AMIL VS.

CA It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. Exception: First, an exception to he principle that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel is one wherein the negligence of the latter is so gross that the former was deprived of his day in court, as a result of which he is deprived of property without due process of law. Thus, in Legarda v. Court of Appeals, this Court ordered the restoration to petitioner of her property sold at public auction in satisfaction of a default judgment resulting from the failure of her counsel to submit an answer and his lack of vigilance in protecting her interests in subsequent proceedings before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Secondly, as we have emphasized, trial courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default and granting motions for new trial if the defendant appears to have a meritorious defense. Parties must be given every opportunity to present their sides. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. APEX MINING VS. CA It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client. However, the application of the general rule to a given case should be looked into and adopted according to the surrounding circumstances obtaining. Thus, exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require, and accord relief to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence. If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. [32] Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyers professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to present his side.[33] Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. PEOPLE VS. SEVILLANO We cannot right finish to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client. They lacked vigor and dedication to their work. Atty. Agravante did not explain to the accused the nature of the crime of which he was charged and the consequences of his plea. Atty. Pabalinas, instead of assisting the accused, hastily left the courtroom after obtaining leave while the prosecution was presenting its three (3) witnesses. Resultingly, all three (3) witnesses were never cross-examined. On the other hand, Atty. Saldavia moved for the postponement of the scheduled hearings during which he was supposed to present evidence for the defense; worse, on the last scheduled hearing he submitted the case for decision without presenting evidence. In short, no evidence was ever presented for the defense. And, as if to compound his deficiency with ignorance, Atty. Saldavia relied on his client's plea of guilt in the mistaken belief that it would modify and reduce to reclusion perpetua the imposable penalty of death. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. 26 Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.

GATCHALIAN VS. NALDOZA The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; [17] in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required.[18] Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.[19] It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.[20] Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third

and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to remember the Courts ruling in In re Almacen,[22] which we quote: x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x (emphasis ours) [L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya,[36] the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to an execution, viz.: [E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility. In Obia v. Catimbang,[37] we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the money entrusted to him: The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal profession." Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.

TOLEDO VS. ABALOS We agree with the Commission that respondent may not be disciplined either by the IBP or by this Court for failing to pay her obligation to complainant. Complainants remedy is to file a collection case before a regular court of justice against respondent. The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. We do not, of course, ignore the fact that by virtue of ones membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus submits himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization. However, as the complaint lodged against the respondent in the case at hand did not pertain to an act that she committed in the exercise of her profession, the IBP need not assume jurisdiction to discipline respondent. As the Commission on Bar Discipline correctly suggested, complainants remedy is to file the necessary collection case in court for her to recover the amount respondent owed her. SEBASTIAN VS. CALIS We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution that herein respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. All for material gain. Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. [6] The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. [7] This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.[8] We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9] The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[10] We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.[11]

PENTICOSTES VS. IBAEZ In Daroy v. Legaspi,[1] this court held that (t)he relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature...[thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.[2] Respondents claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts, not in his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, a lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations because a lawyers disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the publics eye.[3] Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.[4]

office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him x x x x.

LIKONG VS. LIM With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision. There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial court of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states: 9. Negotiations with opposite party. A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law. The Code of Professional Responsibility states: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel. Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. BUSIOS VS. RICAFORT It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's [sic] consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Daroy vs. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304).

CO VS. BERNARDINO The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]). As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x x x The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the

Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8). Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without their consent, and by deceiving the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used as a bond which was not required is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. By so doing, he betrays the confidence reposed in him by his clients. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession. His belated payment of the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained do not relieve him from any liability if only to impress upon him that the relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring high degree of fidelity and good faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct (Daroy vs. Legaspi, supra).

VILLAFLOR vs. SARITA The facts and evidence obtaining in this case clearly reveal respondents failure to live up to his duties as a member of the Bar in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath and Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus warranting disciplinary sanction. As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. [16] The highest form of respect to the judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes. Atty. Alvin T. Sarita committed an immeasurable disservice to the judicial system when he openly defied the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. By such act, he deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts. He neglected his duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers,[17] and to act with candor, fairness and good faith to the courts.[18] Moreover, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals was ambiguous in its phraseology, respondent should have carried out the intent and the spirit of the said TRO rather than choose to be narrowly technical in interpreting and implementing the same. In De Leon vs. Torres,[19] this Court said: We desire to call attention to the fact that courts orders, however erroneous they may be, must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system. Not only did respondent disobey the order of the Court of Appeals, he also misled the trial court judge into issuing the order to implement the writ of demolition which led to the destruction of the family home of complainant. In doing so, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Surely, such conduct of respondent is starkly unbecoming of an officer of the court. Respondents behavior also exhibited his reckless and unfeeling attitude towards the complainant. By disobeying the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, he inflicted deep physical and moral injury upon complainant and his family by making them homeless. Obviously, it did not matter to him whether complainant and his family would still have a place to stay as long as he won the case for his client. We would like to emphasize that a lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions

ARRIETA VS. LLOSA As an individual, and even more so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land AT ALL TIMES, to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct AT ALL TIMES, to uphold the integrity of his profession AT ALL TIMES, to promote respect to his profession AT ALL TIMES, and to act with justice AT ALL TIMES. As a lawyer, respondent breached his professional responsibility by certifying under oath an instrument fully knowing that some of the signatories thereto were long dead. X X X If indeed respondent had taken steps to verify the identities of the signatories, he would have easily known that the signatures were fake as they purported to be those of his former clients. Respondents act of certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, they being his former clients, constitutes misconduct. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantial public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.6 A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.

against the other party.[20] Respondent failed to live up to this expectation. COMELEC vs. NOYNAY If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA. Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision. Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[14] mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. FERNANDEZ vs. GRECIA On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that: Canon 1. . . . Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of justice." By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding respect and dignity. 4 He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled. Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites. 5 The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a "sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "I do" with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage. But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is that what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

MIJARES vs. VILLALUZ

deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers. 7

Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases: a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;

ORCINO vs. GASPAR The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause.[13] The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted.[14] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. [15] He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.[16] A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause.[17] Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. x x x." b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules; c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client; d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively; e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement; f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and g) Other similar cases." Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. [21] Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require.[22] He must still appear on the date of hearing [23] for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. [24]

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.[18] In the instant case, complainant did not give her written consent to respondent's withdrawal. The court thus ordered respondent to secure this consent. Respondent allegedly informed the court that complainant had become hostile and refused to sign his motion.[19] He, however, did not file an application with the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw. Granting that respondent's motion without complainant's consent was an application for withdrawal with the court, we find that this reason is insufficient to justify his withdrawal from the case. Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the xxx confidence" between them and that there had been "serious diffferences between them relating to the manner of private prosecution." [20] Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.