Motion picture actor Ronald Reagan led the Republicans to victory over california's gubernatorial candidate, Pat Brown. In each of the three legislative arenas - congress, state Assembly and the Senate - the g.o.p. Victory was whittled down from 23-15 to 20-18.
Motion picture actor Ronald Reagan led the Republicans to victory over california's gubernatorial candidate, Pat Brown. In each of the three legislative arenas - congress, state Assembly and the Senate - the g.o.p. Victory was whittled down from 23-15 to 20-18.
Motion picture actor Ronald Reagan led the Republicans to victory over california's gubernatorial candidate, Pat Brown. In each of the three legislative arenas - congress, state Assembly and the Senate - the g.o.p. Victory was whittled down from 23-15 to 20-18.
TIe 1966 EIeclion in CaIiJovnia AulIov|s) Tollon J. Andevson and Eugene C. Lee Bevieved vovI|s) Souvce TIe Weslevn FoIilicaI QuavlevI, VoI. 20, No. 2, Favl 2 |Jun., 1967), pp. 535-554 FuIIisIed I University of Utah on IeIaIJ oJ lIe Western Political Science Association SlaIIe UBL http://www.jstor.org/stable/446081 . Accessed 05/04/2012 1026 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. University of Utah and Western Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Western Political Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA TOTTON J. ANDERSON, University of Southern California and EUGENE C. LEE, University of California, Berkeley IN AN ELECTION which brought about the consolidation of the normally con- servative forces in both major parties, motion picture actor Ronald Reagan led the Republicans to victory over Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, seeking his third successive gubernatorial term of office.' Close to "sweep proportions," the dimension of the Republicans' success was indeed impressive, encompassing the following: five of the six partisan, statewide offices (all but the attorney-generalship) ; 5 new Senate seats, narrowing Democratic control 21 to 19; 7 additional Assembly seats cutting the opposition majority 42 to 38; and a whittling of the Democratic ascendency in the congressional delegation from 23-15 to 20-18. (The results are summarized in Table 1.) Further indicating the extent of the G.O.P. victory was the fact that in each of the three legislative arenas - Congress, state Senate, Assembly - the com- bined Republican vote was greater than the Democratic, a feat not accomplished since 1952.2 Of equal or perhaps more lasting historical significance was the impact of the 1965 reapportionment of legislative districts under the Supreme Court ruling of "one man, one vote." For the first time since becoming a state the balance of political power in the California legislature has been relocated from northern to southern California. The eight southern counties from Santa Barbara to San Diego now control more Senate and Assembly seats than the fifty remaining counties in the state. Moreover, four of the six partisan statewide elected officers are from the southland: 1NOTE: For the last two gubernatorial elections see: Totton J. Anderson, "The 1958 Election in California," Western Political Quarterly, 12 (March 1959), 276-300; and Totton J. Anderson and Eugene C. Lee, "The 1962 Election in California," ibid., 16 (June 1963), 396-420. 2 California party balance, 1948-1966 -Democratic percentage of two-party registration and vote for major offices: VOTE FOR Year Registration President Governor U.S. Senate Congress* Assembly* 1948 ................. 60.2 52.6t 46.6 40.2 1950 .................. 61.2 35.1 40.8 45.8 43.0 1952 ............- .. 57.3 43.1 $ 46.0 32.4 1954 .................. 57.4 43.2 46.1 51.5 49.0 1956 .................. 57.4 44.4 45.8 52.4 53.4 1958 .................. 59.2 59.8 57.1 60.0 58.9 1960 .................. 59.5 49.7 53.9 54.0 1962 .............. 58.8 52.6 43.5 51.8 53.9 1964 .................. 59.8 59.2 48.5 52.9 53.6 1966 .................. 58.5 42.3 46.8 46.3 * These figures are based on the total of Democratic plus Republican candidates' votes. In the earlier years, when a large proportion of legislators took their seats without a contest, the congressional and assembly totals are not as meaningful, since they include many voters who ratified the election of successful cross-filers, mostly Republican incumbents. t Truman plus Wallace. : Knowland won by cross-filing. 535 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY the governor, lieutenant governor, controller, and treasurer. Election of the Senate on a popular vote basis has given Los Angeles fourteen and one-third senators, whereas the county had previously been represented by a single individual. This shift of the center of political gravity to southern California confirms the transposition of popular voting strength in the region into political reality. During the twenty-two years since World War II, the population of the state has increased 130 per cent, from 8.3 million to 19.3 million, the preponderant portion of this incre- ment settling in the eight counties of the southland. Since most of the historic issues which have divided the state geographically have been resolved, the evaluation of the full significance of this change must await future developments. A summation of the causes for the Republican success must account for a change in the temper of an electorate which firmly endorsed Democratic incumbency and the status quo in 1962. The key to the fact that the public was deeply disturbed and contemplating the possibility of a change was the size of the "undecided" vote which may have ultimately determined the outcome of the election. The resolution of indecision for the Republican who had abandoned his party after the Goldwater debacle of 1964 was to return to the fold when the Democrats failed in their attempt to stigmatize Reagan as a prototype of John Birch conservatism. The troubled Democrat, on the other hand, switched his vote after a fratricidal primary fight between Brown and Mayor Samuel Yorty of Los Angeles had proven the Governor to be politically vulnerable. An ineptly managed campaign was further marred by internal dissension resulting from the rivalry for control of the party between TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS, CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS - NOVEMBER 8, 1966 Democratic Total Per Cent of (Includes Democratic Republican Two-Party Others) Registered voters ............................... 4,720,597 3,350,990 58.5 8,340,868 Total vote cast .................................... 3,629,153* 2,808,304* 56.4 6,605,866 Per cent of registered voters........ 76.9 83.8 79.2 Governor vote.................................... 2,749,174 3,742,913 42.3 6,503,445 Per cent of total vote cast .......... 98.4 Congress Total vote ................................. 2,937,862 3,336,943 46.8 6,278,601 Per cent of total vote cast ........ 95.0 Seats won ... ........................ 20 18 Change from 1966 ................... -3 +3 Assembly Total vote ................................ 2,835,177 3,294,210 46.3 6,131,813 Per cent of total vote cast........ 92.8 Seats won .....4....................... 42 38 Change from 1966 ..................... -7 +7 State Senatet Total vote .................................. 2,996,234 3,174,658 48.6 6,184,098 Per cent of total vote cast ...... 93.6 Seats won ................................. 21 19 Change from 1966 ...................... -5 +5 * Based on the January 1967 registration, which closely approximates the actual vote cast in November. t In both Alameda and San Francisco counties, two county-wide senatorial races were held in 1966. The average vote for these elections has been used in these calculations. 536 THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA Brown's supporters and those of Assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh. These surface manifestations of the party change-over are readily ascertainable, but two imponder- able issues certainly lay close to the root-cause of the action: the race problem accentuated by riots in Los Angeles and San Francisco along with the invalida- tion of the Rumford Act mandating the sale of real property to white or Negro alike, and the war in Viet Nam, signalizing the unpopularity of the Johnson Administration. THE PRIMARY ELECTION Several aspects of the 1966 primary were unique. For the first time in many years the Republicans outnumbered Democrats among the new registrants. The total registration of 7,855,102 was the largest in history, although the partisan ratio remained constant at 3:2 Democratic (4,485,777 or 57.1 per cent Democrats to 3,125,884 or 39.8 per cent Republicans). The turnout of 5,079,911 or 64.7 per cent was the highest ever recorded for a gubernatorial primary. When the Democrats swept into office in 1958 the figures were 4,125,124 or 65.7 per cent. As in the past, Republicans substantially outdistanced Democrats in registered primary participa- tion, 71 to 61 per cent.3 For the first time in history a high-speed IBM 1440 computer added votes for the largest field of candidates in any partisan election: 788. Twenty of the fifty- eight counties used either fully or partially automated voting or vote counting sys- tems. Another historic first, in modern times at least, was the contention for 168 of the 170 state and federal partisan offices (neither U.S. Senate seat was at stake). The Democratic Primary Campaign The June 8 primary wherein Brown could muster only 140,128 votes more than the combined opposition of his five Democratic opponents, dramatically revealed the fissures which had developed within the party since the great triumph of 1958. The apparatus of the party had gone untended during the last gubernatorial term: the California Democratic Council had been both alienated and politically ener- vated; quarreling within the party hierarchy had compromised the effectiveness of its leadership; and a renegade Democratic mayor of Los Angeles was permitted to strike a lethal blow at an incumbent governor. The Messiah-like fervor which activated the 40,000 members of the CDC to pre-primary endorsements and registration and get-out-the-vote drives for Adlai Stevenson had long been dissipated. By November 1965 the organization was in debt; the Board of Directors failed in a 29 to 18 vote to impeach its president Simon Casady on a no-confidence vote, and he finally resigned the following February on a censure vote of 1,001 to 859 taken in the state convention. Brown won an endorse- ment of 874 votes to 280, but faced both a heckling and a walkout by 200 delegates in the process. 3 The decline to state, 205,830 or 2.6 per cent, and miscellaneous, 37,611 or 0.5 per cent. The registration figure topped all but that for the 1964 general election of 8,184,143. In 1966 the Republicans gained 225,516 registrants or 7.8 per cent, while the Democrats increased only 207,012 or 4.8 per cent. Los Angeles County registered 1,722,827 Democrats and 1,150,728 Republicans for the primary. 537 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY The struggle between Brown and Speaker Unruh for influence within the party was reflected in the organization down to the precinct level, and Unruh refused to commit himself openly in the Brown-Yorty primary. Mayor Yorty had served briefly in the state Assembly and the Congress, and had twice been defeated (1954 and 1956) in an effort to become the Democratic nominee for the U.S. Senate. In 1964, he contested the "official" Brown-led delegation to the Democratic national conven- tion and received nearly one-third of the votes. In 1960 he alienated party regulars by supporting Richard Nixon, but enhanced his support among conservatives by defeating Representative James Roosevelt for mayor to win a second term in 1965. The Brown-Yorty campaign was personal and vindictive: the mayor strongly inferring that Brown was supported by Communists and lacked understanding of urban affairs, while the governor retaliated by calling Yorty a right-wing "fright peddler" and implying that he had made a mess of city government. Whereas Brown stumped the state, attacking Reagan and Christopher, Yorty allegedly made no over- night trips, remaining in the city and relying heavily upon television to reach the voters. The Yorty showing in the Democratic primary was impressive: he polled 981,088 votes compared to 1,355,262 for Brown; lost Los Angeles County by only 95,748 votes; won conservative Orange County away from Brown by 57,176 votes to 47,564; was particularly effective in the Central Valley, actually winning Kern County; and, significantly, showed strength in several San Francisco Bay Area counties. His candidacy proved that anti-Brown sentiment was both statewide and preponderately conservative. It also gave the mayor an embryonic organization to support a possible third attempt to run for the U.S. Senate in 1968.4 The Republican Primary Campaign Faced with a major task of re-grouping its forces after the disaster of the bitter presidential primary of 1964 which split the party virtually in half (Goldwater 1,120,403 and Rockefeller 1,052,053), and the subsequent loss of the state to Lyndon Johnson, the Republican hierarchy performed a minor political miracle. State chair- man Gaylord G. Parkinson, an obstetrician by profession, acted as mediator between the warring factions. The party organization was reinforced on both state and county levels with experts in administration, finance, research organizational techniques, and candidate sponsorship. The cohesion essential to victory was achieved for several reasons. Two succes- sive gubernatorial defeats created a strong psychological incentive to unite. The Goldwater conservatives were completely discredited in the loss of the state to Lyndon Johnson, while the moderates achieved signal success in electing U.S. Senator George Murphy over Pierre Salinger. Parkinson worked unceasingly to implement 4 The four other Democratic and one Republican incumbents for statewide partisan office led their principal opponents with comfortable margins: Lieutenant Governor Glenn M. Anderson (D) 1,308,735 led Robert H. Finch (R) 1,211,540 in a field of seven candi- dates; Secretary of State Frank M. Jordan (R) 1,626,646 led Norbert A. Schlei (D) 780,709 in a field of nine; Controller Alan Cranston (D) 1,866,771 led Houston I. Flournoy (R) 634,145 in a field of eight; Treasurer Bert A. Betts (D) 1,959,111 led Ivy Baker Priest (R) 1,777,337 and Attorney General Thomas C. Lynch (D) led Spencer William (R) 972,674 in a field of six. In the general election, the named Republicans won all of these offices with the exception of that of attorney general. Incumbent Superin- tendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty (R) won this nonpartisan office by 2,925,401 over his closest competitor, Willard Harper. 538 THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA his eleventh commandment, "Thou shall not speak ill of any Republican." Con- siderable attention was paid to the party auxiliaries, all of which had been captured by Goldwater forces. Finally, in a move reminiscent of the drafting of Eisenhower in 1952, the party recruited an attractive, conservative candidate with virtually no political experience and placed him under the skilled management of one of the most successful political public relations firms in the nation, which created an image of a political moderate acceptable to all. Ronald Reagan had held no political office, was a former president of the Screen Actor's Guild, a registered Democrat until 1962, and state co-chairman for the California Committee for Goldwater-Miller in 1964. Contesting the gubernatorial primary was a former mayor of San Francisco, George Christopher, successful businessman and moderate Republican. Unsuccess- ful as a primary candidate for U.S. senator in 1958, he became the party nominee for lieutenant governor in 1962, but lost to the Democratic incumbent. He served as northern California campaign manager for Rockefeller in 1964. Christopher empha- sized his moderate Republicanism and attacked both Reagan's conservatism and Brown's alleged ineptness. In effect, he tried to capture the moderate Republican vote while trading the conservative Republicans for conservative Democrats. For his part, Reagan either rationalized or ignored his public pronouncements during the Goldwater campaign. He attempted to appeal to all Republicans while winning away at least 25 per cent of the Brown dissidents. Thus his main campaign was waged against Brown; he denied that Birchism was an issue and sought to make a virtue of his alleged "inexperience" in government service, by classing himself as a "citizen politician." A central issue of the primary in the minds of the Republican voters was the question of which candidate could defeat Brown. According to the State Poll, Rea- gan's lead over Christopher began with a substantial margin of 17 per cent in September 1965, but dwindled steadily to 13 per cent in January 1966, to 9 in March and to only 6 on May 1. On May 3 the poll showed that Christopher would have beaten Brown by a greater margin than Reagan (50 versus 46 per cent). Christo- pher's strength represented 30 per cent of the Democratic vote and Reagan's only 23 per cent. Within ten days, syndicated columnist Drew Pearson printed information about supposed altercations that Christopher had had with government authorities regard- ing his dairy business in Marin County more than 26 years ago. Among the charges was a misdemeanor conviction. These disclosures contributed to the reversal of the trend of Christopher's steady advance in the polls, giving Reagan a comfortable 17 per cent lead days before the election. Christopher initially charged the Reagan organization with trying to "destroy" him. Later he alleged that the Democratic hierarchy had conspired to release the politically damaging information to Pearson after having reached the decision that Reagan would be the easier candidate to defeat. Christopher and Pearson exchanged law suits in the millions of dollars. Pre-primary polls indicated that about one-half of the state's G.O.P. registrants classed themselves as "conservatives" and the remaining half as "middle-of-the-road" or "liberal." Of the former group, two-thirds favored Reagan, while an equal pro- 539 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY portion of the moderates favored Christopher. However, the conservative forces appeared more strongly motivated to vote and contained fewer undecided voters than did the moderates, thus accounting for the over-all Reagan edge. Significantly, the polls indicated that Reagan's efforts to portray himself as a moderate were prov- ing successful. Where the California Poll reported Christopher had held an edge of 17 percentage points over Reagan among moderate Republicans in April, this lead had narrowed to just 2 points in mid-May. At the same time, his plurality among conservative Republicans increased from 19 to 27 percentage points. The Reagan trend described by the polls in mid-May was more than confirmed by the election results, the former actor easily defeating the former mayor 1,419,623 to 675,683. The extent of the Reagan victory in the G.O.P. primary demonstrated clearly his appeal to a much broader spectrum of Republicans than was the case with Gold- water in 1964. Whereas Goldwater was able to achieve only a narrow 52 per cent Republican victory over Rockefeller in their 1964 presidential primary race, Reagan swept the 1966 primary with a smashing 63 per cent victory, dominated by near 80 per cent margins in southern California. Only in the Bay Area was former San Francisco mayor Christopher able to obtain a majority, as Reagan captured all but five of the state's 58 counties. While the deep north-south split in the Republican party continued to be demonstrated - Christopher led Reagan in the north - the primary returns indicated an equally significant division among Republicans between the Bay Area and the other northern counties. In 1964, only 4 percentage points had separated the distribution of the Bay Area G.O.P. vote from that of the rest of the northern half of the state, the two sections voting 62 and 58 per cent, respectively, for Rockefeller. But in 1966 the nine Bay Area counties voted nearly 55 per cent for Christopher, while his vote in the remaining northern counties was less than 38 per cent. Although there were distinct differences within regions of the state, a three-fold categorization of Republican voting- Southern California, Central Valley, Bay Area - seemed appropriate fol- lowing the June gubernatorial race. Legislative Results The 1966 legislative primary elections were dominated far less by the statewide races or even party politics than by a quite separate factor, a sweeping reapportion- ment of the California state Senate and, of much less importance, minor changes in the state Assembly. Following an order of the state Supreme Court in mid-1965 calling for reapportionment of the two houses, the legislature met in special session in the fall, finally approving a plan which was signed into law by Governor Brown on October 27, 1965. Ratified by the state Supreme Court in December, the plan returned the state Senate to the strict population basis which had been in effect from 1850 to 1930, reducing the number of senators representing the 50 northern counties from 31 to 18 while increasing southern California representation from 9 to 22. Senate representation for Los Angeles County, hitherto the most underrepre- sented district in the nation, was increased from 1 to 14I/3. Minor adjustments were made in the Assembly, with the main change a reduction in San Francisco's repre- sentation from 5 to 4 seats. 540 THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA The court order required that all 40 Senate seats be contested in 1966, double the usual number. In 20 seats, mostly in the new districts in the southern half of the state, there were no incumbents seeking election. In contrast, in five districts in the north a total of 12 incumbents thrown together by reapportionment competed for their party's nomination. An additional 11 senators found it advantageous to retire from office entirely. Of the 27 Senate incumbents choosing to run, only 3 faced opposition in the primary from other than fellow senators. However, attracted by the large number of "open" seats, a record number of 211 candidates competed in the senatorial primary, nearly four times the usual figure. Included among their number were 19 assemblymen, lured from the lower house by the prospect of a four- year term (assemblymen serve only two years), the added prestige of a "senator," and highly advantageous partisan districting in which they had participated only a few months before. That the "case of the ambitious assemblymen" was a success is suggested by the fact that 16 of the 19 won their primary contests and 14 went on to win Senate seats in the general election. As a consequence of the attempted move of assemblymen to the Senate and the retirement of several others, a total of 29 Assembly seats were without an incumbent in the primary. Here, too, the lure of "open" seats attracted a record number of 385 candidates. In contrast, relatively few incumbents faced opposition from within their own party primary. This pattern was equally true in the congressional pri- maries in which 37 out of 38 incumbents ran for re-election; less than half of the incumbents faced opposition from within their own primary and the number of con- gressional candidates was markedly fewer than in recent years. In sum, the key variable in legislative races in terms of both numbers of candi- dates and contested primaries was the number of incumbents contesting the election. That a decline would occur in intra-party competition in 1968 and 1970 as the "new" incumbents established themselves seemed likely. And that incumbents would rarely be defeated within their own primary seemed equally true. In 1966, the only primary losses suffered by incumbents were in senatorial races contested by other incumbent senators or, in one case, by an assemblyman seeking a senatorial seat. GENERAL ELECTION Registration and Turnout State and national polling data indicating the upsurge in G.O.P. strength dur- ing the campaign were verified by the release of the fall registration figures for the two parties. In recent years Democrats had always outgained the Republicans in the summer registration drive by wide margins, better than two to one in 1964, for example. In 1966, in contrast, the two parties were almost even in the number of new registrants enlisted. In year-to-year comparisons, the Republicans gained some 170,000 new registrants over 1964 while the Democrats lost more than 17,000, dropping a percentage point to the Republicans in the two-party ratios. The total registration for the state of 8,340,868 was the largest in history, exceeding by more than 150,000 the previous high of 1964. While the vote actually cast in 1966 fell below the 1964 figure, the turnout of 6.6 million voters was a new record for a California gubernatorial election. The 79.2 percentage of voters to 541 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY registrants compared favorably with almost identical ratios in 1962 and 1958, while in terms of partisan distribution, the G.O.P. once again demonstrated its superior ability to mobilize its registrants. Eighty-four per cent of registered Republicans voted in 1966 compared to 77 per cent of the Democrats. (In 1962, the comparable figures were 82 and 78 per cent for the Republicans and Democrats, respectively.) Coloring all of the statistics, however, was the fact that more than three million California adults were unregistered, a commentary both on citizen apathy and the need for registration reform. The Republicans The Republicans faced two major problems in planning the strategy of the general election: party unity and management of the gubernatorial candidate. The annihilation of Christopher as a moderate candidate and the size of Reagan's pri- mary vote left no effective grounds for intra-party dissension. A state campaign executive committee was formed headed by two of the most prominent businessmen and party factionalists of the 1964 campaign: Henry Salvatori, wealthy, conserva- tive, proponent for Goldwater; and wealthy, moderate, proponent for Rockefeller, Leonard Firestone.5 Christopher was hesitant personally to endorse Reagan, but many of his key staff members immediately joined the conservative organization. Reagan also won a vote of confidence from every major Republican auxiliary organization. The decision was made early in the campaign not to stir up old party antipathies by inviting former Republican candidates to return to the scene of previous party battles. Reagan visited Gettysburg to receive Eisenhower's blessing, but publicly stated that he would not solicit speaking engagements during the campaign from Richard Nixon or Barry Goldwater. Reagan did unsuccessfully seek U.S. Senator Thomas Kuchel's endorsement. Kuchel had endorsed Christopher and Reagan refused his request publicly to disavow support from the John Birch Society. Thus Kuchel again contributed to his growing alienation from the conservative wing of the party, seriously jeopardizing his prospects for renomination in 1968. The meetings of the state party convention and central committee during the weekend of August 4 offered the first opportunity to test the temper of the party organization as a whole with reference to campaign issues. By instigating a move to modify the statute requiring the election of a new state chairman between the primary and general elections, the Republicans adroitly avoided the kind of fac- tional warfare which plagued the Democrats. Reagan set the guidelines imple- mented by the platform committee headed by conservative Assemblyman Frank Lanterman, bridging the "issue gap" between the various factions of the party. The "extremism issue" was met by the strategy of silence and the racial-discrimina- tion-in-housing issue, imbued with "white backlash" implications, was handled by a demand for "repeal or amendment" of the Rumford Act, which prohibited such discrimination. 'Other members: John A. McCone, Marco Hellman and Arch Monson, former Christopher backers; and Bernard Brennan and M. Philip Davis, leaders in the Goldwater campaign. Conservative members of the party provided the "seed money" to test Reagan's prospects as a candidate. 542 THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA Professional campaign management has become virtually a necessity in Cali- fornia gubernatorial elections and many observers believe that the skillful guidance of Spencer-Roberts and Associates contributed greatly to Reagan's success. The firm participated in all aspects of the campaign with the exception of fund-raising and controlled the organization, schedule, itinerary, and the selection and timing of issues. The campaign was conducted with occasional Hollywood flourishes, but with emphasis on the simplicity and sincerity of the candidate. Spencer-Roberts stead- fastly denied trying to change the Reagan image. Spencer declared that "that king- maker stuff is a lot of bull. In politics you don't change a guy's image and get any- where. If you try . . . and put words in his mouth, people see right through him. A guy has X number of qualities, and you emphasize some and not others, that's all." 6 Whatever the validity of such a political homily, three aspects of Reagan's issue-behavior revealed skillful tactical maneuvering: he did not respond to repeated charges that he was an "extremist" and was appealing to the "white backlash" vote; he settled for variations upon three basic themes; and his positions on key issues moved progressively from the right to the center of the ideological spectrum. Believing that "normally you can't get through more than two or three issues," Spencer-Roberts had Reagan play variations upon "three main ones ... morality; then taxes, spending, that whole ball of wax; and then the eight years of incum- bency." 7 Subthemes on morality included: tax scandals, nepotism, civil rights vio- lations and riots, narcotics and crime control. On taxes and spending: the deficit, welfare-giveaway, home rule for allocation of federal funds and property tax relief. For eight years of incumbency: third term, throw the rascals out, left-wing CDC dominance and so forth. One unplanned issue developed from the question and answer sessions with crowds, "the mess at Berkeley." Reagan thereupon repeatedly promised an investigation to clean up conditions leading to the free speech and filthy speech demonstrations at the University of California. He succeeded in politicizing the problem which led subsequently to the precipitous dismissal of President Clark Kerr by the Regents of the University. The slogan adopted by Reagan for his cam- paign was "The Creative Society." The Democrats The tradition of the Democratic party entering happily into internecine war- fare in the primary, only to emerge united for the general election, was shattered in 1966. The party never regained the unity requisite for a major campaign effort. Yorty refused to endorse Brown and the vicious refrain of his earlier charges echoed throughout the campaign. Some of Unruh's key personnel were loaned to the Brown organization to conduct "get out the vote" campaigns and to serve as liaison between the party and legislative candidates. Unruh himself finally endorsed Brown in the general election but remained out of the state until the last few days of the 6 Walt Anderson, "Dynamic Duo of California Politics," Los Angeles Times West Magazine, December 11, 1966. 7 Ibid. 543 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY campaign, apparently believing that taking the "low road" against Reagan would compromise his own future ambitions. Misadventure seemed to trail Brown throughout the campaign. President Johnson's visit to California, scheduled for the first week in November in conjunc- tion with his trip to Manila, never materialized. Senator Robert Kennedy spoke in various parts of the state, but the citizenry was far more bemused with the famous Kennedy personality than with listening seriously to Brown. The Governor won the endorsement of famous non-constituents such as Harry Truman, the New York Times and even Life magazine, but Reagan won the support of the influential Los Angeles Times and Oakland Tribune. The disjointed and sputtering effort of the Brown organization was no more dramatically displayed than in the sorry handling of the issues of the campaign. Forgetting the old adage "what have you done for me lately," Brown was bewildered when the mere recitation of the accomplishments of his first two administrations was received with monumental indifference. He then tried to identify Reagan with extremism by linkage with the John Birch Society. The innocuous rationalizations of his opponent delivered in the bland Reagan manner deftly parried the charge. Brown then indulged in a jejune gesture of offering to ban the four issues from the campaign which the Republicans found most viable: crime, the courts, the Rum- ford Act and the University of California! By the end of the first week in October the Democrats admitted the failure of the extremism issue and shifted tactics to the "impeachment of the witness," attacking Reagan's qualifications and credibility. Finally in apparent desperation, Brown brought the racism issue into the open, stat- ing that Reagan was "riding the backlash." Conjecture on the reasons for the rather inept performance of the Democrats in the gubernatorial campaign centers upon several circumstances. There was no firm comparable to Spencer-Roberts in charge of the total campaign.8 Baus and Ross with an enviable record of election victories including the Goldwater con- quest of Rockefeller in the 1964 primary was employed only on an "adjunct" basis. Another firm, Harry Lerner and Associates, dealt with some "attack issues" against the opposition. The Democratic organization experienced dissension at the highest echelon of the decision-making process and the personal animosities which developed affected the morale of the entire organization. In addition, a series of events in the administration of public policy over the past several years left a residue of ill-will among both the liberal and conservative wings of the Democratic party which undoubtedly contributed to the defeat. Citi- zens in both camps sensitive to capital punishment criticized Brown vigorously for his many attempts and ultimate failure to save convicted rapist-slayer Caryl Chess- man from execution in 1960. Neither faction was mollified when he signed the Rum- ford Act (anti-discrimination in housing), was forced to use national guardsmen 8 When asked how he would have handled the Brown campaign, Roberts (of Spencer-Roberts) replied: "In the first place I would never have attacked Reagan. ... I would have killed him with kindness, I would have said he's a decent, fine person and no doubt has a future in politics, but maybe he should start at a local level . . . the extremist issue . . . was a mis- take. That's an over-the-hill issue; it worked in '62 and '64 but not in '66. They finally dropped that, but by the time they'd shifted the issue, school was out." Anderson, ibid. 544 THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA to quell a racial uprising in San Francisco in September 1966, and subsequently sponsored a "law and order" Riot Act. Internal party problems plagued Brown during most of his two terms in office: he was unable to deliver the Democratic dele- gation to the Kennedy organization in 1960, fought his legislative leaders in the state Senate and Assembly almost continuously, felt compelled to repudiate the CDC and its position on key issues, carried on a running vendetta with Speaker of the Assembly Jesse Unruh, and seemed incapable of mediating intra-party conflicts or winning the confidence of the Johnson Administration. In short, despite many governmental and administrative accomplishments, he was not politically adept at mobilizing his party's resources. Roughhouse Campaigning California did not have a statewide, bipartisan fair campaign practices com- mittee in this campaign as it has had in recent elections. The Republican state chairman did appoint a party committee with that title to assist in mediating between Republicans during the primary election.9 The exhumation of the ancient misdemeanor charge against Christopher has been widely interpreted as a lethal blow to his candidacy. The story first appeared in two columns of Drew Pearson's, but was perpetuated in anonymous, black- bordered handbills carrying a picture of the candidate and a number across his chest and captioned "Wanted." Some were distributed in envelopes mailed from Sacra- mento containing both Reagan and John Birch literature. Christopher claimed that others were found in Reagan headquarters in Los Angeles and that still more were mailed by Brown's Beverly Hills campaign staff. The net effect of the expose was to place Christopher on the defensive throughout the remainder of the campaign. The Brown forces made a determined effort to pin the John Birch label upon Reagan. In anticipation of the charge Reagan had issued a 500-word statement that he neither supported nor repudiated the organization and that if individual mem- bers of the Society supported him, they accepted his views, but that he did not neces- sarily reciprocate. On August 11 Democratic state chairman Robert L. Coate released a "documentary" of over 20 pages giving "names, dates and places" pur- porting to prove direct collaboration between Reagan, the Society, and its front organizations. The report also alleged that members of the Society were in the Reagan campaign organization and that money had been accepted from "eastern extremists." Reagan was offered a preview of the statement before its release to the press, but declined to join the issue. Brown forwarded a copy to the National Fair Cam- paign Practices Committee requesting an opinion as to whether or not the charges constituted a "smear," as the Republicans claimed. A follow-up on the same theme appeared for distribution in a "campaign kit" released by the California Democratic State Central Committee a month later. Entitled "Ronald Reagan Extremist Collaborator: An Expose," the 13-page docu- ment represented a facsimile of Time magazine. The Foreword claimed that "Ronald 9 The five members of the Republican FCPC, all political sophisticates, were: Dr. Arnold Beck- man, Herbert Hoover Jr., former Assemblyman Casper Weinberger, and businessmen J. S. Fluor and Lee Kaiser. 545 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY Reagan is an extremist's candidate for Governor of California. He is the extremist's collaborator in California. He endorses their projects, promotes their policies, takes their money. He is their 'front man.' Meanwhile, he pretends he is a moderate, middle-of-the-roader. The record belies him. It shows that he has collaborated directly with a score of top leaders of the super-secret John Birch Society." Other forays into the area of questionable practices found Yorty charging that Brown received support from the Communist party, an exchange of charges between Christopher and Brown that each owned bank stock, implying conflict of interest; Brown charging Reagan with bigotry for signing a "Caucasian only" restrictive covenant in 1941, and Reagan reciprocating with the claim that Brown rented a house with a restrictive deed while staying in Los Angeles.10 As a possible significant aftermath of such roughhouse tactics Democratic National Committeeman Eugene L. Wyman disclosed his intent to request a con- gressional investigation of the role of television and radio in election campaigns. California has 33 television channels and 322 radio stations. Television "editorials" endorsing candidates and propositions have become commonplace; radio "talk shows" where persons call a station and engage in discussion with commentators either supporting or attacking a candidate are thriving; prediction of the outcome of an election before the polls close is standard practice on the major networks, and "newscasts" occasionally come perilously close to outright endorsement of a candi- date. Wyman's contention is "that as licensees of the federal government, radio and television stations should not be allowed to use the public airwaves to endorse a candidate for public office." Gubernatorial Results Reagan's 58 per cent vote in his victory over Brown was almost as sweeping as Brown's 60 per cent vote in his win over Knowland had been in 1958. In that year, Brown had carried all but 4 of California's 58 counties. In 1966, Reagan won 55 of the 58. Among the large counties of the state, only Alameda (by less than 2,000 votes) and San Francisco voted for the incumbent Democrat; Brown's percentage vote declined from 1962 by margins ranging from 4 per cent in San Francisco to 16 per cent in Kern. Not since Earl Warren's 65 per cent vote in his victory in 1950 had a Republican candidate for governor demonstrated such strength. Perhaps most noteworthy in the Reagan victory was the blurring of the north- south split which featured the 1964 presidential race. In that year, 10 percentage points separated the vote above and below the Tehachapis. In 1966, the margin was reduced to 5 per cent. Democrat Brown was able to run a close race only in the San Francisco Bay Area, but even there trailed the G.O.P. challenger. The remain- 0 Under Proposition 14 the state and its subdivisions or agencies are enjoined from denying, limiting or abridging the right of an individual to sell, lease or rent his property to anyone he chooses. The Supreme Court held (5-2) that the measure denies equal protection under the 14th Amendment and the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently upheld this decision. 546 THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA ing northern counties, which had provided him with a 64 and 55 per cent vote in 1958 and 1964, respectively, voted only 43 per cent Democratic in 1966.11 Whether the north-south dichotomy, described by these authors in their 1964 study, is undergoing change will require continued and detailed analysis. Perhaps the main example of the split in 1966 was in the vote on the so-called anti-obscenity amendment, Proposition 16. Supported by Reagan and an expensive campaign, the initiative proposition was attacked by other leaders in both parties as unconstitu- tional and unworkable. The marked regional difference in the resulting vote, 53 per cent "no" in the south and 62 per cent "no" in the north, suggests that differences in political culture within the state are very much alive. Polls The likelihood of a Reagan sweep had been suggested by the polls for more than six months preceding the November election. Whereas in January 1966 Brown enjoyed a small lead over Reagan in public preference, this edge was lost by April and never recovered. The polling data conclusively demonstrate Reagan's inroads into Democratic ranks, the key, of course, to Republican victory. While in 1962 Brown had commanded the allegiance of 82 per cent of decided Democratic voters in the last pre-election poll, the comparable figure in 1966 was 73 per cent. Republi- can strength, on the other hand, remained as strongly for Reagan as it had for Nixon in 1962. Undecided voters were substantially higher than in 1962, and of these 72 per cent were Democrats, many of whom apparently voted for the Republican candidate. Analysis of California Poll reports over the past eight years suggests that basic realignments may be taking place within the Democratic party, despite the relative constancy of its 2-1 share of registrants. The data indicate that Governor Brown suffered substantial losses in support among white working people, especially union members, and among lower income and educational groups which had been his chief Democratic percentage of two-party vote for president (1960 and 1964) and governor (1958, 1962, and 1966) - by region 1958-66: Region 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 Northern California San Francisco Bay Area* ..................... 65 52 57 66 49 Other .................................................. 64 51 55 63 43 Total .................... ............. 64 52 56 65 46 Southern California Los Angeles County .......................... 58 50 53 58 43 Othert ........................................ 52 44 45 51 34 Total ........................................ 56 48 50 55 40 California (whole state) ............................ 60 50 53 59 42 *Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma. t Imperial, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, Santa Barbara, and Ventura. 547 TABLE 2 CALIFORNIA REGISTRATION AND VOTE BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT- NOVEMBER 1966 DEMOCRATIC PER CENT OF TWO-PARTY TOTAL Democratic Total Per Cent VOTE FOR Per Cent Vote/Registra- District Number and Location Registration Registration Governor Congress Yes Prop. 14 tion Ratio* North Coast-Mountain 1 North Coastal ............................................. 2 Sierra Nevada ............................................. Total .. .................................... Central Valley 3 Sacramento ................... ........ 4 North Central Valley .................................... 15 San Joaquin-Stanislaus ............................... 16 Fresno-Merced-Madera ............................. 18 Kern-Kings-Tulare ........ ........................ Total ....--.......---- ... ..... ...------- San Francisco Bay 5 San Francisco . .... ........ .................. 6 San Francisco . . ........... ...................... 7 Oakland-Berkeley .............................. 8 Oakland-Alameda-San Leandro .................. 9 Southern Alameda-San Jose ........................ 10 N. & W. Santa Clara ................... ................. 11 San Mateo .................................................... 14 Contra Costa -- ..............-----...............-- Total ........................................... Central Coast 12 N. Central Coast .............. ..................... 13 Santa Barbara-Ventura .............................. Total 285,207 240,175 525,382 273,320 149,603 186,378 216,685 220,421 1,046,407 55.0 60.1 57.4 63.4 63.8 60.9 66.5 62.7 63.5 130,365 241,758 191,038 190,294 216,060 293,942 253,210 239,668 1,756,335 185,469 228,175 413,644 41.1 34.9 39.6 70.9 40.4 51.3 49.1 44.1 41.7 46.2 38.9 44.3 72.4 63.1 63.2 65.6 76.8 51.7 56.5 59.6 61.1 54.5 54.3 54.4 66.8 55.2 59.1 47.3 45.3 42.9 46.3 44.9 49.4 67.5 59.5 57.0 71.4 44.1 60.3 71.3 23.4 64.4 65.4 63.2 30.9 40.6 56.4 48.7 38.5 22.7 37.9 32.5 38.1 28.1 74.7 65.9 70.4 37.8 42.5 39.9 35.2 41.0 40.5 45.6 46.9 41.5 H Cd r i H Q- ?; 77.4 69.1 68.5 69.5 62.0 69.8 30.9 32.3 30.4 38.5 39.0 35.8 36.8 38.3 35.8 92.3 87.5 93.5 72.1 59.0 83.0 81.9 75.3 80.9 70.6 70.0 70.0 41.3 43.6 42.5 o Los Angeles County 17 Southern-Harbor .......................................... 170,588 68.0 41.7 60.8 52.0 61.3 19 Southern-Whittier ........................................ 173,152 63.7 39.3 62.3 52.4 61.7 20 Northern-Pasadena .................................... 226,993 41.3 30.9 26.6 47.2 74.8 21 Central ................................................. 141,453 88.0 85.5 84.8 43.4 97.2 22 Northwest-San Fernando ..............-.............. 222,092 55.6 38.0 53.5 46.3 68.3 23 Central .................................................190,960 65.4 38.1 32.6 51.2 58.3 24 Northeast-Pomona ....................................... 246,798 41.1 26.8 23.7 48.9 65.2 25 Eastern ......................... ................ 175,706 62.2 36.1 47.4 52.2 58.0 H 26 Western-Beverly Hills ................... .......... 221,241 70.3 62.7 62.3 37.3 89.2 27 North Central-Lancaster ......................... 188,827 59.8 39.3 34.7 48.6 65.7 28 Western-Malibu-Palos Verdes ................... 374,226 47.7 37.3 27.7 41.5 78.2 29 Central .......................................... 179,470 65.0 44.4 51.1 50.3 68.3 30 Central ..................................................... 160,623 67.2 58.9 66.4 50.8 87.6 31 West Central .............................................. 211,429 70.0 57.0 63.4 51.5 81.4 32 Southern-Long Beach .............................. 227,958 57.1 36.7 19.9 42.4 64.3 H 0 Total .... .... .... ........... ... 3,111,516 59.6 42.7 44.3 47.2 71.6 z Other Southern California 33 San Bernardino ..... .............................. 259,027 58.0 37.8 46.5 47.9 65.2 34 North Orange ....................... .- .... 307,099 52.9 31.2 55.8 50.9 59.0 35 South Coastal ......................... ...... 332,072 37.4 24.9 26.9 49.7 66.6 36 San Diego ...................... ........... 213,925 49.0 34.8 27.1 42.4 71.0 37 San Diego ........... .... ..................... 172,468 61.1 43.9 61.2 46.1 71.8 38 Riverside-Imperial ....................................... 202,993 54.9 37.2 54.5 52.3 67.8 Total ................................. ....... 1,487,584 51.0 33.6 43.9 48.5 65.9 California ................. .......................8,340,868 58.5 42.3 46.8 43.6 72.3 North ....................... ....... 3,513,593 60.9 45.9 51.3 38.4 75.4 South ...... .................................... .......... . ..... 4,827,275 56.7 39.7 43.6 47.4 70.0 * Democratic Vote/Registration Ratio derived by dividing Democratic per cent of two-party vote for governor by Democratic per cent of two-party registration. Cn ^D THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY source of strength in 1958 and, to a lesser degree, in 1962.12 Whether this decline was at least partially attributable to "white backlash" could not be conclusively demonstrated, but the high relationship between opposition to California's fair housing act and support for G.O.P. candidate Reagan gave credence to the sup- position. The ingredients and implications of the G.O.P. swing can also be seen in a review of the issues found by the pollsters to be of public concern in mid-June 1966. Heading the list were crime, drugs, and juvenile delinquency (selected by 57 per cent of the public as important), racial problems (49 per cent), state taxes and financing state governments (44 per cent), and welfare programs (40 per cent). Significantly, 55 per cent of the survey sample credited newcomer Reagan as the candidate most likely to do a better job of handling the issues which were of importance to them, compared to only 31 per cent who selected Brown. This choice is particularly revealing in the light of a separate California Poll survey conducted in September which indicated overwhelming public agreement (71 per cent) that Reagan's greatest deficiency was his inexperience in government. Apparently, however, this was more than offset in the public's eye by its view of his strong points: 70 per cent of the sample surveyed indicated that the G.O.P. candi- date's personality and speaking ability were among his most outstanding qualities as a candidate, followed by the fact that he represented a new face and new blood (49 per cent), and was honest, sincere, and a man of integrity (33 per cent). In contrast, while 57 per cent of those polled indicated that Brown's experience was a strong point in his favor, only 30 per cent of the total sample (and only 42 per cent of the Democrats) were willing to state that his "good record as Governor" was among his virtues. Offsetting even this modest affirmative support was agreement by 49 per cent of those polled (including 44 per cent of the Democrats) that one of Brown's weakest points was that he had been in office too long. In sum, the polls suggest that while there appeared to be general public agree- ment that the state was facing complex and difficult social and economic issues, there was equal agreement that a new administration - regardless of its lack of experience - should be entrusted with their solution. Candidate Reagan's claim that he was a "citizen" politician, rather than a "professional" appeared to strike a Jacksonian chord in the public's mind. Legislative Results The Republican trend which swept the nation and the state sharply reduced Democratic margins in both the state legislature and the congressional delegation. Five Democratic incumbents in the Assembly, five Democratic state senators and three Democratic congressmen were among the casualties resulting from the G.O.P. 12 Brown's share of preference votes among white voters: 1958 1962 1966 Union members and their family ........................... 78 72 57 Less than high school education ........................... 71 60 53 Lower income ...................... ... ........-.... . ........ ... 71 61 62 Source: California Poll, October 1966. 550 THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA sweep.l3 As a result of reapportionment and G.O.P. gains, the turnover in the California legislature following the 1966 elections was one of the greatest in the state's history. In the Assembly, only 46 incumbents returned to Sacramento at the start of the 1967 session. The pattern in the state Senate was more complicated and more interesting. While 18 incumbents were returned to office in the 40-man chamber, 14 ex-assemblymen were also elected.l4 Significantly, there were more Democrats among this number (9) than there were Democratic incumbent senators. And the 8 Democratic incumbents were also outnumbered by 10 returning Republi- can senators. As the 1967 legislature commenced, it seemed likely that normal pat- terns of organization and leadership in the tradition-bound upper house might become unstrung as the various groups and factions - including the new assembly- men - vied for power. That the Democrats retained power at all could be largely attributed to their skillful drawing of district boundaries in 1961 and in the special session in 1965. As shown in Table 1, the combined Republican votes for each of the three legislative chambers exceeded that of the Democrats. Nevertheless, the pattern of districting results in Democratic margins in all three instances. The lesson is most explicitly seen in Los Angeles County, where the art of districting has been most expertly applied. Of the 14 Senate districts created in 1965, for example, 8 were safely Demo- cratic, 5 safely Republican and only 1 was competitive. The consequence of this pattern is seen in the fact that, while the combined Los Angeles G.O.P. senatorial vote exceeded the Democratic vote by over 50,000 votes, the Democrats won 9 of the 14 seats. In summary, although Republicans were able to make serious inroads into Democratic strength in 1966, the same general pattern of legislative politics described by these authors in earlier studies again prevailed. In all three chambers - Senate, Assembly, House of Representatives - well over half the seats are so heavily regis- tered for one party or the other that general election competition offers little promise of success.'5 Although an occasional Republican can win in a district registered 63 per cent or more Democratic and, on even rarer occasions, a Democrat in a district registered 53 per cent or less Democratic, these are but exceptions to the general rule. As in the national congressional arena, shifts in the party occur in a relatively small number of districts, and the ouster of an incumbent is regarded as noteworthy. Another measure of competitiveness, of course, is the closeness of the contest. Here the distinction between the safe and competitive districts, as defined by registration, was equally as pronounced in the 1966 elections. Of the 51 competitive districts, 13 Four of the five Democratic senators were defeated by Republican senators, thrown into the same district as a result of the 1965 court-ordered reapportionment. 14 One additional development arising out of reapportionment may be an increase in the num- ber of state legislators, particularly in Los Angeles County, seeking congressional office. As a result of the four-year term, a state senator will be able periodically to compete for congressional office without risking his own seat, a tempting opportunity for an ambitious politician. c In 1966, of the 158 legislative districts (38 congressional, 80 assembly and 40 state senate), 50 were in the competitive class (54-62 per cent Democratic). Of these seats, 20 were held by Democrats and 30 by Republicans following the election. In contrast, 61 of the 68 "safe" Democratic seats were held by Democrats, while all but 2 of the 40 G.O.P. districts were represented by Republicans. 551 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 31 (61 per cent) were won by margins of less than 60 per cent. In the 107 safe seats, on the other hand, 41 (38 per cent) involved contests which were this close. FINANCE The stress and strain of party campaign financing seemed more in evidence than usual. The plight of the voluntary party worker was exemplified when Dr. Gaylord B. Parkinson, Republican state chairman, acknowledged receipt of $30,000 from a fund subscribed to by individual Republican donors entitled SCORE, stand- ing for the Select Committee on Research and Education. The fund was raised to help reimburse him for loss of income because his medical practice had been seriously curtailed since he became a party officer. He claimed that sums received from the Republican State Central Committee covered only travel and basic expenses of the position. The difficulty of compliance with the State Elections Code which requires a candidate to pay his bills within 25 days of the election was demonstrated by the Democrats when several affluent members felt obliged to sign a $140,000 note to meet the immediate expenditures of Pierre Salinger in the 1964 campaign and held a dinner a year later to attempt to liquidate a $230,000 deficit. In the middle of March 1966 a mortal blow was struck at one of the prime sources of party funds by an amendment to the federal tax bill which bans deduc- tions by corporations for advertisements in political publications. With their 136- page "Tribute to Governor Edmund G. Brown" souvenir program dispensed at Los Angeles Sports Arena on March 2, the Democrats raised approximately $300,000. Advertising in gold ink was sold at $5,000 a page, while the silver pages brought $2,500 each. Under the new legislation, none of this advertising will be tax deductible. Finally, the candidates as well as the parties became extremely apprehensive when Internal Revenue Service agents appeared in September to scrutinize the books of public relations campaign firms handling hundreds of thousands of dollars for both parties. Besides dinners ranging from $25 to $1,000 a plate, advertising, and large donations from wealthy adherents, several other interesting sources of funds were revealed. A month before the primary, the two state chairmen announced a plan called the California Compact. A non-profit group, the California Good Citizen- ship Committee, was formed and serviced by a professional staff to raise money for both parties. California businesses and industries were furnished plans to organize "in-plant political contribution programs." Employees were to contribute to the party or candidate of their choice with the funds to be dispensed by the employer.16 An in lieu source was revealed by the Democrats when State Controller Alan Cranston was asked to vacate his rent-free campaign headquarters in the Los Angeles Subway Terminal Building. The building is owned by an insurance com- pany headed by Louis Warschaw, whose wife was defeated for the Democratic state chairmanship last summer, allegedly with the assistance of Cranston. 16 The Aerojet-General Corporation, a pioneer in this area, reported that 12,835 of 20,000 employees contributed $82,228 or an average sum of $6.40 apiece to 239 candidates and committees of both major parties. 552 THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA Another interesting source, apparently tapped openly for the first time, were the 300 lobbyists registered with the state legislature. Christopher backers addressed a letter to "Dear Legislative Advocate" asking each recipient to purchase a $100 ticket to a testimonial dinner for the candidate. The suggestion was made that tables would not be reserved for less than ten guests. The lobbyists were told that "Christo- pher, in our opinion, has an excellent chance to become governor." Governor Brown's adherents solicited hundreds of appointees to state boards, commissions, and departmental positions. Telephone callers reading a letter of solicitation by an executive of the campaign organization were followed by mailed contribution forms in quadruplicate. A contribution chart was included suggesting that gifts be scaled according to salary, the steps ranging from a minimum of $100 for those earning less than $12,000 a year to $1,250 or $1,500 for those earning $25,000 to $27,500. It was reported that over 1,000 persons were solicited. California campaigns have attracted out-of-state funds for many years, but the sources and amounts are cloaked in mystery. The Republican state finance chairman in Connecticut, angry over lack of financial support, charged in October that wealthy Republicans in that state had contributed over $400,000 to Reagan, Senator John Tower of Texas and Representative Howard Callaway, candidate for governor in Georgia. Brown charged that Reagan had had out-of-state con- tributors to his primary campaign and implied that many of these "angels" were members of the John Birch Society; the allegation was denied. Whatever the source, Brown reported expenditures of $561,876 in the primary, Reagan $544,199, Christopher $459,586, Patrick $332,140 and Yorty $311,238. Preliminary and incomplete reports on the general election indicated that Reagan's organization spent over $2.6 million and Brown's, over $2.0 million. This may well have been by far the most expensive election in the state's history. CURIOSA Every campaign in California has its quota of bizarre political incongruities. An ultra-rightist movement sponsored by a "Committee for a Responsible California Supreme Court" developed during the campaign to unseat four state Supreme Court justices, three of whom had voted to invalidate a ballot proposition which nullified the Rumford Act (one concurred but was disqualified from voting). The plan was to mobilize the popular majority of over 4.5 million which had supported Proposition 14 in 1964 to vote against ratification of the gubernatorial appointments in the hope that a Reagan victory would bring a conservative majority to the court. The average vote against continuation of the five justice's tenure was 685,762 with a high of 818,033 and a low of 364,051. CONCLUSION In concluding their study of the 1964 election, the authors stated that each party had the potential to win in California in 1966, that each faced internal fac- tionalism composed of ideological differences and the clash of leadership ambitions and that "the victorious party in the 1966 struggle for power would be the first to have resolved these dilemmas successfully." Although it may well be that no Democratic candidate for governor could have survived the national Republican 553 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY trend in 1966, it is clear that the Republican party met this challenge more effec- tively than the Democrats. Yet as one looked forward to 1968 and beyond, it was evident that, despite its impressive gains, the G.O.P. could not rest on its laurels. Confronting the party was the prospect of a bitter primary battle in 1968 for the U.S. Senate seat currently occupied by moderate Republican Thomas Kuchel. In early 1967, an effort to unseat Kuchel was being initiated by Republican backers united behind the prospective candidacy of Max Rafferty, California's vocal, articu- late, and conservative superintendent of public instruction. Equally disturbing to exponents of G.O.P. unity was the potential explosiveness of a contested presidential primary. That national candidates could ignore the Cali- fornia primary, or that a Reagan favorite-son delegation could remain united at a sharply contested convention, seemed doubtful. Memories of the ill-fated California Democratic delegation of 1960 loomed large among thinking Republican politicians, but their course of action was unclear. On the Democratic side, the future was even more uncertain. A relatively non- political attorney general and razor-thin majorities in the state legislature and Con- gress were all that remained of the 1958 landslide which had marked the renaissance of the Democratic party to whom victory had been so long denied. To whom did the party future belong? Speaker Jesse Unruh and Mayor Samuel Yorty were the names most frequently mentioned. Even more likely was the emergence of new personali- ties, related to the Johnson-Kennedy-Humphrey in-fighting already evident in party circles. Only one thing appeared certain in 1967- a fundamental and permanent shift of political power to southern California. Predictions that there would never again be a governor or U.S. senator from above the Tehachapis were no doubt premature. But that the future of California would increasingly be dominated by the decisions of Los Angeles and Orange County voters was the key political fact of life in the Golden State. 554