LEGISLATURES

(01/10/2012)
Readings: Jennifer Smith, Canadas Minority Parliament, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 133-154.

1. Legislatures have a. strong roles and b. weak roles. 2. A: makes laws, pass statutes 3. B: represent voters, deliberate on legislation, audit the executive 4. Q: Has the strong role been lost endangering the weak roles? This is different between nations 5. Power of the legislature depends on a. the relationship between the leg and the ex, is the power fused or separates; b. how strong/weak is the party discipline 6. Q: How strong should the legislature be? There is a trade off between efficiency and inclusiveness 7. How is the Congress inclusive and how is the PR efficient? 8. Is the Congress inclusive, 500 people represent 300+ million, they have veto points and the govt is removed from the people
Fusion of power Separation of power Strong parties Parliament UK/Canada Weak Congress S. Korea/Argentina Weak parties St. Parliament Italy/Poland Congress USA

2. PM and his CAB control the ability of the MPs to more up in the party 3. PR and his CAB use sticks and carrots to control MPs 4. Sticks: dismissal form caucus, withhold election funds, dont sign nomination papers (PM), assign new candidates 5. Carrots: promotion to committee chairs, parl. secretary, secretary of the state and cabinet 6. MPs want to move up in the party for power, status and money 7. Party whip oversees discipline, there is also one for the opposition CONTROL OF THE OPPOSITION 1. Convention: the govt must govern, while the opposition might delay and object 2. If there is a conflict, the govt prevails, has tools to stop opposition: a. closure; b. time allocation 3. Closure allows government to restrict debate severely 24 h notice of vote on motion 4. Time allocation is less severe: fixed schedule, in advance, for passing bills 5. These tools are now used commonly, minority PR might constrain the use of those tools 2. REMAINING ROLES OF THE PARLIAMENT 1. The strong role might be on the decline, but what about the weak roles? 2. Media politics opposition does not even use the tools available to it? 3. Throne speech debates beginning of session; much debate; confidence votes 4. Budget debate after debate tabling; same as above 5. Opposition days 20/session; opposition motions have precedents and lose 6. Oral question period major media even, circus? 45 min/day; limited policy content 7. Standing committees chaired by govt MP (majority govt) except public accounts a. Proportionate membership

CANADA 1. In the CDN PR, party discipline today is very high; US < UK < Canada 2. CDN from 1840 to 1870 before disciplined parties 1. HOW DOES THE CABINET CONTROL THE PR? There are two sets of tools: 1. Govt caucus; 2. Control of the opposition GOVT CAUCUS 1. Rely on the ambition of the back bench MP to move up in the party hierarchy

b. Conduct policy review; but the agenda is set by the govt (majority govt) c. Standing committees also do clause by clause review of bills 8. Constituency service this is done by individual MPs for their electros policy relevance is limited SMITH ON HARPER MINORITY AND MAJORITY His rhetoric and reality differed widely More controlling than any before him? Still must return to efficient and inclusion trade off, US comparison But even if efficiency is good, we might have too much of a good thing

FEDERAL STATES AND FEDERAL SOCIETIES (01/17/2012)

Readings: Reeta Tremblay, et al., Mapping the Political Landscape, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 217-239

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON FEDERALISM 1. Federation: state institutions that divide the sovereignty between two or more levels of the govt 2. Federalism: principle of reconciling unity and diversity via autonomy [reading] 3. * Most states are unitary states 1. FEDERALISM AS AN IDEA Federalism is a modern idea, the age of liberalism and nationalism a.) Liberal view: need to divide the govt in order to restrain the power US federalism started here also in post-war Germany Key: protect the individual Federalism cannot exist if the states are not lib democratic examples: formed USSR, Yugoslavia, and Russia today b.) Autonomy for nations and ethnicities Examples of this: Switzerland [1847] classics case, after 500 years of a confederation, Canada [1867], Belgium [1993] Key: protecting the community c.) Other factors: size? Australia [1901] 2. FEDERATION AS A VARIABLE INSTITUTION Not all federal societies are created equally; there are differences in how power is divided between the national and the states, the difference of powers between different states, etc a.) Centralization/decentralization difficult to measure

FROM JOSHS REVIEW SESSION Strong and weak legislatures Separation of powers and party discipline If you have greater SOP, then the legislature will be more powerful because it will not be dominated by the executive Disciplined parties weaken the legislature because they strengthen the executive How and why did CDN parties develop into disciplined parties? Money & PM uses this knowledge to mold parties Has the legislative power in Canada weakened or strengthened? Weakened because the parties have become more disciplined and will only be so, the executive power in Canada is strong The cabinet controls the legislature because they have the ability to control the movements of MPs in the parties and they have the ability to control the opposition Counter example US: separation of powers and relatively weak parties, but due to political polarization, this might be changing In CDN govt closure is used more than before, closure of debate, the strong role is to make policy, the weak role is to represent and debate

Do you look at the formal divisions of power? These might not be the same in practice What about own-source revenues? What about transfer payments? these also vary in the degree of conditionally TRIES TO MEASURE

AREND LIJPHART CENTRALIZATION

Meech Lack and Charlottetown accords proposed to make QC a distinct society Was rejected by eh English Canada Is this because there is a conflict between individualist communitarian images of federalism? Asymmetry is more often in non-fed cases: Spain, UK; may be Italy A step toward federalism?

Only (d) and (e) are on the federal continuum (a) unitary centralized states: UK, France, 13 others (b) unitary but decentralized: Japan and 4 Nordic nations (c) semi-federal: Spain, Netherlands, 2 others (d) Federal/centralized: Australia, India, Venezuela (e) Federal/decentralized: Canada, US, Germany, Australia, Belgium, Switzerland Is Canada the most decentralized among the (e)?

c.) Classical v coordinative federalism Also called inter-state and intra-state federalism Former divides power between levels to create less interaction: US, Canada, etc But much interaction may happen anyways In latter, federal may have most powers, but lower level has power at center: Germany and the role of the Lander in Bunderstat Encourages collaborative decision making between levels

In Federal states, how much spending do lower govt control? USA: 35% Australia: 39% Germany: 43% Switzerland: 57% Canada: 58% The above are only approx and money is not everything Canada and Switz may be the most decentralized: majority of spending is lower controlled

3. WHAT ABOUT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS? Usually delegates powers: federal or unitary Exceptions: Switz, India (1992) Some in Canada also want municipal 3rd order of the govt Are cities: creative incubators or are they dysfunctional? In federations, delegation usually from the lower level to the municipal level, but the municipal role varies between countries

b.) Symmetry/asymmetry Most federal system are symmetrical, meaning all subunits get the same powers: this includes US, Germany Belgium: cultural communities and regions dont coincide; need to accommodate Brussels Canada? BNA: distinctive features for QC: civil law, French language but not asymmetrical powers

a.) Anglo-Saxon model: informal, muddling though (US, UK, Canada) ex. Who will pay for social services in Ontario? b.) Germanic model: formal, collaborative decision making (Germany, Austria, Spain, Belgium) c.) French: formal, top-down, technocratic (France, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Quebec)

 d.) Scandinavian model: formal: much admin devolution, based on consensus 4. GLOBALIZATION GOVERNANCE AND MULTILEVEL

Is globalization pushing power both up and down from once sovereign states? Some argue that Ottawa is loosing power to the provinces who are loosing power to the municipal governments Some also argue that Ottawa is loosing power in the upward direction to regional and global levels; regional: NAFTA, global: WTO/UN Result of this might be weakened capacity of the state to solve problems and the triumph of the market or may be not.. may be multilevel governance is how we adapt to globalization, the nation state might be too small for big problems and too big for small problems Example: The European Union the EU level moving toward federalism, but still is a confederation nation states are not going away regions are expanding [UK, Spain, Belgium] based on the principle of subsidiary Democratic legitimacy argument for more global and local governance Many issues today are global: envi, financial regulation, development, but there is no democratic forum to decide on those issues Even the EU suffers form a democratic deficit so we need regional and global democratic governances Think of a realist response to this FROM JOSHS REVIEW SESSION Division of sovereignty What is different about a federal system from a unitary system? There is a constitutional division of power; the lower level is mandated (has a constitutional right) by the constitution to do its job; in unitary govt the power of to

the lower level is delegated by the central govt Canadian federalism started out centralized; initially it became decentralized in the beginning of the 20th century because of the JCPC rulings Constrained the power of the central govt, turned highly centralized federalism more into classical federalism, this prevented CDN govt from passing a ND During WWII there was centralization of power because the fed centralized the power of taxation and money leads to political power Centralization began to unravel in the 1960s and on, form the QR, differential economic growth between provinces, the nature of the state and what it does expanded making it harder to centralize, the Welfare state expands While initially the fed had all the powers, the provinces began to take it back

FEDERALISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE Globalization is causing power to move above and below the state Glocalization globalization and localizations Do federal models provide guidance as to how we should move forward with GG? Does the EU represent a potential model for the future? Integration of financial and social polices, as well as of national cultural identity As the world become more integrated there is a need for some over reaching authority, overarching legislative structure Political decisions begin to affect each other need for coordination at a supranational level Europe is similar, but is it not similar enough to be successful in the EU project? Why would anyone want to give up their power to a supranational organizations? This is the realist argument

EVOLUTION OF (01/24/2012)

CANADIAN

FEDERALISM

Reading: Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, The Dynamics of Canadian Federalism, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 155-178.

Now Canada is decentralized, but it was not this way in the begging 1. BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN ACT (1867) In this act Ottawa was more powerful than the provinces because it had 1. More powers 2. Had the right to invade 3. Left the provinces with modest powers 1. More powers: sec 91 starts with residual power (peace, order and good govt; POGG) had main economic and security powers in the spheres of agriculture and immigration the powers were concurrent but the feds have paramountcy 2. The right to invade: LG may use reservation to block prov leg, Ottawa may disallow such legislation and Ottawa can use declaratory power in prov areas 3. Modest provincial powers, sec 92 gives provinces fewer fiscal means (direct taxation and natural resources); soc inst: hospitals & charities, education and municipal and local 2. DECLINE OF FEDERAL DOMINANCE 1867 TO 1930S 1. Provinces rose in the 20th century, their fiscal means rose in importance (income, sales, and property taxes) and social policy also rose in importance, like building the welfare state 2. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council converted centralism into classical federalism 3. Key: how it treated POGG; POGG was the basis for fed claims in disputed areas 4. Local Prohibition Case (1896) JCPC drastically restricted POGG, the power in disputed areas was confined to 1. If the power is not on the prov list in sec 92 and

2. If the disputed area had a national dimension 5. Snyder Case (1925) went further: POGG only gave power to Ottawa in disputed areas in times of emergency most disputed powers now under prov control 6. Social Insurance Act Reference (1937) blocked Bennetts New Deal depression not an emergency no New Deal in Canada

3. WAR TIME CENTRALIZATION, 1939 -45 1. JCPC allows Ottawa to use War Measures Act to take prov taxes and powers needed in war time 2. This is based on the emergency view of POGG 3. After the war, Ottawa still has all that money 4. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, 1945-65 1. After WWII CDN builds a welfare state under federal leadership 2. Sometime Ottawa administer is after a constitutional amendments: EI (1940); pensions (1951, 1965) 3. Sometimes in prov jurisdiction with Ottawa handing back some of that money to cover the costs 1. Health insurance (1958, 1968), 2. Universities (1960), 3. Social Assistance (1956, 1966) 4. Money handed back are conditional grants, preserving power of the federal govt 5. Poor provs also get equalization grants 6. If this was cooperative it was because the provinces were weak, this later changed 7. Initially in Quebec, the Quite Revolution 8. Then in the West with the natural resources boom 9. And then everywhere with province building 10. Today the right to invade powers are virtually extinct, by convention

5. COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM, 1965 TO 95 1. Substantial decentralization prov challenge yields conflict 2. 1977 Ottawa replaces conditional grants with block grants for health and universities 3. Block grants are unconditional for universities and modestly conditional for health 4. 1995 extension of block grants to social assistance, these were also unconditional 5. Today there are almost no fully conditional grants 6. 1995 Ottawa drastically cut total transfers to provinces, the provinces then cut health care, social assistance and university funding 7. Post war Ottawa lead creation of the welfare state and also its dismantling 8. Constitutional negotiations were also a part of this era 1. Meech Lake; 2. Charlottetown would have restricted the federal powers limiting the spending power of the fed government and may be via Distinct Society clause, but the accords failed 6. CONTEMPORARY ERA, SINCE 1995 TO PRESENT 1. Collaborative? Haddow prefers disengaging between the two levels of the govt 2. Agreements on economic union in 1994 and social union in 1999 were collaborative 3. Economic union reduced inter-prov trade barriers; social union included fed promise to use spending powers less 4. Ottawa introduced new child benefits in 1999 and 2006 which go directly to the people, bypassing provinces 5. Ottawa cut EI unilaterally in 1994, pushing more people onto provincial social assistance

6. Health accords restored 1995 transfer cuts; modest collaboration, but in 2012 Ottawa offers new formula of health funding with no prov input and promising no oversight of prov health care 7. May be they are disengaging, ending post 1045 overlap ELECTORAL SYSTEMS REFORM (01/31/2012) AND DEMOCRATIC

Readings: 1) A. Brian Tanguay, Reforming Representative Democracy, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 221-248. 2) Lisa Young, Women (Not) in Politics, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 283-300.

1. WHY DO ELECTORAL SYSTEMS MATTER? 1. Electoral systems affect the expression of the popular will 2. Compare SMP and PR systems; SMP: single member plurality; PR: proportional representation 3. PR: seats = % votes 4. SMP: over rewards the 1st party 5. Fed. Liberal from 1993 to 2000 and Tories in 2011 most votes yields much higher % of seats than votes 6. Even if the party gets minority of votes, they can form a majority govt 7. Contrast how SMP treats 3rd parties (NDP then, Liberal now) for smaller parties the % of the vote exceed the number of seats they get 8. Who supports PR systems? Not governing parties 9. SMP does it distort democracy or is it a source of stable govt & does it mean adversarial politics? 2. CAIRNS THESIS AND CANADA 1. SMP: rewards divisive regional parties and punishes weak national parties, weakening national unity 2. Evidence: Separatist BQ: always larger % of seats than votes until 2011

3. SMP: exaggerates regional voting variation 4. Evidence: Liberals win few AB seats but get of the vote, same with Cons, even though they get 1/5 of the vote 5. NDP is much less a QC party in votes than seats, 2011 6. Voters are more balances than caucuses and this too weakens national unity 3. ALTERNATIVES 1. Two stage majoritarian a. France b. 1st and 2nd candidates run off 2. Preferential ballot/ alternative vote a. Australia b. Voters rank candidates in a district c. Drop candidates with fewest 1st choices; distribute their votes to their 2nd choice d. Still no majority? Repeat for candidates 2nd fewest 1st choices, etc e. Winner is the least disliked 3. Single transferable vote STV a. Ireland b. Uses multi-member districts (5) c. Voters rank their preference d. CNDDT needs 20% to win seat e. If the top cnddt gets 26%, the 6% are transferred to the 2nd choice f. Repeat for others with surplus g. Got to 3rd or lower choices until 5 seats are filled 4. Mixed member proportional MMP a. German Bundestag b. Modified PR system: PR for overall party balance, but with individual districts c. 2 ballots: 1 for SMP member and ! for party list d. parties with lower % SMP seats than votes are compensated with extra seats from the list e. Germany: 5% threshold for fringe parties 4. CANADIAN DEBATE

1. There is much debate, but no action; in BC the assembly recommended STV in 2004 and in Ontario there was a proposition for MMP system in 2006, both initiatives were rejected in election referenda; QC suggested a form of PR, but 2. No province has changes and thee is no federal discussion on the matter 3. Is this because of 1. Vested interests of the politicians? 2. What about the voters? May be the arguments for change are not convincing REFORMERS More diverse leg in terms of gender and ethnicity Might enhance participation, reduce cynicism and end wasted votes More accurate reflection of popular will and better for national unity

OPPONENTS POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS (02/07/2012)

Reading: Daniele Caramini, Party Systems, in Caramani, ed., Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 316- 345 [Course pack]

Parties address diversity via brokerage PR systems also suffer from declining voting Is participation such a good thing? Arent all list based systems elitist and what about stability?

PARTIES: non-state organization that seek to control or/ and influence state executive, the govt PARTY SYSTEMS: effective number of parties, power of each party, and the relations among them 1. TYPES OF PARTIES CADRE V MASS

Cadre parties are controlled by a small elite, they tend to emerge in legs and most are early parties from 19th century Mass are rank and file control, these parties tend to have non-leg origins, they are usually originate in union, farmers, NGOs, etc R. Michels Iron Law of Oligarchy Parties want to win, and cadre parties are better at winning, so mass parties tend to turn into cadre parties or die Parties also need members and money to win Cadre parties have broadened for policies?

Lipset and Rokkan 1967 cleavage structure frozen after 1920s But post materialism cause partial thaw New left parties celebrate this and new right challenges this

3. INSTITUTIONS AFFECT THE PARTY SYSTEM 1. Not all social cleavages yield party divisions some cleavages might die out and sometimes they overlap within a party 2. Some die out, like some agrarian, religious, communist, fascist 3. In the US, Reps = classical liberalism and the new right and the Dems = reformed liberalism and post material 4. Is there similar over laps in Canada? 5. Institutions influence is cleavages yield party divisions and the number of parties ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ARE KEY We know that SMP favors big parties and punishes small ones, contrast this with PR Duvergers Law 1954: SMP favors a 2 party system while PR favors a multiparty system SMP: more soc cleavages overlap and more parties die out How do you count effective parties? What is SMP combines with regionalized voting?

BROKERAGE V IDEOLOGICAL Brokerage: aggregate existing interest in order to win, often have cadre origins Ideological: articulate ideas and interests, cause, often mass origin Same fate?

DO SUCCESSFUL PARTIES FROM CARTELS? 2. PARTY SYSTEMS HAVE SOCIAL ORIGINS Parties act positionally, in systems & reflect broader social cleavages NATIONAL REVOLUTION in the 19th century created parties Liberals (capitalist, urban, free trade) v Conservatives (aristocratic, rural, protection) If the conservative parties do not challenge the secular state, then Catholic parties form Industrial revolution yields broader suffrage, new parties by the early 20th century Agrarian parties challenge urban dominance Key: socialist parties to rep workers, challenge upper classes After 1917, Communist parties split off from latter challenge reformism Fascist parties emerge to challenge those

FEDERALISM ALSO MATTERS Decentralize federalism means more regional parties and weaker federal and provincial party links, like CDN PARTIES INFLUENCE THE

4. CAN THE INSTITUTIONS?

Yes; Boix 1999 In the early 20th almost all states had SMP systems, but then most moved to a PR system, why did this happen? Socialist parties threatened the dominance of liberal and conservative ounces Not in US or CDN and is not a problem if an old party dies out like in the UK

Otherwise, PR, etc., prevents socialists form winning v divided right Once CDN example BC 1952

5. DO PARTIES DIFFER? Downs 1957 not if voters are normally distributed on the left-right spectrum Parties want to win, so they move to center to capture marginal voted, beating opponent But what is distribution is bi-model? Temptation to move to the center is less and in a multiparty system, moving to the center opens space for extreme parties

CANADAS PARTY SYSTEM (02/14/2012)

Reading: William Cross, Representation and Political Parties, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 249-264. 2) Anthony Sayers, The End of Brokerage? in M. Whittington & Glen Williams, eds., Canadian Politics in the 21st Century, 7th ed., (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008), pp. 137-152 [Course pack]

Double majority convention So governing meant deal making by the liberal-conservative party, later became conservatives, later progressive conservatives This extended to the new federation after 1867 Liberals were more ideological and lost until Lauriers 1096 brokerage breakthrough Winning elections requires money so that one party principle was getting money, links to business This provides an opening for smaller parties 1. Progressives, 1920s; farmers, some workers; 2. CCF/NDP on the left and Social credit on the right When CCF/NDP threatened, brokerage parties accommodated

3. PARTY SYSTEMS FROM 1867 TO 1993 PERIODIC CRISIS DID RECONFIGURE THE SYSTEM Par sys. 1 Period Style Level Local Crisis at outset 1837 Lord Durha m # of parties

1. THE CANADIAN ANOMALIES UNTIL 2011, THE LIBS AND THE CONS WERE MAIN PARTIES Did not divide along social (class) cleavages Much more brokerage than ideological

1867 to Broke 1917 rage

THESE PARTIES HAD A FRANCHISE STRUCTURE Hyper cadre on policy But were decentralized when it came to candidates, local campaigns

THE MAIN PARTIES WERE ONLY CONTESTED BY MINOR PARTIES, WHICH FAILED TO BREAK THE MOULD 2. WHY Frank Underhill 1930s: back to the beginning Province of Canada form 1840 to 67 was diverse, fissured: lang, religions, region, urban/ rural, class

1 party dom; 2 parties 1921 to Broke Regio WW1; 1 1957 rage nal conscr party ipt. dom; 2 p + 1963 to Broke Natio Govt Comp 1999 rage nal party etitive collap 2 p + se 1993 - Ideolo Natio Mulro Comp gical? nal ney etitive and coaliti multi- region on party/ al collap unstab se le

1st and 2nd systems: when brokerage works it is conducive to 1 part dominance Conservative dominance form 1840 to 90s Succeeded by liberals from 1896 to 1984 Rise in level of brokerage WW! Crisis loosened brokers influence and permitted farmers and workers to mobilize Post war Liberal hegemony and welfare state; alienation of the west 1984 to 93 Mulroney coalition and demise, alienation of Ontario, then everybody End of an era?

4. SINCE 1993, THERE IS A FOURTH SYSTEM, BUT WHAT IS IT? End of Progressive Conservative Party Rise of Reform then Canadian Alliance in the west on the right and of BC in QC 2003: PC and CA merge: Conservative Party: brokerage again or a right party? 2011: Liberal party in the 3rd place, left NDP is 2nd; BQ collapse; for how long? Will NDP replace the Liberals as the majority party? Has ideological cleavage replaced brokerage? Does ideological conflict displace regional conflict Or is it the new regional politics? A right west v left QC and maybe AC with ON divided between urban and rural Implications for the future, national unity?

FROM JOSHS REVIEW SESSION Electoral systems in terms of Canadian party systems, how can we explain the Canadian system with the reference to the electoral system? Party system: a number of viable parties within a system, for most of the system before WWII we had a two party system Challenges which weakened the two party system were the Social Credit party in the West in the 1920s and the CCF Now Canada has a two and a half party system

The messy system began in 1994 when the Conservatives lost the election and the Reform Party became a large oppositional group in the West, BQ made large strides and became the official opposition, NDP was also there Why did this happen? Political and economic dynamics, the Quite Revolution increased Quebec nationalism, the Ch accords tried to satisfy Quebecs distinctiveness party which lead the movement were the PC, so many people in Quebec voted for the PC because they thought they will able to do this After people in QC realized, no, went to BQ, BQ: wanted recognition for distinctiveness, the West/Reform party tried to address the issues of Western alienation and growing economic wealth in the West Cleavages: economic often match up with regions/ ethnic/ cultural/religious How do parties replicate social cleavages What kind of a system are we headed towards? A two party system? What are the major fault lines of CDN politics today? (1) development of the oil sands, resources in the west (2) manufacturing in the center interests do not always match up, there are differences within the systems QC nationalism as a future fault line? Distinction between mass parties and cadre parties, in CDN there is an amalgamation of both Post M and the NSM how do they relate to the Charter and how has the Charter interacted with the new movements, envoi, fem, LGBTQ, rights wing

INTEREST GROUPS AND MOVEMENTS (02/28/2012) NEW SOCIAL

Reading: Eric Montpetit, Are Interest Groups Useful or Harmful? in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 265-282. 2) Charles Lindblom, The Market as Prison, The Journal of Politics, vol. 44, no. 2 (1982), pp. 324-336. [On-line reading]

[Access on-line from UTL, starting with journal title; then select JSTOR]

1. INTEREST GROUPS IN CANADA AND THE US Non-govt organizations with common interests Influence the state form the outside the govt and the legislature Contrast interest groups with political parties

NORTH AMERICA: A PLURALIST SETTING Pluralist: mostly competitive and unregulated policy environment Groups may evolve from issues oriented to institutionalized if they master selective incentives

Lindblom Market as Prison Govs respond to well-resourced IGs But business is special, structural power Govs need votes; economic growth helps this and investment helps economic growth So govs want to induce investments by anticipating business needs and not just responding to its views CND Council of Chief Executives: small big business organization Big business influence more than CCCEs Post 2008 bank bailout: how much IG pressure was used or needed?

2. NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS Social movements are non-governmental networks, including interest groups and others These are more fluid and informal, than single IGs The goal of social movements is to influence the state Not all are new: Chartists 1840s ; Maritime Rights 1920s Not all are left, pro-free trade 1988

POLICY NETWORKS/COMMUNITIES Key interest groups and state agencies differ among sectors pluralism again These form different policy communities With changeable links and networks Distinguish sub-govt and attentive public Can result in dirigisme, pluralist free-for- all, quasi-corporatism (but sectoral), clientelism

SUCCESSFUL IGS ADAPT TO INSTITUTIONS Result: CDN and US IGs differ Canada: exec dominated IGs in Canada mostly target the cabinet and senior bureaucracy and avoid the Parliament, confrontation In CDN, IGs use inside strategy But Charter modified institutions and therefore IGs and how they behave Institutionalized groups now may be louder In the US IGs were always confrontational, they lobby the congress and executive agency, forming iron triangles and there are also the courts On the US the IGs are more outside, more visible also more influential?

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS New social movements add post materialism and identity this relates to equality seeking or difference promoting Anti-elitist ethos Transnationalized with globalization Environmentalists, alter-globalists, anti- landmines, feminists Possibility of mainstreaming May result from govt funding, cooptation Another iron law? But think of variations: NAACP v NAC v Greenpeace as IGs that are a part of NSMs Evolution of NSMs is fluid and variable Contrast with parties: institutionalizations may not = mainstreaming

PRIVILEGED POSITION OF BUSINESS

VARIETIES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (03/07/2012)

Reading: 1) Rodney Haddow, States and Markets: Studying Political Economy in Political Science, in R. Dyck, ed., Studying Politics, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Nelson, in press) [On-line reading] [Will be available on course web site] 2) Lane Kenworthy, Egalitarian Capitalism (New York: Russell Sage, 2004), pp. 1-10, 125-145 [Course pack]

Is pluralism more efficient? If so globalization again may lead to convergence

A FOUR CELL MODEL

Japan, S.Korea Taiwan

Strong
Singapore

State has a variable relation to the economy, society this is macro-level analysis not sector/ meso
Corporatism
Sweden Norway, Denmark, Finland Germany, Netherlands Belgium Austria Switzerland

France, Italy, Spain, Portugal

STATE DIRECTION: STRONG AND WEAK STATES Some lib dems needs more state than others, the later to industrialize UK 1st, US early and was sheltered Needed only a weak state Weak: embedded with non government interests, fragmented laissez-faire France, Germany late; East Asia later still Required a strong state Strong: autonomous from eco interests; internally cohesive; direct intervention Bigger engine for bigger tasks Important variation over time and space Strong state tends to weaken over time Globalization theory: weak will beat strong may be leading to convergence on the weak model

Pluralism

A
Canada UK, Australia, NZ, Ireland

B Varieties of Political Economy

C
Weak

USA

WELFARE STATE VARIATION Variations in Marshalls social rights parallel above variations

(I) WHAT IS IN A WELFARE STATE? There are three main program types 1. Selective: for most needy, ex: social assistance, this is inexpensive but stigmatized Must be modest because otherwise will create disincentives 2. Contributory; benefits are related to contributions, examples: contributory pensions, EI Higher benefits for many, but excludes unemployed, is gendered, regressive taxes Less affordable with an aging population 3. Universal: all get the same benefits, examples: health insurance in Canada, and K to 12 educations, higher benefits for all, solidarity, is expensive

COORDINATION: CORPORATISM AND PLURALISM Some economies are more coordinated than others More coordinated = corporatism Business cooperation on research and development, finance May be with unions on skills, social benefits Variations in continental Europe, east Asia Less cooperation = pluralism Business fight each other, weaker unions Examples: US, UK, Canada Reflected in the interest groups life Different emphases on equity/ inclusions v liberty

(II) WELFARE STATE TYPES Esping-Andersen: Different mixes, different regimes program

LIBERAL Anglo states, group A Cheapest, lowest taxes Features: most selectivity and modest social insurance Reinforces market: workfare Middle class relies on private benefits Result: highest poverty and inequality

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC Scandinavian states, group B Biggest welfare state, highest taxes Mostly universal The middle class gets public benefits; solidarity with poor follows Result: lowest poverty and inequality

CONSERVATIVE Continental Europe, groups C and D Middling, payroll deduction based Mostly social insurance Middle class and men get public benefits Better than those for poor and women Groups C and D create status stratification instead of market reinforcement A or solidarity B Difference? C: stronger unions, broader distribution of benefits, middling poverty and inequality D weaker private unions, civil servant focused benefits, highest poverty and inequality Group E (East Asia) does not fit theories well low but rising inequality and poverty, despite weak unions Japan: welfare is company based

GLOBALIZATION THEORY A will triumph over all comers because of lowers taxes, more competitive workers so convergence may happen again

Is the control of the economy coming from the bottom up, meaning the state is weak or is it controlled by the state from the top down To what extend does the state monopolize the policy space? To what extend does it say that we are going to monopolize this space and we are going to decided what happened in economic terms and social policy Canada is largely a weak state, a classic example of a weak states is the US, we have a less of a weak state tradition because we are action on American influence and size Corp and plur plur economy looks likes CDN economy because there are many diff IGs (competing against one another in the public sphere), another good example is the US, AU, NZ In corp states, IGs are institutionalized within the govt where they are guaranteed a policy role, there are two main IGs 1. The business 2. Labour, in corp states they have permanent inst representation in the state, this includes countries like Germany, Scandinavia, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal there seem to be more problems with this model; strong corp east Asian; moderate corp Scandinavia Canada weak model laissez-fair model less regulation as a whole in plur, the welfare states are weaker Plur weaker welfare states because labour is weaker the business IGs are not opposed in the competition for public policy CND economy is resource based, meaning there is less need to govt intervention, in large party govts intervene in other states because they have to compete in technologically advances envis in manufacturing industries

FROM JOSHS REVIEW SESSION Strong v weak states and the relationship between the state and the society

CANADAS POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (03/14/2012)

Reading: Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, The State, Business, and Industrial Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp. 32-76 [Course pack]

4. 1965 Auto Pact = CDN consumption and production of the big 3 cars 1960s/1980s ECONOMIC DEBATE 1. Alternative course: Lib and NDP 2. Industrial policy: strategic investment in leading CDN industries 3. FTA, NAFTA, CONTINENTALIZATION/GLOBALIZATION WTO:

Themes: 1. Weak state, qualified by protection 2. Pluralism, unqualified 3. Quebec anomaly 1. STAPLES ECONOMY AND NATIONAL POLICY 1. Harold Innis: Canadas staples path 2. Political and economic metropoles: France and UK succeeded by another economic and political metropole US 3. Exports: fish, fur, wood, minerals, hydro, oil and gas 4. States limited role: protect property and build infrastructure 5. National policy 1978 challenges path, but only partly and with limited success 6. National policy 1. Railway to the West 2. Immigration 3. Tariffs to protect manufacture (1 + 2 markets for 3, so ISI) 7. Result? Industry develops but only in central Canada for the domestic market and highly expensive & CDN still exported staples 8. Foreign ownership extensive was and is 9. Overall: weak state + tariffs & infrastructure 10. IS this bad? According to some yes, according to others no 11. Innis: Yes: mature economy diversify from primary to secondary production, exports 12. Mackintosh: No: let comparative advantage determine exports and ours is primary 2. POST WWII ERA, 1945 TO 1984 1. CDN wartime economy was state lead because specific things had to be produced for the war, like munitions for example 2. But the state-lead war time economy was quickly dismantled after the war 3. From then to 1985: 1. US trade becomes crucial 2. US direct investment replaces UK

1. Mulroney Conservatives: comprehensive free trade agreements with US 1989 2. Eliminates almost all tariffs, most subsidies & most interventions: FIRA, NEP, Petro-Canada, IRAP, Auto Pact, etc 3. Cultural, banking and farming exceptions persist 4. Followed by NAFTA with US & Mexico 1993 & multilateral WTO 1994 5. Many non-tariff barriers ended More 1. Trade agreements permit R and d assistance with out national discrimination 2. Chretien Liberals promote high tech: Canadian Foundation for Innovation 1997, Sustainable Dev. Technologies Can 2001 3. Harper Conservatives less ambitious but persists 4. 2011: 53% of CDN merch exports are primary; 28% of these are food, energy, forestry, mining/minterals 5. Overall: Ottawa still practices some intervention but we are cloased to pure weak state than any time before 4. PLURALISM NOT COLLABORATION 1. Limited efforts: 1970s wage and price controls; aborted 2. Labour too weak: organizationally and politically even more so today 3. Business culture is competitive and firm centered 5. QUEBEC: A DISTINCT POLITICAL ECONOMY?

Quiet Revolution: dramatic changes 1. Quebec state intervened to create Franco economic opportunities 2. 1980s: starts building cooperation with business and labour on economic goals STATE INTERVENTION 1. To create Franco eco opportunities 2. Nationalized the hydro system: Hydro Quebec 3. Uses state agencies to finance private Quebec firms, such as Bombardier, SNC- Lavelin, Videotron, biotech, film, etc 4. By 1980s more mature firms resisted intervention 5. Overall: Qc still mixed: strong & weak state COOPERATION WITH B & L ON ECONOMIC GOALS 1. 1996 summit agreed on deficit and poverty reduction 2. in Qc unions are stronger, but B is mostly competitive, firm-centered 3. Overall: still mixed both plural and corporatism CANADAS POLITICAL ECONOMY 2 (03/21/2012)
Reading: Keith Banting, Dis-embedding Liberalism? The New Social Policy Paradigm in Canada, in D. Green and J. Kesselman, Dimensions of Inequality in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), pp. 417-452 [Course pack] 2) Rodney Haddow, Federalism & Adjustment, in G. Skogstad and H. Bakvis, eds., Canadian Federalism, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Oxford University Press, in press) [On-line reading] [Will be available on course web site]

Pre WWII almost purely liberal, selective social assistance form the provinces V. limited cost sharing in 1930s 1930s depression: we need change 1940: Federal UI; was a constitutional amendment; v. limited WWII political climate; strong unions and strong CCF (left); Esping-Andersen says 1944 social policy Green Book & 1945 white paper on employment signify a change 1944 universal family allowance, spending power 1951 universal pension (OAS); constitutional amendment 1960s Federal post secondary education cost-sharing; spending power of the fed 1958/1968 universal health insurance; fed cost sharing; spending power 1965 Contributory pension (CPP/QPP) 1971 Major expansion of federal UI

PAUSE: STILL A LIBERAL STATE? Mostly but with significant universalist features, and some generous social insurance Contrast US: little universality; social insurance only in pensions; much private PSE Why the difference between Canada and the US? Stronger unions and the left party; but also institutionally fewer veto points

2. CRISIS, GLOBALIZATION, RETRENCHMENT 1970s oil crisis, stagflation, deficits 1980s globalization, reality and/or ideology 1989 universal OAS pension claw back 1992 universal family allowance ends Successive UI cuts, culminating in 1993 creation of EI Ottawa reduces cost-sharing, culminating gin 1995 budget: Affects: health insurance, PSE, social assistance Mid-1990s: major provincial social assistance cuts

CANADAS WELFARE STATE From production to reproduction THEME: liberal welfare state but variably, liberal = selective, private, smallish, cheaper, higher inequality and poverty 1. ORIGINS AND HISTORY BNA Act 1867: social programs are provincial (section 92 of the constitution) But Ottawa has unlimited spending powers

Anything positive? Fed child tax credits Selective Liberals intro universal child care, 2006 But Tories cancel, replace with child allowance universal

And the enxernal pressures are less powerful (trade deals, WTO, capital flows)

GLOBALIZATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES (04/03/2012)

David Held & Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization (Oxford: Polity, 2002), pp. 1-8, 38-57 [Course pack] Mark Brawley, Globalization and Canada, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 323-338.

ANOTHER PAUSE: RETURN TO A PURER LIBERAL MODEL? OR ARMAGEDDON? 3. WHERE ARE WE NOW? Impact of social service change is hard to measure but Universal health insurance remains with delisting, waiting lists and cost pressures PSE: remains public, but with much higher tuition, less financial aid and larger classes Do we need universal child care? May be , but that would be new There has been buckling, but has there been breaking? On income transfers we can use surveys to be more precise: But this data is not definitive: SLID data is better over time Social transfer programs reduce inequality starting from the market Income taxes too, but other taxes?

Question: will globalization undermine variety? 1. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION More trade, more FDI, MNC outsourcing, and capital flows

POST-WAR BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM Freeing up of trade, gradually though GATT Due to the experience with depression and comparative advantages This system allows exchange controls to regulate capital flows Speculative pressures are base, esp for week post war economies So currency pegs needed against gold secured US$; this system was regulated and was adjustable Prevent short term currency runs Will permit order FDI, MNC activity, and was state-regulated

OVERALL PATTERN Market inequality has increased since 1980s, in Canada and almost everywhere Why? Globalization: outsourcing., technological change: blue collar jobs are gone, etc Under this constraint, after transfer/tax inequality has risen, but no more Transfers are doing as much or as little as before Elderly? Very low poverty in Canada Contrast US data on inequality and change, is the glass half full or half empty? Either way: less mercerization for welfare state than economy (production) in Canada, this is because of greater internal social and institutional barriers (inc parties, unions, federalism)

RESULT OF THE SYSTEM: EMBEDDED LIBERALISM Strong post-war growth; affluence in western Europe, north American and east Asia Combined with variable economic systems: strong and weak states, pluralism and corporatism, also with different welfare states Domestic interest who lost in this system, had limited options to exist the system Trade openness and markets combined with variable domestic choices Contrast CDN debate in FTA era

THE 1970S AND 1980S TRANSITION USA: Viet Nam: downward pressure on money Result : trade and budget deficits Nixon abandons pegs, allows money to float, restoration of competitiveness (for a while) Currencies now float Exchange controls are difficult, so they end Eurodollar market: offshore unregulated money Massive growth of capital flows Think of mutual funds When the markets are unhappy, the money runs

OVERALL PATTERNS Nordic and Germanic rival Liberal on GDP/ per capital, close on growth Latin Europe (D) very weak on both, per capita and growth Equity: Nordic groups wins in female employment rate Latin Europe trails again What are these poverty and inequality scored? Nordic wins on both, followed by Germanic Liberal loses, followed by Latin/Med

OVERALL ASSESSMENT Liberal is moderately ahead of Nordic and Germanic on efficiency and by more if we count population growth But is this enough to make up for weak equity? Responses to the above will reflect social choices, not measurable performance and social choice is affected by social power Latin/med models do not work, because there is excess clientism, corruption, limited regulation, will it change?

IMPLICATION FOR GLOBALIZATION THEORIES Short term logic favors low taxes, spending intervention, cooperation and redistribution Why? (1) because the above lead to better short term results (v. patient capitalism) (2) They are perceived to lead to better outcomes (3) this is what capital managers want ideologically Example: Capital flights, French nationalizations (1981), Swedish tax increases (1994) Which theory is favored by the short term logic? The liberal, Anglo-Saxon one

VARIATIONS ON PATTERNS USA is the richest, also has the most poverty and inequality Cause and effect/ Other factors? Nordic: Norway is the richest? Oil? Germanic: Germany is poorest and most unequal Latin/Med is bas all around, but look at Italy

What might happen? Option (1) inferior performance for B, C, and D will convince the elites to change (2) Or may be the rigidities in the systems will prevent change and they will decline (3) May be 1 or 2 are not correct, but the elites in B, C, D will think that it is Can test 1 and 2, need case studies for 3

ASSESSMENT OF VARIATIONS Avoid excess generalizations Change may equal adjustment within a model Germany became a bit more liberal Quebec became a bit more Nordic But globalization seems to determined nothing, depended on social choices

2. IS THE LIBERAL STATE WINNING? Efficiency measures focus on the growth of the pie Equity ones on the division of the pie

FROM JOSHS REVIEW SESSION

Who benefits and who loses from glob, what does glob mean for political economy and the welfare state? Glob might lead to a race to the bottom, this relates to how well different models of pol-ecos have done If glob weakening or strengthening of the welfare state? Weakening because taxes are being lowered this relates to the ides of where for the business is the most beneficial to set up operations govts are trying to shirt the tax burden unto the less mobile factors Increasing consumption taxes more resistance to the welfare state because people do not want for their taxes to go up What about having an effective state which invests in its people, this might be good? Nordic: invest a lot in the population, high taxes and they are doing generally well Globalization increases economic insecurity: may increase pressures to strengthen the welfare state create a sense of security in insecure times

LEGISLATURES AND EXECUTIVES (A) Legislatures makes laws (statutes) (B) Executive executes the law, forms the govt, sponsors most laws

COUNTRIES IN COMP P: UK 1: What are the institutions (A) PR (commons/lords) (B) cabinet (political executive) and crown which is a forms executive 2: Where is the power? PS means that the legislature trumps the executive Dem means that the commons dominate lords in the leg Almost unicameral Cabinet dominates the crown in the exec Fusion of the cab to Commons Responsible govt and confidence conventions result from the domination of the house and the ex of their respective branches Disciplines parties reverse the relation, creating a friendly dictatorship, where by the PR is no longer sovereignty in the a PS system, but the executive dominates the leg by controlling individual MPs and how they vote Except in cases of minority govts

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES I (10/25/2011)

Written and unwritten constitutions; Parliamentary and Presidential Government; federal and unitary states; the rule of law and judicial power. W. Phillips Shively, Power and Choice, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2007), pp. 311-322, 331-347 [Course pack]

COUNTRIES IN COMP P: USA 1: What are the insts? (A) the two houses of the congress (B) the president 2: Where is the power? SOP precludes fusion Written constitution balances the exec and the legislature, they cannot fuse like they did in PS system The ex and the leg are independent branches of the govt The written constitution maintains a balance within the leg, there is real bicameralism, both the house and the senate are important

WHAT ARE THEY? Constitutions answer two questions (1) what are the state institutions (2) and the relationship between the institutions where is the power? Questions 1 and 2 can be answered in a written doc, govt by a SOP USA Or can be answered by unwritten conventions, lead by a Parliamentary Sovereignty (PS) UK Canada is a mix of the two

FEDERALISM

1: What are the inst? Legislatures and executives 2: Where is the power? What is the relationship like in a federal state? Divide the power Are there two sets of the leg and exec insts that divide sovereignty and power?

WHO HAS THE POWER? W: separation of powers, diffuses power U: PS concentrates power in ex and leg (esp the ex if the parties are disciplined) CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 2 (11/01/2011)
Canadas complex constitution, in light of its British and American antecedents. Samuel LaSelva, Understanding Canadas Origins, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 3-22. Roger Gibbins, Constitutional Politics, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 97-114.

US: Yes: Federalism SOP means division of power between the fed and the states, local govts are the creature of the states

UK: No: Unitary PS means that the London ex and the leg overrides all local govts, but the EU is changing this

JUDICIARY AND THE RULE OF LAW Courts authoritatively interpret law Stare decisis (precedent) basis Courts make common law in the process The rule of law works differently in US/UK

ENTRENCHED RIGHTS

1: What are the inst? Written constitution guarantees rights 2: where is the power? The constitution protects the citizens

UK (Unwritten constitution) Courts (a) interpret common law and thereby re-make it, embellishing the common law Courts (b) interpret statutes form the Parl, this too leads to embellishment But Parl Supremacy means that statute law is trump, so the courts must yield to new statutes from the Parl.. except for the EU

USA: Yes SOP extend to the Bill of Rights in the written constitution Individual is protected from the fed or the state action by entrenched rights (in the constitution)

UK: No PS precludes written entrenchment But there is common law, but EU is changing this

US (Written constitution) As in UK, courts interpret and embellish both (a) the common and (b) the statute law But they also do more Written constitution in above statutes and courts can interpret and embellish the written constitution, too Rules can be rules ultra vires if they are against the written constitution Courts are only trumped by constitution amendment

UK v US constitution Constitution Relationships Ex/leg Rights UK U ex U common centered law only US W ex and W leg are entrenched balanced Fed/un U unitary W federal

Courts evolve by new appointments, which are done by the ex and approved by the senate Court systems is a political process with political results In UK, the leg is supreme; in US the leg is not, in CDN it depends

CANADA Responsible govt in 1840s

BNA ACT (1867) 1. Leg and ex relation is left unwritten like in the UK 2. Federalism, BNA written constitution here Ottawa v provinces, like UK 3. There was no bill of rights (UK) 4. Jud could only trump the leg on federalism, not ex/leg relation or rights some qualifications (1) JCPC to 1949, after SCC (2) Canada close to UK on the constitution, the leg/ex relation, entrenched rights and more like US when it came to federalism CONSTITUTION ACT (1982) Entrenched the Charter of rights and freedoms Moved entrenched rights form UK to US model expansion of the role of the SCC CONST ACT also includes an amending formula, fed parl +7 prov/50% of people for many amend

CND constitution in US/UK comp Constitution Relationship Ex/leg rights Fed/unit UK U ex U com U unitary centered law only US W W the W fed balanced bill Canada to U ex U com W fed 1982 centered law Canada U ex W - W fed from 1882 centered charter W= written, jud enforcement, subject to amend