THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

ALFREDO M. DE LEON VS. HON. GOVERNOR BENJAMIN ESGUERRA G.R. NO. 78059 AUGUST 31, 1987 (RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSITUTION) FACTS: An original action of prohibition was instituted by Alfredo M. De Leon, as Barangay Captain of Dolores Rizal with other baranggay councilmen for the memorandum ordered by Governer Benjamin Esguerra in replacing the petitioners. On February 9. 1987, Alfredo M. De Leon received a memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 designating new officers barangay captain and barangay councilmen by authority of the Minister of Local Government granted by the 1986 provisional constitution. The Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. However, the respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the following provision: All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. ... and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution. ISSUES: Whether or not the 1986 provisional constitution may be validly recognized? Whether or not the 1987 constitution was already in effect on February 2, 1987 the day of the actual plebiscite or February 8, 1987, its announcement? HELD: The court held that since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it was antedated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the oneyear deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: "Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Further, the record of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission further shows the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the of facial confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite." .... Therefor, the 1987 Constitution is deemed ratified on February 2, 1987, the actual date of the voting and not February 8, 1987, the announcement of the resolution.

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G.R. NO. 160261 NOV. 10, 2003 Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee onJustice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by theChief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred tothe House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and threeweeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by HouseRepresentatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the

filing of the second impeachment complaint isunconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courtsas a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with thecorollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that itsvast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is afundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division inour Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and issupreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. TheConstitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of thevarious departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declareexecutive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court isthat while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied inSection 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leavethe matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of thecalibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

RAMON A. GONZALES VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-28196 NOVEMBER 9, 1967 (CONSTITUTIONALITY OF R.A. NO. 4913 ENFORCING RBH 1 AND 3 - ELECTION) FACTS: Petitioner prays for the judgment of restraining the COMELEC from enforcing R.A. No. 4813 declaring the act unconstitutional and void. 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case being a political question? 2. Whether or not the "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void? 3. Whether or not the congress may propose amendments to the constitution and at the same time call for a constitutional convention? 4. May constitutional amendments be submitted for ratification at a general election? 5. Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution? HELD: Issue 1 Jurisdiction of the court Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that,

the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power. In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review. Issue 2 Legality of congress and legal status of the congressmen Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect. Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress with a House of Representatives composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said elections remained in force, we cannot see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment within the period aforementioned. Issue 3 Available alternatives to the congress In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day. Issue 4 May constitutional amendments be submitted for ratification in a General Election? There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Issue 5 - Would the submission now of the contested amendments to the people violate the spirit of the constitution? The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance

that the major political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken place on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for amendment, have been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.

MANUEL B. IMBONG VS. JAIME FERRER AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMELEC G.R. NO. L-32432 SEPTEMBER 11, 1970 (CONSTITUTIONALITY OF R.A. NO. 6132 AND THE PROVISIONS IN SEC. 2, 4, 5 AND 8 OF PARAGRAPH 1) FACTS: These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales to mpugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly passed Resolution No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen. After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year Congress, acting as a Legislative Body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives," 1 "and that any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution." On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a Legislative Body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not RA No. 6132 is constitutional? 2. Whether or not Section 2, 5, and 8 is valid and does not prejudice the rights of individual embodied in the constitution? HELD: Issue 1: In sustaining the constitutionality of R.A. No. 4914 and R.A. No. 6132, the court explained the following: 1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds. 3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid. 4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4. Issue 2 Validity of Section 2, 5 and 8 Section 2: Apportionment of delegates Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides. The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available official population census, for such apportionment was presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation to effect the desired proportional representation. Section 5: Deprivation of Libery Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."

As observed by the Solicitor General in his answer, the overriding objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.) Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves, propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the community. As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice. Section 8: Prohibition from organization and political party support Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important public interests.
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits: 1. any candidate for delegate to the convention (a) from representing, or (b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization; and 2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group of whatever nature from (a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or

(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election.

While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a) which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all organization support." We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to all organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any existing organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political party or any other association for support. And he, as much as any candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected.

SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-34150 APRIL 2, 1981 (AUTHORITY OF INTERIM BATASANG PAMBANSA) FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings agains the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments: ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional? HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following: 1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence. 2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." 3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or

revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-43150 OCTOBER 16, 1971 (APPROVAL OF PIECEMEAL AMENDMENT ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1) FACTS: Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1 A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18 BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention: Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows: Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971. Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case? 2. Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in

said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the Convention separately from the whole amended constitution? HELD: The court upheld the petitioner. Issue 1: Jurisdiction of the courts The Court has jurisdiction over the case. As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution.. Accordingly, we are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes without saying that we do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case. Issue 2: Constitutionality of piecemeal amendment The Conventional Organic Resolution No.1 and subsequent acts and resolution is violative of the constitution due to the following grounds: 1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendment shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. 2. Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable

as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts.. A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-446640 OCTOBER 12, 1976 (PRIME MINISTER PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENT DURING MARTIAL LAW) FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in "barangays" applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which is quoted in the footnote below. 2 On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The questions ask, to wit: (1) Do you want martial law to be continued? (2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution. On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976. Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case? 2. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission? HELD: Issue 1 Justiciability of the courts We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people. Issue 2 Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution? As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President. Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Issue 3 - Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission? It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-44640 OCTOBER 12, 1976 (PEOPLES INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION) FACTS: On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order 1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; 2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; 3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7 Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition: DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION? According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments. (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law. (3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication. (4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. (5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative. (6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose. ISSUES: 1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative. 2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. HELD: Issue 1 Whether R.A. No. 6735 is sufficient to cover the peoples initiative to propose amendments? R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM. Curiously, while R.A.

No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. Issue 2 Validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

RAUL R. LAMBINO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 174153 OCTOBER 25, 2006 (PEOPLES INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION) FACTS: On February 15, 2006, Raul R. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado (Lambino Group) intiated a peoples intiative to amend the constitution. The alleged that the group gathered 6,327,952 votes which composed of 12% of all registered voters with 3% representative from each legislative district. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification: DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER? On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. The Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people." ISSUES: 1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative; 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and 3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition. HELD: There is no merit to the petition. The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.

a) The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People due to the following: Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states: Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature." The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet which contains as follows: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERALPRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?" There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. b) The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives:

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides: ARTICLE XVII AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (2) A constitutional convention. Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative. Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments. Under the US Jurisprudence, the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the

deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39 Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located. In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,

Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

POLICE POWER
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS. DRILON G.R. NO. L-81958 JUNE 30, 1988 (SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FEMALE HOUSEHOLD WORKERS) FACTS: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's nonimpairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police power is valid under the Constitution? HELD: In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by physical and personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical

predicament. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has not been contemplated. The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process? HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the equal protection of laws and due process. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country

from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. DUE PROCESS The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such

interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . . The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

WALTER LUTZ VS. ANTONIO ARANETA G.R. NO. L-7859 DECEMBER 22, 1955 (VALIDITY OF SUGAR ADJUSTMENT ACT FACTS: This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act. Promulgated in 1940, the due to the threat to our industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market"; wherefore, the national policy was expressed "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes." In section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufactured; while section 3 levies on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane and ceded to others for a consideration, on lease or otherwise a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 19491950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the case directly to this Court (Judiciary Act, section 17). ISSUE: Whether or not the CA No. 567 or Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional and for public purpose. HELD: The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the taxing power. Analysis of the Act, and particularly of section 6, will show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great source of the

state's wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain. Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in section 6 of the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power. That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. At any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". From the point of view we have taken it appears of no moment that the funds raised under the Sugar Stabilization Act, now in question, should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are also in need of similar protection; that the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of "all or none." As ruled in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson vs. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 84 L. Ed. 744, "if the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied;" and that "the legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach".

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECREATARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. NO. L-78742 JULY 14, 1989

FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which involve constitutional questions as to the validity of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the wellbeing and economic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program: SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential

Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. ISSUE: Whether or not Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 is unconstitutional and violates individual rights to equal protection clause and due process. HELD: The court in upholding the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 discussed the issues. The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain. Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal. This brings us now to the power of eminent domain. Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation. Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the

exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused. A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the political question. The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ G.R. NO. L-63419 DECEMBER 18, 1986 FACTS: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the bouncing check law is unconstitutional? HELD: BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to the public interests. Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; and (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable (least limitable) of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 million to 80 million pesos a day. By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable on demand. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated: The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword. In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that

the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the wellaccepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents. G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

FACTS: The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds. The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. ISSUE: Whether or not MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 is unconstitutional and violative of the constitution rights to academic freedom and quality education, due process and equal protection? HELD: In reversing the decision of the RTC Judge and affirming the constitutionality of the MECS Order No. 12, the court cited that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power, violation of due process, and undue delegation of legislative power? HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution. The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with

applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents. G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

FACTS: This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void. Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution: RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve

the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration. ISSUE: Whether or not the Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 is a valid exercise of police power? HELD: We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance. An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.' The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.

POWER OF IMMINENT DOMAIN

THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellees. FACTS: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged: That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdiction of this court. The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been inserted in order to show the general character of the defenses presented by each of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with very clear and explicit reasons, supported by ambulance of authorities, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above question as its principal ground of appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a necessity to expropriate the particular land for public use? Whether or not said expropriation is in accordance with the principles of eminent domain? HELD: The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use." It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and if the court shall find the right to expropriate exists," means simply that, if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, then the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislative and not a judicial question. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation. If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that question. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people. Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been examined, and we are justified in making the statement that in each case the legislature directly determined the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the particular case. It is not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is presented to the legislative department of the government

and that department decides that there exists a necessity for the exercise of the right in a particular case, that then and in that case, the courts will not go behind the action of the legislature and make inquiry concerning the necessity. But, in the case of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St. rep., 622, 628]), which was cited in support of the doctrine laid down in section 158 above quoted, the court said: But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be taken, then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts. Where the application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court, the question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in limene. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.) And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that their exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described that the municipal board believed at one time that other land might be used for the proposed improvement, thereby avoiding the necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of the dead. Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvements, the defendants further contend that the street in question should not be opened through the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said cemetery is public property. If that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot appropriate it for public use. The city of Manila can only expropriate private property. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.) Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)

The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority of the Spanish Governor-General. REPUBLIC VS. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. G.R. NO. L-18841

FACTS: The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94, with the powers and duties, in addition to certain powers and duties formerly vested in the Director of Posts. The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries.2 The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party to the present case, but has contractual relations with the parties) is an American corporation authorized to transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legis lative franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operate broadcasting and radiotelephone and radio-telegraphic communications services. Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically betransferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. The contracting parties agreed to divide the tolls, as follows: 25% to PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT and 70 % for RCA, and again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement was later extended to radiotelephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1958.5 Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone service, containing a statement, above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission. One of the many rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and

prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates.10 Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former. On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents. Actually, they inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement.12 On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections.13 When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958.14 The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States.15 At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had 5,000 pending applications for telephone connection.16 The PLDT was also maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000 pending applications.17 Through the years, neither of them has been able to fill up the demand for telephone service. The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT.18 The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission and in consideration of 37 1/2% of the gross revenues.19 In its memorandum in lieu of oral argument in this Court dated 9 February 1964, on page 8, the defendant reduced its offer to 33 1/3% (1/3) as its share in the overseas telephone service. The proposals were not accepted by either party. On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed. Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground that the severance of telephone connections by the defendant company would isolate the Philippines from other countries, the court a quo, on 14 April 1958, issued an order for the defendant:

"(1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78) trunk lines that it has disconnected between the facilities of the Government Telephone System, including its overseas telephone services, and the facilities of defendant; (2) to refrain from carrying into effect its threat to sever the existing telephone communication between the Bureau of Telecommunications and defendant, and not to make connection over its telephone system of telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreign countries through the said Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio facilities of RCA Communications, Inc.; and (3) to accept and connect through its telephone system all such telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreign countriesuntil further order of this Court." On 28 April 1958, the defendant company filed its answer, with counterclaims. It denied any obligation on its part to execute a contract of services with the Bureau of Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to compel it to enter into interconnecting agreements, and averred that it was justified to disconnect the trunk lines heretofore leased to the Bureau of Telecommunications under the existing agreement because its facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone operations in excess of authority, in competition with, and to the prejudice of, the PLDT, using defendant's own telephone poles, without proper accounting of revenues. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims. Both parties appealed. Taking up first the appeal of the Republic, the latter complains of the action of the trial court in dismissing the part of its complaint seeking to compel the defendant to enter into an interconnecting contract with it, because the parties could not agree on the terms and conditions of the interconnection, and of its refusal to fix the terms and conditions therefor. We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the

needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. The Bureau of Telecommunications, under section 78 (b) of Executive Order No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communications throughout the Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces under such terms and conditions or arrangement with present owners or operators as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned; but there is nothing in this section that would exclude resort to condemnation proceedings where unreasonable or unjust terms and conditions are exacted, to the extent of crippling or seriously hampering the operations of said Bureau. A perusal of the complaint shows that the Republic's cause of action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the Bureau's facilities from the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be carried out by the PLDT, thereby preventing the Bureau of Telecommunications from properly discharging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public. Save for the prayer to compel the PLDT to enter into a contract (and the prayer is no essential part of the pleading), the averments make out a case for compulsory rendering of inter-connecting services by the telephone company upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine to be just. And since the lower court found that both parties "are practically at one that defendant (PLDT) is entitled to reasonable compensation from plaintiff for the reasonable use of the former's telephone facilities" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 224), the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation of such services independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and reasonable compensation for the same, instead of dismissing the petition.

Defendant PLDT, as appellant, contends that the court below was in error in not holding that the Bureau of Telecommunications was not empowered to engage in commercial telephone business, and in ruling that said defendant was not justified in disconnecting the telephone trunk lines it had previously leased to the Bureau. We find that the court a quo ruled correctly in rejecting both assertions.

Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the Bureau of Telecommunications, expressly empowered the latter in its Section 79, subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the Philippines", and, in subsection (c), "to prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head, equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered by the system". Nothing in these provisions limits the Bureau to non-commercial activities or prevents it from serving the general public. It may be that in its original prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that the service would be limited to government of f ices: but such limitations could not block fuure expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms of the Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the Government not to engage in services that are authorized by law. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDT vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724). The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse under its contract, are, likewise, untenable. First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone service being very much more than the supposed competitors can supply. As previously noted, the PLDT had 20,000 pending applications at the time, and the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone company's inability to meet the demands for service are notorious even now. Second, the charter of the defendant expressly provides: "SEC. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of messages. or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise: ." (Act 3436) And third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau of Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature, that is, throughout the Philippines, if not abroad" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 216). The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines. It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT lies in the fact that said appellant did not expect that the Bureau's telephone system would expand with such rapidity as it has done; but this expansion is no ground for the discontinuance of the service agreed upon.

The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to compensation for the use of its poles for bearing telephone wires of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Admitting that section 19 of the PLDT charter reserves to the Government "the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the grantee to attach one ten-pin cross-arm, and to install, maintain and operate wires of its telegraph system thereon; Provided, however, That the Bureau of Posts shall have the right to place additional cross-arms and wires on the poles of the grantee by paying a compensation, the rate of which is to be agreed upon by the Director of Posts and the grantee;" the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its poles by the plaintiff, contending that what was allowed free use, under the aforequoted provision, was one ten-pin cross-arm attachment and only for plaintiff's telegraph system, not for its telephone system; that said section could not refer to the plaintiff's telephone system, because it did not have such telephone system when defendant acquired its franchise. The implication of the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if such use is for plaintiff's telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches more than one (1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes. As there is no proof that the telephone wires strain the poles of the PLDT more than the telegraph wires, nor that they cause more damage than the wires of the telegraph system, or that the Government has attached to the poles more than one ten-pin cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter, we see no point in this assignment of error. So long as the burden to be borne by the PLDT poles is not increased, we see no reason why the reservation in favor of the telegraph wires of the government should not be extended to its telephone lines, any time that the government decided to engage also in this kind of communication. In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to continue the link between its network and that of the Government is that the latter competes "parasitically" (sic) with its own telephone services. Considering, however, that the PLDT franchise is non-exelusive; that it is well-known that defendant PLDT is unable to adequately cope with the current demands for telephone service, as shown by the number of pending applications therefor; and that the PLDT's right to just compensation for the services rendered to the Government telephone system and its users is herein recognized and preserved, the objections of de- fendant-appellant are without merit. To uphold the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future expansion of its services under its non-exclusive franchise.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. FACTS: It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3) Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question. ISSUE: Whether or not ordinance no. 7, series of 1950 is a valid exercise of police power?

HELD: the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees. FACTS: Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as the Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga. On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10 In her motion to dismiss filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among other things, that the land under her administration, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her P5,000,000.00 as unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit. After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959. On March 15, 1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be awarded. The plaintiff will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands of defendant Toledo-Gozun since (sic) the amount deposited as provisional value from August 10. 1959 until full payment is made to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in court. In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be paid by the plaintiff to defendant Castellvi from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land when the instant action had not yet been commenced to July 10, 1959 when the provisional value thereof was actually deposited in court, on the total value of the said (Castellvi) land as herein adjudged. The same rate of interest shall be paid from July 11, 1959 on the total value of the land herein adjudged minus the amount deposited as provisional value, or P151,859.80, such interest to run until full payment is made to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in court. All the intervenors having failed to produce evidence in support of their respective interventions, said interventions are ordered dismissed.

The costs shall be charged to the plaintiff. On June 21,1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Catellvis property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends to expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the same when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that the taking of the property for the purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupy the property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the meantime increased during the period of the lease. This would be sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would have the effect of depriving the owner of the property of its true and fair market value at the time when the expropriation proceedings were actually instituted in court. The Republics claim that it had the right and privilege to buy the property at the value that it had at the time when it first occupied the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract What was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement was that, should the lessor require the lessee to return the premises in the same condition as at the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the right and privilege (or option) of paying the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition as it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the lessees performance of the undertaking to put the land in said condition. The fair value at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not refer to the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost of restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when the lessee took possession of the property. Such fair value cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase was never intended by the parties to the lease contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of contracts that However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree. We hold, therefore, that the taking of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the taking of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,16 the just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation

should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be expropriated, which had never been under lease to the Republic, the Republic was placed in possession of said lands, also by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned as of June 26, 1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain. the Republic maintains that, even assuming that the value of the expropriated lands is to be determined as of June 26, 1959, the price of P10.00 per square meter fixed by the lower court is not only exhorbitant but also unconscionable, and almost fantastic. On the other hand, both Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun maintain that their lands are residential lands with a fair market value of not less than P15.00 per square meter. The lower court found, and declared, that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are residential lands. The finding of the lower court is in consonance with the unanimous opinion of the three commissioners who, in their report to the court, declared that the lands are residential lands. The Republic assails the finding that the lands are residential, contending that the plans of the appellees to convert the lands into subdivision for residential purposes were only on paper, there being no overt acts on the part of the appellees which indicated that the subdivision project had been commenced, so that any compensation to be awarded on the basis of the plans would be speculative. The Republics contention is not well taken. We find evidence showing that the lands in question had ceased to be devoted to the production of agricultural crops, that they had become adaptable for residential purposes, and that the appellees had actually taken steps to convert their lands into residential subdivisions even before the Republic filed the complaint for eminent domain. So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in determining the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is practically impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded rule, but, as a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner is to be estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. (Miss. and Rum River Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403)." In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market.17 The owner may thus show every advantage that his property possesses, present and prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the market may be satisfactorily determined.18 The owner may also show that the property is suitable for division into village or town lots.19

The trial court, therefore, correctly considered, among other circumstances, the proposed subdivision plans of the lands sought to be expropriated in finding that those lands are residential lots. This finding of the lower court is supported not only by the unanimous opinion of the commissioners, as embodied in their report, but also by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the province of Pampanga composed of the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor and the District Engineer. Eminent domain; Taking of property; Elements of.A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; Momentary defined. "Momentary means lasting but a moment; of but a moments duration (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every moment (Websters Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition). The word momentary when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to -mean a limited periodnot indefinite or permanent. Mere notice of intention to expropriate cannot bind landowner; Expropriate must be commenced in court.It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands at some future time, but certainly mere noticemuch less an implied noticeof such intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court. Just compensation; Value of property expropriated determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.Under section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Circumstances considered in determining the value of the property expropriated.In expropriation proceedings, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market. The owner may thus show every advantage that his property possesses, present and prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the market may be satisfactorily determined. The owner may also show that the property is suitable for division into village or town lots. Provisional value cannot be made the basis for fixing the fair market value of the property expropriated; Reason.The amount fixed as the provisional value of the lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily represent the true and correct value of the land. The value is only

provisional or tentative, to serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property being expropriated by the condemnor. Same; Same; Valuation fixed for assessment purposes cannot be made the basis for fixing the fair market value of the property expropriated where the landowner did not intervene in fixing it.The valuation fixed for the purposes of the assessment of the land for taxation purposes cannot bind the landowner where the latter did not intervene in f ixing it. Same; Same; Report of the commissioners; Nature of.The report of the commissioners of appraisal in comdemnation proceedings are not binding, but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is concerned. Same; Same; Same; Right of court to change.A court of first instance or, on appeal, the Supreme Court, may change or modify the report of the commissioners by increasing or reducing the amount of the award if the facts of the case so justify. While great weight is attached to the report of the commissioners, yet a court may substitute therefor its estimate of the value of the property as gathered from the record in certain cases, as, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either palpably inadequate or excessive. Payment of interest on amount adjudged as the value of the property expropriated not allowed for the period during which the owner of the property received rentals from the condemnor; Case at bar.If Castellvi had agreed to receive the rentals from June 30, 1956 to August 10, 1959, she should be considered as having allowed her land to be leased to the Republic until August 10, 1959, and she could not at the same time be entitled to the payment of interest during the same period on the amount awarded her as the just compensation of her land. The Republic should pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the value of her land, minus the provisional value that was deposited, only from July 10, 1959 when it deposited in court the provisional value of the land.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972 FACTS: Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925." *

On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case? HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing. LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-BALAOING, petitioners, vs. HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents. G.R. No. L-48685 September 30, 1987 FACTS: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation." Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied ISSUES: 1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978 without notice and without hearing and in issuing the Order dated June 28, 1978 denying the motion for reconsideration. 2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause, specifically: a) The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size and no matter how small the area to be expropriated; b) "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is not really for a public purpose; c) The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court; d) The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors; e) The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and every raise of expropriation. HELD: The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed by the constitution, to wit: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. IV, Sec. 9); No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1). Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people, bereft of public character." The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.

The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. (p. 231) Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. 11, sec. 7]. The 1987 Constitution goes even further by providing that: The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]

POWER OF TAXATION
WENCESLAU PASCUAL, AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS FACTS: On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, an item of P85,000.00, "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals"; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal" which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May 29, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon"; that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was "illegal and, therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision'"; that, "in order to give a semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation", respondent Zulueta executed, on December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donationcopy of which is annexed to the petitionof the four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, as such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation." ISSUE: Whether or not the statute is unconstitutional and void? HELD: "It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. * * * It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure

which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money." (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Italics supplied.) The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language: "In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals." Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states: "Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be used only for a public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public purpose. * * * "The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. * * * ." (81 C.J.S. p. 1147; italics supplied.) The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, later on, became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.4 The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation. PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA FACTS: This suit was commenced by two lawyers; a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental surgeon and a pharmacist, purportedly "in their own behalf and in behalf of other professionals practising in the City of Manila who may desire to join it." Object of the suit is the annulment of Ordinance No. 3398 of the City of Manila together with the provision of the Manila charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected under the ordinance but paid under protest. The ordinance in question imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax "by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by

imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court." The ordinance was enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which empowers the Municipal Board of said city to impose a municipal ocupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons engaged in the various professions above referred to. Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, plaintiff s, upon being required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance, paid the same under protest and then brought the present suit for the purpose already stated. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3398 impose double taxation? HELD: The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city, it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. In raising the hue and cry of "class legislation", the burden of plaintiffs' complaint is not that the professions to which they respectively belong have been singled out for the imposition of this municipal occupation tax; and in any event, the Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select or exact taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law has authorized the City of Manila to impose the said tax, it has withheld that authority from other chartered cities, not to mention municipalities. We do not think it is for the courts to judge what particular cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes in addition to those imposed by the National Government. That matter is peculiarly within the domain of the political departments and the courts would do well not to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the National Government and with a population and volume of trade many times that of any other Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces. LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FACTS: Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donors gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donees gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to a religious organization is subject to donors tax? Held: Constitutional exemption for religious purpose refers only to property taxes.Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious

purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes. Imposition of gift tax on property used for religious purposes not violation of Constitution.A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution. ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA, petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra; ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS OF PATERNO MILLARE, respondents. FACTS: On June 8, 1972 the properties of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. was sold at public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid real property taxes thereon and the same was sold to Paterno Millare who offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued by the defendant Municipal Treasurer. (a) that the school is recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand students all in all; (b) that it is located right in the heart of the town of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; (d) that the high school and college students are housed in the main building; (e) that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and (f) that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos. The only issue left for the Court to determine and as agreed by the parties, is whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties are exclusively for education purposes? HELD: Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof, determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary thereto as well as to the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 470, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, are without legal basis and therefore void. On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college lot and building in question which were subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for the educational purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent residence of the President and Director thereof, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being used and rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation The phrase exclusively used for educational purposes was further clarified by this Court, thusMoreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is not limited to property actually indispensable therefor, but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, a school for training nurses, a nurses home, property use to provide housing facilities for

interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents (84 CJS 6621), such as athletic fields including a firm used for the inmates of the institution. The exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose the lease of the first floor to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education; Case at bar.It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for educational purposes as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary pur-poseeducational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education. Trial Court correct in imposing the tax not because the second floor is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes but because the first floor is being used for commercial purposes. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.

DUE PROCESS
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process?

HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the equal protection of laws and due process. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. DUE PROCESS The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither

arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON. RODOLFO S. MILADO, Department of Labor and Employment Mediator-Arbiter for Region VIII, Tacloban, City, and PHILPHOS MOVEMENT FOR PROGRESS, INC. (PMPI), respondents. FACTS: PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION (PHILPHOS) assails the decision of the Secretary of Labor of 7 August 1990 affirming the order of the Mediator-Arbiter of 28 March 1990 which directed the immediate conduct of a certification election among the supervisory, professional or technical, and confidential employees of petitioner corporation. On 7 July 1989, Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. On 15 November 1989, PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The amended petition was filed in view of the amendment of the PMPI Construction which included in its membership the professional/technical and confidential employees. On 14 December 1989, the parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. On 28 March 1990, Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees" 1 to comprise the proposed bargaining unit. On 16 April 1990, PHILPHOS appealed the order of 28 March 1990 to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who on 7 August 1990 rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in rendering the assailed rulings. On 8 July 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from holding the certification election among petitioner's supervisory, professional/technical, and confidential employees scheduled on 12 July 1991.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was abuse of due process? HELD: DUE PROCESS The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the

action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. 3 Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor. OTHER ISSUE This is precisely the situation which the law prohibits. It would create an obvious conflict of views among the members, or at least between two (2) groups of members espousing opposing interests. The intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank and file, or where the supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting interests, especially where, as in the case at bar, the supervisors will be commingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit. Members of the supervisory union might refuse to carry out disciplinary measures against their co-member rank and file employees. 10 Supervisors have the right to form their own union or labor organization. What the law prohibits is a union whose membership comprises of supervisors merging with the rank and file employees because this is where conflict of interests may arise in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and strikes. 11 The professional/technical employees of petitioner therefore may join the existing rank and file union, or form a union separate and distinct from the existing union organized by the rank and file employees of the same company. As to the confidential employees of the petitioner, the latter has not shown any proof or compelling reason to exclude them from joining respondent PMPI and from participating in the certification election, unless these confidential employees are the same professional/technical employees whom we find to be occupying rank and file positions.

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power, violation of due process, and undue delegation of legislative power? HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution. The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with

applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 131728 March 9, 1998 BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, respondents. FACTS: On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss. On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition for change of venue. On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding. On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance." In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without prejudice to, and independent of, this Court's separate determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab."

On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00. On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. 4 According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance. 5 It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private complainant Juvielyn Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance. Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayan's parents, who affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their daughter's decision to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion. Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." 6 On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date, stated that the State interposed "no objection to the granting of bail and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the granting of bail." Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail. On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to join the aforestated motion." Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion. The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.

On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila. Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the scheduled promulgation. On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of the them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for "Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court. Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the decision nullified and the case remanded for new trial; thus: The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III, 1, Constitution). ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICATION DENYING THE RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS? HELD: Jurisprudence 11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."

it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 16 Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. 17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; 18 (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; 19 and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. 20 There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings.

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents. FACTS: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. 2 On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the two (2) firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress. Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious. 4 On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against petitioner be also dismissed. Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166; 7 and petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an

elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881. 8. ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Congressman Francisco in the case is violative of due process? HELD: The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process which requires that the procedure established by law should be obeyed. COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. 31 Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor.

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. FACTS: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. 5 When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988. The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. ISSUE: Whether or not the reduction of 15% is violative of due process clause (a) the questioned order violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the

rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process? HELD: Procedural due process It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law. 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multifaceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order. At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:

Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: xxx xxx xxx (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service; ... There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. Substantive due process Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business. On the other hand, respondents assert that since petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at any time without necessarily violating any vested property right of herein petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of such privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary, but it must be fair and reasonable. There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires. Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common good. The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate

them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

HELD: The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: 1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. 2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. 3. "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." 4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial." 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. 6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. 7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen

the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S. J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA. petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR., MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents. FACTS: As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital on February 10, 1991 and Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint AdministrationFaculty-Student Investigating Committee 2 which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. 3 Through their respective counsels, they requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits. In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." 4 Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge on or before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses. On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against respondent students. In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge against you arose from initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of students, showing your participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their written answers to the above charge on or before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their defenses. 5 In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held in abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the evidence against them. 6

Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer with regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to a petitioners dated February 27, 1991, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991. On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the Administration so that this case be decided not just on the Law School level but also on the University level." In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the physical hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the needs of the neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President of the University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not. Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming they did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondents students are still guilty in accordance with the principle that "where two or more persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the respondents can be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education and contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. 12 In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, 13 the Board excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also set the investigation of the two students on March 21, 1991. On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.

On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent students and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident. 15 Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then held. On April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereeta to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to the original petition. 16 Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day lifetime. 17 Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondents Judge Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April 10, 1991. 18

On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the instant case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. 19 On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students. 20 The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge. 21 ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were denied of procedural due process? HELD: The minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions are as follows: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. The above requirements were met. Thus due process was accorded to the respondent students.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents. FACTS: The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2 City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled: AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3 Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance NO. 6537 is violative of equal protection clause> HELD: The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees. FACTS: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 4 is violative of due process clause? Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation

Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. ISSUE: Whether or not the anonymous letter can be the basis of the ombudsman investigation without violating the equal protection clause? HELD: Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. 31 On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent FACTS: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases5 both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010." The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.7 The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and

corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). ISSUE: Whether or not the PTC is violative of equal protection? HELD: According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities."77 "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."78 The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.79 Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80 It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple

inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted] Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class." The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause."98 "Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach."It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.100 In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step" process.101 "With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked."102 In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination."103 PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS: This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation." ISSUE: Whether or not the BP 51, 52, 53 are violative of equal protection caluse? HELD: Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from

government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated. In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chosen belonging to the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is

EQUAL PROTECTION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents. FACTS: This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1 Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the probation act violates the provision of the bill of rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of laws? HELD: This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer which is the situation now and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs.

HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents. FACTS: City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled: AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3 Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5 On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 is violative of the equal protection clause? HELD: The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13 TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of the national government.

The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be interfered with, thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and independent of the national government. As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011). With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. FACTS: This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation." For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions: Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. .... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4. Sec. 4. ... Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact. ... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied). Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be held on January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52) Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.) ISSUE: Whether or not BP Blg. 52 is violative of equal protection clause? HELD: The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as

provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial. Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated. In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies"

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents. FACTS: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1, series of 1988 is violative of equal protection clause? HELD: The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act.

ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner,

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder 1 and attempted murder 2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides: Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours). On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, 3 relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan. 5 In his order dated December 14, 1993 6 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied. 7 Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of equal protection? HELD: The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and

liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the same class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent. FACTS: The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.7 The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the same. E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. ISSUE: Whether or not EO NO. 1 is violative of the equal protection clause? HELD: The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the

intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.67 The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies"68 were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption." In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force." One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.74 "According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities."77 "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."78 The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.79 Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80 It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."82

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.83 "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."84 The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86 The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted] Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous administration" only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class."97 In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination."103

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to

the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of equal protection clause? HELD: Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. 31 On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees. FACTS: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause. ISSUE: Whether or not ordinance no. 4, series of 1964 is violative of equal protection clause? HELD: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI G.R. NO. 81561 JANUARY 18, 1991 FACTS: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8). Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes) opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the NBI. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987). Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence is illegally searched and seized objects? HELD: The court in ruling the negative explained that this constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions and not between private individuals. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN vs. HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR G.R. NO. 82585 NOVEMBER 14, 1988 FACTS: Petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitution requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest?

HELD: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. NICOMEDES SILVA vs. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC G.R. NO. 81756 OCTOBER 21, 1991 FACTS: In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the nullification of Search Warrant No. 1 issued by respondent Judge as well as the return of the money in the amount of P1,231.00 seized from petitioner Antonieta Silva. On June 13, 1986, Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, pursuant to the said "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of search warrant 1 was tainted with illegality and that the judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the Order? HELD: In ruling for the petitioner, the court held after examining the questioned search warrant as well as the "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part suggestive questions answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon.

The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided. In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes abuse of discretion".

ESTEBAN MORANO vs. HON. MARTINIANO VIVO G.R. NO. L-22196 JUNE 30, 1967 FACTS: Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00. On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962.1wph1.t In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commissioner of Immigration ca issue warrant of arrest? HELD: The power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is planted on the "accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions."8 So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact that where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition under which they were admitted as non-immigrants. Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

ANDREW HARVEY vs. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO G.R. NO. 82544 JUNE 28, 1988 FACTS: The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes. On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. ISSUE: Whether the warrants of arrest issued by respondent is in violation of the constitution? HELD: The court rejected petitioners contention. There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence. That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia". While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth.

Arrest warrant issued by the commission on is not constitutionally proscribed. The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions, which are substantially Identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. "The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.". There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings. NARCISO ALVAREZ VS. CFI G.R. NO. 45358 JANUARY 29, 1937

FACTS: the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at nay time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest is illegal due to the following grounds: 1. because it has been based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom he considered reliable; 2. it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant; 3. fact that it authorized its execution at night; 4. lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be seized; and 5. search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the AntiUsury Board might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him for violation of the Anti-usury Law. HELD: The following are the respective decisions of the supreme court: 1. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance

2.

3.

4.

5.

of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. it appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night. Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People vs. Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDISON SUCRO G.R. NO. 93239 MARCH 18, 1991

FACTS: On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2,1989). As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned

out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, Ibid). It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant. (pp. 18-19, Ibid) At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. (pp. 6-8, TSN, June 19, 1989) When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24, 1989) The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence maybe admitted in the absence of search warrant? HELD: There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 89139 AUGUST 2, 1990 FACTS: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade, 3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. ISSUE: Whether or not the unlicensed firearm can be admitted as evidence? HELD: In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General: The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced officer, the behaviour of the men indicated that they were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When the police officer approached the men and asked them for their names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. . . . Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS G.R. NO. 87059 JUNE 22, 1992 FACTS: The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and

Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division. ISSUE: Whether or not the unlicensed firearm can be admitted as evidence without an arrest warrant? HELD: Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established. The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence. This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant. Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.

SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 123595 DECEMBER 12, 1997 FACTS: Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast." 6 Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. ISSUE: Whether or not the search was appropriate incident to his arrest and the hand grenade a product of unreasonable search and seizure? HELD: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; 34 and (6) a "stop and frisk." 35 In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement. At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. 38

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . 39 Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," 40 it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 41 Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast". Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. IDEL AMINNUDIN Y AHNI

G.R. NO. L-74869 JULY 6, 1988 FACTS: Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence may be accepted even though there was no search warrant? HELD: In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT G.R. NO. 91107 JUNE 19, 1991 FACTS: At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the

personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence is admissible event without search warrant? HELD: Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee. When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, 13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant. The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society. RODOLFO ESPANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 120431 APRIL 1, 1998

FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. ISSUE: Whether or not the ten cellophane of tea bags found in his house is inadmissible as evidence because there were no search warrant? HELD: Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence. An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions. As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control. The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner. HON. RICARDO PAPA VS. REMEDIOS MAGO G.R. NO. L-27360 FEBRUARY 28, 1968

FACTS: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of search when the policemen seized the products of the respondents without warrant of arrest? HELD: This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. 15 Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.) In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said: . . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. . . . . . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to. The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARI MUSA G.R. NO. 96177 JANUARY 27, 1993 FACTS: Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's

house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house. At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa ISSUE: Whether or not the plastic bag containing dried marijuana somewhere in the kitchen can be used as evidence even without obtaining prior search warrant? HELD: There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drugpusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may

not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence. Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. 48 We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. RICARDO C. VALMONTE vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEMBER 29, 1989 FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed. ISSUE: Whether or not there setting up of checkpoints is violative of searches without search warrant?

HELD: Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
RAMIREZ VS. COURT OF APEALS G.R. NO. 93833 SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 FACTS: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is in violation of R.A 4200 and whether the conversation in the tape recorded can be admitted as evidence in any proceeding? HELD: The aforestated provision clearly makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." The definition is broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionallycharged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 107383 FEBRUARY 20, 1986 FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. ISSUE: Whether or not the documents may be used as evidence in a case of legal separation? HELD: Indeed, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible as evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. NAVARRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 121087 AUGUST 26, 1999 FACTS: Sioco and Liquin, reporters, and after reporting to the police headquarters the incident in Entertainment City night club, were met by petitioner Navarro, a policeman, who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena pushing him to the wall. At this point, Lingan intervened. This angered Lingan, the two then had a heated exchange. Finally, as Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased. ISSUE: Whether or not the tape recorder is admissible as evidence? HELD: The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.

OPLE VS. TORRES G.R. NO. 127685 JULY 23, 1998 FACTS: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."[1] Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. ISSUE: Whether or not AO No. 308 is a violation of rights to privacy? HELD: It is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. By narrowly drawn, the intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. A.O. No. 308 does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.[67] The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation.[68] However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation.[69] The use of technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy.[70] As

technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions. Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational relationship test.[75] He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end.[76] In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hold that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
UNITED STATES VS. BUSTOS G.R. NO. L-12592 MARCH 8, 1918 FACTS: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing, including councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information as libelous. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. The judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In

view of this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive Secretary." Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and six councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-General, but whether the papers were forwarded to the Governor-General as requested the record does not disclose. ISSUE: Whether or not there is defendants will be held liable for libel? HELD: The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J. A communication made bona fide (good faith) upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable (libel). A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or

a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by the Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this action took place the Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted in such matter. We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALVADOR ALARCON G.R. No. 46551 December 12, 1939

FACTS: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of first Instance of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein except one of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter, signed by Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the herein respondent, Federico Magahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that paper of September 23, 1937. ISSUE: Whether or not there is excessive exercise of freedom of speech punishable by contempt of court? HELD: The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well defined by the cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to (1) impede, (2) obstruct, (3) embarrass, or (4) influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter complained of was published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have been influenced by the questioned publication. As stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that "newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the case is ended." AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS VS. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988 FACTS: Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), 1 envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer Lope V. Juban who suggested th they consult with the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed.

The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as wel as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. In a letter dated 16 December 1987, petitioner Hal McElroy informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis of it. The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact. ment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a excessive use of freedom of speech as to violate the right of privacy? HELD: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy." The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the trian of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject mater, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character. The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account. Juan Ponce Enrile is a Public Figure. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in the decisions" (1) that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when they received it; (2) that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and (3) that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. On one or another of these

grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that there was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. 16 There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private respondent. ARTURO BORJAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999 FACTS: On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT), private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned. During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the FNCLT to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of excess freedom of speech? HELD: The FNCLT was air undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the government and the private sector, and organized by top government officials and prominent businessmen. These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the conference itself. But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied in the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not validly

be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly became less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. Generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct Primarily, private respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioner was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or that the articles were written and published without good motives or justifiable ends. On the other hand, we find petitioner Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public deception. Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false or not" means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, 38 or that he possesses a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. The articles subject of the instant case can hardly be said to have been written with knowledge that these are false or in reckless disregard of what is false or not. This is not to say however that the very serious allegations of petitioner Borjal assumed by private respondent to be directed against him are true. But we nevertheless find these at least to have been based on reasonable grounds formed after the columnist conducted several personal interviews and after considering the varied documentary evidence provided him by his sources. Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. JOSE B.L. REYES vs. RAMON BAGATSING G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983 FACTS: Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. 2 During the course of the oral argument, 3 it was stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be

presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally." On October 25, 1983, the answer of respondent Mayor was filed on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo G. Montenegro. 5 It turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." 6 To be more specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." 7 Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured." ISSUE: Whether or not the freedom of speech may be restricted by the respondent mayor due to intelligence reports? HELD: The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. It is essential for the validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or censorship that the licensing authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify such a limitation there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. The possibility that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough." To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that (1) serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the (2) danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a (3)serious one. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should (1) inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. (2) Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. (3) Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. LEO PITA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989 FACTS: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and coedited by plaintiff Leo Pita. On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. ISSUE: Whether or not the publication is protected by the guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press? HELD: The "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 31 "the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action ... lies on the. . . authorit[ies]." "There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger." 33 "It is essential for the validity of ... previous restraint or censorship that the ... authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require." "To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test."

As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. 1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order; Test to determine obscenity: 1. whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. 2. that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency, that *w+hether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, 3. decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it. 2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; 3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001 FACTS: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14,2001. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RA. NO. 9006 5.4. is in violation of the freedom of speech? HELD: The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."11 The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 12 thus: There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality Nor is there justification for the prior restraint which 5.4Iays on protected speech. Near v. Minnesota,13 it was held: [The] protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates transports or the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and overthrow by force of orderly government Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a

limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election. .. Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. To summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS vs. VALERIANO E. FUGOSO G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948 FACTS: This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the ground that the respondent refused to grant such permit. ISSUE: Whether or not the mayor can deny the application of permit and suppress the freedom to a peaceful assembly? HELD: The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle growing out of the nature of wellordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that (1) it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, (2) not injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844 and 1119. Section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,

meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly. Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit cannot be given any consideration. As stated in the portion of the decision in Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort and convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities." To this we may add the following, which we make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . . .

MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO G. R. NO. 62270 May 21, 1984

FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), theplace indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. ISSUE: Wether or not the responsents are guilty of abridging the freedom of speech and assembly? HELD: Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level, there is persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A students rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substantially interfering+ with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of others. * * * But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reasonwhether it stems from time, place, or type of behaviourmaterially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law.

If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense for this would manifest arbitrariness which would restrict the freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed by the constitution.

LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, MERCY DE LEON, TERESITA EUGENIO, CORAZON GOMEZ, ELENA GUEVARRA, ROSALINA JINGCO, LOIDA IGNACIO, and EMERITA PIZARRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999 FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cario of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in affirming the CSC resolutions finding them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when their only "offense" was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. Moreover petitioners insist that the mass actions of September/October 1990 were not "strikes" as there was no actual disruption of classes. Petitioners therefore ask for exoneration or, in the alternative, award of back wages for the period of three (3) years when they were not allowed to work while awaiting resolution of their appeals by the MSPB and CSC, deducting the period of six (6) months' suspension eventually meted them. ISSUE: Whether or not the freedom of speech and assembly were validly exercised? HELD: The mass actions of September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to a strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons to protest and pressure the Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the non-payment or delay in payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they were entitled, and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours." In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, 18 we denied the claim that the teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. But the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper

authorities within the bounds of law, no one not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Court could have held them liable for their participation in the mass actions. The rights of free expression and assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties was not applicable to defend the validity of the 1990 mass actions because what were pitted therein against the rights of free expression and of assembly were inferior property rights while the higher consideration involved in the case of the striking teachers was the education of the youth which must, at the very least, be equated with the freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973 FACTS: Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan . In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm. After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for

perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company . ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may avail themselves of defense their constitutional right to freedom of speech and assembly? HELD: The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in

such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents. G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

FACTS: This is a consolidated case wherein the petitioners seeks the invalidity and unconstitutionality of BP 880, The Public Assembly Act of 1985. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. ISSUE: Whether or not BP 880 is unconstitutional? HELD: The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes. The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.21

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it contentbased because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny." FREEDOM OF RELIGION GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent. FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the director of posts was in violation of freedom of religion? HELD: Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination.

The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents. G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981 FACTS: This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. Contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicent Ferrer is violative of freedom of religion?

HELD: That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint cannot be branded as illegal. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation. In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. Plaintiff prays for the declaration of unconstitutionality of said ordinance in violation and suppression of freedom of religion. ISSUE: Whether or not tax imposed on the corporation is illegal and suppresses the right of freedom of religion? HELD: The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . . "When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. . . . In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of property here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their

fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute." (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 304-306). Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code, provides: SEC. 27. EXEMPTIONS FROM TAX ON CORPORATIONS. The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as such (e) Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code; Appellant's counsel claims that the Collector of Internal Revenue has exempted the plaintiff from this tax and says that such exemption clearly indicates that the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and does not fall under the above legal provisions. It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. The said ordinance is not unconstitutional, rather it is inapplicable to the case at bar. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA, respondents. G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." ISSUE: (1) first, whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the

reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs. HELD: Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include religious programs like its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed." We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 16 We have also laboriously defined in our jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist: 17 Religious Profession and Worship The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. (1) Freedom to Believe The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul -- in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes. (2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. Accordingly, while one has lull freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to "go forth and multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot express in his disbelief in act of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful. The police power can validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee, born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband. We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. However, we reverse the ruling of the appellate court as to the reason why the program was barred. First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. 19 It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for "attacking" either religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1," "B," "C," and "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 22 this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 23 we further

ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger."

EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU G.R. NO. 95770 MARCH 1, 1993 FACTS: All the petitioners in the original case were minor school children, and members of the sect, Jehovah's Witnesses who were expelled from their classes by various public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955 and by Department Order No. 8, dated July 21, 1955 issued by the Department of Education. Aimed primarily at private educational institutions which did not observe the flag ceremony exercises, Republic Act No. 1265 penalizes all educational institutions for failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony with public censure on first offense and cancellation of the recognition or permit on second offense. ISSUE: Whether or not the State may coerce certain individuals to salute the flag in violation of their religious belief and right to freedom of religion? HELD: No doubt, the State possesses what the Solicitor General describes as the responsibility "to inculcate in the minds of the youth the values of patriotism and nationalism and to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs." The teaching of these values ranks at the very apex of education's "high responsibility" of shaping up the minds of the youth in those principles which would mold them into responsible and productive members of our society. However, the government's interest in molding the young into patriotic and civic spirited citizens is "not totally free from a balancing process" 12 when it intrudes into other fundamental rights such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the constitutional right to education and the unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious upbringing of their children in accordance with the dictates of their conscience and their sincere religious beliefs. 13 Recognizing these values, Justice Carolina Grino-Aquino, the writer of the original opinion, underscored that a generation of Filipinos which cuts its teeth on the Bill of Rights would find abhorrent the idea that one may be compelled, on pain of expulsion, to salute the flag sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge during a flag ceremony. 14 "This coercion of conscience has no place in a free society". 15 The State's contentions are therefore, unacceptable, for no less fundamental than the right to take part is the right to stand apart. 16 In the context of the instant case, the freedom of religion enshrined in the Constitution should be seen as the rule, not the exception. The ostensible interest shown by petitioners in preserving the flag as the symbol of the nation appears to be integrally related to petitioner's disagreement with the message conveyed by the refusal of members of the Jehovah's Witness sect to salute the flag or participate actively in flag ceremonies on religious grounds. 20 Where the governmental interest clearly appears to be unrelated to the

suppression of an idea, a religious doctrine or practice or an expression or form of expression, this Court will not find it difficult to sustain a regulation. However, regulations involving this area are generally held against the most exacting standards, and the zone of protection accorded by the Constitution cannot be violated, except upon a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has a right to protect. To the extent to which members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect assiduously pursue their belief in the flag's religious symbolic meaning, the State cannot, without thereby transgressing constitutionally protected boundaries, impose the contrary view on the pretext of sustaining a policy designed to foster the supposedly far-reaching goal of instilling patriotism among the youth. While conceding to the idea adverted to by the Solicitor General that certain methods of religious expression may be prohibited 26 to serve legitimate societal purposes, refusal to participate in the flag ceremony hardly constitutes a form of religious expression so offensive and noxious as to prompt legitimate State intervention. It is worth repeating that the absence of a demonstrable danger of a kind which the State is empowered to protect militates against the extreme disciplinary methods undertaken by school authorities in trying to enforce regulations designed to compel attendance in flag ceremonies. Refusal of the children to participate in the flag salute ceremony would not interfere with or deny the rights of other school children to do so. It bears repeating that their absence from the ceremony hardly constitutes a danger so grave and imminent as to warrant the state's intervention The responsibility of inculcating the values of patriotism, nationalism, good citizenship, and moral uprightness is a responsibility shared by the State with parents and other societal institutions such as religious sects and denominations. The manner in which such values are demonstrated in a plural society occurs in ways so variable that government cannot make claims to the exclusivity of its methods of inculcating patriotism so all-encompassing in scope as to leave no room for appropriate parental or religious influences. Provided that those influences do not pose a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to society and its institutions, expressions of diverse beliefs, no matter how upsetting they may seem to the majority, are the price we pay for the freedoms we enjoy.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211 SEPTEMBER 15, 1989 FACTS:

NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN G.R. NO. L-3708 MAY 18, 1953 FACTS: On On August 20, 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land amounting to P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance of P4,800 was made payable in 2 equal annual payments 7 per cent per annum with security of morgage over the same parcel of lands. Placido J. Esteban failed to pay the two installments setting up a defense the moratorium clause embodied in Republic Act No. 342. He claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted on August 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Phil-ippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war ; and that under section 2 of said Republic Act No. 342, payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine War Damage Commission, and this period has not yet expired. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he raised for the first time the constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the motion was denied. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 342 is violative of the non-impairment clause of the constitution? HELD: The moratorium is a postponement of fulfilment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign power" . In the United States, many state legislatures have adopted moratorium laws "during times of financial distress, especially when incident to, or caused by, a war". Thus, such laws "were passed by many state legislatures at the time of the civil war suspending the rights of creditors for a definite and reasonable time . The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a moratorium statute lies in the determination of the period of suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution. "Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control which the State retains over remedial processes, but the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interest of its people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end 'has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect.' * *. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of pro-tecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while, a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this court." The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end. * * *." "Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved power cannot be construed so as to destroy the

limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They must be construed in harmony with each other. Application of this 'rule of reason' was justified on the theory that all contracts are made subject to an implied reservation of the protective power of the state, and that therefore statutes which validly exercise this reserved power, rather than impairing the obligations of an existing contract, are comprehended within them It must be noted that the application of the reserved power of the State to protect the integrity of the government and the security of the people should be limited to its proper bounds and must be addressed to a legitimate purpose. ALthough conceding that the obligations of the mortgage contract were impaired, the court decided that what it thus described as an impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal. Constitution, within the police power of the State as that power was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which the legislature had found to exist." But the ruling in the Bleisdell case has its limitations which should not be overlooked in the determination of the extent to be given to the legislation which attempts to encroach upon the enforcement of a monetary obligation; if these bounds are transgressed, there is no room for the exercise of the power, for the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts would assert itself. Here are instances by which these bounds may be transgressed. (1) The impairment should only: refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right (2) The protective power of the state, the police power, may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts; (3) "A different situation is presented when 'extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy A shadow . The changes of remedy now challenged as invalid are to be viewed in combination, with the cumulative significance that each imparts to all; (4) The decision in the Bleisdell case is predicated on the ground that the laws altering existing con-tracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning their enactment. The obligations covered by Republic Act No. 342 and Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 had been pending since 1945 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits .are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief. There are at least three cases where the Supreme Court of the United States declared the moratorium laws violative of the contract clause of the Constitution because the period granted to debtors as a relief was found unwarranted by the contemplated emergency The continued opera-tion and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be pro-longed a minute longer, and, therefore, the same is declared null and void and without effect. ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. PARTNERSHIP VS. FEATI BANK & TRUST CO.

G.R. NO. L-24670 DECEMBER 14, 1979 FACTS: Plaintiff is a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613 and 106092 issued in its name, respectively, and the building restrictions were also annotated therein.4 Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez, free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in Annex D,5 while Lot No. 6 was acquired from Republic Flour Mills through a Deed of Exchange, Annex E.6 TCT No. 101719 in the name of Republic Flour Mills likewise contained the same restrictions, although defendant-appellee claims that Republic Flour Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6 in good faith, free from all liens and encumbrances, as stated in the Deed of Sale, Annex F7 between it and Emma Chavez. Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719, 101613, and 106092 were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiffappellant where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established. Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. It alleges that plaintiff-appellant completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue10 and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area x x x had been declared a commercial and industrial zone x x x. On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which defendant-appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained building and planning permits to proceed with the construction. On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, supra, was submitted in the lower court for decision. The complaint sought, among other things, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction x x x restraining and enjoining defendant, its agents, assigns, and those acting on its or their behalf from continuing or completing the construction of a commercial bank building in the premises x x x involved, with the view to commanding the defendant to observe and comply with the building restrictions annotated in the defendants transfer certificate of title. ISSUE: Whether or not resolution no. 27 is violative of the non-impairment clause?

HELD: The police power is superior to contractual stipulations between parties on the use of lands sold by subdivisions even if said conditions are annotated on the Torrens Title.With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendantappelleereferring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appelleeit should be stressed, that while nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Invariably described as the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers and in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Resolution No. 27, S-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila are, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ G.R. NO. L-63419 DECEMBER 18, 1986 FLORENTINA A. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ G.R. NO. L-63419 DECEMBER 18, 1986 FACTS: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the bouncing check law is unconstitutional? HELD: BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to the public interests.

Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; and (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable (least limitable) of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 million to 80 million pesos a day. By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable on demand. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit.

Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated: The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword. In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be

punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched. HELD: Checks are not mere contracts, but substitutes for money. Non-impairment of contract clause applies only to lawful contracts.We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and theref ore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. GANZON VS. INSERTO G.R. NO. L-56450 JULY 25, 1983 FACTS: On August 28, 1979, petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judicially foreclose a real estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in his favor. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed on March 19, 1979 between Randolph Tajanlangit and Esteban Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo Ganzon as mortgagee on the other hand was to secure the payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note amounting to P40,000.00 in favor of Ganzon. On October 31, 1979, the private respondents filed an amended complaint. Owing to the reason that The vendor warrants to the vendee peaceful possession of the above-mentioned parcel of land and that the said vendor shall see to it that all occupants thereof at the execution of this deed shall vacate the premises within a period of one hundred twenty (120) days computed from the date of the execution of this document. The aforestated guaranty was violated by defendant Ganzon since the occupants of the said lot up to the present are still within the premises of the lot; and (5) The extra-judicial foreclosure is illegal since defendant Ganzon committed a breach in his warranty and the deed of real estate mortgage does not contain any stipulation authorizing mortgagee Ganzon to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged property. After the issues had been joined but before actual trial, the private respondents filed a Motion For Release Of Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu Thereof, to which the petitioners interposed an Opposition. This is a Motion for Release of Real Estate Mortgage and for the Clerk of Court to Accept Bond or Cash in Lieu Thereof. Finding the motion filed by plaintiff through counsel for approval of surety bond well taken and considering that the opposition filed by defendants does not question the validity of the surety bond itself but is anchored upon grounds that had already been passed upon by this Court in the order dated November 20, 1980, the surety bond in the amount of P80,000.00 issued by Summa Insurance Corporation is hereby approved.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has the authority to change the mortgage contract into a surety bond to ensure payment of the sale? HELD: A Trial court cannot order that a real estate mortgage be substituted with a surety bond. Applying the principles underlying the nature of a mortgage, the real estate mortgage constituted on Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1F of the subdivision plan Psd-27482, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324 cannot be substituted by a surety bond as ordered by the trial court. The mortgage lien in favor of petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable from the mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would convert such lien from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This conversion cannot be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage contract. Contracts, Court order for substitution by surety bond of a mortgage lien would violate constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts.Moreover, the questioned orders violate the nonimpairment of contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION GAMBOA VS. CRUZ G.R. NO. L-526291 JUNE 27, 1988 FACTS: On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others. The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her. On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner. On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of constitutional rights to counsel? HELD: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the

respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. 5 As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to those under police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remind police investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police lineup, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. PEOPLE VS. MACAM G.R. NO. 91011-12 NOVEMBER 24, 1994 FACTS: Accused Macam et all were charged with the Crime of Robbery with homicide. It appears that the security guards at the factory of the father of accused Eduardo Macam detained appellants. They were later brought to the Quezon City Police Headquarters for investigation. Since they refused to admit their participation in the commission of the crime, appellants were then brought to the Quezon City General Hospital and were made to line-up together with several policemen in civilian clothes. Salvacion Enrera, Benito Macam and Nilo Alcantara, who were confined at the hospital for injuries sustained during the robbery, were asked to pinpoint the perpetrators. At that time, appellants were handcuffed and bore contusions on their faces caused by the blows inflicted on them by the police investigators. ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of Custodial Investigation? HELD: Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch as the accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However, as a result of the changes in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial system well before his trial begins (U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 37 L Ed 2d 619, 93 S Ct 2568 [1973]). It is therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings (U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926 [1967]).

After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces. However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at the police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused can not be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the incourt identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not show that said identifications were of independent origin. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON G.R. NO. 85215 JULY 7, 1989 FACTS: Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2 On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten notes stating his willingness to compromise for alleged irregularities. About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6 which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K. ISSUE: Whether or not the above written evidence is violative of custodial investigation? HELD: It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative

investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the socalled "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. PEOPLE VS. PINLAC G.R. NOS. 74123-24 SEPTEMBER 26, 1988 In the case of People vs. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770, promulgated on March 20, 1985, which cited the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, this Court reiterated the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation. Therein, We said 7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, .... He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. (pp. 19-20, 139 SCRA) When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2). In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. (People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289). The Fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance with the duties of an interrogating officer. As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence.

Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the accused during custodial investigation was inadmissible, although he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, for the reason that the prosecution failed to show that those rights were explained to him, such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood" by the accused. (People vs. Nicandro supra) Going to the instant case, We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession. PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS G.R. NO. 101808 JULY 3, 1992 D uring the trial, it was clearly established that the alleged oral admission of the appellant was given without the assistance of counsel as it was made while on board the police vehicle on their way to the police station. The specific portion of the decision of the court a quo reads as follows: . . . the police boarded the two, the accused Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay in their jeep and proceeded to the police station of Balagtas, Bulacan to be investigated, on the way the accused told the police, after he was asked by the police if he killed the victim, that he killed the victim because the victim was abusive; this statement of the accused was considered admissible in evidence against him by the Court because it was given freely and before the investigation. The foregoing circumstances clearly lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused Ramon Bolanos is guilty of having killed the victim Oscar Pagdalian. (Judgment, p. 6) A Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), was filed by the Solicitor General's Office, dated April 2, 1992, with the position that the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of appellant while on board the police patrol jeep. Said office even postulated that: "(A)ssuming that it was given, it was done in violation of appellant's Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent and to have a counsel of his choice, while already under police custody." (Manifestation, p. 4) Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families. (Emphasis supplied). Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, besides appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, this Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under review. PEOPLE VS. ANDAN G.R. NO. 116437 MARCH 3, 1997 Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family

and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters. We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 97214 JULY 18, 1994 Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. 3 Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," 4 which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 5 A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony.

PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO G.R. NO. 117487 DECEMBER 12, 1995S The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of appellant's plea of guilty, it does not affect the requirement compelling the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. No where in the rules does it state that an extrajudicial confession is a prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. While the constitutional infirmities that attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and should not be glossed over, his conviction was based mainly on his plea of guilt made in open court and not on the extrajudicial confession, which formed but a small aspect of the prosecution's case. An extrajudicial confession only serves to confirm or substantiate a plea of guilty entered in open court. As between an extrajudicial confession and a judicial admission, the latter significantly is given evidentiary weight. Even assuming the extrajudicial confession in this case could not be given evidentiary weight because of mistakes committed by authorities in conducting their custodial investigation and in their gathering evidence, his plea of guilty on arraignment, his repeated admissions to the same in spite of repeated warnings of the trial judge of the consequences of his plea and the presence of ample corroborating testimony from a credible eyewitness to the crime establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The essence of the plea of guilty in a trial is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the

precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information. 17 A plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. 18 This, notwithstanding, (in line with the pronouncement of the Court in several cases 19) the trial court received evidence to determine if the appellant erred in admitting his guilt. Independent of such plea, there was more than sufficient evidence adduced to prove that appellant indeed committed the acts charged. RIGHT TO BAIL RULE 114 BAIL - Bail is the 1. security given 2. for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, 3. conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of 1. corporate surety domestic and foreign corporation licensed as a surety, 2. property bond lien or real property of the accused (1) Owner; (2) If 1, Equivalent in amount (3) If 2, atleast equivalent to the bail 3. cash deposit, or 4. recognizance. Conditions of bail:FASE 1. Effective upon approval and remain in force during proceeding, unless court directs otherwise; 2. Appearance when court requires; 3. Failure to appear is a waiver of his right to be present and trial may proceed in absentia; 4. Surrender upon conviction. Bail a matter of right; exception - All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. Burden of proof in bail application - the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. Amount of bail: (ANPCAWPPFF) 1. Ability to finance of the accused; 2. Nature and circumstances of the offense; 3. Penalty of the offense charged; 4. Character and reputation of the accused; 5. Age and health of the accused; 6. Weight of evidence; 7. Probability of the accused being present;

8. Forfeiture of other bonds; 9. Fugitive from justice when arrested; 10. Pendency of other case of the accused. Bail not required 1. Shall be release immediately, when a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense or possible penalty of destierro which has been imprisoned for 30 days; 2. At discretion of court, period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged. Bail were filed 1. Amount fixed, at the court having jurisdiction or in the absence of the latter, at any court; 2. Bail is discretion or under recognizance, only at the court when the application is filed; 3. Not yet charged, at any court. BASCO VS. RAPATALO ADM. MATTER NO. RTJ-96-1335 MARCH 5, 1997 FACTS: Complainant Inocencio Basco charged respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case (Criminal Case No. 2927) without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing. Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for murder was filed against a certain Roger Morente, one of three accused. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on said date as the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified. Another attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995. In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995. He later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995[1] was issued on the basis of a marginal note[2] dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00," signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 (when the hearing of the petition for bail was aborted and instead arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995. In his comment dated October 16, 1995, respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since

he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail. ISSUE: Whether or not a Judge may issue a bail on the ground that said petition for bail wash not oppose by the prosecutor and in accordance with the latters recommendation in the absence of a hearing? HELD: Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution.[5] In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to release. It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense cpunishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court.

A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. "The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused. Although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge should have nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application. x x x Only after satisfying himself that the prosecution did not wish to oppose the petition for bail for justifiable cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and taking into account the factors enumerated in Rule 114, Sec. 6. Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be traced to the case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons[39] where this Court gave the following "instructions" to the People's Court, however, this was replaced upon the amendment and insertion of The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify." The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of bail to the accused. This also prevents the practice in the past wherein a petition for bail was used as a means to force the prosecution into a premature revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to do so, the accused would claim the grant of bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong.[42] It should be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an application for bail must be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution were permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the proceeding, which is to secure provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits.[43] In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this Court reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an pplication for bail is filed: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra); (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied. PEOPLE VS. DONATO G.R. NO. 79269 JUNE 5, 1991 FACT: The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion, 1 and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987 granting the motion for reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which asked the court to allow petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer for a reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored. Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987. In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof. As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to bail. ISSUE: Whether or not the an accused charged with an offense that is subject to bail may not be granted by the Court in view of the flight risk and interest of public? Whether or not the right to bail may be waived? HELD: Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for

bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail. We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. 33 But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. However, we agree with Petitioner that private respondent has waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009. When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that: b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person. they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his copetitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it." Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may be.

This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures; 45 the right to counsel and to remain silent; 46 and the right to be heard. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. PEOPLE VS. GARRA G.R. NO. 90643 JUNE 25, 1993 FACTS: The conviction of Agustin Fortes y Garra for the rape of a young girl described by the trial court as "a guileless lass of only 13, [a] sixth grade pupil, bred in a barangay of rural atmosphere," and the denial by the trial court of his application for bail pending his appeal from the judgment of conviction are questioned in these consolidated cases. In G.R. No. 90643, the accused appeals from the decision of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Irosin, Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 219. The court a quo, in its Decision dated 18 November 1988 but promulgated on 25 January 1989, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay the victim the sum of P20,000.00 to answer for damages and costs. 1 In G.R. No. 91155, the accused seeks to annul and set aside two (2) related orders of the said trial court denying his application for bail, filed after his conviction, to secure his provisional liberty pending the resolution of his appeal. On the same day, the accused filed his notice of appeal 14 wherein he requested that the amount of the appeal bond be fixed by the trial court. The following day, 26 January 1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal 15 but did not resolve the request to fix the amount of bail. Thus, on 11 April 1989, the accused filed an "Application for Bail on Appeal" 16 reiterating his earlier request that the bail bond for his provisional liberty pending appeal be set. This was subsequently denied by the trial court in its Order of 19 June 1989 on the ground that ". . . the accused has already been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of rape and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and his appeal from the decision already approved by the Court . . . ." 17 Thereupon, on 19 August 1989, the trial court issued a Commitment of Final Sentence turning over the person of the accused to the Director of Prisons in Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. 18 On 25 August 1989, the accused filed a motion to reconsider the RTC's 19 June 1989 Order denying his application for bail pending appeal, 19 but the same was denied in the Order of 6 September 1989. 20 In the meantime, the trial court, on 12 September 1989, transmitted to this Court the records of criminal Case No. 219. We received the same on 16 November 1989 and docketed the appeal as G.R. No. 90643. On 9 December 1989, the accused filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court denying his application for bail and his motion to reconsider the said denial. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 91155. In the Resolution of 20 December 1989, 21 this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition.

Then, on 18 June 1990, the said case was ordered consolidated with G.R. No. 90643. 22 The records of G.R. No. 91155 do not disclose if the respondents had actually filed the required comment. ISSUE: Whether or not bail may be granted to a person convicted by the trial court of the crime of reclusion perpetua? HELD: There is no merit in the said petition. The clear implication, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, 26 ruled that: Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. In the instant case, the rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied his application for bail during the pendency of the appeal. COMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA G.R. NO. 93177 AUGUST 2, 1991 FACTS: In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot. ISSUE: Whether or not Military may apply for bail? HELD: We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system. xxx xxx xxx

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice. The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

U.S. VS. PURGANAN G.R. NO. 148571 SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8 Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and

reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory. Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069. Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001 ISSUE: Whether or not bail may be granted to person subject to extradition cases when the nature of the offense not in violation of Philippine Laws but of foreign country? HELD: As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70 Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations. Alleged disenfranchisement - We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class." It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail. Anticipated delay - Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action. Not a flight risk - Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not

actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition. SUMMARY By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.

BAYLON VS. SISON A.M. No. 92-7-360-0 April 6, 1995 FACTS: ISSUE: There are two main arguments invoked and relied on by respondent judge to support and justify his grant of bail to the accused, namely, that time was of the essence, considering that the accused had been detained since October 21, 1991; and that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection to the granting of bail and to ask for an opportunity to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt against the accused. HELD: We reject the first tenuous proposition that time was of the essence, since the ambient circumstances obtaining prior to the grant of bail could not but have cautioned respondent judge to be more circumspect in entertaining and resolving the petition therefor. First, the accused were charged with double murder, each of which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, hence bail is not a matter of right. Second, no bail was recommended in the information which was filed on the bases of the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident, thus constituting clear and strong evidence of the guilt of all the accused. 10 Third, at the time of the application for bail, there was still pending a reinvestigation of the case being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor. It must be noted that the reinvestigation was at the instance of the accused themselves, hence any resultant delay caused by the conduct thereof is naturally and logically attributable to them. And, finally, the guileful setting of the hearing of the petition for bail on December 23, 1991, when the same was filed only on December 21, 1991 which was a Saturday, readily casts doubt on the good faith in and the regularity of the procedure adopted by the defense.

This brings us to the second and main contention of respondent judge. He would want to impress upon this Court that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to seek permission from the trial court to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, and that when it failed to do so in any of its pleadings filed with the court, respondent judge was left with no other recourse but to grant the application for bail. He likewise asserts that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection during the hearing on the petition for bail. Such arguments are deplorably specious and lamentably absurd. The obstinate persistence of respondent judge in posturing that he did conduct a hearing on December 23, 1991 is belied by the fact that the order granting bail, the contents of which could merely be deduced after a careful perusal of the records of the case and the other orders issued by him in view of the parties' failure to present the same, leaves much to be desired. For one, it does not contain the requisite summary of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support the grant of bail. What appears from the records is that the petition for bail was granted on the basis merely of the joint counter-affidavit of the accused, and possibly of a witness, and the position paper of the accused. The prosecution was not even given the chance to cross-examine the accused on their counter-affidavit. Mere affidavits or recitals of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, hence they cannot legally form the basis of an order granting bail. MANOTOC VS. CA G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986 FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said business, but acts as president of the former corporation. When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Instance Corporation as surety. On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." ISSUE: Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. HELD: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.

... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise. Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities. As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. he constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states: The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG VS. OLALIA G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007 HELD: In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings. At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order. First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice rearrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently." Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been

detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NOS. L-72335-39 MARCH 21, 1988

FACTS: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. ISSUE: Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? RULING: A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the of the prosecutor be enhanced. Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law

has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter. We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. GALMAN VS. SANDIGAN BAYAN G.R. NO. 72670 SEPTEMBER 12, 1986 FACTS: On November 11, 1985 petitioners, filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as

filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment. But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to- two-vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was "very material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14 On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985. On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of due process upon the existence of partial tribunal? HELD: Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no doubt, that a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the defense." The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a motion for the reconsideration of said denial for the reason that it would be futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same. ... His posture ... is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of something else. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice

Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the actuality of such directive having been complied with to the letter. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in the City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information given by the Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said jail. The same information was given when the custody was proposed to be given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the custody of the accused military personnel with their respective Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after sometime. ... The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel: "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case outside the Court had been monitored by Malacaang presumably for it to know what was happening and to take remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of the President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that purpose. There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room', wherein military and Malacaang personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings." the close monitoring by Malacaang showed its results on several occasions specified in the Report. Malacaang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence injustice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacaang intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding. " It is abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the case should be handled He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be complied with. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly designed to accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the same offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power. The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of

politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the centuryand that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 131728 March 9, 1998 BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, respondents. FACTS: On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiyab

asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss. On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition for change of venue. On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding. On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance." In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without prejudice to, and independent of, this Court's separate determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab." On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00. On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. 4 According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance. 5 It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private complainant Juvielyn Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance. Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayan's parents, who affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their daughter's decision to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.

Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." 6 On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date, stated that the State interposed "no objection to the granting of bail and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the granting of bail." Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail. On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to join the aforestated motion." Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion. The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano. On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila. Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the scheduled promulgation. On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of the them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for "Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court. Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the decision nullified and the case remanded for new trial; thus:

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III, 1, Constitution). ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICATION DENYING THE RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS? HELD: Jurisprudence 11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 16 Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. 17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; 18 (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; 19 and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. 20 There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO G.R. NO. L-21325 OCTOBER 29, 1971 FACTS: The defendants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza to refrain the latter from testifying in the robbery committed by the defendants.

In the evening of January 9, 1964, while they were in the house of their co-accused Priolo Billona, the accused Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused Francisco Billons, Modesto Ronquilla. Crescencio and Severo Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the, latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. 2 The death was due to the wounds inflicted, two in the epigastric region, one in the right lumbar region, and another in the left breast. It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the lower court reached its decision. Its dispositive portion found the accused, now appellant Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder], defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by the circumstance of evident premeditation aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each of the said accused, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, the penalty of [reclusion perpetual]." 3 Reference was likewise made in such decision as to why the other co-accused were not convicted, two of them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the others three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Roquilla acquitted. Defendant asserts that in conspiracy the other accused should also be guilty for the murder of the Estelito Nogaliza. ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution established proof beyond reasonable doubt for the three accused? HELD: It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. 5 That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into count. The proof against him must survive the reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway away judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.

By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense. The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would have been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability. DUMLAO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-52245 JANUARY 22, 1980 FACTS: PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS: This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the

commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation." ISSUE: Whether or not the BP 51, 52, 53 is violative of the presumption of innocence provided in the constitution? HELD: here is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case. In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first provides: a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact ... ...the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact. The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case.". We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence. "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact." It is clear that the law challenged therein did in fact establish a presumption of guilt from the mere filing of the information or criminal complaint, in violation of the constitutional right to presumption of innocence.

MARQUEZ VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 112889 APRIL 18, 1995 FACTS: The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice as that phrase is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law states: Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: xxx (e) xxx xxx

Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)

Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. ISSUE: W whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office? HELD: The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided: Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) ...

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. 5 (Emphasis supplied) Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no

obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter. Concurring Opinion, DAVIDE JR. Thirdly, the disqualification in guestion does not, in reality, involve the issue of presumption of innocence. Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint against him. He is disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt. Finally, Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95 SCRA 392 [1980]) cannot be invoked to cast doubt on the validity of the challenged disqualification. Dumlao struck out as violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence that portion of the second paragraph, Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact." It is clear that the law challenged therein did in fact establish a presumption of guilt from the mere filing of the information or criminal complaint, in violation of the constitutional right to presumption of innocence. CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 74259 FACTS: The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court finding himself guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment ranging from Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the provincial government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is the amount misappropriated, and to pay the costs of this suit. Further, the accused is ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to the amount embezzled.

ISSUE: Whether or not he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation and whether his alibi may be considered? HELD: The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he has not committed is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed injustice on the petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be rejected as an warrant presumptuousness. The equipoise (equilibrium) rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed. FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD VS. CA G.R. NO. 94262 MAY 31, 1991 FACTS: The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1990, affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court of Tax Appeals which found the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1464), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil liable under Section 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code and ordering the forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doub? HELD: Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 10 In the case at bar, we find and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears mention that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation had been committed on the basis of circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on Section 5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. As earlier stated, forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which involves. such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt does not apply. In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence as clearly demonstrated by this comprehensive discussion in respondent court's decision. RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO G.R. NO. L-2809 MARCH 22, 1950 FACTS: The accused was charged guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention based on the following facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." On may 8, 1948, the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as follows: Court: Is this the case ready for trial? Fiscal: I am ready, your honor. Court: to the accused. Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? A. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty. Court: Arraign the accused. Note: Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this question. Q. What do you plead? A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo. Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo. The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man. Fiscal: I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo. Court: Sentenced reserved. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was not given the right to be heard by himself or counsel as provided in the Constitution? HELD: Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and

one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI G.R. NO. 122770 JANUARY 16, 1998 FACTS: Sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused was charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA AGBAYANI, the crime of rape. he above-mentioned address the complainant, Eden Agbayani, on the evening of July 19, 1994, was sleeping on the floor of the room with her father, the accused Eduardo Agbayani and her youngest sister, Edima, while her sisters, Fedelina and Diana slept on a bed. At the time, complainant's mother was outside the country, working in Saudi Arabia. At about 9:00 p.m. of July 19, Complainant Eden Agbayani was awakened from her sleep by hands caressing her breasts and vagina. She turned to discover that it was her father who was then molesting her. Frightened, she asked, "Tay bakit niyo po ginagawa sa akin ito, gayong kalalabas mo lang sa kulungan?" and threatened to kill her [sic]. The accused then proceeded to undress her. Thereafter he undressed himself and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the complainant who could only cry helplessly. The complainant thereafter felt blood dripping from her vagina and felt pain. The next day, or on July 20, 1994, the complainant informed her elder sister, Fedelina, of what had been done to her by her father. She was told not to worry as they would go to Bulacan to report the incident to Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan, who had, the year before, handled the rape case filed by Fedelina and Dodima. Several attempts were made by her sisters, Fedelina and Eden to reach the said fiscal but it was only on September 9, 1994, that they were able to meet with him. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported the

complaint to Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened the previously provisionally dismissed case and issued a warrant of arrest against the herein accused. Thereafter, the victim filed an affidavit of desistance whereby it was latter detracted because the same was obtained through force and intimidation of the victims mother. On the motion for a new trial, the accused claimed that he was denied the right to counsel because the trial court failed to apprise him of this right. Appellant countered that his consent to the appointment of counsel de oficio at his arraignment did not relieve the court of its duty under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to inform him of his right to counsel and that it would be grievous error to deny an accused such right. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court was unable to apprise the accused of his right to be heard by himself and counsel? HELD: The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of 22 December 1994 and the order issued by the trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only state that the court appointed de oficio counsel with the consent of the said accused. They do not categorically disclose that the trial informed appellant of his right to counsel of his own choice. However, this does not mean that the trial court failed to inform appellant of such right. This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial court's order 30 of 22 December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused." Since appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court stand. 31 In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 32 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him. It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right. In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the appellant at his arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. 37 Besides, it is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it in the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to question the alleged failure of the trial court to inform him of his right to counsel.

AMION VS. CHIONGSON A.M. NO. RTJ-97-1371 JANUARY 22, 1999 FACTS: A verified complaint dated August 29, 1996 1 was filed by Baltazar D. Amion with this Court on October 7, 1996 charging Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City with Ignorance or the Law and Oppression relative to Criminal Case No. 94-159772 pending in said trial court and in which complainant is the accused. The allegations against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a counsel de oficio for accused-complainant despite the latter's objection thereto on the ground that he had his own retained counsel in the person of Atty. Reynaldo C. Depasucat.

Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge appointed another lawyer in the person of Atty. Manuel Lao Ong of the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the scheduled hearing of the aforecited criminal case on March 28 and 29 1996. He further avers that his retained counsel was ready for hearing on said dates but on March 27, 1996, the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that Atty. Depasucat was ill. It was for this reason that accused-complainant was not represented by defense lawyer in the scheduled hearing which prompted respondent judge to appoint Free Legal Aid Lawyer Atty. Manuel Lao Ong. Notwithstanding complainant-accused's vehement opposition, respondent judge proceeded with the triat on March 28, 1996 with Atty. Ong representing the complainant-accused as counsel de oficio. He also claims that Atty. Ong did not have sufficient knowledge of the case and that no prior conference was held between said counsel de oficio and himself. Complainant-accused asserts that the aforesaid incidents constitute a clear violation of his right to due process and a deprivation of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own choice. Respondent judge reiterated his belief that his appointment of a counsel de oficio to represent the accused-complainant is justified because of the vexatious and oppressive delay on the latter's part who has been represented by a counsel de parte who refuses or fails to appear during hearings. He averred that the records of the case will show that the accused-complainant and his lawyers have employed every means fair, but mostly foul, to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 94-15772. He added that the Petition for Certiorari and the Administrative Case were filed for the purpose of not only delaying the resolution of the case but also to pressure him into inhibiting himself. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent-judge deprived the complainant the right to be heard by himself or counsel in violation of the constitution? HELD: Verily, the facts and circumstances of this case point to the pervasive and prevaricated procrastination of the proceedings undertaken by the accused-complainant and his counsel. Contrary to what accused-complainant would want to impress upon this Court, it seems that he has been the oppressor while respondent judge Roberto Chiongson appears to be the oppressed. Through the course of the proceedings in the subject criminal case, accused-complainant had filed several Motions for

Inhibition, a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and this administrative complaint with the view of delaying the eventual disposition of the case. An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. 12 Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case. Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which brought upon the need for the appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal case had been dragging on its lethargic course. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION PEOPLE VS. QUITLONG G.R. NO. 121502 JULY 10, 1998 FACTS: The case was generated by an information for murder filed on 25 October 1994 against accusedappellants Salvador Quitlong, Ronnie Quitlong, Emilio Senoto, Jr., and several other unidentified persons following the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly after the filing of the information, submitted a motion for reinvestigation alleging that "it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim after getting irked when the latter urinated near and in front" 3 of his wife. The trial court acted favorably on the motion. On 12 December 1994, the City Prosecutor filed a motion to admit an amended information on the basis of affidavits 4 executed by Nonita F. delos Reyes, Nicanor Ellamil, Lydia Q. Cultura, as well as accused-appellants Salvador and Ronnie Quitlong themselves, to the effect that it was Jesus Mendoza who had been responsible for the death of the victim. The information, as amended, included Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. 5 Unlike accused-appellants who were immediately arrested after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza remained at large. At their arraignment, the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The trial court held that conspiracy was inferred in the in the information and complaint as follows: That on or about the 20th day of October 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife,

with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO suddenly and unexpectedly, without any warning whatsoever, inflicting upon him a stab wound at the left thorax at the level of the 7th rib, left medclavicular line, penetrating the pereduum and left ventricle causing left remothones of 700 cc and hemoperecuduum of 250 cc, which directly caused his death. CONTRARY TO LAW. ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy was deemed inferred in the information and is not in violation of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation? HELD: Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 17 The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. The practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him has been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U.S. vs. Karelsen; 19 viz: 1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and 2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and 3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the 1. Name of the accused; 2. the designation given to the offense by the statute; 3. a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; 4. the name of the offended party; 5. the approximate time and 6. date of the commission of the offense; and 7. the place where the offense has been committed. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that

the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. 21 Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well. PECHO VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 111399 SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 FACTS: In our decision of 14 November, we modified the appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844 by holding the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pri-sion correctional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).

In short, we held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz., violation of Section 3(e) of R.A No. 3019, as amended because the said section penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not consummated he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that after having been acquitted of the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a special law, he could not be convicted anymore of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, an offense punishable under the Revised Penal Code, as general law; otherwise, the constitutional provision on double jeopardy would be violated. In other words, his acquittal of the crime charged crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, because both offenses arose from the same overt act as alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 14844. As to the second issue, the Office of the Solicitor General rejects the theory of the petitioner and submits that the information in this case contains the essential ingredients of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents; therefore, assuming there is sufficient evidence, the petitioner could be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents without violating Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution on the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be charged based on similar facts changing however the name of the offense without violation of the Constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him? HELD: There is absolutely no merit in the petitioner's claim that he could not be convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be informed without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It has the following objectives: 1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; 2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; 3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. 4 What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. 6 An incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake. 7 It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court thus provides: Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint of information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved. The succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes or is included in another. We have shown in the challenged decision why the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents is included in the offense charged. Moreover, we held that the information in this case "can also be considered as charging two offenses; the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents." And since the petitioner failed to object before trial to such duplicity, 8 he could be validly convicted of both or either of the offenses charged and proved. SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. L-65952 JULY 31, 1984

FACTS: The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The factual background is as follows: Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393. For violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner claims that he is not liable because said act was not under contract or transaction punishable by RA. 3019 but it is punishable by RPC. He further states that if he is punished under RPC which is not reflected in the information, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation is violated. ISSUE: Whether or not the charging of direct bribery in RPC would result to violation of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation? HELD: It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed BORJA VS. MENDOZA G.R. NO. L-45667 JUNE 20, 1977 FACTS: The jurisdictional infirmity imputer to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining of the City of Cebu which was not remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in this certionrari proceeding was the absence of an arrainment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical injuries. This notwithstanding respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in abssentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated

on August 18, 1976, found him guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. 2 It was then alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976 petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, 3 more specifically of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not there the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation was violated? HELD: Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of Possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter he is no longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an Idle ceremony. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION UNITED STATES VS. JAVIER G.R. NO. L-12990 JANUARY 21, 1918 FACTS: Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, on the 20th of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading the carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused. The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely, that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit

B is the sworn statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas. ISSUE: Whether or not the right of confrontation of witnesses is violated when the sworn statement of a person is deceased at the time of the trial? HELD: Appellant's argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of the Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S., 325) that it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. 1. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon deposition or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." 2. That a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. For courts to determine the credibility of the witness.

TALINO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NOS. L-75511-14 MARCH 16, 1987 FACTS: The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26k, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments. Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were allowed. They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned transactions. In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the testimony in a separate trial by other defendants violates the right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution? HELD: The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the

evidence of the prosecution. While it is true that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain on record against an the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused. The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration. 11 With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin that it intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. 1. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination. 2. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. COMPULSORY PROCESSES ROCO VS. CERVANTES G.R. NO. 158275 JUNE 28, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the business of buying and selling dressed chicken. Sometime in 1993, he purchased his supply of dressed chicken from private respondent Cals Poultry Supply Corporation (Cals Corporation, for short), a domestic corporation controlled and managed by one Danilo Yap. As payment for his purchases, petitioner drew five (5) checks payable to Cals Corporation against his account with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB). Cals Corporation deposited the above checks in its account with PCIB but the bank dishonored them for having been drawn against a closed account. Thereafter, Cals Corporation filed

criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of Batas Pambasa Blg. 22 (BP 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Petitioner Domingo Roco then filed with the MTTC Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cals Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court on 19 May 1999 and to bring with them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999. However, this was denied by the MTTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of his right to compulsory processes specifically for sub poena duces tecum is constitutional? HELD: We rule in the negative. A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena. Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will not be enforced. Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al.,9 we held: Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court,

and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified. Going by established precedents, it thus behooves the petitioner to first prove, to the satisfaction of the court, the relevancy and the definiteness of the books and documents he seeks to be brought before it. Admittedly, the books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case. It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden. TRIAL DE ABSENCIA PEOPLE VS. MAPALAO G.R. NO. 92415 MAY 14, 1991 Constitutional Law; Rights of Accused; Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide; Appeals; An accused who escapes from confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court, including his right to appeal his conviction.Parenthetically, the appeal of appellant Rex Magumnang should be struck down. After arraignment and during the trial, he escaped from confinement and had not been apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated. Nevertheless, through counsel, he appealed to this Court. Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court, may upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. In this case, appellant Magumnang remained at large even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed. The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the trial on the merits and after his arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and the judgment against him was promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2) Article III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment against him. While at large as above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in court. PEOPLE VS. VALERIANO

G.R. NOS. 103604-05 SEPTEMBER 23, 1993 FACTS: One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non appearance during the trial. After the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large. The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence commenced Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel. SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS LANSANG VS. GARCIA G.R. NO. L-33964 DECEMBER 11, 1971 FACTS: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more injured, including practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them. On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional requirements for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeaus corpus promulgated in Proclamation No. 889 was complied? HELD: Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended. Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that

there has been and there is actually a state of rebellion and that"public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State." In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" "when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist." As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence 14 attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New People's Army, other, of course, that the arm forces of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual commencement of hostilities. In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army proper is too small, compared with the size of the armed forces of the Government, that the Communist rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger public safety as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This argument does not negate, however, the existence of a rebellion, which, from the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be widespread or attain the magnitude of a civil war. The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the validity of the suspension of the privilege namely, that the suspension be required by public safety.

Before delving, however, into the factual bases of the presidential findings thereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's function in passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended. Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant 22 the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative findings; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The administrative findings can be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases, in both jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla" or "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," 23 even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence in the sense in which the term is used in judicial proceedings before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ. Referring to the test of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in the leading case of Nebbia v. New York, 24 the view that: ... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio ... With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practically of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ...

Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General ... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endanger by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily. No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test. Indeed, the coequality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness. Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889, as amended? Petitioners submit a negative answer upon the ground: (a) that there is no rebellion; -existence of rebellion is obvious (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts;- if the courts are not function, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeaus curpos not necessary. (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; - went into hiding because of the incident (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and according to Professor Egbal Ahman of Cornell University, "guerrilla use of terror ... is sociological and psychologically selective," and that the indiscriminate resort to terrorism is bound to boomerang, for it tends to alienate the people's symphaty and to deprive the dissidents of much needed mass support. (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. - Considering that the President was in possession of the above data except those related to events that happened after August 21, 1971 when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and national security required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing or water mains and conduits, as well as electric power plants and installations a possibility which, no matter how remote, he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest. He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that the situation was critical as, indeed, it was and demanded immediate action. This he took believing in good faith that public safety required it. And, in the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had substantial grounds to entertain such belief. Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President could have declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in

connection therewith." Even this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation of the AntiSubversion Act filed against herein petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison, and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or, otherwise, to order their release.

JACKSON VS. MACALINO G.R. NO. 139255 NOVEMBER 24, 2003 FACTS: A search warrant was issued against petitioner Raymond M. Jackson in violation of Art. 176 of the RPC. whereby his passport was obtained. When apprised of the seizure of the aforementioned passports from the petitioner, U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene of the United States Embassy in the Philippines advised the Department of Justice on December 10, 1997 that the said passports had been cancelled.[7] Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of Immigration and Deportation. On May 18, 1999 said passports did not match those appearing in the photographs affixed in the original applications for the issuance of the same. The CID issued Mission Order for the petitioners arrest for being an undesirable alien. The petitioner was arrested by P/C Inspector James B. Mejia of the Foreign Intelligence and Liaison Office, PNP Intelligence Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, who turned him over to the CID on the said date. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners writ of habeaus corpus may be granted for his detention by the CID? HELD: In their comment on the petition, the respondents averred that the CID is authorized under Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to issue warrants for the arrest of aliens on the CIDs finding of the existence of a ground for deportation. The petitioner cannot feign lack of due process because he filed a motion for the reconsideration of the December 11, 1997 Order of the BOC ordering his summary deportation which the BOC denied on October 14, 1998. When Mission Order RBR-99-164 was issued on May 21, 1999 to effect the arrest of the petitioner, it was on the basis of a final and executory order of deportation. The RTC, for its part, held that (a) the petition was premature because the petitioners petition with the CID to lift the summary order of deportation had not yet been resolved by the BOC of the CID; (b) the petition for habeas corpus was inappropriate because the petitioner was validly detained under a mission order issued by the Commissioner based

on the order of deportation issued by the BOC on December 11, 1997; (c) the petitioner is estopped from assailing his arrest and detention by the CID. Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained.[26] Section 4, Rule 102 of the said Rules provides when the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed or discharged authorized: Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[27] Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.[28] As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process.[29] Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. Amparo - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

PADUA VS. ERICTA G.R. NO. L-38570 MAY 24, 1988 FACTS: After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings, as above narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for cancellation of a hearing date. In a motion dated and filed on March 1, 1974, 5 copy of which was personally served on defendants' lawyer 6 Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another hearing on March 6, 1974 in Tarlac Court of First Instance entitled: Salud Dupitas vs. Mariano Abella, Civil Case No. 4904 which is of 1966 stint, and said court in Tarlac is anxious to terminate said case once and for all," and that the cancellation would "at any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two (2) hearing dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on these premises, he asked "that the hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be ordered cancelled." No opposition was filed by the defendants to the motion, whether on the ground that the motion had not been properly set for hearing, the clerk having merely been requested to "submit the ... motion upon receipt ... for the consideration of the Court," 7 or some other ground. Apart from filing this motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiffs counsel took the additional step of sending his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial, March 6,1974, to verbally reiterate his application for cancellation of the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent Judge however denied the application and dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge acted capriciously and unjustified in dismissing the case because of the motion to cancel the hearing at the specified date? HELD: The Trial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants' counsel had twice applied for and been granted postponements of the trial; that plaintiffs counsel had filed a written motion for postponement five (5) days prior to the hearing sought to be transferred, and this was the very first such motion filed by him; that although the motion for postponement could have been objected to, no opposition was presented by defendants, which was not surprising considering that their counsel had himself already obtained two (2) postponements; that the ground for cancellation was not entirely without merit: the counsel had a case in the Tarlac Court scheduled on the same day, March 6, 1974, which had been pending since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court understandably was anxious to terminate; that the Padua motion for postponement sought cancellation of only one (1) of three settings, leaving the case to proceed on the two (2) subsequent hearing dates; and the motion had been verbally reiterated by plaintiffs wife on the day of the hearing sought to be cancelled, Under the circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the respondent Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled. Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of causes. It should be their constant effort to assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and free presentation

of evidence by all the parties, specially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any part. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment. ... (T)rial courts have ... the duty to dispose of controversies after trial on the merits whenever possible. It is deemed an abuse of discretion for them, on their own motion, to enter a dismissal which is not warranted by the circumstances of the case. While it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion, such discretion must be exercised soundly with a view to the circumstances surrounding each particular case. If facts obtain that serve as mitigating circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set aside, especially where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent and no injury results to defendant . It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for postponement and the setting aside of orders previously issued, rest principally upon the sound discretion of the judge to whom they are addressed, but always predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby. When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow them. FLORES VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. L-25769 DECEMBER 10, 1974 FACTS: The accusation for robbery against petitioners Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel was filed as far back as December 31, 1951. The decision rendered on November 29, 1955 found them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of appeal was filed on December 8, 1955. 2 For a period of three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the Court of Appeals. On that day, there was a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the case. 3 Such a resolution was amended by a second resolution dated August 5, 1959, which granted the motion for counsel of appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on certain new facts or matters may be received and that a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered in accordance with the facts as found. 4 Accordingly, the case was returned to the lower court with the former decision set aside so that the trial could be had, but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear notwithstanding the six or seven dates set for such hearing. 5 It was further alleged that when thereafter he did take the witness stand, his testimony was far from satisfactory, characterized as a mere "fiasco" as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime; there was even a failure to identify the two accused. 6 Instead of rendering a new decision, the former one having been set aside as required by the Court of Appeals, the lower court merely sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 7 At that stage, five more years having elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against them due to such inordinate delay in their disposition, which covered the period of December 8, 1955 to May 10,

1965, a period of almost a decade; thus did they invoke their constitutional right to a speedy trial. 8 Respondent Court of Appeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the vigorous plea on the part of counsel for petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second motion for reconsideration dated January 28, 1966. In the answer on behalf of the People of the Philippines, the facts as above set forth were substantially admitted. However, a special and affirmative defense raised was that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Philippines, against whom it is filed, is not a tribunal or an office exercising judicial functions and that without the Court of Appeals being made a party to the petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Moreover, on the merits, the view was expressed that under the circumstances, it was not adequately shown that the right to a speedy trial had been violated, as the Court of Appeals had taken all the steps necessary to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial. On the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant for the conclusion that the right to a speedy trial, so zealously guarded in both the 1935 and the present Constitutions, had not been accorded due respect. There is thus merit in the petition. ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of cases? HELD: The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 9 "means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, ... ." 10 Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid defense. As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel: "The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law." It was stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. ... He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed." Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us considering the controlling doctrine announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time again.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION US VS. TAN TENG G.R. NO. 7081 SEPTEMBER 7, 1912 FACTS: Offended party, Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of age, was, on the 15th day of September , 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila; that on said day a number of Chinamen were gambling had been in the habit of visiting the house of the sister of the offended party; that Oliva Pacomio, on the day in question, after having taken a bath, returned to her room; that the defendant followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in that position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what happened upon the morning of the 15th of September. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first. later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. ISSUE: Whether or not the result of the scientific examination can be used as evidence against the accused and would not be inviolation of his right against self-incrimination? HELD: The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined: seems no more to infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief. The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the

purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself. In the case of Holt vs. U.S. (218 U.S., 245), Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court upon this question, said: But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent. The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS G.R. NO. 16444 SEPTEMBER 8, 1920 FACTS: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. ISSUE: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States and practically all state constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. HELD: Thus, the always forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in the late case of Holt vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 245), in resolving an objection based upon what he termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a

criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." We can only consistently consent to the retention of a principle which would permit of such a result by adhering steadfastly to the proposition that the purpose of the constitutional provision was and is merely to prohibit testimonial compulsion. The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in England in early days, but not in the other legal systems of the world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness against himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of republican government, the principle was taken into the American Constitutions, and from the United States was brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old English days. Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purgue the community of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood. But no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person. Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. BELTRAN VS. SAMSON G.R. NO. 32025 SEPTEMBER 23, 1929

FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. ISSUE: Whether or not the dictation to give a handwriting to adduce evidence against the accused in the crime of falsification is in violation of right against self-incrimination. HELD: As to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not limited to declaration but says "to be a witness." Moreover, as we are concerned with a principle contained both in the Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several states of the United States, but expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a common conception. In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wording in the constitutional clauses; this much is conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore immaterial that the witness is protected by one constitution from 'testifying', or by another from 'furnishing evidence', or by another from 'giving evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various phrasings have a common conception, in respect to the form of the protected disclosure. What is that conception? (4 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 863, 1923 ed.) As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret. It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume 4, page 878), says: Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor it is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. Requiring him to make specimens of handwriting is no more than requiring him to move his body . . ." but he cites no case in support of his last assertion on specimens of handwriting. We note that in the same paragraph 2265, where said authors treats of "Bodily Exhibition." and under preposition "1. A great variety of concrete

illustrations have been ruled upon," he cites many cases, among them that of People vs. Molineux (61 N. E., 286) which, as we have seen, has no application to the case at bar because there the defendant voluntary gave specimens of his handwriting, while here the petitioner refuses to do so and has even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not be compelled to do so. Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels. which to our mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864): In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that the court preferred to rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the case there consisted in that it was the case of the examination of the body by physicians, which could be and doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner therein to furnish evidence by means of testimonial act. In reality she was not compelled to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something preventing the examination; all of which is very different from what is required of the petitioner of the present case, where it is sought to compel him to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Besides, in the case of Villamor vs. Summers, it was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him. CHAVES VS. CA G.R. NO. L-29169 AUGUST 19, 1968 FACTS: Petitioner Chaves was found guilty of qualified theft for motor vehicle based on the testimony as an ordinary witness. The Petitioner having been compelled over his objection to be a witness was made to affirm his statement given to NBI agents. This statement detailed the plan and execution to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the statement of the accused as ordinary witness despite the objection of of himself against the right of self-incrimination is valid and constitutional which renders him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged? HELD: It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Taada and Fernando take note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra, which reaffirms the rule that the constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and

humanity; of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence. Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, 19 and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial. And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse." Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall: While a defendant's knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from thence, and he is exposed" to conviction. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury

or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial. It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became fruitless, no objections to questions propounded to him were made. Here involve is not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a defendant's constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself. And the objection made at the beginning is a continuing one. 1wph1.t There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. PEOPLE VS. GALLARDE G.R. NO. 133025 FEBRUARY 27, 2000 FACTS: The accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the homicide of Editha Talan in Pangasinan on June 24, 1997. During the preliminary investigation, the police informed him that he was a suspect in the rape and killing of Editha Talan, and he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the Talan residence he was wearing short pants and rubber slippers. Fernandez asked him at the police headquarters to pull down his shorts and he complied. He was then wearing briefs with a hemline that was a little loose. He was informed that a cadaver was recovered near his house. When he was asked questions while in police custody, he was not represented by any lawyer. Subsequently, the police took pictures of Gallarde. ISSUE: Whether or not the photographs of the accused without his consent may be admitted as evidence and does not violate the accused right against self-incrimination? HELD: We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel

morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. PASCUAL VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS G.R. NO. L-25018 MAY 26, 1969 FACTS: Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. The answer of respondent, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner remedy is to object once he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be compelled to take the witness stand in an administrative hearing and eventually does not violate his right against self-incrimination? HELD: Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an a administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation. We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.

The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenors that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." 12 Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." MAPA, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. L-25018 MAY 26, 1969 FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In the interim, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos were charged in New York with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by transporting to the United States and concealing the investment of money through cronies and offshore organizations. To insure the conviction of the Marcoses, the prosecution solicited the testimonies of witnesses. Among these witnesses were petitioners Vergara and Mapa. Petitioner Vergara was interviewed in 1987 by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and by United States Prosecutor Charles La Bella. Petitioner Mapa was interviewed on November 14, 1988 and August 11, 1989 also by Prosecutor La Bella at the behest of former Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez and former PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas. After their interviews, petitioners were requested to testify in the said RICO cases against the former First Couple. They were promised immunity from further criminal prosecution. They agreed. The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. They travelled to New York to testify against the Marcoses. Their travel fare and hotel accommodations were even furnished by the PCGG. But despite their availability and willingness to testify, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand. The result was a debacle for the US prosecutors and the PCGG. Mrs.Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the jury. Earlier, former President Marcos was delisted as an accused as he died in the course of the proceedings.

The legal struggle shifted back to the prosecution of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960 before the respondent court. On the basis of the immunity granted to them, petitioners filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on October 22, 1990. Deputized PCGG prosecutors Vivencio B. Dionido and Angel J. Parazo filed a Manifestation interposing no objection to petitioners' Motion. Despite PCGG's concurrence, the respondent court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss, by a vote of 4-1. 1 Petitioners were undaunted. On April 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This was followed on May 23, 1991, by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration. The deputized prosecutors again filed a Manifestation reiterating PCGG's acquiescence to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent court, however, refused to budge from its prior position. It denied petitioners' motions. Hence, this recourse where petitioners charge the respondent court with grave abuse of discretion in denying their Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Does the fact that the information provided by petitioners to the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) did not refer to Criminal Case No. 11960 make the immunity granted to them inapplicable to Criminal Case No. 11960? Does the fact that the prosecution in the RICO cases did not actually present petitioners as witnesses abrogate the immunity granted to them? HELD: We find merit in the petition. Congress has enacted laws giving immunity to witnesses to facilitate the solution of crimes with high political, social and economic impact against the people. Some of these statutory grants are related in the impugned Resolution. Thus, PD 749 (PCGG) provides for the conditions to concur: 1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above- mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations; 2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer; 3. 4. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State; Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and

5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional immunity and the usedand-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. 4 In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a

witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence . . . The power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . . xxx xxx xxx

But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a number of exemptions from the testimonial duty, the most important of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an important advance in the development of our liberty. It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege. Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence, are not incompatible with these values. Rather, they seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime. Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses, and their primary use has been to investigate such offenses . . . (E)very State in the Union, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one of more such statutes. The commentators, and this Court on several occasions, have characterized immunity statutes as essential to the effective enforcement of various criminal statutes. . . We shall now examine the powers granted to PCGG by Executive Order No. 14, as amended, to grant immunity from criminal prosecution. There are obvious differences between the powers granted to the PCGG under sections 4 and 5. Section 4 deals with the power which PCGG can use to compel an unwilling witness to testify. On the other hand, section 5 speaks of the power which PCGG can wield to secure information from a friendly witness. Under section 4, the hostile witness compelled to testify is not immunized from prosecution. He can still be prosecuted but "no testimony or other information compelled under the order may be used against the witness in any criminal case . . . ." In contrast, under section 5, the friendly witness is completely immunized from prosecution. We observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity, section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, confers on the PCGG the power to grant immunity alone and on its own authority. The exercise of the power is not shared with any other authority. Nor is its exercise subject to the approval or disapproval of another agency of government. The basic reason for vesting the power exclusively on the PCGG lies in the principles of separation of power. The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a

higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level. Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant of a section 5 immunity made by the PCGG to the petitioners, the power of the respondents court can go no further than to pass upon its procedural regularity. The respondent court should only ascertain: (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge of its functions; - The records show that petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. They gave the information in the course of interviews conducted by PCGG lawyers Kendall and Severina Rivera and US prosecutor Charles La Bella. They collaborated with the prosecution. Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York can not nullify their immunity. They have satisfied the requirements both of the law and the parties' implementing agreements (b) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question; - We also rule that there was nothing irregular when PCGG granted a section 5 immunity to petitioners while they were already undergoing trial in Criminal Case No. 11960. Section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended, does not prohibit the PCGG from granting immunity to persons already charged in court and undergoing trial. As long as the privilege of immunity so given will in the judgment of the PCGG assist it in attaining its greater objectives, the PCGG is well within legal grounds to exercise this power at any stage of the proceedings. This section 5 immunity frees and releases one from liability, and as it inures to the benefit of an accused, it can be invoked at any time after its acquisition and before his final conviction (c) whether in the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused. Respondent court cannot substitute its judgment to the discretion of the PCGG without involving itself in prosecution and without ceasing to be a court catering untilted justice. - Finally, we reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characterized the grant as special privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it misread the raison d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-incrimination vis-a-vis immunity statutes.

The days of inquisitions brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights. Not the least of these abuses is the expert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right against selfincrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized countries. Over the years, however, came the need to assist government in its task of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matrix of public welfare. To accommodate the need, the right against selfincrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity, as heretofore discussed. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against selfincrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly. PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT PEOPLE VS. ESTOISTA G.R. NO. L-5793 AUGUST 27, 1953 FACTS: Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal possession of firearm under one information, the appellant was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the second, for which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment. This appeal is from that sentence raising factual legal and constitutional questions. The constitutional question, set up after the submission of the briefs, has to do with the objection that the penalty from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines provided by Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual. ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty of 5 to 10 years of imprisonment for illegal possession of firearms are cruel and unusual? HELD: Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are like small fishes, bound

to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty. PEOPLE VS. ESPARAS G.R. NO. 120034 AUGUST 20, 1996 FACTS: Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 759 for importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897 before the RTC of Pasay City, Br. 114. After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. On March 13, 1995, the trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court automatic review of the death penalty is waived by escape of the accused? HELD: With due respect to the dissenting opinions of our esteemed colleagues, section 8 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which, inter alia, authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps bail, has no application to cases where the death penalty has been imposed. In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This is the text and tone of section 10, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule, viz.: Sec. 10. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however elusive it may be, and our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or has escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of the law. Or because he may want to avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon. Or because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor should the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict escapes. Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted. The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous crimes for as discussed above, we have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the will of the convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the State should not be given the

license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all rights, a matter of societal concern that transcends the personal interest of a convict. The importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of the public in the multiplication of heinous crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in our Constitution which recognizes that an accused, even if he belongs to a minority of one has the right to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong. ECHAGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. NO. 132601 OCTOBER 12, 1998 For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that: 1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority; First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation. The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law. 3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . . 4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review. Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity.

5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit: i. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes. ii. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law; iii. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and antideath partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG A.M. NO. 297-MJ SEPTEMBER 30, 1975 FACTS: The criminal complaint for estafa against complainant (docketed as Criminal Case No. 1602) was filed on July 21, 1971 with respondent judge by then Guiguinto chief of police Juan P. Estrella at the instance of Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza. The supporting statements executed and sworn to by the Mendoza spouses as offended parties before respondent judge likewise show on their very face that their complaint was about a simple debt of P1,500.00 borrowed by complainant from Mrs. Mendoza and which she had failed to repay despite her promise to do so by January and February, 1971. Worse, the one question propounded by him shows that he did comprehend that the criminal complaint involved a mere failure to pay a simple indebtedness and yet he found probable cause of the herein complainants guilt of estafa and forthwith issued the warrant of arrest against herwhich would indicate that either he believed that non-payment of an indebtedness constitutes the crime of estafa which would make him guilty of gross ignorance of the law or although knowing the law, of nevertheless disregarding it and giving due course to the town

police chiefs prosecution on behalf of the municipal secretary which would constitute an utter betrayal of his oath of office to render justice to every man. ISSUE: Whether the alleged estafa case is credible? HELD: In admitting such a criminal complaint that was plainly civil in all aspects from the very face of the complaint and the evidence presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged, respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properlywhich in this instance was to dismiss the complaint outright since it is elementary that non-payment of an indebtedness is not a criminal act, much less estafa, and that no one may be criminally charged and punished for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Worse, the one question propounded by him shows that he did comprehend that the criminal complaint involved a mere failure to pay a simple indebtedness and yet he found probable cause of the herein complainants guilt of estafa and forthwith issued the warrant of arrest against herwhich would indicate that either he believed that non-payment of an indebtedness constitutes the crime of estafa which would make him guilty of gross ignorance of the law or although knowing the law, of nevertheless disregarding it and giving due course to the town police chiefs prosecution on behalf of the municipal secretary which would constitute an utter betrayal of his oath of office to render justice to every man. FLORENTINA A. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ G.R. NO. L-63419 DECEMBER 18, 1986 FACTS: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the bouncing check law is unconstitutional? HELD: BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to the public interests. Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; and (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a

worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable (least limitable) of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 million to 80 million pesos a day. By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable on demand. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated: The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword. In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the wellaccepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches

to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched. ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP CO. VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G.R. NOS. 92191-92 JULY 30, 1991 FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a natural born citizen when his father acquired his citizenship through act of naturalization on 1957 after the birth of respondent when his mother a natural born citizen? HELD: The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read: SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women provided in the 1973 and 1935 constitution whereby only the child of a father Filipino citizen is considered natural born while the child of the Filipino mother would under go naturalization upon attainment of 21 years old. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution. There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process. In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen. What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong (Grandfather of respondent) a natural born citizen? Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen. Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?

Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz: ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards: 1. Persons born in Spanish territory. 2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain. 3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers. 4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied) The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property. As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of subparagraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain. If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. YU VS. DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO G.R. NO. 83882 JANUARY 24, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. ISSUE: Whether or not the renewal of the Portuguese passport and representation as Portuguese national in commercial documents despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on February 10, 1978 was an express renunciation of citizenship? HELD: To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as

a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 87193 JUNE 23, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. ISSUE: Whether or not the special and affirmative defense that he was naturalized in US due to possibility persecution of the petitioner and his filing of candidacy resulted to an automatic repatriation and reacquisition of his citizenship without complying with the naturalization act? HELD: If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the

people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. REPUBLIC VS. DE LA ROSA G.R. NO. 104654 JUNE 6, 1994 FACTS: On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23). In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26). On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28). The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted. On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the National Press Club with private respondents picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H"). Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33). On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent complied with the requirements of naturalization law? HELD: He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed. It is private respondents posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media. Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms. Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law. Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]). The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and

any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period. A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]). Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies. Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality. LABO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 86564 AUGUST 1, 1989 FACTS: The petitioner does not question the authenticity his naturalization in Australia. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as

such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen." The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. ISSUE: Whether dual citizenship is allowed? HELD: Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725 That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines. The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen. It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more

allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien. Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office. AZNAR VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 83820 MAY 25, 1990 FACTS: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1"). ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be considered as an alien based on the evidence presented: Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigrant Certificate of Residence. HELD: The petition is not meritorious. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern us here. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there

can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied". MERCADO VS. MANZANO G.R. NO. 135083 MAY 26, 1999 FACTS: The proclamation of private respondent as Vice Mayor of Makati City was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He is an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship. The Commission declared him disqualified in running for office because of his dual citizenship under the Local Government Code. On appeal, the Commission reversed the resolution. Hence this appeal by petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is disqualified from running to office because of his dual citizenship and his failure to renounce his American citizenship? HELD: The Petition is without merit. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR vs. Vicente Ching BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999 FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents: 1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant; 2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and 3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has elected within the reasonable period of time his Filipino Citizenship by complying with the requirements of the law. HELD: Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination. C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an

inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. BENGZON III VS. HRET G.R NO. 142840 MAY 7, 2001 FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2 On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1wphi1 ISSUE: Whether or not respondent in acquiring his citizenship through repatriation is reverted back to his original status, a natural born citizen. HELD: Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15 Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23 As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

REPUBLIC VS. LIM G.R. NO. 153883 JANUARY 13, 2004 FACTS: In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected. Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, an illegitimate child, in order to change his nationality should comply with the constitutional requirements of electing Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority? HELD: Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. LABO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 86564 JUNE 6, 1994

ALTAREJOS VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 163256 NOVEMBER 10, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country." Private respondents alleged that based on a letter1 from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.2 On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer3 stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the citizenship of the petitioner is restored upon issuance of the Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization? HELD: Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad. In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that "repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625 (AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY A PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN) Form of election of citizenship: statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. If party is not in the Philippines, he make make the statement authorized before any officer of the Government of United States. COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 63 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED) How citizenship may be lost (NEOR CaDeM): 1. Naturalization in the Foreign Country; 2. Express renunciation of citizenship; 3. Oath of allegiance to constitution of foreign country; 4. Rendering services to the armed forces of the foreign country without consent of the Philippines. 5. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization; 6. Declared deserter of the Philippine armed forces; 7. Marriage of woman to a foreigner when she acquires her nationality. How citizenship may be reacquired (NaRRED): 1. Naturalization; 2. Repatriation of deserters of the army; 3. Repatriation Woman married to a foreigner after termination of marital status; 4. Direct act of national assembly. Procedure to reacquisition:

1. 2. 3. 4.

At least 21 years of age; Resident in Philippines 6 months before application; Proper and irreproachable conduct during stay in the Philippines; Subscription to oath of absolute and perpetual renunciation of allegiance to a foreign authority.

Procedure for repatriation: Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth6 of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry. COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473 (AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION, AND TO REPEAL ACTS NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT.)