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GACAYAN
PART I DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
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1. Define: a. Political Lawis that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory. (PEOPLE VS. PERFECTO, 43 Phil. 887) b. Constitutional Law c. Constitution d. Administrative Law e. Law of Public Officers f. Law on Public Corporations g. Election Law h. Distinction between Political Law and Constitutional Law 2. Read: MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77 JUDGE
the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not selfexecuting. But a provision, which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 4. Kinds of Constitution
The provision in the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges, justices, etc., (public officers) from engaging in business within the territorial jurisdiction of their courts is political in nature and therefore, said provision was deemed abrogated when there was a change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States at the turn of the century. Political laws are deemed abrogated if there is a change of sovereignty and unless re-enacted under the new sovereign, the same is without force and effect. 3. The Supremacy of the Constitution Read: 1. MUTUC VS. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228 2. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to
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only when approved by a majority of the votes cast during the plebiscite, not by the votes of the Members of Congress. 2. Read: R.A. 6735 Requisites for a valid peoples initiative to amend the Constitution; distinctions between amendment and revision. RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO , together with 6,327,952 registered voters vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160 Carpio, J. Facts: Petitioners filed a Petition for Initiative and Referendum with the COMELEC to amend the 1987 Philippine Constitution, particularly Articles VI and VII to replace the present Presidential-Bicameral system of government to Parliamentary-Unicameral system using Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Petitioners claim that their petition was signed by 6,327,952 million voters all over the country and the same constitutes over 12% of all the registered voters in the entire country and that more than 3% of the registered voters in every legislative district signed the same in accordance with Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. The petition to change the Constitution involves sections 1-7 of Article VI; Sections 1-4 of Article VII and an Article XVII entitled Transitory Provisions. The petitioners prayed with the COMELEC that after due publication of their Petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters ratification: DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL BICAMERAL TO A
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3. WHETHER THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE LAMBINO GROUPS PETITION. H E L D: There petition. is no merit to the
The Lambino group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a peoples initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Groups glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. As such, there is likewise no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This Section provides: Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention vividly explain the meaning of the amendment directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition. Thus: MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. IS THE DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT READY TO BE SHOWN TO THE PEOPLE WHEN THEY ARE ASKED TO SIGN?
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gathering the signatures---that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition a copy of the document containing the proposed amendments and as such, the people signed initiative petition without knowing the actual amendments proposed in the said initiative. Instead , the alleged 6.3 million people who signed the petition had to rely the representations of Atty. Lambino. Clearly, Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation. 2. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress and a Constitutional Convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. This is clear under Section 1 of Art. XVII of the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution under Section 2 of Art. XVIII clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments. The two are distinguished as follows: Revision is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document [Constitution]. It may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
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Revision is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document [Constitution]. It may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one. Amendment of the Constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change or only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect. (SINCO, Vicente, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW) 4. Read: a) MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1 b) GONZALES vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 There is no prohibition for Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution and at the same time call for the convening of a Constitutional Convention to amend the Constitution. The word or in the provision Congress, upon a vote of of all its members; OR [2] A constitutional Convention under Section 1, Art. XVII also means AND. c) TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 Doctrine of Proper Submission means all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or
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d) SANIDAD vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 e) ALMARIO vs. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69 If the question regarding the proposed amendment to the Constitution deals with its necessity, expediency or wisdom, the same is political in nature and beyond the power of the courts to decide. f) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 ACRA 106
PART II PREAMBLE 1. Purpose and Effect of a Preamble. WE, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. 2. AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201 It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. PART III ARTICLE I - THE NATIONAL TERRITORY Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine Archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. 1. What is the most significant change in this Article, compared with those of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions?
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COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA, 42 SCRA 23 each: d. Elements of a state. Define 1. 2. 3. 4. people territory sovereignty government
e. Different meanings of the word people as used in the constitution: 1. as inhabitants (Art. XIII, Sec. 1; Art. III, Sec. 2); 2. as citizens (Preamble; Art. II, Sec. 1 & 4; Art. III, Sec. 7); 4) 3. as voters (Art. VII, Sec.
seas
f. presidential & parliamentary forms of government Read: 1. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108 SCRA 757 The government of the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution is essentially presidential with parliamentary features. 2. LEGASPI VS. FINANCE, 115 SCRA 418 SEC. OF
The form of government is essentially parliamentary with presidential features. g. Two-fold function of the government. Read: 1)BACANI VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468 (Ministrant [merely directory] and Constituent [Mandatory] Functions)
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. a. The basic principles underlying the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
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occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. c. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments. "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals
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valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that wellknown principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing the socalled Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.) l. Sovereignty: 1. legal 2. political m. The doctrine of sovereignty as auto-limitation? Read:
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refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. 2. PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476 3. COMMISSIONER VS. ROBERTSON, 143 SCRA 397 2. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national police, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity among all nations. a. difference between aggressive & defensive war b. Read: 1) MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70 OF
The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a generally accepted principle of international law. As such, it should be applied to illegal aliens like the petitioner so that it would be a violation of the said international law to detain him for an unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing to take him. "The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this
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full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372): 3) SALONGA VS. HERMOSO, 97 SCRA 121 4) AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195 The Geneva Convention on Road Signs and Signals, is also considered part of the law of the Philippines since the same is a generally accepted principle of international law in accordance with the Incorporation clause of the Constitution. 5) REYES VS. BAGATSING,125 SCRA 553 Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it finds support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of
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5. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. 6. Section 6. The separation of church and State shall be inviolable. Read: 1) PAMIL VS. TELERON, 86 SCRA 413 2) GERMAN VS. BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514 (NOTE: Read the dissenting opinions in both cases) 3) Other provisions: Other provisions on church & state:
3. Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times supreme over the military. The armed forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. See also: Art. VII, Sec. 18 Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (2) Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4) 4. Section 4. The prime duty of the government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal and military service. Read: 1. PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, 66 Phil. 13 The appellants argument that he does not want to join the armed forces because he does not want to kill or be killed and that he has no military inclination is not acceptable because it is his obligation to join the armed forces in connection with the defense of the State provision of the Constitution. 2. PEOPLE VS. MANAYAO, 78 Phil. 721 3. PD1706, August 8, 1980
2. ART.
VI, Sec. 28 (3). Charitable institutions, churches, mosques, nonprofit cemeteriesactually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, for the benefit, directly or indirectly, for the use,
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services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.. 10. The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. 11. The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. a. Read together with entire provisions of Article XIII
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9. Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support the support of the government.
7. Sections 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination, 8. Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. 1. meaning of "nuclear-free" Philippines; 2. . Art. XVIII, Secs. 4 & 25 9. Sections 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
NOTE: Father Bernas opines that this provision does not take a stand on divorce. As such, a Divorce Law to be passed by Congress may or may not be unconstitutional. But definitely, a law allowing abortion , other than therapeutic, is unconstitutional. 1. Read together with the entire provisions of Article XV. 2. Read: a) GINSBERG VS. NEW YORK, 390 US 629 (1969) A law prohibiting the sale of girlie magazines [bold?) is constitutional and does not violate the above provision. This is so because parents could buy said magazines for their children if they believe the same is already suitable to the understanding of their child. This is in accordance with this provision which states that the parents have the
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and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote human liberation and development. Read together with Article XIV Read : VILLEGAS VS. SUBIDO, 109 SCRA 1 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, July 30, 1993; In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "intergenerational responsibility" and "intergenerational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." The minors-petitioners have the personality to sue since the case deals with the timber licensing agreements entered into by the government which if not stopped would be prejudicial to their future. This is so because the DENR holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations the natural resources of the country. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
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Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are selfexecuting and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and farreaching in nature even to be hinted at here. 12. Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
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COCONUT AUTHORITY, 286 SCRA 109 Mendoza, J. The Philippine Constitutions, starting from the 1935 document, HAVE REPUDIATED laissez faire (or the doctrine of free enterprise) as an economic principle, and although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art. XII, Sections 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.
See Art. XII 14. Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments. a. Do we practice the free enterprise system in the Philippines or is it the welfare state concept? Distinguish the two. b. Read: ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (Note: Read the separate opinion of former Chief Justice ENRIQUE FERNANDO only) The Philippines never practiced the free enterprise system. It is the welfare-state concept which is being followed as shown by the constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to labor (NOTE, however, that the 1987 Constitution have provisions which provide for free enterprise) PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS. PHILIPPINE 15. Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform. a. Read together with Secs. 4-10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution b. Read PD 27 - as to the extent of land reform under the MARCOS regime c. Read RA 3844 & 6389, as amended - THE CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORMS OF THE PHILIPPINES (Read the policy of the state on this matter) d .Read the COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM LAW, RA No. 6657 as signed into law by the President on June 7, 1988. e. Read: Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, July 14, 1989 16. Sections 22. The State recognizes and promotes the right
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as amended by RA 3047, PD 77 and BP 195.. b. PD 749, July 18, 1975, which grants immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery other than graft cases against public officers. c. RA 1379. Forfeiture in favor of the State any property found to have been illegally acquired by a public officer or employee. 21. Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
17. Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. 17-a. Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building. 18. Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. a. Define "autonomy" b. See Art. X Read the 1991 New Local Government Code and enumerate its provisions evidencing "autonomy" to local government units. 19. Section 26. The State guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. 20. Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. To be discussed under Article XI. a. Please see RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Public disclosure of government transactions CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),1[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as
Annex E of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
1[4]
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commitment.3[7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,4 [8] approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. All were disregarded by the petitioners.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGGs nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure
3[7]
No. 174318.
No. 174318.
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The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v. 5[15] Daugherty, cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.6[16] In those earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate.
In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function, thus: Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
I S S U E:
Is Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution? Is its implementation wherein the petitioners are exempt from appearing in investigations involving their transactions violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution?
Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1, which limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding provides:
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public
5[15]
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The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.7[24]
as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x. x x x
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and nonaccountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea,8[25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution which mandates that Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Read together with Section 7, Article III and Sec. 20, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. PART V ARTICLE VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding
7[24]
Public Officers and Election Law, p. 2. No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 558.
8[25]
1. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by
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a. Define legislative power - Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power: 1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws 2. principle of separation of powers 3. non-delegability of legislative powers - reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablable laws - Separation of Powers Read: a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139 b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62 c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178 d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106 e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991 f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 b. Nature of legislative power
2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government. - Other exceptions: traditional 3) Delegation to local governments The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is deemed to know better the needs of the people therein. a. X aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660 bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56 A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary of probation officers in their area is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws. In areas where there is a probation officer because the local government unit appropriated an amount for his salaries, convicts may avail of probation while in places where no funds were set aside for probation officers, convicts therein could not apply for probation. d. Reason for the delegation 4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies 5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution and Section 32, Article VI---The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the b. Read: See Section 5 of Article
c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to the legislature? d. Explain the doctrine of nondelegation power. e. Permissive delegation of legislative power. 1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President in case of war or other national emergency, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
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Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having
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Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President: ... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of
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charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows: The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows: That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence. The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919. The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GovernorGeneral to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
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the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the GovernorGeneral to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in
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5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757 (Affecting National interest) 6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989 Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasijudicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process. Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the
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exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit: It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasijudicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categorical classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus: Moreover, although the rulemaking power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of factbased upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid
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5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328 6. US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327 7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270 h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII. i. Classify the membership of the legislative department. Differentiate their qualifications, elections/selections and as to the participation of the Commission on Appointments in order to validate their membership. j. selection Manner of election and
1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 2. Sections 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided for by law. 3. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding the day of the election.
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Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25 years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election. Read: 1. ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545 Rep. Act No. 2630
Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine Citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United states, acquired US citizenship, MAY REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY TAKING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND REGISTERING THE SAME WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY IN THE PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR LAST RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES. The said Oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. 2. Section 2, Article IV, Philippine Constitution 1987
Section 2. Natural born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine Citizenship in accordance with par. 3* , Section 1 shall be deemed natural born citizens.
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
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Are the votes of Mark Jimenez stray votes and should not be counted? Whether the petitioner as second places should be proclaimed winner since the winner was disqualified? Held: 1. There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate in order that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered stray. This final judgment must be rendered BEFORE THE ELECTION. This was the ruling in the case of CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA. Hence, when a candidate has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day he was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The reason behind this is that the people voted for him bona fide and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. 2. The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the second placer to be declared the winner. The said principle was laid down as early as 1912 and reiterated in the cases of LABO VS. COMELEC, ABELLA VS. COMELEC and DOMINO VS. COMELEC. Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of 3 years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election. No member of the House of Representative shall serve for a period of more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
4.
As a result of said disqualification of Jimenez, the petitioner claimed that all the votes cast for the former should not be counted and since he garnered the second highest number of votes, he should be declared winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of manila. Issues:
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a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress? P204,000.00 [P17,000.00 per month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. The Presidents salary is P300,000.00 per annum, while the VP, Speaker, Senate President and Chief Justice is P240,000.00 per annum. The Chairman of the Constitutional Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and the members, P180,000.00 per annum. b. Read: 1. Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President; P240,000.00 for VP, Senate President; Speaker; Chief Justice; P204,000.00 for Senators, Representatives, Chairmen of CC; P180,000.00 for members of the Constitutional Commissions) 2. PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479; 3. LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823 6. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. a. Privilege from arrest Read: Martinez vs. Morfe,
5. Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of representatives approving such increase.
Read: 1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863 2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876 7. Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
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personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Read: 1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39 2) PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31 What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. So a member of Congress who is a stockholder of the corporation involved in a case is not allowed to appear under the guise that he is appearing as such, not as counsel for the corporation.
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place than that which the 2 Houses shall be sitting. Read: 1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for reconsideration dated March 14, 1949 2) Disciplinary measures on erring members Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863 3) journal Dual purpose for keeping a
4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive over the other? Read: U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729 The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of newspaper journalists and reporters as to what the proceedings all about. b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1 CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347 The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that it is urea formaldehyde is the one exempt from tax, and not urea and formaldehyde which appears in the journal which was really approved, the former prevails and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION. d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131 e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714 (NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all matters required to be entered in the journals, like yeas and nays on the final reading of a bill or on any question at the request of 1/5 of the members present. ) 5) Differentiate a "regular" from a "special" session.
-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be suspended by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 13 of RA 3019. This preventive suspension applies to all public officials, including members of Congress. Otherwise, the same will be considered class legislation if Senators and Congressmen who commit the same is exempt from the preventive suspension imposed therein. Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended by the Congress itself. [4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one fifth of the members present, be entered in the journal. Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings. [Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
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1. RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989 If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress is substantial so as to dramatically decrease the membership of one party while reducing the other, the number of representatives of the different parties in the Commission on Appointments may also be changed in proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the Senators was only temporary so as not to result in the change of membership in the Commission on Appointments) 2. GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992 Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, in addition to the Senate President as the head thereof, every two (2) Senators are entitled to one (1) representative in the Commission. Parties, however, are not allowed to round off their members, I.e., 7 Senators are entitled to 3 representatives in the Commission on Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is only 3.5. Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requires that there must be 24 members of the Commission. If the different parties do not coalesce, then the possibility that the total number of Senators in the CA is less than 12 is indeed a reality. (Example: Lakas---13 Senators; LDP---11 Senators. In this case, Lakas is entitled to 6 members in the CA (13/2= 6.5) while LBP would have 5 members (11/2= 5.5) 3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of the October 20, 1992 Decision) To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.
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In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005; (2)
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to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week. Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter from the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured. On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464, ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows: SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between coequal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. (a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez,
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1. Conversations and
correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002); 2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998). 3. Information between intergovernment agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); 4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); 5. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002). (b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:
1. Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; 2. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; 3. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; 4. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
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2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and 3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. H E L D: Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are present is in order. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.11 Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin12 and Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,13 respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.14 The Supreme Court, however, held that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,
11
12 13 14
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 133. G.R. No. 67752, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 657. G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987 (res). Rollo (G.R. No. 169777), p. 117.
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is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.17 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is coextensive with the power to legislate.18 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the
17
Supra at 45, citing McGrain v. Daugherty 273 US 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 (1927). Id. at 46.
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conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.20 In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
20
Supra.
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The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. 2 E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information on matters of public concern. There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces
21
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issuance before it was implemented. This is clear from the doctrine laid down in the case of TANADA VS. TUVERA. WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, are declared VOID. Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Nov. 20, 1991 This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations. Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process. The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 1Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
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made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious. The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows: It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held : ... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of
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We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution. Investigation in aid Executive Privilege of legislation;
ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. (En Banc) THE FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate. At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear
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dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The pertinent portion of the letter reads: With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project, including his conversation with the President thereon last 26 September 2007. Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006). Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege on the following questions, to wit:
a) Whether
the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe? Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.
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In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) nonappearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioners request that he be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing. On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007. Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. The said Order states: ORDER For failure to appear and testify in the Committees hearing on Tuesday, September 18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him, which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is
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discussions meant to explore options in making policy decisions. According to him, these discussions dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the countrys diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita27[10] and United States v. Reynolds.28[11] Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made to him in official confidence under Section 729[12] of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 2430[13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
488 SCRA 1 (2006). 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 29[12] Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either: (1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or (2) To prejudice the public interest. 30[13] SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases. (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure.
27 28 [11]
[10]
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Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public concern) Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust) Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed) and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers? 2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege? 3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of petitioner for noncompliance with the subpoena? H E L D: At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit: First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order? There is merit in the petition. At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. 31[18] Ermita becomes imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
31 [18]
Supra.
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information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. I The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded. The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.34[21] Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.35[22] This directs us to the consideration of the question -- is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464? A- There is a Recognized Claim of Executive Privilege Despite the Revocation of E.O. 464
34 [21]
Ibid. Ibid.
87 Phil 32 (1950)
35 [22]
58.
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presidential communications as presumptively privileged. Apparently, the presumption is founded on the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. In In Re: Sealed Case,43[30] the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. The latter includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decisionmaking of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones44[31] As a consequence, congressional or judicial
In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997. 44[31] Id.
43[30]
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commander-in-chief,48[40] appointing,49 [41] pardoning,50[42] and diplomatic51[43] powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit: 1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. 2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.52[44]
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v. PCGG46[38], this Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. In Chavez v. PEA,47[39] there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed. As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments at pp. 18-19. [38] 46 360 Phil. 133 (1998). 47[39] Supra.
45[32]
3)
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence
48 [40]
VII.
49 [41]
VII.
50 [42]
VII. Section 20 and 21, Article VII. 52[44] CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law Practice and Recent Developments, supra..
51 [43]
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sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,54[46] where it was held that presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch.55[47] Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted. Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v. Nixon56[48] that demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality. However, the present cases distinction with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon,
54 [46]
55[47] 56 [48]
159 U.S. App. DC. 58, 487 F. 2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) Supra.
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limitation. provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,58[51] Article 22959[52] of the
58[51]
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x ( c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either: (1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or (2) To prejudice the public interest. 59[52] Article 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. Any public officer who shall reveal any secret known to him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he may have charge and which should not be published, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos if the revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall have caused serious damage to the public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
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More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the peoples right to information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executivelegislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases. B- The Claim of Privilege is Properly Invoked Executive
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date. 61[54] Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communications. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following case: x x x (a) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. 62[55] In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra., the Supreme Court recognized matters which the Court has long considered as confidential such as information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused. It also stated that presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during close-door cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court or other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as confidential. Such information cannot be pried-open by a co-equal branch of government.
[53]
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Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, 66[59] the Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department. II Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3) questions he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautistas letter, stating that his nonappearance was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons why his conversations with President Arroyo are covered by executive privilege. Both correspondences include an expression of his willingness to testify again, provided he be furnished in advance copies of the questions. Without responding to his request for advance list of questions, respondent Committees issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate SergeantAt-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion
66 [59]
supra..
64 [57]
65[58]
Unites States v. Article of Drug, 43 F.R.D. at 190. Senate v. Ermita, supra., p. 63.
Id., citing U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 S. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727, 32 A.L. R. 2d 382 (1953).
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Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008. Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. We quote the OSGs explanation: The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention. A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions
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considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Courts mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law. The respondents-Committees were therefore stopped from calling the petitioner and ask the three(3) questions mentioned above in connection with his conversations with the President being covered by the executive privilege rule. Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Right to Privacy; Public disclosure of government transactions; right to information on matters of public concern; right against self-incrimination; CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),69[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000, 344 SCRA 519.
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Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified. Ranged against it is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.71[7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order72[13] directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees members.
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
70[6]
No. 174318.
71[7]
The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v. 73[15] Daugherty, cited in Arnault v.
73[15]
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In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function, thus: Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of any of its committee. This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.77[20]
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,78[21] where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. 75 [18] Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.76[19]
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.79[22] It even extends
76[19]
Ed. at p.739.
78[21] 79[22]
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
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Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea,82[25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.81[24]
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x. x x x x x x
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non80[23] 81[24]
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan83[26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.
No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 558.
82[25] 83[26]
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Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 46). It is also the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is necessarily implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 48-49). Furthermore, the respondents assert that an inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient power lines and its effect on the power consumption cost on the part of Dumaguete residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and its committees. 1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power. While the Constitution does not
expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and dignity (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]); Amault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]), in the same way that courts wield an inherent power to "enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice." (Commissioner v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly 35 Phil. 944 950 [1916], and other cases). The exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned for the first time in the leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950]) where this Court held that the legislative body indeed possessed the contempt power. But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26, L.ed., 377.) The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the real of its respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for
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grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be considered as an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local autonomy. Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed these powers in all government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in the legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation. There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. 15. Sections 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the Rules of each
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17. Sections 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. NOTE: In Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Supreme Court held that the E-VAT Law is constitutional even if the same was the VERSION which came from the Senate, not from the House of Representatives. This is so because the Senate is allowed to propose amendments to bills which must exclusively originate from the House of Representatives. 18. Section 25 [1] The Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the President for the operation of the government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. [2 No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. [3] The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. [4] A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the national treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. [5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate,
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LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496
The case questions the law entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court." It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire
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creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a twopronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twentyone barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790. 5) ALALAYAN VS. NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172 6) CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO, 6 SCRA 418 7) TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330 18. Section 27. [1] Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such consideration , 2/3 of all the members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
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We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto: The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriation. A careful review of the legislative action on the budget as submitted shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as recommended by the President, as well as those of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An unwanted consequence of this provision is the inability of the President, the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services and infrastructure projects. I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the President to use savings to augment any item of appropriations in the Executive Branch of the Government. The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY'89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY'90), is unconstitutional and without effect.
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concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared "that an 'item' of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill." It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]). The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
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general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation ... cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing "items" of expenditure essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location ot a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a coequal branch of government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine ... We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as items for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills. Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached, the veto power does not carry with it the power to strike them out, citing Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In other words, their theory is that Section 55 (FY'89) and Section 16 (FY'90) are such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the veto power.
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Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[l], supra). But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners' argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to override" (citing Bolinao) has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld. e. BENGZON VS. DRILON, April 15, 1992
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that: There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch
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the purpose of which is to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]). As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Through the years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better benefits. P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the lump sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances each Justice was receiving on the date of his resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4, 1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which should include the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree was receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices, supra) The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly favored is, again, a misimpression. Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens of thousands while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70 while military men
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treatment" to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on retirement benefits of Justices. One last point. The Office of the Solicitor General argues that: . . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds, raised from taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are already leading private lives and have ceased performing public service. Said the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: "To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law . . ." (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16) The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are unbecoming of an office whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in the law. Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia Muoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may no longer be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who represent the government before the two courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared before these retirees, should show some continuing esteem and good manners toward these Justices who are now in the evening of their years.
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Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it. For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated. 2) What is a "pocket veto?"
3) What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law? 3. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506 What is the so-called executive impoundment? It means that although an item of appropriation is not vetoed by the
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Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employeddirectly or indirectly for the benefit, use, or support of any sect, denomination, or system of religion except when such preacher, priest is assigned to the AFP, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. All money collected on any tax for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. Read: 1. Garcia vs. Executive Sec., 211 SCRA 219 1-a) PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789 2) PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104 3) APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER, 71 Phil. 547 4) PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331 4) AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201 5) MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987 Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was named outstanding Health Worker for 1980 by the Ministry of Health on January 22, 1981. Being such an awardee, Dr. Perez was granted by the Ministry of Health a two-step salary increase in accordance with the merit increase program as enunciated in Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 562. Thereafter, the Ministry of Health requested the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City, which is paying Dr. Perez' salary in full to appropriate the amount corresponding to the merit increase in its current
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the salary plan provided for in Sec. 8 of the same decree shall cover the City Officer, among other officials, whose salary shall be paid out of city funds and therefore a local government employee whose position does not appear in the list of national government employees defined under another law (P.D. 985). 2. The constitution provides that no money shag be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there is no such appropriation, the Minister of the Budget cannot be compelled to release the amount for the payment of the merit salary increase because such allocation entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of the Minister of the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus. 3. The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as an employee of the national government would have far reaching effects such that all other city health officers and local officials similarly situated would also be so entitled to an personal benefits given to national employee. Dr. Perez's exemplary accomplishment which merited for him the grant to a two-step increase must yield to the overriding economic consideration of availability of funds which the government must set aside for the purpose. We do not agree with the arguments set down by petitioners. Private respondent invites Our attention to the City Charter of San Pablo City (CA #5201, Sec. 87, May 7, 1940) more specifically, Art. IV thereof, which provides that the position of a City Health Officer is not included among the heads of the regular departments of the city but included among the national officials performing municipal functions under the direct control of the Health Minister and not the city mayor as provided for in Art. XIV of the same charter. Such principle is reiterated in the Decentralization Act of 1967 which shows that the appointing authority is the Health Minister and not the local officials. Petitioner Minister of the Budget
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corresponding to his merit increase could be legally disbursed contrary to the unfounded speculations expressed by the petitioners. Lastly, there is no basis in petitioner's allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Respondent Dr. Perez has been proven to be a national government official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the Health Ministry wherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus.
20. Section
30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998) Regalado, J. Section 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides: In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for Certiorari within 10 days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Issue: Is Section constitutional? 27 of RA 6770
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b. May the President refuse to enforce a law on the ground that in his opinion it is unconstitutional? No. Otherwise, he will be violating the doctrine of separation of powers because by doing so, he will be arrogating unto himself the power to interpret the law, not merely to implement it. Read: 1) L.S. MOON & CO. VS. HARRISON, 43 Phil.38 2) GOV'T. VS. SPRINGER, 50 Phil. 529, read also the separate opinion. 3) What is the extent of the executive or administrative orders that may be issued by the President as the Chief Executive, under the Administrative Code of 1987? BLAS OPLE VS. RUBEN TORRES, ET AL. G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 Puno, J. Facts: On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM. The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY . The AO Senator Ople grounds: was on questioned by the following
PART VII ARTICLE VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. 1. a. Define executive power
1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines; 2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the
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formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these informations gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. YET, THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM. AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizens right to privacy. Sections 2. No person shall be elected President unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years o f age on the day of the election, and a resident o f the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election. Section 3. There shall be a Vice President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from Office in the same manner as the President.
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of
Section 5Oath Section 6. ResidenceSalary may not be decreasednot increased until after the expiration of his terms shall not received any other emolument from the government of from any source during their tenure. Section 7. ..shall assume office at the beginning of their terms. P & VP not qualified, the Senate President shall act as President or the Speaker, if SP is not yet qualified.. Congress shall pass a law if the SP & Speaker are not qualified to act as President Section 9. VP is vacant, the President shall nominate from the Senate of HR and who shall become VP upon confirmation of majority vote of the members of the Senate & H of R voting separately. Section 10. In case of vacancy in the office of the President and VP, Congress shall convene on the 3rd day after the vacancy to enact a law calling for special election to be held not later than 60 daysthe law is deemed certified under Section 26, par. 2 of Art. VI and shall become a law upon 3rd reading.. Special elections cannot be postponed but no special election if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the next presidential election. Section 11. When President transmits to Congress his written declaration of inability to perform his duties, the VP shall be acting President until the President transmits another declaration to the contrary. When majority of the members of the cabinet transmit to the Senate President a written declaration that the President is unable to perform his duties, the VP shall act as the President. If the President transmits to the SP his declaration that there is no disability, he shall reassume his post
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1. On 13 November 2000, the Speaker of the House of Representatives transmitted to the Senate the Articles of Impeachment charging petitioner Joseph Estrada with bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The impeachment of petitioner resulted from disclosures made by Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis Chavit Singson in October, 2000 that petitioner had received payments from illegal jueteng operations and excise taxes; The impeachment trial began on 07 December 2000. A highlight of the December 2000 hearings was the testimony of CLARISSA OCAMPO of the Equitable PCI Bank that she witnessed petitioner affixing the signature of JOSE VELARDE on bank documents involving a P500 M investment agreement; 2. On 16 January 2001, the issue of whether or not to open what has been dubbed as the Second Envelope arose before the impeachment court. The envelope allegedly contained proof that petitioner held P3.3 B in a secret bank account under the name JOSE VELARDE. The motion to open the said envelope was struck down by the senator-judges by a vote of 11-10. The public and private prosecutors walked out of the trial to protect the ruling. Hours after the controversial ruling, the public began to rally at the EDSA SHRINE; the rally continued in the following days; 3. On January 17, 2001, the public prosecutors tendered their collective resignation to the Speaker. They also filed a Manifestation of WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE with the Impeachment Court. Thereafter, Senator Roco moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings. Chief Justice Davide granted the same; 4. In the afternoon of 19 January, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the AFP
c. Read: PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION VS. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 453 (The snap presidential election case) 3. Sections 7-12 a. Note the order of succession to the office of the President and Vice President b. Query: Is President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo a de jure or a de facto President? If de jure, how did she succeed? Resignation or permanent disability of former President Estrada? JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and 146738, March 2, 2001 Puno, J [En Banc] F A C T S:
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Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her Proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malacanang Palace, the seat of the Presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless country and beloved people. Mabuhay (Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada 7. Petitioner also sent copies of the following letter to the Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives on 20 January 2001. The copy for the House Speaker was sent at 8:30 a.m.. Another copy was transmitted to the Senate President and received only at 9:00 p.m. Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Art. VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be Acting President. (Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada 8. Prior to the events of January, 2001, 6 cases had been filed our
by Chief Justice Davide as the 14th President of the Republic of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family left Malacanang Palace. Petitioner issued the following statement:
At 12 oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
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particular
The 1987 Constitution narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of the court, not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. IN support of the contention that the cases involve political questions, the respondents cited the cases of LAWYER' LEAGE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON AQUINO, May 22, 1986 and related cases. The court pointed out that in those cases, it held that the government of President Aquino was the result of a successful but peaceful revolution by the Filipino people. The Freedom Constitution itself declared that the Aquino government was installed through the direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. IN contrast, the Arroyo government is not revolutionary in character. The oath of President Arroyo took at the EDSA Shrine is an oath under the 1987 Constitution where she swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. The EDSA 1 that installed President Aquino and EDSA II which installed Arroyo are different because the first involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the Office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to
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b.
c.
e.
f.
even at that time since his term is supposed to be up to 2004; Estrada did not object to the suggestion that he consider a dignified exit and that he be allowed to go abroad with enough funds; Estradas statement that he was guaranteed by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes that he would be given a 5-day grace period in the palace which shows that he had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign; During the negotiations between the Estrada and Arroyo groups in the early morning of January 20, 2001, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a fact; During the 1st round of negotiations, Estrada said Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, intriga. The court held that this was a high grade evidence that he had resigned. The SC held that ayoko na are words of resignation. The Presidents act of leaving the palace on January 20, 2001 confirmed his resignation. Petitioners press release, his final act and farewell, acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President, his reservation about its legality. He said he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and order. He did not say that he was leaving as a result of a disability and was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability appears III
NO. The court held that the petitioner has in fact resigned and his claim of inability was laid to rest by Congress. The decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President, made by a co-equal branch of the government, cannot be reviewed by the Court. Both Houses of Congress had recognized that Arroyo is the President when they passed Resolution
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520 US 681, the US Supreme Court held that the presidents immunity from suits for money damages arising out of official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. Finally, the constitutional provision that a public office is a public trust would be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a nonsitting President enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency. V NO. The SC held that the evidence presented by the petitioner is insufficient for the Court to rule that the preliminary investigation by respondent Desierto be enjoined. The claim of the petitioner, based on news reports, that the Ombudsman had prejudged his case is not sufficient ground to stop the investigation. As held in MARTELINO VS. ALEJANDRO, 32 SCRA 106, to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be an actual prejudice---there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced. The accuracy of the reports cited by the petitioner could not be the subject of judicial notice since the Ombudsman is entitled to the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty. (NOTE: On April 7, 2001, the Motion for Reconsideration of Estrada of the above decision was denied for lack of merit.) 4. Section 13. The President, VP, Members of the Cabinet or their assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.. They shall not during their tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession, participate in any business or be financially interested in any contract withthe government or any government owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
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Read: 1. PUNZALAN VS. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153 2. ADAZA VS. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431 3. Opinion No. 155, Series of 1988 by the Secretary of Justice 4. Executive Order No. 284 5. Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Sec., February 22, 1991 5 Sections 14 Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President within 90 days from his assumption of office. Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (NOTE: Section 9, Article VIII. The President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the submission of the list) Read: 1) AYTONA VS. CASTILLO, 4 SCRA 1 2) PAMANTASAN VS. IAC, 140 SCRA 22 6. Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. a. Read: Temporary Appointments for members of the Cabinet; Ad interim appointments. SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, et al., vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al., 472 SCRA 587 Carpio, J. Facts: 1. On July 26, 2004, Congress commenced its Regular Session. On August 25, 2004, the Commission on appointments was constituted; 2. While Congress was in session, the President issued appointments as Acting Secretaries to the following: a. Arthur Yap to the Department of Agriculture; b. Alberto Romulo to the Department of Foreign affairs; c. Raul Gonzales to the Department of Justice; d. Florencio Abad to the Department of Education; e. Avelino Cruz, Jr. to the Department of National Defense; f. Rene Villa to the Department of Agrarian Reform; g. Joseph Durano to the Department of Tourism; and h. Michael Defensor to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 3. On September 8, 2004, the petitioners questioned said appointments as Acting Secretary as
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VS. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438; ACOP VS. SECRETARY GUINGONA, 383 SCRA 577; VIOLA VS. HON. ALUNAN III, 277 SCRA 409; ALUNAN III VS. MIRASOL, 276 SCRA 501). 2. Only those members of the Commission on Appointments have the personality to sue and not the other petitioners who are not. While it was held in SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 421 SCRA 656 that members of Congress have the personality to sue if the Presidents act has the effect of impairing the powers of Congress, the same is not applicable in this case. This is so because the Commission on Appointments is independent from Congress itself. President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. 3. The temporary appointments are valid. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
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c. Differentiate the status of an appointment made by the President while Congress is in session compared to that when it is in recess. 7. Section 17, The President shall have control of all the executive departments , bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Presidents Control over the executive department; usurpation of legislative powers and infringement on the citizens right to privacy KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006 BAYAN MUNA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006 Carpio, J. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 420 that mandates the Adoption of a Unified, Multi-purpose Identification System by all Government Agencies in the Executive Department. This is so despite the fact that the Supreme Court held in an En Banc decision in 1998 OPLE VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES Administrative Order No. 308[National computerized Identification Reference System] issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos that the same is unconstitutional because a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system, where none existed before. The Supreme Court likewise held that EO 308 as unconstitutional for it violates the citizens right to privacy. Based on the Ople ruling, the petitioners claimed that Proclamation No. 420 is unconstitutional on two (2) grounds: a. usurpation of legislative powers; and b. it infringes on the citizens right to privacy
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constitutional power of control over government entities in the executive department as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. 2. The said Executive Order No. 420 does not violate the citizens right to privacy since it does not require all the citizens to be issued a national ID as what happened in AO 308. Only those dealing or employed with the said government entities who are required to provide the required information for the issuance of the said ID. a. Distinguish the power of control over the power of supervision Read: 1. Santos vs. Exec. Sec., April 10, 1992 1-a. Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., 197 SCRA 771 1-b. Echeche vs. CA, 198 SCRA 577 The act of the Executive Secretary in reversing the decision of the Secretary of the DENR allowing the payment of the backwages of petitioner is considered an act of the President and therefore valid in accordance with the doctrine of qualified political agency. 1-c. Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271 The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave b.
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over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows: Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote: Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote: Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days
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The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ... xxx xxx "Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to xxx
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... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, Commissioner Blas Ople would not. The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the
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be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for the reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision over all local governments" is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged
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of judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon direction of the provincial governor. If the indorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of the provincial governor to investigate the petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the Executive, but the investigation to be conducted by him would not be that which is provided for in sections 2188, 2189 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve" neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office." True, they may involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of age and the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn complaint of the offended spouse. 4 The charges preferred against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of law. 1-e. Carpio vs. Exec. Sec., 206 SCRA 290 1-f. Malayan vs. CA, 213 SCRA 640 6) LACSON-MAGALLANES VS. PANO, 21 SCRA 895
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Justice FERNANDO in the LACSONMAGALLANES VS. PANO CASE) d. Powers which must be exercised personally by the President and could and could not be delegated to any cabinet member? Doctrine of qualified political agency; personality to sue; when the said doctrine does not apply CONSTANTINO and the FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION VS. CUISIA, et al., 472 SCRA 505 Tinga, J. F a c t s: The petition seeks to stop the respondents from executing additional debt-relief contracts or foreign borrowings in connection with the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 and to compel the Secretary of Justice to institute criminal and administrative cases against respondents. The respondents negotiated with the foreign commercial bank creditors a multi-option financing package in connection with the countrys foreign debt. This includes a cash buyback of portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount. The second option allows creditors to convert existing Philippine debt instruments into bonds or securities. Petitioners characterize the Financing Program as beyond the powers of the President under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution. I s s u e s: 1. Do the petitioners have the personality to sue? 2. May the respondents contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines? Stated otherwise, may the President delegate such power to her subordinates?
c. What is the doctrine of Qualified Political agency? (see the separate opinion of Former Chief
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G.R. No. 171396 3, 2006 - versus HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: The cases: These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. The Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or May
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constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people; On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus: WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the dulyconstituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government; WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media; WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
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and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary; WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion; NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented.84 Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and
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would not follow standards set by the government during the state of national emergency. Director General Lomibao stated that if they do not follow the standards and the standards are - if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover. National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to cooperate with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for balanced reporting from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is threatened.87 Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions. When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police. Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Police action in various parts of Metro Manila and the reactions of the huge crowds being dispersed were broadcast as breaking news by the major television stations of this country. Petition in G.R. No. 171400, p. 11.
86
87
Ibid.
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hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered moot and academic by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021. Such contention lacks merit. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,88 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case89 or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative. The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
88
Courts may exercise the power of judicial review only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of unconstitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent,
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736. Royal Cargo Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. Nos. 103055-56, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 21; Vda. De Dabao v. Court of Appeals, supra.
89
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In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi. Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.91 In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the realparty-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.92 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,93 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the
91
92
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. 1991, p. 941. Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., 88 Phil. 125 (1951). 275 Ky 91, 120 SW2d 765 (1938).
90
Salonga v. Cruz Pao, et al., No. L- 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438.
93
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Association v. De la Fuente,100 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works101 and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.102 However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,103 where the transcendental importance of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,104 this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the far-reaching implications of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.105
99
117, 2947,
November January
7, 11,
1945 1959
100
110 Phil. 331 (1960). 77 Phil. 1012 (1947). 84 Phil. 368 (1949) The Court held: Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. L-No. 40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275. Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, where the Court held that where the question is one of public duty and the enforcement of a public right, the people are the real party in interest, and it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen interested in the execution of the law; Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, where the Court held that in cases involving an assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and part of the general public which possesses the right. Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, L. No. 81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371, where the Court held that objections to taxpayers lack of personality to sue may be disregarded in determining the validity of the VAT law; Albano v. Reyes, G.R. No. 83551, July 11, 1989, 175 SCRA 264, where the Court held that while no expenditure of public funds was involved
104
105
19 Wend. 56 (1837). 232 NC 48, 59 SE2d 359 (1950). 302 U.S. 633. 318 U.S. 446. 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
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Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review of the Visiting Forces Agreement; (3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,108 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that Balikatan 02-01 involves the exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,109 that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed. By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: 1. the cases involve constitutional issues;
be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
4. for
concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
5.
108
G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, 138698, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449.
Supra.
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legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson. Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions. The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the transcendental importance doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP 1017 cases. This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,114 may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
114
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,111 the Court reiterated the direct injury test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional issues. It held that there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act. In Lacson v. Perez,112 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,113 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their
110
G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 130. G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998, 289 SCRA 337. G.R. No. 147780, 147781, 147799, 147810, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756. G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA
111
112
113
656.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (De Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, 2004 Ed., p. 302).
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The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castaneda to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia, Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile. The tug-ofwar always cuts across the line defining political questions, particularly those questions in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and
115
when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile. There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution provides: Public Office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Ibid., Sec. 2.
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what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus: First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. First Provision: Calling-out Power
The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656) this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
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powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
Supra.
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Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted123 from Former President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-inChief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees? PP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
123
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution. Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
121
Ironically, even the 7th Whereas Clause of PP 1017 which states that Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government replicates more closely Section 2, Article 2 of the 1973 Constitution than Section 4, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that, [t[he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
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x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency. The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the martial law thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.125 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the
125
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, 1998, p. 1, citing Legaspi v. Ministry of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 (1982); Garcia-Padilla v. PonceEnrile, supra. Aquino v. Commission on Election, supra.
Section 17, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads: In times of national emergency when the public interest so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
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Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other.126 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
126
p.21.
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Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 1) Read: 2) The Habeas Corpus Cases
a. BARCELON VS. BAKER, 5 Phil. 87 (1905) b. MONTENEGRO VS. CASTANEDA, 91 Phil. 882 (1952) c. LANSANG VS. GARCIA, 42 SCRA 448 d. GARCIA-PADILLA VS. PONCE ENRILE, 121 SCRA 472 April 20, 1983 e. MORALES VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, 121 SCRA 472 April 26, 1983 f. OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION, G.R. No. 54558, May 22, 1987 g. ROLANDO ABADILLA VS. GEN. RAMOS, 156 SCRA 97 h. JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE SALAZAR, June 5, 1990 i. People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 120 The Martial Law cases a. AQUINO VS. ENRILE, 59 SCRA 183 b. AQUINO VS. MILITARY COMMISSION, 63 SCRA 546 c. GUMAUA VS. ESPINO, 96 SCRA 402 d. LEGASPI VS. MINISTER 115 SCRA 418 (on the possible 2)
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convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296; State ex rel AnheuserBusch Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.) [4] Pardon is complete with the act of the President while Amnesty is valid only with the concurrence of the majority of the members of all the members of Congress. 2) VERA VS. PEOPLE, 7 SCRA 152 Before one may validly apply for executive clemency (pardon or amnesty) he MUST ADMIT HAVING COMMITTED THE ACTS WHICH RESULTED IN HIS IMPRISONMENT. 3) CRISTOBAL VS. LABRADOR, 71 Phil. 34 4) PEOPLE VS. JOSE, 75 Phil. 612 5) 5) PELOBELO VS. PALATINO, 72 Phil. 441 6) PEOPLE VS. PASILAN, 14 SCRA 694 7) LEGASPI VS. MINISTER, 115 SCRA 418 8) MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN,February, 1989 The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a
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government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied. Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. 2 The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for further review and action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held: We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, as borne out by the records, petitioner was convicted of the crime for which she was accused. In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute honesty in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising, Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite. n fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position. ... Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that "a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence." (Sec. 36, par. 2).
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of the sentence. Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by the pardon. The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension from public office. The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding of the nature of pardon and its legal consequences. This is not totally unexpected considering that the authorities on the subject have not been wholly consistent particularly in describing the effects of pardon. The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the King's wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by American case law. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance." At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads: The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given
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punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved. The modern trend of authorities now rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man", and "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime,
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Province of Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a decision of the Office of the President, the governorship (p. 1, Petition). Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90 days. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive clemency to respondent governor. By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, respondent governor reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to the petitioner. Petitioner posits that the issuance by public respondent of the May 15, 1991 Resolution was "whimsical, capricious and despotic, and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction," (p. 6, petition) basically on the ground th executive clemency could be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. Petitioner also contends that since respondent governor refused to recognize his suspension (having reassumed the governorship in gross defiance of the suspension order), executive clemency cannot apply to him; that his rights to due process were violated because the grant of executive clemency was so sudden that he was not even notified thereof; and that despite a finding by public respondent of impropriety in the loan transaction entered into by respondent governor, the former failed to justify the reduction of the penalty of suspension on the latter. Petitioner further alleges that the executive clemency granted by public respondent was "the product of a hocus-pocus strategy" (p. 1, Manifestation with Motion, etc.) because there was allegedly no real petition for the grant of executive
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Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides: Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, ... (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense s warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent coul influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. (3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation the proceedings against him until its termination. (Emphasis supplied) Let us first deal with the issue on jurisdiction. Respondent govemor avers that since under the Constitution discretionary authority is granted to the President on the exercise of executive clemency, the same constitutes a political question which is beyond judicial review. Such a rule does not hold true in the case at bar. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President. In this
connection, the case of Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051, is very enlightening, and We quote: Elsewhere in this treatise the wellknown and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers. As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326). In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is not purely political. Here, we are called upon to decide whether under the Constitution the President may grant executive clemency in administrative cases. We must not overlook the fact that the exercise by the President of her power of executive clemency is subject to constitutional limitations. We will merely check whether the particular measure in question has been in accordance with law. In so doing, We will not concern ourselves with the reasons or motives which
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By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of the executive clemency in administrative cases. d. Is breach of the condition of pardon subject to judicial review? Read: TORRES VS. GONZALES, 152 SCRA 272 On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation to the President, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board showed
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Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926. 3 Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution. The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three times in the past. This Court was first faced with this issue in Tesoro Director of Prison. Tesoro, who had been convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents, was granted a parole by the then Governor-General. One of the conditions of the parole required the parolee "not [to] commit any other crime and [to] conduct himself in an orderly manner." Two years after the grant of parole, Tesoro was charged before the Justice of the Peace Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery said to have been committed with the wife of Tesoro's brother-in-law. The fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance the corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for nonappearance of the complainant. The complainant then went before the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and charged Tesoro with violation of the conditions of his parole. After investigation by the parole officer, and on the basis of his report, the Board recommended to the President of the Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the petitioner. Tesoro contended, among other things, that a "judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime" is necessary before he could properly be adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
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In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol, the petitioner had been convicted of the crime of inciting to sedition. While serving his sentence, he was granted by the President a conditional pardon "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Espuelas accepted the conditional pardon and was released from confinement. Sometime thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court in Tagbilaran, Bohol, of the crime of usurpation of authority. He appealed to the Court of First Instance. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case provisionally, an important prosecution witness not having been available on the day set for trial. A few months later, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired period of his original sentence. The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
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thereafter try to prove it through indubitable evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, the court will then affirm the allegation of commission in a judgment of conviction. e. Amnesty to rebels Read: Proclamation No. 80, February 28, 1987 10. Sections 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided for by law. The Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the government or government owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided for by law. Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate. (NOTE: Please see Section 25, Art. 18. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the USA concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.) Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within 30 days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
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Read: Badua vs. CBA, February 14, 1991 b. Restrictions to the exercise of judicial power Political question doctrine Read: 1) JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 50 SCRA 30 2) DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294 3) ALMARIO VS. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69 (When the question deals with the necessity, expediency and wisdom of a particuar act, the same is political and not justiciable) 4. Read again ENRILE VS. JUDGE SALAZAR, June 5, 1990 b-1. Definition of political question Read: 1. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, the matter is definitely justiciable or non-political) 2. Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 3. Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. (Political questions are questions to be answered by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested to the executive or legislative branch of the government) 4. Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (When the crux of the problem deals with the validity of an act, it is justiciable) c. general Cases on judicial power in
1) LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756 2) SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA, 32 SCRA 188
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case, without the concurrence of at least 3 of such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. Read: 1) VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA, 80 Phil. 297 2) VIR-JEN SHIPPING VS. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 3. JANDUSAY VS. CA, 172 SCRA 376 To be decided by the Supreme Court en banc 1. Involving the constitutionality of any law, treaty, etc.; 2. When there is conflict of the decisions of 2 or more divisions of the Supreme Court; 3. When a case is referred to by the division to the banc and the same was accepted by the latter; 4. In death penalty cases; 4. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1)Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2)Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
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shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance with the civil service law. (READ: Maniago vs. CA, 253 SCRA on the limitation of the Rulesnot to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. a. What is the power of judicial review? What are its requisites? DISOMANGCOP VS. HON. SIMEON DATUMANONG, 444 SCRA 203 Requisites for the exercise of judicial power. The following are the requisites for the exercise of judicial power: a. There must be before the court a case calling for the exercise of judicial review; b. The question before the court must be ripe for judicial adjudication; c. The person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge; d. The question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity; and e. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
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VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES. Under Section 3.1 of the said EO, THE IMPORTATION INTO THE COUNTRY, INCLUSIVE OF FREEPORT, OF ALL TYPES OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES IS PROHIBITED. The private respondent, which has a business of importing all kinds of used motor vehicles questioned the constitutionality of said EO. I s s u e s: 1. Does the private respondent have the personality to sue or to question the constitutiona lity of EO 156? 2. Does the President have the authority to promulgate EO to promote police power like in this case? 3. Is EO 156 constitutiona l? Held: 1. The privat e respo ndent has the perso nality to sue to questi on the consti tution ality
1) legitimizing function 2) checking function 3) symbolic or educational function Read: aa. SALONGA VS. PANO, 134 SCRA 438 bb. JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 b. On personality to sue
Is there a difference as to the "personality" requirement if the law being questioned involves disbursement of public funds and on the other hand, if it does not . Standing to question the validity of an Executive Order which does not involve disbursement of public funds; Requisites before the President may issue executive Orders in furtherance of police power. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. VS. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, 482 SCRA 673 Ynares-Santiago, J On December 12, 2002, President Arroyo issued EO 156 entitled PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR
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of all motor vehicl es, not only used cars will be prohib ited. 2. The Presid ent is autho rized to issue an execu tive order provid ed it compl ies with the followi ng requis ites: a. Its
p r o m u l g a t i o n m u s t b e a u t
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n c e w i t h t h e p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e ; c. It m u s t b e w i t h i n t h e s c o p
b. It
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e a s o n a b l e .
There is no question that no less than Art. VI, Section 28 [2] of the Constitution authorizes Congress to in turn authorize the President by law, within specified limits, and subject to such restrictions and limitations, to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas. Likewise, the Tariff and Customs Code likewise delegates to the President similar powers. 3. Is the EO prohibiting the importation of all motor vehicles, not only used cars constitutional? In this case, while the first two requisites are present, the 3rd is not. This is so because it is not within the powers of the President to prohibit the importation of other vehicles, not only cars, even in the Freeport Zones like Subic which is allowed by RA 7227. The EO therefore is ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the President because it tries to supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws. The 4th requisite is not also present because the same is unreasonable since it likewise prohibit the entry of used motor vehicles into the Freeport which is owed by law, RA 7227. Read: 1) PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331 2) SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 3) DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 3-a. Read again NEPA VS. ONGPIN, 171 SCRA 57 4. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, May 5, 1994 Read this very carefully because it changes the original concept of
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Read: 1. IN RE CUNANAN, 94 Phil. 534 2. ZALDEVAR VS. GONZALES, Oct. 7, 1988 Re: Indefinite suspension imposed on RAUL GONZALES) g-1. May law students practice law before the courts? Requisites? Read: Circular No. 19, issued by the Supreme Court on December 19, 1986 h. On the integration of the bar IN RE EDILLON, 84
6. Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Read: DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE, 119 SCRA 337 7. Sections 7. (1) No person shall be appointed member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court must be at least 40 years of age, and must have been for 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar. (3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. Section 8. A judicial and bar Council---compositionChief Justice,
Read: 1) PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ, 36 SCRA 172 2) PEOPLE VS. SOLA, 103 SCRA 393 3) PEOPLE VS. PILOTIN, 65 SCRA 635 f. Rule making power; note the limitations Read: 1) BUSTOS VS. LUCERO, 81 Phil. 648
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vote of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Read: 1) OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 51 O.G. 147 2) DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294 10. Section 12. The members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Read: 1) GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106 2) MANILA ELECTRIC VS. PASAY TRANSPORTATION, 57 Phil. 60 3) LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756 4) IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO, October 5, 1988 11. Sections 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing o f the opinion o f the court. A certification to this effect signed by the CJ----Any member who took no part or dissentedmust state the reason therefor. The same procedure in all lower collegiate courts. Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. Read: 1) AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155 2) VDA DE ESPIRITU VS. CFI, 47 SCRA 354 3) BUSCAYNO VS. ENRILE, 102 SCRA 7
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after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, BUT NOT WHERE A RESOLUTION IS ISSUED DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION AND STATING THE LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR like the petition raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondents court decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In this case , the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner on the grounds that the factual issues had already been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in agreement with that of the Labor Arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals. This complies with the constitutional requirement under Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution 12. Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within 24 months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, 12 months for all lower collegiate courts, and 3 months for all other lower courts. (2) A case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. (4) Even after the lapse----the court shall still decide without further delay. Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within 30 days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the judiciary. Read: 1) CORPUS VS. CA 98 SCRA 424 2) MALACORA VS. CA, 117 SCRA 435
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Primarily confidential position is one denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of the personal trust on confidential matters of the state (Example: Chief Legal Counsel of the PNB, Besa vs. PNB, 33 SCRA 330) Highly technical position requires the appointee thereto to possess technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree. Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. a. Government and controlled corporations Read: These cases were decided under the 1973 constitution where it was held that employees of government owned and controlled corporations, with or without charters are within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Under the 1987 Constitution, there is now a distinction and only those with original charters shall be under the CSC while those created under the Corporation Code are not. 1) 172 NHC VS. JUCO, 134 SCRA
2) MWSS VS. HERNANDEZ, 143 SCRA 602 3) QUIMPO VS. TANODBAYAN, December 2, 1986, 146 SCRA 4) PAL VS. CFI, January 8, 1987 b. Checking function of the CSC
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1) DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE, 87 Phil. 289 2) MEDALLA VS. SAYO, 103 SCRA 587 3) MATURAN VS. MAGLARA, 113 SCRA 268 4) DE GUZMAN VS. SUBIDO, 120 SCRA 443 5) ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353 e. Dismissal for cause Read: 1) ANG-ANGCO VS. CASTILLO, 9 SCRA 619 2) VILLALUZ VS. ZALDIVAR, 15 SCRA 710 3) HERNANDEZ VS. VILLEGAS, 14 SCRA 544 4) BRIONES VS. OSMENA, 104 Phil. 588 5) CORPUZ VS. CUADERNO, 13 SCRA 175 6) CRISTOBAL VS. MELCHOR, 78 SCRA 175 7) INGLES VS. MUTUC, 26 SCRA 171 8) ALCOLALO VS. TANTUICO, 83 SCRA 789 9) ABROT VS. CA, 116 SCRA 468 10) GINSON VS. MUN. OF MURCIA, 158 SCRA 1 11) MARCELINO VS. TANTUICO, July 7, 1986 12) CADIENTE VS. SANTOS, June 11, 1986 f. May gov't. employees form unions for purposes of collective bargaining and to strike against the government? Read: 1) ALLIANCE OF GOVT. WORKERS VS. MOLE, 124 SCRA 1 2) Executive Order No. 180 , June 1, 1987 authorizing govt. employees to form unions. 3) SANTOS VS. YATCO, 106 Phil. 745 4) PEOPLE VS. DE VENECIA, 14 SCRA 864 5. SSSEA vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686 6. NSC vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 123
1. Panis vs. CSC, Feb. 2, 1-b. Home Insurance vs. CSC, March 19, 1993 1-c. Medenilla vs. CSC, February 19, 1991 2. Simpao vs. CSC, November 15, 1990 3. Barrozo vs. CSC and Valentino Julian, June 25, 1991 4. Lapinid vs. CSC, May 14, 1991 5. Santiago vs. CSC, 178 SCRA 733 6. Orbos vs. CSC, Sept. 12, 1990 7. Teologo vs. CSC, Nov. 8, 1990 8. Gaspar vs. CSC, Oct. 18, 1990 9. Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 c. Primarily confidential Read: 1) CADIENTE VS. SANTOS, 142 SCRA 280 (Provincial Legal Officer is a primarily confidential office, but not his assistant) 2) SAMSON VS. CA, 145 SCRA( The City Legal officer is a primarily confidential officer) d. determining Highly technical/policy
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d. Regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication.. a. Term of COMELEC Commissioners Read: 1. Brillantes vs. Yorac, Dec. 18, 1991 1-a) NP VS. DE VERA, 35 Phil. 126 2) REPUBLIC VS. IMPERIAL, 96 Phil 770 b. Power to enforce and administer laws relative to the conduct of elections. Read: 1) TICZON VS. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 671 2) SANCHEZ VS. BILIWANG, 114 SCRA 454 2) SANCHEZ VS. BILIWANG, 114 SCRA 454 b-1. Powers of the COMELEC 1. PANGILINAN VS. COMELEC, NOVEMBER 18, 1993 2. NPC VS. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 3. Labo vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 c. Sole judge of all election contests Read: 1) GABATAN VS. COMELEC, 122 SCRA 1 2) GAD VS. COMELEC, May 26, 1987 3) UPP-KBL VS. COMELEC, June 4, 1987 4) DEFERIA VS. PARAS, 141 SCRA 518 d. Distinguish referendum from plebiscite Read: SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 e. Cases to be decided by the COMELEC EN BANC OR IN DIVISION Read: CUA VS. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582
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(LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof. Likewise, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled Establishing a Program fro Devolution Adjustment and Equalization with the purpose of facilitating the process of enhancing the capacities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved tot hem by the national government agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code. Issue: May the Congress or the President impose conditions for the use of the IRA by the different local government units? Held: The provision of the GAA for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 are unconstitutional as they encroach on the fiscal autonomy of the local government units in violation of the Constitution. And even if this case is already moot and academic because said provisions have been implemented, there is a possibility that the same be incorporated in the future GAA or it is capable of repetition and as such, it must be decided before another GAA is enacted. It behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public. Likewise, the act of the President as embodied in EO No. 48 is unconstitutional because it amounts to control to local government units when the Presidents power over local government units is confined to general supervision, not power of control. The distinctions of the two powers were enunciated in Drilon vs. Lim, 235 SCRA 135. Thus: An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may in his discretion, order the act undone or re-
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The petitioner who is the daughter of Rep. Tomas Dumpit, 2nd District of La Union, filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor of Agoo, La Union for the May, 2004 elections. The respondents filed a case for her disqualification on the ground that she is a registered voter of Naguilian , La Union and only transferred her registration as a voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union, on October 24, 2003. Her presence in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union was noticed only after her certificate of candidacy. Barangay officials claimed in an affidavit that she is not a resident of the said Barangay. The petitioner countered that she acquired a new domicile in San Juan West when she purchased from her father a residential lot on April 19, 2003 and she even designated a person as caretaker of her residential house. Held: While residence and domicile are synonymous, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, the following requisites must be present: 1. an actual removal or actual change of domicile; 2. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. acts which correspond with the purpose. In the case of petitioner while she bought a parcel of land in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on April 19, 2003, property ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote or voted for an office. To effect a change of residence, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, change of domicile or residence must be voluntary and the residence a the place chose for the new domicile must be actual.
Carpio, J. Facts:
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2) VELASCO VS. BLAS, 115 SCRA 540 3) DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569 4) MUNICIPALITY OF ECHAGUE VS. ABELLERA, December 12, 1986, 146 SCRA 5) PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION VS. LAC, December 17, 1986, 146 SCRA 6. MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS VS. LIBANGAN SA MALOLOS, 159 SCRA 525 Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials shall be not more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. BENJAMIN BORJA VS. COMELEC, and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998 Mendoza, J. Issue: Whether a Vice Mayor who succeeds to the Office of the Mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term for the purpose of the three-term limit on local officials as provided under the Local Government Code. Held: No. Article X, Section Constitution provides: 8 of the
Section. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be determined by law, which shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
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ROMEO LONZANIDA VS. COMELEC, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602 The petitioner was elected Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms. During his 3rd term (1995 elections), he was proclaimed the winner but his opponent filed an election protest and two (2) months before the next election and 4 months before the end of his 3rd term , the COMELEC declared his opponent to be the winner and was able to occupy the position of Mayor for 2 months. Is he entitled to run for the position of mayor in the election after he was declared a loser during his 3rd term but he almost completed 3 terms? Held: Yes because in order that the prohibition shall apply to him, the following requisites must be present: 1. the local official must have been elected for the same position [Example: Mayor] three times; and 2. the local official must have fully served three consecutive terms as Mayor. In this case, he was not elected to the position 3 times because he lost during the 3rd time though he served the office for 2 years and 10 months. Likewise even assuming that he won the 3rd election, he did not fully serve the term of 3 years. It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Prohibition to run for more than 3 consecutive terms FEDERICO T. MONTEBON vs. COMELEC & ELEANOR ONDOY, G.R. No. 180444 , April 8, 2008 Petitioners Montebon, Ondoy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were
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office if there was an interruption in one of the previous three terms. On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for disqualification ruling that respondents assumption of office as vice-mayor should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service. His second term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.129[5] On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division, as follows: Respondents assumption to the office of the vice-mayor of Tuburan in January 2004 during his second term as councilor is not a voluntary renunciation of the latter office. The same therefore operated as an effective disruption in the full service of his second term as councilor. Thus, in running for councilor again in the May 14, 2007 Elections, respondent is deemed to be running only for a second consecutive term as councilor of Tuburan, the first consecutive term fully served being his 2004-2007 term. Petitioner Montebons and Ondoys June 9, 2007 manifestation and omnibus motion are hereby declared moot and academic with the instant disposition of their motion for reconsideration. WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.130[6] Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondents assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor.
129[5] 130[6]
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the same
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.135[11] Section 44136[12] of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. Thus: SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said
Id. at 478. See Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 356 Phil. 467, 476-477 (1998). 136[12] SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein. x x x.
134[10] 135[11]
370 Phil. 625 (1999). Id. at 636. 356 Phil. 467 (1998).
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The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated. xxxx Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the nonperformance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.138[14]
city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged or abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Read: 1) PAREDES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 128 SCRA 6 2) LOPEZ VS. METRO MANILA COMMISSION, 136 SCRA 633
138[14]
Rollo, p. 26.
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4) SCRA 735
6. Sections 11-14 Read: 1) CENIZA VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763 2) Differentiate a highly urbanized city from a component city (See BP 337, Sections 162-168) 7. Sections 15-21 Is there a Cordillera Autonomous Region? a. Read: Exec. Order No. 220 b. Ordillo vs. Comelec, 192 SCRA 100 PART XI ARTICLE XI - ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 1. Sections 1. Public Office is a public trust. CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. The Facts:
PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.140[6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.141[7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1.
I S S U E:
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. Assuming that it has not been repealed, is it not inconsistent with Section 1, Art. XI which states that public office is a public trust? The petition has no merit. Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),139[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the
Annex E of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
139[4]
No. 174318.
141[7]
No. 174318.
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The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.142[24]
clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x. It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and nonaccountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea,143[25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan144[26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.
2. Sections 12--18 a. Impeachment, officers of the government who are impeachable, grounds, limitations for its exercise, procedure, etc. . . ROMULO, et al vs. YNIGUEZ, et al, 141 SCRA 263 Culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any other office
144[26]
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make
142[24]
Public Officers and Election Law, p. 2. No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 558.
143[25]
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6) BAGASO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 155 SCRA 154 7) DE JESUS VS. PEOPLE, 120 SCRA 760 8) QUIMPO VS. TANODBAYAN, December 2, 1986, 146 SCRA 9) INTING VS. TANODBAYAN, 97 SCRA 494 b-1 Who prosecutes public officials? Exception Read: 1. Corpuz Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 c. vs.
1987
2) MAHARLIKA PUBLISHING VS. TAGLE, 142 SCRA 553 D. Power of the Ombudsman to suspend public officials. Read: Buenaseda September 21, 1993 vs. Flavier,
a-1. Degree of loyalty, etc. of government employee. Read: SCRA 21 Lim-Arce vs. Arce, 205
PART XI ARTICLE XII - SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1. Secs. 1-19 2. Adjudicatory Power of Commission on Human Rights Read: 1. Carino vs. CHR, December 2, 1991 2. EPZA vs. CHR, April 14, 1992 Read also: 1) G.R. No. 2) G.R. No. SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO, L-48685, Sept. 30, 1987 DIZON VS. GEN. EDUARDO, 59118, March 3, 1988 the
b. The SANDIGANBAYAN AND TANODBAYAN DECREES Read: 1) PD's 1486, 1847, 1606, 1607 and 1630 2) Exec. Order 244 3) NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433 4) MANGUBAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 147 SCRA 478 5) GABISON VS. DE LOS ANGELES, 151 SCRA 61 6) ZALDEVAR VS. RAUL GONZALES, April 27, 1988 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 May 1988
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No. 127980,
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)145[1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manangs Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men badmouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manangs. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manangs and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then. After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. Kailangan ng apology in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made. On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m.,
145[1]
Under the 1973 Constitution, Academic freedom shall by enjoyed BY ALL institutions of higher learning while under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Academic freedom shall be enjoyed IN ALL institutions of higher learning. In short, before, ON LY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING ENJOY ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHILE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS ALSO ENJOYED BY THE TEACHERS AND PROFESSORS AS WELL AS STUDENTS, ASIDE FROM THE SCHOOL. Academic freedom; due process in disciplinary actions involving students DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO
College of Saint Benilde is an educational institution which is part of the De La Salle System.
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(AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227) were docketed as Discipline Case No. 94953-25121. The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.148[9] Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows: Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano. You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses. On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony. Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of. For your strict compliance.149[13] During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995,
148[9] 149[13]
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On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution150[18] finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,151[19] pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.152[20] The dispositive part of the resolution reads: WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (ABBSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (ABMGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion. In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge. SO ORDERED.153[21]
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration154[22] before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a LetterResolution155[23] dated June 1, 1995. On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 9574122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs. The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO156[24] directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995. On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,157[28] in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS). On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention158[29] in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders to
150[18]
151[19]
Id. at 139-150. Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(c) provides that expulsion is an extreme penalty of an erring pupil or student consisting of his exclusion from admission to any public or private school in the Philippines and which requires the prior approval of the Secretary. The penalty may be imposed for acts or offenses constituting gross misconduct, dishonesty, hazing, carrying deadly weapons, immorality, selling and/or possession of prohibited drugs such as marijuana, drug dependency, drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism, and other serious school offenses such as assaulting a pupil or student or school personnel, instigating or leading illegal strikes or similar concerned activities resulting in the stoppage of classes, preventing or threatening any pupil or student or school personnel from entering the school premises or attending classes or discharging their duties, forging or tampering with school records or school forms, and securing or using forged school records, forms and documents. 152[20] Rollo, pp. 151-153. 153[21] Id. at 150.
at at at at at
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summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.165[38] The Resolution states: RESOLUTION 181-96 RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED. RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.166[39] Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters167[40] to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:
165[38]
at at at at at at
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(b) provides that exclusion is a penalty in which the school is allowed to exclude or drop the name of the erring pupil or student from the school rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued. 166[39] Rollo, pp. 125-126. 167[40] Id. at 1599-1606.
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On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.171[47] On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent Aguilars urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the order reads: In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilars urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents motion to dismiss is denied. The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect. Hence, this case. I S S U E S: Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom in support of its decision to expel the private respondents? H E L D:
171[47]
Id. at 523-530.
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a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question.175
[95]
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.176[96] Accordingly, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued, not EXPEL. Read: 1.THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, February 9, 1993 1-a. THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. RUBEN AYSON, August 17, 1989 1-c. UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. CA, August 31, 1999 Academic Freedom includes the power of a University to REVOKE a degree or honor it has conferred to a
Malabanan v. Ramento, 214 Phil. 319, 330 (1984). 176[96] Rollo, p. 515.
175[95]
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2) MONTEMAYOR VS. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION 3) VILLAR VS. TIP, April 17, 1985 4) MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO,129 SCRA 359 5) BELENA VS. PMI 6) ALCUAZ VS. PSBA, May 2, 1988 6-a) ALCUAZ VS. PSBA, September 29, 1989 (Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration) Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice Sarmiento 7) TONGONAN VS. PANO, 137 SCRA 246 8) ATENEO VS. CA, 145 SCRA 100 9) GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706 10) ANGELES VS. SISON, 112 SCRA 26 11. Tan vs. CA, 199 SCRA 212 12. Colegio del Sto. Nino vs. NLRC, 197 SCRA 611 13. Dean Reyes vs. CA, 14. UP vs. CA, February 9, 1993 15. Ateneo vs. Judge Capulong, May 27, 1993 PART XIV ARTICLE XVI - GENERAL PROVISIONS 1. Sections 1-12 Exec. Order No. 264 a. Implied b. Consent is either Express or
"What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines." "The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher recognized and effectively guaranteed by society to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning."'
Express 1. general law aa. C.A. 327 bb. Act 3083, Sec. 1 cc. Art. 2180 par. 6, New Civil Code (R.A. 386) dd. PD 1807, January 16, 1981 Special law Read: MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT, 34 Phil. 311 c. Implied 2.
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aa. MINISTERIO VS. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA bb. U.S. VS. RUIZ, 136 SCRA cc. TORIO VS. FONTANILLA, 85 SCRA 599 dd. COMMISSIONER VS. SAN DIEGO, 31 SCRA 616 ee. USA vs. JUDGE QUINTO, et al., February 26, 1990 and the cases cited therein ff. Republic of the Philippines vs. Judge Sandoval, March 19, 1993 gg. Wylie vs. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357 hh. Veteans vs. CA, 214 SCRA 286 Immunity from suit; effect of a void contract with the government; unjust enrichment DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH VS. C.V. CANCHELA, et al., 475 SCRA 218 Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: The DOH entered into three owner consultant agreements with the private respondents covering infrastructure projects for the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC), the Batangas Regional Hospital and the Corazon L. Montelibano Memorial regional Hospital in Bacolod City. The agreements for the three (3) projects are almost identical. This requires the private respondents to prepare: detailed architectural and engineering design plans; technical specifications and detailed estimates of cost of construction of the hospital, including the preparation of bid documents and requirements; and construction supervision until completion of hand-over and issuance of final certificate. While the Agreements were witnessed by the respective Chief Accountants of the hospitals and were duly approved by the Department of Health, the former did not issue corresponding certificates of
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The DOH through is authorized representative, wrote separate letters to the respective chiefs of hospitals confirming the acceptance of private respondents complete Contract or Bid Documents for each project and RECOMMENDED THE PAYMENT OF 7.5% OF THE PROJECT ALLOCATION TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS CONSULTANCY FEES. During the construction of the projects, various deficiencies in the performance of the agreed scope of private respondents work were allegedly discovered which were not communicated to the private respondents. Due to such alleged deficiencies, petitioner withheld payment of the consultancy fees due to private respondent. Neither did petitioner return the documents, plans, specifications and estimates submitted by private respondents. Considering the refusal of the DOH to pay said fees despite repeated demands, the private respondents submitted the dispute to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). After the presentation of evidence by both parties, the Arbitrator issued his decision dated March 30, 1999 sentencing the DOH to pay the private respondents to pay P3,492,713.00 for services performed and completed for and accepted by DOH. The said amount shall earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of the award until the decision becomes final. Thereafter, the principal and the interest accrued as of such time shall earn interest at 12% per annum. The DOH filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for being filed out of time. As such, on motion of the private respondents, the Arbitrator issued a Writ of Execution . Issue:
Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction to entertain the suit considering that the Agreements, being to promote the heath and wellbeing of the citizens, is in furtherance of the states sovereign and governmental power and therefore, IMMUNE FROM SUIT. Held: In their Memorandum before the Supreme Court, the DOH, for the first time, raised the nullity of the three (3) agreements from the very beginning for failure to include therein a certification of availability of funds which is required under existing laws, particularly the Auditing Code of the Philippines, PD 1445. As such, the fees of the private respondents shall not be based on the project fund allocation but on the basis of reasonable value or on the principle of quantum meruit. While the agreement is indeed void ab initio for violation of existing laws, the DOH is liable to pay the private respondents their consultancy services based on quantum merit to be determined by the Commission on Audit. The invocation of immunity from suit is without merit. This is so because the government has already received and accepted the benefits rendered. To refuse payment as a result of the states immunity from suit would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. (Citing Eslao vs. COA, 195 SCRA 730) 4. Tests of Suability for incorporated government Read: aa. RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN, 110 SCRA 456 bb. ANGAT RIVER IRRIGATION SYSTEM VS. CIR, 102 Phil. 789 5. Tests of Suability for an unincorporated govt. agency government agency
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level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. Contrary to her expectations, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf was never appointed to the position occupied by Mrs. Abalateo whose appointment was extended indefinitely by private respondent Detwiler. Feeling aggrieved by what she considered a shabby treatment accorded her, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf wrote the U.S. Civil Service Commission questioning the qualifications of Edward Isakson. Thereafter, said commission sent a communication addressed to private respondent Detwiler, 10 finding Edward Isakson not qualified to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, and requesting that action be taken to remove him from the position and that efforts be made to place him in a position for which he qualifies. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf avers that said recommendation was ignored by private respondent Detwiler and that Isakson continued to occupy said position of guidance counselor. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf likewise wrote the Base Commander of Clark Air Base requesting a hearing on her complaint for discrimination. Consequently, a hearing was held on March 29, 1978 before the U.S. Department of Air Force in Clark Air Base. Before the Department of Air Force could render a decision, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages, dated April 27, 1978, against private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2783, for the alleged discriminatory acts of herein private respondents in maliciously denying her application for the GS 1710-9 position. Private respondents, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2783, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that as officers of the United States Armed Forces
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Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only sects against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen etc., et al. "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates crime invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
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b. RICARDO SILVERIO VS. PCGG, G.R. No. 77645, Oct. 26, 1987,155 SCRA 60 c. KWONG, et al vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 79484, December 7, 1987,156 SCRA 222 d. PALM AVENUE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PCGG, G.R. No. 76296, August 31, 1987,153 SCRA 579 e. LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC. VS. PCGG, April 15, 1988,160 SCRA f. PCGG VS. PENA, 159 SCRA 556 g. Executive Order No. 275 ******************************
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