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Central Asian Survey

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State, national awareness and levels of identity in Afghanistan from monarchy to Islamic state
Pierre Centlivres & Micheline CentlivresDemont Available online: 01 Jul 2010

To cite this article: Pierre Centlivres & Micheline Centlivres-Demont (2000): State, national awareness and levels of identity in Afghanistan from monarchy to Islamic state, Central Asian Survey, 19:3-4, 416-425 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/026349300750058017

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Central Asian Survey (2000), 19(3/4), 419428

State, national awareness and levels of identity in Afghanistan from monarchy to Islamic state1
PIERRE CENTLIVRES and MICHELINE CENTLIVRES-DEMONT
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Introduction Identity and national awareness are dif cult themes to deal with; rst of all, because they belong to the inner experience of the people and largely escape external observation; and secondly because the very theme of identity, or at least the ambition to deal with it, involves the danger of reifying reality, as if the collective or individual identity was there once and for all, in a de nite form. In the following pages, we will try to expose brie y the politics of the Afghan State in its past attempts to national construction and to mention the confrontation between the efforts to fabricate a nation-state and the obstacles met with on the way. Generally a national awareness is built in relation to an external otherness; especially the inner or external stranger. But at the end of the 19th century, the Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman, in a voluntary enterprise, had a model and a design in his mind: the European Nation-State. In many ways, we witness today the failure of Abdur Rahmans endeavour.2 It does not mean that we think the Afghan national consciousnes s does not exist, or is weakening, but we understand that the Afghan identity process is a long and complex one; it is related for many Afghans to the experience of exile and diaspora, to the fact that millions of Afghans found themselves in a situation where they were strangers in a foreign land. The foreign milieu conveyed and still conveys a picture of themselves and of their home country which, from then on, belongs to the construction of their own sense or identity. We can try to grasp this confrontation through this kind of mirror effect. In Afghanistan, the national awareness hardly coincided with the territory of the State, that is with the national border. Up until the marxist coup of 1978, one notices the relative weakness of a national bond and of a sense of citizenship. Consciousnes s of belonging to the Islamic community on one hand, and to a region, tribe or ethnic group on the other were the salient traits of identity. The ethnic, linguistic , religious and cultural diversity of Afghanistan is a well-known fact. The notion of ethnic group is however both recent and not
Prof. Dr Pierre Centlivres and Dr Micheline Centlivres-Dumont are at the University of Neuchatel, Switzerland. ISSN 0263-4937 print; 1465-335 4 online/00/3/40419-10 DOI: 10.1080/0263493002002077 5 2000 Central Asian Survey

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without ambiguity, and even the cartographic projection of these entities confronts us with many problems. One of the rst ethnographic maps of Afghanistan, a Soviet one publishe d in 1955 in Sovetskaja Ethnogra ya shows 16 ethnic groups. One of the most recent publication s on ethnic groups lists 55 ethnic names.3 The Kabul communist regime, in the 1980s, made of cial the existence of eight nationalitie s based on the Soviet model. The question of the disparate character of the entities called nationalitie s or ethnic groups was not solved by this political decision. Neither the ethnographic maps nor the lists made out by the anthropologist s nor the political discourse about nationalitie s were able to express the complex relationships between Afghan heterogenousnes s and Afghan unity.4 The borders of the Afghan State, xed at the end of the 19th century, did not correspond to the greater expansion of Afghanistan in the 18th and early 19th century; they were established under the pressure of the great neighbourin g powers, Imperial Russia and British India. For this reason, contrary to the historical, stable accepted borders of some nation-states , which are delimited by other nation-states , and which are part of the identity and heritage of the citizens and of their mental map, the borders of Afghanistan, do not have this indisputable clearness. The notion of Emirate, which is the of cial appellation today, refers more to the community of the believers led by the Commander of the Faithful, than to the de nite territory of a kingdom or a republic.5 The question of the Afghan nation and of the Afghan national identity can be expressed in the following manner: in which way a Pashtun, a Hazara, an Uzbeg from Afghanistan, for instance, are rst, one for the other, a fellow contryman, a compatriot, a watandar, and in which way a Tajik of Tajikistan, an inhabitant of Uzbekistan, a Pathan from NWFP are for the former: a neighbour or a foreigner? In October 1966, professor Georg Debets, a Soviet physical-anthropologis t and member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, made a preliminary draft for a Conference on The Formation of the Afghan Nation. It is to be noticed that 33 years ago, the existence of the Afghan nation was not questioned by scholars, but only the context and the history of its development. What a contrast with the present pessimistic view! Today doubt is dominantit is apparent in the formulations and queries of the scholars, Afghan and non-Afghan.6 The draft of 1966 suggested a nine-chapter programme; fundamentaly historical, it re ected the Soviet theory of socio-economical evolution from band to tribe, from ethnic group to nationality , from nationality to nation and state. The last part was supposed to deal with the uni cation process of the Afghan nation. Of course, the conference could not take place. Soon the Afghan con ict shattered the old certainties on state and nation determinismnational awareness, the development process of national identity went into crisis, as well as the common political future. 420

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Abdur Rahman and the making of the Afghan State During a reign covering the last twenty years of the 19th century, the Amir Abdur Rahman gave himself the task of modernizing the Afghan State and of achieving the building of the nation, the uni cation and centralization of the rst being, in his view, the precondition and the prerequisite for the second. External conquests being no longer possible, due to the presence of British India in the south and of the Russian Empire in the north, the fearsome Amir devoted himself to the paci cation of his own country, an inner conquest completed with harshness and cruelty. In 1900, one year before his death, there appeared in London a biography of the Amir which was edited by Mir Munshi Sultan Mohamed Khan, a Penjabi scholar who lived in the vicinity of the Afghan court.7 These Memoires were written in the form of a plea to be read by British readers. It appears that only the rst part of the book was written by the Amir, the second part of the autobiograph y was probably composed in England, according to the Afghan historian Hasan Kakar.8 Nevertheless, according to Kakar, those sections that deal with internal matters, as distinct to AngloAfghan matters, are in accordance with other sources and seem to re ect the Amirs position. For Afghanistan, the Amir did not think of a federal system, nor of a pluralistic imperium, like the Ottoman millet system, which was in complete decline at the time. He did not think of any possible autonomy for the diverse regions or population s of the Emirate, nor of a kind of neo-feudal regime, in which the big khans, begs and other tribal chiefs would manage their territory in the name of the Amir. He was convinced that centralized power was more suitable for the Afghans. Afghanistan, he said, would be a great nation in the future. Hence the necessity of breaking down the feudal and tribal system, and substitutin g one grand community under one law and under one rule. Luckily I have succeeded fully in this respect, as also in shaping Afghanistan into one united kingdom.9 Abdur Rahman crushed without pity the opponents to his programme: Hazaras, Ka rs, Ghilzais, inhabitants of North West and North East of Afghanistan were repressed not as non-Pashtun ethnic groups, but as enemies of the State. It was only under his successors that the Pashtunizatio n of the administration , was imposed, even if the royal families in their Kabul palace spoke Dari and not Pashtu. Seventy years later, Daoud, the rst president of the Afghan Republic (19731978), tried to promote the concept of a Pashtun State, which would be the ethnic, cultural and linguisti c foundation and legitimacy of Afghan unity. Daoud for instance prohibited the use of ethnic surnames and ethnonymes, and put an end to a modest plurilinguis m on the national radio, where only Pashtu and Dari were to be used. Up to the marxist coup of Sawr in 1978 (as well as under the monarchy and under the republic), the very existence and the plurality of ethnic groups had always been a taboo question for the Afghan government. Up to 1978, of cial 421

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papers, constitutions , census, of cial reports overshadowed systematically the Afghan pluralistic reality and recognized only a linguistic duality: Pashtu and Dari. According to the 1964 and 1977 Constitutions , Afghanistan is an unitary and indivisible state and the word Afghan shall apply to each and every individual of the nation of Afghanistan. The ideal of national unity in which all the citizens are to be considered as Afghan is, as one knows, built on an ambiguity, since Afghan means every inhabitant of Afghanistan as well as a member of the dominant group, the Pashtuns or Afghans. The ambiguity suggests that, among the citizens of Afghanistan, some are more Afghan than others. Moreover, in the period of the king and during the Daoud Republic, the Pashtunizatio n of the country was part of the programme of the State. Indeed, the authorities had an obsessive fear of what could endanger the formation, or the myth, of a uni ed nation. This is why precise gures on ethnic groups and precise statistic s on spoken languages are so dif cult to nd. After the last population census of 19781979, the publication of ethnic and linguistic gures was prohibited by President Taraki, since these gures were considered to be too sensitive , and since they could jeopardize a consensus built on the lack of information. The suspicion of ethnic statistics or ethnic pluralism in the prerevolutionar y periodwhich never prevented the government from making use of the tribal or ethnic registerdid continue after the coup of 1978, both among the communist regime and among the oppositio n parties of the Islamic resistance and, for the latter, not in the name of the uni ed Afghan mellat, but in the name of Islam and Umma. These parties never openly used tribal or regional appellations among them, unlike Pakistan, where several parties or organizations have ethnic or tribal labels. Indeed, the political parties in the Afghan resistance have or had a strong ethnic bias in their membership; Jamiat and Hezbe islami, not to mention the Taliban, are in this instance obvious examples. But the programme, ideology and appellation of these parties were non-ethnic, or supra-ethnic. They emphasized that the religious order, the af liation to the Umma, was above national or tribal order. As for the Shia parties, which regroup the Hazara of Central Afghanistan, nothing in their appellation either points to their religious or ethnic speci cation. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 greatly accelerated the ow of refugees toward Iran and Pakistan. In the mid-1980s, more than 3 million Afghans were said to be refugees in Pakistan, and more than 2 million in Iran. Akbar Ahmed10 and other anthropologist s have described the brutal rupture in the everyday life of refugees, in their social organization and in their political leadership. But with the Soviet intervention , Afghanistan as a whole became part of the big contest between East and West. For a majority of Afghans, the con ict also meant the great divide between a regime under atheist leadership and patronage, and the Muslims in general, whatever their country. Refugees in Pakistan and Iran became estranged from their traditional belonging, 422

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their usual self de nition relating to neighbourhoo d and local ethnic con guration. They were facing other Afghans, another human environment with Iranians, Pakistanis and members of the internationa l community. This new context of dependency and promiscuity led to a crisis of identity due to a change in otherness.11 The exodus and the new dimensions of the identity process One can sketch two directions in the new de nition of the self in a collective sense; one is closely linked to the refugee condition, the other is linked to an increase or a beginning of national awareness. The rst direction is related to the gathering, the mobilization of cultural and ideological ressources in a context which is dominated by loss of heritage, dispersion, promiscuity and grief, as well as by a precarious material existence. This use of cultural and moral ressources aiming at recapturing an identity has been studied by Edwards,12 Christensen 13 and ourselves.14 Far from being crushed by relentless fatality, the Afghan refugees found the means of viewing themselves and their situation in a relatively positive light. In the 1980s, the Afghan refugees seem to have de ned themselves along three ideological models. 1. The most familiar to Westerners is the one of refugee as de ned by the Convention of the United Nations of 1951. For the Afghans however the UNs concept of refugee is only one of the semantic conventions under which they take cover in exile and of which they could take a pragmatic advantage. Consequently , in the 1980s, the Afghan refugees conformed to the role the International Organizations expected them to ful l, and conformed to the image of a foreign-imposed identity. They gave the foreign visitors, politicians or journalists, the sight of victims of a war imposed on them by a great power, this great power being the enemy of the West. According to that manner of seeing, the Afghan refugees were at the outpost in a common struggle against the Empire of Evil. 2. The second register was related to the tribal code of honour as practised by the Afghans, according to which hospitalit y and temporary shelter in a time of need, are important norms. These norms, part of the pashtunwali, are shared by the Pashtuns on both sides of the southern border and according to them the Afghan refugees could regard themselves as the guests of the NWFP tribes. 3. The third and most important register, however, that of the moha jer, refers to Mohammeds ight from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD and has religious signi cance. In fact, this appelation became the most frequently used in Pakistan, con rming the religious character of the Afghan exodus, especially in the eyes of the Muslim world. This triple register corresponded to three sets, three forms of non-national identity in exile, which were in some way mastered or chosen, by the refugees. 423

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They were not always necessarily considered as contradictory. The refugees are and were victims, but they were not passively subjected to what happened to them. Today, most refugees have returned to Afghanistan and the war unfortunately did not come to an end. The meaningful representations and ideological models from which the refugees were able to build positive identitie s in exile are gone. Perhaps not entirely, however, insofar as many Afghans recall, in an emphatic way, the role of the Islamic resistance in the collapse of the communist world. The second direction taken by the Afghan awareness is related to the reawakening of the national identity in exile. We have already mentioned the weakness of a national bond and of a sense of citizenship up until the coup of 1978. The idea of nation that the rulers of Afghanistan tried to develop, did not mean anything to most Afghans. Only a portion of the political staff in Kabul and of the intellectuals have expressed a national project for the future. And even then, this project was for most of them tied with Pashtun nationalism. In Pakistan and in Iran, in Europe and in the USA, the Afghan exiles have been confronted with the fact that they were foreigners among Pakistanis, Iranians or Westerners. They were dealt with as dependent victims by members of humanitarian or international organizations , or journalists. Foreigners, dealing with the Afghan problem, sent back to the refugees a picture of themselves sometimes alien to them. Confronted with this picture, some Afghans would sometimes reject it, but they often had to take it into account in the process of reconstruction of their identity. Afghans from diverse origins were in this way united in a common condition in exile and we could make the hypothesis that the national consciousnes s was reinforced. There, the media and the international organizations in their humanitarian or political discourse spoke of the Afghans in general terms as a national and homogeneous community. Through the echo aroused by their heroic ghts and their misfortune, the Afghans felt their common destiny. A kind of collective consciousnes s was asserting itself, without doubt, through the mirror of others. When asked by expatriates about their identity, most Afghans living in exile give an answer referring to their Afghan origin, to the whole of Afghanistan, and rarely to a province, a tribe, an ethnic group or a town. Furthermore, the Pakistanis and the Iranians or the Westerners identi ed and still identify the Afghan refugees collectively through a whole set of signs such as the way of speaking, walking or dressing; they hardly distinguish a Tajik from a Hazara, an Uzbeg from a Turkmen. Finally some emblemsfood for instanceor references to the environment or climate are often claimed by Afghans in exile as identity markers. But the awareness of common origin or common condition in exile says little about an active sense of national belonging. In reality, the diffusion of the idea of nationalities , more or less ethnic, as well as the aspirations to regional political entities seem to challenge the real recognition of the Nation and its State, in the sense of belonging to a centralized, uni ed Afghan State in its present borders. 424

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Ethnic pluralism and nationalitie s At the beginning of this paper, we brie y mentionned the politics of nationalities of the Kabul revolutionary regime. According to the Fundamental Principles of April 1980, the regime did recognize and mention the ethnic pluralism and the existence of nationalitie s mellat. These national entities were more cultural and linguisti c abstractions than concrete political realities. For instance, they had no de ned territorial basis. When the mujahidin entered Kabul in the Spring of 1992, they did not follow up this pluralist orientation. Yet the subsequent factions and territorial divisions in AfghanistanJumbesh in the North, Hazarajat with the Hezb-e Wahdat in the centre, Rabbani and Massoud in the North-Eastseemed to echo the defunct politics of nationalities. It seems indeed that they represented an ideological lever, which was not without strength and appeal, for instance among the Hazaras. The latter indeed present a remarkable religious, geographical and socio-cultural homogeneity, which is reinforced by the painful memory of more than a century of domination, economic plundering and marginalization on every level. But the Hazaras are not the only ones to be sensitive to the idea of nationality , in the sense of autonomous entity of an ensemble; so are the Tajiks, the Uzbegs and the Pashtuns. Moreover, the interest in nationalitie s has brought many inhabitants of Afghanistan to rede ne their identity above the tribal or local level, and has led small groups to consider their integration into a broader unit. Even if the community con icts inside Afghanistan, for instance between Pashtuns and Hazaras, Pashtuns and Uzbegs, are often evaluated in terms of nationalities , one must admit that these national entities are often rather vague, due to the territorial dispersion of most of the ethnic communities, and to other factors of division. The advent of the Taliban movement did not suppress the ambiguity. They also claim to be above the tribal and ethnic divisions , and to recognize only their af liation to a rigorous Islam, whose norm are their own interpretation of the Shariat. Promoting virtue and discouraging vice, that is the inner core of the Taliban programme, and not federalism or rights of minorities; they claim to be Muslims rst and they do not attach any importance, they say, to ethnic or tribal belonging, or to any nationalist aspiration. But in reality, many people inside and outside of Afghanistan, whatever their origin or their belonging, consider instead the Taliban movement as a manifestation of Pashtun nationalism or hegemony, or as a Pashtun reconquest under the cover of paci cation or moral order. It would however be a mistake to look at the Taliban movement only as the tool of Pashtun nationalism . Their fundamentalism and their interpretation of the Shariat are far from being in conformance with the tribal way of life and tradition. Mullah Omar came out clearly against tribal norms in his decree on women rights in October 1998. 425

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The Afghan diaspora in Europe In the last part of this paper, we would like to outline brie y some of the dimensions of the identity process which can be observed among the Afghan diaspora in Europe. More and more Afghans in exile are not only outside Afghanistan, but also outside the regional space of neighbourin g Iran and Pakistan. Today, more than 60,000 live in Germany and perhaps 200,000 in the Western countries. Exact gures are almost impossible to obtain because, among other reasons, many Afghans are now nationals in their country of residence. The draft for a Conference on the Afghan Nation, made in the 1960s by Professor G. Debets, could not anticipate the Afghan crisis. There was nothing to suggest that the question of the Afghan nation, of the Afghan identity, would extend beyond the historical territory of the citizens of Afghanistan. The reconstruction of an Afghan identity is also in process beyond the border of the State, wherever Afghan communities are. This identity process is not only built on the opposition to foreign or inner otherness, but in a context where the person or the group is itself an alien. There, the reference to the Nation or to the origins focuses on a distant territory. Identity has become for many in some way unterritorial. The identity process goes on among transterritorial and transnational communities. Networks have replaced the homogeneous closed collectivity. These networks link together the scattered families and groups, and these to an Afghanistan which is at the same time concrete and imagined, reconstructed by the work of the memory. Through these networks go information, people, sometimes goods, and also representations and ideas. This is not the place to discuss the probabilitie s and the perspectives of the exiles return plans, nor to analyze the myth of return among the diasporic communities. 15 Afghans in Europe manage to succeed in a lasting setting, which implies a successful integration for them and their children.16 To get ones elderly parents or relatives coming from Pakistan to Germany, for instance, implies an expectation of a long-term stay. It implies also to accepting the place of exile as the affective and often professional locus of ones own life, as its long-lastin g human environment. The Afghan refugees who are naturalized Swiss, German or French are more and more numerous; they, however, do not depart from the eld of Afghan identity. On one hand, they take an active part as citizens in the political life of their new countries. They are integrated in the work world and in their neighbourhoods . According to the legal order, they have a contractual relationship, as citizens, to the State. But, on the other hand, the social order they belong to, to use the distinctio n made by Todorov,17 is in good part related to their community of origin, the use of the mother tongue, home food and concerns about marriage of the young generation. Generally, whatever their of cial nationality , they spontaneously declare themselves to be Afghans. Afghan cultural associations, religious practices, ceremonies like weddings or funerals are favoured occasions, or loci where an Afghan culture, an Afghan 426

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way of life are produced and reproduced in exile with their religious and community life, and socio-cultural dimensions. Afghan culture and Afghan ways are representations which are transmitted and activated by the existence of networks and the living together of several generations. Moreover, associations and ceremonies are also evidence of changes and of adaptation to the host country. When several generations live together, change and integration are related to the interplay between the generations: the one active on the labour market, the one more recently arrived, the parents, who contribute to keep the practice of Pashtu or Dari among the young members of the domestic group, and the children, on their way to schooling in a foreign language. The elitist character of the Afghan immigration in Europe, whose members mostly come from the urban middle class or higher middle class and have a good level of education with a basic knowledge of Western languages, is certainly one of the keys to their successful adaptation. Among the Afghan diaspora in Europe, the Pashtuns represent a high percentage, higher than their percentage among the ethnolinguisti c con guration in Afghanistan. These Afghans state rmly a positive sense of being Afghans, a strong identity. They insist for instance on the role the Afghans had in the collapse of the USSR, and on their capacity to preserve their spiritual cultural heritage. This claim seems to be reinforced by a strong endogamy. The facility to adjust to the host society is, according to them, a proof of their cultural superiority. Paradoxally, capacity for integration seems, to their own eyes, precisely a moral Afghan property. The success of integration for many of them, on one side, and the preservation, or the continuing process of identity, on the other, could be thought of as a paradox. We mean by integration the access to the labour market or to the facilities of the welfare state, and also the adhesion to most of the norms of behaviour of the host country. They sometimes compare this aptitude to the lesser achievementsaccording to themof other immigrant communities. Far from seeing a contradiction in the paradox of the uniqueness of being Afghan and the aptitude to integrate, one can suppose an articulation between two complementary sets of values: one underlying a positive identity, a positive image of oneself as Afghan, and the other underlying the capacity of adapting to various circumstances, to face successfully the mobility and the uidity of life. This positive image of being Afghan in the core of the identity process, is reinforced by the many risks and hazards of exile. It helps to master changing contexts. It confronts the basic superiority of being Afghan and the temporary accidents of history, even in the absence, or at a distance, from the territory of a nation-state. Notes and References
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin, October 1999. 2. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p 28.

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3. Erwin Orywal, ed., Die ethnischen Gruppen Afghanistans. Fallstudien zu Gruppenidentit at und Intergrup penbeziehungen (Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert, 1986), pp 1819. 4. Pierre Centlivres, Les groupes ethniques et les nationalites dans la crise afghane, in Riccardo Bocca and Mohammad-Reza Djalili, eds, Moyen-Orient: migrations, democratisation, mediations Institut Univer sitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva (Paris: PUF, 1994), pp 161170. 5. Hasan Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan. The Reign of Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p 21. 6. See the special issue of Les Nouvelles dAfghanistan entitled Quelle nation afghane {Which Afghanistan}, No 79, 1997; Amin Tarzi, L anti-nation afghane {The anti-Afghan nation}, Les Nouvelles dAfghanistan, No 79 (4), 1997, pp 811; Shah Mohammad Tarzi, Afghanistan in 1992. A Hobbesian state of nation, Asian Survey, Vol 33, No 2, 1993, pp 165174. 7. Mir Munshi, ed., The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, 2 Vols (London: John Murray, 1900). 8. Kakar, op cit, Ref 5, p 248. 9. Munshi, op cit, Ref 7, Vol II, pp 176177. 10. Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakistan Society. Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press), p 166. 11. Pierre Centlivres, Exil, relations interethniques et identite dans la crise afghane, Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Mediterranee, Nos 5960, 1991, pp 7082. 12. David B. Edwards, Marginality and migration: cultural dimensions of the Afghan refugee problem, International Migration Review, Vol 20, No 2, 1986, pp 313325. 13. Asger Christensen, When Muslim identity has different meanings: religion and politics in contemporar y Afghanistan, in Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari, eds, Islam: State and Society (London: Curzon Press, 1988). 14. Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont, The Afghan refugee in Pakistan: an ambiguous identity, Journal of Refugee (Oxford), Vol 1, No 2, 1988, pp 141152. 15. Madawi al-Rasheed, The myth of return. Iraqi arab and Assyrian refugees in London, unpublished paper submitted to 4th International IRAP Conference, Oxford, 59 January 1994. 16. Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont, Exile, diaspora et changement social: le cas de lAfghanistan, in Mondehr Kilani, Islam et changemen t social (Lausanne: Payot, 1998), pp 219229; Pierre Centlivres, Micheline Centlivres-Demon t and Tina Gehrig, La diaspora afghane: le paradoxe apparent de lidentite et de lintegration, To appear in Actes du Colloque CLUSE, Neuchatel, September 1998 (2000). 17. Tzvetan Todorov, La coexistence des cultures, in Bertrand Badie and Marc Sadoun, LAutre. Etudes reunies pour Alfred Grosser (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996), pp 293307).

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