The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security Author(s): Helga Haftendorn Reviewed work(s): Source: International

Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 3-17 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600386 . Accessed: 13/02/2012 06:57
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International StudiesQuarterly (1991) 35, 3-17

The SecurityPuzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Buildingin International Security

HELGA HAFTENDORN

Freie Universitat Berlin

The term"security" as ambiguousin content in format: ita goal,an is as is issue-area, concept,a researchprogram, a discipline? a or There is no one conceptof security; "national security," "international security," "global and security" referto different of issuesand have theirorigins different sets in historical philosophical and contexts. The authorarguesthattheconceptof international security mightmostappropriately describecurrentsecurity affairs. She challengesthe conceptof nationalsecurity fixatedon the as and not takinginto accountthe security otherstates.She nation-state of criticizes notionof global security presupposing world-wide the as a common definition security of and sharedsetsof values,rules,and principles notyetexisting. the long term, In however, worldmight movingin the be thedirection a globalsecurity of if system institution-building continues and leads to commonpractices, rules,and enforcement capabilities. all conAs ceptsyieldonlylimited explanations and are of marginal value fortheorybuilding, essayidentifies the someassumptions questions be clarified and to in future researchprograms. a closingsectionthe fieldof international In security studiesand itsrelationship international to relations discussed. are

Introduction
The term "security"is as ambiguous in content as in format:is it a goal, an issue-area a concept, a research program, or a discipline? There is no one concept of security; ''national security,""international security,"and "global security"refer to different sets of issues and have their origins in differenthistoricaland philosophical contexts. Which one offers the most convincing explanation of the many changes in security relations we are witnessing? If none is convincing, we as social scientistsare called results. upon to constructsuitable research programs thatwill yield more satisfactory As children of the Enlightenment, we seek knowledge in order to improve the quality of human action (Keohane, 1989:158). As survivorsof World War II, we are committed to promote international peace and individual freedom in the world we
Editor's note:Helga Haftendornis Presidentof the InternationalStudies Association 1990-91. This article.- an edited versionof her presidentialaddress, delivered at the 31st Annual Conventionof the InternationalStudies Association,Washington,DC, April 11, 1990. Author's note:This paper has been written part of a projecton "New Dimensions in Security," as funded by the Catherineand John T. MacArthurFoundation to the Center forTransatlanticForeign and SecurityPolicyat the Free University Berlin. It has been discussed at the Center's SecurityStudies Seminar. Helpful commentswere of received fromChristopherDaase, Gunther Hellmann, Stephen D. Krasner,and ChristianTuschhoff. ? 1991 InternationalStudies Association

The Security Puzzle

livein. As teachers, ask how security we studiesas an academicfieldcan be clarified, whatwe should teach,and how our curricula should be designed. Withthesetasksin mind,I willfirst and historical conanalyzethe philosophical security, globalsecurity. and texts the conceptsof nationalsecurity, of international philosophical tradition wellas as Mymainargument thateach relatesto a different is to a specific of relations. Second,I willattempt historical interpretation international to evaluate the strengths and weaknessesof each concept. In a quasi-anarchical of dilemma"(Herz, globalsystem, thoughwitha growing consciousness the"security 1950; Jervis,1978) and increasingregimebuildingin process (Krasner, 1983), I mostappropriateto current security considerthe conceptof international security I as on affairs. will,therefore, challengethe conceptof nationalsecurity fixated the of nation-state and not takinginto account the security other states. I will also a of criticize notionof global security presupposing commondefinition secuthe as not yetexisting.I rity world-wide and shared sets of values, rules,and principles concede, however,that the world mightbe movingin the directionof a global and leads to complexesof comsecurity paradigmif institution-building continues for the enforcement of mon practices, shared rules of behavior,and capabilities value of the theserules(Keohane, 1989:163). Third, I willexaminetheexplanatory to variousconceptsof security and to whatdegree theycontribute theory-building. security affairs are of and As they provideonlylimited explanations international for I will someassumptions questions and to marginal value fortheory-building, identify and "differentiated be clarified futureresearchthatwilllead to new hypotheses in I and theory" (Georgeand Smoke, 1974:637). Finally, willdelineateboththecontent studiesand its relationship both to the reach of the fieldof international security of relations. strategic studiesand the traditional discipline international In preparingthispaper and readingthe bodyof literature international on relaon tionsof both European and Americanorigin,I feltmuchlike a dwarfstanding the shouldersof giants:on the one hand richbecause of the broad bodyof knowlhow much I owe to edge to stand on and at the same timehumblein recognizing scholarsand friends like E. 0. Czempiel,RobertKeohaine,Stephen Krasner,ancl that beforeon JamesRosenau. Whatcould I contribute had notbeen said or written bothsides of the Atlantic, and doubt moreelomuchmore knowledgeably without Could I solve the "security quently? puzzle" or at leastchartthewayto itssolution?
1.

and Collaborationl in Three decades ago ArnoldWolfers his book DiscordI (1962:147) that"may not have any as characterized nationalsecurity an "ambiguoussymbol" is "Security a word with precisemeaningat all." AlastairBuchan (1966:24) writes, with absence the to themselves equatingsecurity Mostauthorslimit manymeanings." overthrow or of or of a military threat withthe protection the nationfromexternal attack. in a RichardLowenthal (1971:11), from Germanperspective, additionemphasizes Joseph Nye (1988:6) concurs safeguarding politicaland social self-determination. as thattodaymostsecurity policiesare designedto insure"socialautonomy a group, of survival individnot to and a degree of political status, merely insurethephysical "a uals within nationalboundaries."He adds anothercriteria: certainminimalexLike Nye,RichardUllman (1983:123) arof pected enjoyment economicwelfare." in terms nationalsecurity gues that "defining merely(or even primarily) military a He falseimage of reality." suggests broaderdefinition: conveysa profoundly
A threatto national security an action or sequence of eventsthat(1) threatens is and over a relatively briefspan of time to degrade the qualityof life drastically

HELGA HAFTENDORN

to forthe inhabitants a stateor (2) threatenssignificantly narrowthe range of of policy choices available to the governmentof a state or to privatenon-governmental entities(persons, groups, corporations)withinthe state. (1983:135)

of This definition but takes account of a broad variety contingencies, it requires and And it mustbe seen-as further clarification raisesquestionsof applicability. cultural context: highly the industrialized shouldtheotherdefinitions-ina specific have verydifferent democraciesof the West. Other countries conceptsof security. Mostdevelopingcountries emphasizetheeconomicand socialas wellas thedomestic of means freedomfromfear; dimensions security. The Soviet term"besopasnost" of Moscow'ssecurity maintenance. policyhas been an instrument system British scientist Taking accountof thesedifferent interpretations, political Barry Buzan (1983:6) triesto avoid thistangleand arguesthatnational "cannotbe security definedin any general sense, but onlyin relationto specific cases." In his seminal in on Problem International Relations study TheNational Security (1983) he thusrestricts of himself an ideographictreatment the security to problem.' Social science,however, cannotnotbe content with cases while explaining singular the disregarding taskof devisinggeneralthesesor at leastconceptsapplicableto a of of cluster cases. I willstart witha veryelementary, definition "security" "generic" to as value and/orsystem maintenance over time, and theabsenceof threats it. I will ask whichvalues or systems to be maintained. are
II.

of The evolution the security paradigmand thechangesfrom"nationalsecurity" to "international security" "globalsecurity," to each based on different theoretical and politicalassumptions, closelylinked to the historical are evolutionof the internationalsystem theintellectual and in In progress itsinterpretation. each phase we find competinginterpretations, realistand the other idealist,based on different,, one theoretical assumptions about the natureof man and the behaviorof states.Often thereis a third interpretation, effort bridgethegap and to developconverging an to of concepts,buildingon the ability man and statesforrationalbehavior.Historical experiencewillshowwhichone prevailsand why. Each conceptof security to corresponds specific values,threats, capabilities and to meet the perceivedchallenges.Its historical evolutionis linkedto the extensionof theboundariesof the international from one of regionally bounded nationsystem, to of states, thehighly interdependent political systems theindustrialized world,to a of globalcommunity people. Advancesin communication, technological the perfectionof wagingwar,and the growth industry commerce of and have contributed to thisprogress(North,1990). Human experienceand learninghave extendedanotherset of boundaries:those of knowledgeabout security-building. and diplomacyas regulatory War processes werejoined and modified balanceof powersystems, armscontrol by by regimes, and to by institutional arrangements further cooperation.
III.

The paradigmof national security Withthe emergedin a specific historical setting. birthof the nation-state the Seventeenth in in Centuryand its interest national
I In his revised second edition of Peoples,States, and Fear, forthcoming 1991, Barry Buzan seems to retreat in froman ideographic approach and to adopt a systemic and integrative approach to security. See "The Case fora Comprehensive Definitionof Securityand the Institutional Consequences of AcceptingIt." Center for Freds- og Konfliktsforskning, Kobenhavn: Arbejdspapirer4/1990.

The Security Puzzle

survival, national security became a prominent concern.To end "the war of all againstall" (Hobbes, 1651/1957)and to secure a stateof domesticpeace, citizens deferto a powerful sovereign who,in turn,promises end of religious the and civil war.2In the international arena, strugglepits each stateagainsteveryother.The of system nation-states lacks common rules and institutions law enforcement. of Diplomacyand war are the primemeans to further nationalcauses; statesmen and diplomatsare the prominent actors;war is the continuation diplomacy other of by means(to paraphraseClausewitz,1853/1963).The sovereign, whether princein a a in constitutional monarchy thecitizens or themselves a democracy, entrusted is with of securingdomesticpeace and safeguarding lifeand the property the people the againstany foreignthreat. Againstthis realistdesign, Kant (1795/1954) proposes a scheme of "perpetual peace" as a moralnormto be followed sensiblemen. His proposalis based on the by conviction thatthe system nation-states of dominating of and nationalinterests can be restructured an enlightened by political order-a republican a constitution, federal statesystem, and a global citizenship-to forgea community mankind.For of hima compelling reason fornation-states subsumetheirnationalinterests to under and the moral commitment the rule of international is the rationalinsight law of to of individualcitizens a community mankind. In a thirdline of thought, Grotius(1625/1969),like Kant,describesinternaDe in of tionalpolitics terms a society states.As opposed to the Hobbesiantradition, of he contendsthatstatesare not engaged in a simplestruggle, like gladiatorsin an withone anotherby common rules and arena, but are limitedin theirconflicts institutions to (Bull, 1977:26). But contrary the Kantianor universalist perspective, Grotiusacceptsthe Hobbesian premisethatsovereign ratherthanindividual states, humanbeings,are the principal actorsin international politics. International politics of betweenstatesnor completeidentity interest. expressesneither completeconflict The Grotianprescription international for conductis thatall statesin theirdealings withone anotherare bound by the rules and institutions the society of theyform. whattheseimperatives But,as opposed to theviewof the Kantians, enjoinis notthe of of of overthrow the system statesand itsreplacement a universal by community mankind rather acceptanceof therequirements coexistence but the of and cooperationin a society states(Bull, 1977:27). Withno supranational of for authority their Laws "regulate" behaviorbutdo notchangeit.To laws enforcement, do notsuffice. the circumscribe actionsof "insecure"or "non-saturated states,"as Bismarckhas at called them, incentives restraint for have to be developed.Historic efforts political have institution-building been the Concertof Europe, createdat the Congressof in Vienna (1814-1815), and Europe's balance-of-power Censystem theNineteenth of not their war. tury, purposebeingto enhancethesecurity nation-states, to prevent were stillnecessary.) (To safeguardthe balance of power,war and diplomacy of conHobbesian,Kantian,and Grotianideas outlinedthemainelements future in ceptsof security. Hobbes prepared the ground for the realisttradition political of of theory. Kant,themastermind GermanIdealism,appealed to themoralimpetus for man and his desirefora better world;hisideas are guidingprinciples theliberal to the tradition. The gap is bridgedbyGrotiusand hiseffort further rule of law by I will institution-building. call thisthe institutional approach. At first glance,the paradigmof nationalsecurity respondsto politicalrealismas follows Kantiantradithe taughtby Hobbes, whilethe paradigmof global security of tion,withits assumptionof a community mankindand politicalprocessescon2 To provide staik coiitiasts, I tise the Hobbesiainpar-adigimi inisteadc tihemorc cliffcreintiated by Locke, of olic although I sharc Bull's (1977) aigument that Locke's desciiption of intcrinationial as relationis a societywithout cenitr-al utthority imiore is appropriate thaniHobbes's of Intelnatiional anarchy.

HELGA HAFTENDORN

security, turn,bein trolledby enlightenedmen. The paradigmof international comes meaningfulwith the formation securityregimesand the building of of A examination, international institutions Grotius recommended. morecareful as has of however, revealsthatthe different traditions overlap,and we findelements realsurvey security of ism,idealism, and institution-buildingeach period.A historical in will show theirrespective and decline. It is a story achieveof affairs prominence mentsand failures, progressand regression. of

IV.
Century notcompatiwas The European balance-of-power system theNineteenth in ble withtheemergence totalitarian likeSovietRussiaor Nazi Germany in of regimes hegethe Twentieth Century. The former could deal withthe riseof a continental in their mon,like Napoleon or WilhelmII, and it was successful counterbalancing But of aspirations.3 itcould notcope with dissolution thebasisforthebalance-ofthe depended on power systemwhich,in a rationalcalculationof national interest, restraint reconciliation. and The League of Nations, of foundedundertheimpact WorldWar I, was to provide a radicalalternative: carefully balanceof forces wouldbe replacedbya the calibrated of system collectivesecurity. was to include among its membersany potential It to of was attacker, itrestedon thepremisethata threat thesecurity one member and a threat all thatcalled foradequate responsebyeach. In proposing conceptof to his collective security, President Wilsonstressedthe need for"a new and more wholeof some diplomacy" (Claude, 1962:111). Not a balanceof powerbut a "community power" was Wilson'sideal (Waltz, 1959:118). In the new systemall stateswould and cooperatein thecommoncause of providing security justiceforall ratherthan and coercion.The same standardsof conductthatwere engagingin competition observedamong individualcitizens would apply to nationsand theirgovernments. International organization to providefortheruleof law,ifnotforworldgovernswas ment.While the League of Nations did not discriminate againstany country, its the VersaillesTreaty,set Germanyapart and thus sowed the seeds of corollary, future conflict. the Realistssuch as Carr (1939/1966)and Morgenthau (1948) clhallenged Wilsoof nianschemeon thegroundsthatitpresupposesa harmony interests amongstates whilein reality were and relations they amongthemgovernedbyideas and morality, balance-ofand ruledbynationalinterests power.Wilsonhad wantedto abolishtlhe of and thepolitical powersystem preponderance a nationor groupof nations(with international its negativeeffects small and weak nations).Carr, to strengthen on stability, argued for the dominanceof a superiorpower: "The new international coherentand sufficiently order can be builtonly on a unit of power sufficiently without its to beingitself compelledto takesides in the strong maintain ascendancy thereis an issue of moralissuesmaybe involved, rivalries lesserunits.Whatever of in of cannotbe expressedin terms morality" (1966:235). Writing 1939, powerwhich to as or a Carr foresaw Pax Americana a Pax Britannica mostlikely be imposedon a dividedand weakenedEurope. Withthe Atlantic in wereadded to the old Charter, the 1940s,twonew elements it would lastonly system conceptof nationalsecurity: was recognizedthata security if it relied on both a renunciation forceand a respectfor human rights. of The UnitedNation'sCharteris builton thesetwopillars.It stipulates thatthesecurity of all membersshall be guaranteedby a system collective of security exceptional (in
3 1 differsomewhatfromMandelbaum (1988) who in his excellentanalysisterminates European the balance-ofpower system beforeWorld War 1. I do not,however,give a historical account butaim to explain systemic changes.

The Security Puzzle

the and situations permitting use of forcefor self-defense), it promotesuniversal for Councilmembernormsand principles individuals wellas forstates.Security as allies an oversight role. The ship and votingarrangements give the fivewar-time to conflict creating UnitedNationsis thelatesteffort manageinternational by global institutions peace-keeping. for Both the League of Nationsand the UnitedNationssystems failedbecause of the WhiletheLeague of Nations interests. dominanceof nationalovercollective security failedto cope withtheriseof Fascismand Nazismand collapsedon theeve of World withthe emergence twopreponof War II, the United Nationsbecame ineffective derantpowers,theUnitedStatesand theSovietUnion,and their exclusive mutually claimforworlddominancewhichgave riseto theCold War.The Westperceived the claim for dominanceas a challengeto the ideals and principles Communist upon whichWestern to of societies werebuiltas wellas a threat theterritorial integrity its politicalsystems. a consequence,the Hobbesian paradigmof nationalsecurity As not international regained prominencein international affairs.National survival, or that was security worldgovernment, thenation'sprimegoal. It was significant the was leadingjournal of the timedevotedto questionsof security called Survival.4 maintain The requirements nationalsecurity of dictated thatstates forces military For and a large arrayof weapons systems threat. adequate to the perceivedmilitary thesuperpowers, ultimate the weapon was nuclearweaponsdeployedin accordance withthe strategy massiveretaliation. of For the smaller, non-nuclear nations,integrationinto military alliancesunder the leadershipof the nuclearpowersbecame of The Westmetthepolitical a and mandatory. challengewith policy containment an arrayof alliancesystems, whilefortheideologicalcompetition withtheSovietUnion it devised a counterideology anti-communism "free-worldism." of and NATO, the regionalsecurity regimespanningthe Atlantic, incorporates military, the political, and ideologicalrequirements the West. The "crusade for freedom"was shortof lived,but the relianceon nuclear weapons by both superpowershas significantly changed the natureof international relations. In the absence of effective the of global institutions, structure the international of and a system nuclear of systemconsistedof a combination alliance networks one regulating deterrence, more cooperativeand the other more confrontational relationships. Deterrencewas based on mutualassured destruction a coupled witlh Withthecredibility (extended)nucleardeterof restraint. policyof mutualpolitical rence diminishing, elaboratesystem U.S.-led military the of alliancesis gradually of Allianceis held together theHarmel formula twoparaleroding.The Atlantic by lel tracksof military defense and politicaldetente.Nuclear weapons systems are graduallybeing transformed froman instrument warfareinto an elementof of and psychology-atleastin the East-West diplomacy context.
V.

In the 1960s,withtheCuban missile it crisis a catalyst, was increasingly as recognized that"the security dilemma"(Jervis,1978)-that an increasein one state'ssecurity decreasesthe security others-was not necessarily zero-sum of a game but could be overcomeby cooperativestrategies. Alliancesystems have long modified individual conceptsof nationalinterest and nationalsurvival. the military In domain,"flexible response"has been the"tit-for-tat" strategy gradually leadingto cooperation among as antagonists, describedbyAxelrod(1984). Armscontrol aimsat thejoint managementof the risksassociatedwithmilitary deployments. Withthe recognition that
4 Survivalwas founded in 1958 to serve as thejournal for the newlyfounded institutefor StrategicStudies in London, now The InternationalInstitutefor StrategicStudies (1lSS).

HELGA HAFTENDORN

of not a even a modified strategy nationalsecurity might prevent nuclearholocaust, insteadof nationalsecurity. emphasisshifted a paradigmof international to in under The conceptof international security based on a mutualinterest survival is of thatan adversary willbe deconditions nuclear deterrenceand on recognition from out This restraint. terred attacking of itsownself-interest. is morethanpolitical To be operational, of cooperation needed. Again, are patterns partialor temporary the concept spawned a programmatic journal: InternationalSecurity.International in of security, contrastto national security, impliesthat the security one state is at linkedto thatof otherstates, leastof one otherstate.Statesare interdepenclosely of dentin theirsecurity affairs such thatthesecurity one is strongly affected the by has actionsof the other,and vice versa.This structure been identified Keohane by and Nye (1977/1989)as complexinterdependence; theyassumethattherealization of mutualvulnerability leads to the formation regularpatterns of and to the evolu"definedas principles, norms, "International regimesare," accordingto Krasner, converge in rules,and decision-making procedures aroundwhichactorexpectations a givenissue-area"(1983: 1). Regimesare intervening variables betweenbasiccausal on factors the one hand and outcomesand behavioron the other. As Keohane be agreed upon (1989:4) suggests, rulesand principles need notnecessarily formally but by governments should be observedover an extended period of time. Also, will a as cooperationneed notbe theexclusivepattern; structure qualify a regimeif are of and interactions markedby a mixture confrontation cooperationas long as institutionalized proceduresare followed. in behavior issuesrelating cooperative Security regimes definedbyregularized are or to the nationalsecurity twoor morestates, of governedbyeitherexplicit implicit in in nationsto be restrained their behavior thebelief normsand ruleswhichpermit of thatotherswill reciprocate(Keohane, 1980:33). Security regimesare patterns of whereno central security cooperationamong statesin a situation quasi-anarchy on of interests. exist Security regimes authority imposeslimits thepursuit sovereign numberof stateswhichshare a over time,but theyoftenencompassonlya limited but exunder the threatof nucleardeterrence) commoninterest (such as survival clude otherinterests nations.Cooperation"requiresthattheactionsof separate and individuals and organizations-which not are (but in theiractionsinterdependent) with in pre-existent harmony-be broughtintoconformity one anotherthrougha cooperationpreprocessof policycoordination" (Keohane, 1984:51). International to the institutions constrain behaviorof states. supposes effective or arrangement, formally Institutions referto a particularhuman-constructed can informally organized.5Specificinstitutions be definedin termsof theirrules. behavioral rolesforactors, besides These rulesmustbe durableand mustprescribe of contribute Social patterns learning and constraining activity shapingexpectations. such of Some institutions, as alliances, formal are to recurrent practices cooperation. and the capacityfor purposiveaction. with prescribedhierarchies organizations are Others,such as armscontrolarrangements, complexesof rulesand norms,the and explicitly core elementsof whichhave been negotiated agreed upon by states. International institutions have the potentialto facilitate cooperation;theyreduce howsharednormsand principles, and uncertainty costs(Keohane, 1989). Without ever,institutions emergebut willnot endure. may of behaviorwilllead to The liberalinstitutionalist beliefthatpatterns cooperative is of institutions challengedby a numberof authors. the formation international
5 Keohane defines regimes as "institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments,that pertain to particularsets of issues in international relations"(1989:4). Occasionallyhe uses the analyticalconceptsof regimes and specificinstitutions interchangeably.

tion of regimes.

10

The Security Puzzle

. not and power relationships . . are the proximate, Realistsargue that"interests system" (Strange,1983:345). just theultimate, cause of behaviorin theinternational lastingcommitIn a world of sovereignstatesseekingto maximizetheirinterest, regimes-are ratherrare. mentsto rulesand norms-and thussecurity of explainedbythedistribution relations primarily are If patterns international of theninstitutionalist are concepts not amongstates, military economiccapabilities and thatgame theory modelsare alwaysuseful. Jervis (1983) and Oye (1986b) maintain moreappropriate thanregimemodelsto explain mostcases of "Cooperationunder accountsforcooperationand reself-interest Anarchy",6 narrowand short-run as not The obviousclass of models is Prisoners' straint, commonrulesand principles. Dilemma,Stag Hunt, and Chicken,in whichcooperationis desirableto reap the of mutualbenefit but is not automatic.Outcomes varyaccordingto the strategies of reciprocity used and the conditions play prevailing. The actionsof the UnitedStatesand theSovietUnion in thepasttwodecades did in Dilemma.Neither indeed resemblethe behaviorof the delinquents a Prisoners' cooperthey superpower attackedtheotheror challengedtheother'svitalinterests; a But thiscooperationdoes not constitute ated to preventtheirown destruction. and Moscowon variousoccasionsagreed security regime.Though bothWashington Even and rules,each side interpreted themdifferently. major on commonprinciples the armscontrolagreements like the ABM Treatyor the SALT I Agreement, core were implemented of onlywithreservations. elements the cooperative relationship, as relationship-"detente"-had brokendowncompletely a By 1980 thecooperative and the Americanreturnto a consequenceof the Soviet invasionof Afghanistan of strategy containment. Limited cooperationwas resumed in the mid-1980s,when MikhailGorbachev the assumedcontrol over thecourseof Sovietpolicyand setout to reform Commuof American nist system,and when PresidentReagan's strategy reconstructing and Domesticnecescurtailed financial budgetconstraints. was by strength seriously both costs-rather thaninsight motivated has sity-the need to reduce transaction and construct joint security a nationsto abandon the unilateralpursuitof security of the And they so in a situation did whentheability each to destroy otherregime. stillintact. and thusdeterrence- was basically of It So far,onlythecontours an emerging security regimeare visible. is based on armscondoctrines defense,mutually profitable emphasizing symmetrical military trol,and-possibly in the future-economic agreements.But will the American witha Soviet-American resecurity intentto projectpower globallybe compatible And will an economically weak Soviet Union, gime based on mutual restraint? be and politicalstrife, a reliablepartnerin joint plagued internally separatism by institution-building? How can thisregimebe extended to otherareas and linkedwithothersecurity with emphasis nucleardeterrence its A on security regime regimes? Soviet-American is and armscontrol but a regionalsecurity percepregime.It takesaccountof threat tions withina specific, homogeneous region fromthe Atlanticto the Urals and but devisesadequate institutions, it willbe no exemplarforotherregions.Under its in the European security system, emphasisis on institutionumbrella, theemerging and bind a united Germany.In the Third World, buildingin order to integrate and ethnichomogeneity, economicgrowth. stability, emphasisis on internal offers better a for prescription current security Though a conceptof international in of formit has serious affairs thana strategy nationalsecurity, itspresent security It and with thenotionof its it deficits cannotbe applied globally. carries conceptional withnuclearweaponsand deterrence, is highly the and ethnoorigin, preoccupation
" This is the titleof a seminiial of speciaileditioni /ltt iationtalOtganization, edited by Oye (1986ai).

HELGAHAFTENDORN

11

centric, based on U.S. perceptions and values (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988). It does smallwarsin theThird World,or forthefactthatthreat perceptions-at leastin the FirstWorld-have changed frommilitary attacks economicand ecologicalcrises. to is to So farthe usefulness the conceptof international of security limited thatof a regionally limitedregime. VI. To overcomethe limitations inherent the prevailing in concepts, hitherto neglected dimensions security-economy, of ecology,the domesticfoundations securityof have to be includedand theapplicability different to areas and regions made feasible (Krell 1980). Also,theethnocentricity traditional of approacheshas to be overcome. As thebiggest problemis regionalization, searchhas begunfora newand common a paradiginforglobal security. Globalsecurity refers a system worldorderor security. embodiesa program to of It of commonsecurity the global community men, as proposed by the Palme for of Issues. In on and Secur-ity an Commission, IndependentCommission Disarmament A itsreportCommonSecurity whichwas stubtitled BlueprintFor Survival (1982:4), the of Commissionargues for replacingthe strategy mutual deterrencewithone of commonsecurity to thatrestson a commitment joint survivaland a programfor of' armscontrol It calls and disarmament. fur-ther fora transformation the internationalsystem make it capable of peacefuland orderly to change,suitablefortrade and travel, and conduciveto the intercultural exchangeof ideas and experience. In the Kantiantradition, paradigmof globalsecurity but a utopia: nonexisis the will of tantbuttheoretically possible(Bloch, 1959). Globalsecurity lead to a situation or global peace, not in the sense of a hegemonial"Pax Americana" "Pax Sovietica," but as a conditionin whicheach nationand each individualcan enjoyjustice and happiness(in theJudeo-Christian sense of "shalom"as wellas in the philosophical of tradition enlightenment). A system worldorder,a globalsecurity of a system, presupposes universal concept of security witha shared set of norms,principles, and practiceswhich resultin commonpatterns international of of behavior.The construction an all-encompassovertimeand regionswilldepend on our assumptions about ingconceptof security the natureof the international system. is and interacting Accordingto Waltz (1979) a system composed of a structure units.Structures defined,first, is are accordingto the principle whicha system by of of ordered;second,by thespecification functions differentiated units;and third, or of by the distribution capabilitiesacross units. In a quasi-anarchical self-help conditions unitsworry about theirsurvival, and thisworry theirbehavior. system, The system thus encourages statesto seek security. Increased power in termsof concernof statesis not to capabilities may but need not serve thisend. The first in or maximizepowerbut to maintain improvetheirrelative positions the system. Withstructures of definedby thearrangement partsand theinternational system characterized anarchy,accordingto Waltz, the evolutionof a global security by in system requiresradicalsystems change. Or is Ruggie(1986:148) right criticizing Waltzforoverlooking quantity, and of he the velocity, diversity transactions-what calls"dynamic of density"-as determinants changein worldpolitics? neglecting By unit-level cannotaccountforchange. processes,Waltz'stheory observetwo forcesof change: one internal the Today, social scientists affecting of to of capability states(and thusvindicating Waltz)and theotherrelating patterns interaction among units (as emphasized by Ruggie). The rise of Gorbachev,his in and renewaland reconstruction both domesticand forpolicyof "perestroika,"
not account for future militarycontingencies that are not all-out nuclear war but

12

The Security Puzzle

eign policyare internalprocesseswithin SovietUnion leadingto changesin its the In and societies highly capabilities. an age of globalinterdependence wherestates are withotherstatesand societies, sensitive and oftenvulnerableto interactions even in like the SovietUnion-unless it is reconverted politics an authoritarian country intoa "Gulag" as under Stalin-cannot be completely shieldedfromoutsideinflufrombipolarto ences. The resultis a transformation the international of structure of to multipolar, in international and relations from dominance national the interests the emergenceof commonnormsand rules. A global security system, however, presupposesstrong a institutions-potentially worldgovernment-to regulateinteractions betweenunitsand to enforceits rules and norms.The failureof both the League of Nationsand, a generation later,the a UnitedNationsattests thedifficulty establishing globalpeacekeepingsystem. to of The historical emphasison military forcehas contributed a truncated to conceptof security. Change will take place onlyif statesrealize thattheywill maximizetheir To gainswithcooperative, dissociative, not strategies. assuresuccesswe mustexamine the area where the Hobbesian, Kantian,and Grotianconceptsof security conin verge:in buildinginstitutions around commoninterests, facilitating evolution the of shared normsand principles, and in furthering commonunderstanding the a of problemsconfronting mankind. VII. The Hobbesian,Kantian,and Grotianconceptsof security neither providean ademannerthechangesin security quate security paradigmnorexplainin a satisfactory our conceptof relationswe witnessin manypartsof the world today.To clarify and an we security to construct empirically testable paradigm, mustdefinethe"setof and observational the hypotheses," "hard core of irrefutable assumptions," the "set of scope conditions" that,accordingto Lakatos(1970), are requiredfora "progressive" researchprogramthatwilllead to new factsand explanations. We mightdo wellto followKeohane's counsel (1989:37) to applysomewhat "softer," moreinterpretative standardsthan Lakatos has suggested. We need to clarify whether our presentresearchprograms adequate to conare Above all, they stluctnew paradigmsand theorieson the basis of novel insights. shouldrevealthedeficits existing of of conceptsand theessential parameters a new paradigm.Our expectationis thatinstitutionalism yieldanswersto questions may thatrealismand idealismcould not provide. A new paradigmof security demands: 1) it should specifically meetthe following in from shouldexplaindiversity change-differences variousregions, transition and one dominantconcept to another,systems transformation; it should be multi2) focused,not limitedto a singleissue-areaor levelof analysis. The Hobbesian tradition, realismand neorealism,7 teaches us to recognizethe of and the distribution capabilities of structure the international system among its units. Empiricalevidence, however,shows that statescannot be treatedas black and boxes, thatindividualpolicymakers,bureaucratic structures, domesticpolitics matter. Whilestructural of of realism enhancesour understanding thestructure the of of international and system theeffects thedistribution capabilities amongitsparts, and comparative policyresearch,politicalpsychology, organizational theoryoffer approaches and models to assistus in opening the black box and explainingthe actionsof states.RobertPutnam(1988) has contributed path-breaking researchon two-level analysis.
7 Basically, I follow Koehane (1989:7-10) in the use of the labels "realism," "neorealism,"and "liberalism." Instead of "neoliberal institutionalism" use the somewhatsimplerterm"institutionalism." I

HELGA HAFTENDORN

13

and The Kantiancontribution the emphasison moralcommitment the rule of is institutions affecting in politilaw. Liberalism stresses impactof human-created the and change patterns of cal behavior.It emphasizesthe ability men to influence of a action and to build institutions, it reflects beliefthatenlightenedmen can and The liberalhope thata collective cumulatively achieve progressin human affairs. in inherent thesecurity dilemmahas security system would overcomethe problems versions liberaltheory, of however, been disappointedtimeand again. Sophisticated and the developmentof international address the way transnational interactions of system to normscan interact withthe domesticpolitics statesin an international (Keohane and Nye, 1977/1989:xi) transform how thesestatesdefinetheirinterests. blendsthetwoseemingly contradictory The Grotianor institutionalist perspective because it is in theirown bestinterest to approaches.8 Statesdo cooperateregularly relations is do so. Cooperationpertaining particular of issuesin international to sets patterns behaviorand instituof reinforced social learningand results specific by in tions.International institutions significant states' to actionsbecause theyprovide are foran exchangeof information help defineareas of commoninterest; they thus and of A specialization affect formulation security the conceptsand strategies. growing froma divisionof labor leads to increasing of participation among unitsresulting to of statesinjoint decisionmakingand contributes a transformation the atomistic of structure the international system. All three traditions to and the schools thatbuild on them contribute a better of of For a understanding the prevalent concepts security. developing generalparais At muchfurther and research necessary. this digmof security theoretical empirical towarddesigninga "progresstage,however, fewhypotheses be formulated a can sive"researchprogram. 1. Threat perceptions as of and security are concepts formulated a result political to and social processeswithin degreessensitive transnastates;theyare in varying to tionalinteractions. Researchis necessary establish: are and to whatdegreesecurity Under whatconditions concepts shaped in response to domesticor international demands. of system-suchas bipolarto multiHow changesin the structure theinternational of of or among statesin terms military polar-and in the distribution capabilities of economicpoweraffect formulation nationalsecurity the concepts. interacWhichprocessescontribute mostto makingstatesadaptiveto transnational and and the impactof transnational intertions,and whichreduce adaptiveness; on nationalinteractions changesin nationalsecurity concepts. national of 2. Regionalvariations security conceptscan be explainedbydifferent whichare in part security strategies, priorities (Haftendorn, 1989) and theresulting and geopolitically determined. culturally whatotherfactors Besides culturaland geopolitical shape nationalsecuvariations, how are security rity strategies; strategies (commonto thestatesof a regionor an alliance) formedand modified? threatsand other-economic, ecologic, What is the relationship betweenmilitary will over the internal-challenges;under whichconditions one gain prominence other? continuum. 3. Changes fromone concept to anothertake place on a historical interconto One factor impactof transnational contributing change is the growing whichincreasingly forcesstatesto adapt to interand interdependence, nectedness
8 Otto Keck (1990) first called myattentionto the capacityof the "new institutionalism" blend the realistand to the liberal approach.

14

The Security Puzzle

In nationalinteractions. the Westawarenesshas grownthatsecurity no longer can or be The provision security exclusively predominantly realizedunilaterally. of nebetweenstates.Some challenges, cessitates cooperationratherthan confrontation such as the "greenhouseeffect," onlybe meton a global scale. can Is the growingawarenessof the necessity cooperativestrategies for limitedto the There is evidencethatthe SovietUnion and other Western industrialized states? East European statesare beginningto share this notion; what causes them to recognize and whatare theprospects ThirdWorldcountries to embrace it, for also it in a regionalcontext? Does a rational of to calculation costsand benefits contribute changein behavior, or of as are patterns actiontransformed a resultof social learning? 4. In the East-West nuclearweapons have produceda delicatebut basiconflict, callystablebalance of deterrence and self-deterrence whichhas transformed these weapons frominstruments warfareto instruments diplomacy. of of Because of its deliberatenuclearwar has becomeunacceptable and is no longera destructiveness, In likelycontingency. addition,a mutually reinforcing, incredibly expensivearms race has nurtured own reversaland has stimulated searchformutually its a profitIn able arms controlagreements. the West,military are contingencies increasingly replaced by economicand ecologicalchallengesto the well-being societiesand of states. been broughtabout and security Have the changes in threatperception strategies arms races, or by the political primarily the economic costs of maintaining by of inacceptability nuclear weapons, or by new challengesof the indiscriminate destructiveness posingan even greaterthreat? in and Whathas been theroleof newtechnologies, especially communication, of new in about thesechanges? management strategies bringing Whathave been the primary of forces change: themasspublicor thepolitical elites, and in whatkindof interactive processes? 5. A mixture self-interest positive of and experiencewithtransnational interactionsand international institutions reinforced cooperative has the behaviorof states in security affairs. has been facilitated specific It by regularpatterns actionand by of
negotiated institutions.

If theability cooperateis supported regimes to by and institutions, causes states what to transform existing patterns conflictual of interaction moredurableinstituinto tionswithcommonpractices, rules,and norms? If institutions half-way are houses betweenrecurrent but informal practicesand formal how muchinformality necessary provideflexibility organizations, is to and how muchorganization insurestability? to To what degree do international institutions provide new opportunities the for specialization participation unitsand, as a result, and of contribute thetransforto mationof the structure the international of system? Whyare thereso fewsecurity in regimes an East-West context, including United the Statesand theSovietUnion,and even fewer to pertaining Third Worldcountries and regions? To answerthesequestions, recent writings interdependence, on regimes, instituand tionsprovidea promising pointof departure. They need, however, be applied to to thestudyof security issues.Further empirical researchmight also solvea contradictionin Keohane's approach to international institutions when he postulates "lima itedexplanatory impactof systems structure" (1989:13) butat thesame timeassumes

HELGA HAFTENDORN

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on effects state in exert that"variations the degree of institutionalization substantial behavior"(1989:2-3). These are just some of the researchquestionsthatneed to be answeredbeforea A can be constructed. Promethean, global research general paradigmof security effort needed to solve the security is puzzle and to guide our workforglobal peace and security. VIII. whatis to be studied, Security studiesas an academicfieldis in need of clarification: studiesto be distinguished fromvarious how is it to be studied,and how is security the relations theother?At present, on subfields the one hand and international on field security of studiesis highly compartmentalized rangesfrom and peace research to strategic of studies.It suffers fromtheabsenceof a commonunderstanding what and whatits mostrelevant researchquessecurity how it can be conceptualized, is, tionsare. discredited because of its Kantianorientation Peace researchhas been somewhat not toward globalpeace and itsfocuson themostobviousbutoften themostrelevant followan idealistor liberalapproach; obstaclesto global peace. Most researchers paradigmsand theyuse a broad selectionof methods,rangingfromnormative have indeed Though someof theirresults behavioral approachesto critical theories. been trail-blazing, have been applied to policymaking. few in a thematic approach.Its focusis Strategic studies, contrast, follow morelimited to on themilitary of withspecialattention nuclearweaponsand dimensions security, and, paradigm, nuclearstrategy. Mostresearchers a Hobbesiannationalsecurity use in theirnormative to Their orientation, committed thegoal of nationalsurvival. are and is economic, approachis oftentechnical, scantattention devotedto thepolitical, and culturalaspectsof security. In the United States the fieldof international security studies has oftenbeen has problems made itunduly equated with strategic studies;itsemphasison technical narrow.In contrast, have tendedto shyawayfromthe"hard European researchers For them, facts"of weapons systems, and doctrines. nuclearstrategy, employment and peace researchhas provided an easy way out of a fieldwhere intellectually morally acceptablesolutions hard to achieve. are studieson The dichotomy betweenpeace researchon theone hand and strategic both.Research studiescould integrate theotherneed not be. International security of and problems security well as and teaching shouldfocuson thevariousparadigms withits as its political, and otherimplications. Strategic studies, economic,cultural, is emphasison military aspectsof security, one area of the field. of a in Ethnocentrism,limitation the past,could be an assetin theform culturally acquired specialexpertise.U.S. scholarswould teachothersabout nuclearweapons considand strategy of underconditions nucleardeterrence. Europeanshave always for ered history necessary a foundation empirical studies;theyare also expertson knowlThird Worldscholars wouldsharetheir theeconomicdimensions security. of of studies and dimensions security. Security edge of regionalconflicts the domestic it an could thusdevelop intoa truly international discipline; wouldbe studiedfrom committed the goal of globalsecuto and interdisciplinary intercultural perspective 1988). rity (Haftendorn,1988; Nye and Lynn-Jones, in Withthisinterdisciplinary intercultural and perspective mind,a setof relevant the for international security, including following: topicscan be formulated teaching of and history peace, war,and conflict; theory values,culturalheritageand threatperceptions; and conceptsof regional,international, global security;

16

The Security Puzzle

security regimesand institution-building; economic,natural resource,and ecological dimensionsof security; challengesof and terrorism drug traffic; on impactof technology and information dissemination international conflict; defensepoliciesof statesand theirdomesticfoundation; nuclearstrategy, weapons systems, armscontrol, and disarmament. Care mustbe taken,however, clarify relationship to the between international security studieson the one hand and international relations theother.International on as has relations a discipline traditionally focusedon peace and war,on international conflicts and their resolution, and on relationsbetweenstatesand international institutions (Czempiel,1965). In thecourseof itsevolution, normative the approach has been partlysuperseded by a positivistic behavioralist or emphasis on valueneutraldata. Recently, however,withgame theory(Oye, 1986a) and "new institutionalism" (Keohane, 1989), normative orientations have come back into the field. The dichotomy betweena normative and an empiricalsciencecan be overcomeif researchers keep in mindtheirmoralresponsibility the political for implications of theirresearch and their of commitment thepromotion international to peace (Daase and Moltmann,1989). The fieldsof international relationsand security studies should not therefore distinguished theirrelationship values. be to by I propose to considerinternational of security studiesa subfield the traditional international relations studiesto encomdiscipline. The expanded focusof security and cultural dimensions tendsindeed to blurtheboundpass itspolitical, economic, aries betweenfieldand subfield;the latter should not deal withthe whole universe but rather witha definedsetof core security The international relations paradigms. studiesby providingthe theoriesand disciplinecan enrichinternational security methods for and will necessary bothconceptualization analysis. Security studies yield theoretical and empirical on and explanations findings themanifestations conditions of security. I Instead of harmful competition betweenthe two fields, foreseetheir happyand lastingmarriage.
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