UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE

Philosophical Method in Wittgensteins On Certainty DISSERTATION submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Philosophy by Brian Bruce Rogers

Dissertation Committee: Distinguished Professor Penelope Maddy, Chair Professor David G. Stern, University of Iowa Professor Emeritus Alan Nelson Assistant Professor Jeremy Heis

2011

UMI Number: 3460827

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Images in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 2000 Oxford University Press, University of Bergen, and the Wittgenstein Trustees All other materials 2011 Brian Bruce Rogers

Zeynep iin...

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF TABLES LIST OF SYMBOLS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS CURRICULUM VITAE ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1: The Right Frame of Mind for Doing Philosophy CHAPTER 2: The Final Manuscripts Source Manuscripts for Wittgensteins Final Publications Selected Pages from the Final Manuscripts CHAPTER 3: On Certainty and Wittgenstein's 'Works' CHAPTER 4: Therapeutic Readings CHAPTER 5: Theory and Therapy in On Certainty CHAPTER 6: The Reception of On Certainty BIBLIOGRAPHY iv v vi vii viii xi 1 19 46 76 77 82 94 125 162 179

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LIST OF FIGURES
Page Figure 1: MS 169, p. 81r Figure 2: MS 169, p. 78r Figure 3: MS 171, Front Cover Figure 4: MS 173, p. 31v Figure 5: MS 175, p. 79 Figure 6: MS 176, p. 22r Figure 7: MS 175, p. 34v Figure 8: MS 176, p. 19v Figure 9: MS 176, p. 24r Figure 10: MS 176, p. 46v 47 48 53 63 77 78 79 80 81 85

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LIST OF TABLES
Page Table 1: Source Manuscripts for Wittgenstein's Final Publications 76

LIST OF SYMBOLS
The following abbreviations for Wittgensteins philosophical publications are used in this work:

BT LWPP2 OC PI RoC

The Big Typescript, TS 213, eds. Luckhardt & Aue, Blackwell, Oxford, 2005. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. II, eds. von Wright & Nyman, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992. On Certainty, eds. Anscombe & von Wright, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969. Philosophical Investigations, 4th Ed., eds. Hacker & Schulte, Blackwell, Oxford, 2009. Remarks on Colour, ed. Anscombe, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My thinking on Wittgensteins philosophy has benefitted from discussions with Pen Maddy, David Stern, Alan Nelson, Jeremy Heis, Kai Wehmeier, and Josef Rothhaupt. Im especially grateful for Pens support, encouragement, and keen criticism over the years. The work of David and Josef has served as an ideal toward which I have strived. Work on the first three chapters of this dissertation was carried out in Europe while participating in an exchange program with the University of Salzburg. I would like to recognize the assistance provided during this time by Jonathan Smith at the Wren Library in Trinity College, Cambridge, Alois Pichler at the Wittgenstein archives at the University of Bergen, Joseph Wang at the Brenner Archive at the University of Innsbruck, and Johannes Brandl at the University of Salzburg. I thank Oxford University Press, the University of Bergen, and the Wren Library at Trinity College, Cambridge for permission to include selected images from the Bergen Electronic Edition of Wittgensteins Nachlass in my dissertation. Financial support was provided by the Graduate Division, School of Social Sciences, and Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of California, Irvine.

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Brian Rogers
Curriculum Vitae University of California, Irvine Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science EDUCATION Ph.D, Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, 2011 M.A., Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, 2009 B.A., Philosophy (minor in Religion) (Summa cum Laude), University of Northern Iowa, 2004 AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION History of Analytic Philosophy, Wittgenstein AREAS OF COMPETENCE Logic (through Incompleteness), Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy of Language, Early Modern Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science DISSERTATION Theory and Therapy in Wittgensteins On Certainty Committee: Penelope Maddy (chair), Jeremy Heis, David Stern (Iowa), Alan Nelson (North Carolina, Chapel Hill) ARTICLES Wittgensteins Philosophical Methods in On Certainty Language and World, V. Munz, K. Puhl, & J. Wang (eds.), Kirchberg am Wechsel 2009: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 360-362. Descartes Logic and the Paradox of Deduction (with co-author Alan Nelson) Gods and Giants in Early Modern Philosophy, P. Easton (ed.), U. of Toronto Press (forthcoming). viii

BOOKS Wittgensteins Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933, from the Notes of G.E. Moore (with co-editors David Stern and Gabriel Citron) Cambridge University Press (forthcoming) WORKS UNDER REVIEW Tractarian First-Order Logic: Identity and the N-Operator (with coauthor Kai Wehmeier) PRESENTATIONS Propositional Functions and Expressive Completeness of Tractarian Logic American Philosophical Association/Association for Symbolic Logic, San Diego, CA, April 2011 Propositional Functions and the N-Operator University of California, Irvine, Dept. of Logic & Philosophy of Science, April 2011 Tractarian First-Order Logic: Identity and the N-Operator (with co-author Kai Wehmeier) Southern California History & Philosophy of Logic & Mathematics Group, October 2010 Wittgensteins Philosophical Methods in On Certainty 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg, Austria, August 2009 Wittgensteins N-Operator and the Question of Expressive Completeness University of Salzburg, Department of Philosophy, June 2009 Cognition and Inference in Descartes (presented by second author Alan Nelson) Yale University History of Philosophy Series, April 2009

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RESEARCH ACTIVITIES August 2009 Research on Wittgensteins correspondence at the Brenner Archiv in Innsbruck, Austria. February 2009 Research at the Wittgenstein archive at the Wren Library, Trinity College, University of Cambridge. February 2009 Research at the G.E. Moore archive at the Cambridge University Library, University of Cambridge. February 2009 Visitor at the Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen, Norway. 2008-2009 UC Irvine/Salzburg University exchange program participant. AWARDS Graduate Deans Dissertation Fellowship for dissertation research. (Spring 2011) Social Science Associate Deans Fellowship for research. (Fall 2010) Social Science Pre-Dissertation Fellowship for dissertation research. (Spring 2007) Logic and Philosophy of Science Summer Fellowship for research. (2010, 2008, 2007, 2006) Social Science Merit Fellowship for graduate study. (2004-2009)

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Philosophical Method in Wittgensteins On Certainty by Brian Bruce Rogers

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, Irvine, 2011 Distinguished Professor Penelope Maddy, Chair

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein aims to demotivate philosophical theorizing by examining the conditions under which philosophical puzzlement arises. His goal is to enact this therapy without advancing controversial philosophical theories himself. The implementation of this new methodology distinguishes the late Wittgenstein from the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. After completing work on the Investigations, Wittgenstein continued to write philosophical remarks, including those published in On Certainty, until xi

his death in 1951. Recently, some interpreters have called for the recognition of a third phase of Wittgensteins career associated with On Certainty, during which Wittgenstein purportedly lost interest in the therapeutic goals of his second phase and adopted a systematic approach to classical epistemological problems. In this dissertation I challenge the idea of a third Wittgenstein by arguing that Wittgenstein retained his therapeutic aims in On Certainty although he was not always successful in fulfilling his methodological goals. A survey of Wittgensteins correspondence reveals that he consistently criticized the quality of his writing throughout the year 1950. Yet in the spring of 1951, just weeks before his death, Wittgenstein reported that he had regained his philosophical capacities and was doing his best work in years. These fluctuations in Wittgensteins assessment of his writing correspond to the dates he underwent cancer treatments that affected his cognitive abilities. The results of philological investigation show that the first half of On Certainty was written during Wittgensteins self-critical phase, while the second half was written during his final weeks of satisfactory work. The early remarks of the book contain a response to G.E. Moores attempt to refute skepticism that is based on a theory of hinge propositions. Later in the book Wittgenstein implements a more therapeutic, less dogmatic method in his treatment of Moore. By exploring the ways that Moores philosophical xii

assertions can be used in everyday contexts, Wittgenstein wishes to lead us to question whether we fully understand what Moore is trying to say. I argue that Wittgenstein was satisfied by this latter response to Moore because it fulfilled the therapeutic and anti-theoretical aims of his later philosophy.

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Introduction
76 Storeys Way Cambridge 16.4.51. Dear Norman, Thanks for your letter. Apart from a certain weakness which has constant ups & downs I'm feeling very well these days. My room here is much more agreable than the one in Oxford. Not that anyone could possibly be kinder to me than Miss Anscombe was; & I was very happy there, too, while I was ill. But now that I'm up the whole day I prefer it here. Thanks for sending me the book Kon-tiki. I've often heard of it & it's bound to be interesting. I saw Moore twice recently & had discussions with him. One very bad one, the other fairly good. I was responsible for the bad one's being bad. An extraordinary thing has happened to me. About a month ago I suddenly found myself in the right frame of mind for doing philosophy. I had been absolutely certain that I'd never again be able to do it. It's the first time after more than 2 years that the curtain in my brain has gone up. Of course, so far I've only worked for about 5 weeks & it may be all over by tomorrow; but it bucks me up a lot now. I'm indoors most of the time, all the more as the weather is pretty rotten & very cold, but I can go out for short strolls. I want to go to Oxford before long to visit Smythies & Bouwsma if all goes well with me. Miss Anscombe sends her good wishes. Give my love to everybody. Affectionately Ludwig Remember me to Dr Mooney. I like to think of her. 1

Letter written by Wittgenstein to Norman Malcolm on April 16, 1951. All quotations from Wittgensteins correspondence in this work are from (Wittgenstein 2004). The spelling and grammatical errors occasionally encountered in these letters have been reproduced without correction in the quotations.

This is the final known letter of Ludwig Wittgenstein. He wrote it just two weeks before his death. Wittgenstein had recently moved into the home of his personal doctor in Cambridge to receive constant medical attention. Just over a year earlier he had been diagnosed with prostate cancer. The prognosis was now dire; Wittgenstein was told he only had a few weeks left to live. As Wittgenstein reports in his letter to Norman Malcolm, in March of 1951 something extraordinary happened to him. He had suddenly found himself in the finest mental condition for engaging in philosophy that he had been in for two years. During that time he had remained convinced that, given his age and state of ill health, he had completely lost his ability to do philosophy. One might naturally assume from this letter that Wittgenstein had completely abandoned philosophical activity for some time, but this is not the case. Over the previous eighteen months Wittgenstein had composed a significant number of philosophical remarks. Selections from this material were published posthumously in Culture and Value, Remarks on Colour, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II, and On Certainty. The remarks published as On Certainty begin by addressing G.E. Moores famous attempt to prove the existence of the external world by remarking, Here is one handand here is another (Moore 1939, p. 166). Wittgenstein then goes on to consider the epistemological concepts of doubt, 2

certainty, and knowledge, as well as the variety of uses that the terms for these concepts are put to. Since its publication in 1969, themes from On Certainty have received a good amount of attention from Wittgenstein scholars in numerous articles and a handful of book-length treatments. A new surge of interest in the book over the last decade is largely due to Danile Moyal-Sharrock. She has advocated for assigning On Certainty a special place in the Wittgenstein corpus, arguing that it marks a final phase in his career that should be distinguished from the phase associated with Philosophical Investigations. When this book was published shortly after his death, the thematic and methodological differences between the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations were so striking to readers that it became commonplace to figuratively speak of two Wittgensteins: the early Wittgenstein, whose work finished with the publication of the Tractatus and a move to rural Austria to become a schoolteacher, and the late Wittgenstein, whose career began in the early thirties in Cambridge and culminated in the publication of Philosophical Investigations.2 Work on the typescript for Part II of the Investigations was completed in 1949, but as mentioned above, after this point Wittgenstein continued to produce new

The appropriateness of sharply dividing Wittgensteins career into these two phases has in recent decades become the subject of scholarly debate, though the terminology of early and late remains entrenched. See (Stern 2005) for a survey of this literature.

philosophical writing until his death in 1951. The phase consisting of these final writings has thus come to be known as the third Wittgenstein:3 the development in Wittgensteins thought is such as to warrant the distinction of a post-Investigations, a third Wittgenstein, from the indiscriminate assemblage of what is referred to as the second or the later Wittgenstein. This demarcation wouldindicate not only a new phase in Wittgensteins thinking, but also that Wittgenstein was the author of three, not two, philosophical masterpieces. (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, p. 1) The introduction of this distinction in Wittgensteins career has been lauded and adopted by several interpreters, most notably Avrum Stroll, who describes the recognition of a third Wittgenstein as a deep and original insightI am in agreement with MoyalSharrock that we should divide Wittgensteins career into three phases: the First Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, the Second of the Investigations, and the Third of On Certainty.4 (2004, p. 22)

In the present work I adopt the following terminology for the phases of Wittgensteins career. The second Wittgenstein will refer to the phase beginning with a return to Cambridge in 1929 and finishing with the construction of the typescript now known as Part II of Philosophical Investigations in 1949. (For simplification, I include what some have called Wittgensteins middle or transitional period approximately 1929-1933 in the second Wittgenstein.) I designate the notebooks composed between 1949 and 1951 as the final writings. I mention the third Wittgenstein when referring to the particular interpretation of Wittgensteins project in the final writings espoused by Moyal-Sharrock et al. Finally, I associate the later Wittgenstein with all of the writings after 1929. The later phase thus includes both the second and final phases. 4 Moyal-Sharrock demarcates the third Wittgenstein corpus as essentially [the] post-1949 (post-PI) work; for the most part, notes that have been divided into what we know as: Remarks on Colour, the second volume of Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology and On Certainty (Moyal-Sharrock 2002, p. 294 fn. 2). In a later characterization of the third Wittgenstein (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 2), the demarcation is expanded to include all of the writings from 1946 onward. In addition to the publications previously mentioned, this expansion also includes remarks published as Part II of the Philosophical Investigations, most of the remarks in Zettel, both volumes of Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, volume 1 of Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, and a selection of remarks from Culture and Value. In this dissertation I focus on the earlier, narrower characterization of the third Wittgenstein as comprised only of the 1949-1951 notebooks. (See the beginning of chapter 3 for the justification of this choice.) For an account of Wittgensteins writings from 1946 to 1949, see (Schulte 1993).

The case for distinguishing a post-Investigations phase of Wittgensteins career rests on three major claims. 1) The philosophical importance and quality of On Certainty is of comparable stature to the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations; indeed, Wittgenstein was the author of three, not two great works: On Certainty is Wittgensteins third masterpiece (Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner 2005, p. 1). 2) After 1949 Wittgensteins thought moves in new directions: On Certainty is a highly original work, in many ways quite different from the Investigations (Stroll 1994, p. 7). The philosophical issues in On Certainty are confronted by Wittgenstein for the first time, for the theme of this work [is] different from anything that Wittgenstein produced earlier (Stroll 2004, p. 22). 3) Wittgensteins post-Investigations writing reveals a shift in philosophical method. One of the most salient differences between the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations concerns the apparent methods applied in the texts. While in the Tractatus Wittgenstein is primarily concerned to answer fundamental questions of metaphysics and philosophical logic5, in Philosophical Investigations he adopts a new

This is at least Wittgensteins aim according to standard readings of the Tractatus. Such readings have in recent decades come under attack by interpreters who argue that Wittgenstein employs a therapeutic methodology in this book as well. In the present work I will not enter into this debate about the Tractatus, for my argument relies merely on an understanding of Wittgenstein as being driven by deflationary and therapeutic intentions in

deflationary, therapeutic method that seeks to make philosophical problems completely disappear (PI 133) and not advance any kind of theory (PI 109). The transition from Wittgensteins second career phase to his third is also characterized by a methodological break, for the third Wittgensteinsomehow lost interest in the therapeutic enterprise in his last years (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, p. 5).6 Wittgenstein abandoned his therapeutic goals in his final years, instead attempting to answer traditional epistemological questions in a theoretical and systematic manner: the highly therapeutic thrust of the Investigations is much diminished in On Certainty. Wittgenstein is himself caught up in relatively straightforward, classical philosophical concerns about the nature of certainty and its relationship to human knowledge. (Stroll 1994, p. 7) The goal of this dissertation is to present what could be called a therapeutic reading of On Certainty. In using this terminology I am not, however, claiming to give an interpretation that is analogous to recent therapeutic readings of the Tractatus.7 Such a reading would require an understanding of On Certainty as a carefully planned and executed text that consistently works towards a therapeutic goal. On the contrary, I will argue that Wittgenstein did not consistently satisfy his therapeutic ideals in his

Philosophical Investigations, and such a position is well established in the secondary literature. 6 A similar opinion is held by Frongia and McGuinness, who suggest that there is a pronounced change in Wittgensteins attitude towards constructive and systematic ways of doing philosophy. Certainly there seems to be a loss of interest in the therapeutic aim of removing mental cramps (1990, p. 35). 7 Thus I will provide an interpretation that differs from what Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner identify as the therapeutic reading approach[ing] On Certainty in the spirit of New Wittgenstein commentators (2005, p. 3).

final writings. But this does not mean that he abandoned the methodological goals of the Investigations in his final years, for, as I will show, Wittgenstein was most satisfied with work during this time when it succeeded in meeting these ideals. My interpretation directly challenges the third claim made by the authors above. In his final years Wittgenstein did not adopt a new philosophical method. Those remarks that some readers take to indicate a change in Wittgensteins later methodology should instead be understood as indicating periods during which Wittgenstein was not successful in satisfying his metaphilosophical goals. The case for recognizing a third phase in Wittgensteins career is severely destabilized when its third pillar the claim that Wittgenstein changed his philosophical methodology in On Certainty is removed. The recent work of Kim van Gennip, tracing the development of themes addressed in On Certainty in writings, lectures, and discussions from the thirties and forties, has also undermined the second pillar concerning the supposed uniqueness and separability of On Certainty with respect to the rest of Wittgensteins Nachlass.8 This leaves only the first pillar, namely the claim that ideas attributed to Wittgenstein by certain readers are of high philosophical value. I will not contest this evaluation, but rather argue that it is not sufficient to warrant the recognition of a distinct phase in Wittgensteins philosophical development.

(van Gennip 2008)

A fundamental assumption held by most interpreters who advocate for the recognition of a third phase of Wittgensteins career is that On Certainty is one of Wittgensteins works. This assumption makes it possible for them to afford the book a status similar to that of Philosophical Investigations and the Tractatus the two publications widely agreed to be works of Wittgenstein. I will argue that the conception of On Certainty as one of Wittgensteins works is unwarranted. The question of whether this title is appropriately assigned to a piece of historical writing is of real importance to interpreters, for the notion of a work is bound together with a number of suppositions concerning the writings internal structure and the authors attitudes about this writing. In particular, a work is generally taken to systematically develop a theme, consist of a carefully planned structure, and be conceived by the author to form a cohesive unit. The satisfaction of these conditions is what legitimates common interpretive techniques in the history of philosophy such as rational reconstruction, including the attempt, particularly by advocates of the recognition of a third Wittgenstein, to reconstruct the purported underlying epistemological theory not explicitly stated in the text of On Certainty. The conception of On Certainty as a self-standing work was enabled by its editors, who in their preface claimed that it constitutes a single sustained treatment of the topic of Moores attempted proof, which he apparently took up at four separate periods during this eighteen months. 8

These claims have had a real effect on how commentators have come to understand the nature of these final notes; indeed, advocates for the recognition of a third Wittgenstein have cited these very editorial claims as evidence that On Certainty is one of Wittgensteins works. For the editors to call the book a sustained treatment invites the reader to assume that Wittgenstein had already worked out its fundamental ideas before beginning composition, and that his eighteen-month process of composition was one of continually developing a single theme. In the first two chapters of this dissertation I will show that these editorial claims are very misleading, by carefully investigating the biographical and philological details of the composition of On Certainty. This will result in a more accurate understanding of the nature of the book, the relation of its source manuscripts to contemporaneous items in Wittgensteins Nachlass, and the degree to which its structure is a result of editorial construction. I believe that an interpretation of On Certainty can benefit from being informed by details relating to the conditions under which it was composed. Yet a preliminary defense of this extended investigation of historical circumstances may be called for. Such an investigation might be considered by some to be merely of historical interest and irrelevant to a strictly philosophical interpretation of a historical text: a philosophical historian of philosophy [is] someone who postpones until the very last moment the abandonment of belief in the reasonableness of the views of the philosophers she studies; a piece of philosophical history of philosophy is an 9

attempt to reconstruct the justification for a philosophical view. A non-philosophical intellectual historian, by contrast, will be happy to appeal to non-justificatory explanatory factors at a much earlier stage in her account of a view, or of a change of view. (Morris 2008, p. 9) As declared earlier, the legitimacy of submitting a historical text to the technique of argumentative reconstruction depends on very basic assumptions about the nature of that text and the authors relation to it. While such assumptions are satisfied in the large majority of cases, the evidence I will provide shows that they are unfounded with respect to On Certainty. This means that an investigation into the very nature of the text itself is necessary to inform an appropriate reading of the book. Indeed, the revised understanding I provide of the status of On Certainty in the Wittgenstein corpus will serve as the foundation for my account of the methodologies applied in those remarks. Thus, a historical investigation into the composition of a text can in some cases serve as preparation for better philosophical interpretations which account for what kind of text the book actually is. Chapter 1 of this dissertation constructs an account of Wittgensteins philosophical activities during the final two years of his life from extant letters written to friends, colleagues, and family members. Special emphasis is placed on Wittgensteins own assessment of the quality of his work during this time, as well as the relation of his philosophical productivity to the major events of his final years, particularly the treatment he underwent for

10

prostate cancer. Wittgenstein was prompted to consider the topics discussed in On Certainty during a visit to his former student Norman Malcolm in the fall of 1949. After returning home he maintained a correspondence with Malcolm, and these letters show that Wittgenstein was consistently critical of his work throughout 1950 and the beginning of 1951. However, as seen in his final letter to Malcolm quoted above, Wittgenstein subsequently reported that he was finally mentally capable of doing satisfactory work in philosophy, a state he had not achieved for the past two years. By March of 1951, when this change happened to Wittgenstein, he had already composed the remarks that make up roughly the first half of On Certainty. In the six weeks following this event his pace of work greatly accelerated, and he succeeded in penning the remarks that constitute the final half of the book, working until April 27, two days before he died of complications due to his illness. This change in Wittgensteins attitude should not be written off or ignored by biographers, for it coincides with the commencement and cessation of hormone treatments for prostate cancer. They should also be acknowledged and accounted for by Wittgensteins interpreters, for they show that he judged the final remarks in On Certainty to be of higher quality than those at the beginning of the publication. This makes interpretations which characterize On Certainty as a cohesive, well-developed, or systematic work less attractive, and suggests that a better reading should characterize On Certainty as composed of multiple parts. Since Wittgenstein was more 11

satisfied with some of these parts than others, a reading of the text should account for this by showing what properties are to be found in the final sections of On Certainty that are missing from the initial remarks. The first step in providing such a reading, of course, is to determine exactly which remarks were composed during Wittgensteins period of optimism and which were penned earlier. Chapter 2 takes on the task of determining which individual remarks in On Certainty are associated with Wittgensteins optimistic phase, and which are associated with his pessimistic phase, by delving into the large Nachlass of notebooks, manuscripts, and typescripts that were left behind after his death. The remarks that make up On Certainty are spread out among a series of notebooks composed during the last two years of his life, interspersed with other remarks concerning mostly color concepts and philosophical psychology. The goal of this chapter is to describe and date all of the items in Wittgensteins Nachlass from the last two years of his life, in order to understand how his various phases of self-assessment relate to the entirety of his final writings. This task is simple for the few notebooks that were dated by Wittgenstein himself, but most were not dated. For these manuscripts, philological and biographical research can be utilized to estimate their dates of composition. Wittgensteins early literary executors attempted to date these materials, though these estimates were not always accurate or precise. Some estimates of composition dates can now be 12

narrowed (at least to the degree that the evidence allows), and a few corrections can be made to the executors initial attempts at dating Wittgensteins final notebooks. Two significant corrections deserve mention here. First, a revision of material on the topic of color, printed as part 1 of Remarks on Colour, was originally thought to have been composed during Wittgensteins optimistic phase; however, evidence from letters and notebooks is presented that indicate this material was actually written during the pessimistic phase. Second, a manuscript containing the first 65 remarks of On Certainty was deemed by the executors to have been composed during Wittgensteins pessimistic phase, but evidence from letters and memoirs suggests that these remarks were in fact penned in America during his visit to Malcolm, before Wittgenstein began to consistently pan the quality of his work. The investigative results of these two chapters allow for an informed consideration of whether the posthumous publications culled from Wittgensteins final writings should be considered to count among his works. In chapter 3 I argue that Joachim Schulte provides a good framework for approaching this question, providing three independent scales concerning the author, the reader, and the text, respectively by which the status of a piece of writing may be evaluated. The previous biographical and philological investigations are shown to refute a number of claims made by Wittgensteins editors and advocates for the recognition of a third 13

Wittgenstein concerning the composition of On Certainty and Wittgensteins attitudes towards it, thereby leading to the conclusion that this piece of writing fails to be a work according to the first and third criteria. This leaves the second criterion, concerning the readers impressions of a text. Though some readers feel that On Certainty is an intense and sustained effort and for this reason ought to be considered one of his works I counter that these impressions are only possible because On Certainty is a constructed artifact not of Wittgensteins making, the result of his editors splicing together segments of text from various sources. I conclude that even though On Certainty fails a number of tests for counting as a work, the editorial decision to publish these text-fragments together in a single volume was not a mistake. For provided that readers are given an accurate account of the manuscript sources of On Certainty and their relation to contemporaneous notes on other topics, the book can provide them with an insight into one facet of Wittgensteins thought in his final years. A central component of my reading of On Certainty is the claim that Wittgensteins final optimistic writing phase is characterized by a therapeutic approach. In preparation for that conclusion I present a characterization of the late Wittgensteins therapeutic project in chapter 4. In a number of wellknown passages, Wittgenstein compares his philosophical method to psychotherapy and denies that he intends to advance any kind of theory. 14

This shows that Wittgenstein does not subscribe to a traditional conception of the aims and methods of philosophy, which are usually taken to include the construction of theories in the service of answering philosophical questions. Instead, Wittgenstein tends to see philosophical bewilderment itself as a problem which stands in need of treatment. Despite the familiarity of Wittgensteins metaphilosophical remarks, many of his readers tend to attribute philosophical theses to him in their textual interpretations, even some of those who give a central place to the remarks on therapy. One reason for a reluctance to take Wittgensteins antitheoretical claims seriously may be his frequent use of multiple voices in dialogue, many of which do indeed appear to advance philosophical theses. On the other hand, Wittgensteins most sympathetic readers sometimes appear to use his stated desire not to advance any kind of theory as a means for deflecting any principled criticism of his philosophy. I argue that if we take Wittgensteins remarks on therapy at face value as descriptions of his metaphilosophical goals, yet still leave open for evaluation the degree to which he succeeded in meeting these goals, it is then possible to take Wittgenstein seriously as a therapist without thereby sacrificing grounds for legitimate critique. Such a critique is made from a perspective which I call the observer; this persons task is to monitor, describe, and evaluate Wittgensteins methods. That perspective should be distinguished from what I call the 15

patient - someone who attempts to personally undergo Wittgensteinian therapy. This distinction helps to ease a current debate in the Wittgenstein literature over whether interpreters should read the Philosophical Investigations in a text-immanent manner, limiting themselves only to the remarks printed in the book, or whether they should approach the book in a contextual manner, helping themselves to Wittgensteins earlier drafts, lecture notes, correspondence, and other outside material that could shed light on the text. The results of chapters 1-4 are put to use in chapter 5, where I present a therapeutic reading of On Certainty that is informed by my account of the books structure. I follow the strategy of taking Wittgenstein seriously as a therapist outlined in Chapter 4 by distinguishing between Wittgensteins therapeutic goals and the degree to which he succeeded in satisfying them. My thesis is that the final half of On Certainty, written when Wittgenstein expressed satisfaction with his work, exhibits the qualities that Wittgenstein desires in a therapeutic philosophy to a greater extent than the books earlier remarks, which he consistently panned as unsatisfactory. This contrast can most clearly be seen by comparing Wittgensteins reactions to G.E. Moore in the two halves of the book. In the earlier remarks, Wittgenstein tends to react to Moores assertions of having basic items of knowledge, e.g. I know this is a hand or I know this is a tree, by saying that these assertions are inappropriate because they lack sense. The 16

notion of having sense is given what appears to be a theoretical foundation in these early sections, based on the characterization of what have come to be known as hinge propositions. In what at points reads like a theoretical treatise, Moores statements are deemed meaningless for failing to satisfy these criteria for sensical utterances. However, in the later sections of On Certainty, Wittgenstein personally engages with G.E. Moore, thereby shifting his focus from solving a philosophical problem to resolving a particular case of philosophical bewilderment. Rather than declare Moores claims meaningless at the outset, Wittgenstein imagines a series of situations in which it might be natural to make one of those claims, situations in which they would indeed make sense (where this phrase is given an everyday meaning rather than a theoretically loaded one). These are opportunities for Moore to give his statements a determinate everyday sense, but if he continually rejects these options as not truly capturing the elevated philosophical sense he intends to convey, at some point he may question whether he really does have a determinate meaning in mind, and thus decide to cease making these statements. This can be understood as an administration of Wittgensteinian therapy, which proceeds not by advancing arguments, but rather seeks to allow the patient to once again function in the linguistic community through the dissolution of the grip that a philosophical problem formerly had over him.

17

In the later sections of On Certainty Wittgenstein also submits his earlier pronouncements about hinge propositions to critical scrutiny. These statements are now criticized as being suspicious and too general, as well as for apparently having different meanings when uttered in an everyday context rather than a philosophical one. Here Wittgenstein appears to realize that his earlier hinge-theoretical response to Moores utterances involves the same kind of peculiar philosophical uses of language committed by Moore. Thus, the later sections of the book exhibit both therapeutic and antitheoretical elements, as required by Wittgensteins metaphilosophy. I discuss the main trends of On Certainty interpretation in Chapter 6, pointing out that most readings do not account for the books internal structure or explain how its remarks might serve a therapeutic end. Both of these considerations are central to my interpretation of the book. After identifying a number of competing pieces in the secondary literature in which these two considerations are also addressed, I conclude by specifying some advantages my interpretation has over these rivals.

18

Chapter 1 The Right Frame of Mind for Doing Philosophy

In the fall of 1946, when he was 57 years old, Wittgenstein began to seriously consider retiring from his position at Cambridge, expressing doubt to colleagues about the effectiveness of his teaching and frustration over not being able to focus on completing Philosophical Investigations, which he had worked on for over a decade (Malcolm 1984, p. 53). By the summer of 1947 he was nearly resolved not to return the next year: I am almost certain that I shall resign my professorship in Autumn....I'ld like to be alone somewhere & try to write & to make at least one part of my book publishable. I'll never be able to do it while I'm teaching at Cambridge. (August 27, 1947; letter to Malcolm) Wittgenstein did indeed submit his resignation of his chair before the Michaelmas Term of 1947, but was told that he still had an available term to take for sabbatical. He did so, and during the fall of 1947 dictated a typescript of material he had worked on for the past few years. This typescript was published posthumously as Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1 (Monk 1990, p. 518).1 After completing his sabbatical term and officially resigning his chair in December of 1947, he moved to Ireland, hoping to find a peaceful place to work in solitude:

In this chapter I mention some uncontroversial dates of composition for manuscripts in order to orient the reader. In the next chapter I investigate the dating of Wittgensteins final manuscripts in detail.

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I can't, so far, say anything about my work ... Wish me luck! (December 9, 1947; letter to Rhees) He soon found a small farmhouse where he could stay as a guest. While he suffered from bouts of physical ill health, for a few months he was able to do satisfactory work. When his friend Drury came from Dublin to visit, Wittgenstein reported the good news: Sometimes my ideas come so quickly that I feel as if my pen was being guided. I now see clearly that it was the right thing for me to give up the professorship. I could never have got this work done while I was in Cambridge. (Drury 1981, pp. 153-154) At times the inspiration came so intensely that a neighbor is reported to have seen Wittgenstein, out on one of his regular walks with notebook in hand, sitting in a ditch, writing furiously, oblivious of anything going on around him (Monk 1990, p. 521). Around Easter his work stopped for a few weeks due to insomnia. Wittgenstein then decided to move into an empty cottage in Rosro, an even more secluded location on the west coast of Ireland. There he was able to find solitude and once again do some work (ibid., p. 528). He stayed there until August, when he left to visit his dying sister Hermine in Vienna. Upon returning, he stopped off in Cambridge to have a typescript made of his work over the past year. This is now published as Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II (ibid., p. 535). Upon returning to Dublin in October, Wittgenstein found himself once again in a good state for working. Rather than risk the harsh winter at the

20

cottage where he had been the previous summer, he decided to stay in Dublin: I arrived here about 3 weeks ago after staying in Cambridge a fortnight & dictating some M.S.S.. When I came here I found to my surprise that I could work again; & as I'm anxious to make hay during the very short period when the sun shines in my brain I've decided not to go to Rosro this winter but to stay here where I've got a warm & quiet room. (November 6, 1948; letter to Malcolm) Wittgenstein found a room in Rosss Hotel and was able to visit with his friend Drury nearly every day. The conditions for writing were excellent; Drury reports that he seemed...to be writing copiously; when I went up to his room he was nearly always working and would continue to do so for some time before we went out (Drury 1981, p. 156). Some of these writings have since been published in Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I. Over the winter Drury had frequent discussions with Wittgenstein, and he would sometimes talk about what he was currently writing. He appeared to be making progress towards finishing the book, for he was now considering what title to use; lately he had preferred Philosophical Remarks (ibid., p. 160). For the next four months Wittgenstein reported to various colleagues that, despite some occasional physical illness, his work was going pretty well.2 This fruitful period came to

As seen in the following: I can still work moderately well & that, on the whole makes me feel well. (December 12, 1948; letter to Rhees) I am well & working pretty hard. (December 16, 1948; letter to Moore)

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an end in March, when weakness exhausted both his physical and mental strength: My work went fairly well, & sometimes even very well, in all this time; I was too ill to work for only 4 or 5 days; but about a fortnight ago I almost suddenly became exhausted, my ideas petered out, & now I'm completely incapable of thinking about philosophy. This doesnt necessarily mean that I couldn't discuss philosophy, but I can't write. God knows if I'll ever be able to work again, but I feel that I'll certainly not be able to work soon. Perhaps a holiday of a couple of months would make me fit again. (March 16, 1949; letter to Rhees) The cause for Wittgensteins exhaustion was later diagnosed as anemia by a Dublin doctor. He was prescribed iron and liver extract, which gradually helped him improve physically (Monk 1990, p. 542). The letters leading up to March 1949 thus confirm part of Wittgensteins claim in his final letter to Malcolm in April of 1951 (quoted in full in the introduction): for several extended periods after his retirement from Cambridge, the curtain in his brain had been up, allowing him to do
I, too, am working a fair amount & still moderately well. I wish my luck could hold for another 6 months, for by then I could get a good chunk of work done. (December 31, 1948; letter to Malcolm) I can still work fairly well though not as I did a month ago. (December 31, 1948; letter to Moore) I had a pretty good turn of work in the last 3 months, or so, but I fell ill with some sort of infection of the intestines about 3 weeks ago & it hasnt yet cleared up...Of course it hasnt done my work any good. I had to interrupt it completely for a week & after that it just crawled along, as I do when I take a walk, these days. (January 28, 1949; letter to Malcolm) I am doing well. I was ill for a while with an intestinal infection, but it is over and Im getting strong again. My work isnt going badly, either. (Translation of: Mir geht es gut. Ich war einige Zeit krank mit einer Darminfektion, aber sie ist vorber & ich werde wieder krftig. Auch meiner Arbeit geht es nicht schlecht.) (February 17, 1949; letter to Koder) My work is still going fairly well, though not as well as, say, 6 weeks ago. Thats partly due to the fact that Ive been a bit ill, & also that a number of things are really worrying me. Money is not one of them. I am, of course, spending rather a lot, but Ill have enough for another 2 years, I think. During that time, God being willing, Ill get some work done; & that, after all, was why I resigned my professorship. (February 18, 1949; letter to Malcolm)

22

work that, on the whole, he was excited about and satisfied with. As we will now see, Wittgensteins correspondence between March 1949 and his final letter to Malcolm also confirms his other claim in that letter, namely that during this time he was unable to do any particularly satisfactory philosophical work and despaired that this situation would not change before his death. Over the next two years Wittgensteins reports to colleagues about the state of his work were consistently negative. As mentioned in the above letter to Rhees, Wittgenstein thought that a holiday might help him get back to working. He already had a particular vacation in mind; he was considering a trip to America to visit Norman Malcolm. Malcolm had come to Cambridge to study under Moore in 1938, and while there he attended Wittgensteins lectures. The two got along very well and began a correspondence after Malcolm took a position at Princeton in 1940. The personal and professional friendship was further strengthened when Malcolm visited Cambridge during the 1946-1947 academic year. In addition to sitting in on Wittgensteins final year of lectures on the philosophy of psychology, Malcolm also met with him once a week to discuss the latest version of Philosophical Investigations. After a time these discussions began to move away from the text of the typescript, but this nevertheless shows how much confidence Wittgenstein placed in Malcolm to comprehend his writings. As Wittgenstein explained to Malcolm, the reason I am doing this is so there will be at least one person who will understand 23

my book when it is published (Malcolm 1984, p. 44). Malcolm now had a position at Cornell and had invited Wittgenstein to come to Ithaca for an extended stay. After some initial reluctance, Wittgenstein finally committed to the visit and booked a ticket for July on a transatlantic ocean liner. He hoped that visiting his old friend might spur him back to doing philosophical work: I have booked a passage to New York on the Queen Mary for July 21...I haven't been doing any work at all for the last 2-3 weeks. My mind is tired & stale, partly, I think because I'm a bit exhausted, partly because lots of things worry me terribly just now. I think I could still discuss philosophy if I had someone here to discuss it with, but alone I can't concentrate on it. (April 1, 1949; letter to Malcolm) Some of the things worrying him included the health of his eldest sister, who he came to Vienna to visit in April. After returning to Dublin in May, Wittgenstein made frequent visits to his doctor, hoping to cure his anemia. The prescribed medications slowly had a positive effect on his physical health, though he still was in no shape to do philosophical work: I'm taking iron & liverextrat, but if I'm getting better at all it's a very slow process. I haven't been able to work for over three months. I'd been feeling lousy for a long time before they made a blood test & found what was the matter. That only happened 3 weeks ago. (June 8, 1949; letter to Fouracre) Wittgenstein nevertheless was optimistic that his health and mental capacities would improve. What he especially hoped for was to be able to participate in philosophical discussions with Malcolm by the time he arrived

24

in America. Wittgenstein hoped to show Malcolm the fruits of his labors the past winter, and thus planned to have a typescript of this work made up before he departed: At present I am quite unable to do any philosophy & I don't think I'd be strong enough to have even a moderately decent discussion. In fact at present I'm sure I couldn't do it. But of course it's possible that by the end of July I may have recovered sufficiently for my brain to work again. I intend to go to Cambridge in about 2 weeks & to dictate some stuff if I feel strong enough. That will show me where I stand & I'll let you know the result. (June 4, 1949; letter to Malcolm) Fortunately, by the time he was about to leave for Cambridge and then proceed on to Ithaca, the medications had succeeded in alleviating many of his physical ailments: My anaemia is as good as cured, but unfortunately I'm still not the same I was before I got ill. (July 8, 1949; letter to Malcolm) Wittgenstein then went to Cambridge for a short time to prepare his typescript. This was eventually published as Philosophical Investigations, Part II. On July 21, the Queen Mary set sail for New York. The trip seemed to provide just the refreshment that Wittgenstein was seeking. En route to New York, he reported to his friend Koder The passage is very smooth and physically Im doing quite well.3 (July 24, 1949; letter to Koder) Indeed, upon his arrival in America Wittgenstein was vigorous and energetic, as Malcolm saw when he picked up Wittgenstein at the dock: When I first saw him I was surprised at his apparent physical vigour. He was striding down the ramp with a pack on his back,
3

Translation of: Die berfahrt ist sehr glatt & es geht mir krperlich ganz gut.

25

a heavy suitcase in one hand, cane in the other. He was in very good spirits and not at all exhausted and he would not allow me to help him with his luggage. My chief recollection of the long train ride home is that we talked about music and that he whistled for me, with striking accuracy and expressiveness, some parts of Beethovens 7th Symphony. (Malcolm 1984, p. 68) For the first six weeks of his stay, Wittgensteins health remained stable. This allowed him to actively participate in a number of philosophical discussions with faculty members and graduate students at Cornell. A range of topics were covered, including Freges essay On Sense and Reference and the Tractatus. As Wittgenstein had brought along copies of both typescripts now known as parts I and II of Philosophical Investigations, he attempted once more to explain his book to Malcolm in private sessions, though again these soon fell through. One set of discussions was of particular importance for Wittgenstein, for they stimulated thoughts that would eventually be published in On Certainty. Malcolm had recently published an article in Philosophical Review criticizing Moores use of I know in his papers A Defence of Common Sense and Proof of the External World.4 It was Malcolms contention that Moore had not used these words in their ordinary sense, and thus that they constituted a misuse of language, thereby failing to serve the purpose of defending common sense. Malcolm had sent an offprint of the article to Moore, who then composed a critique of the paper and defense of his own position. Moore agreed that he had used these words in circumstances in
4

(Malcolm 1949)

26

which they are not usually uttered, but disagreed that this constituted a misuse of the words; he further argued that his use of the words I know was the very same as their ordinary sense, because their truth-conditions are identical. This reply Moore sent off to Malcolm on July 21, the same day that Wittgensteins ship set sail for New York. Malcolm was eager to hear Wittgensteins take on Moores reply. This prompted a series of discussions on Moores papers, and, more generally, the concepts of knowledge and certainty. These took place in August; Bouwsma was also in attendance at a discussion that began with consideration of Moores I know that this is a hand on August 20 (Bouwsma 1986, p. 30). On September 2, Malcolm sent a long reply to Moore, claiming that most of the ideas were due to Wittgenstein, but that he had given them his own slant. If Moore composed a response it has not been preserved, but it is clear from the notes he wrote in the margins of Malcolms letter that he was not convinced. There is evidence to suggest that Wittgenstein may have composed some philosophical remarks during his visit to America. He had, after all, brought along a selection of his recent notebooks (Drury 1981, p. 168), presumably in the hope of making additional entries while on vacation. Bouwsmas recounting of a discussion from August 5 suggests that Wittgenstein had recently attempted to start writing again: ...he spoke...of the way he worked. He worked in spurts. There were times when he was so dull that he could scarcely believe he 27

had written what he had written. And he had been ill since March, and now for the first time since, he was beginning to do something. (Bouwsma 1986, p. 10) By the end of August, after the discussions on Moore had taken place, Wittgenstein reported: I'm doing some philosophy, but my work's no good. I have discussions with Malcolm & some other people, & sometimes they (the discussions) aren't too bad. (August 31, 1949; letter to Rhees) This letter does not definitively prove that Wittgenstein was writing new remarks, since by doing some philosophy he might have only been referring to his philosophical discussions. But his mention of my work strongly suggests that he was also attempting to do some of his own philosophical work, aside from the many discussions he was taking part in while in Ithaca. Despite this attempt to get back to writing, Wittgenstein was not satisfied with the results, as he often mentioned to Malcolm: More than once, Wittgenstein said to me that it was a problem for him as to what to do with the remainder of his life. When a person has only one thing in the world namely, a certain talent what is he to do when he begins to lose that talent? he asked. (Malcolm 1984, p. 76) This was typical of the pessimism about his prospects of doing good work again that he would repeatedly express over the next eighteen months in letters to colleagues. During the latter part of Wittgensteins trip he became ill once again. Malcolm arranged for him to have a brief stay in the hospital, where he was seen by a Dr. Mooney (mentioned in the letter in the introduction), with 28

whom Wittgenstein got along quite well. No diagnosis of his condition was able to be made, which was actually a relief to Wittgenstein, who did not want to undergo treatment in America. He returned to England at the end of October, and immediately fell ill with the flu. This prevented him from doing any philosophical work, and also from returning to Dublin, as had been his intention before going to America: My health is bad and I must lie down for a large part of the day and cant work.5 (November 25, 1949: letter to Koder) Wittgenstein instead stayed for several weeks in Cambridge with his former student Georg Henrik von Wright, so that he could undergo several examinations by Dr. Edward Bevan, who was a friend of Drurys and also happened to be von Wrights family physician. Dr. Bevan was able to make a diagnosis: Wittgenstein was suffering from prostate cancer. His condition was terminal but it would be possible to prolong his life for a few years with hormone therapy. Wittgenstein was not overly pleased about prolonging the inevitable: The doctors have now made their diagnosis. I have cancer of the prostate. But this sounds, in a way, much worse than it is, for there is a drug (actually some hormones) which can, as I'm told, aleviate the symptoms of the disease, so that I can live on for years. The doctor even tells me that I may be able to work again, but I can't imagine that. I was in no way shocked when I heard I had cancer, but I was when I heard that one could do something about it, because I had no wish to live on. But I cou[l]dn't have my wish. I am treated with great kindness by

Translation of: Meine Gesundheit ist schlecht & ich mu einen groen Teil des Tages liegen & kann nicht arbeiten.

29

every one & I have an immensely kind doctor who isn't a fool either. (undated, ca. November 28, 1949; letter to Malcolm) Knowing that his days were numbered, Wittgenstein decided to make an extended trip to visit his family in Vienna. Even though his sister Hermine was suffering from cancer herself, Wittgenstein vowed to keep the real extent of his ill health a secret from his family. He wrote to his sister Helene: Im considering the idea of coming to Vienna not long from now. My health is quite bad and thus I cant work...Im taking a medication which the doctor says will help me.6 (November 28, 1949; letter to Salzer) Wittgenstein did not want to give the details of this medication, lest his family learn of his cancer. Over the next two years he repeatedly implored his friends and acquaintances in correspondence not to reveal his diagnosis to members of his family. He stayed in Cambridge another month, not succeeding in getting any work done, but optimistic that this might change after the treatments were given some time to have an effect: I am getting slowly better & the doctor tells me that after some months I may be well enough to work. (Though I can't imagine that I'll ever work again.)...I think of going to Vienna for some time as soon as possible. There I'll just do nothing & let the hormones do their work. (December 2, 1949; letter to Rhees) On December 24th he flew to Vienna and spent the holiday season with his family. For the next two months Wittgenstein was able to relax, play music with his old friend Koder, and spend time with his ailing sister. Though he
6

Translation of: Ich berlege den Gedanken, in nicht langer Zeit nach Wien zu kommen. Meine Gesundheit ist recht schlecht & ich kann daher nicht arbeiten...Ich nehme ein Mittel, welches, wie der Arzt sagt, mir helfen wird.

30

had not been writing any new remarks, he did report some intellectual stimulation coming from an attempt to read Goethe: I am very well indeed now & am anything but depressed...My brain works very sluggishly these days but I can't say I mind. I'm reading various odds & ends, e.g. Goethes Theory of colour which, with all its absurdities, has very interesting points & stimulates me to think...If we could meet you'd find me pretty slow & stupid; I've only got very few 'lucid moments'. I'm not writing at all because my thoughts never sufficiently crystallize. (January 16, 1949; letter to Malcolm) A week later he reported that he had finally attempted to begin writing again, though he was far from satisfied with the results: My brain is mudled & sluggish but I can't say I mind. I have been reading again parts of Goethes "Farbenlehre" which attracts & repels me. It's certainly philosophically interesting, & I've been thinking about it & even written down some weak remarks. (January 22, 1950; letter to Rhees) These remarks now form the first part of the posthumous publication Remarks on Colour. After having been sick for some time, in February his sister Hermine finally succumbed to the cancer and passed away. Over the next month Wittgensteins health slowly improved, and he was able to do some more writing, as well as participate in discussions with Anscombe (who was in Vienna working to improve her German skills) and Feyeraband. At the end of March he returned to Cambridge to visit Dr. Bevan again, and found he had received an invitation from Ryle to give the John Locke lectures in Oxford. Despite the fact that his physical health had somewhat improved, he decided to turn down the offer: 31

I had a letter from Oxford the other day, inviting me to give 6 lectures on philosophy. There are to be lectures of that sort every year by people outside Oxford. The lectures are called John Locke lectures & I'd get 200 for them. I was told, however, that I'd have to expect a large audience, over 200 students, & there mustn't be any discussion during the lectures. I haven't yet given them any definite answer but I think I'll reply in the negative. I don't think I can give formal lectures to a large audience that would be any good. I feel fairly well, though not quite as good as I did in Vienna, & I'm very dull & stupid. (April 5, 1950; letter to Malcolm) A week later, Wittgenstein received an offer from the Rockefeller Foundation for a research grant. Malcolm had contacted their director in the hope of securing funds for his mentor to focus on his work. Wittgenstein thought hard about the offer, but decided that he could not in good faith accept the grant unless the Foundation understood his current state of his health and philosophical work, which he explained in detail: The truth is this...a) I have not been able to do any sustained good work since the beginning of March 1949. b) Even before that date I could not work well for more than 6 or 7 months a year. c) As I'm getting older my thoughts become markedly less forceful & crystallize more rarely & I get tired very much more easily. d) My health is in a somewhat labile state owing to a constant slight anaemia which inclines me to catch infections. This further diminishes the chance of my doing really good work. e) Though it's impossible for me to make any definite predictions, it seems to me likely that my mind will never again work as vigorously as it did, say, 14 months ago. f) I cannot promise to publish anything during my lifetime...My health at present is pretty good. I'm doing some work but I get stuck over simple things & almost all I write is pretty dull. (April 17, 1950; letter to Malcolm)

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Wittgenstein continued to attempt to work, though as just seen, he was never satisfied with the results. He soon moved into the home of Anscombe in Oxford, where he would stay for the next five months. Wittgenstein spent the summer trying his best to continue his work. The medications were keeping him in relatively stable health, but he had not been able to regain his mental vigor or philosophical ability that had last left him over a year ago. His work continued to be disappointing, and Wittgenstein soon became depressed with the thought of continuing on with such an unfulfilling state of being: I'm working a bit but my work's no good...I'm just not in the right frame of mind; my work only mildly interests me; & you can imagine what under these circumstances the stuff is like I'm writing down. I'm moderately well. Dr Bevan in Cambridge wrote to a London specialist about me, giving him the history of my case up to the present time & the expert replied that I might easily live for five more years. Nice prospect! Another year of this half-life would have been ample. (May 7, 1950; letter to Rhees) During this time Wittgenstein continued working on the remarks on color concepts that he had begun in Vienna earlier that spring, as well as some passages that would eventually appear in Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II. Despite his efforts, he consistently reported dissatisfaction with what he was producing.7 Later in the summer he hoped

As shown by the following: Im working, sometimes more, sometimes less, but not really well. I think much less sharply and clearly than I used to. (Translation of: Ich arbeite, manchmal mehr, manchmal weniger, aber nicht wirklich gut. Ich denke viel weniger scharf & klar als frher.) (May 22, 1950; letter to Koder)

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to spend some time in Norway with his friend Richards, but this was delayed for a few months. In the intervening time Wittgenstein revisited the epistemological topics he had discussed one year ago with Malcolm. He does not seem to have been any more enthusiastic about these writings than the ones on color he had produced earlier in the summer: I'm pretty well, & I'm working but not particularly well. I get tired soon....I have hardly any philosophical discussions. I could see students if I wanted, but I don't want to. I've got all sorts of unclear thoughts in my old head which perhaps will remain there for ever in this unsatisfactory state. (July 30, 1950; letter to Malcolm) By the end of the summer whatever ability Wittgenstein had to work was slowly draining: My health is good, but my work is getting more and more worthless. Thats no complaint.8 (August 26, 1950; letter to Hnsel) A couple weeks later he had all but abandoned more attempts to continue working: I did some work, though not good work, for quite a time, but I've hardly done anything for the last 3 weeks, & anyhow my
Physically Im quite well, but various things are troubling me; especially my terribly small ability to work. That makes the rest of life more difficult. (Translation of: Mir geht es krperlich ganz gut, aber verschiedenes bedrckt mich; besonders meine schrecklich geringe Arbeitsfhigkeit. Die erschwert das ganze brige Leben.) (May 29, 1950; letter to Hnsel) Im doing quite well, except that Im working slowly and poorly. (Translation of: Es geht mir recht gut, auer da ich langsam & schlecht arbeite.) (June 23, 1950; letter to Hnsel) I'm well & getting more & more stupid every day. I think there must be a leak somewhere in my head & my brain is slowly running out. Even now when I bump my head on anything it sounds like a kettledrum. (June 23, 1950; letter to Fouracre) Im working poorly & that will probably no longer change. (Translation of: Ich arbeite schlecht, & das wird sich auch wahrscheinlich nicht mehr ndern.) (July 13, 1950; letter to Koder) 8 Translation of: Meine Gesundheit ist gut, aber meine Arbeit wird mehr & mehr wertlos. Das ist keine Klage.

34

ability for philosophical work seems to have practically vanished. (September 6, 1950; letter to von Wright) Wittgensteins writing ceased on September 23, after which he prepared for what was hoped to be a relaxing and refreshing vacation in Norway. The trip was fraught with difficulties, for Wittgensteins travel partner, Richards, fell ill with bronchitis twice and had to spend time in the hospital. Since he spent a good deal of time caring for Richards he was not able to do any of his own work. Still, the peaceful surroundings of Norway made Wittgenstein optimistic that he could work again during a future visit: I had intended to do some work but I didn't do any. I may possibly go back to Norway before long & try to work; it's the only place I know where I can have real quiet. Of course it's possible that I'm no longer able to do any decent research, but it's certainly worth while finding out if I am or not...My health is not too bad but I am very dull & stupid indeed (as this letter shows). (December 1, 1950; letter to Malcolm) Wittgenstein booked a ticket to return to Norway at the end of the month, determined to give an attempt to resume working his best shot. The plan unfortunately fell through, because the host he had intended to stay with had notified him that space would in fact not be available. Around the same time, Wittgenstein fell ill once again and had to spend Christmas at Dr. Bevans home. His health rapidly deteriorated in January. He was again staying with Anscombe in Oxford, who called Bouwsma on the 10 th to tell him that Wittgenstein had fallen ill. Bouwsma was visiting Oxford to give the very John Locke lectures that Wittgenstein had declined several months earlier. 35

The next day the director of the Rockefeller Foundation, who had offered Wittgenstein a grant in the spring of the previous year, visited to once again offer research funds. Wittgenstein refused a second time, telling the director that ...in my present state of health & intellectual dullness I couldn't accept a grant; but I said that if, against all probability & hope, I should one day find that I could again do worthwhile work in philosophy, I'd write to him. (January 12, 1951; letter to Malcolm) It was suggested that if Wittgenstein was not capable of working right now, that the money might be used to publish some of his papers. 9 But Wittgenstein did not feel that much of it was worth publishing, responding, But see, I write one sentence, and then I write another just the opposite. And which shall stand? (Bouwsma 1986, p. 73). The same day Bouwsma heard Wittgenstein say something about the rot people publish, going on writing after theyve stopped thinking. They dont know when to quit. Russell! (ibid.). This suggests that Wittgenstein was uncomfortable with the thought of publishing the remarks that he had written in the past year, during which he had regularly complained of the low quality of his work. These remarks were, nevertheless, published posthumously side by side with other notes that Wittgenstein considered to be of higher quality (as we will see was the case with On Certainty). On the 16th Bouwsma again visited Wittgenstein, who was now in severe pain and hardly eating, and at times
9

After Wittgensteins death, the Rockefeller Foundation provided funding for his literary executors to catalog his papers and publish selections from them.

36

appeared to be welcoming the prospect of approaching death (ibid.). During this time Wittgenstein had to travel frequently to Cambridge to see Dr. Bevan, which added further hardship to his already poor condition. At the beginning of February Wittgenstein moved into the Cambridge home of Dr. Bevan so that he could be under constant supervision and undergo frequent radiation treatments at the hospital. These changes had a positive effect, but Wittgenstein still was not able to do any philosophical work: As you see I'm in Cambridge; I'm staying with my doctor who is an extremely kind man & an excellent doctor. I also saw a speciallist here & I'm to have deep X-ray treatment again, this time for my spine. I've had a pretty bad time at Oxford but am feeling much better now (for reasons no one knows), I have very little pain & discomfort....I can't even think of work at present, & it doesn't matter, if only I don't live too long! I'm not depressed though....I wish I could have a talk again with you, Doney & Nelson. But even if I could be with you you'd find that my head was empty. (It was half empty already when I was in Ithaca.) (undated, approx. February 8, 1951; letter to Malcolm) Wittgenstein had a year earlier expressed a desire not to die in an English hospital, and Dr. Bevan had said that Wittgenstein could spend his final days at the doctors home. But in the middle of February Wittgenstein was still holding out hope that his lodging situation would only be temporary, if his health would improve: Im being treated with X-rays now and it is possible that this will bring about a quick improvement. I havent been working any for months, but I dont feel unhappy about that. Im now living

37

here in my doctors house for a while.10 (February 19, 1951; letter to Koder) At the end of February Dr. Bevan concluded that the hormone and X-ray therapies were no longer going to be of help and thus should be terminated. When he was told that he would not live for more than a few more months, it came as an enormous relief to him (Monk 1990, p. 577). Remarkably, in March, soon after the cancer treatments had come to an end, Wittgensteins mood and mental clarity improved, though he continued to be quite weak physically. Still, he was able to take strolls around Cambridge and visit friends. A few weeks after the cessation Wittgenstein wrote to Malcolm about his condition and mentioned something troubling that he had read recently: I'm feeling much better now than I did a month ago. I have hardly any pain. The improvement is probably due to the deep xray treatment I took for a few weeks...I am of course very weak & there seems no doubt that this isn't going to change for the better as time goes on. I hardly think that I'll be on this earth when you come to Cambridge in Autumn '52. Still, one doesn't know....I am not depressed in the least, by the way....I saw Moore yesterday & we talked philosophy. But it was no good because I was far too dull & hazy. When I'm alone I am sometimes a bit brighter. The other day I saw a laudatory review of two philosophical books in the "New Statesman". One was by a man Toulmin, who come to my classes while you were in Cambridge, I think; the other seemed to contain articles by Wisdom, Waismann, Ryle & other charlatans. The review I read particularly praised one remark of Waismann's which came straight out of my lectures. I'd like to see a review some day

10

Translation of: Ich werde jetzt mit Rntgenstrahlen behandelt & es ist mglich, da das eine rasche Besserung bewirken wird. Ich habe schon seit Monaten nichts mehr gearbeitet, fhle mich aber darber nicht unglcklich. Ich wohne jetzt fr einige Zeit im Haus meines Arztes hier.

38

which debunks these people.11 (March 19, 1951; letter to Malcolm) The review article in question handed out praise to certain linguistic philosophers such as Waismann for illustrating the influence of language on our thoughts (McGuinness 2008, pp. 476-7). Since Wittgenstein was throughout his career known to be hyper-sensitive to anyone making use of ideas he considered to be his own, his reaction is not particularly deserving of prolonged consideration. What is especially interesting about this episode, however, is that it apparently served as a goad for Wittgenstein to begin writing again for the first time in over five months. This book review was published on March 10; on the same day Wittgenstein began writing a series of notes which now appear as the second half of On Certainty. The editors of that book chose not to publish the very first passage that Wittgenstein wrote that day, immediately before proceeding on to what now appears as remark 300: Suppose a poet said: If this character in my tragedy lives a pious and good life, he will prosper, but if he sins, then he will perish. ...This is no way excuses the theft from my ideas that is being committed today by some university professors. For even though I attach little value to what they are able to take away, they themselves consider it valuable, & it is indeed better than what they can think up themselves. /This doesnt excuse the theft by those who have adorned their publications with my unpublished ideas for years./ 12 (MS 175 pp. 34v-35r)

11

Wittgenstein sent a letter to Rhees criticizing the same article on March 14.

39

Wittgenstein apparently was upset that his former students and colleagues were receiving praise for advancing what he considered to be watered-down and poorly-understood versions of ideas that he had first arrived at during his lectures, and thereby managed to feel plagiarized and mischaracterized at the same time. After many month of producing no writing whatsoever, the sense of injury that Wittgenstein felt from this incident is apparently what sparked him to final put pen to paper once again.13 In his final letter to Malcolm on April 16, Wittgenstein says that he regained his ability to work about five weeks earlier, which indeed coincides very closely with the time that he read this book review and began composing new remarks. The last few weeks of his life stand in contrast to the eighteen months before them. After his cancer diagnosis, Wittgenstein was often in relatively stable physical condition, but almost never was he
12

Translation of: Denke, ein Dichter sagte: Wenn dieser Charakter in meiner Tragdie fromm und gut leben wird, so wird es ihm gut gehen, wird er sich aber versndigen, so wird er unkommen. ...Damit ist der Diebstahl, der von manchem Universittslehrer heute an meinen Einfllen begangen wird, durchaus nicht entschuldigt. Denn, wenn ich auch, was sie davontragen knnen, gering achte, so halten sie selbst es doch fr wertvoll, & es ist auch besser, als was sie selbst erdenken knnen. /Damit ist der Diebstahl derer nicht entschuldigt die seit Jahren ihre Publikationen mit meinen unverffentlichten Einfllen schmcken./ The final sentence surrounded by slash-marks is one of several variants in the text for the second quoted sentence. The date 10.3.51 actually occurs after the first sentence, but the consistent ink color before and after the date (see Figure 7 in Chapter 2), as well as the dependence of the content of the second sentence on that of the first, it is very likely that these lines were composed together. 13 This was actually not the first time that Wittgenstein was motivated to write after feeling that his ideas were being mishandled by members of the philosophical community. Cf. the preface to Philosophical Investigations: Until recently I had really given up the idea of publishing my work in my lifetime. All the same, it was revived from time to time, mainly because I could not help noticing that the results of my work (which I had conveyed in lectures, typescripts and discussions), were in circulation, frequently misunderstood and more or less watered down or mangled. This stung my vanity, and I had difficulty in quieting it.

40

satisfied with his mental state. This thought of carrying on this half-life with a dead mind but a body that continued to survive was depressing. Yet in his final six weeks he was energetic and optimistic, even while his body was deteriorating: I am, on the whole, pretty well, rather weak of course, & occasionally having very mild pain. I have no cause to grumble! (March 30, 1951; letter to Rhees) Wittgenstein enjoyed the next few weeks and took advantage of his newfound mental vigor, visiting Moore for philosophical discussions, shopping for his favorite recordings of Bach to send off to his sister, and developing a friendship with Mrs. Bevan. The two would walk to the pub each evening, where Wittgenstein never drank, but always took great pleasure in trying to covertly pour out his beer into a plant (Monk 1990, p. 577). Now that he was in the right frame of mind for doing philosophy, he committed to completing as much work as possible: Wittgenstein was feeling extremely well and working furiously. At the time when the curtain went up he said to Mrs. Bevan: I am going to work now as I have never worked before! (Malcolm 1984, pp. 80-81) Indeed, over the next six weeks Wittgenstein wrote enough remarks to fill over half of On Certainty, as well as a short set of remarks included in a section of Last Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II. When his friend Drury came to visit in mid-April, he was still committed to working, in face of his surely approaching death: 41

Isnt it curious that, although I know I have not long to live, I never find myself thinking about a future life. All my interest is still on this life and the writing I am still able to do. (Drury 1981, p. 169) This is surely how he had hoped to live out his last days: spirited and lively, rather than vegetative and depressed. The final remark of On Certainty was composed on April 27. Later that night, Wittgenstein fell very ill. By the next day it was clear that the end was near. Mrs. Bevan phoned Anscombe, Drury, Richards, and Smythies to stand by his bedside. He passed away on April 29, and his burial the next day was also attended by Moore and von Wright. The report that Wittgenstein gave to Malcolm about his mental health over his final two years is thus borne out by an investigation of his correspondence over this period. After March of 1949 he did not have another satisfactory productive working phase for two years. Between November 1949 and March 1951 he was never able to lift the curtain in his brain; he consistently complained that his mind was not functioning well and he worried that this situation would never change. Even though he managed to write some remarks during this period, at no time did he express any satisfaction with them to colleagues; on the contrary, he continually criticized these writings for their low quality. However, from March 1951 until his death at the end of April, Wittgensteins energetic spirit and philosophical capacities were restored, allowing him to work fruitfully and produce writing that was to his satisfaction. 42

A reader of this correspondence might naturally be incredulous that such a dramatic change at the end of Wittgensteins life could be possible, and thus be inclined not to assign particular significance to the final letter to Malcolm. How could Wittgensteins capacities to work suddenly improve, even as he was nearing death? It is likely that this change was in part due to the termination of the hormone treatments by Dr. Bevan. Between November 1949 and March 1951 he appeared to constantly suffer from clouded cognition and possibly even depression, both of which are symptoms associated with the use of estrogen therapy in prostate cancer patients.14 Soon after Wittgenstein stopped taking these medications, the curtain began to lift, and he regained many of the capacities that had surely been dampened by the hormones. This explanatory hypothesis gains further support from the fact that two of his closest friends appear to have held it to be true, as well as Wittgenstein himself. Denis Paul, a friend of Elizabeth Anscombe, recalls her story of how unable to think Wittgenstein had been under the influence of his anti-cancer drugs (Paul 2007, p. 297). The biographer Ray Monk claims that Wittgenstein also believed that the hormones were having an effect on his mental capacities: He attributed his intellectual dullness in part to the oestrogens that he was taking to alleviate the symptoms of his cancer. While taking them he found the intense concentration required to write philosophy difficult to achieve. (Monk 1990, 566)

14

See (Chen and Petrylak 2005) and (Salminen et al. 2004).

43

Rush Rhees concurs, further adding that the change in philosophical ability was due to the cessation of the estrogen treatment: From the end of November 1949 to, roughly, the end of February 1951, he was, as he wrote to me, letting the hormones do their work, and more often than not he felt that he could not write anything worth putting down. He recovered his power of mind when he left off the hormones. (Rhees 1984, p. 225) It should be noted that this hypothesis is only meant to explain how such dramatic, and perhaps initially unbelievable, shifts in Wittgensteins philosophical capacities could even be possible. Whether or not this explanation is convincing remains independent of the significant amount of evidence provided in this chapter that such a dramatic change indeed took place.15 The clear shifts in Wittgensteins evaluation of his work are not merely biographical curiosities, but events that are relevant to an exegesis of On Certainty and need to be accounted for by its readers. For if Wittgenstein believed that the first half of the text was mostly dull, while the second half was composed in the right frame of mind, then it is difficult to construe On Certainty as being a unified, coherent text, or in its editors words, a single sustained treatment (OC Preface). Thus the status of On Certainty as one of Wittgensteins works, and the interpretive assumptions that go along with such a status, are undermined. The text should be
15

It might be suggested that the pessimism about his work during the hormone treatments can be written off as a symptom of depression, and thus that Wittgensteins criticism should not be taken at face value. But this suggestion is not persuasive, because even in April of 1951, with the curtain lifted from his brain, Wittgenstein did not reappraise his previous judgment that his earlier work was of low quality, but rather, confirmed it.

44

understood as a collection of parts rather than a unified, consistently developed treatise, and interpreters should give some account of the unequal status of these parts. The following chapters carry out a project of comparing the remarks in On Certainty written during Wittgensteins final fruitful period in spring of 1951 with those written earlier, in order to identify what characteristics the later material possesses that the earlier material lacks, and then explain why Wittgenstein would consider the later work to be of higher quality. The first step in such a project is simply identifying when the remarks of On Certainty were written. Since Wittgenstein often did not date the remarks that he composed in his notebooks, this is a significant philological task. It is also necessary to determine when Wittgensteins other late writings which were not selected for inclusion in On Certainty were composed, for remarks that now appear in Remarks on Colour and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II were penned at the same time. The forthcoming interpretation identifies characteristics that are to be found in the final half of On Certainty that are lacking in the earlier material. Thus, these differences should also be seen in comparing these additional remarks written after March of 1951 to those written before that time. It is then necessary to date, as precisely as possible, all of Wittgensteins writings from the last two years of his life. The next chapter takes up this task.

45

Chapter 2 The Final Manuscripts

As shown in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein did not consider all of the writings from the last two years of his life to be of equal value. This naturally suggests an investigation to determine exactly which parts of those writings, which are now published as On Certainty, Remarks on Colour, and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II,1 were considered to be of high quality and which were not. Such an investigation would be straightforward if Wittgenstein had dated all of his notebook entries during this time, but most of these entries are undated. The three publications named above are each the result of Wittgensteins editors splicing together selections from his final notebooks, in which remarks go back and forth between various subjects. G.H. von Wright greatly facilitated research into Wittgensteins Nachlass by cataloging its contents (von Wright 1982, pp. 3562). He gave the source manuscripts for these final publications the labels MS 169 through MS 177, in what he took to be their sequential order. A further complication of this investigation, though, is that these notebooks were not actually completed in a simple linear sequence, for as we will see, Wittgenstein would sometimes write new remarks in notebooks next to others written significantly earlier, and he may have even written in multiple
1

A small selection of remarks from MSS 169-171 was also included in Culture & Value. There is also a handful of remarks from the final notebooks that have not been published.

46

manuscripts simultaneously. This makes the task of dating Wittgensteins final manuscripts a considerable undertaking. MS 169 is a small pocket notebook, which appears in its entirety as the first part of LWPP2. It was purchased in Dublin, as indicated by a sticker inside the back cover:

Figure 1: MS 169, p. 81r

Wittgenstein must have purchased this notebook during his stay at Rosss Hotel in Dublin from November 1948 to April of 1949. The precise dating of this notebook is controversial. In the preface to LWPP2, von Wright and Nyman describe the notebook as having two parts. The first, which they conjecture was written during Wittgensteins time in Dublin, contains a number of remarks that have similar counterparts in MSS 137 and 138, published posthumously as Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. I. Due to the terse and abbreviated style of the remarks occurring in the first part of MS 169, von Wright and Nyman conclude that it likely constitutes a preliminary study for MSS 137 and 138. Rothhaupt (1996, p. 369) agrees with this conclusion, arguing that part one of MS 169 was composed between November 1948 and February 1949 since its

47

counterparts in MSS 137 and 138 appear in dated entries between December 1, 1948, and February 27, 1949. In contrast, Pichler (1994, p. 138 fn. 117) and Nedo (1995, p. 46) date the composition of the entire notebook to late 1949 in Cambridge. They thus take part one to be a further extension of the remarks in MSS 137 and 138, rather than a preparation for them. In support of this contention Pichler points out that several remarks in MS 169 appear to be excerpts or summaries of their counterparts in MSS 137 and 138. Van Gennip (2004, p. 130) cites the same evidence in support of her claim that the notebook was composed after the summer of 1949. A note written in the penultimate page of the book provides further dating information:

Figure 2: MS 169, p. 78r

48

Notice the lines 3rd middle July, 2nd end May and 5 at the top of the crossed-out section. These are surely notes taken by Wittgenstein while visiting a travel agency to look into the cost of traveling to New York to visit Malcolm: I went to a travel agency to enquire about going to America...Im not allowed to take with me more that 5...If I booked a 3rd class passage right away I couldnt get a birth before the middle of July; if I booked 2nd class, which is much more expensive, I could travel towards the middle, or end of May. (March 19, 1949; letter to Malcolm) Wittgenstein thus had this notebook in his possession while in Dublin at the end of March 1949. According to the dating hypotheses of Pichler, Nedo, and van Gennip, Wittgenstein must have made this entry in the back of an empty notebook and then waited several more months to enter the first philosophical remark in its pages. A more plausible supposition is that Wittgenstein wrote these lines in the back of MS 169 because it was the notebook in which he was currently working in March of 1949. I thus suggest that part one of MS 169 was completed by the spring of 1949. Stronger confidence in this tentative conclusion would need to be supported by a thorough investigation of the series of manuscripts leading up to Wittgensteins dictation of part II of Philosophical Investigations in the summer of 1949, a task that is beyond the scope of the present work. The dating of part two of MS 169 is equally challenging but more relevant to our concerns here, since according to von Wright and Nyman, it is more developed stylistically and closely related in content to the other 49

remarks published in LWPP2.2 Even small sections of remarks thematically related to those occurring in On Certainty and Remarks on Colour appear in the final pages of the notebook. Wittgensteins March 19 notes from the travel agency bear on this investigation as well. Since a philosophical remark begins at the bottom of the left-hand page opposite this note, and is continued, mid-sentence, immediately below the note (see das Physikalische... above), Wittgenstein probably made this entry before either of these pages contained any other remarks, which means that the remarks at the end of MS 169 were written after March 19. Indeed, Rothhaupt (1996, pp. 370-372) argues that the final 30 pages, written mostly in pencil, were actually composed one year later in Vienna, after Wittgensteins return from America, because of similarities between this material and some of the remarks concerning color concepts from the spring of 1950. Similarly, van Gennip (2004, p. 130) argues that these entries must have been composed either during or shortly after Wittgensteins trip to America, due to thematic similarities between some of the remarks in the latter part of MS 169 and topics that were discussed between Wittgenstein and Malcolm in Ithaca (see Malcolm 1984). However, there does not seem to be a discernable difference between the pencil used in the March 19 note and the surrounding remarks, suggesting that even the final remarks of MS 169 may have been composed
2

The fact that von Wright and Nyman are unable to determine a precise demarcation point between the two parts complicates matters, and may count as evidence against the appropriateness of dividing MS 169 into different sections. Rothhaupt (1996, p. 369 fn. 3) identifies two possible locations that may be construed as indicating breaks in the text.

50

in the spring of 1949. Thus, the available evidence is insufficient to precisely determine when, between spring 1949 and spring 1950, part two was composed. Rothhaupt (1996, p. 372) does however show that the notebook was completed no later than April 24, 1950, for the final remarks in MS 169 appear again in revised form in MS 174 under this date. Only the first 10 of the 80 pages of MS 170 contain remarks; the rest are left blank. They are now published as part 2 of LWPP2. The date of composition of these remarks is uncertain and controversial, as no dates appear in the notebook. All three of the major themes of Wittgensteins last writings psychology, color, and certainty are addressed in this handful of remarks. Based on the relation of its content to certain remarks on color in MS 173, Rothhaupt (ibid., 373-374) speculates that MS 170 may come from spring or summer of 1950. The relevance of one the remarks in MS 170 to the discussions of Moore in On Certainty prompts van Gennip to assign this notebooks date of composition to Wittgensteins time in America or shortly thereafter. Von Wright dates it to early 1949, contemporaneous with MS 169. Some pieces of evidence speak in favor of this hypothesis: the binding, size, and number of pages of MS 170 appear to be the same as MS 169, which was purchased in Dublin. This suggests that MS 170 may have also been purchased, and thus presumably also used for composing remarks, while Wittgenstein was in Dublin in the winter and spring of 1949. On the other hand, MS 170 does not include the same sticker inside the back cover 51

that is found in MS 169, thus lowering somewhat the probably that the two notebooks were purchased together. Von Wrights contention is further supported by the similarity between Wittgensteins alternating use of pencil and dark black pen in MS 170 and the final pages of MS 169. Of course, establishing that MSS 169 and 170 are contemporaneous cannot serve to fix a precise date of composition for MS 170 when the dating of MS 169 remains uncertain. MS 171, like MSS 169 and 170, presents a challenge, as none of the remarks are dated. It has a unique appearance; unlike Wittgensteins other notebooks from this time, which have a standard binding on the left side, MS 171 is a reporters notebook, spiral-bound at the top. Only 14 pages contain remarks, and the same number of blank pages is also to be found at the end. The entirety of MS 171 appears as part 3 of LWPP2. Its editors von Wright and Nyman claim that chronologically [it is] probably closely connected to MS 169 and [was] written in the year 1949 (LWPP2, p. xi). Von Wright dates the volume to either 1949 or 1950 in his catalog, while a note now attached to the notebook (by one of Wittgensteins literary executors) indicates that the remarks are from early 1950. A note on the front cover mentions that the design of the notebook is covered by a United States patent:

52

Figure 3: MS 171, Front Cover

While it is certainly possible that such a notebook might have been sold in Europe, this is at least prima facie evidence that Wittgenstein purchased this volume during his trip to New York in early fall 1949. The content of the some of the remarks is also consistent with the hypothesis that this notebook was used for composition sometime during or after Wittgensteins time in America, for the last three remarks in the notebook concern inner/outer, color, and certainty, respectively, all of which are topics that he wrote on in 1950. Like some of the final remarks in MS 169 mentioned earlier, some passages from MS 171 are very similar to others appearing in MS 174 under the date April 24, 1950, suggesting that MS 171 was composed before then (Rothhaupt 1996, p. 374). A letter to Malcolm from December 1, 1950 is written on pages ripped from this notebook,3 though we cannot conclude from this that Wittgenstein was still using MS 171 in December to pen new remarks; indeed he may have been comfortable ripping these pages out of the notebook precisely because he was no longer using it.

This was verified by an inspection of the documents at the Wren Library in Cambridge.

53

We thus see that there is a lack of evidence available for precisely dating the composition of MSS 169-171. It may be the case that these notebooks were not filled during relatively continuous writing sessions, but rather were completed piecemeal over a span of a year of more, and thus cannot be definitively associated with a particular phase of the development of Wittgensteins evaluation of his own work.4 For this reason, an interpretation for these remarks will not be attempted in later chapters. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these manuscripts include a few remarks that clearly are related to the content of On Certainty and Remarks on Colour, but were not included in those publications. This undermines the common belief that these publications contain all of Wittgensteins writings concerning the topics of certainty and color during his final years. Further, the fact that remarks concerning various topics are mixed together and not clearly delineated in the manuscripts undermines the common impression that Wittgenstein consistently marked off these topics in his late notebooks, and thus that he understood himself to be working on three self-standing works in his final years. Like MS 171, MS 172 is also a unique document; it consists of six loose large format sheets of foolscap, each of which are folded in half to produce four pages (somewhat misleadingly described in von Wrights
4

While it is uncertain exactly when these notebooks were composed between 1948 and 1950, it is clear that they were not composed during Wittgensteins final fruitful phase beginning in March 1951, since they lack the physical characteristics consistently exemplified in those final writings, which will be fully described later in the chapter.

54

catalog thusly: Manuscript on loose sheets...24 pp. (1982, p. 46)). Four of the pages contain writing on the subject of color; these now make up part 2 of the publication Remarks on Colour. The other 20 pages contain remarks on Moore and knowledge; these now form the first 65 remarks of On Certainty. Wittgensteins literary executors did not know of the existence of these pages when they originally planned on publishing his remarks on epistemological concepts and terms. As reported by Paul (2007, p. 297), these were discovered in Anscombes home shortly before...early in 1967, two years before the publication was to finally appear in print. Since MS 172 was found in Anscombes home, this means that Wittgenstein did not bring it with him when he moved into Dr. Bevans home in Cambridge at the beginning of February 1951, and thus that its remarks must have been composed before that date. It is unknown whether Wittgenstein intentionally left this manuscript at Anscombes home. Since they werent discovered until 16 years after his death, it is possible that Wittgenstein had already misplaced or forgotten about this manuscript before moving to Bevans home. The pages of MS 172 are undated, but Anscombe speculates that they were written in early 1950: These [sheets] Wittgenstein left in his room in G.E.M. Anscombes house in Oxford, where he lived (apart from a visit to Norway in the autumn) from April 1950 to February 1951. I (G.E.M.A.) am under the impression that he had written them in Vienna, where he stayed from the previous Christmas until 55

March; but I cannot now recall the basis of this impression. (OC Preface) Von Wright comes to the same conclusion in his catalog: These manuscript pages dealing with the topics of colour and of certainty were probably written by Wittgenstein during his last visit to Vienna in the early months of 1950. (1982, p. 54) Both of these descriptions invite the assumption that even though MS 172 addresses two different subjects, its parts were composed as a single document at one time. A note attached to MS 172 by one of the executors says that the first 4 pages are on colours, further suggesting that the pages together constitute a single document. But the manuscript does not in fact have a first page, for none of the folio sheets are dated and they are not bound together to provide a definite sequence. Nevertheless, from inspection of the pages one can determine the page sequences for the individual sections on color and certainty (though see Rothhaupt 1996, p. 379 for an alternate sequence of the color pages). This still does not determine whether the color material comes before or after the remarks on certainty, because the remarks on color are isolated to the four pages produced by a single portfolio sheet, so no sheet contains remarks on both subjects, which would be helpful in determining a sequence. There is evidence from Wittgensteins correspondence that appears to confirm Anscombes impressions about the dating of MS 172, at least with respect to the portion on color. In fact, from his letters we can pinpoint almost the precise date that these remarks were composed. I will argue, 56

however, that further evidence suggests that the remarks from MS 172 on certainty were composed at a different time. Recall from the last chapter that after having spent 3 weeks with his family in Vienna, Wittgenstein reported that he was not doing any writing: I'm reading various odds & ends, e.g. Goethes Theory of colour...I'm not writing at all because my thoughts never sufficiently crystallize. (January 16, 1950; letter to Malcolm) Three days later he also mentioned to von Wright that he was reading Goethes work on color, but did not make any mention of writing: The last two weeks I read a great deal in Goethes Farbenlehre. Its partly boring and repelling, but in some ways also very instructive and philosophically interesting. (January 19, 1950; letter to von Wright) Another three days after that, Wittgenstein says that his reading of Goethe has prompted him to finally attempt some writing: I have been reading again parts of Goethes "Farbenlehre" which attracts & repels me. It's certainly philosophically interesting, & I've been thinking about it & even written down some weak remarks. (January 22, 1950; letter to Rhees) Thus Wittgenstein must have written these remarks sometime between January 19 and January 22. Thats not much time to write, especially for someone who hasnt picked up a pen in months and claims that his brain is mudled & sluggish (ibid.). The four pages of MS172 on color are about the length one might expect, and Goethe is indeed mentioned in these remarks. Thus I conclude that the section of MS 172 on color was composed at this time.

57

McGuinness argues in the most recent bound edition of Wittgensteins Cambridge correspondence that his claim to have written down some weak remarks in the above letter to Rhees ...is in slight contradiction to...the letter to Malcolm above: Im not writing at all. That remark throws some doubt on the hypothesis that Part II of Remarks on Colour was composed in Vienna since the remarks in it are inserted in a longer set of reflections, mostly on themes to do with certainty. (2008, p. 458) I find it hardly a contradiction, but rather evidence for the precise dating of these remarks: on January 16, the date of the letter to Malcolm, Wittgenstein had not yet begun to write, but by January 22 he had completed these remarks. McGuinness reasoning is based on the false belief (encouraged by misleading descriptions of MS 172 by various editors) that the color remarks are inserted in the remarks on certainty. But even though these two sets of remarks are written on the same type of paper and were discovered together, the fact that they are written on separate sheets leaves open the possibility that they were not composed together and do not constitute a unified document. In fact, the information from Wittgensteins correspondence above suggests just this, for he never mentioned that he was thinking about Moore or certainty just Goethe and color, and the fact that he described what we had written in at most three days as some weak remarks makes it unlikely that he was referring to all 24 pages of what now constitute MS 172.

58

So when was the section of MS 172 on certainty written, then? Since on January 16 Wittgenstein said he was not writing at all it could not have been written in Vienna before that date. One might then think that it was written in Vienna sometime after January 22. But this is also doubtful for two reasons: 1) Wittgenstein did not mention that he was thinking or writing about Moore or certainty in his letters during this time, and 2) on March 24, 1950, the day after he returned to England from Vienna, he started composing additional dated entries on color, making it unlikely that his thinking about color was interrupted by a period of writing on Moore and certainty. There is evidence to support the contention that the first 65 remarks of On Certainty were written during Wittgensteins stay in America,5 for they mention subjects that we know he had been discussing at the time. Malcolm mentions in his memoir that he and Wittgenstein met several times to discuss Moores papers, Malcolms recent criticism of these papers, and Moores response contained in the letter he wrote on July 21, 1949. It response to Moore, Malcolm wrote: It was very fortunate for me that Wittgenstein is here. I read your letter to him and we have had a great many discussions of

This conclusion influences the interpretation of On Certainty presented in Chapter 5. Since these remarks were likely composed in autumn 1949, rather than in February 1950 (as Wittgensteins editors have claimed), this means that Part 1 of On Certainty was written before the commencement of Wittgensteins hormone treatments, and thus, before he began to consistently criticize the quality of his work.

59

it and your philosophical papers. (September 2, 1949; letter from Malcolm to Moore)6 Bouwsma was also in attendance for one of these discussions, which he dates to August 20: The subject was Moores: I know that this is a hand. And the background was Normans article and Moores letter (Bouwsma 1986, p. 30). Moores statement that here is one hand is mentioned in the very first remark on On Certainty. Malcolm recalls that in these discussions Wittgenstein investigated the relationship between claiming to know something and being able to make sure of it (Malcolm 1984, p. 72), as well as the roles that mathematical propositions can play in language (ibid., p. 71). Both of these subjects are also mentioned in the opening sections of On Certainty. Further thematic connections between these remarks and topics discussed in Ithaca can be identified. 1) Part of a discussion with Malcolm, Bouwsma, and Max Black on August 4 concerned Moores sentence I am here (Bouwsma 1986, p. 14); this statement is mentioned at OC 10. 2) The statement I know that this is a bit of paper is mentioned at OC 60, and this sentence was of particular interest to Malcolm. Almost a year prior, Moore had used this sentence in correspondence: I do know in particular cases that I have conclusive evidence for so-and-so, e.g. now that I am writing on a piece of paper (perception)... (November 20, 1948; letter from Moore to Malcolm)
6

Quotations from the Malcolm-Moore correspondence come from (Rothhaupt, Seery, and McManus 2003).

60

Malcolm responded that this sentence was representative of the statements that he thought Moore was misusing, and that he would soon send Moore ...an article which I have written about your philosophical practice of making assertions like I have conclusive evidence now that I am writing on a piece of paper (which you said in your letter to me)... (January 18, 1949; letter from Malcolm to Moore). Malcolm later sent Moore an offprint of this article, whose contents he later discussed with Wittgenstein in Ithaca. It is thus likely that Malcolm mentioned this sentence in conversation with Wittgenstein. 3) The first remark of On Certainty begins with Moores statement here is one hand, and then ends with the parenthetical remark (On this a curious remark by H. Newman), a reference to Cardinal John Henry Newman, whose apologetic work Grammar of Assent had interested Wittgenstein over the past few years. This is the only mention of Newman in Nachlass.7 On August 22, two days after the discussion prompted by consideration of Moores here is a hand, Wittgenstein brought up Newman in conversation with Bouwsma: Later he asked me, had I read Newman? He was much impressed by Newman. Kingsley accused him of insincerity. But Newman was sincere. He, W., had read Grammar of Assent too. That was puzzling. How a man of such learning and culture could believe such things! Newman had a queer mind. (Bouwsma 1986, p. 34)

The only other mention of Newman, found in MS 117, is a reference to the Cambridge mathematician Max Newman, as shown by Kienzler (2006, p. 118).

61

This shows that Wittgenstein was puzzled about Newmans curious apologetic remarks right around the same time as he was also thinking about Moores statement here is a hand. Thus it is likely that the first remark of On Certainty, which attempts to draw a connection between Moore and Newman, was composed around this time in late August 1949 when Wittgenstein was reflecting on both thinkers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is some evidence that Wittgenstein was writing while in America: he said to Bouwsma on August 5 that he was beginning to do something, wrote to Rhees that he was doing some philosophy on August 31, and appears to have purchased a new notebook in Ithaca (MS 171). After he returned to England he wrote to friends that he was not working, and as argued above, it is unlikely that the remarks in question were written in February or March of 1950 while in Vienna. Given the significant thematic overlap between these remarks and the discussions held in Ithaca, I find it even more unlikely that they would have been composed after March 1950, since it is doubtful that Wittgenstein would remember the content of his earlier discussions in such detail some eight months after the fact. Thus, I conclude that the opening remarks of On Certainty, constituting part 1 of MS 172, were written during or shortly after Wittgensteins discussions of Moore with Malcolm, sometime between August and October of 1949.

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MS 173 is a large notebook completely filled with remarks on both sides of its 100 pages. It contents appear split up in different posthumous publications. The editors chose to split the material because of lines that Wittgenstein occasionally used in his final manuscripts:

Figure 4: MS 173, p. 31v

The writings from 1949-1951 focus primarily on three themes: certainty and knowledge, color, and the inner and the outer in psychology. This line from p. 31v of MS 173 seems to indicate the end of material on the subject of color and the beginning of remarks on the philosophy of psychology. There is certainly good reason to think of this line as demarcating a border between different texts, for all of the remarks preceding this line are crossed out with a vertical line (indicating that Wittgenstein had finished going through them for the purpose of revision), while those after the line are not. 63

Because of lines like these in the manuscripts, the editors of On Certainty claimed that the book is not a selection; Wittgenstein marked it off in his notebooks as a separate topic (OC Preface). As will be discussion in the next chapter, not all of the places where the editors made breaks in the manuscripts were marked off by Wittgenstein with a horizontal line, nor were all of Wittgensteins horizontal lines interpreted as manuscript breaks, so this editorial claim requires further scrutiny. On p. 47v there is another line, after which the remarks move back to the topic of color. The first and third sections (i.e. the material before the first line plus the material after the second one) appear as Part III of Remarks on Colour (the editors do not indicate that Part III is the result of splicing sections 1 and 3 together). Section 3 of MS 173 clearly starts out with remarks on color, but near the end of the notebook some of the remarks also seem to be relevant to the philosophy of psychology. The editors thus decided to publish section 2 of MS 173 (i.e. the material between the two horizontal lines), plus pp. 87r-100r (a portion of section 3) as Part 4 of LWPP2. Again, no indication was made that Part 4 is actually the result of splicing together two texts separated by 80 pages in the notebooks. The entries in the first section are dated. They were written between March 24 and April 12, 1950, and consist of remarks on the topic of color that Wittgenstein began working on the day after arriving back in England from his final visit to his family in Vienna. The rest of the notebook does not 64

contain dates; von Wright dates the entire notebook to 1950 in his catalog, which is surely correct, because the material on color appears in revised form in MS 176, which was composed no later than March 1951, so MS 173 must have been completed before then. Since Wittgensteins correspondence indicates that he did no writing between September 1950 and March 1951, MS 173 must have been completed by September 1950 at the latest (though in the sequel I argue that it was probably completed even before September, along with the revision found in MS 176). MS 174 is a large notebook; only the first 40 of its 88 sheets contain remarks. It contains two sections, marked off by a horizontal line. The first 28 pages constitute section 1 and deal with the philosophy of psychology. These remarks now appear as Part 5 of LWPP2. Only one date occurs in this notebook, in the first section, just a few pages from the beginning April 24, 1950. A plausible story about the relationship between the two sections from MSS 173 and 174 on the philosophy of psychology can be constructed from this date. Section 1 of MS 173, on color, is dated and ends on April 12. After a horizontal line comes section 2 on the philosophy of psychology. It is not particularly long, only 32 pages. In MS 174, section 1, also on the philosophy of psychology, has April 24 as its first date. Wittgenstein may have thus composed section 2 of MS 173 between April 12 and April 24, and then decided to mark off the remarks in MS 173 with a horizontal line so that he could continue his work on the philosophy of psychology in a new 65

notebook, namely MS 174, on April 24, and then later continue his work on color in MS 173. Section 2 of MS 174 contains remarks on certainty, likely the first time Wittgenstein revisited this topic since MS 172 (dated to autumn 1949 earlier in the chapter). This section is now published as OC 66192. It is uncertain when section 2 was composed; von Wright dates the entire volume from 1950 in his catalog. It is also unclear why nearly half of the volume is left blank, especially when considered in relation to the next manuscript. MS 175 is a small pocket notebook with 80 sheets, all filled with remarks on certainty, though not all composed together. It consists of two sections (not divided by a line, but definitely distinguishable). The material from the first 68 pages now appears as remarks 193-299 of On Certainty. Only one date appears in the section September 23, 1950 a few pages from the end, so this section was composed before that date. These appear then to be Wittgensteins final writings of 1950, since he traveled to Norway in October and didnt do any more writing until the spring of 1951. The relationship between the remarks in section 1 of MS 175 and those in section 2 of MS 174 is unclear. Since the editors of On Certainty placed the remarks from section 1 of MS 175 after those of section 2 of MS 174 in the book, one natural hypothesis is that this is the sequence in which they were written, i.e. that MS 175 was begun after MS 174. This contention is at least supported by the few occurrences of dates in these notebooks: section 2 of 66

MS 174 has no dates, though the section preceding it begins with April 24, while section 1 of MS 175 lists September 23 as the final date of composition. Thus one may suspect that the two sections were written sometime between April 24 and September 23, with Wittgenstein switching from MS 174 to MS 175 at some point during this span. But this hypothesis cannot account for why the second half of MS 174 is blank. Wittgenstein did not switch from MS 174 to MS 175 because he had filled all of the pages in the first volume and needed to move on to a new one. An alternative hypothesis that may account for the blank pages in MS 174 is that these two sections were not written sequentially. MS 174 and MS 175 are different types of notebooks: the former is fairly large and would have likely been kept in Wittgensteins room, while the latter is quite small and can fit in ones pocket. Wittgenstein was known to bring a pocket notebook along with him on strolls, so that he could immediately write down remarks when he found inspiration. It may be that Wittgenstein was writing remarks on certainty in both volumes concurrently. This would at least explain why, in late September, both volumes were only half-filled. Section 2 of MS 175 consists of the first remarks written after the improvement of Wittgensteins mental faculties in March of 1951. They start on March 10, with Wittgensteins paranoid comment about the theft of his ideas (quoted in the previous chapter), and continue with remarks on certainty until the pages of the notebook are exhausted on March 21. Unlike 67

in 1949 and 1950, in which only sporadic dates appear in the manuscripts, all of the entries from March 10 to the end of Wittgensteins life are dated, and they show that he indeed had an intense and fruitful stretch of work, since remarks are composed nearly every day during this time. The entries in section 2 of MS 175 now constitute remarks 300-425 of On Certainty. The larger sized MS 176 consists of 4 sections. The first fills pp. 1r-22r and is a revision of the sections on color from MS 173. The dating of this section will be addressed shortly. Section 2 is a direct continuation of the remarks on certainty that ended on March 21 at the end of MS 175. Like those at the end of MS 175, these remarks are all consistently dated throughout the remainder of the notebook and entries are included almost daily. All of the remarks from p. 22r to p. 81, the final page of the notebook, concern certainty, except for a short group of remarks on the philosophy of psychology that are marked off with horizontal lines. These were composed between April 14 and 15, after which Wittgenstein returned immediately back to his remarks on certainty. The material between these dividing lines section 3 of MS 176 is now printed as Part 6 of LWPP2. The remarks on either side of this brief interruption together form remarks 426-637 of On Certainty. Like in other cases, the editors seamlessly splice together the remarks separated from sections 2 and 4 of MS 176, not alerting the reader that they are interrupted by a short set of remarks on the philosophy of psychology. These remarks on certainty continue until the end of MS 176; 68

the final date to appear is April 24. Wittgenstein immediately continues these remarks at the beginning of MS 177 on April 25. For three days he continues to write and fill the first 21 pages with remarks. The final remark in the notebook, and in the Wittgenstein Nachlass, was written on April 27. That evening Wittgenstein became very ill; he passed away two days later, on April 29. MS 177 is published as remarks 638-676 of On Certainty, the final 39 remarks of the book. The dating of the revision of the remarks on color, i.e. the first section of MS 176, is a challenge, as it contains no dates. In the preface to Remarks on Colour Anscombe claims that it was written in Cambridge in March 1951. If true this would mean that the final remarks on color were written after Wittgenstein had regained his faculties for doing philosophy, when he claimed that he was doing his best work in years. But if they were composed before this time, then they are part of the writings that he considered to be of low quality. It is thus important to determine when section 1 of MS 176 was composed, in order to know what opinion Wittgenstein held of it.8 Anscombes belief that the revision of the color remarks was written in March of 1951 may stem from its location in the manuscript sequence: MS 175 ends with remarks in March of 1951, and MS 176 also includes remarks
8

I will argue that this section was actually written during Wittgensteins pessimistic phase in 1950, and not during his final optimistic phase in 1951, as claimed by Anscombe. This conclusion is crucial for my contention, presented in Chapter 5, that the writings of Wittgensteins final phase are characterized by their therapeutic character. In his remarks on color, Wittgenstein appears to be engaged in the theoretical task of providing philosophical analyses of color concepts, so it is important for my reading of On Certainty that that section 1 of MS 176 was not written during Wittgensteins final weeks.

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from March. But it cannot be the case that MS 176 was begun after MS 175 was completed.9 The last remark of MS 175 was written on March 21 (see Figure 5 below). The very same day, Wittgenstein continued his remarks on certainty in MS 176 on p. 22r (Figure 6), after the revision of the remarks on color, which means that they must have already been completed no later than March 21. That leaves a small window of time for the revision to have been completed during Wittgensteins final productive phase. In his final letter to Malcolm of April 16 he says that he has been working for about 5 weeks; this makes it very likely that the beginning of his last fruitful phase began on March 10, the day that new remarks on certainty began to be entered in MS 175 (see Figure 7). If the hypothesis that the revision of the color remarks was completed during this final phase is true, it must have been composed between March 10 and March 21. Evidence from the notebooks undermines the veracity of this hypothesis. Assuming it were true, it would have to be the case that Wittgenstein wrote the revision of the color remarks in MS 176 while he was at the same time writing new remarks on certainty in the end of MS 175, since the final section of MS 175 contains dated entries from March 10 to March 21. But the characters of these two texts section 1 of MS 176 and section 2 of MS 175 are quite different. The certainty remarks from MS

As, for example, claimed by Nedo: On February 8 Wittgenstein is back in Cambridge, with Dr. Bevan, continuing his work on MS 175, and starting MS 176 around 21 March (Nedo 1995, p. 47).

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175 are all dated, along with all the other certainty remarks from March and April, as well as the remarks on the philosophy of psychology from April 14 and 15, i.e. sections 2, 3, and 4 of MS 176 and all of 177 (cf. Figures 5, 6, and 7). Section 1 of MS 176, on the other hand, does not contain any dates. Further, all of the dated material from March and April is written in a blue pen (see Figures 5, 6, 7, and 9), while the revision of the color remarks is written in a variety of inks some remarks are in blue, others are light black, and others are dark black (see Figures 6 and 8). It is also remarkable that the notes on certainty in MS 176 from March 21 begin immediately after the revision of the color remarks, rather than on a new page or even in a new notebook. Also noteworthy is the difference in handwriting between the revision of the color remarks and the dated material from March and April 1951. The revision is written with a generally steady hand, while the remarks on certainty from 1951 are written somewhat sloppily and hastily (cf. Figures 8 and 9). Anscombes hypothesis would then require that for 11 days Wittgenstein simultaneously wrote material he thought to be of high quality in two notebooks, including dates and using a consistent blue ink in one but no dates and a variety of inks in the other, only to then cut off the possibility of extending the revision of the color remarks on March 21 by writing new remarks on certainty immediately after them in MS 176. A more likely hypothesis is that the revision in MS 176 had already been completed sometime prior to March 10, and thus during the period in 71

which Wittgenstein thought his work to be of low quality. This would make the differences in ink and dates more plausible. It also can help explain why the certainty remarks on March 21 were put immediately after the remarks on color in MS 176, for if the revision had already been completed during Wittgensteins unsuccessful writing phase, he may have had no intention of continuing it further, and thus had no qualms about cutting off the revision with the introduction of new remarks. If the revision of the color remarks was not written during Wittgensteins fruitful phase, then when was it written? One possibility might be that it was written sometime between February 8 and March 10, while he was staying at Dr. Bevans house but before the hormone treatments had been terminated and Wittgenstein had found himself in the right frame of mind for doing philosophy. This too seems doubtful, based on his letters from this time. Soon after arriving at Dr. Bevans home he wrote to Malcolm, I cant even think of work at present. About ten days later on February 19th, he wrote to Koder that he hadnt done work in months, and on March 9, the day before reading a book review would prompt him to begin writing again, he wrote to Rhees, Im very weak physically and mentally, and didnt mention any developments in his work. This all suggests that the revision of the color remarks was already completed before he moved into Dr. Bevans house. Thus it must have been completed by, at the very latest, the end of September 1950, because Wittgenstein did not do any work from 72

the time of his trip to Norway in October 1950 until his stay at Dr. Bevans home. But since it is a revision of the remarks on color in MS 173, it of course must have been begun after their completion. The last section of MS 173 is not dated, so we do not know exactly when it was completed. However, since the remarks on the philosophy of psychology in section 2 of MS 173 stop abruptly and appear to be continued at the beginning of MS 174, which is dated April 24, it is plausible that the color remarks in section 3 began around this date, and may have been completed within a month or two. It is noteworthy that the remarks on color in section 3 of MS 173 go until the end of the notebook but are not continued further in another volume. One hypothesis that may explain this would be that after Wittgenstein reached the end of MS 173, he thought it an appropriate place to stop writing new remarks and begin a revision of the material on color in MS 173 in the fresh volume MS 176. Thus I suggest that section 1 of MS 176 was composed in the summer of 1950. This excursion into dating the final manuscripts has led to the following conclusions: the writings from Wittgensteins last fruitful phase consist of remarks 300-676 of On Certainty and the short section of remarks included as Part 6 of LWPP2. Remarks 66-299 of On Certainty, Parts 4 and 5 of LWPP2, and everything included in Remarks on Colour were all composed during the time when Wittgenstein was undergoing hormone treatments and consistently declared the quality of his work to be subpar. In his letter to 73

Malcolm of April 16, 1951, Wittgenstein says that the curtain in his brain has not gone up for over two years, and in his letter of April 17, 1950 he says that he has not been able to do any sustained good work since the beginning of March 1949. The remarks forming the first two parts of LWPP2 are undated but appear to have been written before this date. There is thus a period of interest, between March 1949 and November 1949, when he began undergoing hormone treatments, in which Wittgenstein claims to not have done any sustained good work, and during which he did not speak well of the quality of the work he was doing, though not as intensely as he criticized the quality of his work after November 1949. This may be considered a period in which Wittgenstein was not satisfied with the quality of his work, but was dissatisfied to a lesser extent than during his hormone treatments.10 During this time, I have argued, Wittgenstein likely composed the first 65 remarks of On Certainty.11 These conclusions are summarized in the table below. Our results further support the conclusion of Chapter 1, namely that On Certainty should not be thought of as a unified work. This research suggest that On Certainty be conceived of as consisting of three parts: 1) remarks 1-65, with which Wittgenstein was somewhat dissatisfied, 2)

10

Wittgensteins letter to Malcolm of February 8, 1951 lends support to associating this period with moderate dissatisfaction: he cant participate in philosophical discussions right now because, he reports, my head [is] empty, although it was half empty already when I was in Ithaca in the fall of 1949. 11 It remains unclear whether MS 171 was composed before the start of hormone treatments or afterward, though clearly it was not written after their cessation.

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remarks 66-299, with which he was very dissatisfied, and 3) 300-676, which he considered to be of better quality than other writings he had produced over the past two years. This division of On Certainty into parts will be utilized in the sequel. Chapter 5 will present a reading of On Certainty that is informed by its division into multiple parts with very different characters, and Chapter 6 will show that most readers of the book do not appreciate that Wittgenstein did not consider all of its remarks to be of equal value.

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Table 1: Source Manuscripts for Wittgenstein's Final Publications

MS Part MS Pages 169 ii-81r 170 1r-5v 171 1-14 172 1 1-20 2 21-24 173 1 ii-31v 2 31v-47v 3 47v-100r 87r-100r 174 1 1r-14v 2 14v-40 175 1 1r-34v 2 34v-79 176 1 1r-22r 2 22r-46v 3 46v-51v 4 51v-81 177 1r-11 MS Dates Publication Section Remarks/Pages undated, prob. late 1948 - early 1949 LWPPv2 1 pp. 2-49 undated, prob. 1949 LWPPv2 2 pp. 51-53 undated, prob. late 1949 or early 1950 LWPPv2 3 pp. 55-59 undated, prob. autumn 1949 OC 1 rem. 1-65 undated, prob. Feb. 1950 RoC 2 rem. 1-20 March 24 - April 12 1950 RoC 3 rem. 1-130 undated, prob. 1950 LWPPv2 4 pp. 61-71 undated, prob. 1950 RoC 3 rem. 131-350 undated, prob. 1950 LWPPv2 4 pp. 71-79 April 24 - ? (prob. Late Spring 1950) LWPPv2 5 pp. 81-90 undated, prob Summer 1950 OC 2 rem. 66-192 (prob.) Summer - September 23, 1950 OC 2 rem. 193-299 March 10 - March 21, 1951 OC 3 rem. 300-425 undated, prob. Summer 1950 RoC 1 rem. 1-88 March 21 - April 14, 1951 OC 3 rem. 426-523 April 14 - April 15, 1951 LWPPv2 6 pp. 92-95 April 15 - April 24, 1951 OC 3 rem. 524-637 April 25 - April 27, 1951 OC 3 rem. 638-676

Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2 MS Part MS Pages MS Dates Publication Section Remarks/Pages 169 ii-81r undated, prob. late 1948 - early 1949 LWPPv2 1 pp. 2-49 170 1r-5v undated, prob. 1949 LWPPv2 2 pp. 51-53 171 1-14 undated, prob. 1949 LWPPv2 3 pp. 55-59 173 2 31v-47v undated, prob. 1950 LWPPv2 4 pp. 61-71 3 87r-100r undated, prob. 1950 LWPPv2 4 pp. 71-79 174 1 1r-14v April 24 - ? (prob. Late Spring 1950) LWPPv2 5 pp. 81-90 176 3 46v-51v April 14 - April 15, 1951 LWPPv2 6 pp. 92-95

MS Part MS Pages 176 1 1r-22r 172 2 21-24 173 1 ii-31v 3 47v-100r

Remarks on Colour MS Dates Publication Section Remarks/Pages undated, prob. Summer 1950 RoC 1 rem. 1-88 undated, prob. Feb. 1950 RoC 2 rem. 1-20 March 24 - April 12 1950 RoC 3 rem. 1-130 undated, prob. 1950 RoC 3 rem. 131-350

On Certainty MS Part MS Pages MS Dates Publication Section Remarks/Pages 172 1 1-20 undated, prob. autumn 1949 OC 1 rem. 1-65 174 2 14v-40 undated, prob Summer 1950 OC 2 rem. 66-192 175 1 1r-34v (prob.) Summer - September 23, 1950 OC 2 rem. 193-299 2 34v-79 March 10 - March 21, 1951 OC 3 rem. 300-425 176 2 22r-46v March 21 - April 14, 1951 OC 3 rem. 426-523 4 51v-81 April 15 - April 24, 1951 OC 3 rem. 524-637 177 1r-11 April 25 - April 27, 1951 OC 3 rem. 638-676

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Selected Pages from the Final Manuscripts

Figure 5: MS 175, p. 79 (the last page of MS 175, written March 21)

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Figure 6: MS 176, p. 22r (end of color revision and continuation of certainty remarks)

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Figure 7: MS 175, p. 34v (Wittgensteins initial remarks after reading the book review, written on March 10 in blue ink)

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Figure 8: MS 176, p. 19v (steady and clean handwriting from the color revision in a variety of inks)

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Figure 9: MS 176, p. 24r (page from the final certainty notes, written in consistent blue ink with unsteady handwriting)

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Chapter 3 On Certainty and Wittgensteins Works

The investigations carried out in the previous two chapters now enable us to effectively assess whether On Certainty qualifies as one of Wittgensteins works. The claim that it does, as we have seen, is central to the case for recognizing a third Wittgenstein, which is claimed to be definitively characterized by On Certainty in just the way that the first and second phases of Wittgensteins career achieve their definitive expression in the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations.1 In response to the possible objection that On Certainty shouldnt count as a work because its remarks were not revised, Moyal-Sharrock offers a defense for applying this term to the book. While recognizing that the criteria for what counts as a work is debatable, she notes the use of the term by Wittgensteins own editors,

As Stroll argues, we should divide Wittgensteins career into three phases: the First Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, the Second of the Investigations, and the Third of On Certainty (2004, p. 22). The central place given to On Certainty in the third Wittgenstein is why I consider only Moyal-Sharrocks initial characterization of this phase as made up of the 1949-1951 writings (cf. footnote 4 of the introduction). For while most of the early material from the first Wittgenstein can be seen as developing towards the Tractatus, and similarly for the writings of the second Wittgenstein in relation to Philosophical Investigations (though there are good reasons for recognizing a middle Wittgenstein), the work on philosophical psychology from 1946-49 does not have this relation to On Certainty. Thus, On Certainty cannot be definitive of the years 1946-1951 in a way that is analogous to how the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations relate to their associated phases of Wittgensteins career.

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Anscombe and von Wright, and cites their descriptions of the notes as evidence of their unique status.2 In the preface to On Certainty, after telling how Wittgenstein began to think about the issue of Moores controversial statements when he visited Malcolm in fall of 1949, Anscombe and von Wright state that this book contains the whole of what Wittgenstein wrote on this topic from that time until his death. They go on to justify their decision to publish the notes as a single volume: It seemed appropriate to publish this work by itself. It is not a selection; Wittgenstein marked it off in his notebooks as a separate topic, which he apparently took up at four separate periods during this eighteen months. It constitutes a single sustained treatment of the topic. In a subsequent essay, also quoted by Moyal-Sharrock as evidence of On Certaintys status as a work, von Wright claims that during the last year and a half of his life Wittgenstein wrote almost exclusively about knowledge and certainty and refers to the book as a treatise (von Wright 1982, p. 165). On the basis of these editorial statements, advocates for recognizing a third Wittgenstein have claimed that On Certainty is an autonomous collection (Stroll 1994, p. 9) and nota compilation effected by someone other than Wittgenstein (Moyal-Sharrock 2005, p. 2), representing an astonishingly intense treatment of a topic over a period of 18 months (ibid., p. 3). They have thus concluded that On Certainty, as well as the other two

(Moyal-Sharrock 2002, p. 294 fn. 3)

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publications culled from contemporaneous notes Remarks on Colour and LWPP2 are wholly self-standing works (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, p. 2). These editorial claims deserve close scrutiny, because they have been heavily influential in how interpreters have come to conceive of the notes comprising On Certainty. They are revealed to be misleading when we consult Wittgensteins correspondence and Nachlass. When told that the discussion of Moore and certainty was marked off as a separate topic, one naturally suspects that Wittgenstein utilized a notation in his notebook identifying whether a remark belonged to his investigations of certainty, color, or psychology. This then gives rise to the notion that he saw himself as concurrently composing three books, and that the editors were following Wittgensteins own editorial directives when they cut and spliced his final notebooks to create the publications On Certainty, Remarks on Colour, and LWPP2. If this were the case then indeed it would be true that the responsibility for compiling the materials for On Certainty does not rely primarily with the editors. The claim that Wittgenstein marked off distinct investigations in his notebooks must surely be a reference to the horizontal lines3 that are occasionally used by Wittgenstein, such as this one from MS 176, p. 46v:

The following discussion of Wittgensteins use of horizontal lines in the final manuscripts relies on a number of observations made in (van Gennip 2004) and (van Gennip 2008).

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Figure 10: MS 176, p. 46v

These lines are not accompanied by any labels or instructions, though in many cases it is pretty clear that the line is intended to separate material on different topics. 10 pages after the line shown above, another line occurs on p. 51v, thereby marking off a section of remarks from its surrounding context. The editors took these lines to indicate that the marked-off section should be published separately, in LWPP2, from the surrounding remarks, which appeared in On Certainty.4 Inspection of the notebooks shows this to have been a reasonable decision by the editors, but it should still be noted that Wittgenstein nowhere explicitly indicates that the remarks above p. 46v and below p. 51v are part of the same investigation. A similar line occurs on p. 14v of MS 174, which the editors took to also mark a separation between LWPP2 and On Certainty. Lines just like the one above occur at several points in the final manuscripts where their purpose is not so clear, and in these cases the

No indication was given in the published text of On Certainty that this splice, which occurs between remarks 523 and 524, had occurred.

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editors did not take them to indicate that distinct investigations were being marked off. For example, on p. 21r of MS 173 a pair of lines occurs around a single remark, apparently separating this statement concerning the terms know and believe from the surrounding material on Goethes reflections on color. Rather than include this remark in On Certainty, the editors chose to publish it in its original context as Remarks on Colour section III, #93, replacing the horizontal lines with square brackets. An identical line occurring on p. 22r of the same manuscript was not interpreted as specifying a demarcation, since it was simply passed over without indication on the next page of Remarks on Colour between remarks 95 and 96. A striking case occurs on the last two pages of MS 172 included in On Certainty. These pages include five horizontal lines, none of which were taken by the editors to indicate a demarcation, since none of them were reproduced in sections 60-65 of On Certainty.5 It is not clear what Wittgenstein intended these lines in MS 172 to indicate. Maybe they indicate the completion of work performed at one sitting, or alternatively, extended lengths of time between the composition of remarks. Van Gennip speculates that they may signify the importance Wittgenstein attached to each of these remarks, though she concedes, it is equally probable that these lines have no particular purpose at all (2008, p. 53). We now see that the horizontal lines in Wittgensteins
5

Similarly, the complete contents of MSS 171 and 169 appeared in LWPP2, yet the editors of that publication (including von Wright) did not reproduce any of the 6 horizontal lines occurring in the former manuscript or the nearly 20 lines occurring in the latter. Thus they clearly did not take these lines to demarcate separate investigations.

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late manuscripts do not all serve a clear and consistent purpose, and thus that they cannot simply be taken for granted as marking off a separate topic without further interpretation. Wittgensteins editors also separated a number of notebooks at points which were not characterized by the occurrence of a horizontal line. Nothing separates the remarks on color and those on certainty in MS 172 apart from the fact that they occur on distinct loose sheets. As seen in Figure 6 in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein does not explicitly distinguish between the remarks on color and those on certainty on p. 22r of MS 176. The break between remarks from 1950 and those from 1951 are represented by a horizontal line in the published text of On Certainty below section 299, even though no such demarcation symbol occurs in the manuscript, reproduced as Figure 7 in the previous chapter. Nor does any line occur on p. 87r of MS 173, which the editors splice together with the line at p. 31v to produce what is published as part 4 of LWPP2, devoid of any indications that a splice has occurred. It is thus clear now that the horizontal lines do not by themselves serve to clearly demarcate separate investigations and that the editors in most cases did not in fact take them to serve such a function. Indeed, as van Gennip describes the situation, not only are Wittgensteins marks ambiguous, but the editors applied their own demarcations in the notebooks as well (2004, p. 129).

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It is clear from these considerations that On Certainty is a compilation of texts selected not by Wittgenstein himself but by his editors, since the strings of remarks comprising this book were neither consistently marked off from other discussions nor expressly indicated to count as a single investigation. The notion that the composition of these remarks was an intense and sustained task must also be corrected. The remarks on certainty are interspersed with extended discussions of color and psychology, so Wittgenstein was clearly not committing his undivided attention to Moores remarks for 18 straight months. From Wittgensteins correspondence we also see that he repeatedly complained of his inability to produce good work in 1950, and even reported that he was unable to work at all for stretches of several months. His philosophical activities in 1950 then cannot be accurately described as sustained.6 This description would perhaps only be appropriately applied to the final six weeks of Wittgensteins life in which he expressed satisfaction with the state of his work. While many editorial statements used by Moyal-Sharrock and Stroll to argue for On Certaintys status as a work have been challenged, we still need to consider what criteria for a work are most appropriately applied to Wittgensteins writings, and the extent to which they are satisfied by On Certainty. Joachim Schulte provides possibly the most extended discussion
6

The characterization of On Certainty as a single sustained treatment is also challenged by van Gennip (2008, pp. 54-58), who draws attention to remarks from MSS 169-171, as well as others from over a decade earlier, which bear upon the themes addressed in the book but were not selected by the editors for inclusion.

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in the secondary literature of the notion of a work in Wittgenstein.7 He points out that the standards one applies in evaluating this question should be shaped by an understanding of Wittgensteins writing process. After filling notebooks with first-draft remarks, Wittgenstein would often identify a selection of these remarks, rearrange them, and then edit them individually in an attempt to product an organic text. This revision process was performed to greater or lesser degrees on a number of texts. Rather than lay down a number of necessary conditions that must be fully satisfied for a piece of writing to count as a work, Schulte suggests that one consideration we should take into account is where a text is situated within a range of texts that are revised to different degrees. This is not the sole criterion to be considered, for Schulte also suggests that a text can be considered a work to the extent that Wittgenstein himself deemed it to count as an organic whole, as well as the extent to which we the readers can discern a line of thought, supplemented by examples, reasons, objections, and so on (Schulte 2005, p. 361). These do not together form a set of conditions that must all be satisfied, but rather are three fairly independent scales concerning the authors attitudes, the readers perceptions, and the form of the text itself that must be weighed against each other because they may (but need not) conflict (Schulte 1999, p. 83).

See (Schulte 1992), (Schulte 1999), and (Schulte 2005).

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Schulte shows how these criteria may be used by applying them to three sections of Philosophical Investigations, viz. remarks 1-188, 189-421, and 422-693 (Schulte 2005, p. 362). All three sections rank high on the textual scale by having undergone significant revisions. The relative obscurity of the third section, however, makes it certainly rank much lower on the reader scale than section 2 (containing the discussions of rulefollowing and private language), in which many readers have found a welldiscernable train of thought. But section 2 may satisfy the author criterion to a lesser degree than section 1, which survived several stages of revision in nearly unchanged form (ibid.), indicating that Wittgenstein was probably satisfied with the organization and presentation of this material. Since no other text from the Nachlass satisfies the three criteria in a comparable way to Philosophical Investigations, that text surely deserves the title of work, even if it does not fulfill all the criteria to the fullest possible extent. We should now evaluate the text of On Certainty with respect to these criteria. Surely these remarks rank very low on the textual scale since they underwent no rearrangement or significant revision. All the writings form 1949-1951 have a similar status, save possibly for the remarks on color in MS 176 that underwent a first stage of revision. With respect to the criterion of Wittgensteins satisfaction with the form of his writing, the remarks from spring 1949 to spring 1951 (including the revision of the color remarks) clearly rank very low, since their quality was 90

consistently panned. Perhaps the remarks from the final half of On Certainty rank somewhat higher on this scale since Wittgenstein indicates some satisfaction with them, though they still constitute first-draft material that surely would have satisfied him to a greater extent if they had been able to undergo revision. Schulte agrees that with respect to On Certainty, the criteria just considered are clearly not satisfied at all, though he points out that the criterion concerning the readers ability to trace a line of thought in the text may lead us to think very highly of this book (Schulte 2005, p. 363). This, indeed, appears to be the fundamental consideration driving MoyalSharrocks claims about the status of the book: I believe that On Certainty should be recognized as one of Wittgensteins three great works if only because it gives us the key to one of philosophys most intractable problems: the problem of skepticism about the external world. (2005, p. 164) While I am not concerned to contest the value of the philosophical solution that is attributed to Wittgenstein, I do want to suggest that a text certainly does not need to qualify as a work in order to contain important philosophical ideas. When we separate our evaluation of the ideas found in Wittgensteins writings from the mostly historical task of determining whether it qualifies as one of his works, we are still able to find value in these texts without thereby distorting our picture of his intellectual development.

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The readers perceptions are nevertheless an important consideration in determining the status of a piece of Wittgensteins writings, but our historical investigations have made clear that perceptions of On Certainty as a sustained or intense effort, or even as thematically more homogenous, concentrated and contiguous (Moyal-Sharrock 2009, p. 559) than Philosophical Investigations are possible precisely because the structure of the book is due to its editors. Had the final notebooks all been published sequentially as a single volume, rather than split up by content into separate publications, the descriptions above would not apply to such a book.8 This suggests that even if our evaluation of On Certaintys contents lead us to deem the book a work, it should not be considered one of Wittgensteins works since those perceptions are very much dependent on a misleading picture of how and what Wittgenstein actually wrote. As a comparison, if one were to collect all of the remarks from Wittgensteins Nachlass concerning, say, the concept of negation, one might indeed produce a text that achieved a striking thematic homogeneity and concentration. Such a text could very well serve to illuminate certain aspects of Wittgensteins philosophy, but it surely would not count as one of his works. Despite all of the considerations given here, I do not believe that the editors choice to publish On Certainty was a mistake, even though I take it

Stern argues that there is a good case for producing such a volume, since there is a sense in which the 1949-51 manuscripts form a relatively self-contained epilogue to the Wittgenstein papers (1996, p. 447).

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to be an editorial compilation that does not constitute one of Wittgensteins works. For I agree with van Gennip that surely the choices of the editors [were] not unreasonable or illogical (van Gennip 2004, p. 129). When one reads through Wittgensteins final notebooks, the remarks selected by the editors certainly appear to be thematically related, even if Wittgenstein did not mark them off as a distinct or unified discussion.9 By isolating these remarks, On Certainty gives us an illuminating perspective on Wittgensteins final thoughts. It should thus be welcomed as a posthumous Wittgenstein publication, as long as readers are not led to believe that it offers a privileged or authoritative perspective on Wittgensteins final thoughts by having been constructed according to editorial intentions clearly indicated in his notebooks. The writings from Wittgensteins Nachlass that deserve to be published are not restricted to just his works, so it is not incumbent on his editors to prove that the texts they produce achieve this special status.

There are a handful of remarks from MSS 169, 170, 171, and 173 that also strike one as related, but one can understand the editors reluctance to include these in On Certainty since they tend to be less distinguishable and detachable from their surrounding contexts, and it is sometimes unclear where they fit in the sequence of remarks published in the book.

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Chapter 4 Therapeutic Readings

A central component of the case for recognizing a third phase of Wittgensteins career is the claim that his final writings are characterized by a shift from a therapeutic methodology to one that seeks systematic theoretical solutions to traditional philosophical problems. In this chapter I argue for a particular therapeutic reading of Philosophical Investigations, the central text of the second Wittgenstein, to lay the groundwork for my claim in the next chapter that Wittgenstein does not in fact abandon these therapeutic methodological goals in his final writings. When we take Wittgenstein as seriously engaged in this therapeutic project, unfamiliar yet fascinating modes of criticism reveal themselves to be appropriate for evaluating his philosophy. Many of the selections from the Wittgenstein oeuvre that are most quoted and discussed in the literature involve descriptions of the goals and methods of his philosophical project. In these passages Wittgenstein denies an intention to advance theses or make controversial assertions and instead claims that his philosophical approach is comparable to a therapeutic procedure. Incorporating these metaphilosophical remarks in an interpretation of Wittgensteins writing can prove difficult, for they seem to undercut the possibility of applying the usual methods of philosophical 94

critique. A significant number of interpreters of Wittgensteins later philosophy discount the seriousness of these remarks by describing Wittgenstein as constructing theories, presenting arguments, arguing with other philosophers, and solving philosophical problems. Construing Wittgensteins work as advancing arguments then sets the groundwork for these readers to apply familiar forms of philosophical critique such as argumentative analysis. A smaller group of therapeutic readers has argued that Wittgensteins interpreters should take his methodological statements at face value and read his work as advancing no philosophical theories. Many interpreters have not found this option promising, for two main reasons. First, despite insisting that Wittgensteins work cannot be criticized for advancing faulty arguments (for it purportedly contains no arguments at all), many interpretations from therapeutic readers nevertheless appear to involve a number of controversial philosophical theses, either by assuming these themselves or by attributing them to Wittgenstein. This can give the impression that either Wittgensteins descriptions of therapy are an attempt to deflect legitimate criticism of his work, or that his readers are using his metaphilosophical statements to shield their own philosophical commitments from criticism. Second, readers may reason that if Wittgensteins work really does contain no arguments, reasons, or controversial theses, then his writing offers nothing that can be subjected to philosophical critique. Thus, if Wittgensteins talk of therapeutic 95

methodology isnt really serious, as in the first case, then it serves merely as a roadblock to rational philosophical critique; on the other hand, if the methodological claims are true, then it appears that philosophical critique of his work is not even possible. For these reasons, Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical statements often dont influence how his readers interpret the rest of his philosophical work. In this chapter I offer a way to take Wittgenstein seriously as a therapist while still allowing his work to be subject to legitimate critique. I begin by giving a reading of Wittgensteins methodological statements and then applying them to one set of remarks in the Investigations. Even though familiar modes of philosophical criticism are inappropriately applied when we take Wittgenstein seriously as a therapist, I argue that new methods of critique are possible if we attempt to evaluate Wittgensteins therapy on its own terms. A brief comparison with Freud suggests two perspectives that one might adopt in relation to Wittgensteins therapy: the patient and the observer. The project of identifying multiple voices in Wittgensteins writing is then presented as one of the observers descriptive tasks, and finally some of the observers possible modes of critique are explored. Wittgensteins therapeutic methodology stems from his unique description of philosophical problems: A philosophical problem has the form: I dont know my way about. (PI 123)

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This strikes one immediately as an unusual way of formulating a problem. Why, we might ask, does this formulation characterize a particular persons situation, rather than describe a logical or conceptual difficulty that anyone is free to reflect on? For that is the form that philosophical problems are ordinarily taken to have, and responses to such problems typically come by way of philosophical theories or explanations of the notions in question. Yet Wittgenstein characterizes a philosophical problem as a statement which essentially expresses the speakers own confusion and disorientation. Of course, I dont know my way about is not what the philosopher actually says when discussing a philosophical problem, but this is Wittgensteins description of what a philosophers concerns about a philosophical problem display about the philosopher himself. By focusing his attention on philosophers in the grip of a problem rather than the abstract characterizations of those problems themselves, Wittgenstein is surely engaged in something quite unlike the traditional philosophical enterprise. His own project characterizes philosophical problems as symptoms of a philosophers state of confusion.1 The goal of his philosophical project, then, is not to solve philosophical problems, but rather to treat them, i.e. to attempt to cure the philosopher of the unease which reveals itself in the symptom of obsession over certain philosophical problems:
1 For detailed elaborations of the notions of illness most appropriate for Wittgensteins project, see (Fischer 2004) and (Kuusela 2008).

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The philosophers treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. (PI 255) Wittgenstein is not here offering a radical reinterpretation of what philosophers have been doing for thousands of years; instead he is prescribing how his unique philosophical project is to proceed. The philosophical problems of concern to Wittgenstein often arise, he claims, from our making unreasonable demands upon our concepts and languages. For example, concepts and their logical interrelations are often taken to have an absolute fixed structure or crystalline purity (PI 107) that admits of no vagueness or indeterminacy. And when struggling with conceptual problems in philosophy, we often attempt to resolve our difficulties by, as it were, revealing the true natures of these concepts through a process of analysis. Yet we discover that the terms of our everyday language are ill-suited for this analytical task due to their indeterminacies. This roadblock can lead to intense frustration with the crudeness of natural language, indeed it can put us on the road to wondering how our radically insufficient language could at all possibly succeed in serving the needs of communication and representation: When we believe that we have to find that order, the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called sentences, words, signs. (PI 105) The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (PI 107)

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We are particularly apt to run into these problems when we attempt to reflect on conceptual essences, divorced from the contingencies of how their corresponding terms are put to use in particular circumstances: The confusions which occupy us arise when language is, as it were, idling, not when it is doing work. (PI 132) So naturally, one way of resolving these problems is to draw our attention to the details of how language manages to function in our everyday activities, and thereby bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use (PI 116). Under a traditional conception of philosophical problems, the natural philosophical response to a problem will be an attempt to solve it by advancing new theories, and one might think that Wittgensteins resolution of these dilemmas would involve articulating a theory of language. Yet surprisingly he claims that taking care of a philosophical problem is not a matter of pronouncing new truths about the subject of the investigation. (BT p. 307) If the goal of Wittgensteins project is not to try to convince a philosopher of the truth of particular propositions, then the difficulty of philosophy is not that of changing our opinions, but rather the difficulty of a change of attitude (BT p. 300). Strikingly, success in this endeavor is not found in answering a question, but in making it go away: Philosophical problems should completely disappear. (PI 133)

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This result is to be achieved by marshalling recollections for a particular purpose (PI 127), drawing our attention to general facts about the functioning of our language that are obvious but not often reflected upon due to their mundaneness: One can be obsessed by a certain language form A philosophical trouble is an obsession, which once removed it seems impossible that it should ever have had power over us. It seems trivial. (Wittgenstein 1979, pp. 97-8) Wittgensteins project is thus successful to the extent that philosophical problems are dissolved away. This technique is performed on a philosopher, rather than on a problem understood abstractly: Suppose someone said My craving is to get a general comprehensive picture of the universe. Can you satisfy this craving? I would say NoLet us see whether doing such and such, or thinking such and such a way will, not satisfy the craving, but make you cease to have it. (Ambrose 1989, p. 109) Thus a philosophical problem is solved when the philosopher is simply no longer captivated by it, and not when he comes to achieve a certain insight not even an insight about the nature of the previously captivating problem. I claim then that Wittgensteins philosophical goals truly are best characterized as therapeutic and anti-theoretical, for they aim to eliminate the problems of philosophers, and not to solve philosophical problems. Wittgensteins person-specific therapeutic endeavor is thus most appropriately evaluated by the degree to which it succeeds in helping particular philosophers let go of particular philosophical obsessions.

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We can see Wittgenstein putting this method into practice in his discussion of ostensive definition in the early remarks of Philosophical Investigations. When learning a foreign language the first words one tends to begin with are simple nouns such as house, car, or book. Upon reflection, we notice that these names are also the kinds of words first learned by children in their native language. We may then come to think that names are the fundamental components of any language, and thus that learning language consists in giving names to objects (PI 26). In teaching language to children we usually convey these names through pointing, i.e. via ostension. We may thereby come to believe that ostensive definition is the fundamental act on which the words of our language depend for their meaning. Yet reflection on the idea of ostension may lead us to worry that it is not sufficiently precise to securely fix the meanings of our terms: Now, one can ostensively define a persons name, the name of a colour, the name of a material, a number-word, the name of a point of the compass, and so on. The definition of the number two, That is called two pointing to two nuts is perfectly exact. But how can the number two be defined like that? The person one gives the definition to doesnt know what it is that one wants to call two; he will suppose that two is the name given to this group of nuts! He may suppose this; but perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake: when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might take it to be the name of a number. And he might equally well take a persons name, which I explain ostensively, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of the compass. That is to say, an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in any case. (PI 28) 101

The possibility that this particular case of ostension might not succeed led us to question whether ostension is determinate at all, since it seems that any act of pointing can be misinterpreted. Suddenly ostension appears to be an extremely poor foundation for our language, and we may begin to think it miraculous that successful communication is even possible. The clever philosopher will notice a way to eliminate the ambiguity of ostension. When pointing to an object and giving a name, we can make our meaning precise by indicating the category of thing being named. Thus the potential confusion resulting from saying round while pointing to a balloon, and then saying red while pointing to the same object, can be prevented by using either the phrase this shape is round or this color is red. We may then come to think of this as how ostension truly works the act of pointing accompanied by a name and a category-determination. Yet further reflection reveals that this added term may be just as ambiguous as the one it is being used to clarify: Perhaps someone will say, two can be ostensively defined only in this way: This number is called two. For the word number here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word. But this means that the word number must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood. The word number in the definition does indeed indicate this place the post at which we station the word. And we can prevent misunderstandings by saying This colour is called soand-so, This length is called so-and-so, and so on. That is to say, misunderstandings are sometimes averted in this way. But does one have to take the words colour and length in just this way? Well, well just have to explain them. Explain, then, by means of other words! And what about the last explanation in this chain? (Dont say: There isnt a last explanation. That is 102

just as if you were to say: There isnt a last house in this road; one can always build an additional one.) (PI 29) We thus appear to be forced into the head-spinning conclusion that our language may be entirely indeterminate since it rests on such feeble foundations. We may then valiantly try to save ostension by coupling it with some other process of determining meaning, e.g. a mental act like intention, but this too will likely leave us unsatisfied. Right where we would expect Wittgenstein to solve this problem by proceeding with a thorough investigation of the foundational mechanisms that determine the meaning of our terms, we instead find the following reply: Whether the word number is necessary in an ostensive definition of two depends on whether without this word the other person takes the definition otherwise than I wish. And that will depend on the circumstances under which it is given, and on the person I give it to. And how he takes the explanation shows itself in how he uses the word explained. (PI 29) The philosopher intensely caught up in this metaphysical problem might find such a response surprising. After all, what Wittgenstein says here is so obvious that one wouldnt usually think to even utter it. Whether I need to clarify my attempt at ostension with a category-term of course depends on a number of mundane considerations such as the external circumstances surrounding the act and the other persons ability to understand me. And how he goes on to use the word Ive just taught him will show if he has

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understood correctly. If he has misunderstood, then I will make further attempts to clarify my utterance, but if a number of further attempts are unsuccessful I may simply come to the conclusion that he isnt able to understand me. This may lead me to have a low opinion of his intellect, but it certainly wont make me question whether the words of my language have any determinate meaning whatsoever. Wittgenstein thus does not attempt to solve this metaphysical problem by articulating a philosophy of language, but rather tries to effect a change in attitude in the philosopher. If the therapy is successful, then after being confronted with these mundane facts about how our language actually works, the philosopher will probably consider the problem to be so illconceived and uninteresting that it deserves no further attention. The philosopher will thus not come to a stage of enlightenment after encountering some philosophical insight imparted on him by Wittgenstein, but rather brought back to a healthy state of mind in which one does not even recognize the problem. That is, if the therapy is successful. There is nothing in Wittgensteins remarks, e.g. no deductive argument, that compels the philosopher to abandon his interest in the metaphysical problem. Wittgensteins therapy will either work or it will not, and we will have to evaluate it according to its results. Therapeutic readings like the one outlined above have encountered a certain amount of resistance. This may be because Wittgensteins readers 104

have been suspicious of his claims to not be advancing any controversial theses. Such claims might be read as an attempt to place a set of philosophical commitments beyond dispute. One certainly gets the impression of this possibility from certain passages in Gordon Bakers later work: Wittgenstein was fully aware of the inclination among philosophers to dispute the correctness of identifying thinking with operating with signs. He made clear why he did not give way to these objections: having asserted nothing at all (even about how think is used), he had nothing to surrender or withdraw.his slogan [Belief is calculating with signs] (like his strategy) is logically immune to refutation. (Baker 2004, p. 169) ...most of the discussions that try to refute or rebut Wittgensteins theory, as well as most of those that try to defend it against attack, are misconceived. There is literally nothing to attack as being incorrect. And nothing to defend as being an accurate description of the grammar of our language. To engage in these controversies is already to take Wittgensteins philosophical investigations in the wrong spirit. (ibid., p. 276) Peter Hacker finds such passages concerning, for they appear to prohibit any potential critical engagement with Wittgensteins texts: If one reads Wittgenstein as Baker did in his last writings, the figure that emerges is indeed secure from criticismHis philosophical position is completely immune to counter argument. (2007, p. 116) The fact that interpreting Wittgenstein as engaged in a therapeutic project can easily lead to shielding his work from all criticism (whether intentionally or not) makes such readings even more suspect when one considers that

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most therapeutic readers are also advocates of Wittgensteins project.2 This imbalance creates a conflict of interest by which therapeutic readers can make their descriptions of Wittgensteins project, which often appear to include a number of controversial philosophical theses, exempt from critique. At the same time, many readers who are critical of Wittgenstein tend to read him as advancing theses. This dichotomy needs to be broken. It must be possible to take Wittgenstein seriously as engaging in therapy and still leave open the possibility for legitimate critique of his project. Such a stance is possible if we take Wittgensteins metaphilosophical statements not to be true descriptions of how his project fares in all cases, but rather as standards and goals that he hopes his best efforts will meet. That is, Wittgensteins description of his philosophical project as advancing no controversial theses and resulting in the complete disappearance of problems and cravings should not be read as describing what his efforts have in fact achieved, but instead as describing what he hopes they will be able to achieve. The observer will then have the latitude to criticize Wittgenstein in those instances when these ideals arent met. Certainly some such instances should be able to be found, for Wittgenstein once confessed to Rush Rhees that he was not meeting one of his philosophical ideals: In

Indeed, Peterman (1992), Savickey (1999), Fischer (2011), and Read and Hutchinson (2010) all attempt not just to explain and illuminate Wittgensteins later method, but also advocate a therapeutic conception of philosophy. And as Glock notes of one group of therapeutic readers of the Tractatus, the New Wittgensteinians not only ascribe [therapeutic] views to Wittgenstein, they also subscribe to them. They endorse the austere conception of nonsense (2007, p. 56).
2

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my book I say that I am able to leave off with a problem in philosophy when I want to. But thats a lie; I cant (Hallett 1977, p. 230). When reading Wittgensteins writing one is often unsuccessful in trying to discern and follow a train of thought or an argument. Wittgenstein sometimes suggests that this is simply due to the nature of the philosophical problems, for the complicated confusions of philosophical obsession require complicated resolutions: Philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking; hence its result must be simple, but its activity as complicated as the knots it unravels. (BT p. 311) Despite this remark, many readers view the complicated structure of Wittgensteins Investigations as a symptom of his failure to compose a philosophical treatise in the standard fashion.3 Other commentators have argued that Wittgensteins claim to not be advancing theses is merely an attempt to avoid criticism.4 Such commentators assign themselves the job of locating the actual philosophical theses lurking beneath the roundabout language of the Philosophical Investigations: Wittgensteins writings seem to me not only summarizable but in positive need of summaryit [is not] true that Wittgensteins writings contain no systematically expressible theories, for indeed they do. It is the difference between what Wittgenstein says and the way he says it which is relevant here; the fact that his later writings are unsystematic in style does not mean that they are unsystematic in content. In both his early and late work Wittgenstein puts forward certain key theses, with relations of logical dependence between them, which can be discerned,
3 4

See e.g. (Glock 2007). For example (Kripke 1982, pp. 69-70).

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stated, and explained just as with any philosophical theory. (Grayling 1988, pp. v-vi) The theory has an identifiable structure and content, even if neither, in their turn, are as transparently stated and as fully spelled out as they might be. And a good deal of the difficulty with Wittgensteins work is that this theory is not presented as such, since it is not officially meant to be there at all it emerges in bits and pieces, in an ad hoc way, and therefore its crucial conceptions are left unclear and often unargued. (Grayling 1988, p. 118) Wittgenstein was no less systematic than Kant, even if his aphoristic style and method of exposition was not linear. (Hacker 2001, p. 342) Such an approach to Wittgensteins work is unsatisfactory, for it requires that we characterize Wittgenstein as either systematically violating his metaphilosophical standards willingly, and thus misleading us about his projects real goals, or violating them unwillingly, and therefore being seriously deluded about the actual nature of his project. A therapeutic reading, in contrast, can give us a more plausible understanding of Wittgensteins methods and intentions. If we take Wittgenstein as a systematic philosopher advancing theses in response to traditional philosophical questions, we are likely to find some of his answers disappointing, since we are bound to find few or no arguments given in their support. After studying Wittgensteins works in this manner, one commentator laments that Wittgensteins later philosophy is not as it stands persuasive (Grayling 1988, p. 111). But Wittgenstein claims that his goal is not to persuade others to adopt particular positions. The

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purpose of Wittgensteins project is to cure, even when it appears that Wittgenstein is advancing theses: We are interested in language only insofar as it gives us trouble. I only describe the actual use of a word if this is necessary to remove some trouble we want to get rid of. Sometimes I describe its use if you have forgotten it. Sometimes I have to lay down new rules because new rules are less liable to produce confusion or because we have perhaps not thought of looking at the language we have in this light. Thus we may make use of the facts of natural history and describe the actual use of a word; or I may make up a new game for the word which departs from its actual use, in order to remind you of its use in our own language. The whole point is that I cannot tell you anything about the natural history of language, nor would it make any difference if I could. (Wittgenstein 1979, p. 97) Wittgenstein frequently states that he is not engaged in traditional theorydriven philosophy, but rather in a form of therapy that attempts to rid us of certain philosophical inclinations. This therapy, he claims, does not advance theses, but aims to change the attitude of the patient. Having just seen the results of applying familiar modes of philosophical critique to Wittgensteins project, I now suggest that we instead critique Wittgenstein by his own standards that we evaluate the degree to which he succeeds in achieving his stated goals.5 When we take Wittgensteins descriptions of therapy seriously as criteria for the success of his philosophical project, then we must apply the interpretive principle of charity to the text in an unfamiliar manner. Since this principle admonishes us to characterize the philosopher in question as
For an example of how to take Wittgensteins methodological statements seriously and still engage in legitimate and responsible critique of his therapeutic project, see (Maddy 2011), which also includes critiques of the therapeutic philosophies of Kant, Carnap, and Austin.
5

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having the strongest and most reasonable possible defense of his position, administering this policy with respect to a philosophical text usually involves reconstructing arguments that lack clarity and rectifying enthymematic reasoning.6 Peter Carruthers has argued that in interpreting Wittgenstein as any great philosopher the principle of charity is, and must be, the fundamental principle of interpretation and that following this principle leads to an obligationto attempt to supply arguments that might explain why he says the things that he does (Carruthers 1984, p. 477). But this manner of applying the principle cannot be appropriate if we understand Wittgensteins philosophical project as guided by therapeutic standards, for we would quite uncharitably characterize Wittgenstein as constantly failing in his attempt to abstain from advancing arguments. To take Wittgenstein seriously as a therapist is to apply the principle of charity in such a manner that 1) he is not characterized as being intentionally misleading, i.e. willfully using therapy as a smokescreen to protect his philosophical commitments from criticism, and 2) he is not characterized as being deluded, i.e. believing that his project is therapeutic when it is actually of a very different character. Applying the principle of charity to a therapeutic reading of Wittgensteins project does not, however, entail that his therapeutic endeavors must always be characterized as fully succeeding in achieving
6

Recall Morris claim (quoted in the introduction) that to abandon this interpretive maxim is to forgo a philosophical history of philosophy.

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their desired goals or adhering to their ideal methodology. This is where the observer is able to find legitimate grounds to critique Wittgensteins work. This is not the critique of a positive philosophical system, but rather the critique of Wittgensteins therapeutic project as therapy. There are several modes of evaluation open to the observer, though the legitimate avenues of criticism sharply differ from that of traditional philosophical critique. Wittgenstein suggests that his approach to philosophy can be thought of as something like psychotherapy: There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (PI 133) While Wittgenstein certainly didnt model his procedure on psychoanalysis, aspects of his philosophical project can be illuminated through comparison with some of Freuds descriptions of the therapeutic process. 7 For example, neither the psychoanalyst nor Wittgenstein intend to state opinions or assert theses in the process of their treatment. The psychoanalyst treats the patients neuroses by questioning the patient about how he feels and thinks, not by telling the patient what he thinks or should think:

Read and Hutchinson argue for a closer analogy between Wittgensteins method and Freudian psychoanalysis than I do, highlighting Wittgensteins observance that a psychoanalysis is successful only if the patient agrees to the explanation offered by the analyst (Moore 1955, p. 21) and claiming Wittgenstein held that the same was true of philosophy (Read and Hutchinson 2010, p. 158 n. 9). While Wittgenstein did write in the early 30s that we can only prove that someone made a mistake if he (really) acknowledges this expression as the correct expression of his feeling (BT p. 303), I think that the above statement about Freud isnt exactly analogous to the procedure in Philosophical Investigations, since Wittgenstein there claims not to offer any explanations or to request assent to any controversial statements.

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Psycho-analysis follows the technique of getting the people under examination so far as possible themselves to produce the solution of their riddles. (Freud 1920, p. 123) Likewise, Wittgensteins treatment does not consist in suggesting an answer to the question that is puzzling the philosopher: On all questions we discuss I have no opinion; and if I had, and it disagreed with one of your opinions, I would at once give it up for the sake of argument because it would be of no importance for our discussion. (Wittgenstein 1979, p. 97) Rather, his treatment involves probing the philosopher to reveal the nature of his own captivation with a philosophical problem. Thus Wittgenstein does not argue with the philosopher in his treatment,8 but instead provokes him; indeed one could teach philosophy solely by asking questions (ibid.). Yet as Freud realized, patients arent always willing to be entirely forthcoming in the therapeutic process. Some even come to resent the therapist and his methods: The work of interpreting dreams is carried out in the face of a resistance, which opposes it and of whichcritical objections are manifestations. (Freud 1920, pp. 141-2) Wittgenstein, too, understands that philosophers will resist his technique, for this sort of investigation isvery much against the grain of some of you (Wittgenstein 1975, p. 103).

While the presence of arguments can certainly be detected in the Investigations, they are intended to serve as an instrument of therapy, rather than a vehicle for convincing one to assent to a conclusion. And due to Wittgensteins use of multiple voices in dialogue, even when arguments are identified one cannot thereby automatically attribute them to Wittgenstein himself. This issue is addressed later in the chapter.
8

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I contend that if we take Wittgensteins philosophy to be therapeutic, two perspectives open themselves for approaching Wittgensteins work. Due to the unusual nature of Wittgensteins project, these perspectives are quite different from our usual understanding of the philosophical commentator and critic. Applying the comparison between Wittgensteins philosophy and Freuds therapy, we can understand the target of Wittgensteins philosophy as the patient, and Wittgenstein as the therapist. The patient is the intended reader of the Philosophical Investigations. Another perspective is that of an outside observer of the dialogue between Wittgenstein and the patient. The observers task is to accurately describe Wittgensteins project and methods. Her reports resemble what a therapists superior might produce in an employment evaluation: she describes what the therapist takes to be illnesses, his methods for diagnosing them, and his techniques for treating those illnesses. She also evaluates the effectiveness of his therapeutic method and provides suggestions for improvement. The observer reports on what the therapist says and how the patient responds to these treatments. Her focus is on what techniques work, i.e. what therapeutic methods cause the patient to exhibit fewer symptoms.9 The perspectives of patient and observer are quite different. One adopts the perspective of the patient by directly engaging with the text of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgensteins most developed attempt to make
9

An interesting related investigation is found in (Cunning 2010), where Descartes pedagogical procedures in the Meditations are described and evaluated.

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his work accessible to the public. Unlike a historian of philosophy, the patient is not particularly concerned to reconstruct Wittgensteins thought or characterize its development, but to, as it were, participate in a direct discussion with Wittgenstein by working carefully through his text. However, one adopts the standpoint of the observer when one wishes to describe and evaluate Wittgensteins therapeutic project. Neither of these perspectives resemble the stance of a traditional philosophical commentator, whose customary job is to explicate or reconstruct a philosophers arguments. If Wittgenstein is truly a therapist, then such an approach is not applicable to his work, since he claims to not advance any kind of theory (PI 109). If no theses are available for explication, then one can only become acquainted with Wittgensteins philosophy either by experiencing the therapy first-hand as a patient or by describing it as a neutral observer. This distinction between the patient and the observer may help to resolve a current debate in the Wittgenstein literature over what methods should be used in the interpretation of the Investigations. Contextual readers often utilize outside sources in the interpretation of Wittgensteins texts; for example, they might trace the development of a particular passage through its earlier versions, or consult notes from Wittgensteins lectures to better determine his intentions.10 Defenders of a text-immanent method have argued that we should limit our sources only to the text itself,
This approach is developed extensively in (Baker and Hacker 2005) and subsequent volumes of the series.
10

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and thus that Wittgensteins extra-textual intentions and the contexts of his writing are irrelevant to the interpretation of the Investigations.11 Our distinction shows that both methods can be appropriate, depending on ones reason for approaching the Investigations. For the patient, the immanent approach is certainly the most appropriate, because he needs to have the therapy administered to him, and not to learn new truths about Wittgensteins project. But the contextual approach is right for the observer, since Wittgensteins intentions, goals, and variety of methods are the target of her investigation.12 Part of the observers task is to describe Wittgensteins techniques for dissolving various philosophical problems and explain how they work (or at least, how they are intended to work).13 This descriptive project is certainly not straightforward, for Wittgenstein only rarely announces what methods are being applied (for indeed he is usually attempting to administer therapy; not to give instruction on therapeutic method). One open project for the observer is to describe the apparent use of multiple voices in the Investigations and to explain how they are to contribute to Wittgensteins therapeutic project. While reading the text one often gets the sense that a change in voice has taken place, but it is generally difficult to determine what characters these voices are to be associated with, and particularly
The most fully-developed example of this approach is (von Savigny 1994-1996). Further discussion of the relative merits of contextual and text-immanent readings, see (von Savigny 1990), (Glock 1990), (Glock 2007), and (Pichler 2007). 13 Recent works that have taken on this descriptive project include (Savickey 1999) and (Kuusela 2008).
11 12

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difficult to determine which voice, if any, is Wittgensteins own. Some readers suggest that two voices appear in the Investigations. In one such reading the patient is thought to identify herself with the voice expressing philosophical theses, and to identify Wittgenstein with the voice expressing dismissal of such theses: The interlocutors voiceexpresses our desire for explanation and succumbs to the traps that our language presents,while the therapeutic voice works against these inclinations by examining concrete examples as a means to achieving a new way of looking at things. (McGinn 1997, pp. 23-4) On this reading the two voices are those of the patient and Wittgenstein themselves; thus, this reading characterizes therapy as consisting of a direct dialogue between Wittgenstein and the patient. David Stern has challenged the two-voice reading, suggesting that the Investigations has three voices14, and that Wittgensteins actual voice is rarely heard: Two different voicesare usually lumped together as Wittgensteins. On the one hand we have the voice of Wittgensteins narrator who does argue for positive philosophical theses and on the other hand we have Wittgensteins commentatorwho dismisses philosophical problems and compares his way of doing philosophy to therapy. (2004, p. 5) Readers are too ready to identify the authors viewpoint with whatever conclusions the reader attributes to Wittgensteins narrator, and so fail to take account of the overall character of the book. At the very least, a careful reader must be aware that

These two approaches do not exhaust all the possibilities of locating voices in the Investigations. Pichler (1997) argues for a polyphonic reading of the Investigations that identifies a large number of unique voices.
14

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the authors use of certain arguments does not amount to an endorsement of them. (ibid., p. 186) Stern brings up an important problem that must be addressed: Wittgenstein claims to not be asserting philosophical theses, yet some of the voices of the Investigations certainly appear to be engaged in proposing, refuting, and adopting theses. This tension can be relieved by recalling that Wittgenstein claims to have no opinion on the judgments that he puts forth. The point is for the patient to take the claims as serious judgments, not the therapist. So the observer needs to account for the interesting fact that Wittgenstein intends to relieve the patient of his desire to philosophize by engaging him in something that looks very much like a philosophical discussion. Sterns three-voice interpretation provides one way of resolving such a tension: This third voice, which is not always clearly distinct from the narratorial voice, provides an ironic commentary on their exchanges, a commentary consisting partly of objections to assumptions the debaters take for granted, and partly of platitudes about language and everyday life they have both overlooked. Most readers treat both of these voices as expressions of Wittgensteins view, with the result that they are unable to reconcile the trenchant and provocative theses advocated by the narrator and the commentators rejection of all philosophical theses. (Stern 2004, pp. 22-3) Perhaps Wittgenstein engages the reader in philosophical argument only to later bring her to see that this very discussion is in certain ways problematic.15

15

Another unexplored possibility might be that the patient isnt to identify with any of the voices in the text, but instead that the patients experience of witnessing the various voices interacting is intended to somehow be therapeutic. Thus an open and interesting question for the observer is to explain how Wittgenstein utilizes voices in his therapeutic project.

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One important question the observer must answer is: Does Wittgensteins therapy work, i.e., are patients really cured from philosophical impulses after undergoing Wittgensteins treatment? There is certainly evidence that his therapy has at times been successful. One of Wittgensteins former students recalled the following therapeutic experience: The considerable difficulty in following the lectures arose from the fact that it was hard to see where all this often rather repetitive concrete detailed talk was leading to how the examples were interconnected and how all this bore on the problem which one was accustomed to put oneself in abstract terms. (Gasking and Jackson 1951, p. 51) This much we should expect. The student, interested in solving traditional philosophical problems, was confused about where Wittgensteins investigations were going, and found looking at tedious details to be philosophically irrelevant and unsatisfying. But eventually a transformation took place: At first one didnt see where all the talk was leading to. One didnt see, or saw only very vaguely, the point of the numerous examples. And then, sometimes, one did, suddenly. All at once, sometimes, the solution to ones problem became clear and everything fell into placeThe solution, once seen, seemed so simple and obvious, such an inevitable and simple key to unlock so many doors so long battered against in vain. One wondered how one could possibly fail to see it. But if one tried to explain it to someone else who had not seen it one couldnt get it across without going through the whole long, long story. (ibid., p. 52) This experience appears to meet some of the standards that Wittgenstein sets for his therapeutic project. After suffering through Wittgensteins confusing technique, the student experienced an abrupt change in attitude

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(notice that Wittgenstein did not convince the student to change his attitude the student simply experienced the change). What had once appeared to him as a complex, abstract, deep philosophical problem now seemed simple, obvious, and superficial. The students resolution did not result from having received a philosophical answer to his question, for he was incapable of explaining his change in attitude to other philosophers. If the result of the therapy had been a philosophical thesis, the student could have simply told his friends the answer. But he instead found himself needing to recount the entire experience. This is a nice example of how Wittgensteins therapy can work, but the last half-century of the history of philosophy has shown that such experiences are uncommon. Relatively few philosophers have undergone the transformations that Wittgenstein sought to effect in his patients while reading the Investigations. To many Wittgensteins text has seemed to only insist that one should not be concerned with particular philosophical problems, rather than successfully effect such a change in attitude in the reader. Perhaps this is evidence that Wittgenstein was sometimes a successful therapist in person, but that his therapy is less effective when performed in print. This might be seen as a natural result of the personspecific character of Wittgensteins methods: in conversation Wittgenstein can address the specific concerns of his interlocutor, while in print he cant

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take the each patients specific cravings into account and thus must deal with problems that not all readers suffer from. 16 Wittgenstein states that his therapy involves no theses, and that the result of his therapy should be the abandonment of certain philosophical attitudes, but it should also leave our everyday practices as they are. So patients successfully coming out of therapy should hold fewer significant philosophical commitments than before the therapy began, and they certainly should not hold new philosophical commitments as a result. We can then evaluate whether Wittgensteins therapy meets its own standards by observing whether his treatment results in patients asserting new philosophical theses. A simple internet search reveals a trend among some thinkers who have engaged with Wittgensteins writings: Wittgenstein taught us that all linguistic behavior, indeed all meaning activity, presupposes a social context in which common practices, established intuitions, and consensual standards exist. (Arrington 1985, p. 489) As Wittgenstein taught usbeing rational or reasonable is not merely a matter of thinking in a certain manner but also a matter of thinking certain things. (Kazepides 1989, p. 392) As Wittgenstein taught us, the meaning of language is determined by social speech habitsand not by the things which

16

Savickey argues that in Wittgensteins methodology, emphasis is placed on the speaking of language as part of an activity or form of life (1999, p. 119), and thus that his therapeutic procedure is not well-suited for the medium of a printed book: Part of Wittgensteins methodological difficulty, and part of his struggle in writing a philosophical book, involves whether or not it is possible to do what he is attempting to do in words and in writing. Is it possible, for example, to return language to its everyday context in a philosophy book? Is it possible to de-textualize our understanding of language-use in a text? These questions and difficulties may help explain why Wittgensteins later methods allow him to teach well but not to write a book (ibid., p. 123).

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language can at best be made to refer to obliquely. (Munz 1990, p. 137) Wittgenstein has taught us that religious belief is indigenous to the religious community and can only be understood and seen as meaningful from inside that distinctive or isolated languagegame and/or form or life. (High 1981, p. 262) Wittgenstein has taught us that meaning and use are not separate things; the meaning of a word is compounded out of its uses. (Kavka 1974, p. 1472) If these thinkers have truly undergone Wittgensteinian therapy, then by Wittgensteins own lights his treatment has not succeeded, for these thinkers all appear to hold new substantive philosophical theses about language meaning, reference, rationality, and belief as a result of their interaction with Wittgensteins work. The observer is then tasked with explaining how such theses manage to find their way into Wittgensteins therapeutic procedure. The principle of charity dictates that we not attribute to Wittgenstein the intention to pass on these theses to his patients. But they might surface in more subtle ways during the therapeutic process. Perhaps some of the arguments presented during therapy manage to be convincing to the patient, despite the therapists intention not to use them to advance any theses. Or maybe Wittgenstein doesnt realize that some of his beliefs really are controversial philosophical theses, and he unwittingly transmits these theses to the patient.17 Another possibility may be that the

The possibility that Wittgenstein may have unwittingly been committed to some philosophical theses, despite his desire to avoid them, is suggested by Stroud: Wittgenstein from the very beginning of his work in the Tractatus was suspicious of, and later explicitly
17

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entire therapeutic project, while not intended to advance any theses in its application, is itself underwritten by a number of controversial philosophical commitments.18 This remains an open question for the observer. One natural response to cases of patients leaving therapy with new philosophical commitments, like those mentioned above, might be to argue that these thinkers did not undergo Wittgensteins therapy correctly. One could cite quotations, such as the following from Wittgensteins lectures, implying that those who assert meaning is use have misunderstood Wittgensteins intention: The question has been raised how far my method is the same as what is called description of meaning by exemplification. That sounds as if I had invented a method, a means of giving a meaning which is just as good as definition. The point of examining the way a word is used is not at all to provide another method of giving its meaning. When we ask on what occasions people use a word, what they say about it, what they are right to substitute for it, and in reply try to describe its use, we do so only insofar as it seems helpful in getting rid of certain philosophical troubles. (Wittgenstein 1979, pp. 96-7) Such thinkers might very well be misunderstanding Wittgensteins intention in associating meaning and use. But patients who come away from therapy

set against, the whole idea of a philosophical theory of a philosophical proposition. That alone does not mean that he managed to avoid them completely, of course (1982, p. 79). 18 In a recent interpretation and defense of Wittgensteins therapeutic project, Kuusela argues that the roots of Wittgensteins conception of philosophy might be said to lie in his emphasis on the difference between true or false factual statements and expressions of exceptionless necessity (2008, p. 3) and that Wittgenstein characterizes the failure to distinguish between these two kinds of sentences as the central confusion and unclarity of philosophy (ibid., p. 294). But this distinction is a philosophical one that is rarely drawn in everyday contexts, and how exactly it should be characterized (or indeed if such a distinction should be made at all) is a matter of philosophical controversy. This reading thus identifies a controversial philosophical commitment as the foundation of Wittgensteins therapeutic project.

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with this misunderstanding cant be faulted for coming to this belief. Such a criticism would confuse the independent perspectives of the patient and the observer. While Wittgensteins above methodological justification for attending to word use is available to the observer, the patient cant and shouldnt be expected to know this or any other piece of information on how Wittgenstein intends for his method to function. A psychotherapist does not preface the administration of her therapy with a lesson on psychological theory; likewise, knowledge about how Wittgensteins procedure is supposed to function cannot be required for a successful application of the therapy. Otherwise, only observers could be successful patients. Finally, the observer may legitimately criticize Wittgenstein for his views about therapy and his decision to be a therapist in the first place. While Wittgenstein claims not to hold substantive theses, it is clear that his method is based on a certain conception of what counts as a philosophical illness. But this conception is not up for critical evaluation; it is assumed and not argued for. For this reason Glock accuses Wittgenstein of succumbing to the myth of mere methodthe illusion that one can fashion philosophical methods in a presuppositionless manner (2007, p. 59).19 One might also legitimately employ a moral critique of Wittgensteins choosing to adopt the role of a therapist in the first place. Certainly Freud and his descendants of psychoanalysts have received plenty of legitimate
Similarly, Hintikka (1996) argues that Wittgensteins therapeutic project is based on a controversial assumption that language cannot represent itself.
19

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criticism over the years. A therapist can diagnose the patients illness and engage in therapy without keeping the patient informed about what he is doing, refuse to honestly give his opinion if the patient requests it, or determine that any patient who displays resistance is in denial, thus preventing the patient from being able to critically evaluate the therapeutic process. To the extent that Wittgensteins project has these characteristics, and the above concerns are legitimate, one might likewise criticize Wittgensteinian therapy. We have identified a number of new and interesting modes of critique available to the observer of Wittgensteins therapeutic project. If we take Wittgenstein seriously as a therapist, then our job as critics should not be to describe and evaluate a body of philosophical theses, but rather to describe the methods of his therapy and evaluate their effectiveness. One final task of the observer we have not discussed is to suggest improvements on Wittgensteins therapeutic methods. This might be a particularly fruitful task for those readers who identify themselves as Wittgensteinians and wish to carry on his legacy, for one can then view Wittgensteins work as a resource of attempted therapies some successful, some not that can be learned from and improved upon. Rather than constructing defenses of Wittgensteins work as actually practiced, these philosophers might best serve his legacy by doing his work and better.

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Chapter 5 Theory and Therapy in On Certainty

From our investigation in Chapter 1 of the fluctuations in both Wittgensteins capacity for philosophical work in his final years and his evaluation of those attempts, as well as the effort in Chapter 2 to date his writings with respect to these fluctuations, we were able to conclude that On Certainty divides itself into three parts, each associated with distinct phases of Wittgensteins self-assessment. The first part, comprised of remarks 1-65, was dated to the fall of 1949, during or shortly after Wittgensteins visit to Norman Malcolm in Cornell. The composition of Part 2, comprised of remarks 66-299, was dated to 1950, a time when Wittgenstein repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the results of his attempts at philosophical writing. Remarks 300-676, making up Part 3, were all written in the spring of 1951, when Wittgenstein expressed renewed satisfaction with his work and optimism about its future development. Wittgensteins writings from the fall of 1949 precede his cancer diagnosis and the subsequent decline in his work, though they still belong to the two years between the springs of 1949 and 1951, deemed in hindsight to have been less successful than his final weeks. According to the editors preface to On Certainty, the material falls into four parts, with divisions after remarks 65, 192, and 299. Anscombe 125

and von Wright thus consider two parts to be included in what I have called Part 2. This is because these remarks come from two separate notebook sources, MSS 174 and 175.1 Yet their divisions are not consistently determined by the distinct source manuscripts, since they count material from MS 175 as comprising two different parts, while the final part is comprised of four distinct blocks of continuous text drawn from three separate manuscripts. Thus I believe that my consistent division of parts according to their association with distinct phases of composition has better support. The structure of the book and its relation to Wittgensteins phases of working is not merely a philosophical or biographical curiosity, but a datum that calls for explanation by interpreters of Wittgensteins writings. That is, I believe that a successful interpretation of On Certainty should point out what characteristics are lacking in Part 2, exhibited in Part 3, and only partially or unsatisfactorily exhibited in the Part 1 of the book, and then explain why Wittgenstein himself would be satisfied or disappointed with the respective exhibition or lack of these qualities in his work. This cannot be accomplished if we read On Certainty as a work, because it lacks the cohesion, consistent development, and authors intention normally associated with this notion, as shown in Chapter 3. Consequently, in this chapter I treat the book as a
1

While the editors placement of the entirety of the MS 175 remarks in On Certainty after those from MS 174 gives one the impression that the latter remarks were composed after the former, I argued in Chapter 2 that it is also conceivable that Wittgenstein drafted remarks in these notebooks concurrently, and thus that the temporal sequence of composition may be more complicated than initially thought.

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collection of thematically related texts spanning a series of composition phases, thereby providing a reading of On Certainty that accounts for the variety of its component parts. In chapter 4 I argued that the metaphilosophical goals of the second Wittgenstein should be understood as therapeutic and anti-theoretical in character. Yet even when we attribute therapeutic goals to Wittgenstein, it is important to distinguish between his methodological ideals and his actual practice. Indeed, this is the key to taking Wittgenstein seriously as a therapist while still leaving room to critically evaluate his project on its own terms, for Wittgenstein did not always succeed in fulfilling his methodological ideals. The considerations of all the preceding chapters bear upon the reading of On Certainty given here. My thesis is that many of the remarks in Part 3 of the book exhibit qualities that Wittgenstein desires in a therapeutic philosophy, that Part 2 often fails to achieve these characteristics by providing what appears to be a theoretical response to the philosophical problems in question, and that Part 1 displays these qualities only to a limited extent. This contrast is seen particularly when comparing Wittgensteins reactions to Moores assertions of having basic items of knowledge such as here is a hand or I know that thats a tree. Although in Part 1 Wittgenstein announces his intentions to give a therapeutic response to Moore, he tends to argue in Part 2 that Moores statements are 127

inappropriate because they are among a special class of propositions that, according to the theory presented there, lack sense. However, in Part 3 Wittgenstein personally engages with Moore, attempting to lead Moore to a frame of mind in which he does not feel compelled to make these philosophical assertions by exploring a number of ways in which his statements could be given an understandable non-philosophical use. In these latter remarks Wittgenstein also begins to call his own prior theoretical claims from Part 2 into question, wondering if like Moores statements the too in fact lack the determinate senses provided by everyday contexts.2 For Wittgenstein, a therapeutic response to a problem that succeeded in allowing one to relinquish prior obsessions without taking on new theoretical commitments was an achievement that was sought but not always fulfilled in actual practice. Many of the well-known declarations of Wittgensteins therapeutic intentions were first formulated in the early thirties, during the so-called middle period when he returned to Cambridge to begin philosophical work once again. A number of these methodological statements persisted through the thirties and found their way into the text of Philosophical Investigations, even though some of the theories or proto2

This reading relies on my characterization of Wittgenstein as pursuing therapeutic methodological ideals. But I want to leave open the possibility of other readers using the structure of On Certainty to develop alternative interpretations of the book. For no matter what characteristics interpreters believe that Wittgenstein hoped his most polished writings would achieve (and there is a wide range of opinions on this subject), I believe that their readings of On Certainty would benefit from comparing the remarks written in 1950 with those from 1951, trying to determine what characteristics the later material has that the earlier material lacks, and explaining why they believe Wittgenstein would think that the later work was of higher quality.

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theories adopted during this middle period were themselves submitted to therapeutic treatment in that text.3 Philosophical Investigations thus did not become a therapeutic text because Wittgenstein planned from the very beginning for it to have the dialogical structure that it does. During multiple stages of revision, additional voices would be added to the text often therapeutic voices attempting to undermine or deflate Wittgensteins own earlier dogmatic statements.4 Wittgenstein thus often became his own therapeutic patient, for despite his oft-stated goal of bringing words back to their everyday use, he often found himself caught up in metaphysical theorizing. This description of the development of Wittgensteins therapeutic writings and his personal struggles with theory-avoidance may help to explain why he was disappointed with the remarks in Part 2 of On Certainty. Achieving a therapeutic resolution to a philosophical problem was often the result of working through theoretical considerations, prompted either by himself or by other philosophers who were to be subjected to treatment. The muddled and sluggish cognition of which he complained after undergoing hormone treatments for his cancer may have contributed to his inability to move beyond his theoretical considerations in 1950 and find that therapeutic voice he constantly sought. Since this voice finally makes an extended
3

E.g. see (Stern 1995) on Wittgensteins adoption of an analogy between language and a system of rules, and his subsequent attempts to undermine this idea. 4 For this reason, therapeutic readings that portray the Tractatus as a book whose theories Wittgenstein had always intended to become destabilized by the end of the text do not in fact treat the book as having a structure comparable to Philosophical Investigations.

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appearance in the final part of On Certainty, the interpretation presented here might be called a therapeutic reading of the book. But it is important to note that this is not a reading of On Certainty as an intentionally therapeutic work, i.e. as having a structure that was planned an implemented, for Part 2 was not intentionally written to serve as a setup for Part 3. It is equally important not to treat the individual parts of On Certainty as if they were self-standing theoretical or therapeutic works. All of the remarks in the book constitute first-draft material, so we should not expect Wittgensteins philosophical explorations to have either the thematic consistency or structured organization of a revised text. It is certainly not the case that nothing of a therapeutic character can be found in Part 2 and that Part 3 is devoid of all theorizing. But according to my reading, the remarks in Part 2 taken together lend themselves to a theoretical reading, while Part 3 is characterized by the emergence of questions that bring the stability of these theories into question, as well as a new approach to Moores knowledge-claims that is oriented around the speaker of those utterances rather than an abstract characterization of the peculiar class of propositions that they represent. The text of On Certainty begins with a direct challenge to one of G.E. Moores most famous claims: If you do know that here is one hand, well grant you all the rest. (OC 1) 130

This was the crucial premise of Moores attempt to prove the existence of the external world.5 By giving a statement, concerning the existence of a particular external object, that he claimed to know with certainty, he thereby claimed to have established the existence of external objects and thus that of the external world. This, he contended, constituted a refutation of external world skepticism. Most philosophers concerned with the problem of skepticism found Moores solution to be entirely unsatisfactory, charging him with begging the question by simply reasserting a premise already challenged by the skeptic and providing no additional proof of its truth. Wittgensteins extensive consideration of this and similar claims was prompted by discussions with Norman Malcolm in the fall of 1949.6 Malcolm, a former student of Moores, had just recently published a unique criticism of not only the premise of Moores proof also a number of other common sense propositions that he had claimed to know with certainty, e.g. the earth had existed for many years before my body was born. 7 In this essay Malcolm charged that Moores use of the expression I know in making these assertions was contrary to ordinary and correct use (Malcolm 1949, p. 202), and was thus a misuse of language. Three necessary conditions for the correct use of the expression I know, which Moores utterances failed to satisfy, were identified by Malcolm (ibid, p. 203):
5 6

(Moore 1939) It was not, however, the first time that Wittgenstein thought seriously about Moores writings or attempted to form a response to them. See (van Gennip 2008) for a discussion of several philosophical encounters between Moore and Wittgenstein. 7 (Moore 1925)

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1) There is a question at issue and a doubt to be removed. 2) The person asserting a knowledge claim is able to give supporting reasons. 3) The question at issue could be settled by carrying out some investigation. Malcolms response can be characterized as a theoretical one, for it attempts to alter Moores behavior by getting him to assent to the controversial thesis that sensible uses of language are determined by adherence to a number of precise rules, and it also requires these rules to be systematically catalogued. Malcolm sent a copy of his article to Moore, who returned a critical response in a letter that arrived around the same time that Wittgenstein made his visit to Cornell. Wittgenstein read the article and Moores response, and participated in several discussions with Malcolm on their contents. Moore protested against Malcolms charges: You wantedto say that my use of that expression was a misuse & incorrect But that I used it under circumstances under which it would not ordinarily be used is no reason at all for saying I misused it or used it incorrectly, if, though this was so, I was using it in the sense in which it is ordinarily used was using it to make the assertion which it is ordinarily used to make. (Rothhaupt, Seery, and McManus 2003, p. 266) The assertion made by a sentence, which Moore here identifies with its sense, is characterized by the necessary and sufficient conditions under which it is true (ibid, p. 265). Therefore, Moore argued, a consideration of the conditions in which a statement is uttered should be entirely distinct from a consideration of its sense. Under this understanding of senses as 132

determined by truth-conditions, the meaning of a proposition is independent of the uses to which it may ordinarily, correctly, or incorrectly be put. By claiming of his utterance that he was using it in the ordinary sense, though not under ordinary circumstances (ibid., 266), Moore was thus relying on an understanding of language that distinguishes meaning (or sense) from use. Wittgenstein wrote Part 1 of On Certainty with these discussions about Moore in mind. In these early remarks we see both theoretical and therapeutic elements at work, and this is associated with Wittgensteins retrospective moderate dissatisfaction with the content of Part 1. While he declares his intentions here to provide a therapeutic treatment of the problems raised by Moores statements, the few constructive attempts he makes end up sharing some of the characteristics of Malcolms theoretical response. In these early remarks Wittgenstein states a goal that is consistent with his desire in Philosophical Investigations to eliminate confusions which occupy us arise when language is, as it were, idling, not when it is doing work (PI 132): The propositions which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched--these I should like to expunge from philosophical language. (OC 31) Thus we expunge the sentences that don't get us any further. (OC 33) This objective of getting philosophers to abandon those propositions that entrance us and thereby prevent progress in our endeavors should certainly 133

be understood as a therapeutic one, for it is aimed at clearing up the ground of language (PI 118) that houses many philosophical stumbling blocks. Notice that Wittgensteins own characterizations of his goals dont conform to the standard accounts of On Certainty. Wittgenstein does not claim to be interested in a class of propositions with a peculiar logical status; he is interested in certain propositions to the extent that they tend to bewitch philosophers. He wishes not to characterize these propositions, but rather to expunge them. And they should be removed from philosophical language not because they display our ignorance of the structure of language games, but simply because they arent useful and dont get us any further in our investigations. A therapeutic procedure for bringing about this change in philosophical language is also sketched in Part 1: If we imagine the facts otherwise than as they are, certain language-games lose some of their importance, while others become important. And in this way there is an alteration a gradual one in the use of the vocabulary of a language. (OC 63)8 This non-theoretical technique of leading a philosopher to new perspectives and ways of using language is described but not put into practice in Part 1. Likewise, Wittgensteins therapeutic statement of purpose to expunge

Cf. the procedure laid out in Part II of Philosophical Investigations for making alternative conceptions intelligible: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him (PI Part II, 366).

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bewitching propositions is merely programmatic. This goal is not achieved in the brief set of remarks constituting Part 1 nor in Part 2, but only realized later in the remarks of Part 3. The beginning of a challenge to Moores conception of an expressions sense as independent of the variety of ways that it might be employed is also articulated: a meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it (OC 61). But this idea is not fully developed until the later remarks, where Wittgenstein highlights the influence of context and use on the meaning of an expression in particular circumstances. In these early remarks Wittgenstein briefly attempts to clarify the nature of external-world skepticism, for when Moore tries to refute this skepticism by holding up his hands, it appears that he does not fully appreciate just how radical his opponents position really is. The skeptic (or the idealist as Wittgenstein calls him in Part I), in wanting a proof of the external world, is not doubting the existence of any particular object, such as ones hands: "Doubting the existence of the external world" does not mean for example doubting the existence of a planet, which later observations proved to exist. (OC 20) The skeptics doubt is placed on a different level than ordinary doubt about the existence of certain objects. If I claim to know that my hands or other ordinary objects exist, then a reasonable man will not doubt that I know. Nor will the idealist; rather he will say that he was not dealing with the practical doubt which is being dismissed, but there is a further doubt behind that one. (OC 19) 135

Wittgenstein wants to bring out into the open the demands of the skeptic he does not want to know that a particular thing exists, but wants to be shown how anything can exist; he does not want particular knowledge claims to be demonstrated but demands a proof of how any knowledge at all is possible.9 Notwithstanding the expression of programmatic statements of therapeutic intentions in Part 1, a number of Wittgensteins early remarks in On Certainty invite a theoretical reading and indeed appear to be comparable to the theoretical treatment of Moores remarks in Malcolms article. For Wittgenstein, too, is inclined here to accuse Moore of using language incorrectly: Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. For otherwise the expression I know gets misused. (OC 6) This illegitimate employment of I know results from a misunderstanding of the rules regulating that expression, for we just do not see how very specialized the use of I know is (OC 11). Like Malcolm, Wittgenstein attempts to explicitly articulate some of the necessary conditions for the proper use of this phrase: If e.g. someone says I dont know if theres a hand here he might be told Look closer. This possibility of satisfying
9

It is debatable whether Moore was actually ignorant of the radical nature of the skeptics demands; he does, after all conclude his proof by admitting, I am perfectly well aware that, in spite of all that I have said, many philosophers will still feel that I have not given any satisfactory proof of the point in question (1939, p. 148). Moore is even aware that what they really want issomething like a general statement as to how any propositions of this sort may be proved (ibid., p. 149).

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oneself is part of the languagegame. Is one of its essential features. (OC 3) In these early remarks he also provides hints of the theoretical response to both Moore and the skeptic that is regularly associated with his work in Part 2, according to which both parties fail to make sense by claiming to either know or doubt so-called hinge propositions, to which these propositional attitudes dont apply: I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face. So I dont know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense ... one thinks that the words I know that... are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would unintelligible. (OC 10) Finally, specific instances of hinge propositions are given and declared to have a special status: There are physical objects is nonsense (OC 35). We can thus see from these initial remarks in On Certainty why Wittgenstein referred to the fall of 1949, which actually preceded the beginning of the hormone therapies associated with his regular reports of clouded cognition, as nevertheless a period when the curtain in his brain had not gone up. For even though he announces his intentions to develop a therapeutic response to Moores unusual attempts at knowledge claims, the product of these initial efforts is mostly theoretical and in fact reminiscent of Malcolms own published critique of Moore. In a few passages from Part 2, Wittgenstein appears to continue Malcolms project of identifying rules governing the correct use of the 137

expression I know: One says I know when one is ready to give compelling grounds (OC 243). Like Malcolm, he accuses Moore of misusing language by violating these rules: The wrong use made by Moore of the proposition I know... lies in his regarding it as an utterance as little subject to doubt as I am in pain. (OC 178) But Wittgenstein makes it clear that he is not particularly concerned with Moore himself in these remarks, but rather with the special status of the propositions that he tends to utter: Moores assurance that he knows... does not interest us. The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. (OC 137) The focus of Part 2, then, tends not to be on confusions specific to particular philosophers, but rather on abstract philosophical problems surrounding the meaning of certain propositions. For these reasons many of Wittgensteins remarks in this part lend themselves to be read as forming the basis of a theoretical response to both Moore and his skeptical opponent. As we will see, this group of remarks has received particular emphasis by his interpreters to draw conclusions about the theoretical nature of his endeavors in On Certainty. Methodological remarks in this part lend credence to such a reading: Naturally, my aim must be to give the statements that one would like to make here, but cannot make meaningfully [sinnvoll]. (OC 76)

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Here we see an apparent shift from Wittgensteins stated intentions in Part 1, merely to eliminate troublesome expressions from philosophical language, to now wanting to show that Moores knowledge claims are in fact nonsense. He does this by delimiting a certain class of propositions and determining their semantic status. The various propositions that Moore asserts, we are told, are in fact all members of a special class: When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions. (OC 136) The propositions presenting what Moore knows are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. (OC 93) The propositions forming this class are thus distinguished by their justificatory roles and their status of nearly universal acceptance. As Wittgenstein reminds us, any series of justifying the grounds for our assertions by giving further grounds must come to an end at some point: to be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end (OC 192).10 Moores assertions are actually claims to know those propositions that we give at the end of such a series, and for which we can produce no further grounds. Wittgenstein gives several metaphorical descriptions of these sorts of propositions: as the solid river-banks supporting our rivers of investigation (OC 99), as the propositions that

10

Cf. OC 110.

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stand fast for me by serving as an axis for rotation (OC 152), and as the hinges around which our disputes turn (OC 341).11 Though the term hinge only occurs three times in On Certainty (at remarks 341, 343, and 654), the members of this class have come to be known as hinge propositions in the secondary literature. Wittgenstein says that there are countless such hinge propositions, general empirical propositions that count as certain for us (OC 273), and readers of On Certainty have gone on to clearly identify various examples: Our investigations rest upon many kinds of foundations. We are certain that the world existed before our birth, that we can rely upon induction, that we know our own names, and that we cannot be mistaken about our hands being our own. (Morawetz 433) These statements have the appearance of being normal empirical propositions, but they differ from empirical propositions and acquire their special status by the fact that we dont arrive at any of them as a result of investigation (OC 138). This is not due to our disinterest in making such inquiries, but instead an essential feature of the role these propositions play in our system of judgments. They cannot be given any grounding or justified by further evidence and thus must be regarded asbeyond question and beyond validation (Strawson 1985, p. 25). By serving as the stoppingpoints of all justification, they ultimately determine what counts as evidence in our investigations and are constitutive of our contexts of giving reasons
11

Stroll (2004) brings attention to the variety of metaphors employed by Wittgenstein in On Certainty.

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and evidence. As a result hinge propositions cannot be falsified or confirmed; in fact the concepts of truth and falsity do not apply to them at all: if the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, not yet false (OC 205).12 So while hinge propositions may appear to be empirical, their constitutive properties make them function more like logical propositions or rules.13 Some propositions might serve a foundational role in one context, yet be available for evaluation in others. We are free in fact to form new contexts of evaluation by taking an empirical proposition and turning it into a hinge proposition. Wittgenstein makes such a claim multiple times in Part 2: Cant an assertoric sentence, which was capable of functioning as an hypothesis, also be used as a foundation for research and action? (OC 87) the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing. (OC 98) It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm of description. (OC 167) While this assertion is made repeatedly in Part 2, we will soon see that it is brought into question in the later remarks of On Certainty.
12

Yet in the next remark Wittgenstein admits that if someone asked us but is that true? we might say yes to him (OC 206). 13 Kober explicates remark 205 by describing the status of hinges in the latter way: Certainties are like the rules of games and belong to the constitutive rules of a (discursive) language-game. Certainties are neither true nor false, rather they define truth with regards to the epistemological aspects of a language-game (1996, p. 424).

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The entire collection of hinge propositions forms a system that is internally structured (OC 102). Like with his vivid descriptions of hinge propositions, Wittgenstein alternatively describes this system as our frame of reference (OC 83), the scaffolding of our thoughts (OC 211), and the whole picture which forms the starting-point of belief (OC 209). He stresses that this system serves a foundational role by providing evidential support for empirical inquiries.14 Hinge propositions, by serving as the ultimate foundation of our reasoning, are responsible for the very possibility of that activity. As Wittgenstein frequently emphasizes, they condition and are constitutive of a number of human practices: All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life. (OC 105) It may be for example that all enquiry on our part is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt, if they were ever formulated. They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry. (OC 88)15 The scope of hinge propositions is immense. Not only do they condition empirical enquiry, they also apparently lie at the very foundation of all our
14

Many readers take the foundational role of this system to be one of the central theses of On Certainty. The extent to which these claims rely on remarks in Part 2 is striking. For example, after quoting eight remarks all from Part 2 Buchanan concludes: It is clear from these remarks that Wittgenstein envisions Moore type propositions as forming a system which plays a foundational role in determining the course of all enquiry and assertion about how things are in the world (2000, p. 216) 15 See also OC 103 and 253.

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linguistic practices by fixing the meanings of our words: if you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either (OC 114). Our systems of hinge propositions is not the result of inquiry, i.e. hinges are not adopted because they are believed to be correct. Rather, they serve as the standards of truth: But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. (OC 94) These propositions are then not available for me to doubt, for bringing them into question would topple my very system of judgments. This makes the skeptics attempt to doubt absolutely everything self-undermining, for the act of doubting itself (just like the act of believing) is constituted by a framework of hinge propositions. Since the game of doubting itself presupposes certainty (OC 115), it is actually impossible to simultaneously bring every proposition into doubt.16 Wittgensteins account of hinge propositions and the constitutive roles they play in our practices of expressing belief and doubt provide the means for convicting both Moore and the skeptic of overstepping the boundaries of sense (Buchanan 2000, p. 214). Both parties attempt to engage in practices that arent licensed by our conceptual system by engaging, or at least attempting to engage, in an evaluation of the truth of particular hinge
16

See also OC 150.

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propositions. But the skeptic undercuts the very ground that makes doubting possible by trying to doubt hinge propositions, and Moore cannot possibly have any grounds for his claim to know them because they form the foundation of our practice of giving reasons. Both parties in the dispute between Moore and the skeptic engage in nonsense because of their ignorance of the true structure of our linguistic activities. They suffer from the misunderstanding that language games, and the criteria of relevant evidence implicit in them, ought to be grounded in reality in the way true propositions are grounded in the facts corresponding to them (Brenner 2005, p. 124). Wittgensteins philosophical explorations in Part 2 thus allow for one of the great philosophical debates between skeptics and realists to be dissolved. One might be inclined to characterize Wittgensteins treatment of this dispute as a therapeutic one, because it aims at ultimately changing the behavior of both the participants, i.e. at getting both of them to lose interest in defending their respective positions. But it is important to see that this response to skepticism does not satisfy Wittgensteins conditions for a successful therapy. Wittgenstein insists that he is not interested in advancing philosophical theories, but the account of hinge propositions sketched here is certainly comparable to a number of grand metaphysical schemes encountered in the history of philosophy (and commentators have been quick to point this out). Crucially, Wittgensteinian therapy does not aim 144

to get the patient to achieve an insight into the essential nature of things. Yet the treatment in Part 2 requires the participants in the skeptical debate to realize that their positions are nonsensical by first being convinced of the truth of a theory specifying the conditions under which propositions make sense. Thus, Wittgensteins response to Moores knowledge claims in Part 2 of On Certainty must be classified as theoretical. The remarks in Part 3 exhibit a shift in style from Part 2, and this new style is more conducive for achieving the qualities that Wittgenstein desires in a therapeutic philosophy. These latter remarks are particularly characterized by the frequent introduction of voices, i.e. sentences couched in quotation marks or set off by dashes in order to indicate that multiple characters or voices are interacting with one another. For example we are often told (or rather, Wittgenstein is telling himself) to imagine that a speaker utters a certain sentence in specific circumstances; afterwards Wittgenstein either attempts to respond to this hypothetical speaker, formulates what he might want to say in such a situation, or makes some general observations on what is taking place, e.g. how the speaker is standing in relation to the circumstances of his utterance. The experience of reading such a text differs from that of reading a philosophical treatise, where the reader is generally only asked to consider the truth of the statements asserted and the cogency of the reasoning used by the author. When reading a Wittgenstein text involving multiple voices, the demands are 145

in some ways greater on the reader, who is constantly trying to determine what identities or characters should be assigned to the voices encountered, particularly the readers own identity and that of Wittgenstein. The need to encounter and adopt new standpoints can facilitate the change in perspective that Wittgensteins therapy strives for. The use of multiple characters and voices, as well as other familiar techniques of Wittgensteinian philosophical investigation, such as the consideration of imaginary scenarios, unusual cultures, and unfamiliar uses of language, are encountered to a considerably lesser extent in the earlier parts of On Certainty. There the focus tends to be more on characterizing the essential features of language games by identifying the distinctive characteristics of hinge propositions. The impersonal and abstract character of this investigation makes the realization of Wittgensteins therapeutic goals unlikely, since they call for the treatment of a philosopher in the grip of a problem, not the resolution of a problem considered in isolation. In Part 2 Wittgenstein articulated the basis for a theory of hinge propositions that could be put towards questioning the sense of both radical skepticism and the attempt to refute it. Yet in Part 3 he almost entirely ignores the skeptic and focuses his attention on Moore. So Wittgenstein is returning to the project of treating the philosophers condition, for while in fact practically no one actually is a radical skeptic, Moore represents a

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significant number of philosophers who devote considerable energy to developing a satisfactory refutation of the imaginary skeptics position. At the outset of On Certainty Wittgenstein stated the desired outcome of his notes about Moores unusual claims: to expunge from philosophical language those bewitching propositions that dont get us anywhere. Now in Part 3 Wittgenstein has a particular phrase in mind: One is often bewitched by a word. For example, by the word "know". (OC 435) Wittgenstein apparently thus believes that Moore has been bewitched by this word, and that this is shown in his insistence on using it in very peculiar ways. In Philosophical Investigations, a procedure is spelled out for dealing with cases when philosophers are captivated by certain language forms: When philosophers use a word knowledge, being, object, I, proposition/sentence, name and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI 116) The procedure for dealing with a philosopher intending to speak metaphysically is thus to consider the use of the expression in question. This is what Wittgenstein does in the later remarks of On Certainty by considering a number of everyday uses of I know. Everyday uses are not restricted, as one might possibly assume, to just those cases in which the expression has an established use in ordinary speech (i.e. the cases typically

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studied by ordinary language philosophers), but rather include any situation in which the expression could conceivably be put toward some practical end, even ones that are completely contrived. As we saw in his response to Malcolms critical article, Moore takes the meaning of an expression to be fixed independently of the various uses to which it might be put in linguistic interaction. We can imagine then that Moore would not expect that the consideration of various uses of an expression could in any way resolve confusions surrounding its meaning. Wittgenstein realizes that an interlocutor with this dubious picture of meaning might insist that one of his peculiar uses of an expression made sense simply by considering the proposition and not its employment: I am told: You understand this expression, dont you? Well then Im using it with the meaning youre familiar with. As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use. (If, for example, someone says that the sentence This is here (saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to him, then he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.) (PI 117) The treatment Wittgenstein offers to such a philosopher is just to consider special circumstances in which the expression makes sense, i.e. cases in which it is actually used (or could conceivably be used) towards a practical end. By confronting a series of examples like this, it is hoped that the philosopher will lose his grip on the idea that he understands the expression in isolation, and thus lose interest in attempting to use it in curious 148

philosophical contexts. This is in fact the procedure that Wittgenstein follows with Moore in Part 3, presenting him with a series of examples in which the propositions he wishes to assert make sense, hopefully leading Moore to the consideration that his own use of this expression does not fit naturally in this class, i.e. that his own attempt to make sense may not be successful. Interestingly, in Part 3 we also see Wittgenstein in the beginning stages of applying this same treatment to his own urges to speak metaphysically. After recognizing that he sometimes wishes to respond to Moore with a theory of language games (as he did frequently in Part 2), Wittgenstein then considers what practical consequences actually follow when one utters these philosophical claims in everyday situations. By bringing them into normal contexts, Wittgenstein deflates much of the theoretical punch from these propositions. So in Part 3, Wittgensteins attempts to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use (PI 116) even involve the attempt to deflate his own apparently metaphysical locutions about hinge propositions and their constitutive roles in our linguistic and epistemic practices. Rather than focus on general characterizations of an entire class of propositions, as he did with hinge propositions in Part 2, in the later remarks Wittgenstein engages in a lengthy consideration of a particular knowledge claim by made by Moore: I know that thats a tree. Malcolm describes the context behind this real-life example: 149

When we sat in the back-garden of his home on Chesterton Road, arguing over the concepts of knowledge and certainty, Moore, wanting to give an example of something he knew for certain, would point to a tree a few feet away, and say, with emphasis, I know that thats a tree. He would claim that he had made an assertion that was perfectly meaningful (as well as true), and I would dispute this claim. (Malcolm 1984, pp. 217218) This was then a real assertion that Moore would make, in person, in discussion with fellow philosophers, in support of his attempts to prove either that there are some things we can know with certainty, or that the external world exists. While writing the remarks constituting Part 3 of On Certainty in Cambridge in the spring of 1951, Wittgenstein was able to make several visits to Moores home and participate in philosophical discussions.17 It is very likely that their discussions involved Moores utterance of this very assertion, since it plays such a prominent role in the notes that Wittgenstein was composing at the time.18 This personal interaction with Moore may have contributed to the conversational style of Part 3, for the earlier remarks tend

17

The occurrence of at least three such meetings can be inferred from these two philosophers letters to Malcolm. Wittgenstein mentions a meeting on March 18 (in his letter of March 19), Moore mentions a meeting on April 14 (in his letter of April 30), and on April 16 Wittgenstein mentions two recent meetings, one of which surely was the one on April 14 reported by Moore. 18 The tone of some remarks in On Certainty also strongly suggest that Wittgenstein was not simply considering the possibility of Moore making such a claim, but rather that he was reporting on his actually having witnessed such an event: I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a tree", pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy. (OC 467) When one hears Moore say "I know that that's a tree, one suddenly understands those who think that that has by no means been settled. The matter strikes one all at once as being unclear and blurred. It is as if Moore had put it in the wrong light. (OC 481)

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to read like a response to Malcolms impression of Moore, based on Moores articles and letters. In prior remarks, Wittgensteins reaction to Moores assertions was to categorize their status. Now he responds quite differently: "I know that that's a tree." Why does it strike me as if I did not understand the sentence? though it is after all an extremely simple sentence of the most ordinary kind? It is as if I could not focus my mind on any meaning. (OC 347) Wittgenstein starts anew with a fresh response to Moores statement. Here his reaction in the face of unusual uses of know is now confusion, a far cry from his previous philosophical response about the proper conditions for using the word. Wittgenstein no longer presumes to know what Moore is intending to do with this statement (nor what he is actually doing with it). He is sincerely puzzled. Moore likely responded to Wittgensteins confusion in the same way as he did to Malcolm namely by insisting that he was using the expression in its normal sense. This response stems from his conception of the meaning of an expression as being fixed despite its various possible uses. Wittgenstein brings this picture into question: Isnt the question have these words a meaning? similar to Is that a tool? asked as one produces, say, a hammer? I say Yes, its a hammer. But what if the thing that any of us would take for a hammer were somewhere else a missile, for example, or a conductors baton? Now make the application yourself. (OC 351) The suggestion, I take it, that Wittgenstein is making here is that something isnt a hammer simply by having certain internal properties, but rather that 151

it can become a hammer if we put it to such a use. Likewise, what an expression means cannot be entirely divorced from the way that it is used in our linguistic interactions. While Moore claimed that he was using his expression in its normal sense but admittedly in unusual circumstances, Wittgenstein wants to challenge whether we can really understand what is actually going on when Moore makes such an assertion. Why one would actually say such a thing in those circumstances is not clear: If someone says, I know that thats a tree I may answer: Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing? Suppose he replies: I just wanted to remind myself that I know thing like that? (OC 352) If someone was constantly making knowledge claims like these for no apparent reason, we would not just say that they were using language abnormally, but possibly that they hadnt really mastered the technique of using language at all: My difficulty can also be shown like this: I am sitting talking to a friend. Suddenly I say: I knew all along that you were so and so. Is that really just a superfluous, though true, remark? I feel as if these words were like Good morning said to someone in the middle of a conversation. (OC 464) Wittgenstein would be more likely to consider this a meaningless utterance than merely something superfluous if it were not possible to discern the speakers purpose in saying it.

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Moores statements arent declared to be essentially nonsensical, however. Wittgenstein points out that a proposition with no clear meaning can suddenly become meaningful to him if its place in a larger context is clarified: In the middle of a conversation, someone says to me out of the blue: I wish you luck. I am astonished; but later I realize that these words connect up with his thoughts about me. And now they do not strike me as meaningless any more. (OC 469) The problem is not simply that Moores claim to know that thats a tree is superfluous or obvious. Even superfluous utterances have a role in our language. What is at issue is that nothing in the surrounding context of the utterance has been called upon to help fix a precise meaning of this statement at all: Just as the words I am here have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly, and not because they are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination. (OC 348) Wittgenstein is inviting Moore to clarify how the meaning of his assertion is made determinate by some particular conditions in which it is stated. If he does so, he will thereby make his meaning clear. As Wittgenstein notices, whenever he tries to think of an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one, its meaning becomes clear and ordinary (OC 347). So Moore is not being set to an impossible task; it is quite possible for I know that thats a tree to be given a determinate sense, though this is achieved most readily by giving it a non-philosophical use. 153

Wittgenstein imagines a variety of understandable ways that this sentence could be used. By doing so, he is demonstrating for Moore how one can make an utterance clear: by connecting its purpose with the surrounding circumstances of its utterance. I know that thats a tree this may mean all sorts of things: I look at a plant that I take for a young beech and that someone else thinks is a blackcurrant. He says thats a shrub; I say it is a tree. We see something in the mist which one of us takes for a man, and the other says I know that thats a tree. Someone wants to test my eyes etc.etc. etc.etc. Each time the that which I declare to be a tree is of a different kind. But what when we express ourselves more precisely? For example: I know that that thing there is a tree, I can see it quite clearly. Let us even suppose I had made this remark in the context of a conversation (so that it was relevant when I made it); and now, out of all context, I repeat it while looking at the tree, and I add I mean these words as I did five minutes ago. If I added, for example, that I had been thinking of my bad eyes again and it was a kind of sigh, then there would be nothing puzzling about the remark. For how a sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it and may therefore be made part of it. (OC 349) This is then a demonstration to Moore of how to literally make sense. One doesnt make sense merely by uttering a sentence associated with determinate truth conditions under any circumstances whatsoever. The meaning of a proposition is left indeterminate without a surrounding context, and one can make sense of a previously unclear statement by expanding it, i.e. by giving further information related to why we are using it. Wittgenstein imagines even far-fetched possible uses of this statement that, though

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unusual and certainly not established in common practice, could nevertheless be made meaningful by attendant circumstances: This is certainly true, that the information "That is a tree", when no one could doubt it, might be a kind of joke and as such have meaning. A joke of this kind was in fact made once by Renan. (OC 463) The possible ways that this sentence can make sense are thus countless and unforeseeable. This distinguishes Wittgensteins response to Moore from that of Malcolm. Wittgenstein is not specifying a list of conditions that must be satisfied for I know to be used correctly. That phrase has a variety of legitimate uses as well as many potential ones that are as yet unconceived. The response here also differs from that provided by Wittgensteins earlier account of hinge propositions. There Moore was accused, without qualification, of using language in ways that produced outright nonsense. Here in Part 3, Moores statement is not being assigned a final semantic status. Wittgenstein freely admits that it has the possibility of becoming completely meaningful: I want to say: it made sense for Moore to say I know that that is a tree, if he meant something quite particular by it. (OC 387) As yet, the meaning of Moores statement is not fully determined, resulting in confusion when one hears the utterance. But it is entirely possible to give this statement a clear a determinate meaning, and thereby to clear up the confusion, by adding additional information that helps clarify its purpose.

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The response in Part 3 to Moores claim, I know that thats a tree, is intended to serve the therapeutic end laid down at the beginning of On Certainty. There Wittgenstein stated his wish to expunge from philosophical language the propositions that bewitch us and prevent us from making progress, and Moores assertion is an example of such a sentence. The treatment of Moores statement in Part 3 succeeds in fulfilling the antitheoretical goals of Wittgensteins metaphilosophy much more than the theory of hinge propositions advanced in Part 2. Moore is not here being urged to adopt a philosophical theory of meaning, realize that his statements are nonsensical under this theory, and for that reason choose to stop making them. He is in fact being presented with multiple examples of how his utterance can be given sense, and urged to engage in this attempt himself. What will hopefully become apparent to Moore is that every time his utterance is given a determinate sense, it no longer produces the philosophical conclusions that he was seeking to establish with it: Every one of us often uses such a sentence, and there is no question but that it makes sense. But does that mean it yields any philosophical conclusion? (OC 388) But now it is also correct to use I know in the contexts which Moore mentioned, at least in particular circumstances. (Indeed, I do not know what I know that I am a human being means. But even that might be given a sense.) For each one of these sentences I can imagine circumstances that turn it into a move in one of our language-games, and by that it loses everything that is philosophically astonishing. (OC 622)

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After repeatedly giving various definite senses to his utterance, yet only producing sentences that are philosophically impotent, Moore may come to have the same observation as Wittgenstein, namely that this sentence seems to only become clear once it is given a practical, non-metaphysical use. This may lead Moore to then question if he really does mean anything definite with his use of this statement. Recurrent failure in producing a statement with the metaphysical strength that he seeks may lead him, ultimately, to simply give up his attempt to make such an utterance, not because he has been definitively convinced that his utterance is nonsense, but because he has lost all confidence that he really means anything definite at all by it. Of course, the success of this therapeutic response will depend on whether Moore in fact reacts in this way to repeated failure to make sense. But if he does, it will have succeeded in causing a shift in a philosophers point of view without having done so by advancing any controversial philosophical theories. The therapeutic method of Part 3 is not only applied to Moore, but sometimes to Wittgenstein himself, especially when he feels compelled to repeat the theoretical conclusions of his investigation on hinge propositions in Part 2. Wittgenstein is certainly not free of the urge to speak metaphysically in Part 3, but for the first time, in these later sections, he follows these philosophical claims by immediately questioning their sense. The method of PI 116 is thereby applied to some of the central tenets of his 157

theory of hinge propositions, for after stating these metaphysical doctrines in Part 3, he often questions what practical uses those propositions can be put to. And when he does this, he realizes that they too dont have the philosophical strength that he intends them to have. Recall that in Part 2 Wittgenstein repeatedly claimed that an empirical proposition can always be treated as uncontestable and thus become a hinge proposition. At the beginning of Part 3 he is apt to repeat these claims again: Is it that rule and empirical proposition merge into one another? (OC 309) But wouldnt one have to say then, that there is no sharp boundary between propositions of logic and empirical propositions? The lack of sharpness is that of the boundary between rule and empirical proposition. (OC 319) Yet immediately after formulating these statements he expresses his dissatisfaction with them, because they are too theoretical for his sensibilities: Isnt what I am saying: any empirical proposition can be transformed into a postulate and then becomes a norm of description. But I am suspicious even of this. The sentence is too general. One almost wants to say any empirical proposition can, theoretically, be transformed..., but what does theoretically mean here? It sounds all too reminiscent of the Tractatus. (OC 321)19 So Wittgenstein is now shying away from some of his previous remarks that have the appearance of philosophical theories, in keeping with his stated intention not to produce any new truths.
19

Wittgenstein had already compared his thinking in Part 2 to the Tractatus at OC 203.

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Another important feature of hinge propositions that Wittgenstein had previously wanted to emphasize was that one cannot be mistaken when uttering them. He was earlier making this statement in a philosophical context, but now it is implied that such a use was questionable: I cant be making a mistake is an ordinary sentence, which serves to give the certaintyvalue of a statement. And only in its everyday use it is justified. (OC 638) He now begins to consider the practical uses and consequences of this sentence that he was earlier prone to give a metaphysical emphasis: What practical consequences has it if I give a piece of information and add that I cant be making a mistake about it? (OC 668) The sentence I cant be making a mistake is certainly used in practice. But we may question whether it is then to be taken in a perfectly rigorous sense, or is rather a kind of exaggeration which perhaps is used only with a view to persuasion. (OC 669) When this expression in used in practice, he sees, it really tends only to be a kind of exaggeration aimed at persuading someone, rather than the strictly metaphysical proposition that he intended to utter in Part 2. This may lead him to question the sense of his original utterance. In these later sections, Wittgenstein realizes that he too, like Moore, may at times be susceptible to the urge to want to think of the meaning of an expression as something fixed, rather than consider the ways in which it can be used: There is always the danger of wanting to find an expressions meaning by contemplating the expression itself, and the frame

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of mind in which one uses it, instead of always thinking of the practice. (OC 601) Noticing himself wanting to speak metaphysically, he immediately replies by considering the use of the phrase in question: I am inclined to say: That cannot be false. That is interesting. But what consequences has it? (OC 437) He is now starting to more promptly catch himself after making metaphysical statements, and quickly move to an investigation of use. The urge to speak metaphysically was something that Wittgenstein continually struggled against, but here in Part 3 we see him succeeding in resisting that urge more successfully than in Part 2. In his critique of Moore and the skeptic in Part 2, Wittgenstein described hinge propositions as being constitutive of our epistemic practices, and thus not even eligible for doubt, which is a practice that takes place only within a system. He therefore holds to the position that no experience can possibly force us to revise these foundational beliefs, for that would show that they werent really serving as the foundation of our inquiry: Isnt the question this: What if you had to change your opinion even on these most fundamental things? And to that the answer seems to me to be: You dont have to change it. That is just what their being fundamental is. (OC 512) Once again, Wittgenstein calls this statement into question soon after formulating it: But might it not be possible for something to happen that threw me entirely off the rails? Evidence that made the most certain thing unacceptable to me? Or at any rate made me throw over 160

my most fundamental judgements? (Whether rightly or wrongly is beside the point.) (OC 517) Wittgenstein does not come to a definite conclusion on whether it would be possible for our most fundamental judgments to be overturned by new experience, and if it were, how we would react to such an experience. Yet an important part of the treatment in Part 2 is that hinge propositions provide the foundation that makes all judgment possible. If Wittgenstein no longer knows how to respond to these questions in Part 3, then he probably is no longer comfortable with the strong theoretical account of language games seen in the earlier remarks. We thus see Wittgenstein at the beginning stages of submitting his own metaphysical utterances to a therapeutic treatment in Part 3 of On Certainty. Had he lived longer, continued to work on these remarks, and been able to revise them with a view to publication, we may have been presented with a book with a much different structure than the one published posthumously by his literary executors. For the theoretical characterization of hinge propositions and language games in Part 2, which has attracted the most attention from Wittgensteins interpreters, may have itself been subjected to a therapeutic treatment.

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Chapter 6 The Reception of On Certainty

On Certainty has received a significant amount of attention in the recent philosophical literature.1 This is surely a result of the perception that Wittgenstein addresses a variety of topics of contemporary philosophical interest in the work. Interpreters of On Certainty have found various projects within its pages. Accounts of Wittgensteins treatment of skepticism are the most common.2 Standard interpretations see Wittgenstein as condemning both the skeptic and Moore for not realizing that certain hinge propositions are exempt from doubt because they serve as norms for claims concerning knowledge or doubt. Some readers focus on the semantic status of hinge propositions.3 Such discussions focus on whether hinge propositions are true or whether they instead lack a truth value altogether. If they are neither true nor false, then it must be nonsense to utter them,

Book-length treatments of On Certainty include (McGinn 1989), (Morawetz 1978), (Rhees 2003), (Moyal-Sharrock 2005), and (Stroll 1994). Chapter-length treatments can be found in (Ayer 1985), (Fogelin 1987), (Kenny 2006), and (von Wright 1982). Anthologies that substantially address On Certainty include (Klbel & Weiss 2004), (Lffler & Weingartner 2004), (McManus 2004), and (Moyal-Sharrock 2004). (Moyal-Sharrock & Brenner 2005) is a unique collection, aiming to showcase the wide variety of readings currently available for consideration. 2 See e.g. (Bogen 1974), (Buchanan 2000), (de Pierres 1996), (Fielding 2004), (Fogelin 1981), (Kober 1994), (Malcolm 1988), (Moyal-Sharrock 2002), (Moyal-Sharrock 2003), (Orr 1989), (Rudd 2005), (Williams 2004a), (Williams 2004b), (Wright 2004a). 3 (Ashdown 2001), (Conant 1998), (Cook 1980), (Fronda 2004), (Glock 2004), (Orr 1989), (Stiers 2000), (Williams 2004b).

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some have argued. This debate, as some commentators have remarked,4 shares some similarities with current disputes on the sense of tautologies in the Tractatus. Another group of readers has focused on the implications of On Certainty for the distinction between logical and empirical propositions. 5 Hinge propositions such as the world has existed for many years appear to be empirical, yet as hinges they are unable to be confirmed or disconfirmed, and thus dont appear to be contingent. Hinge propositions thus seem to occupy an interesting middle ground between logical and empirical propositions. The affinities between this account of Wittgensteins hinge propositions and Kants conception of the synthetic a priori is apparent, as several commentators have noted.6 Some interpreters have found in On Certainty a more systematic characterization of Wittgensteins concept of a language-game,7 while others have investigated the consequences of the work on the theory of knowledge.8 Regardless of what aspects of the book have drawn the interest of interpreters, most of these readings share two common characteristics: 1) They take Wittgenstein to be engaged in a familiar theoretical philosophical activity, such as specifying the conditions for knowledge, attempting to

4 5

(Conant 1998), (Hutto 2004), (McGuinness 1972) (Ellenbogen 2003), (Garavaso 1998) 6 (Brenner 2005), (Morawetz 1974), (Williams 1990) 7 (Haller 1988), (Hertzberg 1976), (Stock 2007), (Stroll 2002), (Winch 1988), (Wolgast 1987) 8 (Bouchard 2004), (Caraway 2004), (Garver 2004), (Kober 1996), (Koethe 2004), (Luckhardt 1978), (Pritchard 2005), (Soles 1982), (Stroll 2002), (Stroll 2004), (Stroll 2005), (Wright 2004b)

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refute skepticism, developing a general account of language, or characterizing the class of necessary or a priori propositions. In doing so, they offer theoretical interpretations of the book. 2) They treat On Certainty as a work by citing remarks from various parts of the book indiscriminately and assuming that Wittgensteins philosophical goals and methodologies remain constant throughout the text. Many of Wittgensteins remarks in On Certainty invite theoretical interpretation. Yet in associating these theoretical remarks with Wittgensteins overall goals in the book, readers come to an understanding of On Certainty that is in tension with his repeatedly stated intentions to avoid theories and engage in therapy.9 The editorial preface to the book also encourages it to be read as a work, but sufficient evidence has now been presented to conclude that On Certainty is actually a collection of thematically related texts that Wittgenstein did not consider to be continuous or of equal status. In the preceding chapters I aimed to show that these two assumptions are unfounded, and thus that a satisfactory reading of the text should be based on an account of that books structure, with a particular focus on identifying Wittgensteins therapeutic goals and procedures. In what follows, I identify items from the secondary literature that take the two factors of therapeutic method and textual structure into consideration, in order to

Orr (1989) and Buchanan (2000) have explicitly pointed out this tension.

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establish the context in which my interpretation is best situated. Then I show that each of these readings faces an interpretive dilemma that is avoided or overcome in my account of On Certainty. Edward Minars essay, On Wittgensteins Response to Scepticism: The Opening of On Certainty (2004), seeks to develop a reading of the book that does not focus on characterizing the status of hinge propositions. For this reason his piece is included as an example of the therapeutic reading in Moyal-Sharrock and Brenners anthology.10 The focus of his reading is on the first 65 remarks (i.e. Part 1), which are relatively continuous notes from a single manuscript in which direct mention of such things as propositions which stand fast, hinges, world pictures and frameworks is absent (ibid., p. 255). Two leading interpretations of On Certainty are briefly considered: the propositional approach of McGinn (1989), which identifies hinge propositions and explains their semantic and normative status, and the nonpropositional account of Stroll (1994), which seeks to transition from talk of abstract propositional entities to consideration of how certainty is manifested in a way of acting. Both of these approaches, Minar contends, are not only unsuccessful in refuting skepticism, but they also misinterpret Wittgenstein as intending to advance a philosophical theory: Wittgenstein is not offering a theory of hinges that shows the limits of inquiry, thought or language (with the intended
10

(Moyal-Sharrock & Brenner 2005)

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consequence that the sceptic shall see that his questions lie beyond the limits). What he does instead is to provide reminders for the purpose of undoing the confusions that lie behind the quest for philosophical accounts of such limits. (ibid., p. 260) The skeptic emphatically holds to the notion that knowledge has a real, practice-transcendent structure (ibid., p. 266). Wittgenstein is read as trying to undermine the grip of this false picture by calling upon the skeptic to explain why our epistemic practices are suspect. Ultimately, the purported stance outside all of our practices from which the skeptic wishes to make his challenge is seen to be illusory, for the skeptic ends up undercutting his own grounds for critique when he brings into question the legitimacy of our practices in toto. This demonstration should help the skeptic to abandon his radical doubts: Wittgensteins reminders prod the sceptic to account for his sense that something is amiss in our dealings with the world. The anticipated result is that the sceptic will no longer find his questions natural or mandatory. Wittgensteins is a strategy for responding to both scepticism and the impulse to refute it. (ibid., p. 254) This treatment also aims at Moore, then, for if it is incoherent to doubt the legitimacy of all our practices simultaneously, then it is likewise impossible to defend them wholesale. So the attempt to refute skepticism is misguided. Minars reading has several advantages. He places himself among the relatively small number of readers who acknowledge some kind of internal structure in On Certainty by noticing that most of the resources for constructing a theory of hinge propositions occur in Part 2 of the book. It is

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also wise for him to avoid attributing philosophical theories to Wittgenstein. And he appears to be accurately picking up the aim of one strand of the remarks in Part 1, namely that of clarifying just how radical skepticism really is by showing how it rules out the possibility of a response that relies on any of our normal epistemic methods, e.g. looking at ones hands in a well-lit room. This reading, however, puts Wittgensteins focus on the skeptic, rather than Moore. It is difficult to see how an attempt to demotivate skeptical urges could have been prompted by discussions with Malcolm about his recently-published article, whose aim was to criticize the manner in which Moore went about trying to refute skepticism. While I agree that Wittgenstein uses some of these early remarks to show that the skeptic is posing an external11 question, this is being done, I believe, for Moores benefit, to help him see how no skeptic could possibly accept his purported refutation. It is also not entirely evident what makes this treatment a therapeutic one; though Minar is described by Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner as a therapeutic reader, explicit talk of therapy does not actually enter in to his discussion. Most troublesome, though, is that Minar seems to avoid attributing theories to Wittgenstein simply by avoiding the large number of remarks in Part 2 that invite such a reading. As it stands, this reading offers no explanation of the relationship between Part 1 and the remaining remarks
11

Stroud (1984) uses this term to characterize the peculiar character of the skeptics demands in his discussion of Moores proof.

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in On Certainty, and thus provides us little understanding of that book as a whole. On this point I believe my interpretation proves more successful by acknowledging and accounting for the variety of remarks found in On Certainty. In Wittgensteins Refutation of Idealism (2005), Michael Williams also limits his focus to just the remarks of Part 1. Like Minar, he takes one aim of Wittgensteins to be the demonstration of just how radical the skeptics demands are, but like me he sees this as being done mostly for Moores benefit. In a nicely structured presentation, Williams then argues that sentences such as there are physical objects are not examples of hinge propositions that need to be appropriately characterized, but actually nonsense, since physical object is a piece of logical or semantic vocabulary, thus unsuitable for formulating the empirical hypothesis the sceptic or idealist would like to express (ibid., p. 86). In what is called the therapeutic phase (ibid., p. 88) of the presentation, Wittgenstein shows that the skeptic is assuming a very questionable stance that experiential knowledge (e.g. sense-data) is epistemically basic. The alternative to this view is a pragmatic one, according to which the normative structure of doubting and justifying is implicit in practices of enquiry which, as human institutions, are subject to change (ibid., p. 95). Williams thus operates with a much different conception of therapy than the anti-theoretical one I have attributed to Wittgenstein in these chapters, for the intended result of 168

this therapeutic encounter is for us to adopt something like a contextualist theory of knowledge. James Conant (1998) offers one of the most developed therapeutic readings of On Certainty in the literature. His presentation focuses on the therapeutic encounter with Moore (beginning at OC 347) that was of considerable interest to us in the last chapter, though he also draws connections to other thinkers and texts, including Frege and the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. Conant is especially interested in Wittgensteins use of the term nonsense, and wants to clarify what Wittgenstein is doing when he accuses Moore of speaking nonsensically. Like some of the readers weve already encountered, Conant aims to criticize those who attribute a theory of hinge propositions to Wittgenstein, such as McGinn, who understand Moore-type propositions to belong to a special class of judgements: those that are immune to doubt (ibid., pp. 224-5). These readers take the theory of hinge propositions to underwrite Wittgensteins use of nonsense as a term of criticism; nonsense results from asserting something which, in that particular context, cannot be meaningfully asserted. As Conant understands them, these readers treat Moores (or the skeptics) propositions as if they already are fully meaningful, but cannot be meaningfully uttered in these particular circumstances: McGinn, in effect, has Wittgenstein saying that there isnt any problem about what claim the skeptic want to make there isnt 169

any problem about what his proposition means the problem just is that these claims run into conflict with various, as it were, additional (pragmatic) constraints on assertibility. (ibid., p. 226) This, Conant argues, implies that there are two kinds of nonsense: one, concerning the meaningfulness of sentences themselves, and another, concerning the intelligibility of asserting these propositions in particular contexts. In contrast to this reading, Conant claims that Wittgenstein is accusing Moore of failing to mean anything in particular with his words, and not with meaning something that it cant make sense to assert in these conditions. The basis for this line of criticism is traced to Freges context principle, and Wittgenstein is claimed to already have put this principle to work in the Tractatus in his declaration that a sign only has sense if we recognize it as a symbol i.e. as having an application. The later Wittgenstein generalizes this principle, moving from words only having sense in the context of a proposition, to sentences only having sense in the context of a languagegame (ibid., p. 239). Wittgensteins criticism of Moore is not that he has used a particular phrase in the wrong context, but rather that it is not clear, when these words are called upon in this context, what is being said if anything (ibid., p. 241). This understanding of sentences as acquiring sense through their employment in particular circumstances is, as we saw in the last chapter,

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contrary to Moores belief that a sentence retains a fixed meaning independent of its use: The philosopher takes there to be something which is the thought which the sentence itself expresses. (ibid.) Wittgensteins criticism of Moores statement as nonsense is thus not directed at the sentence, but at Moore himself for not providing a context for his sentence to acquire a meaning not giving it anything to do. Conants reading has a number of affinities with the one presented in the previous chapter. In particular, he calls upon the remarks at 347 ff. to argue that Wittgenstein is not presenting a theory of sense and then accusing Moore (and the skeptic) of overstepping those bounds. Instead he is claiming that Moores statements have not yet been given a sense at all. Wittgensteins stated confusion at OC 347 about what the sentence I know that thats a tree means in this particular context (if anything) is sincere and not feigned, for Moore has yet to provide that sentence with a particular context or use. Since Wittgenstein claims that the meaning of this proposition is, or now at least, not determinate, this shows that he is opposed to Moores view that the meaning of a sentence is fixed once and for all by the meanings of its internal components. Despite these similarities, Conants interpretation suffers from a number of problems that my reading is able to avoid or rectify. Similarly to how Minar and Williams focused solely on the remarks in Part 1, in this article Conant limits his attention to the handful of remarks around OC 350 171

that are particularly susceptible to a therapeutic reading,12 remaining silent on the rest (and the majority) of the book. Yet as we have seen, clusters of remarks in other parts of the book invite other kinds of readings, some of them highly theoretical. Without having an account of those passages, Conants reading becomes just another voice competing for attention in the shouting match of On Certainty interpretation. I believe that my reading improves on Conants by recognizing that there are multiple sections of the book that invite different readings. Further, I explain why this is the case by investigating the conditions under which its manuscript sources were composed, as well as the editorial decisions involved in turning those manuscripts into a book. I then provide grounds from Wittgensteins correspondence for favoring one of these possible readings namely the therapeutic one over the others as most approaching what Wittgenstein intended for his best writing.13 Although Conant emphasizes the lack of a substantial theory of hinge propositions underwriting Wittgensteins critique of Moore, there is relatively little explanation of how this encounter is supposed to be therapeutic. We dont see Wittgenstein attempting to bring about a change in Moores
12

He also brings OC 31, OC 33, and PI 117, into his reading, all of which are given a central place in the interpretation in the previous chapter. 13 Just because there are grounds for believing that Wittgenstein preferred the therapeutic remarks in On Certainty over the theoretical ones, that of course does not mean that his readers need to reach the same conclusion. One may still think that hinge propositions are of philosophical interest and look to Wittgensteins text for insights concerning them. That is already an entirely legitimate way of approaching the text, so it is not necessary to distort the historical picture of Wittgensteins development to justify reading On Certainty to that end.

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behavior; instead, he is mostly trying to combat particular philosophical positions according to this reading. In contrast I take the discussions of confusion and of the failure of words to be given particular meanings in context, and then connect them to the many instances in which Wittgenstein does give Moores proposition a sense. When this is coupled with the observation that these successful attempts at making sense are immediately followed by a loss of everything that is philosophically interesting (OC 622), a therapy is found. Moore is set upon the task of working through a number of examples, each resulting in the satisfaction of making sense and the dissatisfaction of failing to establish a philosophically interesting point. The intent of this activity, I claim, is to get Moore to at some point give up and just move on to those sentences that actually help him get further in his endeavors (OC 33), not for him to reach an insight into the nature of languages and practices, or to become clear on the conditions for making sense and thereby understand why his utterances failed to meet those conditions. Finally, in Conants interpretation the waters are muddied by controversial readings of the Tractatus and the works of Frege. The background for what Wittgenstein is doing can be clearly found in his later conception of therapy. The attempt to ground Wittgensteins actions in Freges theoretical writings makes the therapeutic endeavors in On Certainty look to be theoretically tinged. But the way that sentences are given 173

determinate meanings in contexts is not a well-known theoretical insight that Wittgenstein is trying to pass on to Moore; for Wittgenstein, it is entirely queer and surprising that certain statements strike him as unjustified and presumptuous when they are uttered without any occasion, yet seem perfectly justified and everyday if they are uttered when there is some need for them (OC 553). Wittgenstein seems to be discovering this remarkable fact right along with Moore. Thomas A. Meyer makes similar criticisms of Conant in his article, A Gesture of Understanding: Wittgenstein, Moore, and Therapy (2004). Meyer is suspicious of the attempt to extend the austere interpretation of the role of nonsense in the Tractatusto account for the project of Wittgensteins later writings as well (ibid., p. 236). After granting to Conant that Moore is accused of speaking nonsense in some early remarks of the book, Meyer rightly notes that On Certainty does not appear to rest with its conclusion that Moores epistemology advances nonsense. Wittgenstein instead appears to search for a way of capturing the sense that Moores references to knowing he has hands, or that he is a human being, might be able to have. (ibid.) Meyer makes two important observations that we can concur with: first, Wittgenstein does not merely state that Moores propositions are nonsensical, but also attempts (and succeeds) in giving them a sense, and second, the positive search for sense after the negative declaration of its lack suggests there is an internal structure to the book, such that

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Wittgenstein is not always engaged in the same activity at every point. Meyer doesnt clearly specify the joints of this structure as I do in the previous chapters, but it is nevertheless noteworthy that he recognizes On Certainty to be a heterogeneous text, for this is not generally recognized. Since Conant devotes much of his attention to what is involved in accusations of nonsense, and little to Wittgensteins successes in actually producing determinate senses for Moores propositions, Meyer takes the occurrence of these successful attempts to refute the therapeutic reading of On Certainty. As I have attempted to show in these chapters, it is possible to give a therapeutic reading of On Certainty that is not an extension of a resolute reading of the Tractatus.14 Meyer wishes to stake a middle ground between the therapeutic reading of Conant and the theoretical reading of Hacker, Conants frequent interpretive opponent. Yet his description of the result of making sense with Moore-type propositions as illuminating the grammar of our language puts him quite close to Hackers account of Wittgensteins philosophy as attempting to identify grammatical rules: The notion that Wittgenstein does find a sense for Moores remarks makes it difficult to maintain that these do not say anything according to Wittgensteins more developed account: what they say is, at least possibly, that Moore speaks a language

14

Moyal-Sharrock & Brenners claim that the Therapeutic reading approaches On Certainty in the spirit of New Wittgenstein commentators (2005, p. 3) invites the impression that this is the only way that a therapeutic interpretation can be given to the book.

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within which certain statements characterize the grammar and can be regarded as true. (ibid., p. 237)15 A difficulty for this reading is accounting for how success is sometimes achieved in trying to give Moores propositions a sense. For when Meyer sees these propositions being given a sense, he argues that philosophical conclusions concerning grammar can be drawn. Yet this is in tension with Wittgensteins observations that he generally only succeeds in giving a proposition sense when he puts it in an everyday context, and that when he does so, nothing of philosophical interest remains. One reader who has recognized phases in Wittgensteins thinking in his final years, and even taken this information into consideration when discussing the structure of On Certainty, is Denis Paul, who was responsible for translating a portion of the books remarks from German to English. He was a friend of Anscombes and was granted access to some pieces of the Nachlass after Wittgenstein passed away. Paul tells about hearing Anscombes story of how unable to think Wittgenstein had been under the influence of his anti-cancer drugs in 1950 (2007, p. 297). Initially, he took this to indicate that Part 3 of On Certainty had a special status, especially since 300 onwards (starting 10.3.51) is certainly written more fluently than the rest (ibid.). Yet he later decides that he had been over15

Even though the evidence Meyer cites when observing that Moores statements can be given a sense comes from Part 3 of On Certainty, the theoretical-sounding conclusions about what results from this activity are drawn from remarks in Part 2. Thus the vague demarcation he makes between earlier and later remarks isnt specific enough to separate the remarks of Part 2 and Part 3.

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impressed by [Anscombes] story of Wittgensteins diminished capacity to work in 1950, noting that 66 onwards reads fluently enough (ibid., pp. 297-8). This leads him to conclude that 66-676 form a unit, to which 1-65 are only a prelude (ibid., p. 298). I agree with Paul that there is a noticeable shift in style at the beginning of Part 3 of the book. As indicated in the previous chapter, multiple voices are now more frequently introduced. The individual remarks also tend now to be longer, and Wittgenstein is better able to sustain a train of thought over multiple remarks and even multiple days of writing (this may be what Paul has in mind when he speaks of these later remarks as reading fluently). But it is not merely the style of Part 3 that is noteworthy, but the content and method as well. Paul appears to presume that the anti-cancer drugs were at most affecting Wittgensteins ability to write flowing and readable prose. Finding Part 2 to be sufficiently readable, he is thus inclined to disregard the cessation of Wittgensteins cancer treatments as marking a significant phase in the final writings. But from our comprehensive survey of Wittgensteins correspondence in Chapter 1, we saw that he did not simply complain of being unable to write clearly during 1950, but also that he could not even think clearly, and furthermore that the ideas he was able to produce were not deemed to be of high quality. Thus the curtain lifting from Wittgensteins brain in the spring of 1951 does mark a significant break, so the remarks from Parts 2 and 3 should not be lumped together as a single 177

unit. At the least, we should examine not just Wittgensteins writing style when trying to ascertain the structure of On Certainty, but also the content of its remarks and the philosophical methods at work in them.

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