1. Introduction 2. Background and scope of the problem 2.1 2.

2 Colombia Mexico

2 3 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 7 9 10 10 12

3. Paramilitary groups, cartels and violence 3.1 3.2 3.3 The FARC and other illegal militias Cartel violence in Mexico Comparison

4. Policy 4.1 4.2 4.3 Project Kingpin and Plan Colombia Mexico U.S Policy Comparison

5. Conclusion 6. Bibliography

1. Introduction

In 2010 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released its World Drug Report detailing the progress member states have made in the fight against drugs. Whereas in the past policy has often revolved around directly attacking demand and supply of narcotics in the world markets, nowadays drug control is increasingly taking a more balanced approach, focused on development, security, justice and health (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010: 4). Since 2007 global cultivation of opium has declined by 23 per cent and coca by 28 per cent since 2000. The report makes the observation that in developing countries where illegal crops are grown it is necessary to tackle poverty and not just drugs. These countries are particularly susceptible to drug trafficking and other types of organised crime.

Colombia and Mexico are two countries which fall into this category of developing countries. They have both developed notorious reputations for its illegal drug trade. This illicit activity has led to widespread violence initiated by the powerful drug cartels and paramilitary forces. During an address at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2011, the United States Secretary of State Hilary Clinton commented that the drug problem in Mexico is looking more and more like Colombia looked twenty years ago where the narco-traffickers control certain parts of the country (Moore, 2011: 51). While one may argue that this is perhaps an oversimplification of the realities in the respective states, nevertheless a comparison may indeed be justified.

The purpose of this essay is to make a comparison between the drug problem encountered in Mexico and Colombia and in so doing attempt to validate Clintons comment. The essay will attempt to offer a contextual description of the problem by analysing the following variables: defining the scope of the drug trade, the paramilitary and violent groups the trade has spawned and internal policy towards dealing with the problem. Furthermore, since both states lie in close proximity to the United States and make significant contributions to the supply of narcotics in the U.S, this essay will compare the United States policies towards the respective
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countries. While the list of variables is not exhaustive, it is nevertheless sufficient to provide one with a fair understanding of the realities encountered by the two countries.

2. Background and scope of the problem

2.1 Colombia

Colombia is the only country in the world that produces high quantities of the main plant-based narcotics: heroin (opium), cocaine (coca) and marijuana (Thoumi, 2005: 8). During the 1990s, 80 per cent of the cocaine that entered the United States originated from one drug cartel in Colombia (Political Risk Services, 2004: 31). Globally, Colombia produces 43 per cent of the world supply of cocaine. Furthermore the cocaine cultivated in Colombia is said to be the purest in the market.

The revenue generated by production and trafficking is used to bribe government officials, pay for political assassinations and finance guerrilla groups. Thoumi (2005: 7) believes that drug trafficking and production have been significant features of Colombian history for the last four decades. This problem has had major negative effects on the social, political and economic infrastructure and institutions in the country. Politicians and other government officials have in the past been highly dependent on the illicit drug trade for power and influence. For example in 1994, it was discovered that newly elected President Ernesto Sampers campaign had been financed by drug money (Thoumi, 2005: 13). This has created a society where the rule of law is constantly undermined. For ordinary citizens buying and selling contraband, falsifying documentation to achieve employment, evading taxes, and paying bribes to public officials are socially accepted behaviours (Thoumi, 2005: 19).

2.2 Mexico

Gonzalez (2009: 72) traces the roots of the trafficking of illegal substances from Mexico to the United States to the period of the American Civil War. Mexico is a major producer of marijuana and heroin. However its location makes it an important
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transit country for illegal drugs into the United States that are produced elsewhere. While cultivated and produced primarily in Colombia and the surrounding areas, it is estimated that 90 per cent of the cocaine that enters the United States passes through Mexico. In 2006 it was estimated that 60 per cent of all drug revenue in Mexico comes from exporting marijuana to the United States (Kilmer, Caulkins, Bond & Reuter, 2006: 3). Furthermore in the mid-1990s it was claimed that that the revenue generated by the trafficking of illegal drugs into the United States was in excess of $10 billion, which is more revenue than oil ($7.4 billion), the countrys largest legal commodity export (Gootenburg, 2010). Mexico is also one of the main suppliers of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines to the U.S (Gonzalez, 2009:72).

In circumstances similar to that of Colombia, the revenue generated by the illicit drug trade is used to bribe government officials and finance paramilitary groups. There is widespread violence between the competing cartels as well as the counter insurgency government forces. This has led to state of generalized fear and a perception of acute vulnerability (Gonzalez, 2009:72).

3. Paramilitary groups, cartels and violence

3.1 The FARC and other illegal militias

During the 1970s and 1980s the drug trade in Colombia was run primarily by the drug cartels. However with the demise of the cartels it has been run primarily run by certain paramilitary groups.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is one the strongest illegal militia groups in Colombia. The others include United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The FARC was formed in 1964 and has traditionally viewed itself as a revolutionary force with the aim of coming to power and instituting a socialist system. It was only during the 1990s that the FARC became a player and influence in the drugs trade. During this period the United States and the Colombian government were successful in dismantling the
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powerful Medellin and Cali cartels which themselves had powerful paramilitary elements. The resulting imbalances in the drugs trade enabled the FARC to assume greater power in the areas of coca cultivation and trafficking routes. From 1995 to 2002 the FARC had increased its number of combatants from 7000 to 18 000 situated throughout the country (Peceny & Durnan, 2006: 95). The FARC has managed to provide protection to drug dealers from government forces. Furthermore it has managed to build a support base from peasants who have resorted to coca cultivation.

In 2009 the United Nations estimated the total annual income of FARC at $342 million of which $202 million is from illegal drugs trafficking. This money is used to finance their political agendas. (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010: 40). The organisation has employed kidnapping, extortion and hijacking in order to achieve its political aims.

3.2 Cartel violence in Mexico The demise of the power of the cartels in Colombia had a direct influence on the emergence of powerful Mexican cartels; the drugs entering the United States needed another supplier. Kellner and Pipitone observe that for a long period Flix Gallardo was the head of the main cartel in Mexico and instituted a nationwide trafficking network whose members rarely resorted to violence (2010: 2). He divided up territory and orchestrated the drug trade. Even after he was arrested in 1989, he was able to direct operations from prison. However during the 1990s there was a major counterinsurgency effort in Colombia and the Colombians began to rely heavily on the Mexicans to distribute their product in the United States. Mexican drug

traffickers began to wield more power and set up their own networks independent of Gallardo. In 2000 it was estimated that in the United States $62 billion was spent on illegal drugs, $36 billion of which was on cocaine, of which 90 per cent was supplied through Mexico. Violence escalated as competing drug trafficking organisations fought for territory and market share.

Currently the main rivalry that exists is between the Sinaloa Cartel (run by Joaqun El Chapo Guzmn, the successor of Gallardo) and the Gulf Cartel which emerged during the power struggle of the 1990s. In 1997 the Gulf Cartel began to recruit military personnel for security purposes and this led to the formation of a sub group called the Los Zetas. This group assumed more power within the organisation and began to employ the means of killing, kidnapping and extortion to achieve its aims. Kellner and Pipitone claim that while Sinola Cartel tried to maintain the veneer of a legitimate business enterprise, the Gulf Cartel burnished a bloody, violent image (2010:32).

Due to the power and brutality of Los Zetas the city of Nuevo Laredo became ungovernable. In 2005 the newly appointed police chief Alejandro Domnguez Coello committed himself to the safety and security of its citizens. Within hours of his appointment he was brutally murdered by the Los Zetas (Grayson, 2008: Internet). There have been numerous ruthless murders conducted by members of the Los Zetas on police personnel, government officials and ordinary citizens.

Bonner (2010: 35) believes that ultimately the rise of these cartels to power and influence can be attributed to three factors: pre-existing corruption, the inability of weak law enforcement institutions to counter them, and the demand for illegal drugs in the United States.

3.3 Comparison

It is important to remember the distinctions between these violent factions. In Colombia the FARC and other paramilitary groups have political aims and agendas. The drug money is the means through which they finance these agendas. Attempts have been made to negotiate with them. However in Mexico for the cartels and drug gangs this is not the case. Their power is focused around the drug trade itself and protecting and expanding their share in the trade. Therefor it would seem that different policy options should be applied in different cases.

4. Policy
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4.1 Project Kingpin and Plan Colombia During the 1970s and 1980s the drug trade in Colombia was run primarily by the Medellin and by the Cali drug cartels. During the early 1990s the United States antidrug policy in Colombia involved targeting the respective leaders of the cartels in what became known as Project Kingpin. The rationale was that by going after the intellectual component of the drug trafficking, the infrastructure for producing and transporting cocaine would be removed (CATO Institute Policy Forum, 2001: 3) Project Kingpin was successful in its stated aims; Pablo Escobar the notorious drug lord of the Medellin cartel was killed in 1993. Many other influential figures in the cartels were either killed or extradited to face prison sentences in the United States.

During the ensuing power vacuum that followed, the FARC became increasingly influential. Despite the efforts to eradicate the drug cartels during the 1990s, Colombia was becoming a failed state. In 1994 Ernesto Samper was elected president. It was believed in the United States that he had received financial aid from one of the cartels. The United States began to distance itself from Colombia and even revoked President Sampers visa (CATO Institute Policy Forum, 2001: 3).

In 1998 newly elected Colombian President Andrs Pastrana developed Plan Colombia which was a programme that sought to end the countrys 40-year old armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and social development (Veilette, 2005: 1). In 2000 President Pastrana pledged $4 billion towards the programme and encouraged other members of the international community to provide assistance. United States President Clinton pledged a further $1.6 billion before the end of his term. Further assistance was given under President Bushs term and the total assistance to date provided to Colombia from the United States is approximately $10 billion. The central components of the relationship is increased cooperation between the U.S and Colombian officials and militarisation of anti-drug law enforcement.

From 2002 to 2010 Alvaro Uribe served as president of Colombia. Uribe continued the fight against drugs and in particular was successful in demilitarising some the paramilitary groups. However the Colombian armed forced were criticised for using excessive force. There were certain operations carried out that received attention from the United Nations and Human Rights Watch for human rights abuses and collateral damage (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2004: 4). In response to Uribes policies the FARC made the following declaration in 2002: The FARC reaffirms its unwavering revolutionary commitment to continue the battle to win political power using a combination of all forms of struggleNothing and no one will succeed in derailing the political objectives of our organisation which has risen in arms for the conquest of peace and social justice (Social Policy, 2003: 40).

That part of the programme that sought to affect the supply side of coca became known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). It has been largely successful. Part of the strategy has been the aerial eradication of drugs by spraying chemicals over the coca plantations. In ten years the cultivation of coca in Colombia has decreased by 58 per cent. With the aid of an enhanced police force, drug seizures have increased since 2001 - seizing more cocaine than any other country in the world. In 2008 it seized more than 400 metric tons of cocaine. (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010:166).

In 2011 Juan Manuel Santos became president. The FARC are believed to have operations in neighbouring Venezuela. Under Uribes presidency there was tension between his administration and Chavezs regarding this issue. However President Santos has sought to normalise relations with Venezuela and attempt to curb the activities of the FARC on the Colombian / Venezuelan border.

It is important to remember that while the U.S has provided significant assistance the aims of the respective parties have not always overlapped. According to Veilette (2005: 1), the primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, while the primary objectives of Colombia are to promote peace and economic development, and increase security. Addressing drug trafficking is considered a key aspect of those objectives.

4.2 Mexico U.S Policy Bonner (2010:37) notes that the corrupt relationship that many government and public service officials had with the cartels began to disintegrate with the presidential election in 2000. For the first time in Mexican history the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost the presidential election to Vicente Fox from the National Action Party (PAN). This was a major event for the progress of Mexicos developing democracy after decades of one-party rule. Fox initiated a few significant projects in the fight against drugs: he reformed the police force and began extraditing significant numbers of traffickers to the United States (numbers rose from 6 to 133 under Foxs presidency). Furthermore when Loz Zetas threatened to take control of Nuevo Laredo in 2005, Fox sent the military to prevent further violence in the region. Gonzalez (2009: 74) notes that this policy, though effective at raising the number of individuals arrested and drug shipments confiscated, fell far short of the governments objective of defeating the cartels. The disturbance of the cartels led to higher levels of violence as competing cartels tried to reorganise themselves. Furthermore the cartels increased their bribery of the police and state officials. In 2005 it was discovered that a spy for one of the cartels had been working for the presidency.

In 2006 Felipe Calderon of PAN was elected as president. Calderon has been more aggressive in his approach and has sought to end the drug violence much the same way Pastrana did in Colombia. A similar programme to that of Plan Colombia has been implemented in Mexico with United States assistance in what has been called the Merida Initiative. In 2009 alone Mexico received $830 million from the United States as part of this initiative (Gootenburg, 2010:3). During Calderons presidency Mexican army troops have increased to 45 000. However his tactics have led to the death of more than 26 000 people. While approximately 90 per cent of the murders involve rival cartel members killing each other, the other 10 per cent involves the deaths of soldiers, policemen and civilians. These figures suggest to Bonner (2010: 47) that Calderons policy is destabilising the cartels significantly. Calderon has also strengthened the security at ports and border posts. It is estimated that 80 tonnes of cocaine have been confiscated since the beginning of his presidency.
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Widespread violence and brutality between competing cartels and police has nevertheless continued. On September 21 2011 thirty-five mutilated bodies were dumped in the middle of a busy road in the state of Veracruz. Among the victims are members with links to organised crime. One of them is believed to be a police officer. (Associated Press, 2011: Internet).

4.3 Comparison

In both countries aggressive attempts have been made to destroy the cartels and the influence of the paramilitary groups. But these groups yield so much power that in both instances there is lawlessness and chaos. Bribery and corruption have prevented effective policy being implemented.

From the above analysis one could argue that the motivations for the United States providing assistance to Colombia and Mexico are similar. Firstly, both countries are very close to American shores and therefore it is in the interest of the United States to make sure that there is regional stability. Secondly the drug trade is fuelled by high demand coming from America. In order to curb its local problem the United States is attempting to tackle the supply side of the drug trade.

5. Conclusion

While there are many similarities between Colombia and Mexico regarding narcotics, Clintons statement is perhaps an oversimplification of the real problems and concerns that the respective countries face. Both countries are the source of large supplies of some the worlds major illegal drugs. Both countries have faced or are currently facing widespread violence from insurgent groups and cartels financed by drug money. Since both countries are in the same region as the United States, it is in the U.Ss interest to assist the government authorities in their war on drugs. Consequently both countries have implemented aggressive strategies to fight the cartels and insurgent groups.

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However the differences between the circumstances also need to be highlighted in order to make sure that policy options are appropriate. The insurgent groups in Colombia in the current environment, like the FARC, are political forces and have political agendas. The drug trade is the means whereby these groups finance their agendas. In Mexico the cartels have no political agendas; the war between the competing factions is over the drug trade itself: territory, supply, trafficking routes.

The analysis of the variables presented each country in isolation. However it must be understood that the illicit drug trade in each country is interconnected. The power of the cartels in Mexico increased and the drug infrastructure improved as the Colombian cartels activities were hampered during the 1990s. Furthermore, much of the drugs produced in Colombia enter the United States via the Mexican trafficking routes. Policy makers have realised that drug policy is more complex than affecting the supply or the demand side of the market; production and trafficking routes will adjust themselves by finding alternatives. Therefore many have argued that drug policy needs to adopt an integrated broad based approach based on politics, law enforcement, public health, economics, social science and psychology.

Word count: 32
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6. Bibliography Associated Press, 2011. Mexico Police Seek Clues in Dumping of 35 Bodies. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903703604576585233663690762.ht ml. Accessed: 2011.09.25. Bonner, R. C., 2010. The New Cocaine Cowboys Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89(4). CATO Institute Policy Forum., 2001. Plan Colombia: Should we Escalate the War on Drugs? The CATO Instititute. Gonzlez, F.E., 2009. Mexicos drug wars get brutal Current history, Vol. 108(715). Gootenburg, P., 2010. Blowback: The Mexican Drug Crisis NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 43(6). Grayson, G. 2008. Los Zetas: The ruthless army spawned by a Mexican drug cartel. Foreign policy research institute. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200805.grayson.loszetas.html Accessed: 2011.09.23 Holmes, J.S. & Gutierrez de Pineres, S.A. 2006. Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 25(1). Kellner, T. & Pipitone, F., 2010. Inside Mexico's drug war World Policy Journal, Vol. 27(1). Landman, T. 2000. Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An introduction. Routledge, New York. Moore, G., 2011. No Mans Land: The Mystery of Mexicos Drug Wars World Affairs, Vol. 173(5). O'Neil, S., 2009. The Real War in Mexico Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88(4). Peceny, M. & Durnan, M., 2006. The FARC's best friend: U.S. antidrug policies and the deepening of Colombia's civil war in the 1990s Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 48(2). Political Risk Services. 2004. Colombia Country Forecast. Political Risk Services. Reiss, S., 2010. Beyond Supply and Demand: Obama's Drug Wars in Latin America. NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 43(1). Social Policy. The FARC Controversy. 2003. Social Policy, 33(4). Thoumi, F.E., 2005. The Colombian competitive advantage in illegal drugs: The role of policies and institutional changes Journal of Drug Issues, Vol. 35(1).
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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010. World Drug Report 2010 United Nations. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2004. Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia.
http://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/Informe2004_eng.p df

Accessed: 25.09.2011 Veillette, C., 2005. Plan Colombia: A Progress Report Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress.

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