Unaddressed Perspectives on Democratization Jonathan Hernandez Temple University: 2011 Photo by: Lonard Crettaz

Unaddressed Perspectives on Democratization Jonathan Hernandez 1. Introduction Democratic consolidation, or democratization, describes how states go about the process of securing democracy. In various levels, and by various perspectives, it analyzes democratization by its causes and as a process (Schedler 1998). However, there is one problem: understanding democratic consolidation is difficult because it includes many perspectives that individually maximize and minimize it conceptually. Thus, understanding what correlates with and causes democratic consolidation is just as difficult because of this lack of academic consensus. This makes it difficult to argue what the true causes and correlative factors of democratic consolidation actually are. However, despite their differences, there is evidence to suggest that the differing perspectives agree, broadly (Norris 2008: 54-78). As an externality, the popularly cited causes that affect democratic consolidation have the capacity to too often miss the true or correlative factors that may very well affect democratic consolidation for states, in cohesion or in lieu of the incumbent arguments. Due to examining puzzles in biased ways, this could mean the loss of time and resources spent, in addition to the misfortune of publishing misleading or incomplete ideas. The implications of this lie in what both the disciplinary and policy audiences learn from said literature. Ideological bias or preoccupations can overwhelmingly lead to wrong conclusions. This behavior effectively has the potential to neglect highly relevant political forces while contributing to the development of theories of democracy and democratization (Anderson 2006: 189, 192). Ultimately, this bias finds its way into the science of politics and the foreign policy decisions made by the United States, and others. I will show whether or not the incumbent literature and competing viewpoints on democratization are missing or mis-hypothesizing major factors that can be attributed to both cause

and/or correlate with high or low levels of democratic consolidation. The importance and essence of this contribution is paramount, because if the current literature on democratic consolidation are missing or wrong on what the important political forces are, due to preoccupations, they could be highlighted through this research. This section reveals the impetus for this research to see if deeper or different answers can be found to the theories presented within the literature of democratic consolidation. Section II will review the incumbent literature on what causes and correlates with high/low levels of democratization, along with the theoretical framework I use to test if incumbent theories are, in fact, accurate. Section III will explain my findings and its implications on democratization literature, insomuch as it will support or refute it, as well as utilize case studies to look for associated correlations. Lastly, Section IV will restate this authors hypothesis and the implications of the researchs findings upon it. 2.1 Literature Review Democratic consolidation, traditionally meant to describe the ways in which states secure democracy as a process, is a term that was originally spawned by the third wave of democracy in which more than 60 polities transitioned from authoritarianism into the process of democratization. Within defining democracy the following are widely cited as being minimally required: elections, free and fair elections, civil liberties, leader involvement, citizen involvement, political equality, group equality (Mazo 2005). As the third wave states became democracies important concerns eventually arose, vacillating about what could prevent these states from reversing into authoritarian states. Eventually other aspects became salient that shed light on corresponding conditions that are correlated with democratic consolidation (Schedler 1998). Some of these include protestantism groups, economic development, civic culture, historical sequencing, modern state, national unity, institutions, and elite actors (Mazo 2005). However, within the democratization literature, several problems arise. Multiple approaches have arisen within the literature that broadly divides it into minimalist or maximalist

conceptualizations, each with their own set of strengths and weaknesses. Trade-offs exist between the theories which seek to destroy each other competitively. Therefore, much time within the literature of democratic consolidation is spent debating which criteria should be deemed most salient or important, while deepening and contributing to their own baseline theories (Norris 2008: 54-78). These approaches, with their varying core attributes, are Liberal (LD), Constitutional (CD), Participatory (PD), and Contested (CD) Democracies. Strong by its comprehensive scope and weak by problems of conflation and measurement, LD focuses on political rights and civil liberties. Strong by its extended time period and weak by exclusions of mass participation and aggregation problems, CD focuses on democracy and autocracy. Strong by its replicable data sources and weak by its inappropriate indicators, PD focuses on electoral competition and electoral participation. Lastly, strong by its clear coding rules and weak by its exclusion of mass participation and its weak relation to state oppression, CD focuses on the contestation of the executive and legislative branches of government by citizens (Norris 2008: 54-78). This broadly illustrates that there is no consensus about which criteria to use as a measurement for democracies and democratic consolidation. Moreover, despite their differences, when measured for correlations, all of the aforementioned approaches within comparative literature correlate strongly with each other. When tested, all approaches tend to agree 79.13% of the time, quite high for approaches who often compete against each other (Norris 2008: 54-78). The high levels of agreement amongst such different approaches is striking, and may warrant the use of new criteria which can be used to measure consolidation within democratizing states. This information begs for two questions to be asked. First, is it possible that incumbent theories of democratization are broadly misrepresenting its correlative factors? Second, are major political powers that catalyze high levels of democratic consolidation underplayed or misrepresented? To both these questions, the answer is yes, as will be addressed within this research. So, what would any researchs methodology have to include that would provide unique findings and circumvent the above-

mentioned pitfalls within the literature of democratic consolidation? 2.2 Theoretical Framework The answer, I believe, lies within the use of Good Governance Scores (GGS). Only becoming popular recently, they are calculated using indices that measure, on a numerical scale, the effectiveness of governments. These scores are supplied by think tanks, on the bases of political rights and civil liberties (Norris 2008: 69). Observations of states that are democratically consolidating could be averaged and categorized in order to tease out causal and correlative trends about what affects democracy. As a measure, this is robust because the criteria will seek broad answers to broad questions, avoiding the externalities of excluding data due to preoccupational bias about what theoretically does and does not fit into a specific approach. Thus, within testing alternate ideas, states scores will support or refute them. The implications for this would be important to the questioned hypotheses, as it could reveal disconcerting results that might challenge them. GGS however, are not without its critics. There may be elements of subjectivity within the assessment process, due to the danger of experts ideological, personal, and/or occupational bias. To whatever degree this may or may not be true, there is very little alternative scholarship within the area, leaving these assessments as a necessary measurement until more objective methods of measurement are available, or the objectivity of these measurements can be verified in other ways (Norris 2008: 6970). Grindle argues that this is because the good governance agenda lacks focus amongst the variable think tanks, leaving results to be open to questioning. However, all GGS are supplied by wellknown think tanks, whose purpose it is to supply reliable data. Moreover, due to many good governance indicators having been created since the 1990s, there is a lack of data that prevents the studies of states longitudinally, or over time (Norris 2008: 69-70). For these reasons, this study will focus on using GGS to shed light on the primary drivers of high levels of democratic governance and consolidation.

In order to reveal new or surprising information about democratic consolidation, I use GGS to test against what causes and correlates with democratization. On its causes and correlations, two major areas of contention within the literature of democratization have been chosen. First, on correlations, do multiethnic polities exhibit lower levels of democratic governance and consolidation than homogenous states do? On causes, are states borne of violent democratic regime-changes more likely to exhibit higher levels of democratic governance and consolidation than nonviolently transitioned democracies? To answer these questions, the GGS of four major publishers have been collected and aggregated to help insulate the observations from variable bias. To achieve this, no scores were used within this research that included a states economic standing. Thus, no states democratic standing was judged, within this research, according to how much money it had, or did not. In addition, GGS, calculated on the general bases of political rights and civil liberties, have been aggregated (averaged on a scale from 1-10) for every democratic polity to be created since the end of World War II, 73 states in total. This large and rich dataset provides this research with the ability to robustly measure its findings for statistical significance, a necessary aspect towards proving the data to be reliable. The aggregate GGS sources selected are the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Bank Institutes Kaufmann Kraay Indicators (a.k.a. World Governance Indicators), Freedom House, and the Polity IV Index. The various sources, all of which use individualized scales of assessment required having their data transformed and scaled to be measurable against each other, this is done in order to provide accurate measures for averages and their standard deviations. In total, 745 calculations were carried out, ten that reveal this researchers findings, and five that reveal the statistical significance (or insignificance) of these findings and its implications upon both this research and incumbent theories of democratic consolidation. 3.1.1 Case I: The incumbent literature on multiethnic democratization Within the literature of democratic consolidation, multiethnic polities are often portrayed as being associated with significantly lower levels of democratic consolidation. It is stipulated that many

of the conditions necessary to secure democratization will be at risk due to the presence of various ethnicities, all of which vie for power. This causes social and political destabilization in ways that contribute to their own ethnic group identities and exclude others. Ultimately, this compromises the ability of the state to achieve national unity, one of democratizations prerequisites. National unity is best explained by likening it to a sense of nationality or stateness. Achieving it allows the public as a whole to aggregate their perspectives of national saliency into a collated and cohesive effort (Rustow 1970: 350-352). There are widespread beliefs and social theories equating [a single] ethnicity to statehood. Under conditions where this is not so or is only weakly the case, then, presumably the best thing to do is strengthen the correlation, (Cohen 1988: 336). Conversely, according to the literature, national unity will be weak or nonexistent within states exhibiting multiethnicity: measured as any state whose minority population is over 5 percent of its total. In step with purely ethnic divisions, often traditionalist and religious divisions accompany them, as a compounding factor (Brown 1993). This leaves multiethnicity to be posited as a causal factor for states that ultimately achieve low levels of democratic consolidation. It is claimed that the unfortunate side-effects of multiethnicity within democratizing states accentuates various ethnic groups identities, this will in turn have a destabilizing impact that undermines the democratization process (Elkins & Sides 2007). Eventually, this leads to issues with severe internal conflicts, sometimes leading states actors towards ethnic cleansing or bloody outcomes (Cohen 1988). Historical examples are numerous. In Africa, efforts to reinvent democracy in the region have fanned the fires of ethnic conflict within the region, effectively creating the impetus for chronic and violent social conflicts, waged upon ethnic divisions. Nationalism and ethnicity, within the context of democratization, share a focus on controlling the state apparatus in ways that undermine democratic consolidation and reinforce divisions of power along ethnic lines (Berman 2010). As the final remnants of the previous military regime disappear, along ethnic lines, powerful

interests seek to attain majority dominance. Whence minority groups are excluded from the democratic system by larger groups, they tend to respond in turn by using violence, their only method for contesting the states power distribution. The danger of becoming a failed state, a regression in a states ability to maintain order, becomes a very real reality within the case that these ethnically stigmatizing events occur (Horowitz 1985: 681). The aforementioned literature unequivocally leads the disciplinary and policy audiences to develop the impression that multiethnic societies are fragmented, prone to violence, and have the potential for democratic backsliding in both overwhelming and inherent ways. 3.1.2 Case I: Findings When comparatively measured, on the basis of GGS, multiethnic democracies actually score higher, in terms of governance. This is counter to the popular expectations the literature on democratic consolidation would have audiences believe. Of the 73 states to have democratized since the end of World War II, 60 of which were multiethnic and 13 of which were homogenous, multiethnic states averaged GGS of 6.8 while homogenous states averaged 6.4, with a standard deviation of 1.7 (See Fig. 1). Additionally, upon testing the data for statistical significance, the data is found to be significant and an accurate and representative measure of the observations within the dataset. This can be proven with over 95 percent confidence.

Fig. 1

This finding exhibits that, on average, multiethnic societies do not underperform in terms of democratic governance, when measured against homogenous states. In fact, multiethnic states function .4 points higher. While this does not prove that democratic consolidation is necessarily easier for multiethnic societies, or that domestic ethnic divisions do not exist, it may exhibit that certain strategies were most useful towards mediating the variable interests of multiple ethnic and interest groups within states. 3.1.3 Case I: Correlations in Taiwan Taiwan, a multiethnic society, was able to successfully democratize itself and achieve aboveaverage levels of democratic consolidation without democratically backsliding. Having been part of an authoritarian regime for over four decades, it was able to incrementally transform its political system from an authoritarian-style single party system to a democratic single-party dominant system, eventually achieving a multiparty system (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, Shin 2008: 83). Despite its authoritarian past, Taiwan has successfully been able to hold transparent elections, settle executive disputes, and successfully and legally transition its executive powers between political parties. It was able to do this by consistently relying on the institutional design of its political system to prevent social and political stigmatization and to build national unity, rather than strong-arming or excluding interests forcibly to preserve its interests (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, Shin 2008: 83). Four things affected Taiwans strategy for democratizing. First, Taiwan had no experience democratizing, as it had never been a democracy previously. Second, the previous authoritarian system was deeply rooted and known for its stability and resiliency. With its elimination, the political system had no natural fallback. Rather, there were apparent needs to separate the ruling party from the state apparatus and to depoliticize the military. Third, unlike most cases of transition, there was no exogenous shock that laid the foundational impetus for an authoritarian defection. Thus, there was little assurance of mass support for Taiwans defection from mainland China. Lastly, to rally mass support, public support had to be raised on a Taiwanese democracy being part of the citizens identity; within

this aspect, Taiwan sought to achieve national unity amongst its multiethnic citizens (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, Shin 2008: 85). Taiwan was able to remove itself peacefully from authoritarian rule due to three conditions. First, existing democratic elements within the old authoritarian systems design were used to make Taiwans transition as smooth as possible. Initially a period of authoritarianism was instituted to give Taiwans politics enough time to mature. However, during this time, local and national-level legislative elections were allowed and successfully held. This prevented the stigmatizing dangers for national interests of too quick political change. Second, the old authoritarian regime had recruited many Taiwanese residents throughout the country into political positions for stability and intelligence reasons. So, when social mobilization took place, the highly supported and connected authoritarian party, was easily able to both accrue and receive support from the citizens. Thirdly, and by luck, the final authoritarian leader had no credible successor within his own family or mainland Chinas elite. Following the regimes rules, his vice-president, a native Taiwanese named Lee Teng-hui, was made his successor (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, Shin 2008: 86-87). The above-mentioned three conditions allowed Lee to become an effective democratic crusader, completing the incremental democratic transitions while in a period of necessary authoritarianism. Despite this, national unity was maintained, displayed in a successful presidential election in 2000, Taiwans first change in executive powers between political parties (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, Shin 2008: 86-87). 3.2.1 Case II: The incumbent literature on violent democratic regime-changes Within the literature of democratic consolidation theorists and academics oft tend to argue that using violence to secure democratization, within an authoritarian state, will lead to higher levels of democratic consolidation. Democratization literature depicts the connection between war and a states transition to democracy to be largely constructive (Bermeo 2004: 161-163). Historically, the majority of democratic regime-changes have been violent which are seen as being fundamental towards securing

a states transition to democracy (Linz & Stepan 1999). Thus, violent regime-changes are helpful to secure democracy because they act towards successfully undoing challenging incumbent military and political institutions that would seek to undermine their efforts. Additionally, the highest probability of securing high levels of democratic consolidation is one in which the previous regimes are devastatingly defeated and thoroughly replaced. (Bermeo 2003: 162). 3.2.2 Case II: Findings & Implications When comparatively measured, on the basis of GGS, nonviolently-transitioned states scored slightly higher, in terms of governance. This is counter to the popular expectation the literature on democratic consolidation would have audiences believe. Of the 73 states to have democratized since the end of World War II, 37 of which transitioned nonviolently and 36 of which transitioned violently, nonviolently-transitioned states averaged a GGS of 6.76 while violently-transitioned states averaged 6.7 (See Fig. 2). Additionally, upon testing the data for statistical significance, the data is found to be significant and an accurate and representative measure of the observations within the dataset. This can be proven with over 95 percent confidence.

Fig. 2

This suggests, overall, nonviolently and violently-transitioned states tend to reach similar levels of democratic governance. Positively, this suggests that in instances where violent conflict can be avoided in lieu of nonviolent demonstration, it should be supported, as the results will be overarchingly similar. However, within this finding is a problem. While this finding unquestionably shows that states borne of nonviolent and violent regime-changes reach comparable levels of governance, it does nothing to show how long this convergence will take, or how easy or difficult it might be. In order to account for this, the statistical analyses were slightly expanded. While it would be ideal to do longitudinal statistical analyses, unfortunately there is not enough data on this. However, by dividing states into time periods according to when they transitioned, unique and interesting trends about violently and nonviolently-transitioned states can be found. For the last three decades, the states that transitioned within each individual decade were calculated together in these, albeit, smaller datasets. This research finds that for all states who democratized within the last three decades, violently transitioned states within their first two decades of democratization experience lower levels of GGS than nonviolently transitioned states. Within the last decade violently transitioned states averaged 5.8, while nonviolently transitioned states performed significantly higher, with average GGS of 6.6. States who began democratizing 10-20 years ago also display the same trend with violently-transitioned states averaging a score of 5.9, while nonviolently transitioned states exhibit higher levels of GGS with 6.7. Lastly, states that began democratizing 20-30 years ago display equal levels of GGS with a score of 6.7 (See Fig. 3).

Fig. 3 After statistical significance tests were run, it was found that the findings for states that democratized within the last decade were insignificant, and while the dataset may not prove that the observed difference is significantly provable, it does show that both violently and nonviolentlytransitioned states do not perform equally, in terms of GGS. Additionally, statistical significance tests show that the findings for states that transitioned 10-20 and 20-30 years ago are significant. This can be proven with over 95 percent confidence. The implications of this show that there may very well be a progression to how violently and nonviolently-transitioned states meet comparable levels of democratic consolidation and governance. While it does not prove this, it does in fact prove that there is a statistically significant difference between states that democratized under violent and nonviolent terms. To find out why this might be, a deeper analysis of the negative externalities of violent regime-change is required. Lastly, from these findings, one perspective is worth mentioning. If, in fact, there is a

progression for states to reach comparable levels of democratic consolidation that requires three decades, the observed states within this study only did so under a period of uninterrupted peace before reaching convergent levels of good governance. This means that if violent regime-changes tend to subject states to decades of below-average democratic governance, then a recurrence of violence could destabilize the state and cause them to backslide in terms of governance for another unspecified period of time. Further, if this sort of violence were to cause an entirely autocratic backslide, only to be violently overthrown back towards democracy, we can begin to understand the cyclical negative effects of state-wide violence on states. 3.2.3 Case II: Correlations within the externalities of war Although there is relative convergence in levels of democratic governance between violently and nonviolently-transitioned states, the costs of securing democratization violently may have pathdependent effects that could undermine the states ability to democratically consolidate. These externalities would be a direct effect of seeking democratization through violent means. Securing democracy through violent regime-changes is no small task; the cost to human life from war is significant, in addition to other high transaction costs, since 1945, 25 million deaths are attributed to civil wars (Hironaka 2005: 4-5). Sri Lankas civil war alone caused between 60,000100,000 violent deaths (United Nations 2009). More recently, Libyas civil war is estimated to have killed up to 15,000 people within the conflicts first four months (Reuters 2011). Although these statistics are only representative of recent civil wars, though impossible, should the death toll of all predemocratization conflicts be calculated the number would be significantly larger. From violent conflicts, additional externalities are to be expected within social, political, natural, and economic areas. Socially and politically, civil rights degenerate due to unwarranted executions and detainments, rape and sexism abounds in freshly conquered regions, and education levels plummet. Environmentally, states participating in war are harmed significantly, deforestation, increased carbon emissions, and contaminated food and water supplies are typical. Economically, states

participating in war spend massive sums while reducing their ability to attain revenue by destroying national champion industries and/or eliminating the ability of the domestic economy to function (Costs of War 2011). The externalities of war are shaped by civil and political society, as war will affect different regimes uniquely. These byproducts leave states in more vulnerable positions where their options are limited and their limitations grow. If a war-related collapse of a state occurs, then civil and political society must demand elections, if it is a viable option. However, in previously totalitarian and sultanistic regimes, outright external monitoring and/occupation is necessary. The need would be for early elections to be called (Linz & Stepan 1999). The challenge in postwar democratization lies in raising the cost of violent competition while lowering the costs of political competition (Bermeo 2003: 163). However, it is not always possible that this can occur. In some cases it is found, newly empowered interests may use the genuine need for reform as a cover to advance their interests without addressing the true problems in any measure, in which case, democratic government appears to fail again. In all instances, democratic government may be blamed and an authoritarian solution may appear to be a desirable means of resolving the deadlock or crisis. The mass public can play a role in checking sudden changes in the nations political institutions that may fail to address underlying problems-or exploit supposed problems to partisan advantage-if the public is skeptical of such dramatic change or if even the public is split between competing sets of elites, (Paolino & Meernik 2008: 3). This behavior exhibits how the process of democratization can become flawed and destabilized from its onset. While this is capable of happening under different circumstances, the danger is more apparent within states that experienced violent regime-changes. In sum, states that democratize violently are only as able to create consolidation insomuch as they are able to destroy the incumbent regime, quickly hold elections and create democratic institutions that account for all interests, and reduce the domestic incentives for violent dissent amongst the public. Shortly, it seems that a lot can go wrong, in which case, it will affect the whole process of consolidation negatively. 4.1 How democratization literature has manifested state-wide issues In the case of Iraq, after a pre-democratizing war with the United States that led to the deaths of

over 100,000 Iraqis, it remains volatile and at risk of democratic backsliding if further state-wide conflict is achieved. This risk has been summed up to be caused by multiethnic conflicts, but rather it is due to the postwar decisions made by the U.S. government, tasked with upholding its sovereignty and rebuilding the states government. These decisions were based off of bad advice, correlating to much of the incumbent literature. After the invasion of Iraq, the incumbent military and political party were dissolved. Before this, in May 2003, L. Paul Bremer, chief administrator, had sent letters to President George W. Bush, stating that, We must make it clear to everyone that we mean business: that Saddam and the Baathists are finished, (Andrews 2007). This was done in order to effectively remove all remnants of the previous regimes power from the country; in line with what democratization literature would suggest. The president had replied to Bremers letter with his full support; the next day, both Iraqs Baathist party, and its military had been dissolved. Allies who had assisted the US in the Iraq invasion had been concerned, at the time, that the move had not been made soon enough (Djevsky 2003). In turn, about a week later, President Bush had declared that the United States mission in Iraq had been accomplished and that all major combat operations would cease (BBC 2011). This would make it seem, as the literature on democratic consolidation would support, by successfully removing the incumbent regimes functional structure, democratization efforts moving forward would transition smoothly. However, this was not the case, as the state would become deeply embattled. As Dick Cheney, vice-president, would admit years later, dissolving the Iraqi military would prove to be a strategic blunder. Of the various reasons, one was an assumption that they could remove from office the senior officials across Saddams government and the remaining layers of government would simply show up for work everyday, (Bennett 2011). It turned out that completely stigmatizing and removing the forces that had long unified the state, proved to allow it to fall into ethnic violence. Colin Powell, former U.S. Secretary of State, had expressed that U.S. officials opted against

planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. Compounding this, Cheney expressed that many externalities occurred which were not expected (Bennett 2011). These comments accurately display that many ideological misconceptions were present amongst those tasked with leading this postwar state towards democratization. Positively, the externalities of the events in Iraq may lead future actors within postwar states to reassess how integral to securing democratization violence really is. This researchs findings show that it is not. Additionally, the effects of the first major misstep in democratizing Iraq directly led to events which would support another misconception, that multiethnicity was a causal factor for Iraqs stalling democratic transition. Due to these actions Iraqs previous structures, albeit minimally existing, for political accountability, reform, and dialogue had all but been dissolved completely. Whereas in Taiwan, the political structure was preserved and incrementally changed to become democratic, Iraq was left with major interest groups who had to commit to new power-sharing agreements. Thus, major interest groups, who had overarchingly been of ethnic natures, rationally made very little concessions. Thus, with no institutional design of accountability available, groups were left to vie for power forcefully. This caused sectarian violence to become the norm, and drove the country into complete civil war (Costs of War 2011). Though today Iraq holds limited elections, issues of corruption, a crippled economy, and sectarian violence are ever present. Many issues of contention within the society are still unresolved and leads the country to perform poorly in terms of democratic governance. Further, political commentators have turned to explaining how Iraqs multiethnic nature has been one of the core issues that caused its transition to become problematic. However, it would be hard to argue that if the structure of the state had been preserved and a different method of catalyzing democratization was pursued, Iraq would still have progressed into civil war, which temporarily halted democratization. Multiethnicity did not cause Iraqs problems, it was simply the juncture on which many of its problems manifested. Its problems were caused by the idea that war is an integral part of securing high

levels of democratic consolidation. While it could be argued that democratization would have still been successful if war was pursued and its institutions protected after the fact, the aforementioned postwar limitations of democratization leave too many vulnerable junctions, all of which could have led the countrys democratization through similar destabilizing obstacles. 4.2 Moving forward This research sheds light on how the literature on democratization can show considerable bias, in terms of what catalyzes and correlates with high levels of democratic consolidation. Through statistical analyses we find: comparative to homogenous states, multiethnic states perform better; and compared to violently transitioned states, nonviolently-transitioned states perform at near equal levels of democratic governance. This shows that certain causal factors may lead violently-transitioned states to perform worse, at the onset of democratization. Examining what these causal factors might be, Taiwan showed us that by democratically deepending and utilizing institutions, its means of securing democracy were legitimized amongst the states citizens. Alternatively, using conflict to secure democratization makes states vulnerable. While it may work towards securing the opportunity to democratize, it does not seem to help states democratically consolidate, at least within the short-term. As Iraq showed us, when there remain no legitimate means of securing political dialogue and accountability whence these structures are removed, it effectively sets the impetus for democratic backsliding and the further creation of political misdiagnoses, based on bad ideas.

Appendix: Data

Appendix: Data

Appendix: Data

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