russian economic and political interests in the near broad. Instrumentality. Interestingly enough, the major conceptual rationale behind the analytical report Outcomes of CIS 10-year activity and tasks for the future published in Moscow in 2001were mainly deducted to three basic points in terms of interim outlook: economization of relationships and multilateral partnership within the framework of the CIS, promotion of alternative, yet reduced formats of integration in the post-soviet space, and, in the context of globalization processes, collaboration on the issues related to integration into the world economics on more favorable terms and provisions. The report itself, though not a conceptual paradigm or any kind of programmatic document, in principle, was in line with V. Putins administration vision of securing realization of more or less coherently defined functional priorities and, to the certain degree, goals of the Russian state.

L. Selezneva, Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: Between Doctrine and Pragmatism in Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy, Ed. Rick Fawn, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2003, p.19. 43 V.Socor, From CIS to CSTO: Can a core be preserved?, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol.2, issue 125, June 28, 2005.
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Summing up the decade of the CIS existence, the report clearly signified mindset of the Russian elite to depart from grand schemes of previous B. Yeltsins era to the more palpable forms of cooperation in pursuit of larger external aims of Russia: regional integration is capable to become an effective response to the challenges of globalization. Its potential member-states of the CIS can utilize more practically and effectively under condition of joint adaptation to the geopolitical and geoeconomic realities, with coordinated participation in settling global economic problems. []The key to formulation of common understanding on aims and tasks of the Commonwealth is pragmatism. Thus, interstate interaction comes forward not as an end-in-itself, but as an instrument of joint decision-making on concrete problems44. Officially drafted and adopted by all the CIS member-states, the report evidently bore the imprint of the newly elaborated Russian approaches; for instance, stating that promotion of regional and trans-regional cooperation on the space of the CIS was an objective trend, it simultaneously necessitated for to the next step of organizational development to arrange binding mechanisms of co-financing thus hinting that Russia was no less and no more interested than other members in functionality of the organization. Moreover, putting coincidence of the national interests at the heart of successful integration process, it vaguely denoted those common areas of collaboration at beginning of the 21st century: (1) providing sustainable and persistent social-economic development, and (2) pursuit of adequate integration into the world community45. As Russian president noticed in his 2002 address, working with CIS countries is the main foreign policy priority

" 10 ", 21.06.2001, , www.mid.ru. 45 Ibid.

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of Russia; a priority, interlinked among the other things with gaining competitive advantages on the world markets46. Institutionalization, differentiation and burden-sharing mechanisms. In practical policy-making process, the Russian government laid a special emphasis on the institutional underpinning of integrationist structures within the FSU. In contrast to the B. Yeltsins period, the CIS countries economic and financial subsidization practice was dropped off, while Russias officially articulated readiness to pay for Russian-centric integrationist projects were politically interlinked with the imperative of either organizational or institutional loyalty to Moscow and burden-sharing prerequisites that had been singlehandedly sketched up by Moscow. Accepting improbability of forging all-encompassing domination policy within the CIS, Kremlin concentrated its efforts on strengthening narrower-profile interstate structures such as Single Economic Space or Eurasian Economic Community47. In contrast to wider foreign policy prerogatives on the international stage, Russian strategy within FSU was majorly geared forward by the longer-term considerations to sustain some kind of regional hierarchy premised on Russian geopolitical and economic preeminence wrapped into the formalized and binding bilateral or multilateral obligations. As for external interference into the area of its vital interests, Russia reverted to the more vigorous deterrence and preemption policies in efforts to hold back potential encroachments to its positions within the CIS. Though far from being hegemonic, particularly after 2005, Russias policies towards the CIS countries acquired much more multidimensional character with the tighter interrelations between the policy areas of
, 2002., www.kremlin.ru W. Kononczuk, The Failure of Integration: the CIS and Other International Organizations in the Post- Soviet Area: 1991-2006, Center for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, May 2007, pp.29-45.
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strategic interests concerned; a level of geoeconomic and military-security interests convergence were raised significantly in addressing the overall objectives of Russia on the post-soviet space. By analogy with the conventional deterrence strategy which is premised on the three-leg operational principles (1. in order for deterrence to succeed, a deterrer should have sufficient capability, 2. its threat should be credible, and 3. it should be able to communicate the threat to its opponent 48 ), Russia significantly upgraded the communicative aspect of its strategy, making clear to the countries inside the CIS as well as the outside powers that its policies and role in the region would be active, rather reactive49. On the macro-level of social-economic relations, as Jeronim Perovic objectively noted, Russia succeeded to achieve a genuine interest on the part of all regional leaders in a strong Russian economy and in stable relations as Russias enhanced economic engagement through its big energy corporations was consequently seen as an opportunity to strengthen economic ties and profit from Russias economic revival50. In this context, economic and social-economic leverages employed by Gazprom against Ukraine during the 2006/07 gas crisis as well as some softer measures applied towards other republics on the post-soviet space evidently proved that Russia could revert to the tougher stance51. One of the public political manifestations of that stance was being reflected in the official document, The Overview of Russian Foreign Policy published by RF MRA in 2007, which was in some sense V. Putins foreign policy heritage summary that unequivocally stated: as gathered experience has shown and as our foreign partners on the CIS realized,

T.V.Paul, The Complex Deterrence: An Introduction in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. by T.V.Paul, P.Morgan and J. Wirtz, The University of Chicago Press, 2009, p.2. 49 A. Monaghan, Calmly Critical: Evolving Russian Views of US Hegemony, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.29, N 6, December 2006, p.989. 50 J. Perovic, Russian energy companies in the Caspian and Central Eurasian region: Expanding southward in Russian Business Power: The Role of Russian Business in Foreign and Security Relations, ed. A. Wenger, J. Perovic, and R. Orttung, Routledge, 2006, pp.107-108. 51R. Legvold, Russias Strategic Vision and the Role of Energy in Russian Energy Policy and Strategy, NBR Analysis, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, vol.19, N 2, July 2008, p.16.
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trade and economic cooperation with Russia is an indispensible prerequisite for sustainable development of the CIS countries. We are talking about important common resources for national development that are the products of economic complementarity and common existence within the framework of unified state. In foreseeable perspective, no other external partners or alternative integration formats can substitute the role of Russia; neither in bilaterally, nor in the CIS generally, within the formats of multilevel integration. The desired final outcome creation of economic system that will provide effective development for its every participant. [] We want to build our relations with the CIS countries based on the sober economic estimation. This kind of relationships would be more sustainable, than old politicized schemes52. In the realm of practical policy-making on the post-soviet space, Moscow actively embarked on the two vehicles of promoting, defending and sustaining those macropolitical preferences outlined above. Namely, from the instrumental standpoint, in contrast to the late 1990s there was a shift in the paradigm of FSU regional security toward expansive bilateralism. Without discarding the political and, to some degree, economic expediency of the multilateral formats, the expansive bilateralism was acknowledged as a construct of bilateral arrangements being nested within multilateral contexts; that is, developing bilateral linkages that were conducive to or prone to broader linkages that become multilateral in their policy significance53. In February 2001, then Secretary of the Security Council, S. Ivanov, announced that Russia was going to adopt a new policy line with regard to the CIS countries and publicly acknowledged that previous attempts to integrate the CIS had come at a very high price, and that Russia must abandon the

, , 2007. J. Willerton and M. Beznosov, Russias Pursuit of its Eurasian Security Interests: Weighing the CIS and Alternative BilateralMultilateral Arrangements in The CIS, the EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration, ed. by K. Malfliet, L. Verpoest, E. Vinokurov, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, NY 2007, pp.65-68.
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integration project in favor of a pragmatic course of bilateral relations. By the time this announcement was made, the CIS states debt to Russia had reached $5.5 billion54. Those political approaches and motivations manifested themselves in a steady economization of Russian foreign policy in general, and with respect to the CIS countries, particularly. In his 2001 Address to RF Federal Assembly V. Putin made a reference to the objective character of Russian reason dtat in the CIS: Not only historical affinity, but also clear and practical considerations make the activation of our efforts within the CIS necessary. Russia continues to remain the backbone of integration processes in the Commonwealth, while in the current period of economic growth the new opportunities are emerging for Russia in this region55. Yet, political-economic matrix of the perspective longer-run vision of Russias role in the post-Soviet space was publicly aired in 2003 by A. Chubais, the leading Russian reformer of the 1990s, that Moscow would build liberal empire in the Central Asia and the Caucasus based on Russias economic and strategic prowess gained over those countries social-economic and social-political development paths.56 Sharp increase of the Russian capital presence in the economies of near abroad states was accompanied by steady expansion of state control over the strategic economic profiles and sectors inside Russia; by 2006 one third of national wealth was controlled by companies chaired by five Kremlin officials57. Here a special attention merits the evolution of interplay between the economic and geopolitical aspects of Russian policies in the CIS. Particularly, since the start of second presidential term of V. Putin (2004-2008) the balance evidently tilted towards political and
A. Tsygankov, If Not by Tanks, then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putins Foreign Policy, EUROPEASIA STUDIES, Vol. 58, No. 7, November 2006, p.1082. 55 , 2001, www.kremlin.ru 56 . , 21- , , 1.10.2003; E. Rumer, Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin, Adelphi Paper, Routledge, IISS, 2007, p.25-42. 57 J. Sheer, Russia and the Near Abroad in a Medvedev Presidency in Russia after Putin: Implications for Russias Politics and Neighbors, A. Jonsson, S. Blank, J. Leijonhielm, J. Sherr, C. V. Pallin, Institute for Security and Development Policy, March 2008, p.29.
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strategic considerations, with a heavier emphasis on geopolitical dimensions of economic and infrastructural dependency of the CIS states on RF. Specifically, in a stark difference to the earlier times, tangible result-oriented paradigm deployed a new emphasis on the processes of social-economic and political synchronization in reform undertaking between the countries of CIS and Russia, as well as on the need to enhance the humanitarian space within the FSU area. At the pedestrian level, the approach was postulated earlier by the Russian government vice-prime minister V.Khristenko, who envisaged the creation of homogeneous space for Russian companies beyond the boundaries of the Russian Federation58. The Russias new functional device on the post-soviet space was proclaimed to be centered upon the imperative of economic and energy expansion that ultimately would lead to Moscows strengthened political and social-economic clout59. Not by coincidence, already in 2004 Russian president declared for the first time since the long time-frame RF had stepped over very important, yet not a simple borderline. And for the first time Russia has become politically and economically stable country, independent country from financial standpoint, as well as independent in international affairs: Today we can better appreciate our own capacities, we know what kind of resources we have; understand what could hinder attaining of those named goals60. Moreover, Russia politically asserted the correlation between international and regional dimensions of its policy-making domains: Our priority remains the task of deepening integration on the space of the Commonwealth of Independent States, including the frameworks of Common economic space, Eurasian

V. Khristenko, Making Headway to Integration, Russia in Global Politics, 2 (MarchApril 2004), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/6/508.html 59 ., , , 22.03.2004 60 , 26 , 2004., www.kremlin.ru.
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economic community. This is, without any exaggeration, one of the preconditions of regional and international stability61. Secondly, during the 2000s Russia actively pushed forward in creating and transforming the multilateral institutions and integrationist structures within the CIS to address the most nascent security and economic interests of RF in a more focused fashion. In military-security sphere, Russian-centric power consolidation trends were rest on the one of the most important military security structure created and developed under Russian aegis at the beginning of the 2000s - Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO was established on the base of 1992 Collective Security Treaty, while during 2002-2003 acquired the institutional-organizational backbone (the Statute, budget, organizational bodies and structures, the Secretariat)62. On 14 May 2002 during a meeting in Moscow it was decided that the Treaty would be transformed into a political and military bloc, and it was finally institutionalized on 27 April 2003 during the summit in Dushanbe. The rationale of creating CSTO was pivoted around the multilateral posture to establish a new type of multifunctional organization capable to cope with a wide array of conventional (military alliance-building and traditional military-security risks) and non-conventional or new types (anti-terrorism, trafficking, illegal migration, etc) of treats63. Initially, the securitization dynamics of interrelationships in the CIS and, first of all, bilateral cooperation with Russia was led by antiterrorism agenda64. At the same time, more traditional geopolitical considerations also played high in Russias military-political calculus aimed in reshaping the regional security order. For instance, in 2001 V. Putin

Ibid. Initially the CSTO included 6 member-states: Russia, Belorussia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2006 Uzbekistan joined the Organization. 63 : , . , , 2011, .8. 64 B. Buzan, O. Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.410.
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explicitly stated: We know about the complex processes that are underway in the world today. The new regional power centers and the new systems of security are forming. Military-political balance is actually redistributing. [In this context] military-technical cooperation for any country, including for Russia, is substantial and rather effective instrument of influencing these processes65. The logic of threat perceptions were reinforced after September 2001events and subsequent US engagement into the regional affairs, which, in its turn, led to the reassessment of Russian national interests in the CIS, with a particular focus on Central Asian and South Caucasian areas. The initial push of security engagement into the Central Asia was not mainly conditioned by the geopolitical externalities, but rather by Moscow inregional security considerations to prevent the spillover effect of Islamic militancy. There was also certain strategic and discursive parallelism to rebuff extremism both internally in Russia and in Central Asian area. Nevertheless, the US military engagement into the Afghani operation resulted in a more forceful efforts by Russia to institutionalize the military-security arrangements in the region66. In August 2004, the CSTO conducted an extensive military anti-terrorism exercise entitled Rubezh-2004 (Border 2004) with the purpose to test for the first time the CSTOs Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) in action. In difference to the previous military multilateral arrangements, whereas the units and regiments of the national armies of the CIS member-states participated on a discrete base, now the units of RDF were permanently assigned as part of one unity. The political message of the military exercise Rubezh- 2004

.. - , , , 9 2001. 66 J. Wilhelmsen, G. Flikke, Copy That: A Russian Bush Doctrine in the CIS?, NUPI, Oslo, 2005, pp.9-12.
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was mainly directed to embolden Russian posture that the Organization was determined to play a long-term future role in the national and regional security of its member-states67. Since the second half of the 2000s, in international political and diplomatic realm Moscow vigorously stepped up efforts to promote the Organization internationally, succeeding in obtaining observer status for the CSTO in the UN General Assembly and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On June 18, 2005, during a meeting of the CSTO Collective Security Council a document was adopted On the main directions of cooperation between the CSTO and NATO. Durability of Russias stance to define the area of its political and strategic zone of influence was also reiterated in the conceptual postulates by N. Bordyuzha, Secretary-General of the SCTO 68. Another practical tool of reasserting and tightening the military-political bonds between the CSTO member-states in a longer run was the decision to supply and equip the alliance armies with Russian-produced weapons and ammunitions at the domestic prices and providing preference in military training and education in Russian institutions. Despite the clause of Russias nuclear umbrella guarantees to its CSTO allies as an ultimate response should the security threats cross the threshold69, certain steps were taken to upgrade the level of conventional military capabilities with more sophisticated forms of military-technical cooperation like unified air defense system, procurement of arms, and joint use of R&D products70. In the same canvas of security thinking, the newly established Russian Kant military air base in Kyrgyzstan (opened October 23, 2003) established under bilateral agreement was added to multilateral regional arrangements. The CSTOs main defense and military directions were defined according to the geopolitical and geographic
J. Saat, The Collective Security Treaty Organization, (Central Asian Series 05/09), CSRC, UK, February 2005. . , . , , 165 (4706), 06.09.2011. 69 S. Blank, A New Russian Defense Doctrine?, UNISCI Discussion Papers, N12 (October / October 2006),p.154. 70 M. de Haas, Russias Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and beyond, Routledge, NY, London 2010, pp.40-42; E. Marat, CIS Defense ministers agree to boost cooperation in air defense, Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 3, 2008.
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considerations West-European military grouping (bilateral Russian-Belorussian treaty agreement), Caucasian grouping (bilateral Russian-Armenian treaty agreement) and Central Asian grouping (multilateral agreement)71. The second major regional organization created during the reign of V. Putins administration was Eurasian Economic Community. Established in 2001 by Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus the organization was aimed to further social-economic and, to some degree, political integration and homogeneity of economies of the member-states72. The main building-blocks of integration that were vehemently supported by Russia included a creation of Customs Union with a single customs tariffs that were to be regulated by a Commission of the Customs Union and single customs territory. Two specific sets of strategic approaches were guiding Russian activities within EurasEC: narrow focus on the most viable (at least, by their size) economies of Kazakhstan and Belarus and quid pro quo approach presupposing that substantial results were to be reaped from. Moreover, the blurring of the lines between Russias bilateral and multilateral strategy in EurAsEC emphasizes the strong influence Russia wields within the organization73. In strategic perspective, Russian efforts were driven by the necessity to structure Single Economic Space with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, despite the latters very cautious stance with regard to Russian initiatives and open-minded skepticism towards micro- and macro-level integrationist projects evolving on the CIS space. Nevertheless, in 2003 the SES Concept was agreed upon outlining the specifics of mechanisms for regulating the economic functions based on common principles, securing the free movement of commodities, services, capital and the workforce. Within the space,
. , , , 20.04.2007. 72 In 2005 Uzbekistan merged to EurasEC, but later on, in 2008, suspended its membership in the Organization. 73 S. Aris, Russias Approach to Multilateral Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Space: CSTO, EuraSEC and SCO, Russian Analytical Digest, N 76, 15 April, 2010, p.4.
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common foreign trade policies as well as common custom, monetary and currency policies were to be pursued with an apparent goal of sustaining macroeconomic stability74. In the Central Asian region of the CIS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan was singled out as the suitable regional platform in addressing political and security interaction vacuum. According to the Declaration on the Creation of the SCO (provision 9), the Organization shall deploy its huge potential and great opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between the member states in the sphere of trade and the economy, and shall seek to promote the further development of cooperation and diversification of its forms among the member states at the bilateral and multilateral level75. Yet, Moscow stance on economic partnership within the SCO was mainly focused on energy related projects. In 2006, at the Organizations annual summit, V. Putin proposed to set up the SCO Energy Club as well as to embark on large-scale infrastructure projects realization76. Russias political approaches to the Organization were double-pronged, whereas the economic dimension of cooperation within the SCO was rather restricted in terms of intensity and the scope. On the one hand, attaching the institutional character to the Shanghai multilateral consultations mechanisms that was launched still in the early 1990s was stipulated by the desire and the necessity to prop up Russias political discourse internationally in advocacy of multi-polar world order, blended with Russian-Chinese postulations of non-interference of extra-regional powers into the processes in the Central Eurasia.
E. Vinokurov, Russian Approaches to Integration in the Post-Soviet Space in the 2000s in The CIS, the EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration, ed. by K. Malfliet, L. Verpoest and E. Vinokurov, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, NY 2007, pp.30-34. 75 , 2001, N7. 76 . , : , 30.03.2010, http://www.journal74

neo.com/?q=node/304.

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Also, Chinas formal participation in the SCO, a country that was external to the CIS format, was viewed as an important contribution into the efforts of non-military regional security issues solutions. In case of the CSTO Russian mainly fostered the development of traditional framework of military-security pact under Moscow strict control and guidance. Yet, Russian leadership considered SCO to be an important element in its security policy as its own security was directly affected by the spread of terrorism, extremism, organized crime and illegal narcotics trafficking from Central Asia to Russia. In other words, SCO was aimed at harmonizing approaches to non-traditional security challenges. In balance, Russian political and strategic approaches towards the regional integration processes, structures and formats within the CIS space during V. Putins two presidential terms (2000-2008) undergone significant transformations. On the conceptual level, the major rationale that shaped Russian policies in the macro-region was geared forward by the necessity of focused, pragmatic, economically justified priorities. Though the degree Russian foreign policy independence increased substantially, while the resource-base of power projection to the CIS enlarged proportionally to the growth of the state budget Moscow was wary not to overstretch its commitments concerning the regional affairs. To use a metaphorical wording, in contrast to the 1990s over the time-frame of our research interest Russian strategies were mainly forwarded based upon bottom-up principle; active engagement of Russian capital and entrenchment of structural dependency relationships on Russia was considered to be the bulwark of Moscows political and social-economic influence projections within the FSU. And yet, a strong synergy reached between authority and capital resources gained during V. Putin administration made the state power effective in its pragmatic orientation that was defined in the RF Foreign Policy concept as strict promotion of national interests.

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Methodologically, the Russian efforts to consolidate its influence and spur the Russian-centric integration processes on the post-Soviet space were actualized via expanded bilateralism and focused networks of multilateral arrangement. Efforts and resources put in provision of institutional and organizational sustainability of the CSTO, SCO and EuraSEC were aimed to bolster the overall strategic tasks of Russia in the CIS space in the mid-term perspective. Russian political, military and economic prevalence was the major factor for integration in the post-Soviet space. Notably, in line with a general mindset and political stance for a more concrete delineation of common and individual commitments and duties of member-states, Russia also altered the decision-making mechanisms from previously practiced single country single vote principle of the CIS to the proportional contribution approach77. 1.3 Caspian Region in the Security and Defense Planning Framework of RF (2000-2008)

It is hardly possible to underestimate the geostrategic importance of the Caspian region for Russian national interests both, historically and in the context of current juncture of military-political and political-economic processes that started to unfold in the central Eurasia since the demise of the Soviet Union. Situated along the Russias southern frontiers, the Caspian basin possesses significant volumes of oil and gas resources, including offshore reserves of Central Asian republics. Yet geographically the region is positioned as a very important hub of communication lines connecting Asia to Europe. Spatially, the Caspian basin itself comprises the five littoral states Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan whose long-term national and economic interests have been tightly intertwined over the principal issues of the Caspian sea legal status
S. Torjesen, Russia, the CIS and the EEC: Finally getting it right? In The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. by E. W. Rowe and S. Torjesen, Routledge, London and NY 2009, pp.155-156.
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determination problem that still pending its solution, oil and gas resource sharing mechanisms, routs of extracted energy resource transportation lines from the Caspian to international markets as well as a wider perspective of communication outlays crossing the Central Asia and the South Caucasus to bridge East and West. As V. Naumkin notes, in the works of strategic analysts today several definitions of the Caspian region can to be found, ranging from a purely geographical one, which includes only the Caspian littoral states, to others which notably extend its borders on the basis of economic and geopolitical dimensions. In the latter case the region is regarded as a vast territory from the Pamir in the east to the Black Sea in the west, Kazakhstans border with Russia in the north and the Persian Gulf in the south78. Finally, the military-security policies of the regional littoral states are tightly interwoven. Since the mid-1990 among the major power centers concerned with and engaged in the regional processes a clear understanding has emerged that potential acquisition of strategic access, control and denial capabilities over the Caspian energy resources and transportation veins would substantially determine the geopolitical trajectory of regional development in a long-run perspective79. As such, the security dynamics of the Caspian has been significantly influenced not only by intricacies of interstate relationships between the Caspian states themselves, but also proxy regional countries and extra-regional power centers, first of all by US resolute posture of engagement in the energy projects and yielding a kind of possession control over the transportation routes80. Rich with hydrocarbonate wealth and located at the very heart of important geopolitical power-lines, the Caspian became the focal point of Western

V. Naumkin, Russias national security interests in the Caspian region in The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. by. G. Chufrin, Oxford University Press 2011, p.119. 79 Dr. LEON FUERTH, Testimony: OIL, OLIGARCHS, AND OPPORTUNITY: ENERGY FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO EUROPE, Committee on Foreign Relations, The United States Senate, June 12, 2008. 80 S. Blank, American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, World Affairs, Fall 2000.
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interest 81 . In this context, parametrical features of regional strategic development directions and the rules of game in practical policy-making domain had undergone important structural transformations during the 1990s along the path of the Western state and private involvement intensification into the regional affairs. Both US and Europe on the one hand, and China on the other had evidently fixed up their interests in the region, while striving to make a scenario of returning the Caspian under the sole control of Russia or Russian-Iranian tandem impossible in strategic perspective. Since then, configuration of power interests in Caspian acquired an obvious international dimension whereas abrupt and tough unilateral actions by any of major actors concerned would be ripe with serious clashes and escalation of intraregional military-political tension82. The tangible and result-oriented policies of the major stake-holder in the Caspian were signified by concrete start of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline materialization at the moment of V. Putins ascendency to power; a geopolitically motivated project to bypass Russian territory and hence Moscow control over the main transportation direction from the region to the international markets. Militarily and economically being the strongest Caspian state, nevertheless, Russias fragmented policy-making setting of the 1990s where multiple actors with divergent options and motives were being involved in Caspian politics to the large extent prevented Moscows initial drive to gain the control package of the Caspian energy resources. Russia forwarded the construction of the large private and foreign-owned Caspian Pipeline System from Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of

A.Cooley, Principles in the pipeline: managing transatlantic values and interests in Central Asia, International Affairs 84: 6 (2008), pp. 11731188; J. M. Goldgeier, M. McFaul, Power and purpose: U.S. policy toward Russia after the Cold War, the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2003, p.159. 82 Steven J Main, Contemporary Regional Power Politics in the Caspian Sea, Conflict Studies Research Center, UK, Caucasus Series 05/67, December 2005.
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Novorossiisk, in the 1990s, but it was forced to accept also the US-supported Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Turkish Mediterranean coast83. In the light of this geopolitical heritage, V. Putin administration position and the followed policy paths in the Caspian were premised, first, on reassessment of Russias national interests, capacities, and policy-alternatives in region, while on the other hand were geared by adaptational considerations to the realities on the ground. Russia Caspian strategy under V. Putin was to some degree derivative from a larger foreign policy perspectives and newly elaborated approaches, yet at the same time it bore context-specific features that were bound to the competition unfolding in the region at the beginning of 21st century and reflecting a complex juncture of state and private preferences involved. Chronologically, the Russias policies were more focused, proactive and innovative during the first presidential term (2000-2004), while during the next period the Russias Caspian prerogatives were put on wider context of Russian energy strategy in Europe and globally, reflecting substantially augmented capital and infrastructure assets under Russian control to leverage the developments in energy sphere. At the doctrinal level, Moscow officially reaffirmed that serious emphasis will be placed on development of economic cooperation, including the creation of a free trade zone and implementation of programs for joint rational use of natural resources. Specifically, Russia will work towards conferring such a status on the Caspian Sea, which will allow the littoral states to develop mutually beneficial cooperation in exploitation of the local resources on a just basis and with proper consideration of each others legitimate interests84. Also, the emergent conceptual framework emphasized the instrumental notions: Russia views the Greater Mediterranean as a meeting point of a number of
A. Aslund, A. Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Center for Strategic Studies, Washington DC 2009, p.135. 84 , 2000, no. 8, . 311.
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regions, namely the Middle East, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea basin, and intends to steer a purposeful course toward turning the area into a zone of peace, stability and good-neighborly relations, which will help advance Russian economic interests there, in particular in terms of defining routes for important energy flows85. In a stark contrast to rigid and heavy-handed stance of B. Yeltsin administration on the Caspian issue during the first half of the 1990s that postulated inadmissibility of external involvement or influence exerting of the third parties on the regional agenda, the new establishment under V. Putins leadership shifted to a much more flexible modus operandi. Particularly, several operational-level themes became persistent in Moscow renovated approaches regarding the Caspian. First, it was publicly acknowledged that market-oriented and competitive modes of Russian regional policy-making should be structurally bolstered to fit the new geopolitical milieu. At the same time, perfectly understanding that rigid confrontational model of interaction with the Western power centers in the South Caucasus was a strategically senseless option in perspective; more prudent and rational solution was found in shifting to the more flexible venues of engagement and protection of Russias national interests at the regional level. Still in April 2000, at the meeting of National Security Council of RF devoted to discussion of Russian strategic priorities in the Caspian region, V. Putin made it clear that it was of utmost importance to achieve resource mobilization in defense of all national and corporate interests86. Specifically, during the RF Security Council meeting in April, 2000, V. Putin bluntly set those priorities: We must understand that our partners Turkeys, the Great Britains and the USs interests concerning the Caspian Sea are not casual. It is because we are not active. [] This is the problem of competition, and we must
Ibid. M. Margelov, Russias National Interests in the Caspian Region in Energy in The Caspian Region: Present and Future, Ed. by Y. Kalyuzhnova, Palgrave NY 2002, pp.195-199.
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be competitive87. The presidential statement was in fact an expression of open discontent of the situation with Russian interests protection in the Caspian; government supported efforts to correct the current juncture of affairs were acknowledged as indispensible, yet it was noticed too, that Moscow did not intend to revert to unpredictable or flagrant measures to bolster its positions in the region warning that Russia would not allow to turn the region into the zone of confrontation88. In the new situation, whereas the influence of the Western countries and specifically US involvement in the Caspian region took progressive and in some way irreversible character after 9.11 events, the new policy trend was surfaced up in Russian regional policy, marking a departure from the previously static modes of preserving and status quo fencing approaches to the more proactive course of involvement of the regional states into the Russian orbit. Secondly, from the beginning of the 2000s onward serious efforts were made to organize, coordinate and guide a concerted strategy in the Caspian allowing Russian state, private and corporate entities involved in the Caspian energy development plans to push forward in a more or less unified policy pretext: From this standpoint, the key issue is to sustain a right balance between the interests of the state and energy companies. We have to accept that in order to secure the Russian companies sustainable engagement sole efforts of state are not sufficient89. To improve a required policy coherency, in 2000 V. Putin assigned to the post of RF president special representative on Caspian issues V. Kalyuzhny (with a status of deputy foreign minister)90. On July 25, 2000, in line with the executives outlined priorities the three Russian energy giants - LUKoil, Gazprom and
. . , - , , N 4, 2008, .128. 88 B. Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putins foreign policy towards the CIS countries, NY, Routledge, 2008, p.168. 89 -, 21.04.2000. 90 Marina Dracheva, Russia Reasserts Leading Role in Caspian, Oil Daily, 25 April 2000.
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Yukos - established the Caspian oil company to promote the investment allure in the regional oil and gas projects and to assist Russia to empower its positions in the region 91. Consistent with the accepted priorities, in November 2002 Gazprom and LUKoil signed an agreement on strategic cooperation for the period of 2002-2005. Few months before those two energy giant came to principle accord for joint exploration and exploitation works in the northern part of the Caspian92. In general, an important political signal was sent to the Russian energy giant corporations to follow the course streamlined by the RF government and to adhere to normative preferences defined by the political elite concerning the Caspian region93. Domestically approved decisions concerning the major issues of energy policies could not but to impact Russias position on variety of oil and gas projects in the adjacent regions. For instance, in 2003 V. Putin stated that for economic, environmental and security reasons, the Russian government had decided that every new oil pipeline in Russia would henceforth be built and controlled by the state: There will be no private pipelines, [] access to the national network should be unrestricted and fair94. Russian Energy Strategy for the period to 2020adopted in 2003 proclaimed that participation of national companies in the projects of expanding transportation infrastructure of energy resources on the territory of CIS member states is in interests of Russia. The priority direction of cooperation will be restoration and further development of unified electro-energetic system of the Commonwealth states, consolidation of mineral and raw material source base of the CIS states, Russias participation in exploration and exploitation of oil and gas deposits and construction of electro-energetic objects in the
. , : , , .2002, .9. 92 M. Smith, Russian Foreign Policy: Chronology July-September 2002, CSRC, UK, Oct. 2002, p.58 93 D.Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow 2001, pp.195-96 94 J. M. Letiche, Russia Moves into the Global Economy, Routledge, London 2007, p.46.
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countries of CIS. Among the strategic priorities is settlement of the complex of problems in the Caspian, including preparation of Caspian Sea legal status convention95. Thirdly, a general consensus was reached that Russia must be not only active, but also initiative to change the present and future pattern of relationships in the Caspian region in its favor. Alongside with streamlining administrative and political processes, Moscow renovated drive in the Caspian was more oriented toward devising the new forms of bilateral agreements with littoral states, while the multilateral dimension was evolved towards the more subordinate format in attaining the goals of RF. Moreover, given the fact that economic expansion of Russia under V. Putin developed along the securitization path, energy cooperation with the immediate neighbors attained a high-profile importance. The political discourse and rhetoric of the past that had been premised on hegemonic ambitions and overwhelming geopolitical control notions were transformed into the modernized vision of Russias role and status in the Caspian arena. The three major areas of Russian proactive engagement in the were discerned: the problem of resolving legal status of the sea and national sectors demacation, military and security restructuring of Russian forces on the southern strategic direction and a variety of mechanisms and formats that were devised to intensify and broaden bilateral and multilateral cooperation in oil and gas industry as well as joint electricity production facilities. In the context, it is notable that the issue of Caspian legal regime settlement was viewed in Moscow as an end in itself, yet on the other hand as a leverage of pursuing its own interests96.

2020 , , 2003, .47, Carol R. Saivetz, Russia: An Energy Superpower? MIT CIS: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts, December 2007.
95

C. Saivetz, Perspectives on the Caspian Sea Dilemma: Russian Policies Since the Soviet Demise, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2003, 44, No. 8, p.596.
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Though far from being an open-minded imperial posture, the Russian moves that followed the above mentioned RF Security Council meeting in April 2000 displayed several important strands of Moscow strategic positioning in the region: Reglamentation of relations with the Caspian states and reaching concrete agreements allowing Russian companies to entrench their positions; legally binding agreements were signed with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan delimitating the shelf and seabed and clarifying resource using in the northern Caspian within the respective national and adjacent sectors. Elaborating and practicing more sophisticated leverages. Having the advantage of more favorable economic development than its CIS partners, Russia has thus increasingly used the economic means at its disposal, which looked more acceptable than tough military and political pressure but could be at least equally efficient97. At the same time, military exercises and force deployment undertaken by Russia during the first half of the 2000s aimed to signal regional and extra-regional players about potential Russian veto on any plans or developments that could run counter to Russian interests. Enhancing the structural dependence of the Caspian states on Russia that finds its paradigmatic reflection in a long-term reality, with a strong historical record, of huge resource asymmetry between Russia on the one hand, and the CIS countries taken together, on the other. Given the structural power cleavage in favor of Russias strong and instrumental preponderance over the former Soviet republics, the balancing options against Russian in the regional equation were primarily connected to extra-regional power projection capabilities that had been, however, rather limited in scope and intensity98.

97J.

Hedenskog, R. Larsson, Russian Leverage on the CIS and the Baltic States, Swedish Defense Research Agency, Defense Analysis, Stockholm, June 2007, pp.45-59. 98 W.C.Wohlforth, Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. by T.V.Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, Stanford University, 2004, p.226.

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Energy policy of Russia grown up to the strategic level policy-making profile comprising a serious dimension of securitization in a wider agenda of foreign policy. Oil and gas pipelines in effect link the Central Asian and the Caucasian regional sub-complexes, and to some extent also the European sub-complex together. As such, Russias policies in the Caspian, particularly along the gradual strengthening of energy positions in European and, to some degree, Asian markets, grown up to an important variable in overall energy strategy, although continuing to be a distinct area of interest application99. In accordance with the Energy Strategy approved in 2003 the key goal for Russia was to ensure energy security as the most important factor of Russias national security. The energy strategy singled out foreign threats (geopolitics, macroeconomics and business conditions) alongside confirming the importance of dynamics of augmenting control and consolidation of domestic functionality of the national energy sector100. The major rationale behind the administrations strategy in the Caspian was pivoted around the idea of reinstalling Russia as a dominant player in the regional power hierarchy in both dimensions vis--vis littoral states and within the multilateral decision-making formats, including extra-regional powers, - rendering any prospects of separate geopolitical and geoeconomic intraregional moves unthinkable without Moscow consent. Because of the focused and high-intensity character of interactions between Russia and the Caspian states, the pattern of inter-state relations in region was more biased toward synchronization paradigm, than economic integration framework creation.

Methodologically, in a wider panorama, practical policy steps undertaken by the Russian establishment in period of 2000-2008 in the Caspian were driven by geoeconomic (economic efficiency and profit-based) and geopolitical considerations (military
G.Chufrin, Russias Caspian Energy Policy and its Impact on US-Russian Relations (The Energy Dimension in Russian Global Strategy), James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2004, pp.3-4. 100 M.Fredholm, The Russian Energy Strategy & Energy Policy: Pipeline Diplomacy or Mutual Dependence?, CSRC, UK MOD, Russian Series 05/4, Sept.2005, pp. 2-6.
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preponderance, security dependency, blocking regional states from entering alliances outside of Russias strategic control) conceptually synthesized in the notion of Russias privileged zone of influence. Judging from the set of activities Russia embarked on during V. Putins presidency time-spam in the region, Moscows mid-perspective strategic goal was to attain establishment of some ideal paradigm whereas Russia would be vested a role of regional security guarantor while retaining in its hands the control package over the strategic issue of energy transportation routes decision-making. This approach and the goal itself were in a perfect concord with the operational principal approach of Russia the water is common, the seabed is divided that was formally materialized via official interstate agreements with the two adjacent neighbors of Russia in the Caspian Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan101. Particularly, still in January 1998, in a stark divergence of previously advocated Russian approach to keep the sea under common possession of the littoral states, Kazakhstan and Russian signed an agreement delimiting their respective national sectors of the Caspian based on the abovementioned principle. It was notable that the parties agreed (the 5th point of agreement) to settle down issues concerning the economic use of the sea (including undersea pipeline construction potentiality) by a separate document only after the convention on legal status of the Caspian sea being adopted by the all parties. In fact, this provision meant a serious block against the erstwhile plans to connect Kazakhstani Aktau port to Baku (Azerbaijan) via undersea pipeline bypassing Russia102. Later on, V. Putins government reiterated the stance in spirit of the 1998 agreement.

According to the median line principle Russias sector accounted for 16 % of the Caspian Sea, Irans for 14 %, Azerbaijans for 20 %, Turkmenistans for 21% and Kazakhstans for 29 %. 102 M. Sharipzhan, Central Asia: New Developments in Russian Caspian Policy, RFE/RL 1998 April 17.
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Specifically, in May 2000 the chief of working group on the Caspian issues at the ministry of foreign affairs A. Urnov came up with the new proposal of dividing the seas underwater resources by applying the principle of drawing the modified median line while retaining the water surface under the common use. The novelty of the proposal was that it stipulated a possibility of reaching bilateral agreements by the contiguous littoral countries should the modified line cross the energy deposits already under exploration and extraction by one of the parties; for instance, the proposal envisaged the change or redrawing of median line alongside its geometrical direction103. This principle later became Russias official approach in dealing with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In January 2001, during his official visit to Baku, V. Putin signed with the Azerbaijani side two documents: Baku Declaration and Joint statement on cooperation principles in the Caspian Sea. According to the Declaration parties agreed that modified median line was to be the method their respective national sectors demarcation and mutually accepted each other exclusive rights to develop economic activity within the boundaries of those sectors defined by median line. At the same, the document made a reference to the RussianIranian1921 and Soviet-Iranian 1940 treaties. Modalities of demarcation described in the Declaration were similar to those of Russian-Kazakhstani agreement of July 6, 1998 concerning both issues division of the seabed as well as disputable crossborder oil deposits (principle of compensation or joint exploitation on 50%-50% baseline)104. Additionally, in pursuit of enhancing the gained foray of shuttle diplomacy as well as fixing its leading positions in solving common problems of the Caspian, the document referred to relevant contiguous and opposite states, apparently implying the principle

Robert Cutler, Russia reactivate its Caspian policy with new demarcation approach, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 21 June, 2000. 104 , 2001, www.mid.ru.
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embodied in the Russian-Azerbaijani agreement should be applicable to the demarcation of the Sea as a whole among all five littoral states105. Since then operational aspects of Russian Caspian policies have been developing within two clusters of activity. On the one hand, Moscow energized its diplomatic and political pressure efforts to keep under its control and guidance a series of multilateral meetings conveyed to discuss and push forward the process of Caspian sea legal status determination. At the international level Russias foreign policy was geared to secure its independent status as a self-sufficient power pole and uphold the role of equal partner within the global configuration of major centers. As V. Putin clearly put at the meeting with the Russian diplomats in 2002 it is perfectly clear now that Russia has emerged from a period of prolonged confrontation in international relations. It is no longer seen as an enemy or adversary, but increasingly as a predictable, reliable, business-like, and equal partner. As a matter of fact, this is all we need from the outside world. Russia does not need any preferences in international affairs106 Yet, in the Caspian equation Russias strategy was more focused on reformatting the pattern and inertia of previously established political relations, and repositions itself in the hierarchy of those relations as a primus inter pares. The geopolitical reasoning was evident in those stratagems applied, and during the second presidential term of V. Putin they found their practical manifestations as Russia gained significant economic leverages (in forms of acquiring the local energy systems or taking under its exclusive control important energy hubs, etc.) in Southern and Eastern Europe to divert or delay, if it deemed necessary, energy transportation scenarios that could potentially undermine the status energy superpower.
R. Cutler, Putin's Caspian diplomacy, Alexanders Gas and Oil Connections, Jan 22, 2001. V. V. Putin, Key Tasks of Russian Diplomacy: Statement by RF President V. V. Putin at an Enlarged Conference with the Participation of RF Ambassadors, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 48, no. 4 (2002) 17, p. 2.
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In balance, V. Putin administration was quick to understand that Russia would hardly be able to postpone or disrupt BTC pipeline that was long been touted as strategic artery replicating the old Silk Road outside of Russias or Irans control. Instead of harsh rhetoric containing a hidden threat of blocking its construction, Russia reverted to the use of more sophisticated tools in practice while changing the assessment criteria of the situation on the ground. Perfectly understanding that BTC project could continue to be touted as a strategic pipeline politically and economically associated with the Western interests in the region, yet in reality heavily dependent on the Central Asian energy resources to provide its full transit capacity, Russian diplomacy promptly capitalized on the problem of still unresolved status of the Sea. The stance was actually aimed to block any attempts of building Transcaspian underwater connection pipeline to deliver Central Asian, first of all Kazakhstans oil reserves to Baku and hamper efforts to make BTC economically viable project. Nevertheless, the northern countries of the Caspian largely resolved the dispute paving the way for more capital investments in extraction and transportation issues107. Particularly, in this context, Russia made it clear that the northern part of the Caspian was to be singled out as primary area of its national interests direct application; subsequent steps came to prove that Russian far reaching goal was provision of the most favorable investment climate in the northern part of the Caspian with an apparent strategic horizon extending well beyond the immediate locality of this littoral space of Russian coastline. Following this course, Russia significantly enhanced its energy cooperation with Kazakhstan. In February 2000, the construction of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium - CPC oil pipeline was a response to the southern route for Caspian area oil, running from the
D. J. Nincic, Troubled Waters: Energy Security as Maritime Security in Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook, ed. G. Luft and A. Korin, Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues, PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL, Greenwood Publishing Group, Santa Barbara, 2009, p.32.
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Tenghiz oil eld in Kazakhstan to Novorossiisk in Russia (1,700 km, completed in summer 2001) and seen as a national priority as the most feasible of all export pipeline options for Kazakhstan108. The Russian authorities and private entities invested heavily to upgrade the initial capacity of the CPC from baseline 22 million tonnes to 67 million tonnes a year in order to add additional volumes of Russian oil into the CPC pipeline109. The notable feature of the administrations regional diplomacy and economic policies was the raised profile of interplay of bilateral and multilateral dimensions to serve Russian longer term national interests. With regard to the primary and most important regional partner, Kazakhstan, Russia skillfully used economic and geographic assets under its possession. As K. Hancock noted, Russia was able to provide Kazakhstan immediate, easily measured economic benefits that no other partner could match. Those benefits were delivered through a major relation-specific asset: oil and natural gas pipelines that connect each state with Russia110. On the other hand, Russias drive to entrench itself as a major in-regional principle player did not preclude its multilateral efforts to sustain a larger pretext of its energy and security policies in Eurasia. Particularly, Russia and China shared a range of threats that promote a security complex, including separatist threats, threats from the US (both direct and indirect), and among other factors they maintain deep suspicions that work against a security cooperative emerging in Eurasia. Moscow strove to rip institutional level benefits from Russian-Chinese cooperation platform in security field as well as in fostering energy dialogue with Beijing. Within the shared Russo-Chinese security agenda were included separatists threats that represented certain common understanding as they were

B. Nygren, p.173. D. Bochkarev, Russian Energy Policy During President Putins Tenure: Trends and Strategies, GMB Publishing, UK, London, 2006, p.29. 110 For more detailed analysis of Russian use of relation-specific assets in its foreign and economic policies see, K. Hancock, Regional Integration: Choosing Plutocracy, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, NY 2009, pp.125-163.
108 109

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stemming from Tibet, Xinjiang province and Chechnya. Those mutual concerns exacerbated by shared fears of both US and NATOs interventionist doctrines; or NATOs 1999 Kosovo operation that provoked rather cautious reactions from the both capitals. Furthermore, the independence of the Turkic states of the former USSR can be perceived as an incentive for separatist movements to pursue and fight for their independence. Consequently Russia, China and Iran, all fear that the US and/or NATO may manipulate vulnerable elements of their domestic politics to destabilize their security, and promotes a security complex111. Though Russian analysts and political circles are prone to view Chinas intensifying engagement into the regional affairs as a potential long-term challenge to the Russian national interests, yet the current level of political relationships and the developed working formats of regional cooperation as well as Russian-Chinese energy partnership perspectives significantly blurring the open-ended competition dynamics between these two countries in Central Eurasia. Specifically, in 2006 Russia gas industry giants made clear their strategic intentions to channel the bulk of its export to Asia and, first of all, to China. And even before its own pipeline to the Pacific and China is built, Russia appeared to be rushing toward funneling Russian oil to Asia via Kazakhstan
112

Moreover, the shared security concerns also bore some instrumental dimension, because, as S. Zhuangzhi notes, the international strategies of the Central Asian countries are different according to whether they are dealing with a near neighbor or a far neighbor. To offset the influence and control of Russia, the nations of Central Asia give priority to the West113.

111

J. D. SDERBLOM, The Eurasian Security Complex and Comprehensive Security Cooperatives, 21 December 2004, www.world-ice.com, p.5

S. Blagov, Russias Long-Term Export Strategy for Asia Remains China-Oriented, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13 November, 2006. 113 S. Zhuangzhi, The Relationship Between China and Central Asia, p.45.
112

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The major organizational format in addressing the in-regional development issues and security concerns was chosen Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In June 2006, the SCO held its fifth anniversary summit meeting in Shanghai adopting statements that reaffirmed the SCOs longstanding opposition to the three evils of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. At the summit, Russian President V. Putin advocated the creation of an energy club among SCO members as energy would likely to be become an increasingly important area of interest for the member governments. As commentators denoted, the lack of international energy institutions linking supplier and consumer countries could potentially provide an opportunity for the SCO to assume this role as far as its roster of members and observers included some of the worlds largest oil and gas exporters (Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan) and importers (China and India)114. Another strategic focus of Russian Caspian policy was on active employment of the broader agenda and stimuli to draw the CIS Caspian states into the Russian-centric infrastructural and energy projects with an offer of wider-range economic benefits. Yet, besides the profit-seeking considerations and strategically motivated drive to control access and exit routs of hydrocarbonate resources from the Caspian, Russian long-reach aim was to eliminate a potential competition with the Central Asian oil and gas producers in international markets115. For instance, alongside with the newly elaborated regional integration groupings within the CIS created under Moscows patronage (Eurasian economic community, free trade agreements, etc.) Russia pushed in with the idea of establishing (October, 2002) of CIS Fuel and Energy Council to deal with the following key issues on agenda:

R. Weitz, Reading the Shanghai SCO Summit, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, Wednesday / July 12, 2006. For more multifaceted analysis of the Russian energy policies in the Caspian region see J. Perovic, Russian energy companies in the Caspian and Central Eurasian region: Expanding southward in Russian Business Power: The role of Russian business in foreign and security relations, ed. by A. Wenger, J. Perovic, and R.W. Orttung, Routledge 2006, pp.98-108.
114 115

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- Common energy market of the CIS countries; - CIS energy security provision and enhancement; - Establishment of new joint companies to explore&extract energy resources in the CIS territory; - Improvement of investment climate and new alternative routes for energy export; - CIS energy policies coordination; - CIS fuel and energy monitoring; - Harmonization of oil export tariffs; - Improvement of CIS fuel and energy-related legislative basics116. Russias focal point in the Caspian gas export schemes became Turkmenistan that possessed huge reserves of natural gas and potentially could position itself as rival to Russian energy giant - Gazprom. And though initially the Turkmen leadership was adamant in its skepticism, sometimes balancing on the verge of open resistance, to the Russiandesigned initiatives of the Sea delimitation as well as closer energy cooperation proposals, in 2007 Russian side finally registered a significant success over the long-term energy plans concerning this Central Asian republic. During V. Putin 5-day visit to Central Asian capitals (May 9-13, 2007), a tripartite agreement was reached between Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to build along the Caspian cost a new gas pipeline; evidently, one major geopolitical rationale behind the reserve agreement was aimed to economically undermine the potential viability of this US-supported Transcaspian project by taking away the needed gas resources to fill in the latter project. The pipelined agreement was

116

V. Korchagina, CIS Agrees to United Energy Strategy, The Moscow Times, 24.10.2002.

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bolstered via bilateral Russian-Turkmen accord stipulating Russian eagerness to buy the lion share of the Turkmen gas (80-90 billion cubic meters) up to 2025117. Military aspects of Russian strategy in the Caspian Sea gained an upper hand under V. Putins administration covering a wide range of security and military-political issues and displaying a relatively stronger emphasis on unilateral military capabilities demonstration and readiness to use those capabilities should the vital interests of Russian in the Caspian be concerned. Moreover, the policy matrix between energy security and military-political security was emboldened. Apart from the traditional role and conventional functions, the Russian military profile in the region was regained the new forms of activity mainly concentrated on the two spheres: anti-terrorism and securing the newly reconfigured economic interests of the state. In October 2003, at a press conference in Yekaterinburg, in the presence of the Russian president and the visiting German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, S. Ivanov stated that Russia reserved the right to intervene militarily within the CIS in order to settle disputes that could not be resolved through negotiation. At the same press conference, V. Putin declared that the pipelines carrying oil and natural gas to the West had been built by the Soviet Union and it was Russias prerogative to maintain them in order to protect its national interests, and this right extended even to those parts of the system that were beyond Russias borders. In 2004 Russian Defense minister S. Ivanov openly stated that We are going to use all measures to ensure our economic security and preserve our economic and energy interests. This concerns the whole CIS and particularly Belarus118. To bolster that assertive stance, still in August 2002 Russia conducted the largest joint military exercises in post-Soviet history of its army, air force, and Caspian flotillathe
Still in 2003, during V. Putins visit to Ashgabat, Turkmenistan granted Russia the exclusive right to buy all Turkmen gas that was not covered by previous arrangements for the next 25 years. 118 A. Grachev, Putins Foreign Policy Choices in Leading Russia: Putin in Perspective, ed. By A. Pravada, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.266-267.
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Sea of Peace-2002 anti-terrorist military exercises, which included a joint Russian-Kazakh component. According to the expert analysis, as in the Soviet period the objective of Russian naval exercises and port visits might be a combination of deterrence and coercive diplomacy, yet ultimately alluding that in case of direct conflict with regional states nuclear deterrence would be a working option too119. While the official scenario of this unprecedented show of force was focused on destroying terrorist groups on land and at sea, it was quite clear for the littoral states that Russia was presenting its arguments in the dead-locked disputes over the division of the Caspian into national sectors120. To confirm by a real example that Russian naval force in the Caspian Sea was the strongest compared with the other littoral states forces121, in the maneuvers participated some 60 vessels and 10,500 soldiers the bulk of which comprised the Russian naval and military units. The Russian military establishment also floated the idea of a pan-Caspian military group, following Russian military exercises on the Caspian, however, rejecting Kazakhstans bid for a naval build-up to protect its Caspian oil fields as well as an overall proposition for regional demilitarization as such a plan could negatively affect the fight against international terrorism122. In spring 2005, Russia suggested creating a rapid reaction force similar to the one created in the Black Sea, and in July Putin met with military officials from the Caspian Sea states and suggested that a force was necessary to fight terrorism, drug trafficking and
R. Allison, Russia, Regional Conflict, and the Use of Military Power in The Russian Military: Power and Policy, Steven E. Miller and Dmitri V. Trenin, editors, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2004, pp. 142-143. 120 P.Baev, Counter-terrorism as a building block for Putins regime in Russia as a Great Power Dimensions of security under Putin, ed. by J. Hedenskog, V. Konnander, B. Nygren, I. Oldberg and Ch. Pursiainen, Routledge 2005, p.329. Military Balance 2002/2003, UK, London 2003, p.87. 121 O. Oliker, K. Crane, L.H. Schwartz, C. Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2009, p.156. 122 Russian Foreign Policy: Chronology July-September 2002, UK MOD, CSRC, J33, p.45. RFE/RL Newsline 26.03.2002.
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organized crime. In August, the Caspian Antiterror 2005 exercise (with security forces from ten CIS countries and observers from Iran) took place, the first of its kind. In October, Putin again suggested establishing a Caspian regional security and peacekeeping force CASFOR also to include Iran. The suggestion was repeated by RF Foreign minister S. Lavrov in January 2006, suggesting that CASFOR should prevent the threat of terrorism and WMD proliferation and illegal traffiking of weapons and drugs123. The major message of the Russian inspired military and security undertakings in the Caspian was not of overtly confrontational character, but mainly directed to uphold the status of energy security guarantor regionally. On December 3, 2002, in China V. Putin openly hinted that idea saying that configuration of interests in the energy sphere is now changing with the unstable situation in the Middle East, while the world economy is interested in stable deliveries of energy carriers from new regions while 124. The Caspian region has remained the focal point of economic, energy and geopolitical policies of regional and extra-regional power centers. Specifically, after the Russian-Georgian military conflict in August of 2008, the dynamic of competition for control over the major pipelines routs of oil and gas transportation has intensified, though the prevailing discourse of US-Russian reset policy has muted the openly confrontational zero-sum approach in public rhetoric of Washington and Moscow. Though the dynamics of great power cooperation and the intensity of rivalry over the strategic issues related to energy transportation routes as well as the energy deposits control in the Caspian basin have yielded certain transformations stipulated, inter alia, by the efforts of US-Russian reset efforts since the change of presidential administrations in both countries in 2008, yet the ultimate aims of major regional stakeholders have not changed in a sense of their

123 124

B. Nygren, p.171 Russian Foreign Policy: Chronology October-December 2002, UK MOD, CSRC, J33, p.71.

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core directions. For instance, like the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has promoted the diversification of natural gas supplies and pipelines to Europe, including the building of pipelines from Central Asia and the Caspian region that bypass Russia, chief among them Nabucco. However, the B. Obama Administration has been less critical of Nord Stream and South Stream than the previous Administration. Ambassador Richard

Morningstar, the State Department Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, has denied that the United States and Russia are involved in a great gamethat is, a geopolitical struggle for Central Asian energy supplies. R. Morningstar has underlined that the United States did not oppose Nord Stream and South Stream; that the United States does not see Nabucco as being in competition with South Stream125. At the same time, the US the major investor into the Caspian energy sector accentuated in a more concrete terms that these projects, first of all Nabucco project, are of primarily strategic and political importance126. Moreover, the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea ceased to be a blocking factor for the US policymakers in the operational realm of pipeline project realization as, according to American side, the main avenue and the framework of resolving disputable issues would be bilateral format and not Russian-preferred approach based on a prerequisite of consensus among all the five littoral states127. In the same vein, in 2011 European Union toughened its posture to diversify its energy supply sources. The EU commissar on energy issues, G. Ettinger, openly stated that EU was resolute in its efforts to hamper the Russian-backed South Stream project realization (the project designed to deliver substantial volumes of Russian and,

J. Nichol, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service, Feb.1, 2011, (RL33407: CRS Report for Congress), p.15. 126 Speech by Assistant Secretary of State for Eurasian Affairs - Philip Gordon, Globsec 2011 Conference, Bratislava, March 3, 2011, http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2011/highlights-news/g11-after-gordon/. 127 Richard Morningstar, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: European and Eurasian Energy: Developing Capabilities for Security and Prosperity, Washington, DC, June 2, 2011.
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presumably, Central Asian oil to Southern and Central Europe via Black Sea underwater pipeline) should Moscow takes any steps against Nabucco128. Over the first decade of the 21st century Russian significantly enlarged its economic powerbase in the region and built substantial leverages to influence the geopolitical dynamics over the strategically important issues in the Caspian. Already in 2007 the US Annual Threat Assessment report by the US intelligence community denoted that Russia now sees itself as an energy superpower, a status with broad ramifications that include strong-arm tactics in its relations with neighboring states129. According to the Russian media outlet, until 2020 the Caspian Navy will be supplemented with up to 16 new warships. From the operative-strategic command South some aviation units will be transferred to the Russian Navy in the Caspian. Additionally, the Caspian military forces will be equipped with the Bastion type rocket systems capable to destroy targets on water surface on distances up to 300km with Yakhont supersonic cruise missiles. No later than in January 2012, the Caspian flotilla will have the first rocket valley warship of a new type, while the 3 newest modern landing crafts will be on duty in a foreseeable perspective. In 2002 the Russian Navy received Tatarstan patrol vessel equipped Uran shock system which is capable to destroy any hostile target on distances up to 130km130. Both conceptually and practically, Russian strategy in the Caspian has acquired much larger, but also unified and centralized character in all policy sectors concerning its national interests. Specifically, V. Putin administration applied significant efforts to tie together private and state-centered interests in the Caspian region in addressing the states major concerns and preferences, while also taking under the effective state control all the major pipelines trespassing the Russian territory. The contextual pragmatism of Russia in
. , , , 22.11.2011. HEARING OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT, 2007,p.13. 130 ., op.cit.
128 129

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the region was being elevated to paradigmatic policy-making framework. More comprehensive toolkits employed by Moscow to protect Russian interests in the processes unfolding in Caspian basin pertained also the institutional arrangements that Russia fostered in the CIS.

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CHAPTER II: Russian Military and Political Strategy in the South Caucasus 2000-2008
2.1 Caucasian Security Complex and Russian Strategic Interests: Dynamics of Transformations over the post-Soviet period

The contemporary region of South Caucasus represents by itself a specific geopolitical system, differing from other modern regional systems by its typical politically asymmetrical structure. The region is influenced by diverse impacts from the South, while simultaneously deepening and expanding its ties with West aimed to institutional integration within Euro-Atlantic community frameworks/organizations. At same time, its essentially open to the North; the fact exposing the regions multifaceted and structural interdependence relationships with Russia. As century before, The South Caucasus, while being on the periphery of European continent continues to be at the crucial crossroad of global and regional interests that traditionally intersect within this tiny land-bridge connecting Europe and Asia131. Formed at the beginning of the 1990s, after the demise of Soviet Union, a new power equilibrium on the regional arena has been stipulated by the host of external factors; yet this set of intraregional factors has had and now continues to have a substantial bearing on strategic realities in this part of the post-Soviet space. Cardinal departure from the once dominant socialist principles of economic life and political leadership, rethinking of national histories, search for a new national identity, and finally bloody interethnic wars that broke up just after dissolution of the Soviet Union were

The Politics of Transition in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. A.Wooden and Ch.Stefes, Routledge 2010; Transcaucasian boundaries, ed. by J.F.R.Wright, S.Goldenberg, R. Schofield, University College London Press, 1996; F. Coen, The Caucasus: An introduction, Routledge NY 2010.
131

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directly interwoven to the policy priorities of external non-regional power centers. To the certain degree, chaotic and indefinite character of the national development vectors at the initial stage of the post-soviet transformation, in fact have not lowered the strategic importance of the region for the outside world. Energy resources, key geographical location between East and West, potential of geopolitical buffer function, as well as a potential possibility of using the South Caucasus as leverage of geopolitical influence on the adjacent regions and countries have proven again sustainability of the old constant of realpolitik persistent drive to establish dominant positions in the region. In case we approach to the current history of the South Caucasian states within retrospective lens, it is possible to figure out two all-regional major (mega-) trends that have evidently surfaced up by the end of the first part of 1990s. First, in May 1994, almost simultaneously, under the strong external pressure ceasefire regimes were set up in the zones of military conflicts in Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazia. Moreover, under aegis of CIS structure along the line of Georgina-Abkhazian conflict peacekeeping forces of Russia were interposed (earlier, mixed peacekeeping battalions were sent to another hot-spot South Ossetia). Secondly, destabilizing potential factor of the frozen conflicts though evident in practical policy-making domain as well as background political setting a new trend was surfaced up; relative stabilization of depressed and crisis-woven economic and social life in the three republics as well as political entrenchment of ruling elites. It is obvious that both of these trends were contradictory to the extent, yet they have proved their sustainability in the mid-term perspective. From 2001 onward, in addition to these base-line political megatrends another two have been added: termination of economic decline and stable growth of GDP in all of the Caucasian republics, coupled with irreversible drive of Armenia, Georgia and

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Azerbaijan to integration (though on different terms, conditions and pace) within wider international political-economic and security structures (NATO, EU). It is noteworthy to mention here that adopted progressive policy priorities aimed to structural engagement of the south-Caucasian states to the Western and Russo-centric security systems as well as wider international/regional economic communities preaching identical values, in essence well corresponded to the norms and postulates of neorealism one of the dominant theories of International Relations. As it is widely accepted, the basic points of this concept, besides acknowledging the anarchic nature of International Relations, premise on paradigmatic position of the state as a single and basic bearer (actor) of sovereignty. To put it in other way, for the newly independent states of the region disposed to identify themselves and cultivate the Western-type values, that was of paramount importance to fix up their statues of so-called like actor, along with other participants of international community. The current stage of state-building and societal development in the South Caucasus can be juxtaposed with the period of nation-building in Europe in the 18-19 centuries. Though the straightforward analogies are suitable here, yet as in Europe of those days number one task was to establish centralized state system, transmission from chaos to authoritarian rule and only then introduce the basic elements of democracy, paralleling the process with implementation of market economy principles. The major challenge here was the imperative to create a new economic framework, new political institutions and authentic models of political culture in a very compressed historical time-frame. Still at the beginning of 1997, proclaiming the Caucasian region zone of its vital political and economic interests132, the US Government have elevated the processes of

R. Craig Nation, Russia, the United States and the Caucasus, Report: Strategic Studies Institute, US, Feb. 2007, p.10.
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reformation in the 3 republics of the South Caucasus to the rank of its strategic regional priorities. Initially, Washingtons support of reformist policies in the region was pivoted upon 4 dimensions: strengthening democracy and establishing the market-type economies, settlement of crisis situations, development of energy sector and new energy transit routes bridging East and West, and cooperation in the field of security 133. From 2001 onward, previously preset American priorities of regional cooperation have been amended by the joint programs of struggle against international terrorism as well as by political-diplomatic prerogative of developing a common stance in pushing forward US grand project of rebuilding the region of Wider Middle East, including recently formulated key tasks of US foreign policy. Evidently, besides the normative values besetting the conceptual base of American policies in the region, several key considerations are guiding the US strategy at the beginning of 21st century in the Caucasus; specifically to transform the region into the relatively homogeneous component of the new geopolitical configuration at the center of Eurasia, while simultaneously containing growing Russian influence on the region. Certainly, the idea to create a unified regional pact in the South Caucasus which would constantly gravitate toward the West and gradually been tied up with the EuroAtlantic structures is extremely complex project. It is not a secret that the region has too many interlocking relations/links with Russia, particularly with several subjects of the Russian North Caucasus, and sometimes it is rather difficult to distinguish the consequences of Russias federal policy-making in the North Caucasus from a variety of means of exerting influence/power over the adjacent borderlands that can formally be classified as a domain of traditional foreign policy. Moreover, within the framework of the new regional status quo the so-called sub-state units still internationally not recognized
Deputy State Secretary S. Talbot: Testimony before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington DC, March 31, 1998; : , . . ., ., . , 2000, .53.
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republics of Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Osetia securing very substantial place by de facto retaining their part of political responsibility for regional security and peace. The joint efforts of US and the unified Europe to bolster and accelerate the above mentioned processes though the host of new programs (EUs New Neighborhood policy, several important cooperation projects of cooperation with NATO, World Bank and IMF involvement in macroeconomic planning, etc.) indirectly indicating on purposive movement to make irreversible presently shaping vectors of regional development. In this context of unsettled major regional problems, stimulating the dynamics of parallel processes, at least testifying that history in this part of the world is starting to accelerate134. Over the past 16 years of post-soviet transformation, the region has undergone substantial changes that were partially stipulated by the specifics of cultural and political situation, yet, as I mentioned it earlier, social-economic and political development has been extensively experiencing the brunt of external influence. At the initial stage, social, political and economic transformations in all of the 3 Caucasian states rolled over tightly in the context of and under strong pressure of regional military conflicts. These interethnic conflicts that after the collapse of Soviet Union entered into the stage of fully-fledged military wars have leveraged the most crucial impact on the regions geopolitical landscape, predetermining strategic parameters of regional development for the mid-term perspective. To present concisely, the most important conversions which transformed the domestic social-political landscape of the whole region were: Upsurge of nationalism and movement towards new political and nationcentric statehood;
134

This expression belongs to Daniel Fried, former assistant to the US State Secretary.

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Processes of political mobilization, coupled with power centralization in the hands of the new national elites;

Process of institutionalization of the political field; Drive to build an efficient state security framework based on qualitatively new principles that would provide strategic and political preponderance in on-going military conflicts;

Civil-military relations in the widest sense of the word; Bilateral relations with Russia which since the end of 1992 employed rather stiff measures to take under its control worsening situation in the region.

It was typical that at the start of post-soviet period imperative of economic development was not deemed as something urgent, while implementation of basic norms of democracy into practice of political life was in fact impossible in conditions of military conflicts135. In contrast to other developing countries (although almost all post-soviet states are now included in the group of so-called countries in transition, just after the collapse of USSR their development indexes were as low as in developing countries) the state and its institutions in the newly independent republics of the South Caucasus did not yield any serious support and trust of society. That was one of the principle aspects that differentiated the new states of Eurasia from the conditions and political routes of development strategies in the Third World. By the mid-1990s index of trust to the state in the CIS was the lowest as compared to the other regions in the world. Over this time-frame,

A. Zverev, Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994, in Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. B.Coppieters, VUB University Press, Brussels 1996, pp. 13-71.
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share of state profit in GDPs of all the republics was impressively low, and the state debt was growing up at an excessively high rate136. Provisionally finding themselves in terms of external power vacuum, more precisely in 1990-1992, the South Caucasian republics passed their first exam to build and sustain the modern type national statehood. As our very recent history has shown starkly, tremendous role in keeping internal stability and domestic order played civil-military relations to put more concretely relationships between new political leadership and newly created military structures who mobilized in their hands (for obvious reasons of military conflicts) a bulk of real power. As the experience of those years have proved, out of all three republics only Armenia managed without serious losses to overcome and avoid potential risks of internal turmoil that led to political crisis and fragmentation of state resources/power in neighboring states. In this regard, an initial stage of power consolidation in Armenia passed in comparatively smooth and rapid way; as one independent British researcher noted from the start of independent statehood government in Yerevan formally and practically controlled countrys whole territory 137. As opposed to Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenian leadership succeeded to set an effective control over its national army-in-making without superfluous excesses and any kind of inter-clan rivalry within the ruling elite. Yet, certain spontaneity was also a typical feature of the first phase of Armenian national army building. During the last years of Soviet Union existence the military formations were being set up in alert mode to provide the security of state borders. For example, in 1990 Armenian National Army was established counting in its rows about 10.000 military men. It noteworthy to mention here that the commanders of those

136 137

: , . 104. E. Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, RIIA: London, 1999, p.27.

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voluntary military contingents and larger formations were closely interconnected with the opposition political forces that won parliamentary elections in May of 1990. For instance, V.Sargsyan, the future Defense Secretary of Armenia, from 1990 to 1992 was chairman of parliamentary commission on defense and internal affairs. None the less, still in August 1990 the first president-elect of Armenia stated that military contingents out of Governmental control pose a real threat to the independence of republic and must be disbanded. Soon after this appeal the Armenian military army, a quasi-state military structure, announced about its self-dissolution. Meanwhile, Armenia managed to avoid being drown into the domestic clashes over this issue that were characteristic to the analogical processes in other newly independent states. Undoubtedly, this aspect significantly promoted and accelerated the process of centralization and structural formatting of power base, providing Armenia tangible strategic advantages over the fluid regional context. The period of 1992-1994 was the most difficult times in the newest history of the S.Caucasus: large-scale wars in the zones of Karabakh and Abkhaz conflicts, drastically worsened social-economic conditions, when indexes of GDP of all 3 republics were approaching to the failed states figures. At the same time, at that very period were formed those substantial power lines, which predetermined not only the emerged strategic equilibrium and the principle courses of foreign policy, but general the landmarks of social-economical development.

***

Within the boundaries of this section of our research work we will not delve into the empirical and theoretical modalities and technicalities of the regional security complexes
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(RSC) as a new distinct pattern of sub-regional international relations, and neither concentrate on variety of debates that engulf the definitions of RSC as viewed from the different angles of International Relations. Yet, for the reasons of academic clarity, the basic template of paradigmatic approach employed here to address the conceptual problem of apprehending the South Caucasian RSC from the strategic point of Russian regional interests, the focus will be put on several key factors that have underpinned the RSC analytical notion elaborated by B. Buzan 138. Specifically, due to huge resource asymmetry between the regional states on the one hand, and Russia on the other, within the RSC framework Russia is viewed as a major player in the high-level security complex that wielded significant economic and military advantage or preponderance over the South Caucasus with the strong and, to the certain degree, structural capabilities to influence over the regional security dynamics139. The Russia-led regional security complex is thus a complex surrounding Russia the post-Soviet space excluding the Baltic states and centered on Russia. And as the research aim is concentrated on Russian interests and security policy options in the region, a more preference will be attached to the macro-level analysis where the major powers operate140. For a variety of strategic reasons the South Caucasus represents the area of Russias vital interests. As the official RF MOD official newspaper noted, since the inception of independent statehood Russia proclaimed the South Caucasus as zone of its priority strategic interests as the power center in control of the region would be capable to control

138B.

Buzan and O. Waever, Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003 139 B. Buzan and O. Waever, pp. 397-398. 140 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition, New York, Harrenter Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 222.

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the Caspian Sea, access points to the Central Asia and the Middle East141. From that standpoint the region was of utmost significance to the Russian strategic interests. One of the most important designated tasks of Russia was to be repulse those negative development trends142. Factors contributing to the regions utmost importance from Moscow perspective range from geographical proximity of the South Caucasus to the Russian North Caucasus and so affecting the political stability of North Caucasus, in Russia proper, to the crucial problem of energy and transportation lines control problem that transcends the region. Several key macro- factors influenced the strategic security perceptions as well as practical policy-making dimensions and avenues of Russias course towards the South Caucasian security complex under V. Putin administration. Path dependency. Russian security policies in the region under V. Putins administration were largely influenced by the policy outcomes of the 1990s. Firstly, at the beginning of 1993 Russia officially put forward the thesis of special responsibility of the RF on the whole post-soviet territory the meaning of which was turned to the imperative of military-political, defensive, economical and informational domination of Russia in the scope of the CIS. The support f stability and peace in the region of CIS was proclaimed to be the most important challenge and the task of Russia on the post-Soviet territory. The main role on the territory of the South Caucasus took the new formed Ministry of Defense of RF which in its activity continued to follow the old geopolitical constant: the fact of existence of the great resource asymmetry between Russia on the one hand and the countries of the South Caucasus on the other143.

. . , - , , 2008, N4, . 126-131. 142 . , , , 5.10.2007. 143 S. Foye, End of CIS Command heralds new Russian defense policy?, RFE/RL Research Report, 2:27, 1993, p.48.
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Secondly, in accordance with the multilateral agreement signed in Tashkent on May 15, 1992, between all post-soviet countries (except Baltic countries), Russia not only took under its jurisdiction the previous soviet military objects and military infrastructure stationed beyond the Russian borders, but also legally designed its responsibility over the process of assignment/reallocation of the armament stocks scattered on the whole territory of the CIS. Moreover, start of systematical transfer of heavy armaments to the Southern Caucasus republics which were at the state of military conflicts was followed by serious consequences to the whole region; level of their national responsibility has been substantially raised which purport not only demand for a real national mobilization, but also effective control on the most important attribute of national statehood military forces. Then, collaboration with Russia acquired a status of real interstate dialogue which necessitated long-term development of bilateral interaction modus. Thirdly, by the end of 1992 Russias position with regard to its basic priorities in the post-soviet space got of more or less tangible character. Particularly, in October of 1992 then Russian president B.Yeltsin directly interconnected the success of domestic reforms in Russia to the effectiveness of integration processes within the CIS 144. The last point posed a significant challenge to all of newly independent republics either to choose for participation and membership in the intrastate structure under Russian aegis or distancing themselves from any Russian initiatives risking to sore its relationship with the country that was continuing subsidizing their semi-destroyed economies. In practice, during the volatile period of 1993-1995 Russia masterly performed the change of regional paradigm from that of stable wars to unstable peace, effectively putting in place regional military (-political) balance as a centerframe of its enduring influence in the South Caucasus. In fact, two contradictory, but closely knitted trends at the
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ITAR-TASS, 17.03.1993, SU/1641, B/1.

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regional stage have been taken shape since then: relative stabilization of the political regimes in the three states that were proceeding in the context of an unstable and warprone regional setting. Structurally, the backbone of Russias military-political presence in the South Caucasus was rest on strategic triad peacekeeping operations in the conflict zones (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), military bases Georgia and Armenia and external border protection of the two republics.145 However, the dynamics of Russian security engagement into the regional processes started to acquire a larger dimension since the start of antiterrorist operation in the North Caucasus (1999) aimed to suppress the Chechen insurgency and preserving the territorial integrity of the country146. Since then the focus and the potential scale of security interaction on bilateral and multilateral levels between RF and the 3 South Caucasian republics was shifted towards more nuanced and politically sensitive agenda to include asymmetric region-wide security issues. Changing pattern of Moscows regional security priorities found its doctrinal reflections. According to the official document The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation published on October 2, 2003, A significant part of all the conflicts had an asymmetrical nature. They demonstrated fierce fighting and in a number of cases resulted in total destruction of a state system147. Tactically, in contrast to the Yeltsins years, Russian policies in the region embarked more on exploiting Russias relative power vis--vis regional states with a greater emphasis on the need of concerted efforts in using military, diplomatic and

V. Naumkin, Russian Policy in the South Caucasus, The Quarterly Journal, NO.3, SEPTEMBER 20 02, pp. 3133. 146 E. Schneider, The Russian Federal Security Service under President Putin in Politics and the Ruling Group in Putins Russia, ed. by S. White, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, NY 2008, pp. 54-55. 147 M. de Haas, Russias Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and beyond, Routledge, London & NY 2010, p.20.
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economic assets under control148. Since start of the Chechen campaign in 1999, Russian military presence in the Southern region was substantially increased. Particularly, by 2002 Russian 58th Army deployed in the North Caucasus Military District counted around 100.000 military personnel149. The Focus of security policies shifted to embrace a larger context of Russian engagement into the regional area. The institutional dimension of was beefed up to address the twin trends that manifested themselves since the beginning of the 21st century. First, alongside the enhancement of Russias international standing and growing influence over the spectrum of global issues, Moscows longer-term priorities were geared forward by larger geopolitical considerations aimed to incorporating and converting its regional influence into the broader interests of RF150. Secondly, the US proactive polices and heavier engagement within the ongoing regional pattern necessitated more focused response on the part of Russia. The Scope and intensity of security interaction was widened to include a new spectrum of security challenges ranging from joint fight against terrorism to nonproliferation issues and cybersecurity. Under V. Putins administration, an emphasis on conventional capacities and military concentration on traditional directions continued to play a functionally significant role in overall calculus of Russian regional policy, yet energy security and asymmetrical warfare modalities took higher profile 151 . A noticeable development was the upsurge of military organizations involvement in provision of

148 R. Suny, A watershed in East-West relations, http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-andeurasia/about/georgian-russian-dialogue/caucasus-security-insight/ronald-suny/a-watershed-in-east-westrelations/ 149 Military Balance 2002/2003, IISS, London 2003, p. 93. 150 R. Allison, The Limits of Multilateralism in Strategic Security Dilemmas in the Caucasus and Central Asia, NBR Analysis, Vol.14, N 3, October 2003, p.25. 151 R. McDermott, Putin Seeks Stronger Role for Collective Security Forces, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 2, Issue 125 (June 28, 2005.)

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energy security, while the potential US military deployment in Georgia was called by the Russian defense minister as senseless and contrary to the interests of RF152. Greater delineation between the federal policy toward the North Caucasus, as an internal policy domain, and the political and social-economic course towards the South Caucasian republics as independent states that fell under foreign policy competency. In contrast to the earlier fussy period that was typical to the 1990s, V. Putin administration placed a stricter difference between those areas to eliminate the messy pattern typical to the situation on the ground during the 1990s. The activities and scope of locally-driven initiatives on the part of some actors (like the Confederation of Mountainous People of Caucasus or Cossacks) that previously played free hand in the cross-regional processes153, including involvement into the military conflicts, were put under stronger centralized control of Moscow. Domestically, certain efforts were being undertaken to institutionalize the North Caucasian polity integration into the wider regional policy of Russia driven from the Center. Moreover, as P. Baev argued, Yeltsin-to-Putin transition have distorted the picture that led to the significant repositioning of interest groups and the reshuffling of the top bureaucracy have resulted in a disappearance from the central political arena of most actors with links to or personal interests in the Caucasus154 . The major political preference was attached to the prerogative of stability provision in the Russian North Caucasus as opposed to the unpredictable and potentially destructive situation along the adjacent bordering areas of Georgian Pankisi Gorge from where, according to the Russian official claims, instant threat of destabilization was emanating due to lack of state control capacities in Georgia at the level central government. On the ground, Russian authorities
152

- , - , 01.03.2005. 153 D. Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan, RIIA, MACMILLAN PRESS LTD, London 2000, p.131. 154 P. Baev, Russia Refocuses Its Policies in the Southern Caucasus, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, Caspian Studies Program, Working Paper Series, N1, July 2001, p. 4.

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reverted the focus of practical policy-making attention to border protection, rearmament of the North Caucasian MD and replenishment of military hardware of the Army on the southern strategic direction as well as on sophistication of social-economic leverages to tackle the broader the context of securitization trends underway. The federal program State Border of the Russian Federation 2003-2010 mirrors the thrust of the manpower program for 2004-2007 that envisaged not only the construction of new buildings and the creation of modern living accommodation for servicemen and their families, but also the construction and fitting out new complexes with modern systems for improving security along the length of the state border 155. Since the beginning of the 2000s the Southern Military District substantially increased its military capabilities to match the benchmark of military hardware and ammunition rearmament set by the State Program of Armaments for 2011-2020 in advance time-spam; the area of responsibility of the unites dislocated in the Southern Military District included military security provision of strategic regions of Caspian and Black Sea region where the oil and gas energy exploration and extractions works were under way156. 2.2. The South Caucasus in Russian Energy Strategy: interplay of global and regional factors

Since 2000 onward, one of the major strands in Russias international and regional engagement policies became the state-supported expansion of energy companies and Russian capital abroad. Russian government started actively backing the international expansion of some of Russias major energy companies and tried to achieve better coordination of Russian oil and gas diplomacy, which had been notorious for its lack of
155 C W Blandy, North Caucasus: Border Security, Advanced Research and Assessment Group: Conflict Studies

Research Center, UK DoD, March 2008, p. 3. 156 . , , , 25.10.2011.

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direction under B. Yeltsin government.157 The expanded foreign economic activities of Russian companies led to a marked upturn in trade and investment starting in 20022003. In 2004, exports to the CIS had grown by 41.8 % against the previous year; imports from CIS countries by 30.7%158. Given the increased profile of economic and profit-oriented motivations behind the Russian state policies in the near abroad (the term emerged in political discourse of Russian elite and media after the Soviet break-up to denote differentiated nature of attitudes and approaches towards the newly independent states on post-Soviet space as opposed to classical external relationships with the rest of the world) and Europe, Russian modus operandi with regard to the CIS states sustained a significant alterations in terms of political underpinnings and employed instruments after 2004, over the time-spam of V. Putins second presidential term. On the one hand, a comparatively stable and prolonged period of economic growth that, consequently, provided Russia with a larger pool of influence yielding toolkits on economic sectors of the near abroad countries significantly enhanced RF general profile of presence in the CIS. Although Russias overall significance as a trading partner for the countries of this region dropped substantially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it remained rather important. However, the relationship was highly asymmetric. While trade with this group of states made up a small portion of Russias total foreign trade the CIS accounted for 20.8 percent of Russian overall imports in 2004 the Caucasus and Central Asian states depended heavily on Russia, especially for imports 159 . According to international trade statistics, after the formal introduction of free-trade regimes between

P. Rutland, Paradigms for Russian Policy in the Caspian Region, in Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds., Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp.163168. 158 Social and Economic Situation in 2004 (JanuaryDecember), 2005, www.cbr.ru/eng/analytics/macro/ 159 CIA World Factbook 2005 (updated 30 August 2005).
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Russia and some CIS countries through the EurAsEC in 2000, the volume of exports from Russia to these countries increased 2030%160. On the other hand, the Russian leadership soon discovered evident limitations of soft power employment and its utilization capabilities in attaining far reaching strategic aims of Russia to uphold the its geopolitical role as veto-player in controlling and guiding the regional development perspectives. As one Russian commentator noted in 2006, up to the moment Moscow had not came up with any sort of comprehensive plan-project of regional integration and development for the South Caucasus161. Moreover, despite of Russias proactive engagement and acquisition of a large and key infrastructural assets in the CIS, first of all energy sector-related objects, an inescapable imperative of technological renovation concerning all the regional states would hardly made Russia an attractive partner. At least, Russian government itself admitted that all-encompassing modernization of Russia was of utmost importance. Nevertheless, the fundamental fact of post-Soviet economic realities between Russia and the newly independent states of CIS, including the South Caucasus, was the huge resource asymmetry that characterized, inter alia, also the Russian economic impact on those states. Yet, given the high energy dependence of the modern economies as well as large scale share of hydro-carbonate energy sources in several strategic level sectors of economic systems across the developing and developed worlds, the export of Russian raw materials and energy sources remained the key high-profile domains of Russian stateowned and private entities engagement outside of RF. Particularly, Russia has been a major player in world energy markets. In 2004, its 1,700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas reserves were the largest of any country, making it both the worlds largest gas producer
160O.

Sushko, The Dark Side of Integration: Ambitions of Domination in Russias Backyard, The Washington Quarterly: Spring 2004, 27:2, p.125. 161 . , , , 31.10.2006.

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and exporter. Russia is also the worlds second largest oil exporter. According to the European Commission, EU member states imported 29% of their natural gas and 26% of their oil from Russia in 2004162. With gas consumption expected to rise more dramatically than oil consumption in the future, some experts predict that Europe could rely on Russia for more than 40% of its natural gas by 2020. Concurrently, as M. Piotrowski notes, companies like Gazprom or Lukoil became now almost obliged to support state interests, a change that was especially visible in policy toward Ukraine and the Caspian-area CIS countries, providing the Russian leadership extended capabilities of multiregional engagement across the continent. For example, Gazproms lobbying activities for a new gas pipeline through Central to Western Europe, which would bypass Ukraine to guarantee Russias position in the expanded EU gas market and weakening Ukrainian transportation position was accompanied by the Gazproms longterm contracts with Turkmenistan, which oppose American plans for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Those moves would presumably secure a Russian transportation monopoly163. Because of high priority of natural energy-related issues in Kremlins strategy, Russias top political leadership was personally involved in lobbying and promoting Russian interests abroad. For instance, during his working visit to Austria, May 23-24, 2007, V. Putin succeeded to secure the Russian-Austrian deal on integration of Austrian energy network into the Gazprom system. The conclusion of agreement was notable in two respects, with rather serious political and practical implications that stretching far beyond just the technical side of Gazproms entrance into the Austrian end-user distribution market. First, Austria which had been entitled to promote and guide Nabucco project by

An Energy Policy for Europe, Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament, COM (2007) 12, January 10, 2007. 163 M. Piotrowski, Russias Security Policy in Toward an Understanding of Russia: New European Perspectives, ed. by J. Bugajski, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, New York 2002, p.71.
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its national energy company OMV as project operator effectively agreed to a Russian proposal to import those Central Asian energy volumes by Gazproms network 164. Previously, in January 2007, after negotiations in Bulgaria and Greece, V. Putin managed to set in motion Burgas-Alexandrapolis oil pipeline project that first had been sketched up still in 1994. This project too, was aimed to provide the Central European markets with Asian oil volumes. Secondly, singlehandedly bolstering its posture on the Austrian

market, Gazprom even more intensified its paneuropean expansion scope. As the CEO of Gazprom, A. Miller, clarified, the Russian gas giant views Austria as a transit country, from where Gazprom intends to secure the European energy demands via widening the local distribution network carrying capacities. By the that time, Gazprom had already taken under its control via stock sharing agreements16 profile national energy companies of European Union (out of 27). Deals reached between Gazprom and Italian, Bulgarian, and Serbian energy companies in 2007 and January 2008 evidently signaled that Gazprom was seeking to convince those countries that had agreed to fund the Nabucco pipeline to withdraw their commitments and rely on the Gazprom proposed South Stream pipeline, - a Russian rival project of delivering Central Asian and Caspian gas to the European markets165. Since the beginning of the 2000s onward, an activated drive of Russian capital into the EU and the CIS countries was pivoted around several strategic and situational considerations that were approved at the highest levels of leading political elites under V.

Nabucco project dates back to the agreement signed in June 2002, when Austrian OMV, Hungarian MOL, Bulgarian Bulgargaz, Romanian Transgaz and Turkish Botas agreed to create a pipeline link stretching from Erzurum in Turkey to Austria. In 2008 an agreement was signed with Azerbaijan, stating that it would supply a part of the gas for the pipeline, whereas, the rest was supposed to come from Turkmenistan. The actual agreement, on the intergovernmental level, was signed in July 2009 in Turkey. Interestingly enough, almost immediately afterwards, Turkey signed a similar agreement with Russia over the South Stream a project which is a potential rival to the EU-sponsored Nabucco. Source: J. Wisniewski, EU Energy Diversification Policy and the Case of South Caucasus Political Perspectives 2011 Volume 5 (2), 58-79. 165 Russia: Gazproms Advance in Europe Continues, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 25.01.2008.
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Putin. The economic logic of Russian energy foray in regional and global markets has been premised upon profit-seeking rationale to boost the state-controlled or partly private revenues to state budget, increasing, thus, Russias economic prowess globally and regionally. Domestic growth coupled with increased capital revenue inflow from the foreign economic arenas was deemed to support, at least modestly, the badly needed internal demand for domestic investments inside Russia. For instance, speaking at a Security Council meeting on 8 July, 2002, V. Putin called on the government to develop a new economic-security policy, noting that there were also important issues in the energy and transport sections must consider the impact of exposure to global markets that will come with Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization. He concluded that the Security Council must therefore establish new economic-security priorities166. At the helm of 2005/2006, while praising the Russian annual economic growth that stood at 6.4%, slightly above of the government projected figure of 5.9%, V. Putin accentuated the administrations long-term emphasis on the energy sector as energy markets had become more and more globalized and interconnected167. At the same time, given the lions share of energy profile within the state budget structure, V. Putin himself expressed some concerns regarding the Russian energy sector development trends as the fact of serious structural interdependencies were regarded a critically interrelated with national economic and strategic security interests.

Russian energy strategy in the South Caucasian region under V. Putins twin administrations majorly was driven on the one end of the spectrum by strategic and policydriven imperatives, though profit-making rationale and market-based pattern of Russian

166 167

Putin Calls for New Economic Security Policy, Security Watch: RFE/RL, July 11, 2002. Vladimir V. Putin, Energy Egotism Is a Road to Nowhere, Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2006.

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firms assertiveness in the regional energy domain was considered as no less important factor in sustaining the generic approach adopted at early 2000s by the Russian leadership. Economic sustainability of Russian foreign policy and a proactive shift towards more practical orientations in utilizing the competitive advantages of rising economic potential of engagement into regional big business projects or simply gaining control over strategically important infrastructural assets in the neighboring countries were recognized to be of utmost importance in a new geo-economic and geopolitical setting that surrounded the dynamics of development in the CIS area. In other words, V. Putins plan of restoring Russian power included an important provision of creating a market economy able to function in a globalized world168. In a more applicable way, Russian Prime Minister M. Fradkov, in May 2004, announced about the prospective plans of economic engagement in Georgia, saying that Moscow would have to increase the electricity supply volumes and to create joint ventures in oil, gas and communication fields169. Concerning the FSU, Russian policy-making pattern in energy-related fields of economic cooperation was dominated by the three interrelated themes. From the standpoint of macro-political projection devices and the more sophisticated schemes of the post-Soviet integration developed since the start of 2000s, the openly and officially declared course was bound, inter alia, to the necessity of fostering institutionalized integration plans within the CIS and Baltic region that would be centerframed around Russias gigantic potential of both, natural resources and the infrastructural delivery means (pipeline networks, refineries, storage facilities, etc.) under its national disposal. The main political-economic framework and the rationale behind that strategic

Russian Foreign Policy: The Implications of Pragmatism for U.S. Policy, Testimony of C. A. Wallander, Europe Subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations, Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 27, 2002. 169The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putins foreign policy towards the CIS countries, Routledge: London and NY:2009, p.151.
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approach were pivoted around the urge to strengthen, intensify and broaden the structural energy dependence from Russia and enclose the neighboring areas into the orbit of Russian influence. For instance, referring the energy partnership with the Central Asian states, a Russian official paper postulated that one of the priority directions of cooperation was energy sector, which was played the role of locomotive of strategic partnership with the regional states. [] With our participation were being realized large scale cooperation projects that contributed to solution of acute problems of domestic development of those countries concerned170. Secondly, expansion of Russian capital and foray of its private and state-controlled firms in the regions of CIS was partially driven by the domestic considerations. The matrix of government-supported business structures in a number of key economic fields concerning the social and national interests found its extrapolations also in business activities of large Russian companies and firms outside of Russia. In contrast to the situation of the 1990s, capital flee was substituted by significant and sharp rise of Russian FDIs abroad in a form corporate external expansion. In general, the process of political power concentration in Russia was closely associated with economic structures pertaining to the generic logic of social-economic and social-political development of Russia171. Here, with regard to financial and economic activities of the Russian firms and corporations outside of RF, the major political underpinning was structured along the top political support by the state to its firms in promoting their interests abroad. Even more, there emerged some ideological strand, first articulated in more or less comprehensive terms by A. Chubais (CEO of RAO UES), on creating the liberal empire within the boundaries of

170

2007 : , . 2008, , . 29. 171 , : , . . . ; . , : . , 2007, . 136-137.

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former Soviet Union, where the primacy of Russian dominance had to be based on economic and social-economic levers of power-yielding. In his article published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, A. Chubais maintained that Russia was a natural and unique leader in the region, and that only combining liberal values with a program to reestablish its empire can Russia to occupy its natural place alongside the United States, the EU, and Japan, - a place designated for Russia by history172. Finally, but no less importantly, the South Caucasus was objectively seen as a crucial area and the focal point in terms of geo-economic access, denial and control functions to be performed in a larger context of Russias economic and energy policies across the continent. Specifically, given the extended clout of Russian energetic engagement or elaborated prospective plans of engagement in Middle East, Turkey, Central Asia, as well as policy modalities concerning the European (including the Western CIS) and Chinese energy expansion directions, the region continued to be of significant derivative importance173. Particularly, since the mid-2000s problem of control over the South Caucasian energy transport corridor, one of the key linking sections between the Central Asian hydrocarbonate resources and the European Union gas market within the framework of EUbacked major and long-term Nabucco project, became a serious geopolitical and geoeconomic variable of a larger context rivalry. Locally and regionally, Russias energy strategy in the South Caucasus was structured along a complex interplay of political-economic levers Russia exerted upon the regional states174, offered benefits and demands, region-specific dependency links a

. , XXI , , 10.01.2003. 173 .. , :

172

, EURASIANET, http://russian.eurasianet.org/taxonomy/term/1229, 29 , 2003. D. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 65, Cambridge University Press:1999, pp.139-147.
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legacy of the Soviet times, as well as bunch of in-regional political factors that hampered a hypothetically possible energetic cooperation from inside of the region. In this context, three important long-term avenues in Russian energy policy-making were designated to encompass the matrix of national economic and strategic interests. First, Russian oil and gas companies, be they government-controlled monopolies or privately owned firms, will be directed to conduct business on economic, market-oriented terms. Second, all former Soviet republics would be charged the same prices for Russian oil and gas as paid by Western countries. For decades, what Western countries have paid had been determined by prices quoted on world markets. From that time on, the stance would be identical towards all other countries. Third, Russian oil and gas companies were to be encouraged to form partnerships with Western energy companies. Already, Gazprom Russias state-controlled gas monopoly and two German companies, EON and BASF, have established the North European Gas Pipeline Company175. This geoeconomic strand in Russian strategies within the CIS trade, investment and economic areas was majorly accentuated during the first half of the 2000s, whereas during the second presidential tenure of V. Putin administration geopolitical stratum of policyorientation took an upper hand, signifying the decreased aptitude toward classical economic reasons and a stronger capitalization upon social-political spectrum of implications that Russias economic assertiveness could potentially entail off. Similarly, as J. Mankoff underlines, during V. Putins second term, the Kremlin dramatically stepped up the process of bringing both oil and gas production under the control of the national champions Gazprom and Rosneft, which became two of the worlds largest and most valuable companies, though both have taken a beating during the recent economic

175

J. Letiche, Russia Moves into the Global Economy, Routledge: London and NY, 2007, pp.13-15.

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downturn 176 Russian approaches in using energy levers gradually started to acquire more sophisticated nature being increasingly utilized in the grey zone between economics and politics177. For instance, in November 2005, as Russian-Georgian relations over a spectrum of regional and intraregional issues had already become rather strained, it was announced that Gazprom would raise the gas price for Georgia from $63 to $110; a decision that was viewed in Tbilisi as purely political move178. In this context, it was not by accident that the US expert community expressed its concerns over the Russian assertiveness in the neighboring states in energy domains: Through its energy firms, Moscow has pursued several objectives in recent years. Russia has tried to purchase a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and other key energy assets of the countries of central and eastern Europe. Russia needs these assets to transport energy supplies to Western European markets, as well as to secure greater control over the domestic markets of the countries of the region. In several cases where energy infrastructure was sold to non-Russia firms, Russia cut off energy supplies to the facilities179.

In the regional energy-related domain, three spheres were of direct commercial and structural-industrial interest for giant vertically-integrated Russian corporations gas (Gazprom), electricity (RAO UES), and oil (Lukoil). Though with varying degrees and scales of engagement into the respective regional markets energy segments, all the three showed

J. Mankoff, Eurasian Energy Security, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, Council Special Report No. 43, February 2009, p.8. 177 J. Hedenskog, R.L. Larsson, Russian Leverage on the CIS and Baltic States, FOI-Swedish Defence Research Academy, June 2007, p.59. 178 Georgian PM: Increase of Gas Price Political Decision, Civil Georgia, 25 November, 2005 (www.civilgeorgia.ge). 179 S. Woehrel, Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries, May 20, 2009, RL34261, CRS Report for Congress: Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, p.4.
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serious appetite of bolstering their respective profiles of business presence in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Besides the locally-driven profit-making rationale of regional expansion, two, operational and strategic-level considerations dominated the expansion of Gazprom and RAO UES in the South Caucasus with an apparent horizons extending far beyond the inregional strategy calculus. First, both of them stove to entrench their monopolistic positions in the regional markets while, in contrast to the European markets, preferred to do business without partnership agreements with large foreign companies. Secondly, both, Gazprom and RAO UES prospective plans envisioned broader expansion modalities. For example, since 1998 RAO UES that already held control over the high capacity transmission lines for electricity re-exports to Turkey through the Georgian Russian joint venture GruzRosEnergo. By September 2003 these Russian companies and their partners in Georgia controlled the entire Georgian energy sector. On 10 October 2003 there was a joint Georgian Russian business forum held in Tbilisi during which Russian companies were offered new investment opportunities in Georgia. After the squeezing out of American energy giant AES there were doubts that any other western company would venture to enter Georgia180. The active phase of RAO UES expansion, a giant Russian corporation that generated about 70% of electricity across the whole CIS, into the South Caucasian electricity market started in 2003, when the Russian company succeeded to win a large share of Georgian electricity generation and distribution share from the US-based AES Corporation. RAO UES bought the Georgian assets of AES Corporation for $23 million acquiring 100% of stocks of AES Mtkari, AES Khrami and AES Telasi in July 2003. According to media outlets, the

L. Jervalidze, Georgia: Russian Foreign Energy Policy and Implications for Georgias Energy Security, Global Market Briefings, Series editor: Dr K. Rosner, GMB Publishing Ltd, London: 2006, p.30.
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nominal amount of deal was about the tenth of real investments (about $ 260 million) that the US-based Corporation had made in its Georgian assets. Since then, the Russian company took under its control over the 75 % shares of Telasi electricity distribution network of capital Tbilisi, two energy blocks of Tbilisi hydro energetic plant with a total output of 600 MW, 50 % share of AES-Transenergy that was specializing in electricity export to Turkey from Georgia as well as obtained the management rights of JSC Khramesi, including the two hydro energetic plants with output capacity of 113mW and 110mW, respectively181. Two years later, in 2005, RAO UES took under its control about 20% of the Georgian electricity generation capacities and 35% electricity distribution and supply to the Georgian end-users, including the full power supply of Georgian capital, Tbilisi. RAO UES annual 2003 report clearly indicated that purchase of Georgian and Armenian energy assets was driven and aimed to a broaden the expansion geography from Caucasian region to Turkey and Iran182. In evidence, before the RAO UES entrance to the Georgian market and the Georgian energy systems strategic management (2003) field as early as March 2001, the company announced a contract with Turkey to supply 2.02.5 million kilowatthours (kWh) daily. According to a trilateral agreement signed at the time by UES, Georgian Energy, and Turkish TEAS, Georgia won a third of all electricity transported via its territory183. Russian energy expansion in Armenia will be discussed later on, in the next chapter, yet to have a broader picture of Moscows economic engagement in the region, it should be

"": "" 23 , ., 12.01.2003. 182 I. Torbakov, Russia seeks to use energy abundance, EurasiaNet.org, 19.11.2003. 183 Russia: RAO UES of Russia Exports Russian Electricity to Turkey via Georgia, Tbilisi, PRIME-TASS, 30 March 2001, www.rao-ees.ru/en/news/pub_uesr/show.cgi?300301turk.htm.
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noted here that at the same period of time-spam managed to take under their control the key energy sectors of Armenia: nuclear, gas, electricity184. In March 2004, A. Chubais, the head of Russias Unified Energy Systems (UES) signed a memorandum on linking the power grids of the two countries and in December an agreement that paved the way for an exchange of electric power between Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran was signed185. The annual report of RAO UES 2006 boasted that Russian electricity network worked in parallel with the energy systems of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Moldova and Mongolia (via Kazakhstan, parallel connections were set up with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan)186. In difference to RAO UESs aptitude to ward off its business and corporate interests regionally and treat them, at least, on equal footing with state economic-political priorities within the CIS, in case of Gazproms regional strategy interplay between locally-driven business interests and governments foreign economic preferences was significantly higher. As J. Perovic observed in his analysis of Russian regional energy strategy, An important difference resulting from the goals of UES and Gazprom is that while UESs main interest is a functioning power market, Gazproms primary objective is to own as much infrastructure as possible in order to ensure maximal control. Gazproms goal thus largely coincides with the ambitions of the Russian state, since control is what both are interested in. UESs efforts to stabilize the electricity market are also compatible with state interest, although the political gain for Moscow is less evident, since corporate goals are relatively more important and the state does not control UES the way it does Gazprom187.

See, G.Sargsyan, A. Balabanyan, D. Hankinson, From Crisis to Stability in the Armenian Power Sector: Lessons Learned from Armenias Energy Reform Experience, World Bank Working Paper, N74, 2006. 185 B. Nygren, op.cit., p.112. 186 : 2006 , : 2007. 187 J. Perovic, Russian energy companies in the Caspian and Central Eurasian region: Expanding southward
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In line with the general strand of fortifying its regional dominant positions in gas supply sector, in 2004 Gazprom signed a 5-year contract with Azerbaijani government to supply 4,5 billion cubic meters of gas annually (the initial price was set $52/ 1000 cubic meters, but later was increased to $60 ). The general contract package was worth of $208million, while the gas volumes for Baku were provided from the gas cartel that included Russian, Kazakhstans and Turkmenistans reserves188. In reality, those series of long-term contract conformed Russias preponderance not only in gas supply sphere, but also its strong positions in control strategic pipeline networks of gas transportation in the FSU. In the same vein, amid the political uncertainties surrounding the future of RussianGeorgian relations and politicized setting of energy cooperation negotiations, Gazprom started to make serious inroads into the energy infrastructure of Georgia. Particularly, in summer 2003, Georgia signed a 25-year framework cooperation agreement with Gazprom, according to which Gazprom would supply Georgia with gas, renovate its pipelines, and also to export gas to Armenia, though, under the US pressure and with American advice, Tbilisi discarded a possibility of ceding its national control over the strategic gas pipeline189. Simultaneously, Gazprom announced at the beginning of August 2003 about its decision to resume gas supplies to Turkey via the Blue Stream pipeline and to supply

in Russian Business Power: The role of Russian business in foreign and security relations, ed. by A. Wenger, J. Perovic, R. W. Orttung, Routledge, London and NY:2006, p.106. 188 . , , , 21.02.2004. 189 After the US president visit to Georgia it was decided that $40mln. of Millennium Challenge Fund, would be spent to repair this strategic pipeline. S. Blank, Bracing for conflict: Russia and Georgia in South Ossetia, Eurasia Insight,. 26 September 2006. Later on, in November 2006, in response, Gazprom announced that it would cut off gas supplies to Georgia by the end of the year unless Georgia agreed to a 100% price hike or sold its main gas pipeline to Gazprom, S. Woehrel, op.cit. p.11.

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4billion cubic meters of gas to Turkey in 2004 with it plan to increase the volume up 16billion by 2010190. Despite certain regional moves to provide alternative gas import sources other than Russian (Iran-Armenia gas pipeline project or fostering the construction of Baku-TbilisiErzrum gas pipeline project to circumvent the RF territory), Gazprom remained the key gas supplier for Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Even the opening of the South Caucasus Pipeline, according to experts, would hardly challenge Gazproms dominance as the later had already set in motion alternative projects to hold under its commercial foothold the potential modalities of gas supply avenues, including the Turkish gas market and its transit opportunities to European markets191. Russian oil interests with regard to the regional energy balance was more pivoted around the dynamics of processes in and around Caspian Sea oil deposits and transportation pipelines and, as such, embraced a larger field of policy and economic tools applications whereas the role and the importance of the region between the Caspian and Black Seas was focalized within the two issues concerned: connection infrastructure (pipelines) that could potentially undermine Russias oil exporting once dominant positions and Azerbaijani off-shore and on-shore oil deposits, where the Russian giant Lukoil had had vested commercial and industrial interests since the onset of 1990s. From the standpoint of Russian oil interests projected to the regional markets, the dependency links were not as pronounced as in case of gas domain. As discussed in Chapter I, the major Russian interests in oil sphere related to the South Caucasian region were bunched to the Caspian oil reserves and extended far beyond the local markets utility potential.

A Russian Chronologies: Foreign Policy Chronology, July-September, 2003, UK, Conflict Studies Research Center, Sandhurst: 2003, p. 55. 191 J. Perovic, op.cit, p.93.
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2.3. Russias Role in the Regional Conflict Resolution Processes

Conflict management and conflict resolution strategies on the post-Soviet space occupied especially important place in overall Russian policies in the CIS. Still at the early 1990s Moscow officially proclaimed Russias special responsibility in political, diplomatic and military domains of the post-Soviet conflict resolution processes as pivoted around its dominant strategic position vis--vis conflicting states. Initially, the new liberalminded Russian leadership was more prone to contribute to the conflict resolution efforts within the larger international context and existing mechanisms. For instance, in 1992 Russian MFA even declared that it was ready to support any international initiative aimed to cease the use of force by the conflicting parties in Nagorno Karabakh conflict 192. However, those lazier fair approaches was soon dropped off in favor of significantly more assertive stance based on official recognition of Russian strategic interests in reserving the principally leading role in peacekeeping and political-diplomatic spheres of conflict resolution within the post-Soviet area. On February 28, 1993, president B. Yeltsin declared that cessation of all regional military conflict on the territory of the former USSR are fall within the Russia has vital interests and [] international community more and more understands Russias special responsibility in fulfilling this tough task 193. With Russian direct involvement and mediation efforts, almost simultaneously, in May 1994 the cease-fire regimes were established in the zones of military conflicts in the South Caucasus in Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh. Previously, in June 1992, under Moscow aegis a tripartite cease-fire agreement between Russia, Georgia and South Ossetia

: , , 1996, .196. , ?, , 12.03.1993.

192 193.

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was reached194. A month later a mixed peacekeeping forces were deployed (600-strong Russian peacekeeping contingent was part of tripartite force)195. Under CIS formal

approval, since 1994 contingent of Russian peacekeepers were deployed in the zone Abkhazian conflict. According the RF MOD, as of December 2005, over 3,000 Russian servicemen are taking part in peacekeeping operations on the territory of the CIS states, while the largest peacekeeping contingent, about 1,800 servicemen, was carrying out duties in the zone of Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. In addition, 700 Russian peacekeepers were on duty in the Dniester region and 580 in South Ossetia196. Also, in the mid-nineties Russia proposed to send Russian peacekeeping troops into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. However, the US insisted that troops should be from different states and within the framework of the OSCE, while a potential dispatch of peacekeepers to the zone of Nagorno Karabakh was formally bound to comprehensive political peace settlement between the conflicting sides, meaning that those external forces could only appear in the region after the political framework agreement being signed197. Several strategic level priorities dominated Russia's policies towards the conflict resolution processes in the Caucasian region. Though military and political establishment of RF under V. Putin administration was quick in accepting the old conventional geopolitical reality that the two parts - Russian North Caucasus and the South Caucasus were highly interconnected areas in terms of historically sustained social, economic, ethnopolitical and security bonds, Moscow pursued markedly differentiated policies with

R. McCorquodale and K.Hausler, Caucuses in the Caucasus: The Application of the Right of SelfDetermination in Conflict in the Caucasus: Implications for International Legal Order, ed.by J. A. Green, Ch.Waters, Palgrave Macmillan: 2010, p.36. 195 R. Finch, The Strange Case of Russian Peacekeeping Operations in the Near Abroad, US Army, Foreign Military Studies Office, July 1996, pp.3-4. 196 M.Smith, A Russian Chronology: October-December 2005, Conflict Studies Research Center, UK MOD 2005, p.49. 197 : / 1973-1994., 3, . 1997, . 476-477.
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regard to Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, on the one hand, and Karabakh conflict, on the other hand. Conceptually, since the 1990s up to the current stage Russias engagement in conflict management and resolution process across the its borders continued to occupy a principle place in calculus of potential and probable threats to RF national security. For example, the most recent Russian Military Doctrine approved by RF President in February 2010 stated: Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. The tendencies toward violent solutions of these conflicts, including those bordering the Russian Federation, remains. The existing structure (system) of international security, including international legal mechanisms does not provide for the equal security of all states. However, in spite of the lowering of the probability of the unleashing against the Russian Federation of large scale warfare with the employment of conventional means and nuclear weapons, in a number of directions military dangers to the Russian Federation have increased198. Politically, the overall course of the Russian government in regional conflict resolution processes under V. Putins presidency was geared forward by several priorities. First, it was acknowledged that the radical and abrupt changes in already set regional power balance in the zones of frozen conflicts would be dangerous and potentially detrimental to the long-term interests of Russia. An approach that postulated on necessity of maintaining the established power equilibrium in the South Caucasus while simultaneously enhancing and institutionalizing its control over the North Caucasus was dominating the Russian governing elites strategic thinking. A scenario of regional
Text of Russian Military Doctrine as approved by RF President on February 5, 2010, as quoted in J.W. Kipp, Russian Military Doctrine: Past, Present, and Future in Russian Military Politics and Russias 2010 Defense Doctrine, ed. by S.Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, the US, March 2011, pp. 63-64.
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destabilization that would potentially lead to re-instigation of interstate wars and internal turmoil in the Southern Caucasus was viewed as very unacceptable and negative perspective. Secondly, in the light of growing economic potential coupled with domestic leadership consolidation trends in Russia itself, the new areas of economic and energetic cooperation and expansion were opened up in the region that, on the one hand, supported Russian eagerness in regional stability and sustainable development durability, while, on the other hand, provided the new vehicles for extending its influence exertion capabilities, besides the traditional military-political means. And finally, despite of clear-cut posture of the administration to ward off the traditional sphere of Russias preeminent privileges - the space of former Soviet Union - from any external encroachment attempts, Russias stance to foster a greater institutionalization of interests internationally predisposed its more flexible and responsible engagement formats, though the latter circumstance did not exclude in any way an application of rather tough and unilateral responses. To quote the expertise opinion, Russian multilateralism in case of the South Caucasian regional conflict resolution approaches was rather case specific: Broadly put, Russia sees multilateralism, in its ideal form, as co-ordinated international action around key issue areas, rather than dense horizontal co-operation aimed at developing congruent policies that touch on or require change in domestic affairs199. On the operational level, Russias strategies towards the post-Soviet and, particularly, the South Caucasian frozen conflicts sustained certain important transformations pertaining to not only Russias role-perception modalities and changing regional and international geopolitical contexts, but also reflecting the general shifts that occurred in Russia foreign policy-making patterns. During the volatile period of the1990s,
E. W. Rowe and S. Torjesen, Key features of Russian Multilateralism in The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. by E. W. Rowe and S. Torjesen, Routledge, NY:2009, pp.2-3.
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despite of erratic leadership style and fragmented policy-making milieu, Russia was substantially involved the post-Soviet conflictual processes, while the focal points of Russian efforts were majorly pivoted around the political orientations of the new elites and their acquiescence to the Russian principle role in the regional politics. As D. Trenin underlines, though Moscow was not an instigator of the post-soviet regional conflicts, namely in Transdnestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh, yet its sympathies were not on the central governments sides200. The historical factors and historical legal background of Georgian-Abkhazian conflict played an utmost role in political perceptions of the both conflicting sides toward each other after the USSR disintegration. Though according to 1925 Constitution enjoyed a union republic status, later on, in the 1930s, Abkhazia was incorporated into Georgia as autonomous republic within Georgian boundaries. Since then ethnic Georgian immigration to Abkhazia brought to the situation of great ethnic disparity in Abkhazia 201; by the 1970s the Abkhaz population percentage declined to about 17% of the Abkhazias total202. In response to this shift, in 1978 the Abkhaz autonomous republic petitioned Moscow for separation from Georgia. Though the petition was denied and a new constitution reaffirming Abkhazias status within Georgia was drafted, this marked the beginning of a period of increased nationalism persisting throughout the 1980s203 and up to the end of the Soviet period. In August 1992 Georgian military intervention into Abkhazia triggered fully-

., , Pro et Contra, , , 2006, .11. H. Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: separatism of states and nations in Eurasia and the world, Cambridge University Press: 2008, p.258. 202 S. Darrell, Crisis and Response in Soviet Nationality Policy: The Case of Abkhazia, Central Asian Survey, 1985, N4 (4), pp. 5168. 203 M. J. Butler, International Conflict Management, Routledge, NY: 2009, p.100
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fledged military conflict, with involvement and direct participations of the North Caucasian ethnic population and Russian paramilitary support of Abkhazians204. First of all, the since the beginning of the 2000s the means of exerting influence upon the regional processes broadened as, in I. Oldbergs words, Russias foreign policy became more ambitious and assertive thanks to its growing economic power and concentration of political power, at the same time as changes in the world offered opportunities that Russia could exploit205. In practice, the increased power base of Russias capital presence and financial engagement in the region that was mainly deployed within the energy sectors and other strategically important infrastructural assets subtly altered the background of Russian perceptions of its national interests as applied to the dynamics of regional development perspectives. The later aspect could not but to influence the avenues, instruments and the aims of Russias involvement into the conflict resolution policies in the South Caucasus both, internationally and regionally. Secondly, despite certain variations in foreign policy orientations of three South Caucasian states as assessed against their willingness to concord their external priorities with the major national interests of Russia within the CIS space, the pattern of domestic political development paths was not very divergent in terms of social perceptions of the major social-political expectations, beliefs, and shared perspective of the post-soviet identity. Yet, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the subsequent change of political leadership in this republic later on fostered serious implications in terms of regional development trends. Still in autumn of 1999, Russian Foreign Minister I. Ivanov on the eve of his regional visit came up with a programmatic statement claiming that Russia was, is, and will be a
D. Lynch Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan, The RIIA, London: 2000, pp.130-143. 205 I. Oldberg, Aims and Means in Russian Foreign Policy in Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. by R. E. Kanet, Palgrave Macmillan NY 2010, p.30.
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Caucasian power, and we therefore want stability in this region and make no secret of our position: the neither peace nor war situation which prevails there today does not suit us206. The first priority was particularly actualized in the context of the second Chechen campaign as Russia invested huge political and military-security resources to "reinstall" itself a major and, in fact, the single power center capable to stabilize highly strained situation in the Caucasus. V. Putin himself leveraged significant political and social efforts to provide centralized and coherent policy course under his direct control and guidance. Conflict zones that immediately bordered the Russian North Caucasus, namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and where the Russian military contingents conducted peacekeeping operations since the first half of the 1990's, reappeared as focal points on the Russian regional policy agenda. Given the high intensity of regional security interactions, Russia's stance with regard to those conflicts and its unilateral engagement into the conflict management processes were intricately correlated with military-political and socialeconomic bilateral relations with the South Caucasian states as well as some region-wide initiatives that the Russian leadership put forward to politically accentuate its special macro-regional profile. Moreover, as S. Blank notes, Russias assertiveness in suppressing the Chechen insurgency was driven, inter alia, by the instrumental notion of disposing its resolve and preparedness to fight in a real military conflict and to use a military force in the Caucasus elsewhere should the need occur207. On 11 September, 2002, V. Putin made two significant statements both of them concerning Georgia and Russian-Georgian relations. Stating that the infrastructure of international terrorism in Chechnya has been

. , , , N 160, 2 , 1999. S. Blank, International Rivalries in Eurasia in Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia: The Return of the Great Game, ed. by M.R. Freire and R.E. Kanet, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, NY 2010, p.36
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destroyed208, V. Putin simultaneously issued an ultimatum demanding that Georgia take measures against the Chechen guerilla members who sought refuge there and pressed Tbilisi to agree to cooperation in fighting against terrorism across the borderlands of the both countries209. In comparative perspective, as it was the case during the military phase of GeorgiaAbkhazian conflict during the first part of the 1990s, now again the volatile ethno-political situation in the North Caucasus dictated Moscow the need of preventive measures not to allow Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be drown into the cauldron and hold back those former autonomous republics of Georgia from potentially destabilizing waves that entailed the Russian-led antiterrorist campaign in the region210. In any case, at the beginning of 21st century Russia continued to position itself as a party who had an interest in maintaining the status quo and in keeping its position as the veto player in the region211. The start of active phase of antiterrorist operation in Chechnya and sharp increase of military presence in the North Caucasian region significantly raised the profile of military and strategic implications of cross-border interaction with the two neighboring republics Georgia and Azerbaijan. Namely, over the prolonged period Pankisi Gorge located on the Georgian territory and bordering Chechnya became a focal point of Russian military-security concerns and sore point of bilateral relations. The Russian political and military establishment made allegations that official Tbilisi was either unable to cope with the terrorist band-groups of Chechen insurgency operating in Pankisi Gorge (Georgia), or was intentionally fomenting the unrest in the North Caucasus providing them a safe heaven on the Georgian territory and keeping the Russian-Georgian border porous.
Russian Foreign Policy: A Chronology July-September 2002, UK CSRC, MOD, p.62. Interfax News Agency, Moscow, 11 September 2002. 210 P. Baev, Chechnya and the Russian military: A war too far? in Chechnya: From Past to Future, ed. by R. Sakwa, London: Anthem Press, 2005, pp.117-130. 211 Ch. Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, New York University Press, 2007, p.151.
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Secondly, the widened international context of antiterrorist campaign impacted and reconfigured the political and technical emphasis in regional conflict resolution strategies. Particularly, emergence of the new asymmetric types of security threats substantially heightened the necessity of regional stability provision. The peacekeeping operations in the zones of conflict acquired a new rationale regardless of the degree they promoted the political solution of those conflicts212. Thirdly, acceleration of the US military involvement in Georgia and gearing up bilateral partnership via military and security training programs with Georgia could not but to influence Russian approaches, intra alia, to Abkhazian and Ossetian conflicts. Moreover, conflict management and settlement routs became an important variable in the context of Georgian aspirations to join NATO that Moscow vehemently opposed. On May 1, 2003, RF Federation Council speaker Sergey Mironov describes the US-Georgian agreement on military cooperation as unprecedented: It directly concerns the interests of Russia and all the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States of which Georgia is, incidentally, a member.213 In May 2005, V. Putin stated that he would not like foreign troops or the contingents of other countries to appear in Georgia after the Russian military pull-out214. As S. Kaufman noted, NATO military intervention experiences in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) exemplified the need of continued Russian intervention in the Caucasus and that must be understood as a Russian effort, driven by the security dilemma, to prevent such NATO hegemony on its southern border215. As for the potential geopolitical modalities that would entail Georgias possible accession to NATO MAP (membership action plan), Kremlins official stance was aired by Russian ambassador to Georgia, V.
212 213 214 215

J. Bugajski, Russias New Europe, The National Interest, Winter 2003/04, p.90. , , 1.05.2003.

D. Lynch, Why Georgia Matters, Chaillot Paper, N 86, Paris: Feb. 2006, ISS, p.46. S. Kaufman, Ethnic Conflict and Eurasian Security in Limiting institutions? The challenge of Eurasian security governance, ed. by J. Sperling, S. Kay and S. V. Papacosma, Manchester University Press 2003, p.53.

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Kovalenko - the move would alarm Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the point where they would distance themselves from Georgia further before216. Fourthly, the new modus operandi that rested on a broader understanding of Russian regional interests and enhanced leverages over the security dynamics within the post-soviet space, altered somehow the Russian practical approaches; the key role of Russia in conflict resolution processes in the CIS space that previously had been regarded as a sort of springboard in determining and guiding of the whole specter of the regional strategic priorities evolved into the more instrumental notion of securing the larger interests of Russia in this part of the FSU. Along the intensification of economic and energetic expansionism in the South Caucasus, the exceptional standing of Moscow in conflict settlement strategies was started to diffuse into the larger agenda of Russian external interests217. To the certain degree, the shift was a manifestation of gradual retreat of Grand policy to low politics priorities (economy, trade, societal issues, ecology, migration, etc.) as regional replication of broader nature transformation in domestic and external domains of Russian politics218. Under V. Putins administrations, Russias peacekeeping and conflict resolution policies in the South Caucasus reflected both, functional and strategic dimensions of policymaking process. The major aims and motivations of the Russian military and foreign policy establishment were bound to in-regional as well as locally-driven considerations. For variety of strategic and tactical reasons, Russian approaches towards Georgia as well as practical steps in regional conflict processes directly involving Georgian interests

S.Blank, Russia and the Black Seas Frozen Conflicts in Strategic Perspective, Mediterranean Quarterly 19:3, 2008, p.29. 217 S. Secrieru, Russias Foreign Policy Under Putin: CIS Project Renewed, UNISCI Discussion Paper, N10, January 2006, pp. 298-299. 218 A. Sergounin, Global Challenges to Russias National Security: Any Chance for Resisting/Bandwagoning/ Adapting/Contributing to an Emerging World Order? in Globalization, Security, and the Nation-State Paradigms in Transition, ed. by E.l Aydinli, J.N. Rosenau, State University of New York, NY2005, p.119.
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Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts were much more heavy-handed and politically sensitive as opposed to Russian initiatives enacted to other CIS regional conflict resolution frameworks. Specifically, during the time-frame of 2001-2003 Russias relations with the neighboring Caucasian states were strongly impacted by the spill-over effect of the Chechen conflict. Despite some initial foray to sustain and maintain macro-political allregional framework based of common understanding of basic parameters of regional order in the whole Caucasian region and embodied in the idea of Caucasian four (comprising Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) that V. Putin put forward in 2000 219, very soon Russias stance significantly hardened towards Georgia. Yet, despite of serious deterioration of Russian-Georgian relations over the range of principle issues concerning the dynamics and perspectives of regional development220, Moscow made evident that it would not allow to change the established formats of conflict resolution that secured its principle status role in regional affairs. In December 2003 V. Putin declared that Russia would meet international commitments in the process of conflict resolution in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moreover, as in case of Karabakh conflict, Russian president underlined RF willingness and readiness to come up as guarantor of the peace agreement between conflicting parties: We watch the situations in these republics closely. We declare for the territorial integrity of Georgia, we will support it and make decisions so that there will be no infringement upon the interests of people who live on
. , , , 19.01.2000. The major problems that complicated the bilateral relations included: (1) Russian military presence in Georgia (two bases in Georgia proper Batumi and Akhalkalak, plus Russian military facilities located in Abkhazia, Gudauta military base) that Georgia officially demanded to withdraw after Georgias suspension of its membership in Russian-led Collective Security Treaty; (2) Officially formulated Georgian drive to join the Western military-political block in face of NATO as well as intensification of the US-Georgian military and security partnership since 2002 onward as exemplified in the first launch program Train and Equip that would potentially lead to broadened and institutional engagement of the US into the regional processes and involve more tangible leverages and increased regional profile to influence energy and security orientations of the South Caucasian states; (3) Georgias inability or unwillingness to control the border areas adjacent to Chechnya thus undermining Russian authorities efforts to stabilize the North Caucasus; (4) Tbilisis demand to internationalize peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to undermine the Russia monopolist position in conflict resolution processes within the former Soviet Union space.
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these territories221. Later on, in November 2007, amid the practical start up of military withdrawal from Georgia and against the political and diplomatic background of Russian surrender of its positions in the region, at a briefing held by the RF Defense Ministry it was reconfirmed that At the same time, Russia will further stringently execute its peacekeeping obligations, and the peacekeeping forces will not allow unleashing a new conflict, regardless of wishes of some political fractions in Georgia and their ideological inspirers222. Politically and strategically, Russian approach to conflict resolution prospects concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia rest on two-prong considerations. On the one hand, Moscow made it clear that peacekeeping operations under the CIS aegis, but actually under the Russian control, were conditio sine qua non, while any attempts to change those formats could wreck the already tense situation in the region into the real disorder and mess. On the other hand, Russian leadership strove to uphold the internationally recognized status of the peacekeeping operations, emphasizing, particularly, the cooperation with UN mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in case of Abkhazia and OSCE in the Ossetian conflict zone. Yet, in difference to other post-Soviet conflict resolution processes within the CIS space, Russian policies towards the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts were structured along the unilateralist ting as they directly concerned the core national interests of Russia and were bonded by immediate regional preferences of Moscow in the Caucasian region. In 2000-2001 Russia deliberately stalled the UN Security Council treatment of Abkhaz issue, in fact refusing even a feasibility of replacement of the Russian

Vladimir Putin: Russia will meet international commitments in the process of conflict resolution in South Osetia and Abkhazia, RosBusinessConsulting News Agency, Dec 18, 2003. 222 , , 02.11.2007.
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peacekeeping contingent in the conflict zone by the UN forces, effectively blocking the discussion of the UN on-ground involvement into the problem223. The change of political power in Georgia in 2003/2004 and accession M. Saakashvili as a new Georgian president for a short period of time ushered some positive possibilities of improvement in bilateral relations between the two states. With Russian support, M. Saakashvili succeeded to bring back under the central governments control another autonomous region within Georgia, Ajaria that had been steering de facto independent political and economic life for about 13 years, since the Soviet Union break up. The former Ajarian leader A. Abashidze moved to Moscow, while thanks to the Russian shuttle diplomacy efforts, the potentially dangerous cession crisis in Georgia was despised224. Nevertheless, that brief interim phase of potential normalization did not produce positive bilateral-level outcomes in terms of other ethno-political conflict resolution perspectives in Georgia. Soon afterwards, the new Georgian leadership enforced a small scale anti-smuggle operation in the South Ossetia thus challenging the sustainability of the Russian peacekeeping functions. As Georgian authorities, in rather unilateral fashion, proclaimed the national priority task of pulling back both of those secessionist republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, under Georgian jurisdiction, Russia substantially toughened its conflict management policies. Specifically, since 2004 onward the absolute majority of Abkhazians were granted the Russian citizenship and RF passports225. On the ground, it meant the change in legal dimension of the conflicts as since then Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-

B. Nygren, Russias relations with Georgia under Putin: The impact of 11 September in Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of security under Putin, ed. by J. Hedenskog, V. Konnander, B. Nygren, I. Oldberg, Ch. Pursiainen, Routledge: London & NY 2005, pp.16-163. 224S. Secrieru, Russias Foreign Policy under Putin: CIS Project Renewed, UNISCI Discussion Paper N10, January 2006 p.300. 225 . , , ,
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17.11.2004.

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Ossetian confrontations were started to acquire larger, Russian-Georgian confrontation in political-juridical terms. As experts from the Netherlands Clingendael Institute of International Relations underlining in their research paper, in spite of Georgias stringent efforts to diminish the power-base of Russian influence in the region, however, Georgia lacks the ability to force Russia to stop its support for the separatist regionsan issue that is most problematic as a permanent settlement of the disputed areas cannot be reached without Russian consent. One thing is clear; Georgias frozen conflicts are not only a local South Caucasian issue, as they are distinctly connected to powers (Russia, US) and organizations (CIS, NATO, EU) at the regional and global levels226. Two political strands in Russias approaches towards Georgia with evident ramifications upon the paradigm of Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflict resolution had manifested themselves overtly during the presidency terms of V. Putin. First, Russia made quite clear that military force could be used in the northern areas of Georgia (Pankisi Gorge) to smoke out the Chechen terrorist227. Secondly, in contrast of Yeltsins period whereas the territorial integrity of Georgia had not been questioned and was officially accepted assumption, afterwards the Russian position was significantly toughened; as the Russian foreign minister openly stated that Georgian territorial integrity was a rather virtual category than reality228. During the first half of the 2000s and, particularly over the time-spam of active phase of Russian military and paramilitary operations in the North Caucasus, in Chechnya, an unsteady equilibrium across the Georgian-Ossetian contact line characterized the
Geo-strategy in the South Caucasus: Power Play and Energy Security of States and Organizations, M. de Haas (Editor), A. Tibold, V.Cillessen, November 2006, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, p.19. 227 P.Felgenhauer, Brinkmanship in Georgia, Moscow Times, 10.10.2002. 228 .. , 2 2006 , www.mid.ru.
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situation in this conflict zone. Specifically, in 2003 dangerous signs of armed clashes being transformed into the fully-fledged open military conflict appeared. Though the former president of Georgia, E. Shevarnadze efforts to check the situation under the relative control, in July 2003, the South Ossetian president-elect E. Kokoity appealed to Russian president to accept unrecognized republic as Russian Federation subject, with the same status as in case of their ethnic kinship of North Ossetia. As for Russian leadership position concerning the Ossetian request, there was certain ambivalence in Kremlins official political attitude as Russia could not insist on its own territorial integrity while denying the same right to Georgia. The tension heightened even more after M. Saakashvilis accession to Georgian presidency in 2003, while quadripartite negotiations, with participation of Russian, Georgian, South and North Ossetian sides, together with the head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia centered on finding compromise solution within federal scheme ended in vein. The major debacle that strained the situation on the ground, deployment of Georgian extra-forces in South Ossetian districts, did not find its solution and the Russian proposal on bilateral demilitarization of illegally deployed forces hang in the air until November, 2004229. Moreover, the new Georgian leadership accelerated course to foster closer and broader cooperation with NATO and the US sparked an open Russian criticism. In July, 2003, the head of the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, A. Kokoshin, criticized the appearance in Georgia of a NATO AWACS aircraft: We are talking of a certain strong-arm pressure being applied to us from the South Caucasus direction, which I believe to be quite

229

J. Devdariani, Expectations low for GeorgiaSouth Ossetia talks Eurasia Insight, 4 November 2004.

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unnecessary in the present situation. It neither meets our interests, nor Georgian interests nor American interests230. In general, Russias policies towards the South Ossetian conflict were driven by the two strategic considerations: to avert the possibility of internationalization of Russian-led peacekeeping operation in the conflict zone, while securing its dominant position with regard to any possible resolution modalities, including employment of deterrence measures against the Georgian attempts to change the situation in a cardinal way. For instance, Moscow warned Georgia against attempts to resolve its conflict with South Ossetia by force, noting that many inhabitants of South Ossetia had acquired Russian citizenship, and Russia would not remain indifferent if their lives were threatened231. Another regional conflict that seriously concerned Russias macro-regional interests and where Russia continued to uphold the key role in any potential or on-going conflict resolution modalities over the period of V. Putins presidency was the problem of Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The Karabakh conflict is the result of the 1923 erroneous decision by the Soviet dictator I. Stalin to make a millennia-old Armenian province of Artsakh a part of Soviet Azerbaijan. Throughout its Soviet history, Nagorno Karabakh strove to restore the injustice and reunite with Armenia, however, all the efforts were brutally suppressed by central government in Moscow and activist put in prison. The 1988 became a turning point for the freedom movement. On February 20, 1988, a Special session of the NK council of peoples deputies petitioned the Azerbaijani and Armenian SSR on secession of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast from Soviet

230Russian

Foreign Policy: A Chronology July-September 2003, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK, MoD, 2003, p.44. 231 RFE/RL Newsline, 30.06.2004.

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Azerbaijan and its transfer to Soviet Armenia232. The first democratic process within the Soviet area, the Nagorno Karabakh liberation movement faced fierce opposition by Soviet authorities; however, it caught attention of the whole USSR and world community. Freedom movements throughout the Soviet area became irreversible. Moreover, the Soviet Constitution, in particular, the April 3, 1990 USSR law on the procedure of secession of a Soviet Republic from the USSR, gave the autonomous entities the right to determine their political and legal status via popular referendum. Referendum took place in Nagorno Karabakh on December 10, 1991 with attendance of international observers. 98.9% of local population voted for formation of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic 233 . Thus, formation of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, and consequent declaration of independence on January 6, 1992, was implemented in a full compliance with the international law and then acting Soviet legislation. Yet, still on the eve the formal disintegration of the USSR, the escalation of ethnopolitical tension between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan, at the beginning of the 1990s, entered into the phase of fully-fledged military confrontation. The military stage of the conflict ended up in 1994 as Russian-mediated ceasefire was established in May 1994 and is still maintained due to a balance of powers in the region, without any peacekeeping operation on the ground. Since then Nagorno Karabakh Republic retained under its control not only the territory of NKR proper, but also several contiguous regions as an effective security zone under its control to deter a potential military encroachment by the

232A.

Mirzoyan, Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the West: Between History And Geopolitics, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, NY:2010, p.12. 233 M.P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications, Westport, CT: Praeger: 1998.

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Azerbaijani side. From the mid-1990s onward, a Minsk Group was created, including Russia, USA, and France, to find a political solution of the protracted conflict234. From the mid-1990s onward, Russia as one of the key mediators played a substantial role in conflict resolution process and diplomatic efforts undertaken to mediate a lasting solution. To accentuate its regional preeminence and the status role, Russia under V. Putin from the onset made clear that, regardless of turbulences in its own North Caucasus, was ready to undertake a principal function of the regional security guarantor. In January 2000, during the Armenian-Azerbaijani talks organized in Moscow, Russian President stated that if the negotiations come to a successful end, Russia would act as a guarantor of a compromise solution235. Practically, the statement meant Russias readiness to establish its peacekeeping contingents along the contact line as military security guarantors. The energized US diplomatic efforts in the conflict settlement processes that was proceeding in the context of enlarged framework of regional military and political cooperation dynamics came across rather wary, if not openly hostile Russian stance. In 2003, whereas the trend of broadening of the US involvement had already started to gain a higher profile in the region, the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan, N. Ryabov, openly warned the US that the possibility of appearance of foreign military forces will not ensure but rather prolong the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict236. The major political message that Russia sent to its partners in Karabakh conflict mediation efforts was that problem should be resolved by conflict parties themselves. In May 2006, the Russian Vice-Premier and Defense Minister S. Ivanov asserted upon completion of the sitting of the CIS Council of
S. Kaufman, Ethnic conflict and Eurasian security in Limiting Institutions?: the challenge of Eurasian security governance, ed. by J. Sperling, S.Kay and S. V.Papacosma, Manchester University Press: Manchester and NY:2003, p.63. 235 . , , (), N 4316, ( 4-10, 2000), .7. 236 S. Blank, Russia and the Black Seas Frozen Conflicts in Strategic Perspective, Mediterranean Quarterly 19:3, 2008, p.40.
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Ministers, Moscow stood for political resolution of the problem: We are for peaceful and political settlement of the conflict. Russia along with the United States and France is the Cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno Karabakh. Reiterating that the OSCE Minsk Group was the right way towards the solution, he warned that any settlement format imposed from outside in not only counter-productive but also dangerous237. In fact, Russian Defense Ministers statement was addressed to the NATO Secretary Generals Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Central Asia R. Simmonss proposition on possibility of the Alliance troop deployment in the zone of the conflict as NATO peacekeeping contingent in the region, because the conflicts available in the South Caucasus are in NATO's limelight and the Alliance is concerned over the problems that impede cooperation between the states of the region, while deployment of peacekeepers is possible not only under the OSCE flag, but also under the flags of NATO or the UN238. In the diplomatic realm, V. Putins administration explicitly adhered to the balanced approach in Karabakh problem solution modalities. In difference to Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts where Russias involvement was premised on a more unilateralist strand, Russian political and diplomatic engagement in Nagorno Karabakh settlement was generally set along the international framework of Minsk Group efforts. In 2006/2007, the Russian MFA described the situation around the Nagorno-Karabakh as looking rather less worrisome by comparison with the other two regional conflicts239. Strategically, in a longer-run perspective, Moscow continued to view Nagorno Karabakh issue as a key element in maintaining the regional military-political power correlation pattern that rest on the centre-frame of power balance. At the operational
Sergey Ivanov: Russia Stands for Political Resolution of Karabakh Problem, Panarmenian News, 31.05.2006. 238 Deployment of Peacekeepers in Karabakh Possible under NATO and UN Flags, Panarmenian News, 12.04.2006. 239 O. Oliker, K. Crane, L. H. Schwartz, C. Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2009, p.100.
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level, Russias policies concerning the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement processes over the course of the 2000s were double-pronged inward looking and outward looking. As inward looking policy type, Russian moves were mainly structures along the inregional and bilateral relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Given the prominent importance of military and military-political dimension of security dynamics in the Caucasian region, the major political aim was to avert a potentially dangerous sliding of the conflicting parties into the spiral of open confrontation with serious implications of disrupting the regional balance. An official document by the Russian MFA, Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activities of Russian Federation in 2007, clearly stated that the military and military-technical cooperation was conducted subject to the necessity to maintain the balance of power in the Caucasian region240. Outward looking stance presupposed on Russias side a two-dimensional approach: (1) as participant of formalized negotiation framework of the OSCE MG and (2) as a key geopolitical player in the region whose interests interacted and intersected in a variety of regional and intra-regional domains and over crucially important issues with other powers, like the US, European Union, and China as well as regional states Iran and Turkey. While framing the renovated format of relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan based on newly discovered competitive advantages Russia could exploit vis--vis the two republics in geoeconomic sphere, Moscow explicitly put its position regarding the Karabakh conflict on a politically balanced track. In January 2003, V. Putin stressed the importance of maintaining balanced relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan and a need to

2007 : , , 2008, . 38-55.

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pursue a solution of the conflict that would be based on compromise and justice to suit both countries241. In 2006, the Russian Defense minister maintained that the military hardware and ammunition relocation from the Russian bases in Georgia, part of which was redeployed into Armenia, would not endanger the regional military-political balance: We do not transfer the whole weaponry and ammunition to the 102 military base [located in Gyumri, Armenia V.H.]. There are two principle aspects: first, armaments and ammunition from the one Russian base are being transferred to the other Russian base. All these stocks continue to be at our disposal.[]Secondly, there is an Adapted CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty, where the limits are strictly fixed up, and the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasia are within those framework limits242. Officially, Moscow refrained from recognizing Nagorno Karabakh Republic as a negotiating side in diplomatic and political mediation process. However, in November 2003 Russian Defense Minister S. Ivanov underlined that Moscow was not going to impose its opinion in matters concerning the settlement of the situation around Nagornyy Karabakh. Later on, in 2006 RF MFA declared that Russia views as counterproductive attempts to dismantle the existing mechanisms of settling the Nagornyy Karabakh, GeorgianAbkhazian, Georgian-South Ossetian and Dniester conflicts243.

RFE/RL Newsline, January 21, 2003. . , : , , 25.01.2006. 243 A Russian Chronology: July-September 2006, Conflict Studies Research Center, UK MOD 2006, p.46.
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PART III: Russian Armenian Strategic Relationships in the Regional Security Context: 2000-2008
3.1. Russian Armenian Military and Political Partnership and its Implications on Regional Security Dynamics

Russian penetration in the Transcaucasus begun still in the eighteenth century being partially motivated by geopolitical considerations to drive towards southern seas and as such represented a conquest policy type, yet, at the same time, Russias move to the Caucasian region and beyond was stipulated by invitation of Christian people residing in these lands since pre-ancient times. In the 16th and 17th centuries Transcaucasia had been divided and passed backwards and forwards between the Persian and Ottoman empires, while Russia traditionally was viewed as the protector and guarantor of Eastern Christians against the
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oppression of Muslim empires. Given the common cultural and religious affinity between Russia on the one hand, and Christian Armenians and Georgians on the other hand, Russias entrance into the region and extension of its clout across the Caucasian borderlands occurred relatively easier. Russians organized the first major expedition into the Transcaucasus in 1723 but consolidation of Russias political and merchandise positions there emerged later. King Erekle of Georgia voluntarily placed his kingdom under Russian protection in 1783 signing Georgievski Traktat to save his kingdom from Turkish imminent conquest. His successor decided that Georgia would be safer if it was incorporated in the Russian empire on a more formal footing, and in 1801 Georgia was included into the Russian Empire by Alexander I decree244. Later on, during the 19 century Russian Empire gradually institutionalized process of Caucasian incorporation taking under its control northern parts of modern Azerbaijan and Eastern Armenia, whereas Western Armenians continued their struggle within Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, despite of cultural and political gravitation of Armenians and Georgians towards Russia and the foothold of presence southward of Caucasian mountains (the mountainous ridge that geographically divides the Caucasus into Northern and Southern parts), Russia fought a prolonged campaign to overcome the resistance of nonChristian indigenous ethnic peoples in the North Caucasus245. During the 1830s and 1840s, fighting in the North Caucasus spread from Daghestani territory into Chechnya, where the Chechen legendary leader Shamil stove to resist Russian troops until 1864. After 1864 the entire North Caucasus finally fall under Russia control. As a result of Russian-Turkish war (1877-78), in 1878 Batumi was incorporated into the Empire thus heralding that Russian
The North Caucasus barrier: the Russian advance towards the Muslim world, ed. by M.Broxup, London: Hurst, 1992. 245 F. Coene, The Caucasus: An Introduction, Routledge: London & NY: 2010, pp.126-128.
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Empire in the Transcaucasus was formed and complete246. In historical perspective, a remarkable aspect of Russias entrance into the Caucasian geopolitical scene was the situational circumstance that Russias first incursions into Transcaucasia were to defend the Christian peoples of the area contributes to the perception that many Russians have of the essentially benevolent nature of Russian imperialism and of Russias civilizing influence on non-Christians247. Though cultural, social-economic and political expansion of Russia in the Caucasus did not reap automatically all-encompassing effects; for instance, the Armenian or Georgian churches were not incorporated into Russian orthodoxy. Ideological and political situation in the Transcaucasus started to heat up at the beginning of the 20th century and reached its apex during the First World War (19141918). In the aftermath of the First World War, in 1918, after the break-up of Russian Empire, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan proclaimed their independence. However their independent statehood course was not lasted long. In late 1920 Armenia was conquered by the Russian Red Army of Bolsheviks and forced into the USSR in 1922 as part of the larger Transcaucasian Republic, including Azerbaijan and Georgia (November 29, 1920, was the day of Armenias sovetization). This interim period was greatly detrimental to Armenians national interests. Armenians that had already suffered the hugest tragedy in their history - Genocide of 1915 committed by Ottoman Empire, since 1918 faced a renewed threat now emanating from Kemalist Turkey whose territorial pretensions were extending far beyond the borderline established by 1878 Russian-Turkish Treaty. Though the Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920) called for Ottoman compensations to Armenia, whose independence it had to

H.Seton-Watson, The Russian empire: 18011917, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, p.183. 247 M. Light, Russia and Transcaucasia in Transcaucasian Boundaries, ed. by J.Wright, S.Goldenberg, R. Schofield, Geopolitics and International Boundaries Research Centre School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, UCL: London 1996, p.36.
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recognize, it was never implemented, and was replaced three years later by the Treaty of Lausanne, which did not even mention Armenia. Turkish troops entered Kars in October 1920 and took it without much problem. In fact they did not stop there, but moved beyond the border of 1878. But on 2 December 1920 Armenia and Turkey signed the Treaty of Aleksandropol (Gyumri), which restored the old border. Turkey and Soviet Russia understood the need for friendly relations and on 16 March 1921 signed the Treaty of Moscow and also confirmed the cession of Ardahan, Kars and the southern portion of the Batumi district. As F. Coene rightfully notes, that strange alliance between Turkey and Bolshevik Russia was thus detrimental to the Armenian cause.248 Seven months later the Treaty of Kars (between Turkey and the three Socialist Soviet Republics in the South Caucasus) confirmed the border as defined in the Treaty of Moscow. The new stage of Russian Armenian relations started to unfold since 1991, after the disintegration of the USSR and proclamation of independence of all the 15 republics that once comprised the Soviet Unions constituent republics.

The dynamics of Russian Armenian strategic partnership over the first post-soviet decade has been shaped by several factors. First of all, both Russia and Armenia entered the 21st century with already elaborated and comprehensive framework of bilateral relations covering almost all dimensions of strategic interests ranging from regional to international arenas. Specifically, over the first decade of the 1990s several RussianArmenian framework treaties were concluded to govern the general parameters of bilateral interstate relations. In fact, those important long-term bilateral documents formed the backbone of strategic partnership. In August 29, 1997, Russian and Armenian
248

F. Coene, ibid., p.132.

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presidents, B. Yeltsin and L. Ter-Petrosyan, signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Moscow249. Previously, in spring 1995, another key Russian-Armenian Agreement on the status and functions of Russian military base on the territory of Armenia was signed that legally fixed the status of Russian military presence in Armenia (basing rights and rules regulating the functioning of those bases on the territory of RA) to supplement 1992 agreement on joint protection of Armenias external borders (CIS external border, i.e. Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Iranian border sections). The substantial military cooperative contents pivoted around Russian-Armenian relations over the period of 1990s was further strengthened up in 2000 as Armenia formally approved a prolongation of RF military presence in the republic until 2025. Moreover, in accordance with military and security development plans adopted within the multilateral framework of Collective Security Treaty of CIS, since 1995 started the process of Armenias air defense system integration into the unified air defense structure of Russia250. In this context, it could be argued, development of bilateral Russian Armenian militarypolitical relations in the 21st comprises some kind of path dependency phenomenon that reflects itself not only in legal formal dimension, but also in certain elaborated traditions of interstate partnership. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s RussianArmenian political relations were strongly biased towards the military cooperation pole, while being hailed in both capitals as the backbone of regional security structure. Structurally, the framework of

, , . 21 1998 . N 51. . 6274., , 1999. N 2, . 71 - 77. 250 ., : , , - 1-2 (6-7), M: 2003 [e-version]; () () , , 2005, 10, .23.
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close military-political relations between Russia and Armenia comprised the bulwark of strategic partnership since the second half of the 1990s onward. Secondly, Russia and Armenia have entered 21st century under qualitatively new intraregional and international settings that impacted the forms, orientations and practical contents of national interests of the both countries. The start of antiterrorist campaigns and the new types of preventive engagements first enacted by the US have altered the previous strategic alignments that were based on more traditional discourse of alliance building and straightforward strategic posture. The character of the new challenges to national security and revised modes of interstate relations aimed to neutralize those sorts of asymmetric threats predetermined the need for a more sophisticated profile of regional and international posture for the both countries. Thirdly, the financial crisis of 1997-1998 though damaged the national economies across the post-soviet space; yet starting from the end of 1990s almost all the CIS states displayed a steady recovery and impressive tempo of growth in their GDP surplus statistics that lasted roughly about a decade. Coupled with comparatively stable domestic socialeconomic dynamics in Russia and Armenia over the 2000s, the latter factor created a momentum for a more balanced, but also intensive Russian-Armenian interaction gearing forward more comprehensive and deepened paradigm of partnership. Specifically, V. Putins administration proclaimed priorities to push forward geoeconomic pattern of relations with its CIS neighbor states that was based upon rational profit-seeking assumptions instead of formerly adopted subsidization practice of the former Soviet republics found a pertinent ground for application in case of many CIS states 251. In other words, a stable economic growth trend that started from the end of 1990s visible in almost

Ch. Thorun, Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russias Conduct Towards the West, Palgrave Macmillan 2009, pp. 31-32.
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all of the post-soviet states considerably bolstered attractiveness of economic partnership, opening a new arena for private or state-owned Russian capital involvement within CIS space. Specifically, dynamics of the bilateral relations witnessed certain change of accents that were structured along the broadened understanding and perceptions of strategic partnership. Those changes have taken more officially pronounced shape since 2003 and, in fact, coincided with the sharp activation of Russian capital and energy giants expansionist drive across the whole territory of CIS, including in Armenia. The previously one-dimensional prominence of military-political issues over the bilateral and multilateral agendas started to alter towards more comprehensive schemes of cooperation. Specifically, in January 2003 after Putin-Kocharyan meeting and later on, during high-ranking Russian delegations December 2003 visit to Yerevan, both sides underlined a necessity to up-grade the quality and scope of economic and cultural relations to match the level of established military-political relations252. Finally, substantial transformations occurred in Russias modus operandi towards the former Soviet Union space, impacting, inter alia, on parameters of interstate interaction of Russia and Armenia. The scale, scope and directions of Russian-Armenian relations and evolving modalities of strategic partnership between the two countries were undergone a prominent modernization. Enhanced resource-base significantly elevated the real capabilities of Moscow to shape the regional development directions, while the pragmatic motivations behind the Russias proactive policies in the CIS underpinned the resultoriented and practical achievements foray. Moreover, in the same venue, Russian new leadership dropped off previous grand schemes of overwhelming integration of the whole post-Soviet area under the CIS guise, instead actively prioritizing bilateral relations as a

.. .., 17.01.2003, , www.mid.ru.

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more efficient way of securing Russian national interests253. The new functional formats of integration have taken higher profile to emphasize Russias drive to reap concrete endresults; the recently elaborated integrationist structures like EURASEC (RF, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine), Russia-Belarus Union or CSTO (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, RF, Tajikistan) were all come to prove Russian seriousness in protecting its immediate interests. Strategically, the National Security Conception of Russia approved in 2000 postulated that one of the key strategic tasks related to ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation is to guarantee productive collaboration and cooperation with member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States254. The Military Doctrine of Russia adopted under V. Putin administration applied a similar logic premised on a view that forming and maintaining stability and ensuring an adequate response to the emergence of external threats at an early stage, limited contingents of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops may be deployed in strategically important regions outside the territory of the Russian Federation, in the form of joint or national groups and individual bases (facilities)255. At the level of practical policy-making, several factors attested about the structural and operational changes in pattern of bilateral relations of Russia and Armenia. The first signs signaling about the shift from the static modus of foreign policy making have appeared by the end of the 1990s. First of all, Russia intensified and ordered on more concrete terms of collaboration with a number of CIS states in defense and security domain. In the South Caucasian region, the new strategic course of Russian Federation

S. Torjesen, Russia, the CIS, and the EEC: Finally getting right? In The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, Edited by E. Wilson Rowe and S. Torjesen, N.Y. Routledge 2009, p.154 254 Diplomaticheskiy vestnik [Diplomatic Review], 2000, Moscow, MFA RF, N 2, pp.313. 255 [ ] , 25.04.2000.
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concerned Armenia as the framework of military-political partnership between the two countries could already been ranked as strategic partnership. In general, though the patterns of Russian-Armenian relationships have not undergone cardinal and principle changes over the post-soviet period, yet under V. Putins twin administrations certain transformations in military-security, political, economic as well as in attitudes and postures of the both countries concerning crucial international issues were registered. Though, in contrast to variety of overtones and sporadic contradictions typical to bilateral as well as multilateral relations within the CIS, RussianArmenian relations were exemplary stable and predictable since the beginning of postSoviet transition era256. In September 2000, a series of agreements were signed between Armenia and Russia on the restructuring of the Armenian debt, on military issues, and on cooperation in the energy sphere. In the same vein, the two sides in fall 2000 signed a programmatic political platform Declaration on Cooperation in the twenty-first Century to underline a bilateral strategic intention of bolstering the already laid down comprehensive partnership framework in a longer-term perspective257. Being in general concord with Russias aptitude in fostering institutionally-backed arrangements of inter-state relationships with the CIS partner countries, in spring 2001 Russia was claimed to be the chief guarantor of Armenias national security. On 26 December 2001, the Russian State Duma unanimously ratified a bilateral agreement between Russia and Armenia on

S. White, G. Gill, Darrell Slider, The Politics of Transition: Shaping a post-Soviet Future, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.14. 257 , XXI , . 19912002. 4- . . IV. / ... ., 2002, .360-363.
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jurisdiction and mutual legal assistance on issues related to the deployment of a Russian military base on the territory of Armenia258. However, despite of some straightforward perception of traditional allied partnership with a heavy emphasis on geopolitical reasoning that had been typical to Russian-Armenian regional tandem from the 1990s onward, events after September 11 and the processes that started to unfold in the Eurasia with the start of US active engagement since then, actualized newer dimensions of military-political and security cooperation between those two countries. In a new regional geopolitical milieu, whereas a general international platform-in-making was in favorable disposition of ad hoc or institutional/formalized responses to the new types of security threats like terrorism and other asymmetric type risks, Russia adopted more consolidated approach to embolden its political posture over the regional development pattern. In 2002, amid the dynamic economic growth trajectories across the former Soviet space, Russia at several highranking levels reaffirmed that Armenia was and will be Russias only strategic partner in the South Caucasus259. However, Russias stance towards the perspectives of development bilateral and multilateral relations with the CIS at the beginning of the 21st century was also driven by more complex perceptions that, inter alia, were stipulated by enhanced power base of leverages under Kremlins disposal. Trying to pursue more multidimensional international and regional policy and solidify its status of major power in any regional equations in Eurasia, Russian leadership under V. Putin displayed aptitude towards more balanced and encompassing relations with all CIS neighbor states. For example, intensifying its highprofile bilateral relations with Armenia, Russia, simultaneously, signified its larger context
G.P. Herd, The Russo-Chechen Information Warfare and 9/11: Al-Qaeda through the South Caucasus Looking Glass? in Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. by R. Fawn , University of St Andrews, Frank Cass Publishers, London 2003, p.116. 259 RFE/RL Newsline, 30 May, 2002.
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intentions to prop-up its regional presence: in fall 2000, Russian Foreign Minister I. Ivanov stated that From now Russia intends to pay more attention to the problems of the Caucasus and will try to develop relations with Azerbaijan more dynamically.260 The same tactical-level logic was also evident in the generic political approach of V. Putins administration as formulated with regard to the Caspian region. The emphasis now shifted to exploiting Russias economic influence to gain benefits for Russias domestic economy. Thus, whereas in the early and mid-Russian 1990s Russian policy in the Caspian had been motivated primarily by political and security considerations, after April 2000 economic interests became paramount. Concomitantly, President Yeltsins policy, albeit undeclared, of winning influence through regaining territorial control by political and military means, was abandoned261. Since the second half of the 2000s imitational aspects in Russian integration policies in the post-Soviet space were transformed into the more result-oriented and expansionist course whereas the former subsidization and barter-based relations were substituted by pragmatic adherence to market logic, Russias retreat tactics from its former satellite republics was changed to counterattacks in selected areas, while imperial approaches was modified into the paradigm of Russias sphere of dominant influence. Russias newly formulated pragmatism in relation to Armenia was symbolically mediated by opening in 2006 a Year of Armenia in Russia with a simultaneous message from Moscow that should not expect, though, price preferences from Gazprom furthermore. In spite of political retreat in Ukrainian presidential elections 2004, durable

G. Chufrin, The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 15. O. Antonenko, Russias Policy in the Caspian Sea Region: Reconciling Economic and Security Agendas in The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security, ed. Sh. Akiner, London; New York: Routledge 2004, p. 247.
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economic growth and sustainable instruments in attaining its energy expansion goals still continued to provide Russia significant leverages over the regional dynamics in the CIS262. In October 2002, on the basement of old Collective Security Treaty of the CIS was formed a new security structure Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russian Federation, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Kirgizstan); in contrast to the earlier version, the new organization had no reference to the CIS in its title, yet the major statutory feature of the newly created CSTO was, by analogy with NATOs Statute 5 th provision, a point that fixed up that security threat in form of military aggression to any of its member would automatically considered a threat to all its 6 members. Another important provision included into the founding acts of the Organization and attesting, inter alia, about Russias efforts on institutional footing to consolidate its guidance over the member-states foreign policy courses was that all decision taken within the CSTO on international matters should be obligatory for all the members. In difference to the older regulations claiming about the necessity of multilateral consultations, the new pattern of mutual security guarantees was formalized. Over the following years a package of documents was signed by the CSTOs members to cover issues of decision-making, joint use of force, operational compatibility, military-technical cooperation, etc263. After creation of CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) in 2002, the major aspects of Russian-Armenian military-political partnership was developed along the two prong, bilateral and multilateral, paths with Armenia joining the Russian designed security system within CSTO responsibility area. Particularly, still in October 2000 CIS security functions received additional impetus and functional competencies according to the Bisjkek agreement envisaging a creation of joint rapid deployment force in Central Asia to
. , : , , 30.01.2006. 263 www.dkb.gov.ru
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counter potential hybrid threats emanating from the contagious regions and porous borders (the states contributing troops included Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). On 25 May 2001, Armenia and Belarus joined to the participating countries, thus completing the military plans for the CIS rapid deployment force. Each participant agreed to contribute at least one battalion to this force. Particularly, RF forces in the Southern FD, together with the Armenian armed forces, constitute a coalition group of forces, or multinational OTFs in the Caucasian theatre of military operations within the CIS treaty on collective security264. According to the separate arrangement, Russian and Armenian forces would total 1,500 for crisis management in the Caucasus265 to play a large part in ensuring security in the south Caucasus, but with no aggressive aims266 (as of end of 2001, Russia maintained 2900 military manpower presence in Armenia).267 Thus, the Caucasian Group of the CSTO comprised of the joint military forces of Armenia and the Russian military contingents dislocated in Armenia and acting on bilateral base. However, in case of large scale danger, those forces would be strengthened by the Russian military from the North Caucasian Military District268. Since October 2001, Russian and Armenian forces started jointly to perform the regional air defense duty (on the CIS southern direction), including annual combined command-staff trainings. Besides the rocket antiaircraft systems, the task of air defense was supported by the Russian air-wing of 30 MiG29 dislocated in Armenia269.

I. Isakova, Russian Governance in the 21st Century: Geo-Strategy, Geopolitics and Governance, Frank Cass: London & NY, 2005, pp.210-211. 265 Limiting Institutions? The challenge of Eurasian security governance, ed. by J. Sperling, S. Kay, S. V. Papacosma, Manchester University Press: 2003, p.133; Russia strengthens its military presence in Armenia, PanArmenian News, 13.12.2002.. 266 , 17.04.2001. 267 The Military Balance: 20012002, IISS, London: 2001, pp. 11718. 268 . , : , , 20.04.2007. 269 . , , , 21.05.2004.
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In fact, despite of broadening, intensification and progressive institutionalization of militarysecurity cooperation within the CSTO that was based, inter alia, on rationale to contain and repel the new types of asymmetric threats such as terrorism, narco-trafficking or fight against religious extremism, structurally Russian Armenian military and militarypolitical partnership over the first decade of 21st century was majorly geared forward by traditional geopolitical considerations encompassing traditional warfare operational and strategic contingency planning. Armenian president R. Kocharyan in 2005 after the CSTO regular summit noted that military cooperation remained the main direction of deepening and up-grading security links with partner countries and first of all, with Russia270. In this context, bilateral military and security cooperation between Russia and Armenia acquired an utmost importance as adequate and practice-oriented format to provide the first line defense of the two countries national interests within the regional geopolitical equation. For instance, still in March 2000 was signed the Russian-Armenian protocol according to which Russia obtained a right to keep its military presence in Armenia for additional 25 years. On September 27, 2000, the defense ministers of RF and RA signed another 3 agreements on cooperation in defense sphere extending the defense interaction to the joint planning of military activities, rules of regulating Russias military presence in Armenia and mutual provision of military over flight rights 271. Though politically sensitive and with a limited application for the same political reasons, enhancement of Russias operational capacities south of the major hotspots of Russian major security concerns (Chechnya and Pankisi gorge in Georgia) and significantly increased Moscows military posture to react assertively should the strategic need emerged to involve its Armenian capabilities.

270 271

. , : ?, , 29.06.2005. Russia to keep base in Armenia, Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 March, 2000, p.11.

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Later on, October 1, 2002, the defense secretaries signed intergovernmental agreement on joint use of military infrastructure objects and exchange of defense information272. Afterwards, when the required preparations had been finished, air defense installations and air reconnaissance facilities were combined into the single air defense system with the command center in Moscow. In April 2001, military and military-technical cooperation was intensified by the decision sanctioning a start of completion of the unified Russian-Armenian military contingent273. It was stated that a joint military unit that would play a large part in ensuring security in the south Caucasus, but with no aggressive aims274. Also, a military-political decision was taken to create on Armenian territory the group of collective rapid response forces as a structural component of CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) on the South Caucasian direction which would number about 1500 personnel275. The major feature of the renovated alliance was a provision of the Statute on mutual military assistance in case of external aggression being unleashed against a member-state of the CSTO; a provision that coined the 5th of NATO Charter. To put it simply, military attack on any member should have to be treated as an attack on all the members. Moreover, all the adopted decisions within the framework of the CSTO concerning the Organizations international stance had to be of obliging character for all the participants. At the same time, the formalization of security guarantees and more streamlined decision-making procedures were aimed to attain more efficiency and

- 01.10.2002. Also, in 1999 Russia and Armenia agreed on Rules of Joint Actions of Air Defense Systems. 273 Armenia, Russia agree to create joint military contingent, RFE/RL Newsline, 17.04.2001. 274RFE/RL Newsline, 17 April, 2001; () , , : 2002, N6, .72. 275 Russia strengthens its military presence in Armenia, PanArmenian News, 13.12.2002.
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promptness in contrast to previous stipulations on necessity of multilateral consultations to organize a repulse of aggressor276. One of the practical benefits that Armenia successfully utilized being a member of the CSTO was the Russian government decision to provide its allies armaments and ammunitions produced in Russia by domestic prices. Given the expanding scope of the rearmament needs of Armenia (according to Russian expert estimations in the mid-term perspective the rearmament needs of the CIS states would reach $150billion277) this factor created an additional stimulus for Yerevan to keep in line and deepen the strategic partnership modalities with Russia as the latter remains the principal arms supplier for most former Soviet republics, whose own defense industrial structures remain vertically integrated with Russias278. Additionally, certain mechanisms were developed to foster more effective, though less lucrative from the standpoint of Russian economic interests, military and military-technical cooperation between the CSTO member states. Particularly, besides the most important provision fixed up in the Organizations normative agreements that envisaged delivery of Russian-made weapon systems and ammunition to allies by domestic prices, a special regulation was adopted by the RF Government prohibiting to raise the sales commission rate of military export to the CSTO member states higher than 1,5% of contract amount. In 2005 the scope of Russian made military export to the member states was at $13mln., while in 2006 it reached $20mln279. To improve military and security interoperability of the CSTO forces a number of joint military exercises were conducted with Armenias active participation. For example,
www.dkb.gov.ru 10 : , , 2001. 278 W. Wohlforth, Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. by T. V. Paul, J. Wirtz, M. Fortmann, Stanford University Press: Stanford 2004, p.229. 279 . , : , , 20.04.2007.
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in September 2005 near the Armenian-Turkish border Russian-Armenian tactical exercise was held under the CSTO arrangement where each party dedicated a single motor-rifle regiment, artillery and tank units with a total number of 1300 servicemen280. Taking into account a complex character of contemporary regional security threats and necessity to develop more sophisticated measures to guard against potential risks a special focus was laid on air defense and intelligence capacity-building. During the regular Combat Commonwealth rehearsals consequentially was being approbated a model of regional air defense groupings (integral part of CIS unified air defense system) actions. In 2005 a decision was taken to create a unified air defense system of the CSTO; Armenia was included into the Systems Caucasian area of responsibility with surveillance and command center located in Rostov-on-Don (Russias North Caucasus).281 Not accidently, the Armenias Foreign Relations in 2003: A Summary by RA MFA published in January 2004 stated that the Armenia - Russia strategic cooperation is an important factor in our country's economic progress and guaranteed security. During the last year, our relations entered a new phase as we made significant headway in economic cooperation282. A prioritization of bilateral military cooperation formats with Russia was also fixed in Armenian Military Doctrine (approved in December 2007) as being reflected in itemized enlistment of international cooperation directions according to their attached priority. Particularly, the first point in the Doctrines respective section on international military cooperation postulated that Russia and Armenia are creating a joint permanent force a unified grouping of Armenian and Russian military forces. The following range of interests in foreign military cooperation included active and practical participation in the

V.Socor, Russian-Armenian Military Exercise Anachronistic, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 172 (September 16, 2005). 281 . , . , . , : , , 31.08.2005. 282 Armenias Foreign Relations in 2003: A Summary, http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/pr_04/040114vo_summary.html, accessed 07.01.2012.
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CSTOs programs: development and formulation of defense policies main directions, development of regional security system based on collective principles, improvement of CIS and CSTO air defense system, development, development of military infrastructures, military staff education and military science, fight against international terrorism and international crimes, cooperation with the CSTO member-states in bilateral format283. In a more discursive manner, yet sufficiently clear the essence and major directions of Armenias foreign and security policies in October 2005 expressed Defense Minister of RA, S. Sargsyan: The guarantee of providing the fully-fledged security of Armenia on the hand is Russian-Armenian military alliance, both on bilateral base and within the framework of Collective Security Organization as well as, on the other hand, development of cooperation with the structures of NATO and the US. Reforms in defense sector of Armenia are being realized within the frames of Planning and Revision Process and Individual Partnership Action Plan. Strategy of reforms within Collective Security Treaty Organization is aimed at creation of unified and effective systems against security threats284. Conceptually, Armenias foreign policy priorities were summarized in June 2008 by T.Torosyan, former speaker of Parliament of RA, who underlined that though the major axis of foreign strategy oriented toward Russia did not need any cardinal revision, yet a necessity to activate interactions with other power centers and international and regional organizations was taking more and more demanding nature then: These relationships are not self-substituting, and we need to develop both directions. [] The whole current foreign

Text of Military Doctrine of Republic of Armenia, approved in December25, 2007. http://www.mil.am/arm/index.php?page=104# 284 : - : , , 7.10.2005.
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policy of Armenia, including partnership with NATO, fit into this foreign strategy paradigm285. In this context, NATOs activation in the regional processes concerning joint antiterrorist efforts was met in Moscow in a rather cautious manner. Specifically, NATO potential engagement into the regional hard security matters was viewed as a hidden maneuver directed against Russias core interests in the CIS space. Yet, Russia was more relaxed attitude toward lower levels of NATO involvement: it tolerates symbolic participation of CIS countries (for example, Armenia and Kazakhstan) in US-NATO operations outside the CIS; and it did not protest the dispatch of troops from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and, later on, Armenia as part of the coalition of the willing. Another NATO regional program, PfP (Partnership for Peace), that was launched in 1994 as newly devised cooperative format between NATO and a number of the CIS countries, was also viewed as hardly threatening course286. RA Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian explained the specifics of Armenia foreign policy-making in 2004: We do not see a contradiction between our cooperation with the United States and Russia. With Russia of course its much deeper There is no contradiction between our cooperation with the US and Russia because the policy we have been adoptingemploying in this past six years, a policy of complementarity, allows us to do that. The complementarity policy is not a policy of balance. A policy of balance requires that what you do with one try to do equally with the other so that you create a balance.

285

: , , 23.06.2008.

A.Aslund, A. Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, The Peterson Institute for International Economics, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, April 2009, p.123.
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Complementarity gives us the opportunity to have an asymmetrical relation with two different powers. Thats the essence of complementarity, and it has worked for Armenia and will continue to employ it in the future as long as the contradiction and the differences between the United States and Russia have not gone deep enough to put us in a position where we have to choose between one or the other287. 3.2 Russian Industrial and Energetic Expansion in the Region and the Dynamics of Russian-Armenian Economic Interaction: Strategic and Political Implications

One of the most dynamic dimensions of Russian-Armenian partnership over the first decade of the new century has become the economic cooperation, with a major anchor on energy sector. Gearing forward bilateral relations along economization path was to the certain degree stipulated by the Russian ruling elites predisposition to actively promote and secure capital assets under Russias control within the CIS area. Those modernized approaches signaled about the conceptual and policy-driven shifts from damagelimitation policies of the 1990s (to mitigate industrial and financial losses that appeared as a result of disintegration of formerly unified economic system of the USSR) to the profitmaking rationale and economically viable patterns of relations with the post-Soviet states. This state-backed economic activism was premised on a long-term consideration that Russian structural engagement and ownership of infrastructural assets in neighboring regions would ultimately result in higher level of protection of its national interests. In his Presidential Address to Federal Assembly 2004 V. Putin stated: It is obvious that the scope and scale of the tasks to be handled by Russian state have altered substantially. Foreign policy must be adequately attuned to address the aims and opportunities of this stage of

Vartan Oskanian, Armenias Evolving Relations with United States, Europe, CSIS, Washigton, DC, June 14, 2004.
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development; to put it in other way, foreign policy instruments must be utilized to attain more tangible and practical returns in economy, in realization of all-national projects288. Later, in 2007, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov summed up Moscows policy modalities in the FSU in more concrete terms in referring to energy geopolitics: Russian foreign policy today is such that for the first time in its history, Russia is beginning to protect its national interest by using its competitive advantages289. Yet, in contrast to B. Yeltsins 1992 declaration that the positive outcomes of internal reforms in Russia depended on and correlated with the positive success of integration project within the CIS, a remarkable change was registered in V. Putins approaches of 2004: Our priority remains the deepening of integration on the space of the CIS, including the frameworks of Common economic space and Eurasian economic community. This is, without any exaggeration, one of the preconditions of regional and international stability290. With regard to Armenia, economic interaction between two countries registered a significant rise in capital transaction volumes. Despite of absence of common border between the two countries as well as Armenias limited participation in Russian-led multilateral economic organizations within the CIS (however, since 2003 Armenia has had an observer status in Eurasian Economic Community291 that was created to forge free trade area and custom union), the two aspects of economic interaction growth can be discerned: sharply expanded scope of trade and substantial increase of Russian state-owned and private capital presence in Republic of Armenia.

, 2004 ., www.kremlin.ru S. Lavrov: Russia: Kremlin Sees its Foreign Policy Star on Rise, RFE/RL, 21.03.2007. 290 , 2004 ., www.kremlin.ru 291 J. Cooper, Russias trade relations within the Commonwealth of Independent States in The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. by Edited by E. Wilson Rowe, S. Torjesen, Routledge, London & NY:2009, p.174.
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Since the beginning of the 2000s political-economic matrix of Russian Armenian relations surely was taking a higher profile in determining the overall platform and agenda of bilateral and multilateral interactions. Political relationships between Armenia and Russia over the first decade of 21st century can be characterized as a high-profile partnership based on commonality of strategic long-term interests, including preservation of regional stability and closer synchronization of social-political, economic and humanitarian policies to attain a deeper integration nucleus. Two aspects are discernable in pattern of political Russian-Armenian intercourse. First, previously dominant political discourse inclination of hard balancing and alliance-building had been transformed to paving a way for more nuanced and flexible understanding of regional and global juncture. The both countries attuned their respective regional political preferences to the more functional and result-oriented foreign policy conduct. Specifically, V. Putin

administrations political drive to improve and better institutionalize relations with Azerbaijan has not impacted negatively on Russian-Armenian relations. Russias shift to proactive engagement in the South Caucasus did not purport a strategic change in the regional balance or alterations in status quo, yet newly elaborated regional priorities dictated enlargement and reframing of Russias presence in the region, while sharp increase and solidifying of Russias economic expansion in the region was called up to fill in those new dimensions of policy interests. Still in 2001 assets against debt mechanism was devised to restructure the accumulated Armenian debt to Russia into the Russian assets ownership 292. According to the deal reached between fall 2001 and spring 2002, a principal agreement was set on transfer of five state-owned Armenian enterprises to repay the US$100 million debt to Russia. The abrupt increase of Russias big businesses and government-owned capital
292

Putin Kocharyan Meeting Concentrated on Economic Cooperation, Azg, 19.12.2001.

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interest towards the region featured a significant degree of state support and guidance. A notable aspect of Russian economic expansion in the South Caucasian region was the ultimate focus on acquiring strategic infrastructural and energetic assets in key market sectors. However, the Russian assertiveness in taking over the large industrial and infrastructural assets sparked political controversies among, especially, opposition political spectrum in Armenia and Georgia. As D. Drezner points, that Russia wanted its debts repaid was certainly not a form of economic coercion. What was coercive was the attempt to force the NIS to repay in the form of ownership stakes in strategic utilities and industries293. Another aspect of certain discontent concerning the perspectives of economic interactions within the CIS was the decision of the Russian government and Gazprom, in late 2005, to break off the formerly adopted policies of energy subsidization of the FSU states at significantly lower gas prices294. As G. Gleason argues in his research, Russia was pursuing a neomercantile strategy of expansion in Central Asia and the Caucasus, whereas the Kremlins role was to coordinate the banking sector with Gazprom and the RAO UES electricity monopoly in expanding Russian influence along its southern border. For example, RAO UES negotiated power supply agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan on terms favorable to those countries in order to secure market share. In making these deals, the Russian government has pursued innovative new financial arrangements such as taking equity in enterprises and offering guaranteed loans and credits. The merger of the Russian state, energy companies, and the banking sector

D. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (65), Cambridge University Press: 1999, p.143. 294 T. Mitrova, Gazproms Perspective on International Markets, Russian Analytical Digest, Swiss, Center for Security Studies, N 41, Zurich: May 2008, p.3.
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provided Russia with a powerful new leverage across the CIS regional markets and key economy sectors295. A notable aspect of Russian economic expansion in the South Caucasian region was the ultimate focus on acquiring strategic infrastructural and energetic assets in key market sectors and industries. Three major fields were in focus of Russian TNCs in the South Caucasus energy sector, large industries and financial domain, and transportation and communication sphere. Since then, Russias regional economic profile sharply increased. Using different modes and methods of economic engagement, soon after Russias control were transferred strategically important infrastructural sectors of Armenian economy. A practical outcome of Russian economic activism in the region became an acquisition of substantial assets in Georgia and Armenia. Only through the period of 20022006 the Russian transnational corporations took under their control almost the whole energy sector of Armenia, including power generating capacities as well as distribution and transportation networks296. Specifically, Russian Gazprom acquired Armenias domestic gas distribution facilities, while RUSAL, of one leading global players in aluminum business, started its large scale investment program in Armenia in 2004. Over the next two years it invested about $77mln. to its Armenian daughter company, Armenal, with ambitious plans to take over of about 2,5% in global market of thin foil297. According to economic data on 2004, Armenias main export partners were: Belgium 16.8%, Israel 14.3%, Russia 14.2%, Germany 11.4%, Iran 9.9%, US 7.8%, Netherlands

R.W. Orttung, The Role of Business in Russian Foreign and Security Relations in Russian Business Power: The role of Russian business in foreign and security relations, ed. by A.Wenger, J. Perovic, R. W. Orttung, Routledge, London & NY: 2006, pp.32-33. 296 Russia takes Armenian atom plant in debt swap, Reuters, 19.02.2003. 297. , : , , 30.10.2006.
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5.8%. Armenias main import partners were: Belgium 10.3%, Iran 10.2%, Russia 9.8%, Israel 8.6%, US 7.7%, UAE 6.2%, Italy 5.4%, Germany 5%, France 4.6%,Ukraine 4.5%298. According to Russian official statistic data, in 2005 the volume of bilateral trade increased by more than 40% in year-to-year estimation, while in 2006 annual trade turnover figures added another 70% increase thus reaching $496,3mln. Statistics for 2007, a year before approaching worldwide financial crisis $822,1mln299. Though Russias economic expansion in Georgia started to slow down after M. Saakashvilis accession to presidency, in Armenia, Russia continued its active investment and acquisition strategy, majorly concentrating on energy infrastructure assets and distribution network domains. Russia uphold its status of the main foreign investor in Armenian economy since the post-Soviet times. Total sum of capital investments into the Armenian economy since 1991 amounted to more than $2,8billion (1991-2011). Structurally, those capital investments were segmented across the diverse sectors of Armenian economy, however, as it was mentioned above, the bulk of Russian investment volumes was directed to strategically important infrastructural assets acquisition, with a major priority being attached to economic interaction in energy sphere300. The volume of Russian-Armenian economic transactions was set on a faster track as January 2003, after the meeting of the two presidents; it was noted that the economic cooperation did not yet matched the level of military-technical and political partnership. In this context, not surprisingly in January 2003 Armenian President R. Kocharyan stated that the economic relationships between Russia and Armenia had to become a driving force behind of bilateral partnership. A gradual shift of gravity center from military-political to

CIA Factbook 2005 as quoted by J. Perovic, Russian Energy Companies in the Caspian and Central Eurasian Region: Expanding southward in Russian Business Power: The role of Russian business in foreign and security relations, ed. by A.Wenger, J. Perovic, R. W. Orttung, Routledge, London & NY: 2006, p.92. 299 - - , , 10.12.2011, www.mid.ru. 300 Ibid.
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social-economic and political-economic aspects of bilateral partnership provided more space in settling down a variety of actual issues of mutual concern and, in fact, corresponded to the elaborated complementarity paradigm of Armenian foreign policymaking. Still in January 2003, President of RA, R. Kocharyan in his article published in Russian magazine International Affairs accentuated that: a certain measure geopolitical transformation should be expected in the region. [] Russias substantial participation in regional processes is very important for us: this is the rationale behind Armenias close political, economic, and military-technical cooperation with Russia. We are convinced that it is a major stabilizing factor in the region. This was Armenias position at the time its independence was restored, and it still adheres to it. Armenia has always strongly favored development and deepening of regional cooperation in the Caucasus. We are convinced that implementation of joint projects will further beneficial contacts between our countries, promoting an atmosphere of thrust and a favorable environment to lessen tension in the region.301 Two examples of Russian activated drive in Armenia were mostly demonstrative. In June 2005 RAO UES of Russia started the process of taking over the Armenian electricity grid system, buying the rights of local entity management from Midland Resources Holding. RAO UES acquired from the U.K. Guernsey-registered company, Midland Resource Holding that was primarily a trading company with no experience in any segment of electricity operations, for $73mln. exclusive right to govern Armenian Electricity Network and profit gaining liability. Close to the yearend the Russian company effectively became the dominant electricity producer (80%) and distributor in Armenia302.

Robert Kocharyan, Russias Important Role in Regional Processes, International Relations, Moscow: April 2003, pp. 106-107. 302 E.Danielyan, Russia Tightens Grip on Armenian Energy Sector, Eurasia Insight: Business and Economics, 28.09.2005; 99 , 25.07.2005, www.lenta.ru.
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Previously, In October 2003, the RAO UES confirmed the existence of more complex and far-reaching perspective interests of the Russian energy giant concerning Armenian energy sector, claiming that RAOs expansion in the region was set on gradual, though active track. Taking under its control the financial management of Armenian Nuclear Power Plant through its subsidiary Inter-RAO UES (September 2002) in exchange for $40mln. in debt for Russian nuclear fuel303, a year later RAO UES acquired another Armenian energy asset Hrazdan thermal power plant as a part of Russian $100mln. debt relief scheme. The general aim was to create in Armenia a large-scale joint energy holding that would effectively own 80% of Armenian energetic profile (out of which 40% of domestic energy generation would provide the Armenian nuclear station, 30% - Hrazdan thermal plant, and the rest Sevan-Hrazdan hydro-cascade)304. A synchronization and parallel operation of electric systems between Russia and Armenia that was approved at highest political level, according to RAO UES head A. Chubays, was fostered among other things by the same logic of securing parallel work with Iran as well as prospective plans of electric energy supply of Turkey from Armenia. In 2004 the Armenian nuclear station produced a record volume of electricity (2 million GWh), balanced its books for the first time since its 1995 restart, and avoided the refueling delays that had plagued its operations in years past305. Already in April 2004, Russian ambassador in Armenia A. Dryukov stated that over the independence period Russia invested into Armenian economy about 300 million USD, effectively becoming one of the Armenias key foreign investors. According to the data

G.Sargsyan, A. Balabanyan, D. Hankinson, From Crisis to Stability in the Armenian Power Sector, World Bank Working Report N74, Washington DC: 2006, p.8. 304 . , : " "
303

, , 22.10.2003.
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Russian Utility Rescued Armenian Nuclear Plant, RFE/RL, 16.03.2005.

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presented by the Russian ambassador, the major market sectors in Armenia with substantial involvement of Russian capital were the non-ferrous metallurgy, energetic profile, air transportation, insurance, construction and building, banking sector (9 out of 20 Armenian banks operated with Russian capital participation)306. In 2007 the net total of foreign investments into the real sector of Armenian economy reached to more than $600mln., whereas Russia ranked the first place among the top five (Russia $175,9mln307., Lebanon $134mln., Argentina -$24,9mln., US - $21,3mln., Germany $20,4mln.). The total quantity of joint Russian-Armenian enterprises in RA by 2010 (with participation of Russian capital) reached 1300 one forth from the all joint enterprises with foreign capital308. Russian energy policies towards the Armenia market were premised on a complex approach stretching well beyond the narrow focus of single profile sectors (for example, only gas or electricity, or domestic distribution networks), but were of a rather crossportfolio character with geo-economic considerations extending to a larger areas of interest. One of the major leverages in Russias energy strategies in the region was structural dependency links of the former Soviet republics upon Russian energy resources. For instance, by mid-2000s Armenia continued to importe around 1.7 billion cubic meters of Russian gas annually. Roughly half of that amount is used by the thermal power plants, the rest by other consumers, including the transport vehicles (an estimated 40% of cars and trucks used natural gas instead of gasoline)309.

306

307

, , 11.04.2004. $100mln. was direct investment; , , 5.02.2008.

- - , , 10.12.2011, www.mid.ru. H. Khachatrian, Economic and Political Implications of the Rise of the Russian Gas for Armenia, CENTRAL ASIA - CAUCASUS ANALYST, January 25, 2006.
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In April 2006 the Government of RA and Gazprom signed a 25-year agreement on perspective parameters of cooperation in gas and energy sectors in Armenia, fixing up fluctuations in price policies for exported Russian gas to Armenia in correlations to investments in Armenian energetic and transportation communication fields 310 . Specifically, the agreement envisaged delivery of Russian gas to Georgian border at a price of $110 for a thousand cubic meters that was twice as cheaper as compared to the average European price. Though the price of Russian gas for Armenia for 2009 was increased reaching $165 for thousand cubic meters, yet it continued to be as twice cheaper as compared to the average European one311. Nevertheless, in exchange for a cheaper Russian gas, Armenian government agreed to grant Gazprom ownership of the large, but incomplete gas-fired power plant located in the central town of Hrazdan, with an additional provision being included into the agreement that Gazprom would invest at least $150 million to complete construction of the plant312. At the same time, beginning of July 2006, at Gazproms stockholders annual meeting a decision was adopted on acquiring the Armenian section of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline - a 24-mile section of pipe connecting Armenia to Iran though the territory of the Republic. Officially, Gazproms argumentation to purchase the pipeline was based on a postulation that there was a need to secure Armenias gas import from Russia against unsanctioned gas

310

10.04.2006,

http://www.fondsk.ru/news/2006/04/10/7783.html; Gazprom to retain gas price for Armenia in swap for pipeline participation, Alexanders Gas and Oil Connections, 27.12. 2006. , Daily, 29.04. 2008. E. Danielyan, Armenia Cedes More Energy Assets for Cheaper Russian Gas, Eurasia Insights: Business and Economics, 4.10.2006; V. Socor, Armenias Giveaways to Russia: From Property-for-Debt to Property-for-Gas, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19.04.2006.
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robbery via Georgia313. However, political context, and not the commercial rationale behind this decision was more than apparent. Taking Iran Armenia gas pipeline under its control, Russia was aimed to resolve several regional and intra-regional level issues that would ultimately increase Moscows influence in the Caucasus. First, becoming a major stockholder of the gas pipeline Russia automatically empowered its positions in Armenia, where Gazprom had already controlled not only gas import, but also Armenian gas distribution network. Secondly, Russias entrance into the gas pipeline consortium meant that Gazprom gained effective leverages to block any attempts to re-export Iranian gas via Armenia to outside markets. Also, under the deal Gazprom, through a joint venture, was granted a concession to build a larger second pipeline along this route. In terms of financial resources involved, the deal was a small-scale, but with strategic importance as the Russian company was seeking to maintain its dominance in Eurasian natural gas trading314. As Gazprom deputy CEO put it simply, if we would not take part in building the pipeline from Iran to Armenia, then nobody knows as to where these gas would have to go315. Moreover, as far as Iranian-Armenian gas agreement stipulated that for every thousand cubic of imported Iranian gas Armenia was to deliver back to Iranian side 3 Kw/h electricity from its generating capacities, as a form compensational deal, Russia acquired one of the most powerful electricity generation facility the fifth energy block of Hrazdan

313

V. Socor, Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline: Far more than meets the eye, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 4 Issue:

56, March 21, 2007;. , : , , 03.07.2006; Gazprom intends to acquire Iran Armenia pipeline, Alexanders Gas and Oil Connections, 30.06.2006. A. Kramer, Armenia Sells Russia Crucial Gas Link in Deal for Cheap Fuel, The New York Times, 7.04.2006; ., - , 28.02.2005, www.ekavkaz.org.
314 315

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thermal plant that provided about 20% of domestic electricity demand of RA 316 . Specifically, under the Iran-Armenian gas pipeline agreement Armenian side had to compensate Iran with electricity for the gas based on a 3:1 ratio, i.e. 6 billion Kw/h of electricity for 2 billion cubic meters of gas per year (including the gas for electricity generation). The electricity is to originate at the Hrazdan power plant's fifth power bloc that was transferred to RAO UES ownership317. Russian investment and purchase assertiveness in Armenian energy sector led to upsurge and emboldening of Moscow economic positions in Armenia. In April 2007, Armenian President noted that by March of the same year Russia was to become number one investor, adding that implementation of big energy projects had been already launched318. In banking sphere too, upsurge of Russian capital expansion was registered. One of the most active player in Armenias banking sector emerged Vneshtorgbank, VTB. In 2004 VTB acquired 70% of Armsberbank shares, committing to develop Armenian banks capital from $5mln. to $15mln. to become the largest domestic player in the sector319. The Russian-Armenian high-tech cooperation profile was majorly been focused on nuclear cooperation issues, while under the new presidential administration, in July 2000, Russia and Armenia signed the Agreement on Cooperation in sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the signed Agreement stipulated, among the priority directions of cooperation were designing, building and commissioning of new nuclear energy blocks for nuclear power stations, including on territories of other states, upgrading of safety and
316

-: ?, , 17.03.2005; S.Martirosyan, Pipeline Perks For Russia in Armenia-Iran Energy Deal, Eurasia Insight: Business and Economics, 21.12.2004.

V. Socor, Gas from Iran to Break Gazproms Monopoly in Armenia, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20.01.2006. Kocharian thinks Russia will be number one investor in Armenian economy by March, PanARMENIAN.Net News agency, 24.01.2007. 319 "", , 21.05.2005.
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improvement of technical and economic rates of operating nuclear energy blocks, delivery and shipment of nuclear fuel, industrial production and delivery of equipments, materials, and facilities320. Another aspect of partnership in domain of perspective high-techs concerned intergovernmental cooperation in space technologies. For example, during the 9th meeting of Russian-Armenian intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation, September 2007, a decision was taken activate bilateral cooperation in setting up Center of Space Monitoring in Armenia and navigation and surveillance system over the Armenian territory. 321. The framework document that regulated cooperative relationships between the defense enterprises of Russia and Armenia in military-economic sector was intergovernmental Agreement on industrial and scientific-technical cooperation between the defense industry enterprises (30.03.1994). In order to maintain those elaborated links, Armenia was the first among the CIS countries signed in 1999 additional Agreement on maintaining of specialized enterprises engaged in industrial cycle of producing certain types of military purpose productions. Russian enterprises and 18 Armenian322. An Overview of Armenian Foreign Policy 2003 by RA MFA among the priority directions of bolstering the qualitative dimensions of bilateral cooperation with Russia indicated that The potential of bilateral trade and economic relations is largely contingent on the existence of a direct connecting railway route. Hence the importance of reopening
, 555, 28.07.2000. 321 Yerevan and Moscow continue works on founding Space Monitoring Center in Armenia, Pamarmenian.net, 06.03.2007. 322 - : .. "" - , 23-03-2005.
320

Agreement envisaged to keep operational 23

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the railway through Abkhazia. At the same time, efforts are being made to secure Armenia's participation in the North-South transport corridor and the implementation of the Port Caucasus ferry route project323. Taking into the consideration a widening focus on large-scale economization of interstate relations, regional communication project realization appeared in a limelight of bilateral Russian-Armenian agenda since 2003/04. In 2004 Armenia joined to the multilateral consortium that was called up to rehabilitate the Abkhazian section of RussianGeorgian railway system that would potentially connect Armenia, via Georgia and Abkhazia, to Russia. For quite understandable reasons Armenia has been rather eager in reopening of this connection route (that ceased its operation at the beginning of the 1990s, since the start of Georgian-Abkhazian conflict) in its efforts to alleviate the consequences of closed border with Turkey and reestablishing a stable ground communication with Russia. Since June 1, 2008, South Caucasian Railways (SCR), a 100% Russia-owned company established to promote and guide Russian transportation and communication interests in the region, obtained a concessional rights to govern the Armenian Railways for 30 years with a right of prolongation of concession for another 10 years. However, the perspective interests of the South Caucasian Railways were stretching far beyond the Armenian railway transportation market, as the companys name could evidently suggest, but also perpetuating the potential acquisition of Georgian railways. Obviously, the SCRs strategy aimed to buy controlling rights over Armenian and Georgian railways was bound to the North South transportation route, a project that had been approved years ahead to set a sustainable communication ways to the Persian Gulf via

MFA Armenia (2003): Armenias Foreign Relations in 2003: A Summary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. Available at http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/htms/PR/040114vo_summary.html.
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Iranian territory324. For example, the Russian side joined up to Iran-Armenia talks on building a railway branch line between the two countries a segment of global North South transportation corridor. Accordingly, in May 2008 Armenian transportation minister G. Sargsyan stated that in realization of the project were interested certain international financial institutions and all sides involved in negotiations: Building of Armenia Iran railway branch will have inestimable contribution for our economy development. The route will provide Armenia an option to use alternative transportation capacity for energy resources and commodities, to get direct access to the outer world, while currently our railway communication is operational only with Georgia As soon as the Abkhazian railway would start it work, and sooner or later that will happen, Armenia may become a fully-grown transit country performing serious geopolitical functions.325 In January 2008, about Russias vested interests in this project realization alluded RF transportation minister I. Levitin: railway communication between Iran and Armenia fits into the North South corridor, and entrance access to Iran via Armenia is an important component of this corridor for Russia. Previously, in October 2007, Iran and Armenia signed a Memorandum on Cargo Transportation that envisaged a significant cross-border regime simplification, specifically concerning documentation formalities. In practice, the Memorandum provided Armenia opportunity to use Iranian Enzeli port for its cargo delivery scheme which was the shortest access route to Russia and Central Asia on the Caspian, with cargo transportation tariffs being reduced for Armenia by 60%326.

. . , . . , . . , - : , , 6 (19), 2008, . 56-59. 325 ., , , 06.05.2008. 326 ., , , 23.10.2008

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Nevertheless, Russias and Armenias attempts to solve the transport issue by reopening of northern railway route via Georgia that would have connect the two states land transportation failed since Georgia insisted that the restoration of rail traffic via Abkhazia and Tbilisi to Armenia had to await a solution to the Abkhaz conflict327. In a way, summing up the past period, during the first official meeting of Russian and Armenian presidents in 2008, D. Medvedev confirmed Russias stance in bolstering its positions as a main investor in Armenian economy: Russia is the main investor of Armenias economy. [we] Agreed on several additional steps to be taken that aimed to promote a number of large-scale projects in Armenia realized by the Russian companies328. 3.3. Social-Cultural and Humanitarian Aspects of Russian-Armenian Relationships

Social-cultural and humanitarian dimensions in Russian-Armenian relations acquired a particular prominence across the whole spectrum of bilateral and multilateral interaction agenda during the time-frame of V. Putins presidential tenure. Several factors and variables contributed to the heightened emphasis on a dynamics of the social and cultural activism. First, there was an objective structural evidence of common historical heritage among the peoples of the former Soviet Union as reflected in the similar or congruent social mentality, familiar cultural treats and features of daily life conduct as well as in commonality of future perceptions that, to the certain degree, impacted the major parameters of chosen development trajectories across the CIS countries. Though erosion of

B. Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putins foreign policy towards the CIS countries, Routledge: London & NY: 2008, p.118. 328 2008 , Regnum, 29.01.2008.
327

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phenomenon of post-Soviet space as some distinct entity in geopolitical and discursive terms became an irreversible trend structured along the generic social-economic and political orientations, civilization divergences and identity politics among the CIS countries as determined by their geo-economic locations, yet active cross-border flows of migrants, the existence of large segments of compatriots across the CIS areas, absence of formalized and strict road-blocks upon communication avenues between peoples of the FSU objectively favored the persistency of, at least, common humanitarian space. As Russian Foreign Policy Review 2007 by MFA indicated, there is an evidence to assert that Russias European choice is shared by societies and political elites of other Commonwealth states329. Secondly, Russia as the biggest and richest country of the CIS with a a large pool of surplus capital330 and, henceforth, a larger pool of potential life opportunities for different social groups of migrants or business structures from the other republics of the post-Soviet space continued to uphold its centre-frame positions in humanitarian and social-cultural domains. However, the dynamics of Russias internal developments and process could not but to concern the Diaspora policies on domestic level, though with significant ramifications on intra-regional levels. Specifically, V. Putins administrations drive to institutionalize domestic politics as pivoted around the strong and vertically integrated power center, found its reflections in fostering better organized and, hence, more unified and controllable ethnic diasporas associations that would presumable be better integrated into the political landscape of Russia in-making. Armenian president R. Kocharyan echoed this approach in 2005, on occasion of opening of the Year of Russian in Armenia: Currently, the urgent demand is
, , : 2007. P. Subacchi, New Power Centres and New Power Brokers: are they shaping a new economic order?, International Affairs (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 84: 3, 2008, p.492.
329 330

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becoming a necessity of systemizing of our cultural links, and that is the main conclusion which one is to come to after communicating with representatives of culture and art from our countries331. On the other side, certain efforts to systemize the state-bound approaches to the ethnic and cultural communities residing in Russia was linked to the reinvigorated drive of Russian government under V. Putin to provide more concrete and efficient assistance to ethnic Russians, residents of the CIS and Baltic countries. As M. Light argues, Russian identity was also defined by the near abroad which not only represented danger and loss, but also served as buffer zone offering a potential great power future332. And, despite of skepticism that emerged later on within Russian expert circles concerning the prospects of post-Soviet integration, the defense of rights of Russian-speaking people in CIS remained a priority task333. In October 2001 V. Putin himself made an attempt to define the parameters of Russian world phenomenon in sketching up the state policy in humanitarian sector of international relations. According to E. Lashchenovas (attach of Russian Embassy in Armenia) interpretation those appeared in the focus group belonged not only to the Russian ethnic groups residing outside of RF, but also peoples of other ethnic groups who were unable see themselves outside of the Russian language and culture: It is they who are due to become the social base of Russias foreign policy with regard to compatriots abroad, because the maintenance of Russian world implies preservation and development of the Russian ethos and the information-cultural stratum, the Russian language and culture334.

331

, 25.03.2005. 332 M. Light, In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology in Ideology and National Identity Post-Communist Foreign Policies, ed. by R. Fawn, Frank Cass: London & Portland, 2004, p.53. 333 Ibid. 334 E. Lashchenova, The Russian World in Armenia, International Affair: 2006; 52, 2, p.88.

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Thirdly, the Russian government was quick in accepting the potential of ethnic Diasporas in utilizing of broader political aims of Russia in gearing forward multidimensional integrationist strategies within the CIS area. An instrumental bias of engaging Diaspora organizations or some individual business structures with strong ethnic affiliations in promoting more comprehensive policy-making strategies, was, in general, congruent to the Moscows newly formulated posture as a Great Power that was to be quite aware of its organized policy-driven potential both regionally and internationally. Responsible foreign policy course conduct that would a priori embrace not only militarypolitical and geo-economic policy strands, but also wider social and cultural dimensions was being considered as one of the prerequisites of successful realization of general foreign course encompassing value-driven components, too335. Still in his 2002 Address to Federal Assembly, V. Putin noted that substantial reserves for integration are embodied in humanitarian projects, including scientific and educational projects. Russia has already increased the quota for students from the states of CIS336. Later on, the position was reiterated once again, because taking care for Russian language and growth of Russian culture influence one of the most important social and political issues337. Forth, in the context of steady economic growth trends across the CIS space, whereas the major part of economic transactions developed via small and medium businesses, involving ordinary citizens, a need arose to address the issues of human capital interactions that concerned, naturally, humanitarian and social-cultural dimensions of interstate relations. Increased volumes of trade as well as financial remittances, primarily

Ch. Thorun, Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russias Conduct towards the West, Palgrave Macmillan: NY 2009, pp.10-11. 336 : 2002, 18.04.2002, www.president.ru. 337 : 2007, 26.04.2002, www.president.ru.
335

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from Russia to the other CIS republics338, facilitated a shift of attention to social and humanitarian aspects of policy-making in overall foreign policy paradigm of RF. Additionally, dynamics economic growth and increased volume and scope of economic transactions provided a conducive moment to shift attention to humanitarian and cultural dimensions of relationships in addressing those issues in more systemized fashion. As Armenian President R. Kocharyan underlined in 2005: Destines of our nations are interwoven by common history that formed a powerful cultural strata we can rightfully be proud of. We are responsible to maintain and develop all that as this heritage is timeless value and solid basement of current allied relationships between Armenia and Russia339. Fifth, development and sophistication of media and information resources and penetration of those technologies into the societal processes unfolding in the former Soviet space, enlargement of their scope and accessibility to larger segments and stratums of the societies across the CIS countries necessitated a need for a more serious and thorough informational presence of Russia and, as such, demanded a wider and effective cultural attractiveness of Russian culture and lifestyle intermediated first of all by Russian language popularity. As V. Putin mentioned in his speech on opening of Year of Armenia in Russia (2005): It must be noted that citizens of Russia and Armenia are establishing business, cultural and just interpersonal contacts rather gladly. I suppose that one of the most important ingredients here is formation of common scientific-educational space which is oriented toward the youths and thus works for the future of our interstate relations340.

For instance, in 2005 private remittances reached Armenia totaled 940 million dollars (730 million Euros), most of the money (about 72 percent) coming from Russian-based expatriates; Agence France Presse, August 10, 2006.
338

, , 25.03.2005 340 , 25.03.2005, http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/03/25/1918_type63377type122346_85910.shtml.

339

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And finally, conceptual and practical changes in Russian foreign policy-making modalities towards the states of near abroad, particularly reformulation of means and methods of engagement in domestic political processes within the states of CIS that postulated a necessity to work not only with the official political authorities, but also with oppositional and other political forces in the CIS, objectively dictated a stronger and more sustainable image presence of Russia among the elites of those countries concerned. Russian-Armenian relations in humanitarian sphere since the early 2000s were developing both, within formalized framework of bilateral agreements that was called up to regulate officially approved directions and sets of cultural-social cooperation as well as through the informal channels via initiatives put forward by the civil societies. Here, we delve more into the aspects related to the official framework and the dynamics of socialcultural and humanitarian dimensions in Russian-Armenian relations, because those dimensions were, in fact, congruent and amplified the course of strategic partnership between the two countries, while the informal attitudes and activities outside of governments guidance did not deviate in any meaningful sense from the general strands of bilateral relationships, though the topic itself merits a separate study. Russian-Armenian interaction paths and cooperation in humanitarian field has been based on a rather solid institutional and legal basement of bilateral and multilateral agreements, including about 20 mutual documents that were called to regulate cooperation of the both countries in social-cultural domain. Among those were framework agreements like Intergovernmental Agreement on Scientific-Technical Cooperation (January, 1993) and

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Agreement on cooperation in the fields of Culture, Science, and Education (November, 1995)341. During his official visit to Russia in January 2003, Armenian President R. Kocharyan a joint Russian-Armenian Declaration on Cooperation in Field of Culture was signed. On August 26, 2005, during the head of state summit of CIS countries, Armenian side also supported the Russian initiative on signing the CIS Agreement on Humanitarian Cooperation342. In practice, several directions of cultural and humanitarian cooperation were high on bilateral agenda: education sphere, informational and cultural presence in media, scientific and academic collaboration, mutual popularization of national cultures by holding variety of joint arrangements (presentations, festive events, exhibitions, etc.). In line with general political posture of Russia under V. Putins presidency to reinvigorate Russian cultural and informational presence within the CIS countries, in 2002 in Yerevan a representation of Roszarubezhcenter was established that later on was renamed Rossotrdurnichestvo (Russian Partnership) under competence of Russian federal agency on CIS affairs. Since 2008, Russian center for science and culture in Yerevan started to work. In October 2006, Russia-Armenia NGO and Armenia-Russia Union of the Armenian Association of Cultural Cooperation with Foreign Countries signed an agreement on expanding further cooperation in the cultural sphere343. At the same time, the Russian

341-

, 12-10-2011, , http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/nsrsng.nsf/6bc38aceada6e44b432569e700419ef5/2d27d475993f668ac3256e4e003e2402!OpenDocument. 342 - : - , www.mid.ru. On multilateral level, within the CIS structure, Armenian Ministry of Culture participates in the CIS Cultural Cooperation Council, as well as in the Intergovernmental Foundation for Educational, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (IFESCCO). Y. Antonyan, Country Profile: Armenia, Compendium: Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, CoE, 2011, AM-14. 343 Agreement on Expanding Armenian-Russian Cultural Cooperation Signed Today, ArmenPress, 13.10.2006.

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side re-launched the practice of providing student scholarships from the Russian state budget for Armenian citizens to study in higher education institutions of RF (for example, in 2005 Russian government allocated 175 budgetary scholarships to Armenian citizens that entered Russian higher education system344). From 2001 onward, Russian-Armenian Agreement on mutual recognition of educational certificates, scientific degrees and academic titles entered into force that was later on, in July 2004, reinforced by Agreement on Cooperation in field of education that was signed by the respective ministries of RF and RA. Moreover, the Armenian minister of Science and Education aired an idea of creating consortium of Russian higher education institutions branches, presumably in efforts to resolve a variety of educational problems such as teaching staff completion and improving the quality of learning processes that was assessed by the minister as lagging behind of commonly accepted standards while accentuating a necessity of combining those smaller branches in a more uniform and unified fashion345. By mid-2000s, in Armenia were already functioning 9 branches of Russian higher education institutions, including RussianArmenian (Slavonic) University (since 1999), while in Russia more than 3000 Armenian students were on study at higher education institutions, with 2000 of them on free of charge basis. On the ground, one of the oldest public organizations in Armenia that focused on profile issues concerning the matters of Russian-speaking compatriots and popularization of Russian culture in Armenia OO Rossiya was established in 1993, while in 2005 its members pool reached about 3500 and branches in different Armenian cities and

344

, , 25.03.2005. 345RA Minister of Education and Science Levon Mkrtchyan and Head of Federal Service for Supervision of Education and Science Viktor Bolotov discussed issues of cooperation of the two countries in the sphere of education, November 09, 2007, http://www.armenianancestry.com/phpbb/viewforum.php?f=17.

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communities. Besides the monitoring and organizational activities related to the Russian compatriots in Armenia, the organizations clout extended to revitalization of cultural and spiritual bonds between the nations, educational programs, support of Russian language in RA. As a means of facilitating of Russian language use and study on educational level in Armenia, the Government of RA approved in 1999 a Concept Russian language in the system of education and social-cultural life of Republic of Armenia. According to the Concept, in 16 primary schools of Armenia Russian language was included in the basic curricula as a foreign language with a deeper level of study, while in 2003 the number of those Armenian schools reached 30 employing about 300 Russian teachers 346 . In September 2001, during Russian Presidents visit to Armenia, in Yerevan was opened up the Center of Russian language advancement, and several months later, at Moscow State Linguistic University, was established Armenian Language and Culture Center347. Politically guided efforts to revive and, to some degree, restore the formerly lost social and cultural common historical heritage within the post-Soviet space found its reflections in a variety of arrangements and social-cultural events. One of the impulses to foster and enlarge bilateral contacts in cultural cooperation sphere was the decision to declare 2005 a Year of Russia in Armenia, while in 2006 to set identical arrangements in Russia to celebrate Year of Armenia in RF. Currently we are successfully overcoming the negative trend of breaking the scientific, academic and cultural links between Russia and Armenia that we have been witnessing over the last 15 years-, stated the coordinator of the Center of Caucasian Studies (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) V.

" ", , 2003 , www.mid.ru. 347 http://www.linguanet.ru/collaboration/uis/armenia/multi-armen-Ar/index.php.

346

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Zakharov touching upon the dynamics observable in Russian-Armenian humanitarian and cultural relations348. Another major leitmotiv in spearheading cultural, intellectual and spiritual friendship between the two nations was pivoted around popularizing of Russian language that continued to enjoy its lingua franca status of formal and informal communication. For instance, in April 26-30, 2004, in Armenia were held the Days of Russia Culture, while in 2008 Season of Russian culture in Armenia, and next year Season of Armenian culture in Russia. In 2007, a series of all-year public events and arrangements were organized dedicated to the Year of Russian Language in Armenia, with active participation of both Armenian and Russian writers and establishment, in February 2008, in Yerevan Sate University a Center of Russian Book. In words of Russian ambassador to Armenia, N. Pavlov, Russia language was the solid tier binding the peoples of Armenia and Russia. Reiterating once again Armenias posture as Russias strategic partner and ally, the Russian ambassador underlined that culture, common history and Russian language were indispensable components of strategic partnership, and that for Russia there was no other nation in the Caucasus to be more congenial for Russia than Armenians. Within the organizational framework of Russian Year in Armenia 2007 about 130 arrangements were staged and performed in Armenia, including series of joint conferences, intellectual competitions, etc349. Within the same venue of celebrating Russian language in Armenia, Head of Russian Society of Friendship and Cooperation with Armenia, M. Pereyaslova announced that the writers communities in the both countries would publish a thematic magazine to present

: , , 11.04.2006 349 - , , -, 05.10.2007.

348

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the societies the literary developments over the post-Soviet period as well as confirmed series of Armenian writers books would be published for the Russian readers and vice versa350. Also, by financial support of Russian Vneshtorgbank after more than twenty year break, in Yerevan was staged the first in post-Soviet period performance of famous State Academic Bolshoi Theatre of Russia351. Another sphere of Russias soft power presence in Armenia was related to information and media activities with a particular focus on enlargement of TV broadcasting coverage and scope. Besides the MIR channel (Russian language channel dedicated to cover CIS affairs) as well as other national Russian TV channels that had started their broadcasting over Armenia earlier, In June 2004 the Armenian National Committee on TV and Radio broadcasting took a decision on providing a retranslation right to the Russian TV channel Kultura (Culture) on Armenian territory. A decision that, according to the Russian MFA, would be another step in deepening Russian-Armenian cooperation in humanitarian sphere and propagation of rich spiritual heritage of our nations352. As Secretary General of CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly M. Krotov underlined, the Russian informational productions was in fact mostly demanded by the CIS countries because in those space the majority of residents were Russian-speaking. And the latter fact, according to M. Krotov, should be utilized for shaping more objective presentation of situation across the whole territory of former USSR: Information is the serious resource of state policy, and only together with the Commonwealths (CIS V.H.) other states we will be able to deter the new challenges of our times353.
, , 31.03.2007. Armenian President met Vneshtorgbank Chairman ,PanArmenian News, 23.05.2005 352 : " "" , , 17.06.2004. 353 : , , , 24.06.2004.
350 351

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Another direction of cooperation in cultural and humanitarian partnership in socialpolitical formats was focused on youth policies and engagement of younger generations into Russian-Armenian dialogue on more organized footing. For example, in April 2005 a new youth organization was established, Youth Union of Russia and Armenia, within the structure of non-commercial Partnership of Association of Russian-Armenian business cooperation. The declared rationale of the new entity was to be realization of joint youth programs and promoting of breeding in the patriotic spirit. Additionally, according to media outlet, the new organization aims had to cover issues like formation of joint youth policies in the two states, a greater attention and focus on younger generation representatives to social and political problems concerning both, Russian and Armenian societies, development of common informational, educational, cultural and economic space between the two nations354. Yet, one of the most important areas of mutual interest that transcended the boundaries of official policy-making to the wider context of civic and social relationships between the two nations was the set of issues related to the Armenian Diaspora in Russia. Armenian Diaspora in Russia, according to different estimates, is one of the largest as compared to other Armenian Diaporas worldwide about 2mln. Armenians reside in RF. And it was not by accident that the Constitutive meeting of All-Armenian Organization was held in Moscow (October, 2003) and central body of Union of Russian Armenians (URA) was established in Russian capital. In words of Russian foreign minister I. Ivanov (2002), Russia with dignity valued the idea of unifying of Armenian diasporas were taking its first steps on Russian soil355.

, , 30.04.2005. .. (, 8 2002 ), www.mid.ru.

354 355

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Attaching organizational foray to the activities of Russian Armenians was also compatible with the broader foreign policy goals of RA given Diasporas substantial influence over the international and regional issues concerning Armenias national interests: Armenia is not rich with mineral resources and situated in a rather complex region. Our wealth is entrepreneurial, assiduous and educated population. We will succeed if all these qualities will be fully developed. [In this regard] the shortest and understandable way high tempo of reforms and efficient governance. [] Thus, it is necessary to find rational forms of cooperation inside the Diaspora, specifically with those organizations that possess all-Armenian scope. Complementarity is needed for internal Armenian affairs, too356.

CONCLUSION

, PanArmenian News, 7.10.2003.

356

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Russias foreign policies under V. Putins two presidential administrations (20002008) underwent noteworthy changes and transformations entailing significant implications for the dynamics of regional developments and processes across the Commonwealth of Independent States, impacting the general parameters of Russias bilateral and multilateral relationships with the states of CIS. In comparative perspective, those relative changes were manifested themselves not only in practical policy-making dimensions in various geopolitical and geo-economic areas of the post-Soviet space, but also in newly formulated conceptual approaches elaborated under V. Putins stewardship as reflected, inter alia, in the framework doctrinal documents adopted at the beginning of the 21st century on RF foreign policy and national security. Specifically, previously fragmented pattern of foreign-policy making within the CIS space that had been a typical situation over the 1990s was being altered in favor of much more institutionalized and centralized pattern structured along the logic of Russian internal (political) development path and sustained under V. Putins power vertical paradigm. This shift of prefernces, registered from the very onset in foreign and security priorities, a newly elaborated course of economization of Russias external interests coupled with initially accepted, but rather sustainable drive to get back to normalcy in Russias international posture to secure its status of Great Power could not but impact the content, scope and dynamics of Russian security relations in regional and bilateral equation in the South Caucasus. The Russian political leaderships security thinking as well as security policy arenas under the state control was substantially widened in embracing a larger set of spheres and dimensions, including economic and energy policy directions. Although the initial period of post-Soviet transformations were geared forward by the bunch of factors belonging to the path dependency specifics and residual influences of the processes accompanying the
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demise of the Soviet Union, the new formats of the Russian foreign policy-making and the new quality of multi- and bilateral relations between RF and the newly independent states as reflected in political and strategic aspects of Russian Armenian relationships suggests that the both countries preferred to stronger institutionalization of the strategic partnership modalities in changing geopolitical milieu. In contrast to the earlier post-Soviet period, Russian foreign policy-making under V. Putin acquired more concerted and coordinated character, while the dynamics and policy dimensions within the CIS geopolitical and geo-economic areas of Russian engagements became prominently derivative from the aims and means of Russias general external strategy platform. In metaphorical terms, a practical pattern of Russian assertiveness in diplomatic, economic and energy, military-political spheres across the CIS resembled a sort of spring-board based on the logic of concentric circles. Though far from ideally sketchedup action plan, Moscows efforts to deepen, scrutinize and institutionalize its multilateral posture with regard to profile integrationist structures from within the CIS area as well as to push the dynamics of bilateral relations along the more structured path of development. In relative terms, being the dominant state in the Caucasian security complex capable of projecting power across the regional boundaries, whereas the complex itself continues to be Russia-centered as proposed by B.Buzans research paradigm (The Russialed regional security complex is thus a complex surrounding Russia the post-Soviet space excluding the Baltic states and centered on Russia), however, as the empirical studies could readily suggest Russia over the time-spam of V. Putin presidency was not interested to exert a direct domination strategy towards its South Caucasian neighbors despite of its multidimensional efforts to entrench its positions there as potential veto-player. Rather, Russian policies in the South Caucasus, though divergent in amity enmity continuum of dynamics of bilateral relations development with the three regional states,
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were premised on several strategic-level policy considerations and postulates that were, inter alia, exemplified in Russian-Armenian relationships track record over 2000-2008. To employ and refer to D. Kangs interpretation (David Kang, The Nature of Chinese Empire Hegemony in Early Modern Era: Implications for Today, University of Southern California, Feb.2009) of D. Lakes discourse on hierarchy and authority relationships hierarchy is not absolute, but can range from minimal authority, such as sphere of influence, to complete hierarchy, such as formal empire -, Russias attitudes towards the states of the South Caucasus were premised of rather flexible pattern of sustaining of some form of informal empire, exemplified in A. Chubais liberal empire paradigm. The focus of Russian security policies in the South Caucasus shifted to embrace a larger context of Russian engagement into the regional area. The institutional dimension was beefed up to address the twin trends that manifested themselves since the beginning of the 21st century. First, alongside the enhancement of Russias international standing and growing influence over the spectrum of global issues, Moscows longer-term priorities were geared forward by larger geopolitical considerations aimed to incorporating and converting its regional influence into the broader interests of RF. Secondly, the US proactive polices and heavier engagement within the ongoing regional pattern necessitated more focused response on the part of Russia. The scope and intensity of security interaction was widened to include a new spectrum of security challenges ranging from joint fight against terrorism to non-proliferation issues and cybersecurity. Under V. Putins administration, an emphasis on conventional capacities and military concentration on traditional directions continued to play a functionally significant role in overall calculus of Russian regional policy, yet energy security and asymmetrical warfare modalities took higher profile

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One the key political element in Russias efforts to reinvigorate its region-wide influence was bound to the Kremlins leadership persistent drive to restore the image of great power with multifaceted interests ranging from principal postulate of containing the extension of external actors clout over the regional processes to the resorting to new and more sophisticated tools of engagement. Concentration of resources, centralization of foreign and security policy conduct and maintaining internal order were being considered as important venues of restoring Russias image globally. At the beginning of 2001, Putin put forward his criteria: a clear definition of national priorities, pragmatism and economic effectiveness as while the major guiding principle of Russias return to international policymaking agenda was the need to institutionalize the relationships with the main global protagonist at the organizational level as well as pursue the similar course within the CIS structured along the same logic, however center-framed around Russia. A noteworthy aspect of Russias extended pool of security activities in the region and, specifically, with regard to its policies toward Armenia, was a larger projection horizon and integration of energy policy component into its macro-planning paradigm. During the those period, Russias security interests concerning the region and, particularly, Armenia geared forward by complex mix of concepts, approaches, employed policy means and instruments. Two new strands were dominating Russian policies in garnering back its influence over the dynamics unfolding in the region active expansion of Russian capital and energy corporations in the region aimed to acquire the strategically important assets with the ultimate goal of solidifying structural dependency on Russia and institutionalizing Russias security presence in the South Caucasus via fostering newly developed tools and mechanisms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation formats. In fact, Russias policies in the region were aimed to sustain any kind of integrationist project, despite some initial political efforts undertaken by Moscow to foster dialogue of the
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Caucasian Four (the first initiative came forward still in 1996) Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Rather, Russias regional strategy was premised on a long-term structural factor of existing huge resource asymmetry between the Caucasian republics, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, providing Moscow strong engagement leverages. Despite of substantial path dependency influence over Russian security policies in the region under V. Putins administrations regional security policies as largely influenced by the policy outcomes of the 1990s, the South Caucasus was objectively seen as a crucial area and the focal point in terms of geo-economic access, denial and control functions to be performed in a larger context of Russias economic and energy policies across the continent. Specifically, given the extended clout of Russian energetic engagement or elaborated prospective plans of engagement in Middle East, Turkey, Central Asia, as well as policy modalities concerning the European (including the Western CIS) and Chinese energy expansion directions, the region continued to be of significant derivative importance. To put Russias experience into the analytical and discursive frame on hierarchical structure debate in IR theory (D. Kang, 2009), it could be argued that modalities of Russias foreign policy conduct in those strategically important spheres were being rested on strengthening its control capabilities that can range from proscribing a particular policy while still permitting significant local autonomy which defines behavioral expectations for each party357. The main political-economic framework and the rationale behind that strategic approach were pivoted around the urge to strengthen, intensify and broaden the structural energy dependence from Russia and enclose the neighboring areas into the orbit of Russian influence. For instance, referring the energy partnership with the Central Asian states, a

A.Wendt, D. Friedheim, Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empires and the East German State, International Organizations, 1995, N 49, pp. 689-721.
357

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Russian official paper postulated that one of the priority directions of cooperation was energy sector, which was played the role of locomotive of strategic partnership with the regional states. With regard to significantly expanded reach of financial and economic activities of the Russian firms and corporations outside of RF, the major political underpinning was structured along the top political support by the state to its firms in promoting their interests abroad. Even more, there emerged some ideological strand articulated in well known stratagem of creating the liberal empire within the boundaries of former Soviet Union, whereas the primacy of Russian dominance had to be based on economic and socialeconomic levers of power-yielding. In line with those proclaimed aims, in practice Russian managed to take under its financial and economic control large segments of capital industry assets in Armenia and Georgia, mainly related to energy sphere of these republics. In this context, energy policy of Russia was grown up to the strategic level policy-making profile comprising a serious dimension of securitization in a wider agenda of foreign policy. Oil and gas pipelines in effect link the Central Asian and the Caucasian regional subcomplexes, and to some extent also the European sub-complex together. Given the high intensity of regional security interactions, Russia's stance with regard to the regional conflicts and its unilateral and/or multilateral engagement into the conflict management processes were intricately correlated with military-political and social-economic bilateral relations with the South Caucasian states as well as some regionwide initiatives that the Russian leadership put forward to politically accentuate its special macro-regional profile. To paraphrase J. Hsiung, those approaches were being translated

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into modern social-scientific terms, while the hierarchy was formed by the natural interaction of states up and down the rungs of the prevailing ladder of relational power358. Despite of policy variations concerning the methods and approaches in Russias conflict management strategies and its regional military-security engagement modalities, however, as it was described in D. Kangs model of hierarchical order, to the extent that Russia, the central state of the Caucasian regional security complex, had no territorial ambitions, while the regional states were quite aware that opposing the central state was near-impossible or too costly and that conquest also would entails costs, they thus defer to [the central state] precisely to the point where expected costs of conquering them slightly exceed the expected benefits359.

J. Hsiung, Anarchy, Hierarchy, and Actio Popularis: An International Governance Perspective, Paper for delivery on the Panel on Hegemony, Hierarchy and International Order, The International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, April 19, 2004, p. 6. 359 Ibid.
358

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Books, Monographs and Collection of Articles 1. V. Putin, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium in Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, ed. A. Melville and T. Shakleina, CEU Press, Budapest and NY 2005, pp. 221-234 2. Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, RIIA Chatham House, London 2003. 3. B.Hansen, P.Toft and A.Wivel, Security Strategies and American World Order, Routledge: 2009. 4. Y. Primakov, International Relations on the Eve of the 21st Century: Problems and Prospects in Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, CEU Press, Budapest and NY: 2005, pp. 207-219. 5. R. Sakwa, Putin: Russias Choice, second edition, Routledge, NY 2008. 6. L. Selezneva, Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: Between Doctrine and Pragmatism in Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. R. Fawn, University of St. Andrews, Frank Cass, London 2003. 7. A. Tysgankov, Russias Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. 8. T. Casier, The Clash of Integration Processes? The Shadow Effect of the Enlarged EU on its Eastern Neighbours in The CIS, the EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration, ed. by K. Malfliet, L. Verpoest and E. Vinokurov, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, NY 2007. 9. M.P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications, Westport, CT: Praeger: 1998. 10. J. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Council on Foreign Relations, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009. 11. T.V.Paul, The Complex Deterrence: An Introduction in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. by T.V.Paul, P.Morgan and J. Wirtz, The University of Chicago Press, 2009. 12. J. Willerton and M. Beznosov, Russias Pursuit of its Eurasian Security Interests: Weighing the CIS and Alternative BilateralMultilateral Arrangements in The CIS, the EU and Russia: The Challenges of Integration, ed. by K. Malfliet, L. Verpoest, E. Vinokurov, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, NY 2007.
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13. J. Sheer, Russia and the Near Abroad in a Medvedev Presidency in Russia after Putin: Implications for Russias Politics and Neighbors, A. Jonsson, S. Blank, J. Leijonhielm, J. Sherr, C. V. Pallin, Institute for Security and Development Policy, March 2008. 14. B. Buzan, O. Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 15. M. de Haas, Russias Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and beyond, Routledge, NY, London 2010. 16. S. Torjesen, Russia, the CIS and the EEC: Finally getting it right? In The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. by E. W. Rowe and S. Torjesen, Routledge, London and NY 2009. 17. V. Naumkin, Russias national security interests in the Caspian region in The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. by. G. Chufrin, Oxford University Press 2011. 18. A. Aslund, A. Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Center for Strategic Studies, Washington DC 2009. 19. M. Margelov, Russias National Interests in the Caspian Region in Energy in The Caspian Region: Present and Future, Ed. by Y. Kalyuzhnova, Palgrave NY 2002. 20. B. Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putins foreign policy towards the CIS countries, NY, Routledge, 2008. 21. ., : 21 : , : , 2009. 22. . , : , , .2002. 23. D.Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow 2001. 24. J. M. Letiche, Russia Moves into the Global Economy, Routledge, London 2007. 25. C. R. Saivetz, Russia: An Energy Superpower? MIT CIS: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts, December 2007. 26. W.C.Wohlforth, Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. by T.V.Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, Stanford University, 2004.

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