Nigeria

NIGERIA - POLITICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Political and constitutional developments in Nigeria are best understood within a threedimensional perspective which assumes that every democratic nation passes through three main phases of development. They are: the early years or the classical phase; the later years or neo-classical or human relations phase; and, the years of maturity and full development or the systems phase. It assumes also that political and constitutional experience and developments, though connected in several ways, are distinct and so can be isolated. Furthermore, it suggests, as Elias (1967), Aguda (1985) and others explained, that political and constitutional experience and developments in Nigeria took a modern and new departure from 1951. For Elias, the Nigerian Constitution of 1951 was "an epoch-making Constitution." In spite of her chequered experience, Nigeria has made considerable progress in political and constitutional development since her independence in 1960. Some aspects of this development will be discussed briefly here. CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS Independent Nigeria has so far experimented with five constitutions, the 1960, 1963, 1979, 1989 and 1999 constitutions. (The 1989 Constitution was not promulgated). The 1999 Constitution has given birth to the Fourth Republic, though with problems for which it faces demands for a revision or amendment. The first two of these constitutions were drawn up during civilian regimes while the last three were made or promulgated during military regimes. Some of the lessons learned by Nigerians during these exercises are enduring. The lessons have been taught and learned that no constitution is perfect; that ineffective constitutions can be amended or completely altered; that constitution - making, whether under a military or civilian regime, calls for adequate consultations and experimentation. Furthermore, as was the experience with the 1963, 1979 and 1999 Constitutions, any constitution that is hurriedly drawn up and not tried, stands the risk of failure when subjected to the pressure of political, legal, economic and social forces in and outside the society. ELIMINATION OF ANACHRONISMS Between 1960 and 1963, certain anachronisms inherited at independence were done away with. Nigeria learned some lessons from the Western Region crisis of 1962 during which the Premier, late Chief S. L. Akintola, was removed from office by the Governor of the Region, Sir Adesoji Aderemi, through the exercise of executive powers. Also very instructive were the three important court cases that resulted there- from: Akintola v Aderemi (1963); Akintola vAdegbenro (1963); and Adegbenro vAkintola (1963). Nigeria has learned that political and constitutional conventions should be applied with restraint and, if possible, carefully guided by means of constitutional provisions; that no single individual, however dignified and trusted, should have the power to appoint or remove the Head of State or
Head of Government; and, that a strong Republican Constitution should replace the old Monarchical Constitution inherited from Britain. These lessons served as the back- drop against which the 1963 Republican Constitution was drawn. One other lesson learned relates to the position and authority of Nigeria's Supreme Court. The majority decision in Akintola vs Aderemi (1963) went in favour of Chief S. L. Akintola but one of the Judges of the Supreme Court, Sir Lionel Brett, dis- sented. On further appeal to the Privy Council in Britain, the decision of the Supreme Court was over-ruled. Nigeria's reaction was sharp. Nigeria's 1960 Constitution was amended to delete the requirement for a final appeal to the Privy Council in Britain. The Republican Constitution of 1963 was contemplated and later introduced to replace the Governor-General with a President. This further severed the links between Nigeria and Britain in political and constitutional matters. Subsequently, the Nigerian Supreme Court was fully Nigerianised. The abolition of the Parliamentary system of government in Nigeria on 1st October, 1979 completed the process of change from the old monarchical order, inherited from Britain, to a republican order.
POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES Nigeria has maintained a written Constitution as the supreme law of the country. Thus, there is a departure from the British unwritten political and constitutional principle. She has also maintained two (and as from 1979, three) separate lists staling the functions of the Federal, State and Local Governments. In order to strengthen the hands and position of the Federal Government for purposes of legislation and control, Nigeria has adopted from America the doctrine of Repugnancy and from Australia, the doctrine of Covering the Field. By the doctrine of Repugnancy, the Nigerian Constitution maintains that any law which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency. By the doctrine of Covering the Field, it is maintained that the Federal Government can legislate on any matter which it has legislative competence. Any State laws which are inconsistent with a Federal legislation on the same subject shall, to the extent of its inconsistency, be void and inoperative. Thus, politically and constitutionally, the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a strong Federation.
POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS AND CONVENTIONS Nigeria initially followed the British practice of separation of powers, with a strong emphasis on judicial independence. From 1960 to 1966, the Prime Minister and his ministers sat in the legislature and formed the Government. They helped in making and enforcing the laws. Premiers and their ministers did likewise in the Regions. The parliamentary system in Nigeria took the form of the "Split Executive System". By 1979, she moved towards the American practice where stricter principles of separation of powers are practiced. The President has become an Executive one and State Governors are Executives. They no longer sit in the legislatures. The independence of the judiciary has been reinforced in several cases, including Kalu Anya v Borno State House of Assembly and Other (1984). In
this case, an effort at arbitrary removal from office of Mr Justice Kalu Anya, the then Chief Judge of Borno State, was resisted and declared null and void by the Supreme Court. The principle of Separation of Powers and the doctrine of Repugnancy were also reinforced. In Balarabe Musa v Kaduna House of Assembly (1981), the principle of Separation of Powers and judicial respect for the Legislatures and their privileges were sustained. In the latter case, the removal of Balarabe Musa, the then State Governor, by the Kaduna State House of Assembly, through Impeachment Procedure, as provided for in the 1979 Constitution, was endorsed by the Supreme Court. Nigeria has also maintained the concept or principle of the Rule of Law inherited from Britain. Legislative supremacy is limited by the Constitution. Leoislation declared bv the courts to be in violation of the constitution are null and void. HUMAN RIGHTS Considerable progress has also been made in the area of human rights. Adequate provision for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of Nigerian citizens is made in the Nigerian Constitution and are regularly upheld by the courts when they are breached. The Nigerian Constitution also guarantees to Nigerian citizens the right to fair hearing and repre- sentation by counsel of choice. The Constitutional right to freedom of con- science and religion has been upheld by the courts. The Constitutional right to freedom of expression, movement and to hold opinions has also been upheld by the Courts. CITIZENSHIP QUESTION The rights and privileges of Nigerian citizens have been carefully provided for in the Nigerian Constitution. In Shugaba's case (1981), it was illus- trated beyond doubt that those provisions are not to be taken lightly. An attempt by the Minister of Internal Affairs to deport Shugaba Darman, purport- ing him to be a non-Nigerian, was declared null and void. Arbitrary executive action was, thus, success- fully challenged and kept in check in line with the principles of the Rule of Law and supremacy of the Constitution. In addition, scandalous abuse of the constitutional rights of citizens has been frowned upon by the courts. CENSUS Nigeria has learned lessons from the disputed Census of 1963 and that of 1973 which was can- celled. The conduct of the 1991 Census was carefully planned and executed to the admiration of the , majority of well-meaning Nigerians. The principle has been upheld that political, constitutional and socio-economic planning and development without a sound census or realistic population basis is doomed to fail. THE MINORITY QUESTION This has, since the 1950s, been a very contentious issue which led to the setting up of a full- scale Commission of Inquiry; The Willinks Commission of Inquiry from 1957 to 1958. The issue was largely responsible for most of the political and constitutional problems between 1960 and 1966. Efforts have been made to address the prob- lem since 1967 through the process of creation of states and local governments, and the observance of the principles of Federal Character and Local Govern-ment spread as political and constitutional principles. Before the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967, the Federal Government, under General Yakubu Gowon, abolished the existing Regions and created, in their stead, twelve States. The Murtala Mohammed regime created seven more States in 1976, thus bringing
the total number of states in the Federation then to nineteen. It also created a new Federal Capital Territory in Abuja. The Babangida regime raised the total number of states to twenty- one in 1987 and then to thirty in 1991. The Abacha administration raised the number of states to thirty- six in October, 1996. Since 1976, the Local Government System in Nigeria has undergone radical reforms. In 1976, a total of 306 Local Governments were created by the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. The Babangida regime raised the number to 449 in 1987 and to 589 in 1991, while the Abacha regime raised the number further to 774 in 1996. ACCOUNTABILITY The concept of accountability was identified, as far back as during the Colonial regime, as an important factor in the political and constitutional development of Nigeria. It received a boost consequent to the celebrated Foster-Sutton Commission of Inquiry in 1955. Since then, the concept has been reinforced in practice. This is exemplified by the following: constitutional protection for Auditors- General of the Federal, States and Local Governments; and, in particular, the operation of the Ombudsman system as a political and constitutional principle. Nigeria's Ombudsman system consists of the Public Complaints Commission (Federal and State) and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal. Decree No 43 of 1988 (now abrogated) on Civil Service Reforms had a schedule which dealt with accountability as a national issue with appropriate sanctions. The rules concerning accountability are now protected by several other laws and revised Civil Service Rules. In 1999, the Obasanjo Administration introduced an Anti-Corruption bill to the Legislature in furtherance of the objective.
TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE: A RIGHT INCLINE Between 1983 and 1998, the choice of a correct model of Transition to Civil Rule Programme eluded Nigerians, thrice. Before its final collapse, the Babangida Administration tried two models of the Transition to Civil Rule Programme. The first was the Machiavellian model, characterised by uncertainty, prevarications and inability to fix a consistent handing over date. The second was a modified Egyptian or Abdul Nasser model, characterised by a tendency towards self-succession by the incumbent ruler or President. In the latter case, Babangida had, allegedly, hoped to obtain his endorsement as a civilian President for the Third Republic by an Act of the National Assembly. The bid failed. He then "stepped aside" on 27 August 1993, but shoved into office an Interim National Government headed bv Chief Ernest Shonekan. Shonekan's government was declared illegal by a Lagos High Court and booted out of office in a palace coup d'etat master-minded by General Sani Abacha. Thereafter, a third attempt at choosing a model of transition to civil rule was made during Abacha's tenure as Head of State. His choice was, obvious- ly, the Egyptian model with a bid for self succession, this time around, by means of an election in which he was to be declared legally a "Consensus Candidate", adopted by the five government- approved political parties. He had almost achieved his aim, but on 8 June, 1998, he died.
General Abdulsalami Abubakar was the successor to General Abacha. As soon as he was firmly on the saddle, he proclaimed his administration's support for a genuine democracy, an early return to civil rule and handing over of power to a democrat- ically elected civilian government on 29th May, 1999. He planned and implemented a programme that eventually brought in the Fourth Republic with Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the President . THE ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT As soon as Obasanjo assumed power as President, he chose to become an effective Executive President. This predisposed him to three obvious choices among the prevailing presidential power theories: the residual power; the inherent power; or, the specific great power model. He seemingly chose the inherent power model by which he hoped to return stability to Nigeria, do away with crippling redundant and conflicting laws; place the military in the barracks; retire the old guards; and maintain national boundaries within peaceful limits. Some Nigerians have decried some of Obasanjo's actions and utterances as unpleasant and uncharitable, but certainly no one has success- fully challenged the legality and constitutionality of those actions and utterances, including his expung- ing of the old conflicting laws under the provisions of Section 315(1), (2) and (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution and his threat to impose a state of emergency on Delta, Bayelsa and Lagos States where youth crises had threatened to reach a destabilising level. THE FOURTH REPUBLIC Nigeria's Fourth Republic came into being on 29 May, 1999. There is every sign of success on its way, nationally and internationally. A National Rebirth Programme has been launched and its success demands the committed participation of all Nigerians. It is hoped that democratic government has, indeed, come to stay in Nigeria, with this Fourth Republic. SOME PROBLEMS Nigeria, in spite of her progress, still faces several seemingly intractable political and constitutional problems. The experience of constitution-making in Nigeria, though almost a generation and half old, still faces various problems. Among these are the controversies over the distribution of powers between the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary; Executive or Split Executive of the Presidential system; operation of the party system in its new form; the role of the Independent National Electoral Commission and the limits of its powers; and the choice of a satisfactory formula for political party formation that can guarantee stability and progress in the election of a President. In the last case, between 1960 and 1963, Nigeria was ruled by a coalition between the domi- nant political parties in the North and the East to the exclusion of that in the West. Between 1964 and 1966, the Federal Government was largely a coalition between the North and the West, to the exclusion of the East. Furthermore, between 1979 and 1983, the formula of the North-East coalition was revived with some recognition for the eastern minorities. With respect to the Third Republic, however, the formula was not clear until the collapse of that Republic. In the Fourth Republic, the formula of coalition between the West and the North has been revived but with considerable recognition for the East and the Minorities. CONCLUSION There are signs of further progress in line with the enthusiasm and commitment that often accompany moments of change. Reforms of the nation's political and constitutional
machinery, bureaucracy, economic and social structures are still in progress in the Fourth Republic. In her political and constitutional experience and developments, Nigeria has passed the classical phase. She is now making progress, though not without considerable difficulties, through the later years of the human relations phase. Hopefully, in no distant future, she will reach the dawn of the systems phase, now in vogue in the industrialised countries of the world. The transition to civil rule already completed and the Fourth Republic now firmly in place are definitely pointers in the right FURTHER READING Aguda, T. A., (1985) "Constitutions and Constitutional Changes", in J. A. Atanda and A.Y. Aliyu (Eds.) Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria Since Independence: Political Development, Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1985. Nwabueze, B. 0. (1985) Nigeria's Presidential Constitution, London: Longman, 1985. "First Hundred Days in Office - Olusegun Obasanjo", Newswatch Magazine (Special Edition), September 13.1999. Nwabueze, B. 0., Presidentialism in Commonweath Africa, London: C. Hurst and Company, Pp I I - 16. Tempo Newspaper, Vol. 13, No. 23, P. 8. 16 December, 1999.
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In the last couple of days, the debate on joining a political party took the centre stage among the youth (at least on twitter and blogs). It quite interesting to read analysis of article from pro and anti political party campaigners. I will not like to join the band of opinions on either or not to join a political party but Ill like to share some thought on something I think is far more important than political party and that is government. As we know, politics is the same anywhere in the world but government is not. Another fact is this, that politics does not change but government change. Therefore, if the large population of the Nigerian youth is going to join a political party or not, it important that we define ways of changing government. A brief history of our democracy shows that we have witness three President within the last 13 years and with each President, we have seen different policies both economical and socially. Yet in the last 13 years, we have not witness different politics and there is no celestial prophesy that years coming would be different. So before you pick that political party membership card, think about how you can change government. And changing government is not about changing the leadership of those in government-Nope! It about fixing government. It about fixing the rot in the institution that praise corruption and mediocrity. It about fixing our decay infrastructures.
There are lot of challenges facing our democracy today. From the continuous internal terrorist attack, to the security challenges of kidnapping and arm robbery. Youve to define how to logically solve these problems. Nigeria government is a breeding space for corruption, every aspect of present or previous government encourage corruption, how do you intend to fight corruption. There is absolutely no need flogging this issue, if youre going to join a political party, think about a workable plan on how to fix government. And if you dont see a need to join a political party, device a way to help fix government. As much as more can be done while inside government, much can also be done outside government. Fixing government is the priority and that should take the center stage.
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The West Africa has found itself in the news recently for two diametrically opposed phenomena; the coup in Mali just six weeks to national elections and the just concluded run-off elections in Senegal. The Senegalese elections are especially poignant for many reasons. A careless observer would quickly see Macky Salls win as a revolution that came unannounced but the signs and symbolisms were always there that even Abdoulaye Wade saw them early enough. I came in contact with the realities of Wades possible fall almost two and a half years ago but I will leave that bit to the latter paragraphs of this piece. Senegals political space has had Abdoulaye Wades fortunes as a central theme so it would be apt to outline his story through Senegals democratic history. Abdoulaye Wade has been a major player in the elections of Senegal since 1974 when he founded the Parti Democratique Senegalais (PDS) as a Labour Party until the party adopted Liberalism by default with the laws of Senegal permitting the existence of only three parties with three distinct ideologies. With two already taken by the other parties, Wades party opted for Liberalism. Wade ran for the presidency for the first time in February 1978 against Leopold Sedar Senghor, garnering a respectable 17.38 per cent of the votes. He lost. He contested the Presidential elections again in 1983 and 1988 after a two year stint at the National Assembly from 1978-1980. He placed second behind Senghors successor Abdou Diouf each time. Wade again lost the presidential elections in February 1993 having only managed 32 per cent of the votes compared to Dioufs 58 per cent. The 2000 elections brought Wade a different kind of fortune. He received 31 per cent of the votes but the incumbent, tall and gentle Abdou Diouf failed to win a first round majority for once. Wade won a historic runoff on March 19, 2000 with 58.49 per cent of the votes having enjoyed the backing of candidates from the first round including the third placed Moustapha Niasse. Wade then took the reins on the 1st of April, 2000, putting an end to the forty year rule of the Socialist Party. He got re-elected in 2007 beating his former Prime Minister Idrissa Seck, once considered his protge. Wade has since amended Senegals constitution over a dozen times, as he sought to increasingly weaken the opposition even as he grew even more autocratic in style by increasing executive power through the several constitutional amendments he pushed through parliament. Abdoulaye Wade an educator, lawyer, professor of law and economics, with certificates in psychology, mathematics, sociology, physics and chemistry ought to know better
but it goes to show that the possession of a Phd. is no guarantee for results or of integrity in leadership. Wade foresaw his own possible political mortality last year. He was not unaware of his diminishing popularity in Senegal. He made moves to check the possible repercussions off that receding influence on the electorate when he tried through his party to change a part of the constitution that requires a president to be elected with an absolute majority of the votes 50 per cent plus 1. The Hare as the cunning Wade is called in Senegalese politics had sought to reduce that requirement to plurality of votes cast with a minimum of just 25 per cent. Thousands of protesters marched and gathered outside Senegals parliament throwing stones and other objects, immobilizing the city in the process. Police dispersed them but they had done enough to themselves dispense with Wades penultimate quest to stay in power for a 3rd term. Wade later withdrew the draft legislation. His final push for the power to stay in office beyond 2012 did pull through as the countrys Constitutional Council on the 27th of January 2012 approved Wades third term bid. He did run and acknowledged on the 27th of February, a day after the elections that he had failed to win a majority. Had Wades 2011 proposed 25 per cent barrier pulled through, his first round numbers of the highest votes cast but of 34.81 per cent of the total, would have been more than enough to have him win the elections. He lost the runoff to Macky Sall polling 34.20 per cent of the votes to Salls 65.80 per cent. Sall will be installed as the 5th President of Senegal on the 3rd of April, 2012, in sha Allah. The rest they say, is history but before these historical events, something happened in 2009 that persuaded me that the Senegalese opposition had found the secrets to defeating the incumbent. While a Mason fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, I became very good friends with two outstanding Senegalese citizens Mrs. Naye Bathily and Fode Ndiaye. Just before our graduation, a family friend of Nayes had just defeated the son and heir-apparent of Mr. Wade to be elected the Mayor of Dakar. One thing led to another but while still in exile, I was invited to Dakar, the capital of Senegal in October 2009 by its new Mayor Khalifa Sall. I arrived in Dakar at a time President Wade came under fire from the international media for paying a departing IMF official some two hundred thousand US dollars in cash, calling it an African parting gift. That remains another chapter in his twelve year legacy of roller-coaster leadership in Senegal. It was more than a visit for me though; it was part of the Mayors quest to institutionalize reforms in the capital. My two weeks stay saw myself and two of the secretaries who served with me as the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory present our ideas and views on the city management priorities Salls administration had set for itself. Some of the objectives were ideas of a Town Council Team, including initiatives in Land Use/Town Planning, Waste Management, Transparency and Accountability to the residents of Dakar. They were projecting a New Face, New Life idea for the city at the beginning of a 5 year term. We had comprehensive sessions on Town Planning, Land Use, Education, Health, Culture, Sports, Waste Disposal, Relocation of Markets and the like. With Dakar being home to well over a third of Senegals population, Mayor Sall had a lot to. At least two things were not working for him though, the constitution vested a lot of control of the taxation, land and administration of the city in the hands of the central government, coupled with the fact that Khalifa Sall had just
shockingly beat President Wades son Karim Wade at the polls you see why a Wade is not losing to a Sall for the first time. Sall, a member of the Socialist Party (PS) had scored 81 of the 100 votes cast by municipal councillors to emerge Mayor. The March 22nd, 2009 local elections had voters who were fed up with rising prices and fuel shortages in Senegal, overwhelmingly vote for the opposition coalition Bennoo Siggil Senegal in key locations including the capital. That was the first major blow to Wades then nine year dominance of Senegals politics and a first indication of what was to come in 2012. There are lessons for Nigerias opposition groups to learn from Senegals very poignant recent democratic process. The era of playing the opposition for the sake of it must either come to an end soon or we leave our people at the mercy of political actors who do not see anything wrong in having produced 112 million poor people, more than the population of any other African country. If the bigger evil called the PDP must be defeated at the polls, we must do things much more different from what we used to do the first step is realizing that PDPs current crappy governance will consume us all in the end. The second is to moving from the politics of self-enrichment and personal promotion to one that recognizes overriding public interest. Forming a broad-based political coalition that brings together disparate platforms of the good is the next step necessary to dislodge the toxic aberration running the country. Senegals opposition saw the power of a coalition when together they handed President Wade resounding losses in local elections 3 years ago. That was the testing ground for the realities we see in Senegal today. Even though they yet again ran on different platforms in the first round, a previous alliance made it easier for them to align for the runoff and the results are there for everyone to see. When I spoke to Sall and his group in October 2008 about the possibilities of Wade rigging the elections, they were shocked at even the idea. It was obvious the thought was alien to them and they said that much. They were not bothered about rigged elections because they knew the people of Senegal will just not accept it, be part of it, or be paid money to do it! It is never going to happen, they added. We will not have a democracy to be proud of as long as some political parties value themselves as successful when they present candidates that then succeed at the polls no matter how unknown or unpopular these candidates are. Democracy is about the majority and as long as we continue to have puppet-esque political parties, Lilliputian candidates and corrupt arms of governments that simply pursue their self interest, we will continue to have policy accidents, increasing corruption, unabashed ineptitude, abuse of law and order, insecurity, injustice and the likes as it is the way and norm of the current power brokers in Nigerias national political space. What are the lessons the Nigerian opposition are learning from Senegal? Do we now see that to beat Nigerias biggest nemesis and evil, an early alliance starting with the local and early polls would prove very useful? Confidence must be built with opportunities such elections offer while trust is engendered through understanding as we seek to defy the do or die politics of the powers that be to help provide the much needed leadership our people crave and need for meaningful growth and development.
Thirteen years of democracy under this dispensation has come with much more pains, poverty and penury for our people than joy. We have moved forward at times but taken giant leaps backward. The leaps and reforms the Obasanjo years set in place in many sectors have since been eroded by careless leadership, wanton corruption, unabashed cronyism even as our debts rise in inverse proportions to projects and infrastructural provisions on the ground. It has been a case of growing national debts with poorer outcomes and zero results. If this is allowed to continue, we would have just been mere spectators that had the opportunity to take the bull by the horn, but lacked the courage to do so. Then we would have failed to birth the desired leadership that would secure our future, that of our children and grand-children. Senegal our little brother has shown the way, and just as Khalifa Salls team told us how they were desperate to see Nigeria play its role as a leader on the continent, it remains to be seen if those of us that chose to be in opposition will take a cue from Senegals example and light the new order of change for Nigeria. It is the only way we will end the rule of these thieves of our future the leaders squandering our resources today, providing little or no infrastructure and social services, thus ensuring they steal the future of our youths, children and generations unborn.
# SAVEOKE THE STORY SO FAR March 23, 2012

Posted by seunfakze in MORALITY. Tags: #saveOke, Okeoghene John 1 comment so far
On behalf of Okeoghene John Ighiwotho and his family, we the Federal Government College, Warri Old Students Association (FEDGOCOWOSA) 1999/2000 set, wish to say a Big Thank You to all Nigerians for the response to our call for financial assistance. Words cannot express how deeply we appreciate your efforts. It is our pleasure to announce that the Executive Governor of Delta State, His Excellency, Dr. Emmanuel Uduaghan (a distinguished alumnus of our great institution), has agreed to take up the entire bill for Okes surgery in India. At the moment, Oke is receiving medical attention at a Medical Centre in Lagos, in preparation for the trip to India. He will be travelling within the next few days. We want to use this opportunity to extend our gratitude to the amiable governor, His Excellency, Dr. Emmanuel Uduaghan, for his thoughtfulness, kindness and love. This is exemplary and it is our prayer that he receives the reward of this service to humanity. We also very specially thank Linda Ikeji for bringing Okes story to the social media sphere through her blog. You have shown kindness and empathy and we are grateful for your effort. You are a hero and we celebrate you. But for your effort, Okes story would not have received the traction it did in the public domain. You have shown how potent the social media can be in enhancing the cause of humanity. Thank you very much. We also specially appreciate other Nigerians who have contributed in no small measure to this cause. We appreciate Kathleen Ndongmo for her kindness and perseverance in ensuring Twitter users got to hear Okes story. Thank you very much. We thank Oluwaseun Fakuade, Nasir El-
Rufai, Ufuoma Ejenobor, Uche Jumbo, Ediongsenyen Umoh, Chioma Chuka, Nigerianewsdesk and others too numerous to mention, who constantly retweeted Okes story. Most of all, to all well-meaning individuals and organisations who made selfless financial contributions, offered prayers and extended their hands and voices of friendship and love, we say thank you. God bless you all. To all FEGOCOWOSA members, Old Students of Command Day Secondary School, Ojo and OAU (CLF group) we say thank you. This couldnt have happened without your support. We hope more Nigerians extend their hand of support for Oke. If you are still willing to contribute financially to him, please feel free to do so. However, this will not be expended on his treatment but for his rehabilitation after the treatment as well as to support Okes transition back into a normal life. As we are all aware, his education was thrown to a grinding halt due to uncertainty around his health so here is an opportunity for us to facilitate his getting back on track. This experience for us, is an indication that Nigerians and humans at large have not lost the values of kindness and brotherhood. We believe that with this exemplary attitude portrayed in the struggle for Oke, we can join in building a bright future for ourselves and generations to follow. Thank You and God Bless! Federal Government College Warri Old Students Association, Class of 1999/2000 (OLUWASEUNs COMMENT: It is a thing of joy to me to state here that without YOU friends, we would not have this happen. Appreciations to my dear friends on twitter: @rosanwo @omojuwa @ekekeee @fowora @rmajayi @okshorty1 @oluyomiojo @shecrownlita @payme @bifarin @tee_hide and so many others who constantly kept tugging and retweeting the #saveoke hastag. Its our joy that this happened Thanks to Malam @elrufai OFR, @futurekash. Special Thanks to my dear mums @obyezeks @laurestar, Your support are immeasurable) God bless Nigeria I am @seunfakze
STILL ON FAILING STATE & FADING PEACEKEEPERS by Nasir Elrufai March 23, 2012
Posted by seunfakze in CHANGE, POLITICS. Tags: defence, Nigeria, peacekeepers add a comment
Last weeks column on our nations peacekeeping failures ruffled more than a few feathers both within the defence establishment and corridors of executive power. That was expected, because when those wasting our resources in the name of our defence become exposed in the way our peacekeeping capacity has rapidly deteriorated, all kinds of motives will be imputed to divert attention from the wanton looting of the defence and security budgets going on between the presidency and the agencies concerned. Far more humbling and sobering for me were the number of military officers, both serving and retired that called, wrote, tweeted and sent emails to confirm the essence of what we wrote last week, and offered further stories, anecdotes and facts about the general decline of our onceproud military and peacekeeping capabilities. It seems according to one commentator, that the Nigerian military now has acquired all the sad constituents of decay that have bedeviled the country. We will share some of these today, looking a little closer at the quantity and quality of the equipment of the Nigeria Army, facts about the declining levels of our peacekeeping capacity and the disorganization and mismanagement of our defence infrastructure in the last few years. The backbone of any Army is the Infantry, Armoured and Artillery Corps. They are the ones that fight the wars. All other corps largely provide support services. Let us look at information published in Failed States 2030 authored by some colonels of the US Air University in 2010. So consider first, some of the equipment holdings of the Armoured Corps of the Nigerian Army, of the 129 T-55 main battle tanks owned, 29 are out of service. Similarly, only 36 of 150 Vickers Mk 3 battle tanks are functional. Out of 120 AML Reconnaissance vehicles, only 40 were functional in 2010, and only four Saxon Armoured Personnel Carriers were operational out of 75. No wonder, we can only send a few broken-down APCs to Darfur. Take the Artillery Corps. They initially owned 48 155mm FH-77B Howitzers but only 25 are working. Out of 200 122mm D-74/D-30 Field Guns, only 84 worked in 2010, while all the eight 122mm BM-21 rocket launchers we had had broken down. The anti-tank weapons cache is slightly better, though pathetic by the standards of modern warfare. We have 3,000 RPGs for the entire Infantry Corps, explaining why our soldiers in Darfur cannot have any to repel rebel attacks. We had 240 of 3.5 RL M20 anti-tank guns but when you have a country where equipment continually depreciates with no effort or resources put into maintenance or replacement, barely 10% (24) of those guns are functional. It does not get any better; only 12 of the 50 40mm Bofors L/60 air defense weapons are still doing what they were purchased to do. The list goes on and on with barely any of the categories having all their equipment ready for the defence job for which they are meant. And yet, we budget over nearly 1.2 percent of our GDP on defence! It is also sad to note that one brand of the Armoured Personnel Carrier, Cobra which is in the holding of the Nigerian troops in Darfur is a topic of jest amongst other country contingents. It is reputed to be Chinese manufacture, but the engines were sourced from another country. The Cobra APCs are not up to 7 years old, yet they have all broken down. In saner climes, whoever purchased such refurbished contraption should be court-martialled or put on trial, but in Nigeria, he probably got a promotion and national honour!
Apart from our major military equipment which to a large extent are broken-down, there are quality issues with the personal equipment such as boots, blankets and bullet proof vests, which to say the least is pathetic. Some of the troops deployed to UNMIL in August to September 2010 lacked beds and mattresses; some had only mattresses, while others slept on the bare floor, and the conditions have not changed for the better. As is usual in the case of Nigeria, the decline in quantity and quality of defense equipment is ironically not as a result of funds allocated to the sector; instead it is quite the contrary. As the government allocates more resources to the sector, there is a corresponding decline in the quality of our peacekeeping capacity. It is also evident that the defence ministry specializes in purchasing sub-standard equipment that are not durable. There appears to be no procedure or consideration made to replace already broken-down equipment until the troops are left with nothing thereby giving room for a huge allocation to be made for the purchase of such equipment which eventually never happens. Besides the sorry state of defence equipment, the quantity and quality of the peace-keepers are on the decline. Quality, as shown in last weeks article, is a function of training, both in hard military fighting skills which we demonstrated in Congo in 1960 and ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, but are unfortunately losing as shown by the ease with which our troops are being routinely disarmed and killed in Sudan sometimes without fighting back. Training in soft skills required in modern peacekeeping operations to address human rights and sexual exploitation, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR),etc. are absolutely necessary to enhance our peacekeeping capabilities. These soft skills training has never been our forte and it is disheartening to observe that no efforts have been put towards changing the status quo. Quality is also measured by logistic capability of the contingent which includes the capacity and ability to transport a contingent to and from theatre using a nations own air force, how it maintains those troops in the theatre in terms of feeding, medicals, accommodation, water, sanitation, minor engineering, transport needs and recreation. This is the area where countries make the money UN pays them for logistics but Nigeria scores abysmally low here and our soldiers are among the worst in almost all operations we participate. Apart from loss of money, there is the attendant loss of prestige in fielding a rag tag army that cannot cater for itself while other national contingents from even poorer African countries are doing far better with Ghana, Rwanda, and Ethiopia just to mention a few. The MOU signed in January 2008, between Nigeria and the UN for troops deployment to UNAMID in Sudan, provides that Nigeria will be paid a sum of $83,422,020 each quarter, all things being equal, for deploying 4 infantry battalions. However, out of this amount, for a particular quarter, the country was only able to claim, a paltry $15,902,122.07 thus losing a whopping $67,519,897.93. If one takes into account that the MOU was signed in January 2008 at the beginning of UNAMID, an operation which is still ongoing, and also the fact that the logistical situation of the Nigerian units in the operations has not improved since then, and may have even deteriorated further, the losses as at present (2012) would be colossal as Nigeria would have lost a total of at least $804 million since the operation started, a potential revenue loss of N128 billion, or nearly a third of the defence budget in 2012.
Sadly, in UNMIL, the Nigerian units were rated lowest among all national contingents deployed to the operation meeting barely 60% of COE obligations thus forfeiting another $325,196,93 for the corresponding period. In typical fire brigade manner, the Nigerian government made the necessary minimal purchases for the contingents to ensure that the Nigerian units were not deactivated following the threat by the UN to do so. Nigeria was until recently, the biggest African contributor in terms of quantity to global peacekeeping. Quantity is assessed in terms of the number of military and police peacekeepers that each member state contributes to the UN peacekeeping. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, towards the end of 1999 began to display and keep monthly records of peacekeeping contributions by each country. The countries are then ranked in order of the total number of peacekeepers they contribute monthly to the UN. It is interesting to note that for more than 3 years unbroken, Nigeria was placed fourth largest contributor to UN peace operations behind only India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and also the largest contributor among African countries. Unfortunately, once again, rather than improve, Nigeria has slipped back a place from December 2011 to number 5 and Nigerias fourth position is occupied by Ethiopia, another less-endowed African country. Another record which Nigeria held up till the end of 2011 was being the highest contributor of female peacekeepers. Once again, the position has been taken by South Africa. Until recently, Nigeria held top mission leadership positions in the UN such as Special Representative of the Secretary General, Force Commander, Deputy Force Commander, Sector Commanders and Police Commissioner. This no longer obtains due to the deterioration in the quality and quantity of our peacekeeping contributions. For instance, Nigeria lost UNAMID command to Rwanda when General Agwai was not given an extension. Nigeria also lost some positions in UNMIL Liberia. Currently, only Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari of UNAMID and General Moses Obi, Force Commander UNMISS occupy such posts. A contributory factor to Nigeria losing such positions is the dysfunctional selection process into the peacekeeping force that allows for people to be sent for missions not based on their abilities but on who they know. Eventually they compete with the best from other countries and as expected, cannot beat the competition and meet the rigorous standards of the UN. Finally, corruption within the Nigerian Army is a major mitigating factor to any meaningful progress in the defence sector. Rather than use the UN peacekeeping reimbursements (which are not claimed in full due to our poor performance) gained from participation in peacekeeping to better equip and train the armed forces, these monies are diverted for political interests such as funding political campaigns. In 2010, there was a case where the national,assembly raised queries regarding funds earmarked to buy equipment for peacekeeping which was never spent. The issue died a natural death as soon as the relevant committee was carried along in Nigerian political parlance! In conclusion, the hard earned reputation of Nigeria in international peacekeeping gained through the efforts of late General Aguiyi-Ironsi, Generals Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Mohammed, Olusegun Obasanjo and T Y Danjuma, as far back as 1960 is about to be lost as our contingents are now rated among the worst in terms of training, logistics and professionalism. Even the
fighting reputation we used to have no longer exists as all it takes to disarm our ill equipped troops are rag tag bandits. Something needs to be done. Is the commander-in-chief listening, or do all Nigerians need to take up arms against the state, become militants, insurgents or terrorists to attract his attention?
IFY: MADAM NAIRALAND March 21, 2012

Posted by seunfakze in MORALITY. Tags: #saveOke, delta state, diabetes, Oke 2 comments
I read, with unpretentious disgust and outrage, the unsavory remarks of one Ifyalways on nairaland, Nigerians feast on ugly news, but the case as that of Okeoghene John is saddening, depressing and unfortunate because it is an attempt by IFY, or whatever she is called to gain glory in the case of Oke. It amazes me how a fellow Nigerian took pride in releasing quite degrading reports about another being, who is in pains, and contrary to her report, heavily suffering from Diabetes. At a point, I asked, what did Ify derive in the derisive article she wrote? whats her motive?. If a whole Delta State delegation had believed Oke, who did Ify see? But trust most Nigerians wont see this side! It is unfair in the eventual to see that her article almost caused some of us our image and credibility, as we (Japheth, Chinedu, Rosanwo, Kathleen, etc quite a sum of twitterers) had devoted time to the fund raising and the tweeting to raise awareness for Oke. It would have been said we were a bunch of scammers on the long run. Many had come to ask us to disclaim the article and verify her statements. Having responded (see previous blog), it is imperative we remind Ify of her insincerity of purpose, the deceitful and wicked gesture with which they treated a lot of Gullible Nigerians to plates of lies. I am tempted severely to release Ifys number so as many as possible can let her know Nigerians do not deserve the attention of glory seekers, or busy bodies but true, investigative and honest fact-finding journalists (if perhaps that is what she seeks) but ill let it pass. I have very little respect for dishonest/dubious people. Her actions seriously hurt me and totally undermined our efforts to saving a fellow citizen of our great nation (although down-trodden at the moment). May God bless Oke as he prepares to go for his treatment. May god bless the efforts of all who contributed to making this a reality. May God bless the Delta State government for their love. God bless you.
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Most modern nations have fundamental documents which are especially designated as Constitutions that define the scope and limits of the powers of organs of government which run their affairs. Constitutions provide boundaries and contexts for legislative acts of national and sub-national parliaments and they circumscribe judicial interpretation of legal enactments by legislative assemblies. In Nigerian political history, there has been an abundance of these constitutional documents, stretching from colonial times to the current version of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Well beyond such written constructions, modern nations also take into account their constitutional histories and practices, which may predate their prevailing Constitutions. Such histories and practices capture legal and constitutional sentiments and attitudes that reflect the collective wisdom of the people whom written Constitutions are deemed to serve. I will refer to such bundle of folk practices, sentiments and attitudes towards the governing principles that the people embrace as the spirit of the nations constitution. Ultimately, any nations written constitution derives its underlying authority and legitimacy from its compliance with the Spirit of the Constitution which informs the peoples respect for governance. National constitutions that disrespect the constitutional history and practices of the people are therefore inherently defective. The distinction between a nations prevailing Constitution and the Spirit of its Constitution may appear contrived in certain historic instances in which written constitutions have longevity and are fully reflective of the constitutional thought of such nations. However, in many other instances in which written constitutions have chaotic history, the distinction between prevailing Constitutional documents and the Spirit of the Constitution is an intellectual imperative. Consider the case of Nigeria. For two prolonged periods under military rule, Nigerias written Constitutions were suspended by its military dictators. Although the written Constitutions of the nation were thus rendered moot by those who forcibly seized power, the spirit of the Nigerian Constitution could not be decreed out of existence by any rulers fiat because it endures as an integral element of the political culture of the nation. The elementary framework for Nigerias constitutional practices was constructed during colonial times. By the date of Nigerias national independence from colonial rule in October 1960, the outline of Nigerias constitutional thought and practices had become clear. In particular, in the decolonization decade of the 1950s, beginning with the Ibadan Conference of 1950, Nigerians were fully immersed in the business of constructing a constitution by which their challenging
cultural diversities could be ruled together as one nation. Although the violent overthrow of constitutional government in 1966 and the subsequent onrush and upheaval of civil war and military rule halted further elaboration of Nigerias constitutional pathways, the constitutional framework that emerged from the negotiations of the decolonization decade of the 1950s seemed to have embodied rather fully the spirit of Nigerian political thought. Despite its suspension of the countrys 1963 Republican Constitution, military rule in Nigeria initially respected the spirit of the Nigerian Constitution. Indeed, throughout the era of the civil war and while General Yakubu Gowon presided over the Central Government, Nigerias political affairs were ruled by a healthy respect for the central tenets of the spirit of the Nigerian constitution that was inherited from the civilian era of governance before the onset of military rule. A major departure from such implicit adherence to the spirit of the Nigerian Constitution began with the military putsch of 1975 led by General Murtala Muhammed and General Olusegun Obasanjo. Their military regime imposed a new constitutional framework that sharply revised the doctrine of Nigerias Independence Constitution. It is that new framework, introduced by an ideologically impassioned military regime from 1975 onwards, which has taken hold in post-military Nigeria. The current 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, decreed into being on May 5 1999 by General Abdulsalami Abubakar and his exclusively military Provisional Ruling Council, is ultimately a product of that newer constitutional framework. In many ways, both in terms of the structure and the culture of the Constitution, the existing constitutional framework and its rendition in the 1999 Constitution contrast sharply with the older principles of constitutionalism that we inherited from the colonial era and its immediate aftermath. In order to assess the attributes of the existing 1999 Constitution and in order to reach any conclusions about its strength or weaknesses, it seems proper to compare and contrast these two constitutional frameworks that have dominated Nigerias Constitutional history. That exercise should enable us in some way to measure how much the 1960-63 Constitution and the military-inspired 1999 Constitution comply or deviate from the spirit of the Nigerian Constitution as it emerged in our political culture following independence from colonial rule. Foremost in such comparison is an assessment of the environment that enabled these different constitutional frameworks as well as an appraisal of the factors that drove their construction. The Independence Constitution of 1960 (along with its slightly revised 1963 version) was the product of sheer necessity borne out of attempts to reach difficult
compromises among competing regional interests. The Willink Commission of 1957 was set up to probe the fears of minorities about their political fate in independent Nigeria in regions dominated by the Fulani aristocracy in the Northern Region, by the Igbo in the East and by the Yoruba in the West. Its publication in 1958 revealed just how contentious the negotiations for a formula for a constitutional federalism had become. The result of the negotiations of the protracted constitutional conferences of the pre-independence era was a homegrown form of federalism that protected regional interests, resulting in a central government with limited and circumscribed powers. The Independence Constitution was not ideologically driven nor was it fashioned from any templates copied from other peoples experiences. On the contrary, it was grounded in the practical experiences of Nigerian history and the preferences of Nigerians to ensure that their teeming ethnic nationalities should co-exist in a common political space in full anticipation of mutual benefits for all, while avoiding enforced uniformities. In sharp contrast, the various exercises to construct a perfect constitution for Nigeria under military rule were driven by a singular ideology and mania of centralization of governmental structures. These constructions of a perfect constitution did mock the spirit of the Nigerian Constitution from the Independence era by incorporating the term Federal in the title of the Constitutional documents that were produced by commissioned bodies, including especially the Political Bureau under General Ibrahim Babangidas regime. In other words, there was a marked departure in these military Constitutions from the pathways of federalism. They decidedly veered instead in the direction of full and unhindered centralization of powers. In one important sense, the Constitutional documents manufactured from military rule -- in 1979 under General Olusegun Obasanjo, in 1988 under General Ibrahim Babangida, in 1995 under General Sani Abacha, and in 1999 under General Abdulsalami Abubakar -- could be deemed to be the ratification of measures of centralization that military dictators had undertaken with little or no consent from vested civilian interests. Moreover, the 1999 Constitution appears to be a mandate from military dictators to their civilian followers in the Nigerian populace that they should continue with centralization of governmental functions as the only way forward in the governance of Nigeria. Therein lies the challenges in the 1999 Constitution that finally emerged from decades of military dictatorship in Nigeria.
My key argument here, therefore, is that the centralization mantra of the military constitutions was radically different from the federalism that was crafted in the
Constitutions of 1960 and 1963, before the downfall of constitutional governance. Permit me to anchor that point of view on two prime examples of the scope of the Constitution and the creation of constituent states of the Nigerian Federation. The Nigerian Independence Constitution of 1960 (as well its revised Republican Constitution of 1963) was made up of four constitutional statements: (a) Constitution of the Nigerian Federation; (b) Constitution of Northern Nigeria; (c) Constitution of Western Nigeria; and (d) Constitution of Eastern Nigeria. Subsequently, the Constitution of Midwestern Nigeria was added to these when that Region was created in 1964. That is to say, each of the federating regions of the Nigerian federation stated in written constitutional documents its unique preferences in the form of governance best suited to its needs and traditions -provided these preferences did not violate the tenets of the common federal constitution. For instance, at an early stage of its constitutional development, Eastern Nigeria chose to be governed by a unicameral House of Assembly, whereas each of the North and the West had a House of Chiefs in addition to a House of Assembly. There were similar unique choices in the areas of bureaucracy, education, and agricultural development that each of the Regions made in their constitutional affairs.
All such nuanced preferences and uniqueness have been swept away by the centralized mandate of the 1999 Constitution. It has no room for separate constitutional choices. All the States can only have the single choice of the dictated House of Assembly decreed by Article 90 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: There shall be a House of Assembly for each of the States of the Federation. One could imagine that if the choices were available, some states of the Federation might opt to have second legislative chambers, probably named House of Chiefs or State Senate. Others, perhaps for financial reasons, might be satisfied with unicameral legislative assemblies. This stricture of the 1999 Constitution should not be dismissed as a slight disadvantage. To resort to a bit of pre-colonial history: up to the point of outbreak of civil war in old Oyo in the late eighteenth century, Oyo kingdom had two legislative assemblies, Oyo Mesi and Ogboni, which served the realm quite well (see Johnson 1921, Morton-Williams 1960). Why would modern Oyo State, for instance, not opt for the stability and wisdom which a second Chamber confers in the governance of a people?
Let me offer a second prime example of over-centralization that flowed from the era of military rule by discussing the profligate manner of creating constituent states of the Federation that has sadly emerged as part of our new political culture. The campaign by disadvantaged minority ethnic groups for creating more Regions out of the existing three Regions of the North, West, and East grew loud and serious in the decolonization decade of the 1950s (see Arikpo 1967). The fears of the minorities and their demand for equity were the principal rationale for the establishment of the Willink Commission at the London Constitutional Conference of 1957. The Commission canvassed views throughout Nigeria in an exercise that has remained a major example of how carefully and how seriously national constitutional matters should be weighed. In the end the Willink Commission declined to recommend the splitting up of any of the Regions, offering instead other options for allaying the fears of the minorities. One principal reason for this outcome was the opposition of each of the Regions against losing any portions of its territory. These Regions were fearful of losing economic resources at a time when they had to rely on their own productive powers for their survival and prosperity. However, following Independence and crisis in Western Nigeria, the two coalition partners at the Federal Center, namely, Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) combined to force through the Constitutional steps necessary to create a new Midwest Nigeria out of the troubled Western Region. These included legislative approval at the Federal Centre and in the legislative assemblies of the affected Western Region as well as a referendum in the two Provinces of Benin and Delta that sought separation from the Western Region.
The creation of the new Midwestern Region out of Western Nigeria did not of course calm down the crisis in the Region. On the contrary, its intensification led directly to the bloody coup d etat of January 1966 and eventually to civil war. On the eve of that Civil War between secessionist Eastern Nigeria and the rest of the country, General Yakubu Gowons Central Government took extra-constitutional measures to create a total of twelve states in the Federation, thus satisfying the agitation of disadvantaged minorities for their own states. It was at this point that the awkward terminology of Regions, of colonial vintage, was dropped in deference to its current term of states. That exercise of states creation carefully balanced the interests of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria, creating six states in each of these historically distinct areas.
Yakubu Gowons creation of twelve states in 1967 could be seen as a war-time stroke of preemptive diplomacy that probably helped Nigeria to defeat secession. He was cautious not to turn it into a popular exercise to be repeated. However, the two men who drove General Gowon from office were not so careful. Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo were in a hurry in 1975 to create more states. They and the cohort of their successors of military dictators have by now created a total of thirty-six states by unchallenged acts of military decrees. In these later exercises of states creation, economic viability of the states has disappeared as a central criterion to be wieghed. For instance, some of the states that have been created in these waves of states creation are among the least economically productive areas of the Sahel region of West Africa. Even so, there are current political pressures to split many of Nigerias economically unviable states into even smaller units. This is because there is no strict requirement that Nigerias constituent states should be economically viable. It is enough for the states to await allocation from the Federation account and the Central Government at Abuja to survive. The unwritten formula that equal numbers of states should be created for the North and the South in any exercise of states creation does mean that states with marginal resources will continue to emerge in what appears to be an unending agenda of adding more states by splitting existing ones. Not surprisingly, civilian successors to military rulers seem to believe that they must create their own share of states, as the ongoing campaigns for states creation demonstrate. One wonders how many states will exist in the Federation in, say, fifty years hence. One wonders, indeed, if we as a people bother to look that far ahead into Nigerias prospects. This unending cycle of states creation is clearly a worrisome development that may further cripple Nigerias capabilities to participate fully in the unfolding global economic expansion of the twenty-first century.
Without doubt, the over-riding legacy of military rule in Nigeria is overcentralization of governmental functions. In my view, it is a legacy that Nigeria must curb if it has a chance of competing in the tough international environment of the twenty-first century. Military dictators imposed various schemes of centralized governance in the apparent belief that the previous era of multiple structures and functions of autonomous governments were cumbersome and inefficient. But obsession with centralization of governance, which military rule has bequeathed to us, has resulted in failures that are glaring and that have humbled Nigeria. I will pick on two instances of over-centralization in order to illustrate the debilitating consequences of military rule in the sphere of constitutional development of Nigeria.
First, we must weigh the damages that local governments have suffered as a result of over-centralization. In colonial times and in pre-Civil War independent Nigeria, local governments were important arms of state governments. Local governments, initially called Native Authorities, delivered a wide range of services in rural areas. These included excellent elementary school education that many young men in rural areas relied on for climbing up to working careers and to precious further secondary school education. Local governments offered such other valuable services as motorable roads, medical treatment dispensaries and disease control projects, including management of such deadly diseases as leprosy and small-pox. Many rural communities relied on these services.
In urban areas, Town Councils offered an array of services that city dwellers relied on. Sanitary inspection, town planning, water supply and markets and their managements were among valuable services that Town Councils provided in all regions of Nigeria. The personnel of such high profile Town governments as Lagos Town Council rivalled that of the Central Government in the quality of employees whom they attracted. Thus, such giants in the history of Nigerian public service as Dr. Ladipo Oluwole and Chief Adogbeji Salubi were employees of Lagos Town Council in the 1930s-1940s.
All of these local government formations were judged to be efficient because they raised the revenues from which they funded the services that they provided. They did receive subventions from Regional and Central Governments, usually for targeted expenditures. But they had to tax residents as well as raise tax revenues on the services that they provided. Local government treasuries were key aspects of Regional governments because they raised funds. They were not without their problems. Theft of funds was not uncommon. But these thieves were often convicted in courts of law.
Any fair-minded historical evaluation of the system of local governments that was in place before military rule would find it difficult to dismiss it as of no value to the ordinary men and women whom they served. Yet the sweep of centralization reforms of 1975-1976 ushered into local government formations in the country
some constitutional changes that have dramatically altered their character. Sadly, those changes have had unintended consequences that have virtually led to the downfall of the local government system in Nigeria. This is so whether we wish to compare the well-funded local governments of our times to their ancestors in colonial times and in the era before military rule or whether we compare these modern Nigerian local governments with their international counterparts. In my view, the downfall of the system of Nigerian local governments is traceable to inherent flaws of the centralization measures that have federalized their legal status and their funding.
The 1999 Constitution recognizes 768 local governments that military rulers, operating from the Central Government, had decreed for the states and the Federal Capital Territory at Abuja. Unlike the era before military rule, there is no necessary condition requiring that these local governments be economically viable or that they be capable of raising internal revenues for the presumed services that they are expected to provide to their areas of governance. As a matter of fact, these local governments were created by military rulers to serve as receptacles of their allotted share of the largesse from petroleum oil revenues distributed from the Federation Account. Put differently, most of these local governments would collapse if they did not receive regular allocations from the Central Government.
The first major casualty of the federalization and centralization of local governments under military rule and its aftermath in the 1999 Constitution is the loss of the vital distinction between local governments in rural areas and those in urban and metropolitan areas of the nation. Centralization has created false uniformities of functions for local governments (that have been meticulously elaborated in the Fourth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution). These functions have been pegged at the expectations of rural areas. The larger leadership roles that mayors of international metropolitan cities now direct in the 21 st century have been reduced to those functions that Chairmen of rural areas are expected to provide. Would it not have been more beneficial for development prospects of the nation if Nigerias local governments, especially those in the Cities, are challenged to provide statements of Charters that spell out their expectations of functions and the office holders who would perform those functions? What would be wrong for affected States in carving out major metropolitan areas like Lagos, Kano, Port Harcourt, Warri and Benin that could compete with their international counterparts
and not thus be limited to comparison with the governance of rural areas with less population and fewer problems of governance? It is sad to see several cities that had illustrious histories of metropolitan governance, like Warri and Jos, now reduced to the status of rural local governments.
Furthermore, there are major sociological problems of alienation and corruption that appear to have arisen as a consequence of the constitutionally mandated funding of the local governments from the Federation Account. When, in a previous era before military rule, Native Authorities and local government councils raised revenue from local sources, the chieftains of these bodies were close to the people. They needed the support and approval of the people whom they served for the success of their duties. Under military rule and in the post-military era, the chieftains of local governments rely heavily on remittances from the Central Government. Many of them do not need to raise additional funds from local sources. Consequently, in many states of the Federation, there is a growing alienation of the people from the chieftains of Local Government Councils. In addition, there is widespread corruption because the Councils preside over funds that come from the Central Government almost in the form of gifts, sometimes with few strings of accountability attached to them.
Let me move on to another area concerning police and security in which mandated centralization has wreaked havoc on the provision of basic security and policing services in every-day life in Nigeria. Well up until the onset of military rule in 1966, Nigeria Police Force had an illustrious history. Formed from the British West African Frontier Force in 1898, the Nigeria Police Force was a paramilitary constabulary with quasi-police functions (see Tamuno 1970). Under colonial rule, the austere Nigeria Police Force had a civil companion in neighbourly Native Authority Police formations which functioned under the control of local governments in the North and West. Or, as a pair of authors reported the matter, "The [Nigerian Police] Force was assisted in the North and in the West by local native administration [N.A.] forces of varying size and quality ... No such forces existed in the East" (Clayton and Killingray 1989: 26).
The Nigeria Police Force became a subject of fierce controversy during the decolonization decade in Constitutional conferences that prepared Nigeria for
independence from colonial rule. In the London Conference of 1957, the three Regions pressed for constitutional provisions that would allow them to establish their own police forces in addition to the federal Nigeria Police Force. This proposition was opposed by the minorities in each of the Regions who feared that Regional (that is State) Police formations would become instruments of oppression. Consequently, establishment of Regional or State Police was not allowed in the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions, although the training and control of the Nigeria Police Force had regional components that did not therefore leave the Regions bereft of policing authorities and functions. Moreover, the Independence Constitution allowed the establishment of local government police units by permitting the Regional Governments to make provision for the maintenance by any native authority or local-government authority established for a province or any part of a province of a police force for employment within that province (1960 Constitution: Chapter VII (7)). In addition, the 1960 Independence Constitution and the 1963 Republican Constitution had provisions for establishment of local government police units in the Federal Territory of Lagos (1960 Constitution: Chapter VII (6)). All these arrangements seemed to have helped the Nigeria Police Force to maintain a reasonable image and to enjoy a decent amount of national and international reputation well up to the 1960s. Thus, to help the international community to resolve the Congo crisis of the early 1960s, the United Nations canvassed for the assistance of the Nigeria Police Force. U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, made his case before the Security Council of the United Nations for the employment of Nigeria Police Force as follows: "The question of training of the ANC [Congolese National Army] would have lesser importance if law and order could be protected in various [Congolese] localities by the local police force. Unfortunately, those forces tend to be badly organized. .... It is very satisfying, therefore, that the Nigerian Government has now undertaken to help the Congolese Government in the reorganization of the Congolese Police Force, which in the long view is also vital for the country." (Cited in Ohaegbunam 1982: 125.) The Nigeria Police Force was indeed commissioned to train the Congolese Police Force, a duty that it performed well -- to the satisfaction of the international community and to the pride of Nigerians. Such was the civilian Nigeria Police Force that military rule inherited from the civil realm that it overthrew in the mid-1960s. Today, after several decades of centralization of policing operations in the country, the Nigerian Police Force has suffered a major downfall from its lofty erstwhile heights as a competent
organization. Indeed, domestically in Nigeria and internationally, Nigeria Police Force is now universally derided, with great concern and in total dismay. Nigeria is now faced with monumental problems of insecurity in the everyday life of ordinary and elite Nigerians because Nigeria Police Force has become incapable of carrying out its constitutional responsibilities of supplying basic law and order on behalf the Central Government of Nigeria. Under military rule, the Nigerian Police Force has become totally centralized. First, Local Police forces were abolished by the military, ignoring the relevant provisions of the 1963 Constitution, following the overthrow of civil order by the military putsch of 1966. Second, the military-inspired constitutions of 1979, 1988, 1995, and 1999 have banned any police formations other than the Nigeria Police Force. This prohibition is stated in Article 214 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as follows: There shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof. This Constitutional prohibition has the effect of depriving State Governments and Local Governments of the authorities to provide basic security for citizens under their jurisdiction. The most elementary duty of any government is the provision of basic security. It is therefore an irrational prohibition that can spun catastrophic failures in governance. The gradual erosion of basic security in the country must be blamed on high-handed military concentration of provision of security in the hands of Nigeria Police Force which has no presence in most towns and villages of the Federation. Many of those villages and towns will be glad to raise funds to establish their own policing units for the sake of protecting their lives and properties. It is irresponsible to deny them the Constitutional authorities to do so. Nor is it proper to deny the constituent States of the Federation proper Constitutional authorities to raise police forces of their own to perform their role of protecting the security of their citizens. On the international scale of this matter, it is noteworthy that some of the most efficient police forces in the modern world are owned and operated by local governments of cities. New York Police Department (NYPD) and the London Metropolitan Police are first rate police organizations of international standing that are run by local governments. Why should Nigeria constitutionally bar its metropolitan areas from the opportunities of participating in developments that are the hallmark of the twenty-first century? Of course, a slimmer Federal Nigeria Police Force has its
own important share to contribute to the overall security needs of the nation. But it must not be overburdened. Let me sum up by returning to the central argument of this lecture. It is that military rule has served Nigeria poorly because it relentlessly operated under an ideology of centralization of governmental functions, particularly after the military putsch of 1975. The most tangible and nagging consequence of this mania of centralization is the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In modern times, national constitutions have the dual supreme purpose of overcoming historic impediments to progress and of enabling the countries for which they are drafted to participate with competence in the sophisticated international community of peoples and nations of the twenty-first century. I daresay, the 1999 Constitution accomplishes neither of these goals. Nigerias military leaders have misread the central canons of the nations history and sociology. First, they have treated Nigerias cultural diversities as disabilities that have to be cured. Second, military rulers have used the instrument of centralization of governmental structures and functions as a vehicle for overcoming what they saw as inefficiencies that regional diversities compel. We all are witnesses to the appalling failures of the 1999 Constitution for which the downfall of Nigerias local governments and the current disgrace of the erstwhile illustrious Nigeria Police Force should serve as forceful examples. In my view, Nigerias cultural and sociological diversities do supply a solid foundation for a genuine federal system in which the productive energies of different regions are harnessed together to build up a great nation. A dispassionate review of the Nigerian Constitution should include a reversal of the destructive notion that constituent states of the federation and their local governments exist to receive ready-made largesse from the Centre. A new Constitution should have the courage to challenge all tiers of government, particularly state and local governments, and all agencies of government to make contributions to our common wealth and welfare. Otherwise, Nigeria will be left farther behind by its competitors in the race for survival and prosperity in the twenty-first century and beyond.
REFERENCES
Arikpo, Okoi. 1967. The Development of Modern Nigeria. Middlessex, England: Penguin Books. Awa, Eme O. 1964. Federal Government in Nigeria. Berkeley: University of California Press. Clayton, Anthony, and David Killingray. 1989. Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies. Dudley, Billy J. 1982. An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. London: Macmillan Publishers. Ekeh, Peter P. and Eghosa Osaghae, eds., (1989) Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books. Eleazu, Uma O. 1977. Federalism and Nation-building: the Nigerian Experience, 1954-1964. Illfracombe: Stockwell. Ezera, Kalu. 1964. Constitutional Development in Nigeria. An Analytical Study of Nigeria's Constitution-making developments and the historical and political factors that affected constitutional change. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press. Ihonvbere, Julius. 1996. "A Radical View of Nigeria's Political Development." Pp. 108-134 in Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., Governance and Development in Nigeria. Essays in Honour of Professor Billy J. Dudley. Ibadan: Agbo Areo Publishers. Johnson, S. 1921[1966]. The History of the Yorubas. London: Routledge and K. Paul. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 1992. The Nigerian Police Force: A Culture of Impunity. Washington, D.C.: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Lugard, F. D. 1968 [1912-19]. Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria. A Documentary Record. Compiled and introduced by A. H. M. Kirk-Greene. London: Frank Cass. Morton-Williams, Peter. 1960. "The Yoruba Ogboni Cult in Oyo." Africa, 30:362374.
Nigeria, The Federal Republic of. 1963. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [Containing: The Constitution of the Federation.--The Constitution of Northern Nigeria law, 1963.--The constitution of Eastern Nigeria law, 1963.--The constitution of Western Nigeria law, 1963.--Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria Act, 1964.]. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division. Nigeria, Federal Military Government. 1987. Report of the Political Bureau. Lagos: Federal Government Printer. Ohaegbunam, Festus Ugboaja. 1982. Nigeria and the UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Case Study of the Formative Stages of Nigeria's Foreign Policy. Tampa: University Presses of Florida. Tamuno, Tekena N. 1970. The Police in Modern Nigeria, 1861-1965: Origins, Development, and Role. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.

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NIGERIA - POLITICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE

# SAVEOKE THE STORY SO FAR March 23, 2012

IFY: MADAM NAIRALAND March 21, 2012

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