Kant: History and Theory of Heaven Part Three Show Performance

(Endless Joke. Big Problem. Poetry Generation.) By Mark Julyan

..the incongruity between the sophistication of Kants gelastic theory on the one hand, and his idea of a good joke, on the other, is itself funny. The incongruity inherent in his incongruity theory of humour amounts to an instance and illustration of the theory. The fact that one of the most sophisticated theories of humour in history would be supported by such a weak joke is itself the incongruity. Justin E.H. Smith. 'Kant on Jokes' Silent Speech, Cancellation, Possible Worlds I Kant's idea of a good joke may well have been funny itself and it would appear he played out for high audiences. One crosscategorized performative utterance, defined in terms of such 'freewheeling witty displays', is situated in the opening statement of the appendix which treats of the inhabitants of the stars to his early work the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und theorie des Himmels). Where an even further dilemma for the modern reader exists, it is in the way Kant's own incongruity is thrown into relief through its cancellation by Ian Johnson who physically interacts with the body of the text by inverting Kant's meaning so as to erase out the incongruity in his mistranslation of Kant's publication from German into English and where we can see the difference: Kant: In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy freewheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. Johnson mistranslating Kant: In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, unless we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. Weil ich dafr halte, dass es den Charakter der Weltweisheit entehren heisse, wenn man sich ihrer gebraucht, mit einer Art von Leichtsinn freie Ausschweifungen des Witzes mit einiger Scheinbarkeit zu behaupten, wenn man sich gleich erklren wollte, dass es nur geschhe, um zu belustigen A footnote is attached to the passage where the entire explanation for this re-imaging of the text is that: Kants text has if rather than unless, which seems clearly wrong in the context of the entire sentence." Johnson informs us in the first preface to his otherwise superlative translation (1998), in a passage missing from the most recent edition (2008), that Kant's original footnotes with translators footnotes now attached have been moved from their immediacy within and alongside the text to the end of the book, in a passage which stated: all footnotes have been moved to the end, thus deferring to the end his willingness to immediately explain before then later deleting this explanation of the non-immediate explanation in the later edition. And in this down the rabbit hole move then where Johnson like a play within a play, plays out a joke within incongruity in Kant; where we have the contrast between the 'if' that revels in philosophical impropriety with the presumption of an 'unless' that might resolve it with a fake in translation; between the immediacy of the 'immediately willing to explain' in Kant and the deleted explanation which once explained the deferment of the non-immediate explanation in Johnson; between the apparency of the 'some apparent truth' in Kant with the various apparencies and non apparencies of the 'seems clearly wrong' in Johnson - as well as Johnson's assumption that 'unless' operates as the only or necessary alternative to a disjunctive 'if', in spite of an endless variety of equally coherent alternative options; and his assertion that the 'context of the entire sentence' is sufficient in itself to fully understand the meaning. But then as the first introduction to various kinds of the 'seems clearly wrong' in philosophical language, and particularly with Kant in mind, it was John L. Austin (1962) who first outlined the differing interpretational enlivenments that such a statement 'despite an unexceptionable grammatical form', might function relative, if not in truth, then with at least possible felicities or happiness fulfilled in meaning or event when, with his emphasis he writes: First and most obviously, many 'statements' were shown to be, as KANT perhaps first argued systematically, strictly nonsense, despite an unexceptionable grammatical form: and the continual discovery of fresh types of nonsense, unsystematic though their classification and mysterious though their explanation is too often allowed to remain, has done on the whole nothing but good. Yet we, that is, even philosophers, set some limits to the amount of nonsense that we are prepared to admit we talk: so that it was natural to go on to ask, as a second stage, whether many apparent pseudo statements really set out to be 'statements' at all. It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts: for example, 'ethical propositions' are perhaps intended, solely or partly, to evince emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in special ways. Here too KANT was among the pioneers. We very often also use utterances in ways beyond the scope at least of traditional grammar. It has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd additional feature in the reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to which it is subject or the way in which it is to be taken and the like... Along these lines it has by now been shown piecemeal, or at least made to look likely, that many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake - the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. [1] Which brings us to the idea that what seems clearly wrong if not exceptional grammatical form, is rather a necessary and signal

violation of appropriateness or politeness criteria and as such to the idea that whatever implications or categorically inappropriate juxtapositions we find may have been 'intended as something quite different' and not merely 'something quite different' or 'seems clearly wrong'. In which case, the thought that Kant's work necessitates re-writing in order to make the clause connections somehow acceptable to standards of correctness in speech and politeness is indeed quite the focus of our amusement and thereby perfectly the origin of our project. II In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy freewheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. The incongruity, which is to say the seems clearly wrong elements within this statement, emerge relative to the wider contexts of an inappropriate juxtaposition in terms of the possible worlds we are asked to contemplate and emerges (the cognitive dissonance moment where we are invited to confront unexpected cross categories) through the use and placement of the word 'if'. Teun A. Van Dijk (1979) writes: ..if is a conditional which so to speak selects the possible world or situation in which the consequent is asserted (or asked) to be true. Contrary to the usual logical analysis, both for material and strict implications, we take if. . . (then) to be a general modal conditional; that is, there is a conditional relation between facts, but at the same time the if indicates that the relation only holds in specific possible worlds (viz. those where the antecedent is true). Observing in particular, the relationship between 'if, or and unless', and their comparative relationships to the appropriateness of possible world situations relative to the context of preceeding statements Van Dijk continues: .. we again see that pragmatic or, if and unless are closely related. In all cases they pertain to the - often rhetorical, and/or polite questioning of appropriateness conditions (or sometimes semantic conditions) of a neighbouring, mostly preceding, speech act. It is notable here that if IF and UNLESS are closely related, the relationship is of such a kind as to fulfill a specific function where UNLESS is essentially an expression whose semantic conditions are set by IF followed by a negation - IF + NEG = UNLESS: if + NEG, is expressed by unless: Where: p unless q = if not q, then p. All of which is to say that if Kant's statement seems clearly wrong, it is in the first instance wrong because it is considered inappropriate as to the possible worlds we are asked to envisage relative to what we have been enjoined to expect. And it is precisely here, in this particular expanding non-space of individual unities and ruptures, the orders of implied scales of quantity and quality and the inherent circularities between various social, metaphorical, linguistic and conceptual possible worlds, as conjoined and exploded by the 'if', that we can observe the first array of differences within this particular incongruity. These are the differences in speech that separate the silent from the scream; the implied from the stated; the continuity of social semblance or politeness from rupture and dissemblance. The differences that inaugurate conflict between the elements in Peter Veatch's incongruous and endlessly repudiated anti-Hobbesian description of humour as emotional pain that doesn't hurt; or those relationships between the social nature of actual worlds with the sensuality of the body in Mary Douglass anthropological account of humour described as the irruption of the body' into social situations in which it is supposed to remain hidden. Where language is a complex phenomena with discrete communicative elements that function alongside and merge into one another, any of those individual elements may potentially at some point dis-function so as to detonate a snapping point in incongruity. For a joke to be triggered by the mis-placement of a logical connective suggests a complex joke and for the disjunction to be triggered by the use of a hypothetical connective such as IF, seems particularly inflammatory. This suggests the unleashing of incongruity within the ensnaring terms of a dilemma - the dissonance in imagined possible worlds we thereafter bridge but cannot bridge in the attempt of negotiating the snapping point over the chasm, back and forth, back and forth, between IF and UNLESS. If the unleashing of humour continues involuntarily as physiology after the event, the dissonance or incongruity wrought over a logical connective such as IF continues potentially also in terms of hypothetical possibilities. It continues in it's persisting involuntary oscillation through a connective which still concerns as to the nature of the connection. In this, in it's ambiguous joining function it brings us immediately to the possibility of parataxis - that use of language that operates in the absence of, through or across points of connective specification. As an example of continuous aphoristic play through opposition forces, in a passage from his essay Sentence, Image, History, Jacques Ranciere defines continuous bodily linking or paratactic immediacy through the role of what he calls the sentence-image, as the phrasal power of continuity against the imaging power of rupture. The sentence function is still that of linking. But the sentence now links in as much as it is what gives flesh. And this flesh or substance is, paradoxically, that of the great passivity of things without any rationale. For it's part, the image has become the active, disruptive power of the leap that of the change of regime between two sensory orders. The sentence-image is the union of these two functions. It is the unit that divides the chaotic force of the great parataxis into phrasal power of continuity and imaging power of rupture. As sentence, it accommodates paratactic power by repelling the schizophrenic explosion. As image, with it's disruptive force it repels the big sleep of indifferent triteness or the great communal intoxication of bodies. The sentence-image reins in the power of the great parataxis and stands in the way of its vanishing into schizophrenia or consensus. (p46) These are the continuing and disruptive forces through which in Kant we might understand the way that the sentence links the virtuality of implied possible worlds with the absolute immediacy of the body. As if in the formulation of the dilemma: 'If I stay inside I will die immediately through burning by fire: If I jump from the window I will die immediately from the leap - therefore I will die immediately'; but where instead it becomes possible for the continuity which unites the EITHER and the OR to become BOTH in the apotheosis of the immediate. We collapse the space inwards and bounce inwardly off the recurring jump and burn imperatives and in a fashion both alternative and endless. In the possible world where we both leap and burn in the repulsion of the schizophrenic explosion, this is the interplay of the IF and the IF + NEG, or UNLESS synthesized as BOTH in terms of both disgrace and amusement fulfilled through the free-wheeling witty display and the immediacy of the announcement. The combination at once of continuity in language and rupture in image. And it is these differences that emerge into the silence of the silent speech where on the next page Ranciere temporalizes in cinematic terms, through a comic misunderstanding, his description of the sentence-image: This could put us in mind of those nets stretched over chaos by which Deleuze and Guattari define the power of

philosophy or of art. But since we are talking about cinematic histories here, I shall instead illustrate the power of the sentence-image by a famous sequence from a comic film. At the beginning of A Night in Casablanca, a policeman looks with a suspicious air at the strange behaviour of Harpo, who is motionless with his hand against a wall. He asks him to move on. With a shake of the head, Harpo indicates that he cannot. The policeman then observes ironically that perhaps Harpo wants him to think that he is holding up the wall. With a nod, Harpo indicates that that is indeed the case. Furious that the mute should make fun of him in this way, the policeman drags Harpo away from his post. And sure enough, the wall collapses with a great crash. This gag of the dumb man propping up the wall is an utterly apt parable for making us feel the power of the sentence-image, which separates the everything hangs together of art from the everything merges of explosive madness or consensual idiocy. p46. The muted show performance in this instance is that outspokeness of a forbidden possible world silenced through the irruption of an affirmation and made alive through a mistranslation. A performance where the policeman transcribes a flippant nod as a simple yes or a simple yes as a flippant nod or both together or as if to create some other comic confusion, but where it still enforces the invasion and re-situation of the mute. Yet if the first array of circularities that emerge through the the use of the IF were theatrical yet still seeming silent in colliding the social forces of disgrace and amusement, the second array invites us to read them musically or colourfully, as if on contrasting and resonating scales of reference. Kant's own analysis of a joke uses the metaphor of a string snapping with involuntary oscillations continuing through both mental movement and the body (Critique of Judgement SS 54): It is observable that in all such cases the joke must have something in it capable of momentarily deceiving us. Hence, when the semblance vanishes into nothing, the mind looks back in order to try it over again, and thus by a rapidly succeeding tension and relaxation it is jerked to and fro and put in oscillation. As the snapping of what was, as it were, tightening up the string takes place suddenly (not by a gradual loosening), the oscillation must bring about a mental movement and a sympathetic internal movement of the body. This continues involuntarily and produces fatigue, but in so doing it also affords recreation. This underline of the metaphor, this qualifying 'as it were', is not surprising where we most often use metaphors that relate language to the idea of it's being like a kind of string, perhaps but not only a musical string but with various kinds of transitions or scales between the various extremes or end notes. Colloquialisms for communicative particularity in sender function, intention, context, interpretation or consequence might be described as to 'string along', 'embroider an account', 'spin a yarn', 'weave a tale', 'harp about', 'deliver a punch line', 'pick up the wrong end of the stick' or 'tongue lash' where all insist upon a complex duality of string or line metaphor to different circumstances; and where we might even observe in terms of entire theories the broad idea of truth statements being defined as point to point correspondance or Richard Rorty's complex description of his linguistic philosophy as 'walking a thin line'. In the particular statement we are exploring here, the opposing sets of strings are those that play upon the analogies and dissemblances between 'disgrace', 'amusement, 'kind of flippancy', 'free-wheeling', 'witty displays', 'some apparent truth' and 'amusement'. For the 'some apparent truth' Kant's German has 'einiger Scheinbarkeit', which literally means 'some apparency or claim' (which strongly implies that truth is it's object but which refrains from stating this explicitly). The word 'some' is a naturally ambivalent term in that it tends to be used to signify various kinds of implied, partially spelled out ambiguity on either quantitative or qualitative transitional scales and is a word whose meaning has generated a lot of literature. [2] Some is a complex word that can and very often does function as ambiguous on more than one scale of contextual reference at the same time. Used before a plural noun as in 'some apparencies', the word functions most obviously on a quantitative scale and implies that we mean some and only some of the apparencies, whilst still remaining logically compatible with a variety of other potential meanings. In this sense, it is similar to the term 'a kind of', in the implication that 'a kind of flippancy' suggests something less than being entirely flippant, but as understatement might still imply a comprehensive amount. When used before a singular noun as in Kant's statement, 'some apparency' might, depending on context or intonation, suggest a derogatory sense of what is apparent, or exemplary one or in ironic usage both senses at the same time. But as 'some' tends to implicate meanings on more than one scale in simultaneous implication, there are other potential complexities or ambiguities. As an example, the response 'there is some' to the specific question 'how much is there?', might either in terms of enormity or scarcity underwrite and/or ambiguate the fact that the actual amount is beyond or below anticipation terms in being either a lot, not very much or alternatively and/or simultaneously also suggest a somewhat ambiguous unwillingness to impart the information due to the question violating politeness conditions. Even if we take it in the strong sense that truth is the object of the apparency here, it remains that 'some apparent truth', is equally and logically and semantically coherent in either actually true or false statements. 2+2=5 is not true, but it might as geometry through e.g. some apparency in optical illusions, be made to seem that way and vice versa. And then we have ".. with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays..". If Kant says it was a kind of flippancy, then which kind is implied and what are the transitional phases we might envisage on the scale between this and other kinds? The German is "mit einer Art von Leichtsinn freie ausschweifungen des witzes", which in literal translation, suggests 'a kind of careless suicidal liberality or reckless dissolution through wit'. On a visual scale similarly mixing suicides and liberalities or free-wheels and flippancies and published just seven years after the Universal Natural History, William Hogarth illustrates a set of transitions on a scale which runs from suicide madness in the lower to raving madness at the epiphany. In the print Credulity, Superstition and Fanaticism - A Medley, the teleological continuity of experience runs on a barometer protruding out of the brain of one of Hogarth's denomenational adversaries with Despair, AGONY, Sorrow, Love Heat, LUST, EXTACY (sic) and Convulsions somewhere in between the end points. Conceived in the first instance and amongst other things as a critique of connoisseurship in general Hogarth provides us, in what can scarcely be called a depiction of silent speech, with another scale immediately above this one in the form of a volume meter depicted as scream and bull roar. This time the scale is one of vociferation levels and is indicated as emanating from the preacher and as such is linked to the orders on the barometer of audience experience just described. Contextualizing speech modes are linked into the forms of the flesh in a form which generates future development. The sacred cadences of the Methodist Chapel are relayed in this instance in satirical terms in a way that conflates enthusiasm (a derogatory phrase in the 18th Century) with excessive rhetoric. Illustrating perfectly the complex nature of parataxis through cross-categorization in this

collision of music, teleology and humour, Hogarth ruptures and conjoins font choices between the title and sub-title so as to continue and add complexity to the meaning as these are etched onto the paper. Where the words in the title are in light inks, the 'and' that joins them is dark and links into the boldness in the sub-title to spell out 'and A MEDLEY'. The pre-dominance of the title thus becomes subordinated in a process where the 'and A MEDLEY' underwrites and thrusts into emphasis the immediacy of the sub-title. The 'and A MEDLEY' is the most obvious element a viewer perceives from across the room as they stand back and survey the print as a whole. Beyond our immediate focus the elements of humour resound through linguistics and flesh and announce themselves as doing so. Hogarth thus underscores the immediate nature of his explanation in a way which makes the sense of his whole work resound with the directness of force of the incongruous paratactic 'and A MEDLEY'.

Fig's 1, 2 & 3. William Hogarth, Credulity, Superstition and Fanaticism A Medley. 1762. London, British Museum Kant's statement is clearly wrong and overlapping complexities make it seem so in multiple ways. Kant's statement seems to point towards one expectation and then circle back in and defeat the eventuality. Kant's statement reinforces and underwrites the rationale and sensibilities it seems always determined to defeat. It evokes the unity of an 'in my view' at the outset and conjoins this with the principled and emphatic disavowal of the disgrace, yet seems destined to make a self referential disintegration of all this through the colourful and elaborate descriptions of the kinds of flippancy in the free-wheeling witty displays. Where the explicit criteria of the disavowal in the 'we immediately explain', emerges according to one set of rational expectations, it seems thereafter to function as that explanation and therefore as both detachment and implication. The 'we immediately explain' is the explanation. In this, the disgrace, whilst explicitly contained at the level of semantics, re-emerges as pragmatic eruption in the most incredible kind of implication - yet whilst still implying a kind of reservation. If we accept, as per The Critique of Judgement that 'the joke must have something in it capable of momentarily deceiving us', one possibility for all this is that a complex incongruity may legitimately be used to deceive us into momentarily doubting the seriousness of the task ahead. We joke because to do so underwrites the seriousness of the actuality. We joke thus we are serious. To introduce the incongruity of the joke as contextualization underscores and thrusts into emphasis through the absurdity of the complexity, the fact that we really are in earnest. But there are shades of grey left within and concerns that remain. Through it's explication here as outside the usual frames of acceptable philosophical discourse, what follows perhaps escapes reprehension and therefore of genuine disgrace or uncontextualized bewilderment at some later stage in writing. And whether or not instances of humour are continuous and oscillate through the body in involuntarily movements afterwards, they can, as indeed all statements might through additional statements, inform us that a later statement has modified, reinforced or cancelled the earlier one. Kant does exactly this, except part of the criteria of his statement is the excess of wit or freie ausschweifungen - and the cancellation event begins with a logical connective in the form of 'thus': In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy freewheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. Thus, in the present essay I will not introduce any propositions except those which can really expand our understanding and which are at the same time so plausibly established that we can scarcely deny their validity. Weil ich dafr halte, dass es den Charakter der Weltweisheit entehren heisse, wenn man sich ihrer gebraucht, mit einer Art von Leichtsinn freie Ausschweifungen des Witzes mit einiger Scheinbarkeit zu behaupten, wenn man sich gleich erklren wollte, dass es nur geschhe, um zu belustigen: so werde ich in gegenwrtigem Versuche keine anderen Stze anfhren, als solche, die zur Erweiterung unseres Erkenntnisses wirklich beitragen knnen, und deren Wahrsc heinlichkeit zugleich so wohl gegrndet ist, dass man sich kaum entbrechen kann, sie gelten zu lassen. Thus' derives a meaning consequentially from prior conditions usually established in an earlier passage. Where an earlier statement contains incongruity, aside from involuntary physiology and mental movement, a linking word such as 'thus' immediately following will act so as to continue the earlier problematic logically, and hence the characterization of the statement as a cross-categorized performative utterance, even if it makes an explicit claim to dissolve it. To illustrate how a statement may function through more than one intentional aspect albeit in a different context, consider how Wittgenstein observes firstly that there are transitions on the scale between truth functional statements and expressive cries; and secondly that the placement of single elements on such a scale might be variously unsituated, even in simple phrases. Wittgenstein with his emphasis writes: 'A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And the words "I am afraid" may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far removed from it'. (Philosophical Investigations IiiX). And this suggests also the kind of embedded nuance in different simultaneous meanings that Austin reports when he speaks of language used to suggest forms such as an implied reservation, or something else, to which a statement might possibly be or might possibly not be entirely subject.

Or there again consider how and with insistence in an early episode of an American animation series, the figure Cartman combines language with visual effect in incongruous theatricality to accentuate this emphatic yet still multi-functional property of the dissolution. In this instance, the unease revolves around the inevitability of the cancellation over and above both politeness criteria and the nature of the event. Thus at his birthday garden party Cartman uses the literary device of a set of disco lights of impressive size to spell out, for the exaggerated instructive purpose of the guests, the words 'PARTY ON'. The disco lights however, are connected to an impressive 'ON/OFF' lever set at child size height. Within moments of the party beginning, Cartman pulls the switch. The music abruptly ends and the party status notification spelled out by the lights implodes into 'PARTY OFF'.

Universal Natural History - Section Three Appendix

Kant thus introduces the final part of his Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Published in March 1755 it was the first book in an astonishingly productive decade. In this work Kant presents for the first time in history the modern view of nature as a dynamic force throughout the universe as self organizing complexity. According to Martin Shnfeld (2008) here nature streams outward in a wavefront of organization, generating worlds, biospheres and sentience, and finally reason, human and otherwise. Organization is fragile, and spontaneity, pushed far enough, invites chaos. Mature cosmic regions decay, chaos sets in, and entropy follows in the wake of complexity. But entropy provides the very conditions that allow the cosmic pulse to bounce material points back to order. Thus the expanding chaos curdles at its center into order, followed by chaos, by order, by chaos. Like a rising and burning phoenix, nature cycles between life and death. [3] The book was part of a single focused pre-critical project which attempted to unify a version of Newton's mechanistic vision with a natural teleology. The ambition was to produce a grand theory that accounted for the purposive development of complexity in nature, moral freedom in persons and the nature of God. For some (Beck:1969 and Shea:1986), it was in this work that Kant 'out-Newtoned' Newton. Although Kant's early accomplishments in science now seem unprecedented, his scientific apercus brilliantly correct and the development of his conceptually centred approach well documented, Stanley Jaki (1981), in contrast claims that Kant's enterprise was primarily a philosophical one from the outset and furthermore that his science amounts to an education conducted in public. [4] Then Jaki goes on to tell us what Kant really ought to have said as an editorial insertion in his own translation by suggesting in embryonic form in brackets the influential alteration of the text later adopted by Johnson: Since I hold that the character of philosophy is dishonoured when one uses it to assert with levity (and) with some appearance (of plausibility) free flights of fancy, if [unless] one also declares that all this is merely to entertain; [5] For the initial reception, only a few copies of the Universal Natural History survived the week. If Kant had been released from the university by Martin Knutzen seven years earlier after publication of Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces (1747), here he was more cautious and published the Universal Natural History anonymously. Perhaps an inspired if ironic long-term career move however, Kant's biographers tell us the publisher was declared bankrupt upon printing and the books were sealed in the warehouse. Within days the building was mysteriously engulfed by fire with creditors being paid off through the insurance. [6] Anonymous or not, the cover names a local company Petersen as the printer and Kant was discovered. On Mayday the following year he was exposed as author in the classifieds section of the Knigsberg Wchentlichen Frag und Anzeigungs-Nachrichten (1 May 1756), in a note which stated: Book printer Driest sells: Magister Kant's Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Kant was perhaps fortunate considering the incendiary content and his intention to pursue an academic career thereafter, but with the edition out of circulation any danger was minimized. [7] He withheld the appendix from publication himself some forty years later when he supervised printing the second edition. [8] This shortened version, with the last 56 pages missing, became the standard copy until the original reappeared in 1902 in Georg Reimer's 29 volume Complete Works of Immanuel Kant (The German 'Akademie' Edition), but was replicated afterwards in future translations, such as William Hastie's 1900 and 1968 editions. All of which, along with the analytic focus in modernism and the general lack of interest in Kant's early work, explains why the appendix remained so obscure while the hypothesis in the main text became renowned in cosmology. Presenting his translation as the first English edition to contain the full text in 1981, Jaki concludes his introduction by printing an image of the original, dramatizing logical complexity through 'unless' and quibbling with Kant as to the nature of the disgrace as he takes issue with form of language and typography on two different kinds of cover: [9] The disgrace of the Universal Natural History is rather that boastful attitude in the face of grave scientific and philosophical difficulties, which at times did not even take cover under protestations of diffidence and modesty, unless an unclear style, no small problem for the translator, was the cover itself. (p76) Let us just dwell for a brief moment by means of no interlude as one with an interest in language and typography and focus on this interest in the covers. As if we might observe beneath the header of the 'Disco POST' a corresponding analytic across conceptual and graphic categories where a semi-disguised, bandaged and grinning Martin Kippenberger emerges in the classifieds section of his newspaper print DISCO BOMBS from Mut Zum Druck (Courage to Print). Combining full prisms across and therefore as thus to form an expressive mix of inflammatory harmonics with performative implications alongside a paratactic sense in language where, as if to unify elements in freie ausschweifungen, we might anticipate a disco whose progression literally crashes, falls down to earth, implodes or 'bombs out'. Where (as enter and approach Johnson) "Show-Time lockt Gste!" And where as though to relate intention, mind and act in both speech and typography, we see a thoroughly modern unity of form through music and dance such as that of the disco in Kippenberger's universe, become presentable through an archaic header utilizing the very exact typographic font such that the printing of the Disco POST seems to act itself as prime suspect in both dissolution and exposure of the disco and the force behind Kippengerger's burgeoning sarcasm.

Fig 4: Immanuel Kant. Universal Natural history of the Heavens. Published Johann Friederich Petersen, 1755 Fig 5: Martin Kippenberger. Disco Bombs. From the portfolio Mut Zum Druck (courage to print). Screen print. 1989. London, Tate Gallery. Typography and publishing-event developments aside, the major scientific accomplishments in the Universal Natural History were to correctly account for the disc-like shape of the Milky Way and the development of the planets and solar system from homogenous gaseous origins according to Newton's laws of gravity in a theory which became famously known as the Nebularhypothese. The hypothesis was confirmed in essentials in 1944 by the astrophysicists von Weizsacker and Kuiper. More recently Kant's evolutionary theory of the universe has become the essence of modern models in cosmology (Coles 2001, 240). The cosmologist R.L Oldershaw (2010) presenting Kant and Johann Lambert in 'post Big-Bang' cosmology as originators of the infinite hierarchical or 'fractal' universe writes that the most natural version of Inflation theory is Eternal Inflation in which Inflation is, was and always will be occurring on an infinite number of size scales. The new paradigm that cosmologists have arrived at by several routes is an infinite fractal hierarchy that has universes within universes without end.. The general paradigm that nature is an infinite hierarchy of worlds within worlds has fully arrived, and will probably be our dominant cosmological paradigm for the foreseeable future. The term Kant uses to describe this concept of 'worlds within worlds' is the 'great chain of being', a description borrowed from the poetry of Alexander Pope. Section One begins with a excerpt from Pope's Essay on Man and there are passages from this throughout as well as from poetry by Joseph Addison and Albrecht Von Haller. Biographer Manfred Kuehn tells us that Kant was offered the position of Professor of Poetry at Berlin University in 1764, but declined. If without editing, say in the manner of Jacques Ranciere's cinematic philosophical parataxis, we arrange the poetry from the whole of the Universal Natural History into a single frame, we have: Is the great chain, that draws all to agree, And drawn supports, upheld by God, or thee? See plastic Nature working to this end, The single atoms each to other tend, Attract, attracted to, the next in place Formd and impelld, its neighbour to embrace. See Matter next, with various life endud Press to one centre still, the genral Good. Eternity! Who knows you? For you worlds are days and humans moments. Perhaps the thousandth sun is now turning And thousands still remain behind. Like a clock animated by a weight, A sun rushes by, moved by the power of God. Its impulse comes to an end, and another throbs. But you remain and do not count them. Who sees with equal eye, as God of all, A hero perish, or a sparrow fall, Atoms or systems into ruin hurld, And now a bubble burst, and now a world. When then a second night will bury this world, When from everything nothing remains but the place, When still many other heavens bright with other stars Will have completed their course,

You will be as young as now, just as far from death As eternally alive as now. When Nature fails, and day and night Divide thy works no more, My ever grateful heart, O Lord, Thy mercy shall adore. Through all Eternity to Thee A joyful song Ill raise; For, oh! Eternitys too short To utter all Thy praise. He, who through vast immensity can pierce, See worlds on worlds compose one universe, Observe how system into system runs, What other planets circle other suns, What varied Being peoples every star, May tell why Heaven has made us as we are. Superior beings, when of late they saw A moral Man unfold all Natures law, Admird such wisdom in an earthly shape, And shewd a NEWTON as we shew an Ape. Vast Chain of Being! Which from God began, Natures ethereal, human, angel, man, Beast, bird, fish, insect, what no eye can see, No glass can reach! From Infinite to thee, From thee to nothing. The stars perhaps enthrone the exalted soul As here vice rules, there virtue has control. [10] The major philosophical accomplishment - which is to say that accomplishment which lies in the appendix of the third section immediately after the statement mistranslated by Johnson, lies in it's anticipation that cognitive experience depends on and emerges through the material substance and form of the body - the solution to Descartes mind/body problem. This formulation is now acknowledged as pre-cursor to those sciences and philosophies of embodied cognition recently emerging in the neurosciences, psychology and computation. Cognition is not as Descartes thought primarily related to formal operations on abstract symbols where the body is a simple accessory merely necessary for the reception of outer impressions. It is instead absolutely necessary for the act of thinking. Kant is concise: The human being is created to take in the impressions and emotions which the world is to arouse in him through that very body, which is the perceptible part of his being. The bodys material serves not only to impress on the imperceptible spirit which lives inside him the first ideas of the external world but also is indispensable in its inner working for repeating these impressions and linking them together, in short, for thinking. Although this clearly amounts to much more than a deterministic fate in terms of either ideal or attainable potential for human beings, in 1755 there nevertheless remained for Kant a pessimistic actuality for the majority of such creatures: When we consider the life of most people, it seems that this creature has been created to absorb liquids, like a plant, to grow, to propagate the species, and finally to grow old and die. Among all living things, human beings are the poorest at realizing the purpose of their existence, because they exhaust their excellent capabilities in those pursuits which other creatures, with far less capability, nonetheless attain more confidently and conveniently. The human being would even be the creature most worthy of contempt among all of them, at least from the point of view of true wisdom, if the hope for the future did not elevate him and if the time for a full development of the powers closed up inside him did not lie in store. Kant doesn't say what hope the powers closed up inside human beings might elevate us towards in future until his conclusion. What we do find however is not just that the mind is dependent upon the material substance of the body, but also the much more intriguing idea that the nature and level of rationality in creatures depends upon the type of matter on their planet of origin. The teleological purpose of planets is the development of life and those planets which are not inhabited now will be teeming with life in future. Everything in the universe is interconnected and the links in the chain are equal in necessity and importance. Human beings are neither the sole purpose of creation or the pinnacle: Thus, everything in the total extent of nature holds together in an uninterrupted series of stages through the eternal harmony which makes all the steps related to each other. The perfections of God have clearly revealed themselves at our levels and are no less beautiful in the lowest classes than in the more lofty ones. In his attempt to unify the sensible and the intelligible within a single ontological domain, Kant rejected Descartes dualism of a mental substance that thinks without extension or a material substance that is extended without thought. He presented his project in the preface as one extremely reluctant to develop a natural teleology out of material causes - now he throws caution to the wind and does just that. Kant reasoned that matter is not distributed evenly throughout the solar system. Because in Newton's formula gravity is directly proportional to mass and inversely proportional to distance, he proposed that the gravitational power of the sun had attracted the heavier, more dense materials towards its centre when the planets had originally formed. The material structure of persons on Mercury is thus of a denser type than the finer material bodies found on Jupiter or Saturn and this relationship functions correspondingly in terms of cognitive potential: I summarize all this in one general idea: the material stuff out of which the inhabitants of different planets, including even the animals and plants, are made must, in general, be of a lighter and finer type, and the elasticity of the fibres as well as the advantageous construction of their design must be more perfect in proportion to their distance away from the sun. Because the spiritual or life force element in matter is of an expansive nature, it originally manifested itself in greater quantities on the outer planets. Those creatures living in the outer spheres consequently attain a finer spiritual perfection than those existing nearer to the sun: We will not extrapolate these assumptions beyond the limits prescribed for a physical treatise; only we do once again take note of the above mentioned analogy that the perfection of the spiritual as well as the material worlds in the planets from Mercury right up to Saturn, or perhaps beyond Saturn (insofar as there are still other planets), grows and

advances in an appropriate sequence of stages proportional to their distance from the sun. Although we know now that heat is not transfered to elements in a linear, straightforward way, Kant postulated that it did. This mean't he thought that the sun had a more efficient influence on Saturn or Jupiter than it does on Mercury because of the lighter materials on those planets, and that this influence had a corresponding benefit for beings in the outer sphere's. Furthermore, because those outer planets that had been discovered at that point have more moons that any of the inner planets, that the refracted light from these additional moons and even the rings of Saturn add even greater nuance to the cognitive activity of the inhabitant creatures. If Kant's Universal Natural History was almost entirely without mention in subsequent literature and very rarely available in it's entirety for almost another 150 years, Kant tells us it's planetary theory of being was itself somewhat influenced by Fontenelle's Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds (1686). Possibly if it had been more widely read through modernism, the nearest indication we have to what it's influence could have been, in its celebration of the centrality of the sun as the definer of being, combined with an embodied if pessimistic view of dependent 'plant like' creatures, is perhaps found in art-works such as those by the painter Turner. But in any case, this explains how and why Kant thought human beings existed on the middle rung of a suncentred, cosmically ordered hierarchical scale of creation. The dense material and spiritual substances that define being on Mercury and Venus are only able to manifest themselves through living creatures in a crude fashion where the results produce relatively inactive or sluggish cognitive faculties. With Earth and Mars in the twilight zone, the finer spiritual material substances on Jupiter and Saturn result through the powers of the sun in beings who are more sublime, more elastic in their thoughts and ultimately more lively in their appreciation of the good. If the idea of the most sublime classes of sensible creatures living on Jupiter or Saturn provokes the jealousy of human beings and discourages them with the knowledge of their own humble position, a glance at the lower stages brings content and calms them again. The beings on the planets Venus and Mercury are reduced far below the perfection of human nature. In the conclusion The conditions of human beings in the future life, observing firstly that we do not know what human beings are now, much less what we will become in future, Kant speculates about the future hope for human beings in terms of interplanetary space exploration possibilities for materially embodied souls from beyond the grave: Is the everlasting soul for the full eternity of its future existence, which the grave itself does not destroy but only changes, always to remain fixed at this point of the cosmos, on our Earth? Is it never to share a closer look at the rest of creations miracles? Who knows whether it is not determined that in future the soul will get to know at close quarters those distant spheres of the cosmic structure and the excellence of their dwelling places, which already attract its curiosity from far away? Perhaps that is why some spheres of the planetary system are already developing, in order to prepare for us in other heavens new places to live after the completion of the time prescribed for our stay here on Earth. Although no one can be expected to ground actual hope on such uncertain, imaginary pictures, they are non the less permissible and appropriate as entertainment. Furthermore far from disgrace or dishonour such pleasures are shared with and even necessary for the perpetual contentment of the Highest Being as our collective essence strives towards infinity on all levels: It is permissible and appropriate to entertain ourselves with ideas of this kind. But no one will ground future hope on such uncertain imaginary pictures. When vanity has demanded its share of human nature, then the immortal spirit will, with a swift leap, raise itself up above everything finite and further develop its existence in a new relationship with the totality of nature, which arises out of closer ties with the Highest Being. From then on, this lofty nature, which in itself contains the source of blissful happiness, will no longer be scattered among external objects in order to seek out a calming effect among them. The collective essence of creatures, which has a necessary harmony with the pleasure of the Highest Original Being, must also have this harmony for its own pleasure and will light upon it only in perpetual contentment.

'The Universal Form of a Dilemma'

Kant incorporates the generative potential for at least hypothetical disjunctive syllogisms where: dilemmas therefore, though consequential, are very captious or ensnaring - and he does so in a way where the consequential effects specifically invoke the disjunction between IF and IF + NEG in creating the logical form of the oscillation between IF and UNLESS, or the difference in the statements, as published, between Kant and Johnson. Kant writes in his book on logic of the disjunctive syllogisms of reason: In disjunctive syllogisms we argue either from the truth of one member of disjunction to the falsity of the others, or from the falsity of all the members except one to the truth of this one. That is done by the modus ponens, this is done by the modus tollens. Scho. 1. All the members of disjunction, one excepted, taken together, make up the contradictory opposite of this one. Consequently a dichotomy, according to which when one of them is true the other must be false and vice versa, has place here. (The universal form of this syllogism is, What is A, is either B, or C; A is not B; it is therefore C. (Logic: part 1. 3. 77. p 186) In hypothetical disjunctive syllogisms, the consequences we find might theoretically be developed, 'how many members of a division soever there may be', from di-lemma through tri-lemma and tetra-lemma to thus mathematically theoretical universal or infinity-lemma where Kant writes: A dilemma is a hypothetically disjunctive syllogism, or a hypothetical argument, whose consequent is a disjunctive judgement. The hypothetical proposition, whose consequent is disjunctive, is the major proposition; the minor affirms, that the consequent is false, and the conclusion, that the antecedent is so. (The universal form of a dilemma, tri-lemma, tetralemma, or how many members of a division soever there may be, is that, If A is either B or C, or is; but neither B, nor C, nor D is; therefore A is not.). (Logic: Part 1. 3. 79. p187) The oscillation of the IF and the IF + NEG thus presents us with the interchange of IF and UNLESS across the chasm of a potentially generative, ever extending or infinity lemma. This is the dance in the infinite play upon play of the possible where the interchange of IF and UNLESS emerge out of and into the dual poetics of the lemma and problems in real and other worlds. We noted how in the Critique of Judgement Kant described incongruity as the 'sudden' 'snapping of the string'. In terms of

possible responses or alternatives to the singularity of the UNLESS in this statement, the full lash of the melody becomes unleashed into the reality ever unfolding. Where the divisions divide or multiply, the differences of meaning in logic and grammar collide into the extending rhythm of the dia-logical exchange in the never-ending conjoinations of Kant and Johnson.

Poetry Generation

Where Kant forms the appendix to section three which treats of the inhabitants of the stars in his Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, he theorizes a teleological order of being within a mechanistic universe which opens with a statement which by consent seems clearly to function through incongruous formation. As with every other philosopher of historical significance Kant positioned incongruity within the category of the aesthetic. In this it is useful to compare categories and criteria between passages in the Universal Natural History and The Critique of Judgement, especially with respect to correlations between such terms as spirit, mind, body, judgement, light, fire, centre, sun, quickening, sluggish, coarse, elastic, sublime or enlivenment. Kant writes in the Universal Natural History that it is precisely that faculty of judgement that functions upon the enlivenment of the body and the soul in the fashion of light and the sun when he writes that the coarseness of the material stuff in which his spiritual component is buried operates such that The attempts of reason to stand up against this and to drive away the confusion with light from the power of judgement are like moments of sunshine when thick clouds constantly interrupt and darken their serenity. As if in mirror image, in The Critique of Judgement (SS 54) he relates the power of judgement to these moments of sunshine in an equivalent quickening effect within the body which proceeds to the refinement of the soul in the comparative harmonies of music and humour: Music and what provokes laughter are two kinds of play with aesthetic ideas, or even with representations of the understanding, by which, all said and done, nothing is thought. By mere force of change they yet are able to afford lively gratification. This furnishes pretty clear evidence that the quickening effect of both is physical, despite its being excited by ideas of the mind, and that the feeling of health, arising from a movement of the intestines answering to that play, makes up that entire gratification of an animated gathering upon the spirit and refinement of which we set such store. Not any estimate of harmony in tones or flashes of wit, which, with its beauty, serves only as a necessary vehicle, but rather the stimulated vital functions of the body, the affection stirring the intestines and the diaphragm, and, in a word, the feeling of health (of which we are only sensible upon some such provocation) are what constitute the gratification we experience at being able to reach the body through the soul and use the latter as the physician of the former. As if through an astonishing development of Kepler's cosmological heuristic harmonics, we might even say that in the opening statement of this appendix, when situated in the context of Kant's philosophy as a whole, we find as if to enliven our physicality and refinement with what sunlight, a passage where the Kantian orchestrated linguistic strings of silent speech resound so deafeningly in wit as to blast the heavens with such a Pythagorean Harmony of the Sphere's as even now we could scarcely analyze in dialectic or represent in the understanding. As if through an astonishing development of Kepler's cosmological heuristic harmonics, we might even say that in the opening statement of this appendix, when situated in the context of Kant's philosophy as a whole, we find as if to enliven our physicality and refinement with what sunlight, a passage where the Kantian orchestrated linguistic strings of silent speech resound so deafeningly in wit as to resonate the heavens with such a Pythagorean Harmony of the Sphere's as even now we could scarcely analyze in dialectic or represent in the understanding. Where according to legend Aristotle's affirmation of laughter in the Poetics was removed from the historical record by medieval censors and according to the record Kant's intrinsic teleology was suppressed by his own efforts, we can rest assured that no such measures are required today in respect to this particular incongruity thanks to the re-configurations of our own times mistranslation jockey's. Perhaps as homage to such free-wheeling dissolutions, we might then explore some variations in connective hijacking, set in the form of a text-art generator or Infinity-Lemma, so as to furnish those so engaged in this enterprise with yet ever wider choices for connective selections in future editions. Due to Kant invoking movement of the body as the inevitable consequence of humour - the "animated gathering of the spirit" in Kant or the "irruption of the body", as per Mary Douglas's apt phrase - the following piece of artistic endeavour should be interpreted as a dialogue between an ex-humed version of Kant and his translator Ian Johnson. Here the dialogue becomes played out in the form of a song-bird duet where we can postulate that a script installed on a generative program within a computer is transversing the heavens through the sheer force of the dilemmas in a space craft in the form of 'Kant (Immanuel) Space Station with an Infinity-Lemma to the Heavens and the Inhabitants of the Stars'. The generation program operates in variations on variations according to the members of the divisions in Kant's universal problem formula: If A is either B or C, or is; but neither B, nor C, nor D (etc) is; therefore A is not. If we can imagine something like this: Where the variations - which function hereafter as 'universal 'PARTY ON' switch operators' - are generated according to the newly juggled and expanding clusters of logical connectives situated between the two clauses of the statement. Such renditions, whilst random may also be amusingly ordered into self-referential patterns or otherwise as in: ..if ..if and when we decide we feel like it maybe (we immediately explain that we are doing this only as an amusement) ..If besides maybe (we immediately explain that we are doing this only as an amusement) ..If although besides maybe nevertheless still sometimes rather (we immediately explain that we are doing this only as an amusement) ..If accordingly such that often (we immediately explain that we are doing this only as an amusement) ..if occasionally at least once or twice (we immediately explain that we are doing this only as an amusement), ..if once though not first or forever (we immediately explain that we are doing this only as an amusement), ..if oh! but for the heavens! (we immediately explain that we are doing this only as an amusement), ..if in the event of 'so on' (we immediately explain that we are doing this only as an amusement), and so on.. Where such connective clusters are coherently recursive and formed into nested sets, these constellations should be given their own proper names per my scheme of referencing. Examples might be in qualifications upon qualifications such as the 'Kant/Johnson 'if or unless, not unless, if unless, not unless, if unless, not unless (etc) we immediately explain that we are doing

this only as an amusement'' constellation; or as in either detonative or false alarm potentials, as in the 'Kant/Johnson '.. if in 4hrs; 32 m's; 5/4/3/2/1 sec's potentially we immediately explain that we are doing this only as an amusement'' constellation. The most excellent and ever adventurous Ian Johnson, hereafter an idiot savant muse (let this be his character note) as ever with changing visages, accoutrements and hilarities and represented on the vessel by a clown generator, something of the sort we find on Scott's mind, who we acknowledge as the font of our inspiration. Kant's corpse -aired out, wigged up and be-decked - with formations generated and delivered by the problem program should be seated with an out-stretched arm positioned at a laconic or thoughtful angle, but completely motionless as if deep in contemplation. It is left to individuals to decide for themselves where Kant's amusement, much more the everly renewed perpetual contentment of the Highest Original Being might be situated relative to this at the completion of every exchange in the dialogue.

Incantations

In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if and when we decide we feel like it maybe we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if besides maybe we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if although besides maybe nevertheless still sometimes rather we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if accordingly such that often we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if occasionally at least once or twice we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if in the event of 'so on' we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if oh! but for the heavens! we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if and in spite of 'so on' we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if and when halfway through we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if not firstly we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if as though we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if and when not quite lastly we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if and when lastly or in between we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty

displays having some apparent truth, if in any eventuality we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, not after if yet nevertheless still not yet before we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a dis-grace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if although perhaps sometimes we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement? In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, not 'as' but as if or as if in some other sense we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, because but not in spite of the fact that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if before if not after yet between forever and this we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, even if we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if in order not such that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if once though not first or forever we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, provided that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, rather than we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, since now we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, such that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, though in amazement we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, until when at least the axe falls we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when or if we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, where accordingly we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty

displays having some apparent truth, whereas whenever lastly we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, wherever in an instance we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, in spite of the fact that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, whether or not since we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, while occasionally we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, even though we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, notwithstanding that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when belatedly we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when accordingly yet not lastly we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if perhaps afterwards we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when lastly if not never we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, although sometimes we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if nevertheless we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, or but there goes the disgrace! we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, but alternatively such that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, since occasionally meanwhile we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if however in contrast we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty

displays having some apparent truth, not least whenever we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when finally we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when similarly after-all we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, until we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if in a nutshell meanwhile we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, therefore we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, consequently we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if and when unless but not also we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, too if not too often we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if similarly in consequence we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if in addition we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, even if although not willingly less than before we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if indeed we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, let alone we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, and thereupon we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if however nevertheless we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if on the other hand we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, though in contrast we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an

amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, though momentarily we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if alternatively without surrender we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, whilst yet never we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when in fact we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if in fact we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement.

In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, but that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement.

In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, where or wherever we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, besides that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if anyway we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if after all this we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, as and when for example we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if for instance therefore we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, although in other words we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, but that for (!) we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, alas we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, in that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if first of all we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement.

In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when for one thing we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if in the first place we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when to begin with we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, although next we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if in sum we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, although to conclude this we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, while immediately at once we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, therefore as a result we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, although pretty much often we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, now that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, when in case of fire we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, provided that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, whether or not consequently we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, notwithstanding that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, wherupon at once we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, should it be that we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, if after all we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty

displays having some apparent truth, such that ostensibly we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement. In my view it is a disgrace to the nature of philosophy when we use it to maintain with a kind of flippancy free-wheeling witty displays having some apparent truth, although forever (possibly) if sometimes maybe such that at least occasionally in the first place we are immediately willing to explain that we are doing this only as an amusement.. and so forth...

Notes: 1. Austin uses 'nonsense' as a term of art inherited from logical posivitism. A central part of his project was to demonstrate that non truth-functional statements may in fact be meaningful, hence the qualification at the end of the paragraph "or else intended as something quite different". 2. See for example: Carston, Robyn. 1998. Informativeness, Relevance and Scalar Implicature. Relevance Theory: Applications and Implications, eds. R. Carston & S. Uchida, 179- 236. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Horn, Laurence R. 1976: On the semantic properties of logical operators in English. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University. Reproduced by Indiana University Linguistics Club, Bloomington. Russell, Benjamin 2006. Against grammatical computation of Scalar Implicatures. Journal of Semantics 23(4), 361-382. Sauerland, Uli. 2004. Scalar Implicatures in Complex Sentences. Linguistics and Philosophy 27(3), 367-391. 3. See Universal Natural History: 1:264-6 for the general structural-dynamic formation of the cosmos; 231.18-209 for star motions; 250.5-24 for galactic formation; 255.24-6 for the analogous formation of distant galaxies; 250.34-6 for analogous formation of planetary systems; and 256.11-14 for the galactic field. 4. See also Stephen Palmquist's response which argues that Jaki sometimes fails to take into account the fact that 19th and 20th century developments in science were unavailable in earlier periods (Kant's cosmogony Re-evaluated, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 18:3, September 1987, pp.255-269). 5. The irony from a grammatical point of view is that both Jaki and Johnson alter grammar and punctuation in the sentence but in different ways. Kant separated the clauses with a colon (Das Kolon has the same historical root and function in English as it does in German), Jaki with a semi-colon and Johnson with a full stop. The 'if' connects two clauses that are incongruous and the punctation that comes after this does not affect the function of the 'if' in either case. Without naming any specific instances Martin Schnfeld writes: "Kant defended pantheism, naturalism, evolution, and holism when doing so was incompatible with an academic career. Because one's job was easily lost over such views, he was cautious. In the context of censorship writers tend to become circumspect. To avoid trouble, they may publish something anonymously; or they may make oblique remarks instead of direct statements; or they may have second thoughts and retract earlier dares. Kant did all three things, but for later readers of more secular ages, it was easy to miss such subtleties" (Schnfeld 2008). 6. First related by Kant's early biographer Borowski and subsequently by Rahts (1902) 1:545; Krafft (1971); Jaki (1981); and Schnfeld (2008). 7. Borowski, writing fifty years after the event says that the book was not once put on sale and Johann Lambert in a letter to G. L. Le Sage dated 1 Oct 1768 mentions that although he had seen a copy he was unable to purchase one anywhere through booksellers. Adickes (1925. Kant als Naturforscher. 2:207), notes that the Auskunftsbureau of German libraries could only list one extant copy in the Prussian Staatsbibliothek and five copies in German universities in the early 1920's. 8. Jaki tells us that the second edition was published minus Section 8 of Part Two and the whole of Part Three (or the appendix). 9. Jaki tells us in the introduction that part of his motivation for translating the Universal Natural History was to make the appendix finally available in English and is unremittingly scornful of William Hastie's translation for suppressing the ending. Jaki both exemplifies the reductionistic bias of his era and imagines the conspiracy of a cover up when he writes: Since that intrinsically teleological perspective can hardly appear scientific to anyone enamoured of Kant, the champion of pure scientific reason, crusaders, like Hastie and others, on behalf of Kant could only keep those pages under cover. p10. Johnson, attempting to provide us with a copy more readable than either Hastie or Jaki, fairly describes the difference between the two when he writes in the original foreword to his own translation: The major purpose of this translation is to provide undergraduates a readily accessible version of Kant's work in a modern idiom. Hastie's translation, although very fluent, is seriously incomplete and in places suffers from a curious choice of words. And there are some odd errors of terminology. Jaki's translation is scrupulously faithful to Kant's text, but is doggedly literal and thus, in many places, very difficult to read, especially since it contains many denoted editorial insertions. These two translations clearly reflect the very different attitudes of the translators to Kant's work: Hastie is an enthusiastic apologist for Kant's scientific genius; Jaki, by contrast, believes the scientific value of Kant's work here has been seriously exaggerated (to say the least). I take no stand on this issue (which I am ill equipped to judge), and I refer anyone interested in the debate to consult Jaki's excellent introduction and detailed commentary on Kant's text. His remarks on Kant's theory in context are (for me) extremely persuasive. 10. All excerpts were published in German in the original. Lines Lines Lines Lines Lines Lines Lines Lines 1-2: Pope, Essay on Man. 3-8: Pope, Essay on Man. 9-16: Von Haller, Unvollkommene Ode ber die Ewigkeit. 17-20: Pope, Essay on Man. 21-26: Von Haller, Unvollkommene Ode ber die Ewigkeit. 27-34: Addison, Spectator 453. 35-40: Pope, Essay on Man. 41-44 Pope, Essay on Man.

Lines 45-49: Pope, Essay on Man. Lines 50-51: Von Haller, Unvollkommene Ode ber die Ewigkeit.

Bibliography: Austin. John L, How To Do Things With Words, 1962, Oxford Clarendon Press Borowski, L.E. et al. Immanuel Kant. Sein Leben in Dartsellungen con Zeitgenossen / Die Biographien von L.E. Borowski, R.B. Jachmann und A. ch. Wasianski (Berlin: Felix Gross, 1912) Coles, Peter, ed., 2001: The Routledge Companion to the New Cosmology. London: Routledge Hogarth, William. Anecdotes of William Hogarth Written by Himself. 1833. J.B. Nicols and son Kant, Immanuel. Logic, 1800, W Simpkin and R Marshall, translated by John Richardson 1819 Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgement, 1790, Blackmask, translated by James Creed Meredith Kant, Immanuel. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens or an Essay on the Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Entire Structure of the Universe Based on Newtonian Principles, 1755, translated by William Hastie, 1900, reprinted 1968, New York, Greenwood Publishing Corporation Kant, Immanuel. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens or an Essay on the Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Entire Structure of the Universe Based on Newtonian Principles, 1755, translated by Ian Johnston 1998, revised edition 2008, Richer Resources Publications Kant, Immanuel. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens or an Essay on the Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Entire Structure of the Universe Based on Newtonian Principles, 1755, translated with an introduction by Stanley Jaki. 1981. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press Krafft, Fritz. Analogie - Theodizee - Aktualismus. Wissenschaftshistorische Einfhrung in Kants Kosmogonie, in F. Krafft ed.: I. Kant: Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels. 1971. Munich: Kindler. Krysmanski, Bernd. We See a Ghost: Hogarth's Satire on Methodists and Connoisseurs. 1998. Art Bulletin issue 80 Kuehn. Manfred. Kant. A biography. 2001. Cambridge University Press Oldershaw, Robert L. An Infinite Fractal Cosmos. 2010. Journal of Cosmology, vol 4, 674-677 Palmquist, Stephen. Kant's cosmogony Re-evaluated, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 18:3, September 1987, pp.255269 Ranciere, Jacques. Sentence, Image, history, published in The Future of the Image. 2003. Verso. Translated by Gregory Elliott Rahts, Johannes. Anmerkungen zur Allgemeinen Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels. 1902. Kant, Akademie Edition, vol 1. Smith, Justin E.H. Kant on Jokes. 2009. M.S. Montreal Reflection on Art and Aesthetics Workshop Schnfeld, Martin. 2000. The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project. Oxford University Press Schnfeld, Martin. 2008. Kant's Philosophical Development. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/kant-development/ Scotts mind, Clown Generator. http://www.scottsmind.com Van Dijk, Teun A. Pragmatic Connectives. 1979. Journal of Pragmatics 3, North-Holland Publishing Company Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philsophical Investigations. 1953. Basil Blackwell. Translated by Elizabeth Anscombe

Copyright 2012 Mark Julyan