Building Democracry On The Sand

2008
Demos
Reportfromthe2ndDemosNationalExpertSurvey
[DEMOCRACY
BUILDINGONTHESAND]
AdvancesandSetbacksinIndonesia
Title Editor Design/layout Publishedby Firstedition : DEMOCRACYBUILDINGONTHESAND AdvancesandSetbacksinIndonesia : WillyPurnaSamadhiandNicolaasWarouw : SusantiJohana : Demos(Jakarta)andPCDPress(Yogyakarta). : December2008.
TableOfContent
TableofContent
TableofContent Preface Chapter1 Indonesias Held Back Democracy and Beyond Introduction and Executive Briefing OlleTrnquist Chapter2 Approaching Democracy Some Brief Introductory Notes on Concepts and Methods OlleTrnquistandNicolaasWarouw Chapter3 ADecadeofReformasi:TheFragilityofDemocracy WillyPurnaSamadhiandSofianMunawarAsgart Chapter4 ARoughRoadtoPoliticalCitizenship:UndertheShadowofCommunalism WillyPurnaSamadhi Chapter5 TowardstheConsolidationofPowerfulEliteDemocracy NurImanSubonoandWillyPurnaSamadhi Chapter6 PopulistShortcuttoProgress? SyafaatunKaryadi Chapter7 CraftingRepresentation AttiaNur
TableOfContent
Chapter8 Summary DEMOSteam Chapter9 TheModelofPoliticalBloc ArisArifMundayatandA.E.Priyono Bibliography Appendix
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Preface
Preface
The year of 2008 marked the tenth anniversary of Indonesian reformasi, which was enacted after the fall of Suhartoled New Order regime through protest actions backed by university students. For ten years, we have witnessed some promising changes. Yet, such a span of time is not sufficient enoughtosolidifythefundamentalsofdemocracyandhumanrightspromotion. Indonesiandemocracyremainedunsteady! SowasthegeneraldescriptionofDemos2007SurveyonProblemsand Options of Indonesian Democratisation. The Survey was the second one, following the first conducted in 2003. Indeed, there had not been much improvementduringthespanoftime,butweareconvincedthattheprocessof democratisation cannot be left behind or stopped, as Demos surveys also revealed some existing options that should be used to achieve a better, meaningfuldemocracy. This survey is based on the assesment of 903 informants from 13 frontlines in all provinces in Indonesia, from Aceh to Papua. In order to gather information from the informants, Demos gained incredible support from key informants and research assistants in 33 provinces. Demos research team involved in this survey were Syafaatun Kariadi (coordinator), AE Priyono, Attia Nur, Nur Iman Subono and Sofian Munawar Asgart. Willy Purna Samadhi, Demos Deputy for Research, conducted internal supervision. Contribution was also given by Antonio Pradjasto, Melanie Tampubolon, Gilang Desti Parahita, DebbiePrabawati,InggridSilitonga,AmiPriwardhani,ChristinaDwiSusantiand LaksmiPratiwi. TheexecutivesummaryofthissurveywaspresentedinJakartaonMay 2008. The more regional based results were also presented in six cities in Indonesia, namely Ambon, Palu, Mataram, Banjarmasin, Bandung and Palembang. We are glad and grateful at the same time, that the forums had contributedusefulcomments,criticismandsuggestionstoimproveouranalysis towardourempiricaldata. This book is the result of cooperation between Demos and Gadjah Mada University, in this case Center for Social and South East Asian Studies (CESSAS). The cooperation is expected to produce a more critical empirical studiesthatatthesametimealsomeetacademicstandard. We are grateful to Professor Mohtar Masoed, Dr. Pratikno, Cornelis Lay, M.A, Budi Irawanto, M.A, who have been playing great role to the establishmentofDemosUGMcooperation.Theyhadalsocontributedimportant comments, criticisms, and suggestions to this book. We are also especially
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Preface
thankfultoDr.NicolaasWarouwthatprovidedhispreciousenergyandtimeto becometheeditorforthisbook. Also, we would like to thank Dr. Olle Trnquist, Professor of Political andDevelopmentSciencefromUniversityofOslo,Norway,whohasbeenvery enthusiasticandconsistentingivingallhisattentiontothecooperation. Also to the Embassy of Norway for Indonesia, The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and Swedish Development Aid Authority (Sida), we are grateful for supporting our scientific integrity and independenceinpromotingdemocracyinIndonesia. Thesurveyresultdiscussedinthisbookdidrevealthatthesituationof democracy in Indonesia remained critical. Yet, the fact that prodemocracy actorsnowbelievedthatengagementinpoliticalprocesswasoneofimportant waystoattainpopularsovereigntyisonepointworthofconsideration.Several political attempts were promoted to strengthen democratic consolidation by using the emerging of several national political communities. Unfortunately, some prodemocracy actors took populist shortcut with some justification to their options; which called for harder work of prodemocracy actors to strengthen consolidation among themselves. This became more important as theelitesalsoconsolidatedthemselvesbyusingexistingdemocraticinstruments butrefusingtopromotethem.Therefore,webelievethatthisbookwouldgive importantcontributiontothepromotionofIndonesiandemocracy. Weinvitesuggestionsandcommentsforthisbook. Yogyakarta,December2008 AsmaraNababan Dr.ArisArifMundayat DemosExecutiveDirector CESSASUGMDirector
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IndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond
ChapterOne
IndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond IntroductionandExecutiveBriefing: Advances,setbacksandoptions,20032007

OlleTrnquist(UniversityofOslo) This book is produced jointly by Demos researchers, coordinated by WillyP.SamadhiandateamofseniordemocracyscholarsatUniversitasGadjah Mada (UGM) coordinated by Dr. Nicolaas Warouw, in cooperation with this author.Itisdedicatedtotheendofthebeginningofthreeprocesses. First,ismarkstheendofthebeginningofattemptstorebuildfruitful relations between public academia and civil society. The book is rooted in collective work in the early 1990s between scholars and activists on democratisation;collectiveworkwhichsoonhowevermusttakerescuein civic organisations because of the lack of academic freedom. The first book, Aktor Demokrasi,(BudimanandTrnquist2001)wasresearchedandspreadindrafted versionsduringthedismantlingoftheSoehartoregime.Thesecondbookonthe PostSoeharto Democracy Movement (Priyono, Prasetyo and Trnquist 2003) drewattentiontotheparadoxicalmarginalisationofprodemocratsinthethen buildingofdemocracy.Thustheresultscalledformorecomprehensiveanalysis ofthepoliticaldynamics.Thiswouldbetogeneratebetterknowledgeasabasis for deliberation and improvement. The Organisation Demos was formed to facilitate the work. The aim was to generate researchbased democracy promotionthroughparticipatorysurveys.Participatorysurveysofhowsome900 experiencedactivistsalongthefrontlinesofallcrucialeffortsatdemocracyinall provinces assessed the problems and options. A rigorous analytical framework withhundredsoftheoreticallymotivatedquestionswasdevelopedandapplied. However, while it is true that support was always there from a handful of scholars,itisonlythejointworkwiththecurrentbookthatmarksthesuccessful conclusionofafirstroundofbroaderandclosercooperation.Fortunately,the writingofthebookhasthusalsoenabledthetransformationofthisauthorsco direction and capacity building of Demos into more equal partnership. The continuous academic guidance is now shouldered by a team of Indonesian scholarswiththisauthorasasenioradvisoronly.
Second, the book is also dedicated to the end of the beginning of attemptstoestablishbothatheoreticallyandempiricallysolidbasisforanalysis of Indonesian democracy. Most assessments of democracy are driven by the needofgovernmentofficesandforeignsupporterstoprepareandevaluatetheir policies and projects. The democracy movement, however, in addition to any serious scholar and student, needs more theoretically and empirically inclusive andimpartialassessments.Thisis tomakeitpossibleto considertheprosand cons of a wider spectrum of arguments as well as to extend the sources of information beyond the established elite to the experienced democrats in the field. While such a more solid foundation has now been generated through Demos surveys, this book also introduces an effort to add crucial results from scatteredbutalreadyexistingstudiesaswellasnewresearchofmajorproblems. Much of this work is conducted within a new international education and research programme on Power Conflict and Democracy in theoretical and comparative perspective. The founding partners are UGM with Demos, UniversityofColomboandUniversityofOslo(UiO).Butothersarewelcometo link up too including in the new electronic publication programme, the PCD Press;theprimepublisherofthisbook.TheaimofthePCDPressistofosterthe localneedsandprioritiesofstudentsandscholarsinSouthandSoutheastAsia andtheirclosepartners.Inthefuture,finally,theacademicnodewithUGMin cooperationwithDemosmayalsobetheimpartialandlegitimatepublicsphere thatisneededtoalsodiscussandshareinatransparentwayresultsfromdonor andgovernmentdrivenassessmentsofdemocraticchallenges;assessmentthat maybothaddcrucialinsightsandbenefitfromindependentanalyses. Third, the book is of course dedicated to what one may hope is the endofthebeginningofIndonesiastransitionfromauthoritariantomeaningful democraticrule.Tenyearsago,SoehartosNewOrderbegantobereplacedby the worlds largest New Democracy. It is time to evaluate advances and setbacks,andtoidentifyoptionsforthefuture. Inthepresentbook,theresultsfromtheallIndonesiaresurveywhich was carried out in 2007, are analysed in view of the data from the first survey which was conducted in two rounds in 2003/2004 and which are available in Priyonoet.al 2007 ( ).Beinganewdemocracyinconstanttransformation,Indonesiacalls forresurveysoftheproblemsandoptionsasfrequentlyasthegeneralelections. The approach and framework is presented and discussed in detail in chapter two.Ithasalsobeensubjecttoaseparateacademicallycriticalselfevaluation. (Trnquist 2008b). The full questionnaire is available in the appendix. The lead sponsors in addition to major sections of the democracy movement and scholars at the UiO and UGM with associates is the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its embassy to Indonesia, with Sida (the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency) and other partners, including Ford Foundation. The commitment and support of the Scandinavian sponsors butalsotheirpolicyofnoninterventionisminacademicmattershasbeencrucial tothesuccess. In brief, the resurvey and supplementary research reveal that in between 2003/04 and 2007 Indonesia has developed into a consolidated top down democracy dominated by its powerful elite. The standard of governance related instruments of democracy (such as ruleof law, anticorruption and accountability) has improved though from very low levels. A countrywide political community is evolving as a substitute for the crumbling Jakarta driven nationstatethoughthenewpolityremainsconstrainedbyelitistandlocalised identity politics and economic globalisation. The military is on the retreat from politics,andamajorityofthewidenedandlocalisedestablishmentmakesuseof formallydemocraticrulesofthegamethoughclearlytotheirownbenefitand only at times in favour of the aims of democracy. Much of the comparatively successfuldemocracybuildingisthusbuiltonloosefoundations.Ascomparedto four years earlier, most of the relatively impressive freedoms and rights are stagnating and backsliding. The sections of the powerful elite that rarely win elections seem to be interested in a partial return to the old idea of promoting stabilityandeconomicgrowthaheadofpopularfreedomsandsovereignty.This wasoncelabelledpoliticsoforder(Huntington1965)andusedtolegitimisethe rise of the New Order. Now it is baptised sequencing democracy (e.g. Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Most seriously, however, organised politics is exclusionary. Most people are not integrated from below, only, at best, incorporatedfromabove.Inspiteofattemptsbyprodemocratstothecontrary, there is a lack of representation by people themselves and of basic issues and interests related to middle classes, women, labour, peasants and fisherfolks, urbanpoorandindigenouspopulations.Whilevotingisfree,runninginelections is only for the well endowed and powerful. Hence the worlds largest new democracyisheldback.Andsincethepartysystemisclosedforactorswithout economic and cohesive power, and since popular organisation remains weak, there is a need for popular and civic organisations to form Democratic Political Blocks behind basic platforms on local and central levels, to thus foster and control least worst candidates who can facilitate more meaningful democracy bywhichpeoplecanimprovetheirsocialrelationsandstandardofliving.
DesignversusStructure The generally accepted meaning of democracy is popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. How far has Indonesia moved towards this ideal? And how much further will it now go? Put differently: how much of the old Soehartoera oligarchy remains in place, still governing, but doing so via formally democratic elections? What, if any, are the chances to advance towards more meaningful democracy, in terms of sufficiently favourable means and capacities of ordinary people to really control public affairsandthuspromotedevelopmentinaccordancewiththeirownpriorities? There are two predominant and rather extreme kinds of answers to these questions. The first comes from the designers. Beginning in the global third wave of democracy, from the late 1970s onwards, some concerned scholarsandpractitionersplacedtheirfaithinthedesignofalimitednumberof institutions.Gettheinstitutionsrights,suchpeopleargued,anddemocracywill flourish.Theinstitutionstheyhadinmindrelatetocivilandpoliticalliberties,the rule of law, free and fair elections, and good governance. Internationally this trend began with the eliteled transitions from authoritarian rule in southern Europeinthe1970s,withSpainastheparadigmaticexample.Itthentravelledto LatinAmerica,iteffectedthetransformationofSouthAfricaanditwasexported to the rest of Africa south of the Sahara in addition to Eastern Europe. (E.g. ODonnell and Schmitter 1986, Lintz and Stepan 1996, Grugel 2002). Finally it wastakenaboardinpartsofAsiatoo;andwiththeendgameinJakartaitwas introducedtoIndonesiabyscholarssuchasBillLiddle(2001).Atpresent,much oftheseideasareappliedininternationalagencies fordemocracybuildinglike the National Democratic Institute and International IDEA. In this view and by international standards among new but often poorly advancing democracies, Indonesiaisdoingfine,especiallygiventhetraumatichistoryoftheelimination of the popular movements in 196566, and the more than thirty years of militarised capitalism that followed. Hence, the achievements may testify to whatispossibleevenunderharshconditions. It is true that the designers acknowledge that the system poorly representstherealneedsofordinarypeople,buttheybelievethatthisproblem too can be improved through better institutional design. The measures they propose include more direct elections of government executives, and simplificationofthepoliticalpartysystem.Thelatterstepwouldresultinafew major parties that, although topdriven, would at least be able to develop policies,pickupdemandsfromsociety,recruitpeopleforgovernmentjobsand supervise the executive. The designers think that popular representation from belowisunrealisticandthattopdowndemocracydominatedbypowerfulelites
willhavetodo.Inthisview,deepeningdemocracyisinsteadlimitedtodirect participationbyresponsiblecitizensincivilsociety,usually,defacto,excluding themasses.(E.g.Catn2007) Thesecondanswercomesfromstructuralistsonboththeleftandthe right of the political spectrum. The structuralists use a similarly narrow definition of democracy but are much more pessimistic. They say that the structuralconditionsdonotpermitdecentdemocracy.Asaresult,theoligarchs have retained their power and ordinary people their poverty. From a radical political economy position, this is most forcefully argued by Vedi Hadiz and RichardRobison(2004)andrecentlybyMaxLane(2008),advocatingtheneedto return to extra parliamentary actions. According to some structuralists, freedoms and elections have even generated worse identity politics, conflicts andcorruption,andlesseconomicgrowth(e.g.MansfieldandSnyder2005). Thus, there is a new emerging international thesis: that enlightened groups should sequence democracy. While major parts of the left focus on fightingglobalneoliberalism,sayingitblocksrealdemocracy,therightwantsto buildsolidinstitutions,goodgovernance,growthalliancesandorganisationsof responsible citizens, before entrusting the masses with even the limited freedom of electing topdown parties dominated by powerful elites. This position is gaining ground in, for instance, many ministries for foreign affairs, conservativethinktanksanddevelopmentbodiessuchastheWorldBank.(C.f. thereviewbyCarothers2007a,b) AlternativeFocusonUniversalFactorsinContextualProcesses Boththeseargumentsaretheoreticallyandpoliticallydubious.Thefirst assumes that once the elites have agreed to the establishment of a few democratic institutions, democracy has been achieved. This is, of course, as nave as stating that basic capitalist or socialist institutions always generate prosperity.Yet,mostdesigners,whomasalreadymentionedwereintroducedto IndonesiabyscholarssuchasBillLiddle,haveatleastheldontotheirbeliefin democracy. That is not always the case with the structuralists. They insist that rather narrowly defined democracy is meaningful only if certain prerequisites have already been met. For the conventional left, this usually means greater social and economic equality, workers or the poor having strong bargaining power,andthelike.Fortheright,itmeansstronginstitutions,goodgovernance, associations of responsible citizens and economic growth. As a result, the structuralists by definition exclude the possibility of creating such conditions through improved democracy. Instead, they become pessimistic about the
promiseofdemocracy,orargueorindicatelikereportedlyvicepresidentJusuf Kalla (e.g. Suwarni 2007, Simamora 2008) that it should be limited or even postponed. In between the two extremes (both applying a narrow definition of democracybutoneengineeringeliteinstitutions,theotherwaitingformassive social change) democracy can be understood instead as a contextual process where universal dimensions and intrinsic democratic institutions can only be analysedinviewofcontendingactorsdemocraticwillandtheirpoliticalcapacity touseandpromotetheinstitutionsovertime. A framework for such an analysis was developed and applied in our two national surveys of Indonesias democracy. At each point of time Demos askedsome900experiencedcampaignerscumexpertsondemocratisationinall provincesabouttheextenttowhichtheexistinginstitutionsandthethreeactors that they found to most powerful and the three alternative actors that they deemed to be most important in their own contexts really supported the universallyacceptedaimsandmeansofdemocracy.Thetheoreticalframework and method are presented and discussed in detail in Chapter 2, but the first focus was thus on the performance, spread and substance of the 32 intrinsic instruments to promote and apply democracy that we had identified in accordance with mainstream theories. (These instruments included the major dimensionsofequalcitizenship,internationallawandhumanrightsconventions, ruleoflawandjustice,civilandpoliticalrights,economicandsocialrights,free and fair elections, good political representation, democratic and accountable government, freedom of media, press and academic freedoms, additional civic participation, direct participation). Second, questions were asked about the extent to which the most important actors that the informants had identified actuallypromoted,usedorabusedandevenavoidedtheintrinsicinstrumentsof democracy. Third, attention was directed at the capacity of the actors to promoteandusetheinstruments.Themajordimensioninthisrespectwasthe extenttowhichtheactors(a)wereincludedorexcludedinpoliticsatlarge;(b) hadrelevantsourcesofpowerandabilitytotransformthemintoauthorityand legitimacy; (c) were able to put their main issues and interests on the agenda (i.e. politicise them), (d) could organise and mobilise collective action in democratic ways, and (e) had the capacity to approach decision making and executiveinstitutionsofgovernance,directlyandorbymeansofrepresentation. Thecombinedresultsfrombothsurveysmakeitclearthattheextreme institutionalist and structuralist arguments are not just theoretically but also empiricallymistaken.Letusturntoageneraloutlineofthefindings.
EightMajorConclusions (1)DeterioratingFreedom A first conclusion from these surveys is that while many civil and political rights are being upheld which is in contrast to most other new democracies the advances have somewhat deteriorated since 2003/04. By thenthegeneralstandardofthefreedomswereoutstandingascomparedtothe otherinstitutionaldimensionsofdemocracy.Informantssaythatinadditionto majorproblemsofthefreedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(or teamsofindependentcandidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipatein electionstowhichweshallreturnthefreedomsofreligion,belief,language and culture, freedom of speech, assembly and organisation, freedom of the press,artandacademicworld,citizensparticipationinextensiveindependent civil associations and public access to and the reflection of different views within media, art and the academic world have also backslided. (For an overviewofthedetails,seetheindexinChapter3.) (2)ImprovedGovernance The second conclusion is that there has been a general improvement since 2003/04 in topdown efforts by government institutions to improve the miserableperformanceoftheruleoflaw,particularlythecontrolofcorruption. These improvements are particularly noticeable with regard to the subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law, the equality before the law, the transparency and accountability of elected government and the executive, governments independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power, and the capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organisedcrime.Itistruethattheimprovementsarefromverylowlevelsand that most of these crucial problems remain, but the advances remain commendable. (3)CountryWidePoliticalCommunity Third, the disintegration of the centralistic New Order has not led to thebalkanisation,characterisedbyseparatismandethnicandreligiouscleansing thatmanyobserversandpoliticianshadpredicted.Whathasemergedinsteadis a unitary political (rather than ethnonationalist) community with extensive spaceforlocalpolitics.Itistruethatthisspaceimplieshugeinequalitiesamong the provinces and regions, and that it has often been occupied by powerful groups.The attempts to develop democraticpoliticsonthebasisofrealissues andinterestsonthegroundareunderthethreatbyelitistandlocalisedidentity
politicsand economic globalisation.ButinAceh,whereforeigndonorshaveso farcontainedthemilitaryandbigbusinessandwhereseparatistshavebeenable to substitute political participation for armed struggle, decentralisation also paved the way for peace and potentially fruitful democracy. This part of the frameworkfordemocratictransitionisnowatstakeandweshallreturntothe challenges. (4)TheRelativeStabilityofDemocracyRestsWithElitistInclusionofPeople Atthesametime,politicsingeneralcontinuetobedominatedbythe powerful elite. Yet, the dominant elite groups are more broadlybased, more localised and less militarized than under Soeharto. Hence the surveys and associatedresearchqualifiesthegeneralthesisthatthepowerfulelitefromthe New Order has simply captured democracy. (C.f. Robison and Hadiz 2002) Remarkably, it is rather an extended elite that have adjusted to the new institutions that are supposed to promote democracy. This is not to say that there are no abuses, but decentralisation and elections have enabled more diversesectionsofIndonesiaselitetomobilisepopularsupport.Ofcourse,elites often mobilise such support by making use of their clientelistic networks, their privileged control of public resources and their alliances with business and communal leaders. Yet, the interest of such elite groups in elections is both a crucialbasisoftheactuallyexistingdemocracyanditsmajordrawback.Without this elite support, Indonesian democracy would not survive; with the powerful elite support, it becomes the domain of rotten politicians who prosper and entrenchthemselvesthroughcorruption.(TheresearchprogramsRenegotiating Boundaries and In Search of Middle Indonesia at the KITLV institute in the Netherlands(www.kitlv.nl)andCenterforLocalPoliticsandRegionalAutonomy StudiesatGadjahMadaUniversityareprovidingcomprehensivecasestudiesin thisarea.) In short, beyond a number of freedoms, democratic institutions and peoplescapacitiesremainweak.Yet,muchoftherequiredinfrastructureisnow inplace,andinspiteoftheirweaknessesandbiases,Indonesiasinstitutionsare solidenoughtoaccommodatepowerfulactorsand,atleastpartially,alternative actors as well. Theoretically, this is the bottom line. It is the reason why Indonesiamaybecalledanemergingdemocracy.Inalltheserespects,Indonesia maythusbegintoresembleIndia,themoststabledemocracyintheglobalSouth which is dominated primarily by politically oriented powerful elites that incorporatevulnerablepeopleinto politics,win electionsandof coursebenefit in various ways from the powers thus gained and therefore also sustaining certain procedural fundamentals of democracy while the more modern and cosmopolitanaffluentmiddleclassesincreasinglyoftenoptforprivatesolutions
totheirproblems.(e.g.CSDS2007,Chatterjee2004,HarrissandCorbridge2000, HarrissWhite2003) (5)MonopolisationofRepresentation Sowhatwouldittaketomakethemostofthisdemocraticpotential? The major problem as compared to India is that Indonesias system of representationandelectionsisnotevenopenenoughforthepossibleinclusion of major interests among the people at large and also erects high barriers to participation by independent players. Indonesias democracy is thus held back even in a very basic and procedural sense. Civic and popular organisations are preventedfromgettingintoorganisedpolitics.Moreover,andtoalargeextent due to decades of repression and the continuous monopolisation of representation but also because their own mistakes, these groups remain hamperedbytheirownfragmentationandweakmassorganisation.Moreover, supplementary research indicate clearly that these weaknesses in turn are relatedtoproblemsofrepresentation,eveninbasictermsofbeingresponsiveto theprimedailyproblemsandaspirationsofpeopleonthegroundindeveloping policies and strategies. In this respect Indonesia still seriously lags behind. This underdevelopmentofdemocracyisthuswithregardtoboththepeopleandthe issuesandintereststhatareexcluded. First, the survey reveals that the powerful actors in society dominate politics and the political economy. Politics (including the executive) and good contacts are their primary sources of power; pure economic bases are less crucial.Alliancesaremainlywithinthesepowerfulsectionsoftheeliteinabroad senseoftheword(thusalsoimplyingifcoursethattherearealsootherelites, alternativepolitical, cultural intellectual with less powers). Legitimacy of the powerful elite is mainly related to the ability to connect people and gain authoritative positions. The major issues on the agenda include hard issues of governance and economic development. Ordinary people are brought into politics primarily through clientelism and populism; and in this context the controlanduseofmassmediaisgettingincreasinglyimportant.Comprehensive organisation, however, including several levels and issues towards aggregated agendas, remains insignificant; and attempts to build from below are the weakestofall. Second, the everresourceful elites prevent ordinary people and their smallparties(butnotthepettypartiesoftheresourceful)fromenteringpolitics. IndependentlocalpartiesareonlyallowedandfunctionalinAceh.Participation in elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments) calls for nationalpresencewithbranchofficesvirtuallyalloverthecountry.Hence,itis almost impossible to build more representative parties from below without
having access to huge funds. (For those with such funds, however, it is rather easy to set up an eligible party and get represented, thus causing problems of efficient governance among squabbling elite politicians with special vested interests.) Further, only big parties or extensive coalitions may nominate candidatesforelectionsofgovernors,mayorsanddistrictheads.Asidefromthe elections of individual representatives from the provinces to an insignificant national assembly (DPD), independent candidates have been prohibited and thenewlyannouncedopeningscallagainforhugeresourcesonthepartofthe candidates.Inaddition,candidatestovariouspositionsmusthavecomparatively advanced formal schooling, thus excluding leaders from the labouring classes. Those running in village elections usually even have to share the substantial administrativecosts.Similarly,therearenoefficientmeasurestocountervested interestsandprivatepoliticalfinancingortopromoteinternalpartydemocracy, and the guidelines to foster equal gender representation have generated little result. Third, there are no substantive efforts to foster direct democratic representation in public governance through local representatives and popular organisationsbasedoninterestandspecialknowledgesuchastradeunionsand environmentalmovementsonlyprivilegedcontactsandtopdownselectionof figures and groups. Hardly anywhere in Indonesia can we see substantive representation of crucial interests and ideas of the liberal middle classes, workers,peasants,theurbanpoor,women,orhumanrightsandenvironmental activists. Inshortsofar,Demossurveysandsupplementaryresearchrevealthat the fundamental problem of Indonesian democracy is weak popular representation. Many freedoms are at hand, and the rule of law and public governance are at least improving. But democratic political relations between state and people remain poor. Typically it is difficult for actors and ideas that reflectfundamentalsocialandeconomiccleavagestoengageinpublicaffairs.In the absence of effective popular control over public affairs, economic and political power rests instead with actors related to the state and private businesses. The leverage of these dominant actors has increased with the hollowing out of the public resources and institutional capacities that were vestedwiththestate. Inthiscontext,thepostcentralistandauthoritarianrelationsbetween state and people (the demos) are instead increasingly mediated on the one hand by market institutions and on the other by communal, patronage and network based groups, including alternative patronage via civil associations. Neitherofthesemediatorsissubjecttodemocraticcontrol,(Figure1).Inspiteof rhetoric competition, moreover, the reduction of the public space in favour of
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religious and ethnic communities is not incompatible with neoliberal perspectives. Rather the communal perspectives are in line with the hollowing outofpublicresources.Thereductionofpublicsocialsecurityandeducation,for instance, generate both profitable private hospitals and schools for the rich on theonehandandmorecommunitariancharityandschoolsforthepoor,onthe other;ironicallyattimesfosteringextremeidentitypolitics. Figure1:Thechallengesofdemocraticpopularcontrolofpublicaffairs
(6)TheRisk:Returntopoliticsoforder The defunct representation is not only bad for democracy as such. It also undermines ordinary peoples chances to use it to foster their views and interests and the possibilities to alter the unequal division of power that preventsociallyandenvironmentallyresponsibledevelopment.Inaddition,the monopolisationofrepresentationnourishesagenerallackoftrustindemocracy. Most worrying, upper and middle class groups who rarely manage to win elections may well use this discontent with powerfulelite democracy to gain wide support for alternatives to democracy and to promote better preconditions through politics of order. Supporters of middle class coups typically say that they aim to prevent disruptive populist rule and to build stronger preconditions for democracy. Their views find an echo in some of the previously mentioned international support for proper sequencing of democracy.Indonesiahasbeendownthispathoncebefore,inthe1960s,andit
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gave rise to Soehartos New Order regime; and similar dynamics has more recently been at work in the Thai metropolitan middle class who fail to win broad popular support but take to the streets, call for rule of the educated citizens and link up with the King and the army against no doubt corrupt and probably cheating but anyway politicians with wide electoral support. In contemporary Indonesia, Vice President Jusuf Kallas statements on Poso and similarlydisturbedareasarealsocasesinpoint.Themessagewasthattooearly democratic elections were behind the conflicts and that profitable business drivendevelopmentwouldbethebestwaytohandlethem.Otherillustrations includethequestforpresidentialismandstrongerexecutives,thestreamlining of the party system towards a majoritarian twoparty system, and general admiration for Singapore and Chinas attempts to introduce, promote stability and economic growth ahead of excessive democracy. Meanwhile religious activistsarguefortheneedtoreducethepublicsphere,butthistimeinfavour ofreligiousvalues,communitiesandleaders. The empirical evidence from Demos survey and supplementary researchspeakquiteagainstthisthesisthatrootofIndonesiascurrentconflicts and problems of corruption as well as economic development is the new civil and political freedoms. On the contrary the results show that it is the defunct instrumentsofdemocracyandespeciallythepoorpopularcapacitiestofoster themthathavemadeitdifficulttousethefreedomstoaltertherelationsof power, prevent the abuse of them and thus improve law, policies and governance. There is a shortage of institutionalised channels for interest and issuegroupparticipation,beyondclientelismandgoodcontacts.Evenpopular representationinformalgovernmentisheldbackbyelitistcontrolofpartyand electoralsystems.Thepartyandelectionsystemssustainelitismonpartofthe powerful. The separate issue and interest group representation is weak and undemocratic;andsoisdirectpopularparticipation. (7)TheChallenge:Overcomingtheconstraintsofpopularrepresentation Itisimperative,therefore,thatcivicandpopularorganisationsbeable toscaleuptheirideasandalliances.Byconnectingcommunitiesandworkplaces, andlocalandcentrallevels,itispossibletochallengeelitecontroloverpolitics. Demos survey and case studies suggest, however, that the scaling up into organisedpoliticsisnotonlyhamperedbyelitistmonopolisationofpoliticsbut alsobycivicgroupsandpoliticalactiviststhemselves. First, the survey and supplementary studies reveal that even if many alternative actors now try to enter into politics to not just be confined to civil society activities, many challenges still remain ahead. There are few decisive improvements as compared to the first survey. One problem is the poor
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presence within state, politics and business as well as in related workplaces. Another is that the sources of power and the ways of gaining authority and legitimacyremainfocusedonknowledgeandpublicdiscourseattheexpenseof organisation,attemptstogainpublicmandatesandwinelections.Moreover,the issues that are put on the agenda typically focus on specific rights and complaints, neglecting broader perspectives of how to promote better governance, development and public welfare. Finally and inspite of advances, civic groups remain poorly connected to social movements and popular organisations (and vice versa); collective action is mainly based on individual networking, popular leaders or alternative patronage as against broad and representative organisation; and attempts to approach elections, parliaments and the executive remain primarily by way of media, NGOs and pressure and lobbygroups. Second, comparative case studies show that the problems in these respects are typically addressed instead by either bringing together people on the grassroots level or by topdown organising or by attempts to facilitate issuespecific direct connections between people and the executive or leading politicians.Inmanyinstances,theseeffortsarequiteimpressiveandstimulating. Tomentionbutone,thelocalpeasantsorganisationsinBatanginCentralJava, haveralliedbehindbroaderagendasandwonanumberofvillageelections.They now wish to scale up to the regional level, but one problem is sufficiently democraticselectionofcandidatesandofcoursethelackoffunds.However,so far,theonlymajoropeninghasbeeninAceh,thankstotheuniquepossibilityof buildingpartiesfrombelowandoflaunchingindependentcandidatesafterthe peacetreaty.Yet,thesepartiesareshortofwellorganisedconstituentsbeyond oldactivistgroups,activistnetworksandinfluentialleaders. Moreover, the results point to a number of problems. Unity from belowhasproveddifficultbecauseofthemyriadofspecificissues,approaches and contending projects and leaders. Politics aiming at majorities behind common platforms calls for ways of combining different specialisations and interests, such as among peasants and plantation labourers. There must be convincingagendasfornecessaryalliancesandequalcitizenbasedgovernance. Loose networking and polycentric action the methods favoured by most IndonesiasNGOsandprodemocracyactivistsarenotenough. However,attemptstocompensateforthisbywayofsocialistorother ideologies, centrally coordinated new or established organisations (some with charismaticfiguresatthehelm),orsimplythecreationofajointpoliticalvehicle or individual candidates offering support in return for popular votes, tend to preserve topdown structures and generate divisions among social movements andpopularandcivicorganisations.
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Thealternativeattemptstobypassdirtypoliticsbyfacilitatingdirect linkages between people and the executives (inspired by, for instance, participatorybudgeting)arenodoubtimportantsupplementsbuthavelittleto say on how to coordinate different sections of the people, scale up the operationbeyondthelocalandfacilitatefairrepresentation.Elsewhere,infact, thelatterhascalledfortopdownmeasuresthrough,forinstance,theofficeofa governorormayor. (8)TheRecommendation:DemocraticPoliticalBlocks Hence, there are two major lessons: First, basic popular and civic groupsmustcoordinateinsteadonanintermediatepoliticallevel,betweenthe specific grassroots issues and the toplevel perspectives. This is in order to define joint platforms, wide support and alliances, and control genuine politicians rather than being the victim of fragmentation and dominated by variouspartiesorpoliticalactors.Second,thismayalsobethelevelonwhichitis possibletocombineparliamentaryandextraparliamentaryactivities,aswellas representativeanddirectparticipation. It is no news that both old and new democracy driven organisations sufferfrominsufficientlinksbetweencivicandmorepopularorientedgroupson the one hand and problems of relating to organised politics on the other. This wasmadequiteclearalreadybefore1998(c.f.Trnquist2002).Itwasexpanded intheanalysisofthepostSoehartomovement(Priyono,PrasetyoandTrnquist 2003), where the blame could no longer be put on excessive authoritarianism. AnditwasconfirmedonagenerallevelinthefirstallIndonesiasurvey(Priyono, SamadhiandTrnquist2007).However,themorerecentresultsforthesecond surveyandespeciallysupplementaryresearch(c.f.Priyonoet.al2009,Trnquist et.al2009)alsoidentifiesquiteclearlythatthecrucialproblemoffosteringsuch linkagesrelatestodemocraticrepresentation,(Figure2).
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Figure2:Thechallengesofpoliticisingthedemocracymovement
Organisedpolitics
Counterbyscalingup throughdemocratic representation
Counterbyscalingup throughdemocratic representation
CivilAssociations
Counterbyscalingup through democratic
Popularorganisations
In other words, the major challenge along each of the axes is to developimproveddemocraticrepresentation.Thisistoenablethescalingupof issues,groups,communitiesandworkplaces.Sincestructuralconditionscannot bealteredimmediately,peopleneedtogettogetherandactcollectively.Ifthis shall be attempted at democratically, it calls for trustworthy representation in terms of solid chains of popular sovereignty. This includes authorisation, mandates,responsiveness,transparencyandaccountability.Andthisinrequires clear definitions of what demos are supposed to control what parts of public affairstoavoidpolycentricconfusionbetweenfactionsofthedemos. To facilitate scaling up through democratic representation, Demos recommendation is that democratic social movements, popular and civic associationswishingtoengageinpoliticsshouldbuildcoordinatedDemocratic PoliticalBlocksatlocalandcentrallevels. Suchpoliticalblockscallforleadershipandcommitmenttothebuilding of democracy through popular mandates and accountability, both within and between organisations and in relation to elections. Unfortunately, many democracy activists are unlikely to become involved in democratic representation and electoral politics so long as it remains easier for them to lobby and network. Similarly there is a recent argument that one should recall the tradition of the many scattered militant groups during the anticolonial liberation struggle and prioritise extraparliamentary action in the streets. (Cf. Lane2008)Organisingconstituenciesandwinningmajoritiesinelectionsimplies hardwork.Further,partypoliticalactivistsneedtorealisethattherewillnever beonepartyonlyamongprodemocrats.Hence,theyneedtoavoiddominating and dividing basic social movements and popular organisations. Politicians and
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politicalgroupsmaywellparticipateinbuildingPoliticalBlocks,butpreferablyas members of the movements and associations, and anyway not in dominant positions. The negative international experiences from unfortunate party politicisationofcivicandsocialmovementscannotbeoverstated. While the task of building Democratic Political Blocks is thus next to impossible there are options. Historically, of course, this was the way Scandinavian popular and civic organisations build broad political movements, parties and rights based economic development. At present, the Labour Party with civic and popular organisations in Brazil has tried similar roadmaps, includingbyfacilitatingparticipatorybudgeting.TheAcehneseevenprovedthat some advances are feasible in spite of very poor conditions. The alternative frameworkforchangewerethatthepartysystemwasdemonopolisedtoallow for local parties and independent candidates, and that the civic and political organisationswerewillingandsufficientlywellorganisedtowinvotesandthus takeadvantageofthedemocraticopenings.Neitherofthisisathandelsewhere inthecountry.ItistruethatAcehatpresentsuffersfromthelackoffirmlyand democraticallyorganisedinterestandissuebasedmovementsthatcanputvital issuesontheagendaandkeeppartiesandleadersaccountable.Thereisarisk, therefore, that clientelist and populist means of political inclusion (and associated favouritism and corruption) will dominate while referring to special needs during a quite unspecified period of transition, which may rather take Acehrightdownthesamedrainofprimitiveaccumulationofcapital(bywayof coercive means) as many other provinces. This must be countered by creating broaddemandsfrombelowforpoliticalfacilitationbythenewlyelectedleaders (andsupportivedonors)ofparticipatorydemocraticinstitutions. Furthermore,itdeservestoberepeatedthusthatthesituationbeyond Aceh is less favourable. The chances of building political representation from below have been blocked. According to the recent legislation, participation in elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments) calls for national presence with branch offices in 60% of the provinces, 50% of the districtsandmunicipalities,and25%ofthesubdistricts.Eventheheroicattempt bysocialandpoliticalactivistsinPPR(PartaiPerserikatanRakyat)tomeasureup tothedemandshasfailed.Andunfortunatelysomeoftheleadersnowthinkthat there is no other way to enter into politics than to subordinate themselves to bossesandretiredgeneralsinnewpartieswithhugeresourcesandintemporary need of activists. Similarly, the demands on the mobilisation of signatures of independent candidates in direct elections are so high that one needs to be a localequivalentofItalysBerlusconitostandachance.Inaddition,women,still tendtobesubordinatedandnoordinaryworkers,peasantsandfisherfolkscan
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run even in village elections because of lack of supposedly sufficient formal educationanddemandstopayforthebasicadministrativecosts. Conclusion ThereisacommonexpressionamongdemocracybuildersinIndonesia that the infrastructure is at hand and that most actors adjust to these rules of thegamebutthatitremainstobuildademocraticcultureandfostersocialand economicgainswhichmaysatisfyordinarypeople.Thisismisleadingandpartly wrong! It is true that most actors even the powerful adjust to the actually existing rules and regulations. But giving priority to the outcome and general habits (culture) is to neglect that the democratic infrastructure is far from sufficientandthattosomeextentitisnotevenexistent.Alargeportionofthe contextual rules and regulations do not really support the 32 universal means towards democracy. The alternative actors in particular are short of sufficient capacitytouseandpromotethemeansofdemocracy.Organiseddemocracyand especiallythesystemofrepresentationismonopolisedbythepowerfulelite. Inshort,democracyisheldback.Itistruethatallpeopleareallowedto vote, but women (who are not well connected) and poor and subordinated people, especially migrant labourers, are defacto prevented from standing as candidates and sometimes even from voting, thus trying to develop popular representation. Basic issues of equal civic rights and political equality thus representsasimilarchallengebutalsoopportunityasdidthemovementforthe rightstovoteintheolddemocracies. Hence the immediate need to develop well organised and nonparty dominated Political Blocks to foster independent popular influence within organised politics inspite of elitist monopolisation; to enable, moreover, ordinary people to use and promote democracy; to alter, thus, the current relations of power through more popular representation and participation; to improve,also,theefficiencyofdemocraticgovernance;andtoincrease,finally, bargaining power to foster compromises towards rights based sustainable development.
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ApproachingDemocracy
ChapterTwo
ApproachingDemocracy: Somebriefintroductorynotesofconceptsandmethods
OlleTornquist(UniversityofOslo) With NicolaasWarouw(GadjahMadaUniversity) Democracy assessments have become next to an industry, parallel to that of measuring economic development in countries around the world. InternationalIDEA,thehighprofileinternationalorganisationfordemocracyand electoralassistance,saysthattherearesixmajorassessmentframeworks.(IDEA 2008) One framework focuses on more or less comprehensive human rights in variouscountries.It istypically carried outbygovernmentssuchasthatofthe United States and organisations and institutes like Amnesty and the Freedom House. A second type gives priority to governance, including elections but primarilytheruleoflawandaccountability.Thesestudiesareoftenpropelledby governments, aid agencies and their associates such as the Indonesian PartnershipforGovernanceReformsinordertoevaluatesupportforinstitution building. Third, the democracy indices generated by researchers who relate democratic rights and elections to independent factors such as development and conflict. Fourth, the socalled democracy audits. These have been carried outbygovernments,academeandcivicorganisationsintheglobalNorthtofind out and lay the foundation for public discussion about the strength and weaknessesofvariousdimensionsofdemocracy.Fifth,theeconomicandsocial assessments by governments and international organisations to evaluate the outcomeofdemocracyandguidesupportforbetterstructuralconditions.Sixth, IDEAs own framework. This has been implemented by its associates among governments,internationalorganisations,relatedNGOsandscholars.Theaimis similartothatofthedemocraticauditsintheolddemocraciesbuttheambition istofacilitateapplicationintheglobalSouthtoo.Theprimefocushasbeento assess the quality of the democratic institutions through expert panels and various indicators and resources in addition to surveys of public opinions and attitudes.Oneshouldalsoaddtheassessmentsbyassociationsandscholarsof the democratic quality of civil society, social movements and socalled social capitalintermsofinterpersonaltrusttofacilitatecollectiveaction.
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Interestingly, our own alternative framework for participatory researchbaseddemocracypromotionisalsonotacknowledged.Thisframework is rooted in surveys with experienced expertpractitioners on the ground. It focuses on political identity, the standard of institutions and actors will and capacity to use and promote that infrastructure. It has been developed and proved feasible since 2002 in cooperation between reflective activists and scholars in the pilot case of Indonesia. Why was this perspective needed and whatarethedetailsofthemajorcharacteristics?Thesimpleansweristhatmost oftheotherframeworksdidnotseemtobeveryhelpfulasjudgedbytheneeds of the concerned scholars and activists in this the worlds largest new democracy. Basicallyprodemocratswerenothappytoworkwithframeworksthat reflectedthepreconceivedvalues,politicalinterestsanddevelopmentpriorities ofthedonorsandtheircloseassociates.Thereisofcoursenothingwrongwith donors needs to evaluate their democracy support (which many democrats were anyway dependent on). Similarly, the political patrons of the democracy support must be able to identify and foster likeminded partners; that is the basicsofinternationalrelations.Andrelatedscholarsshouldtestandfostertheir theories and recommendations. But what the Indonesian democrats asked for was an instrument to evaluate their problems and options and related arguments. Actually, they were confused and divided and wanted to judge to whatextentdifferenttheoriesandrecommendationsmademoreorlesssense, notjustoneortheotherfavouriteargumentbythisorthatdonororscholaror activist. In addition they were in large need of more reliable data and information. Academically critical research after decades of authoritarianism remained weak, the various case studies were scattered and the rapidly expanding opinion surveys were driven by political and commercial interests. Also, the prodemocrats were quite rightly disturbed by the preoccupation in most existing assessments with static descriptions of the qualities of rules and regulations without paying much attention to dynamic relations of power and strategiesamongvariousactors.Moreoversomealsorealisedthattheopposite obsessionwithstructures,culture,rights,civicactivismandpopularmovements was not related to the new democratic institutions including parties and elections. In addition the prodemocrats asked concerned scholars to consider theinsightsoftheactivistsonthegroundandtocommunicateexperiencesfrom other parts of the world. In fact, while the Indonesian activists had fought for democracy since several years, the powerful elite and experts that suddenly dominatedtheassessmentsofdemocracyhadusuallybeenquiteindifferentor evenonthe othersideofthefrontline.Similarly,theinternationalexpertshad mainly brought in elitist donor perspectives on crafting of institutions and
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consensusamongthepowerfulactors.Meanwhiletheexperiencesandinsights oftheprodemocratsinIndonesiaandelsewherehadlargelybeenignoredand theythemselveshadnotfoundtimetowriteuptheirstoriesandfindings.Finally severaldemocratsdidnotliketojustwritereportsandtalkinseminarsbutalso wantedtogofromfindingstorecommendationsandconsortedeffortstofoster implementationofthem. In order to develop an alternative framework we added therefore these explicit needs to the core elements in the theoretically most convincing andflexiblepartsofthemainstreamframeworks,primarilytobefoundamong the democratic audits and International IDEAs conceptual apparatus. Meanwhile,however,wealsohadtokeepinmindthatsuchanalternativemust bepossibletoimplementquiteswiftly(sincethedemocraticoptionswerefading away) and without access to huge funds (since that would have called for compromises). BasicDefinitionsandVariables One crucial point of departure was similar to that of the mainstream audits and IDEAs framework: the separation of the aims and the means of democracy. This made it possible to focus on the extent to which the means reallypromotedtheaims.Moreover,asDavidBeethamhadarguedconvincingly, thedisagreementsondemocracywereprimarilyaboutthemeansofdemocracy while there seemed to be general agreement on the aim in terms of popular controlofpublicaffairsonthebasisofpoliticalequality.(Beetham1999). That said, one had to ask what people (demos) that would control public affairs? Who would be the citizens? Would the demos be based on for instancereligiousorethnicorpoliticalidentity?Whilenotbeingabletogointo thedetailsofhowsuchidentitieshadbeenformed,onemustbeabletodiscuss if and how they could be combined, especially in a multi cultural society like Indonesia. Second,whatconstitutesthepublicaffairsthatpeopleshouldcontrol and what is rather deemed to be private matters to be handled within the family,variousnetworks,onthemarketorbyreligiousorethniccommunities? Again, indepth analyses of the construction of public affairs would be impossible,butonehadtoanalysethesubstanceofdemocracyintermsofwhat matterswereincludedandwhatweresetaside. Third, what is meant by control and political equality and how can theybeachieved?FollowingBeethamandIDEA(2002),thefollowingprinciples are intrinsic: the right and ability to participate and authorise representatives and their executives; representatives (and their executives) who in turn shall
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representthemaincurrentsofpopularopinionandthesocialcompositionofthe people, be responsive to peoples opinions and interests and accountable to peopleforwhattheydowhichcallsfortransparencyandsolidarity.Inaddition, whileitisobviousthattheprinciplespresupposeHumanRights(includingcivil, political social, economic and cultural rights), the shaping and practicing of the Rights in turn are also vested with the implementation of the democratic principles. What would be the necessary means, then, to enable and promote democratic constitution of the demos and the public affairs as well as the just mentioned principles to foster popular control and political equality? IDEAs frameworkandmostauditsfocusondemocraticinstitutionsandrelatedvalues among people at large. While this was in accordance with standard political scienceofdemocracyanddemocracybuilding,andtheviewsofmostdonors,it was insufficient to the Indonesian democrats. First, they wanted to be able to evaluateawidersetoftheoriesandargumentsaboutthenecessarymeans,to thusdiscussinamorefruitfulwaywhatseemedtobemostvalidinIndonesia. Further, they needed to go beyond assessments of fixed rules and regulations towards a more dynamic perspective. Hence they wanted to consider the possibilitiesofchangebyalsoincludinginformalinstitutionsandpowerrelations among various actors in politics, the political economy, civic associations and socialmovements.Third,itwasobviouslyunfruitfultoonlycomeupwithsome kind of national assessment in a country where despotic central rule was dismantled and politics was becoming increasingly localised. Similarly, the definitionofthedemosaswellasofpublicaffairscalledforadditionalindicators. Hence the conclusion that one had to go beyond previous perspectives by consideringthreebasicmeansofdemocracy. TheBasicMeansofDemocracy:Institutions,willandcapacity The first major type of democratic means were of course the conventional focus on the standard of a number of democratic institutions related to (a) constitutionalism (citizenship, law and rights), (b) popular sovereignty (elections, political representation and the responsiveness and accountability of public governance) and (c) civic participation (through associations, media, academic life and direct participation). However, by contrast to other assessment schemes one should not only ask for formal but also informal institutions. Further one must supplement the assessment of the performancebyaddingspecificquestionsaboutthegeographicalspreadandthe thematicsubstanceoftheinstitutions(i.e.howmanymattersthatwerewithin the democratic framework and how much was being privatised). While adding
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these crucial concerns, Demos framework has begun by drawing on IDEAs ratherwidelyacknowledgedthoughextensivelistofinstitutions.Thishasbeena pointofdepartureforrelevantrevisionsandsimplifications.Forthedetails,see Box1. Thesemeansareuniversallyvalid.Thisisbecausetheyaretheoretically derived by asking what means are necessary to promote the equally generally valid aim of democracy. The specific rules and regulations, however, vary of coursewithcontextualfactors.Hence,themajorpointistoassesstheextentto which such contextual formal and informal rules and regulations promote the institutionalfoundationsofdemocracy.Indoingso,thefundamentaldimension ofcivicandpoliticalidentityisseparatedfromtheothersasthelatterhavebeen possibletoincludeinanindexonthequalityofdemocraticinstitutions.Outof 100 index points, the relative importance of formal as compared to informal institutionsisestimatedtobe70versus30.Further,therelativeimportanceof performanceascomparedtospreadandsubstanceisestimatedtobe50,25and 25respectively.(Withinthe50pointsforformalinstitutions,theimportanceof positivescoresisofcoursereducedifinformantsdeemsomeoftheinstitutions to hardly even exist.) All attempt to weight however the various intrinsic institutions (which usually rest anyway with some kind of expert estimate) are howeversetasideinfavouroftransparentdiscussionofvarioustheories.
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Box1:Basicinstitutionsofdemocracy. Towhatextentaretheyeffective,wellspreadandinclusive(inclusiveofvitalmattersinsociety)? Institutionsoutsidetheindex The People (demos): the constitution of the demos through political/civic, ethnic and/or religious identityandengagementregardingpublicissues. Institutionsconsideredinindex 1 Citizenship (Equalstatecitizenship;The rights of minorities, migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontalconflicts) 2 GovernmentsupportofinternationallawandUNhumanrights 3 Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialstotheruleoflaw 4 Theequalitybeforethelaw(Equalandsecureaccesstojustice;Theintegrityandindependenceofthe judiciary) 5 Freedomfromphysicalviolenceandthefearofit 6 Freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganisation 7 Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity 8 Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture 9 Genderequalityandemancipation 10 Therightsofchildren 11 Therighttoemployment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds 12 Therighttobasiceducation,includingcitizensrightsandduties 13 Goodcorporategovernance 14 Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsatcentral,regionalandlocallevel;Free andfairseparateelectionsofe.g.governors,mayorsandvillageheads) 15 Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(orteamsofindependentcandidates)thatcan recruitmembers,andparticipateinelections 16 Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates 17 Abstentionfromabusingreligiousorethnicsentiments,symbolsanddoctrinesbypoliticalpartiesand orcandidates. 18 Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsbypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates 19 Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessandaccountabilityofpartiesandorpolitical candidatestotheirconstituencies 20 Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment 21 Democraticdecentralisationofgovernmentofallmattersthatdonotneedtobehandledoncentral levels. 22 Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofelectedgovernment,theexecutive,(bureaucracies),atalllevels 23 Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryandpolicetoelectedgovernmentandthepublic 24 Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitarygroups,hoodlumsandorganisedcrime 25 Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable internationallaw) 26 Governments independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and abuseofpower 27 Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld 28 Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithinmedia,artandtheacademicworld 29 Citizensparticipationinextensiveindependentcivilassociations 30 Transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivilorganisations 31 Allsocialgroupsincludingmarginalisedgroupsextensiveaccesstoandparticipationinpubliclife 32 Direct participation (Peoples direct access and contact with the public services and governments consultationofpeopleandwhenpossiblefacilitationofdirectparticipationinpolicymakingandthe executionofpublicdecisions)
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Second and in addition to most other frameworks one should add a dynamic perspective by identifying main actors and then ask if and how they relatetothemoreorlessdemocraticinstitutions.Twocrucialstepsareinvolved. Thefirstisthespecificationofthemainactors.Allactorscannotbeincludedina viable assessment. Given the localisation of politics this should primarily be on the provincial level. Further, one needs to include powerful actors as well as crucial alternative ones. In the alternative assessment framework, the local informants are asked to identify the three most powerful and the three most important alternative actors in their context. A number of problems are of courseassociatedwiththeidentificationoftheseactorsbutthestumblingblocks rest mainly with the identification and the quality of the informants, which we shall return to. The second step is to enquire then into if and how the actors relatetothedemocraticinstitutions.Dotheinstitutionsmakesensetothem?To whatextentisdemocracytheonlygameintown?Morepreciselywithregard toeachtypeofinstitution:dotheactorspromoteandusetheinstitutions?Do theyonlyusethem?Ordotheyuseandabuseorevenavoidthem? Low figures mean that democracy is not meaningful because the standard of the institutions is too low and/or the capacity of the actors to use and promote them (which we shall return to shortly) is insufficient. Additional negative conditions are set aside. This is not because such conditions are unimportant but because of a crucial assumption about the minimum requirementsofdemocracy.Thealternativeframeworkrefutesargumentsthat democracy calls for extensive social and economic rights, equality, modernisation, prodemocratic culture etc. Actually the framework only calls forsufficientlymeaningfulinstrumentsaslistedaboveandforsufficientcapacity oftheactorstouseandpromotetheinstitutions(whichweshallsoondiscussin more detail). Given that these conditions are present, the actors can use emergingdemocracytopromotemoresocialandeconomicrights,amongother things. Of course, firm judicial institutions, economic modernisation and social and economic equality are likely to contribute to high scores on the indices of democracy. But if more rights, equality, modernisation, favourable culture etc were included as necessary conditions for democracy, they would have to be createdbynondemocraticmeans.Thisisnotnecessary.Ithasprovedpossible tocreatethembywayofgraduallyimproveddemocracy.Therearedegreesof democracy;anddemocracyisaprocess. Hencetheargumentthatthereisaneedtosequencedemocracyby somehowintroducingfavourableinstitutionsaheadofpopularsovereignty(e.g. Mansfield/Snyder 2005) as well as Samuel Huntingtons (1965) old thesis that strong institutions must be at hand to prevent modernisation from generating popularupheavalsarerefuted.(AsmanyIndonesiansknow,thelatterargument
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wasusedtolegitimisetheeliminationofpopularmovementsin1965/66aswell as the rise and existence of the New Order regime.) The same applies for a number of related theses too. One is that a certain level of economic developmentisamust;anotheristheoldextremeleftthesisthatequalityand radicallydifferentpowerrelationsmustbecreatedbymoreorlessrevolutionary meansaheadofpeoplesdemocracy.Itistruethattheoftenratherdepressing fateoftheglobalthirdwaveofdemocracythroughtopdowninstitutionbuilding and elitist compromises is rather depressing. But given that nondemocratic introduction of favourable structural conditions is not necessary, the crucial matterisinsteadwhatkindofspecificandconcretepoliticsofdemocratisation thatvariousactorsandtheirinternationalsupportersoptfor. If this is accepted, the growing critique of the liberal democratic emphasison crafting the institutionalproceduresof democracyonthebasisof agreementsbetweenalreadydominantactorsdoesnotimplythatalldesigning ofdemocraticinstitutionsisinvane.Theimplicationisonlythatpriorityshould be given to institutions that open up for enhanced capacity among ordinary people to foster additional institutions for more political equality and popular control.Ifthepredominanttrendsofarhasbeeninfavourofliberaldemocracy, thisconclusionseemstopointthusinasocialdemocraticdirection. Thethirdmeansofdemocracyisthattheactorsarenotjustwillingbut also capable of promoting the institutional infrastructure. Consequently the alternativeassessmentframeworkconsidersanumberofkeyfactorsrelatedto power,resourcesandmovement.However,thisisonlydonetotheextentthat suchfactorsarecrucialforthepeoplescapacitytoactasdemocraticcitizensin civil as well as politic society. Hence we have combined three analytical approaches: one that focuses on institutions, a second that draws attention to theactorsandathirdthataddressespowerincollectiveaction. Itismorecomplicatedtooperationaliseactorspoliticalcapacitythan democratic institutions. Previous studies and theories about political power, movements and other actors point to five clusters of parameters. These have been discussed elsewhere in more detail (Trnquist 2002, Harriss et.al. 2004, Trnquist2008,Trnquist,StokkeandWebster2009).Thefirstvariablesareto indicate if the actors are present rather than marginalised on central and local levelsandinpartsofthepoliticallandscapesuchasthebusinesssector,interest and issue groups, self management (including cooperatives), parties, parliaments,andexecutivepublicinstitutions.Theseindicatorsrelatetotheories about exclusion and inclusion, differences between new and old movements, sectoral fragmentation, centre versus periphery, and the opportunity structure in terms of the relative openness and closeness of politics in general. Alternatively one may analyse similar factors by drawing on Pierre Bourdieus
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(Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002, Stokke and Selboe 2009) concept of fields of interrelatedactorsandrelationsofpower. A second cluster of variables relate more exclusively to Bourdieus focusonhowtheactorswithinthejustmentionedfieldsareabletotransform theirdifferentsourcesofpowerintermsofeconomic,socialandculturalcapital1 into legitimacy and authority to thus gain symbolic power and political influence(ibid). The third typeofindicatorsistoanalysewhetherandhowactorsare able to politicise thoseoftheirconcernsandaspirationsthatarenot personal, i.e. to put their issues, interests and ideologies on the political agenda. This relates to theories inspired by for instance Jrgen Habermas about the public sphere, Antonio Gramsci about hegemony, Pierre Bourdieu about habitus (internalised norms, understandings and patterns) and the general importance of culture. But the same indicators connect also to analyses of increasingly fragmented priorities and agendas, especially among actors in civil society and related difficulties to generate common platforms (e.g. Trnquist 2002, 2008a, Trnquist,TharakanandQuimpo2009) The fourth cluster of parameters is to capture whether and how the actors are able to organise and mobilise support. This is directly linked to theoriesofpower,politicsandmovementssuchasadvocatedbyNicosMouzelis (1986) and Sydney Tarrow (1994), distinguishing between incorporation into politics by way of elitist populism, clientelism and alternative patronage and related political financing or more integrated by way of networks and or comprehensiveorganisationfrombelow.Butitrelatesalsotoanalysessuchas byMahmoodMamdani(1996),ParthaChatterjee(2004),Houtzageret.al(2007) and Harriss (2006) of different inclusion of citizens, subjects and denizens withoutcapacitytousemostotherrightsthanthattorallybehindandvotefor oragainstleadingpoliticians. Fifththeroadmapstoanalysewhetherandhowtheactorsareableto approachvariousgovernanceinstitutions.Themajorsourceofinspirationisthe growing consensus that the key problem of democracy in the global South in particularisthedominanceofpowerfulelitesandthepoorstandardofpopular representationinspiteofexcitingattemptstoinitiatenewroutes.Thiswasalso
While the meaning of economic capital may be self evident (and may well be expanded by more qualified analysis of the political economy between neoliberalism and state sponsored business under globalisation; seee.g.HarrissWhite2003,Kohli2004andKhan2005),socialcapitalinmainlyaboutgoodcontacts,and culturalcapitalinvolvesinformationandknowledge.InDemossurveyyetanothercategoryhasbeenaddedto cover the power by way of coercion, including by military force but also mass demonstrations such as the peoplepowerphenomenoninthePhilippines.
1
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a prime result from Demos first allIndonesia survey. Hence there is a special needforcloserstudieswithinthisfield. TheFundamentalProblemofRepresentation Suchanalysesinturncallforfruitfulanalyticaltools.Representationis acomplexandcontentedconcept.Thealternativeframeworkdrawsonarecent attempttodevelopaninclusiveperspectiveonthebasisoftheoryandempirical studies of efforts to counter the demise of popular politics (Trnquist, Stokke andWebster2009). As outlined by Pitkin (1967), representation presupposes a representative, the represented, something that is being represented and a political context. The dynamics is primarily about authorisation and accountability, which presuppose transparency and responsiveness. That which is represented may be substantive, descriptive and/or symbolic. Substantive representation is when the representative acts for the represented, for instancealeaderadvancingtheinterestsofworkers.Descriptiverepresentation iswhenanactorstandsfortherepresented bybeingobjectivelysimilar.For instance,awomanrepresentswomenandaresidentinavillagerepresentsthe othervillagers.Symbolicrepresentation,finally,iswhenanactorisperceivedby therepresentedtoonceagainstandforthem,butnow,forinstance,interms ofsharedcultureandidentities.However,symbolicrepresentationmayalsobe understood with authors like Bourdieu (Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002) and Anderson(1983)inthewidersenseofconstructingthedemos,thegroupsand the interests that are being represented and claiming to be a legitimate authorityasarepresentative. Therearetwomajorapproaches.Thefirstmaybecalledthechainof popularsovereignty approach. It is typically adhered to by students of political institutions, focusing on formally regulated politics, government and public administration. The second is what will be labelled the directdemocracy approach.Thisismorecommonamongpoliticalsociologists,anthropologistsand students of rights and law. They emphasise the importance of informal arrangements and the need for alternative participation through popular movements and lobby groups as well as civic action in for instance neighbourhoodgroupsandassociationsforselfmanagement. Therearetworelatedtendenciestowardsdeterioratedrepresentation withinthechainofpopularsovereignty.Oneisthatpublicmattersandresources have been reduced and fragmented under neoliberalism and globalisation beyonddemocraticrepresentation.Theothertendencyisthatalmostallofthe links in the chain itself are tarnished. This is especially with regard to the
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intermediary representative institutions from civic organisation to political parties.Massbasedinterestorganisationshavebeenradicallyweakened,most severely those based on class. While public resources and capacities are shrinking, politicians and political parties lose firm and independent popular roots. The privatisation, informalisation, depoliticisation and weakening of the intermediary political institutions generate further distrust in the authorisation of representatives and their mandates. Representative politics is often looked upon as a particularly dirty business characterised by money and personality oriented politics, nonprogrammatic organisational machines and crooked politicians. This in turn has generated alternative routes. But the various supplementary forms of democracy by taking matters to court and to institutions in civil society for self financed self management and direct participation, pressure and informal contacts are largely detached from the chainofpopularsovereignty.Thecivicorganisationsandactiviststhemselvesare rarelysubjecttobasicprinciplesofdemocraticrepresentation,authorisationand accountability. Moreover, communal ethnic and religious organisations as well as families and clans cater to an increasing number of popular worries and needs,typicallyamongsttheweakersectionsofthepopulationwithinsufficient capacitiestomakeuseofcivicrights.Whennotclaimingequalcivic,politicaland socioeconomic rights for all but specific communal privileges, these organisations and solidarities tend to fragment the demos and to undermine democracy. While the advantage of the chainsofpopularsovereignty approach is precision and conceptual consistency in relation to democratic theory, one drawbackisthatpracticesoutsidetheformallyrecognisedchaintendtobeset aside such as attempts at participatory governance and struggles over public affairsthathavebeenprivatisedorinformalised. Unfortunately however the directdemocracy approach does not provide a good alternative but rather focus on the neglected other side of the coin. Interestingly, this is done from two directions, one which is more market oriented, supported by e.g. the World Bank (1997) and in favour of user and consumer participation (rather than citizenship and popular sovereignty); another advocated by critics of globalisation like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) who argue that state and power has been so dispersed and localised that there is no decisive unit left to fight and that increasingly many producersareregulatingsocialrelationsthemselves,sothatstrongpartiesand representative democracy are unnecessary and even irrelevant. Both positions support thus the position of Robert Putnam (1993) and others that the real demosdevelopsorganicallyfrombelowamongselfmanagingandcooperating citizens (thereby developing social capital), not in relation to ideologies,
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institutions and political engagement. Hence, representation becomes redundant since the people act directly through the same contacts and associations that have constituted the people in the first place. In the process almostwhatevercivicorganisationbecomespartsofthepeopleitself.Hence thereisnoneedtoanalyse,forinstance,differencesbetweenorganisationsthat relate to rightsbearing citizens and people who lack sufficient capacity to promotetheirownrights.Further,onedoesnotneedtodiscusstheimportance of intermediary variables such as politics and ideology. The fact that Scandinavian democracy and welfare states as well as contemporary participatory budgeting, for instance, have all been politically facilitated and thensustainedisconvenientlyforgotten. However,manycivilsocietyactivistsarenowmoreanxiousthanbefore to legitimate their work in terms of whom they try to represent (Houtzager 2007). Moreover, the new institutions for direct participation such as participatory planning are (just like previous Scandinavian experiences of combining liberal political democracy and interest based representation and cooperation between government and associations) attempts to initiate a new layerofrepresentationbetween electoralchainsofpopularsovereigntyon the one hand and associational life and populism on the other. (C.f. Avritzer 2002, Baiocchi2005,EspingAndersen1985,Berman2006)Yet,anumberofquestions remain to be answered such as how to guarantee authorisation and accountability,andevenmoredifficult,howtoidentifyandagreeonwhatparts of the demos should control what sections of public affairs on the basis of politicalequality. Against this backdrop, the final dimension of actors political capacity that is considered in the alternative assessment framework draws on a recent attempt to develop a conceptual model to combine the two approaches, one focusing on the chainsof popularsovereignty and the other on direct democracy. The key is to apply the primacy of popular sovereignty also within collectiveeffortstowidendemocracybeyondtheformalpublicinstitutions.This may be done by situating political practices in formal public as well as other institutions within a comprehensive conceptual frame where it is possible to mapandanalysehowactorsrelatetoeachotherandtotheinstitutionsinview ofthebasicprinciplesofdemocraticrepresentation. Ifthisisacceptedtherearethreebasicpillars:(1)thepeople(demos), (2) the public matters, and (3) the different intermediary ways of exercising popular control of the input as well as output sides of democracy; i.e. policymaking and implementation. Democratic policy making (input) and implementation(output)needtoberepresentativeby,first,beingbasedonthe principles of political equality and impartiality and, second, subject to
29
authorisation with mandate and to accountability with transparency and responsiveness. The actual content of what is thus being decided and implemented is due to the will of the demos but must not be up against the principles of democracy and the absolutely necessary means to develop and applythem.Figure1presentsapreliminaryintegratedframeworkforthestudy ofdemocraticrepresentation. Figure1.Amodelforthestudyofdemocracyorientedrepresentation
A number of crucial problems may be addressed within this model. (Trnquist2009)Inthealternativeassessmentschemeweshallalsobenefitfrom relatedresearchintheserespects(PCD2008),buttheverysurveyfocusesonthe actors strategies in the political system and related forms of representation. First,towhatgovernanceinstitutionsdothemostimportantactorsturnatfirst hand? Second, how do the most important actors reach and affect the governanceinstitutions?Directand/orbywayofsomemediatinginstitutions?
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Therearetwoparticularlysignificantclustersofproblemsthatmaybe analysedinviewofthesequestions. The first cluster relates to the general tendencies of less public and more polycentric governance, a particularly crucial issue are the prospects for democratic regulation of more or less privatised institutions of governance rather than reclaiming these institutions, which may not be feasible. Along the top row in Figure 1, privatised collective transportation, schools, or health services,forinstance,wouldthusbesubjecttodemocraticallydecidedrulesand regulations.2Another basic question is whether or not democratic governance would be conducive to fight corruption and promote environmentally and socially responsible economic growth. There is an urgent need to analyse democratic alternatives to the resurgence of the thesis about the need to promote firm institutions, rule of law and economic development ahead of popular sovereignty by supposedly enlightened authoritarian rule. The same holdstruefordemocraticalternativestoaccommodaterebelslikethoseinAceh, ratherthanbydivisiveclientelismandspecialfavours.(Trnquistet.al2009a)In the figure on representation, attempts to apply participatory governance to improveresponsivenessandaccountability(suchasattemptedatforinstancein Brazil; e.g. Baiocchi 2005) would be by more substantial arrangements for participationandrepresentationthatareattachedtothevariousinstitutionsfor governance(especiallytheexecutiveones)andsectionsofthedemos.Further, therenewedinterestinlearningfromoldScandinaviansocialpacts(c.f.Beckman et.al.2000,Beckman2004)maybeindicatedintermsoftriangularrelationsand agreements (about the exchange between state guaranteed economic growth and collective wage agreements, and universal unemployment and social welfare schemes) between productive sections of capital within the context of privategovernance,relevantsectionsoftheinstitutionsforpublicgovernment, andwellorganisedtradeunionsandrelatedmovements. Thesecondclusterofproblemsaddressesthemediationbetweenthe demosandthepublicaffairs.Themediationrelatesbothtotheinputandoutput side of democracy; to the politically equal generation of policies and to the impartialimplementation (thelatterofwhichseemstobepositivelyrelatedto themoreuniversalasopposedtomeanstestedmeasuresthatareapplied;c.f. Rothstein and Torell 2005). Arrangements for participation and representation thatarerelatedtothedifferentinstitutionsforgovernanceofpublicmattersare
Thisisalongestablishedpracticeofsocialdemocraticgovernancebutithasalsobeentriedinscatteredlocal settings in, for instance, the Philippines (e.g. Rocamora 2004 and Quimpo 2004) and in cases such as Brazil, SouthAfricaandtheIndianstateofKeralaandWestBengal(seee.g.Avritzer2002,Baiocchi2003and2005, FungandWright2003,Heller2001,IsaacandFranke(2000),Tharakan2004,JonesandStokke2005,Buhlungu (2006),Ballard,HabibandValodia(2006),Webster(1992),RogalyandHarrissWhite(1999).
2
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in the upper part of the model. This includes not only the elected legislative assemblies and their executives on the central and local levels. There are also, for instance, various possible institutions for consultation and participation in relation to a number of administrative boards and commissions, workers participation in company management, the meetings of a neighbourhood organisation, or academic selfrule. Most of the introduction of these institutionalised forms of representation may well have been enforced from below through pilot cases and demands on politicians. However, the very implementation tend to be a product of topdown measures and decentralisation,inScandinaviaand Kerala,forinstance,onthe basisofstrong state apparatuses or statebuilding projects and the legacies of free farmer communities and land reforms respectively. For good and for bad, moreover, these roots and measures in turn have then formed much of the system of representation, including parties, movements and even the constitution of the demos. Fardowninthemodel,representationisalsoframedbythedifferent formationsandexpressionsofthedemosandthemeansofrepresentation.The means include the actors and their authorization, responsiveness and accountability as well as their capacity to voice interests and ideas and act accordingly, ideally on the basis of political equality. On the left side of the model are the forms of selfrepresentation and participation. Strictly speaking, this is the only form of direct democracy, i.e. where no representative is involved. On the right side is the representation via mediators. A basic distinction may be made between mediation via (a) civil society defined as associational life among rights bearing citizens, primarily within civic oriented NGOs,localcommunities,popularorganisations,media,academia,andcultural life; (b) informal leaders and noncivicassociations such as patrons, fixers, communal associations, clan leaders and popular figures; and (c) political society including political parties, politically related interest organisations and pressureandlobbygroups. One related question is the fate of democracies dominated by clientelism through informal leaders and privileged political financing. Another dilemma (that have been addressed at in thematic studies related to Demos research; Priyono et. al. 2009, Trnquist 2009 and Trnquist, Tharakan and Quimpo 2009) is the weak and generally problematic linkages between on the onehandcivicassociations(thatareoftenrathersmallandconfinedtomiddle class residents or activists), and more mass based and popular oriented movements. The same applies for the crucial problems of scaling up such linkagesand cooperationsonvarious levelsandtomakeanimpactwithin the organisedpoliticstendtobedominatedbypowerfulelites.
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Box2:Thefivemajorvariablestoassessactorscapacitytopromoteanduse theinstrumentsofdemocracy Peopleneedtobe: 1. present rather than excluded from different parts of the political landscape (e.g.inbusiness,interestgroups,parties,thebureaucracy,theparliamentetc.); 2.abletotransformtheirsourcesofpowerintoauthorityandlegitimacy; 3. able to turn nonprivate concerns into public political matters (e.g. the politicisation of a certain problems by focussing on the specific issue, or by combiningseveralissuesand/orbyrelatingthemtogeneralconceptsorideas); 4. able to mobilise and organise support (e.g. by way of popular leaders, clientelism, alternative patronage, networks and/or comprehensive organising frombelow; byconnectingpeoplethroughidentities, personal networksand/or interestsandideas;andbybuildingandfinancingvariousalliances); 5.abletoapproachvariousgovernanceinstitutions(e.g.directlytotheexecutive orbymeansofrepresentationthroughinformalleadersorpartiesorNGOs) SourcesandMeasurement It is one thing to design the best possible alternative framework for assessing democracy; it is quite another to make it possible to measure the various indicators and to collect best possible sources. Democratic audits draw primarilyonavailableresultsfrompreviousresearchandavailabledatabanks.It is also common to commission a number of studies to cover unexplored problems and to conduct base line surveys of citizens attitudes and ways of relate to democracy. The IDEA scheme (2002, 2008) tries to extend this to the global South by identifying a number of search questions, supplementary indicatorsandresources,especiallyontheinternet.Typicallyonethenallowsfor the assessments of all this information by a limited number of experts. The related but innovative South Asian survey come closer to the original audits in theglobalNorthbybeingabletodrawonalreadyavailableresearch,anumber of commissioned case studies and by giving even more importance to a grand surveyofpeoplesattitudes,opinionsandrelationstodemocracy(CSDS2008). While there are many similarities, the alternative assessment frameworkdiffersfromthesepatternsinsomevitalrespects.First,inIndonesia aswellasinmanyothercountriesintheglobalSouththereismuchlessqualified and critical research on problems of democracy than in the north or in old southern democracies like India. Further, there is a particular lack of written sources on institutions and the practices of various actors on the local level,
33
particularly of course with regard to vulnerable people but also in relation to powerful groups. The kind of internet resources that one is often referred to (including by IDEA) do not really offer a way out of this dilemma but rather reflectthetendencyamongresearchersandvariousorganisationstocollectdata amongmetropolitanexpertswithoccasionalcontactsontheground.Thisisnot to say that one should not collect and draw on whatever results are available andconductnewresearch;weshallreturntothat.Butthemostcrucialproblem is to find the best possible substitute for the lack of previous studies and data banks. Inprincipletherearethreemajoralternatives.Themostcommonisto draw on the assessment of the elite among scholars, experts and political and economicleaders.Theproblemasalreadyhintedatisthatthistendstoexclude information and experiences on the ground around the country, especially among ordinary people and committed prodemocrats that remain in the margins of economic and political life. The second alternative is to conduct extensive surveys among people in general as was done in the South Asian survey. However it is quite difficult to ask revealing enough questions and to really get frank answers, especially in a country were many people still find it troublesome to disclose their opinions on sensitive issues. Moreover, while knowledgeofpeoplesrelationtodemocraticinstitutionsandvaluesarealways important, it is no substitute for the lack of research on a number of crucial problems.Toaskthepeopleisfinebuttherearenorealpopulistshortcutsto qualified assessments and analyses of complicated problems. This calls for scholarly knowledge of various concepts, arguments, comparative perspectives etc.Henceouralternativeassessmentframeworkgavepriorityinsteadtofinding the best possible grounded experts in the form of experienced and leading democracy activists within all major frontlines of democracy work in all the provinces;activistswhohadareputationofbeingabletoreflectcritically. Inaddition,theexpertsurveyalsoenabledustoaskmanyandrather straight forward but complicated questions. Finally and equally important: the expert survey among prodemocrats around the country paved the way for participatoryresearchwithcommittedassociates.Veryfewinformantsdropped out.Manyratherhelpedustothebestinformationandtriedtomakethebest possible out of complicated questionnaires. The participants did also learn about democracy as they went through the extensive questionnaire with our field assistants and most people involved were interested in learning from the results, give feedback, help us develop recommendations and then try to implementthem. Onceagain,thisdoesnotmeanthatoneshouldnotmobiliseadditional informationfrompreviousresearch,conductadditionalcasestudiesandengage
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variouseliteexperts,studentsandscholarsinthework.Weshallreturntothis. But first a number of drawbacks with the participatory expert surveys from below. One rather frequently voiced opinion is that Demos local expert informantsarenotrepresentative,impartialandcriticallyreflectiveenough.This critique comes in two versions. The first is that the informants are not good enoughexperts.However,everybodywhohasreadatleastasummaryreporton theresultsfromthefirst allIndonesia surveyandtheresurvey knowsthat this has proved wrong. The statements made by the informants on the actual situation are much more detailed, locally rooted and especially more balanced than those expressed by many leading experts in mediacentred articles and seminars. The second critique is instead that the informants are not representative.Thiscallsformoreclosediscussion.Oneversionofthisposition isthatDemoshasnotmadeastatisticallyvalidselectionofrespondentsamong prodemocrats, keeping in mind a number of basic criteria such as age, sex, thematic focus and geographic location. The answer to this critique is simple. Given that it would have been possible in the first place to identify the total population of prodemocrats from which a statistical selection could be made, Demos would not have been knowledgeable enough of local contexts to formulatesufficientlyvalidandsimpleenoughquestionstogetreliableanswers. Rather, there was a need for respondents with ability to understand rather complicated and often abstract questions. Moreover, Demos had argued that thesurveywasasubstituteforthelackof, databanks,written documentation andpreviousanalysesnottocollectopinions.Hence,Demosoptedinsteadfor an expert survey. This meant that the challenge was to find the best possible experts and information given the questions, rather than the best statistical sampletomeasureopinionsorexperiences. Thesecondversionofthecritiqueforpoorselectionoftheinformants accepts the principle of an expert survey but discuss whether the best experts have been selected. This is among the most important critique and some valid points have been made in the discussion. To appreciate the importance of the critique, one must first review how Demos has actually gone about identifying the best possible experts in all the provinces and within all major fields of democratisation. The question is if the following criteria (which have been applied)havebeensufficientandfeasible:atleastfiveyearsofconsistentwork with the democracy movement, wide knowledge and experience within the identifiedfieldsofdemocracywork,andrenownedcapacitytoreflectcritically. The point of departure was generally respected keyinformants in everyprovince.These keyinformants would bepartofthe teamandthusalso
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publiclyaccountablefortheirwork.WiththeexceptioninthefirstallIndonesia surveyofoneprovinceoutofmorethanthirty,thispartoftheselectionprocess hasworkedaccordingtoplanandtherehasbeennoseriouscritique. Second there has also not been any noteworthy critique of the identificationofthemajorfieldsofdemocracywork.Thiswasdoneaccordingto planonthebasisoftheprevioussurveyandcasestudiesofandwiththepost Soeharto democracy movement. (Priyono, Prasetyo and Trnquist 2003) A few potentiallyimportantfieldswereadded.Theywereselectedonthebasisofthe comparative work of this author and included attempts to promote professionalism in public and private administration and build democratic politicalparties.Regularreviewsofthegeneraleffortsatdemocracyaroundthe country have not called for any substantive revision of these fields over time, only corrections for overlaps and simplification. The fields of democratisation formwhichinformantswereselectedforthecurrentresurveyareinBox3. Box3:Thefourteenfrontlinesofdemocratisationfromwhichinformantshave beenselected 1, The efforts of peasants and agricultural labour to gain control of their land andfisherfolkstodefendtheirfishingwaters 2.,Thestruggleoflabourforbetterworkingconditionsandstandardofliving. 3.Thestruggleforthesocial,economicandotherrightsoftheurbanpoor. 4.Thepromotionofhumanrights. 5.Thestruggleagainstcorruptioninfavourofgoodgovernance. 6.Theeffortsatdemocratisationofthepoliticalpartysystemandthebuildingof popularrootedparties. 7. The promotion of pluralism as a basic dimension of democracy and conflict reconciliation 8.Theeffortstoimproveanddemocratiseeducation. 9.Thepromotionofprofessionalismaspartofgoodgovernanceinpublicand privatesectors. 10.Thefreedom,independenceandqualityofmedia. 11.Thestruggleforgenderequality. 12. The improvement of supplementary nonparty representation at the local level. 13.Theattemptstopromoteinterestbasedmassmovements. 14.Thestruggleforsustainabledevelopment.
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There are four remaining and unfortunately quite valid points of critique. The first is about the complicated and extensive questionnaire, especially during the first round of the all Indonesia survey (when there was even a lack of even concrete examples) but also the second (when such examples had been added). It is quite surprising that such an extremely high percentageofinformants(somethinglike90%)haveanywaydonetheirutmost to answer almost all the hundreds of questions. At times it has taken several meetingsofthreetofourhoursofinterviewing,especiallywhentheextremely busy leading activists have been interrupted by various urgent matters. The minimumtimethathasbeenallottedtothequestionnairesseemstohavebeen betweenfiveandsixhours.Thisifanythingispossiblythebestindicatoronecan get for (a) the democratic commitment of the informants, (b) the extent to whichtheyhavefoundtheresearchbasedeffortsofDemostoberelevantand crucial and (c) the extent to which they have trusted the team. As already indicated, it is otherwise difficult for regular interviewers (such as for the Asia barometer)togetpeopletoanswertoevencomparativelyinsensitivequestions on political matters. In preparing briefer versions of the survey for local and more participatory use and in face of the resurvey that is reported on in this book, the team has made its very utmost to clarify and simplify the questionnaire, without undermining its scientific standards. Tests indicate that we have brought down the time it takes to complete the interviews substantially. Quite frequently, however, it was still necessary to use two sessionsofsometwohours,giventheunavoidableinterruptions. ThesecondoftheremainingpointsofvalidcritiqueisthatDemoshas notgivenprioritytothefullservicingandenrolmentofthekeyinformants,the temporary assistants and the survey informants in order to initiate a popular education movement. Similarly it is clear that more emphasis could have been giventoeducationandtrainingoftheassistants.Arelatedmatteristhatmuch of the results and data have so far only been made good use of by a limited number of students and scholars within the academe. There may be different approaches to these problems, and this author in particular may be too optimistic in arguing that one may learn from popular educational efforts in otherpartsoftheglobalSouthsuchasKeralainIndia.Butthereisagreementon the need to address the issues and one may hope that the current book in cooperationwiththeacademecanbeoneopening. Third, theprobablymost seriouscritiqueisthattheexpertsmustnot only to be confused with the people (which we have already discussed). In additiononemustalsodiscussiftheyhavethebestknowledgeoftheconditions on the ground. Many of the prodemocrat experts are related to NGOs and actions groups. These might well try their best to serve vulnerable people and
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represent some of their ambitions, but there are many examples of activists giving emphasis to theoretically derived agendas without really having firm knowledge on the immediate challenges in the workplaces and communities. Further,giventhenotalwayssolidrootsoftheexperts,theirjudgementsmaybe influenced rather easily by dramatic and political developments that are reportedextensivelyinmedia.Thisandsimilarproblemswillbeaddressedinthe secondpartonthischapter. SupplementaryResearchandData Onemajorconclusionisthisrespectistheneedforsupplementaryin depth case studies. Moreover, such studies may in many cases be even more difficult to carry out than well structured surveys. Hence there is a need for educationandtrainingofstudentsandresearcherstoo.Whatcanbedone? Aswasspelt outearlier,the choice to emphasiseparticipatoryexpert surveysfrombelowdidnotmeanthatitwasunimportanttoalsocollectandadd relatedresultsfrompreviousresearch,emergingdatabanks(includingvalidand reliableopinionpolls)andsupplementarycasestudies.Yetithastobeadmitted thatithasnotbeenpossiblesofartoprioritisethistask.Itistruethatattempts were made by Demos to carry out a number of thematic studies on problems thatwereidentifiedinthefirstallIndonesiasurveyandwhichcalledforindepth approaches.Onesuchtaskwastoanalyseexperiencesofprodemocratsinlocal direct elections of political executives. But even if the case studies have been concluded the analysis and writing up has been delayed due to more time consumingthatexpectedworkonthereportsfromthebasicsurvey.Therehave beensimilarproblemswithanumberofcasestudiesofexperiencesamongcivil society organisations to engage in politics. But in this case several of the conclusionshavebeenmoreexplicitandpossibletoincorporateinthisvolume. The same applies for this authors even more delayed reports on strategies among prodemocrats to develop popular representation in order to combine civicandpopularorganisationandmakeadifferenceinorganisedpolitics.3 This joint book between the Demos team and concerned democracy scholars at UGM is a crucial step to address these drawbacks. One ambition is thattheacademicscholarsshallbeabletoexpandtheanalysisofthedatafrom theexpertsurveyandalsoaddsupplementaryresultsfromotherresearch. Another aim is to expand the cooperation into several additional fields. This is to gain improved joint analyses and scholarly guidance of the
3
Andanumberofeffortstoaddressissuesofwomenandpolitics,socialpactsandlegalproblemsandoptions inattemptsbyprodemocratstoengageinpoliticshavesimplynotbeenverysuccessful.
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activistresearchersaswellasmorerelevantstudiesanddatathatcancontribute to even better assessments of Indonesian democracy. First, Demos new case study programme will gain from academic guidance and be open for contributionsbyconcernedcolleaguesandstudents.Thefocusisonexperiences from efforts to (a) use democracy to promote social and economic rights, (b) combine customary rights and democracy and (c) foster political facilitation of democratic direct participation in for instance local budgeting and governance agendas. Second, the academic partners (at Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM, with contributions from the University of Oslo, UiO) is already providing education of participatory researchers in intensive course on basic theory and analytical tools as well as a post graduate education programme. This post graduate programme includes research to write a number of master and Ph.D theses.Theambitionisthatthethematicfocusofthesethesesandtheresults will add to the knowledge about crucial aspects of Indonesian democracy. To coordinate and provide further facilitation, the joint work as well as thesis writingiscurrentlybeingorganisedinaninternationaleducation,researchand publication programme on Power Conflict and Democracy (PCD), directed by senior scholars at UGM, UiO and University of Colombo as well as related partnersinanumberofotheruniversitiesandorganisations,includingofcourse Demositself. The long term aim is thus to sustain the unique participatory surveys and democracy promotion from below while also moving in the direction of a morecomprehensivedemocraticauditincomparativeperspective;anauditthat justliketheauditsintheglobalNorthandtosomeextentinSouthAsiaincludes resultsfromseveralotherresearchprojectsandsurveys. Much of this cooperation is also open for other interested parties in IndonesiaorwithafocusonIndonesia.Thecrucialprioritiessofarinadditionto those that have already been mentioned includes popular political of democratic representation in comparative perspective, the role of democracy inpeaceandreconstructioninAceh,politicalfinancing,decentralisationand representation, conflict resolution, statecivil society relationship and governmentality,labour,citizenshipandpolitics,localpoliticsanddemocratic representation,womenandpolitics,ethnicityanddemocracyandnewways ofcontrollingmedia. SurveysoverTime Whiletheseeffortswillhopefullybroadenanddeepentheknowledge andchangesofassessingrigorouslypower,conflictanddemocracyinIndonesia
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in theoretical and comparative perspective, it remains crucial that the expert surveyscanbesustainedasabasis.Evenifwemanagetofosterandsummarise a lot of additional results and promote better education and training, it is no substitutefortheuniqueinformationfromthegroundedparticipatorysurveysin the country at large. Moreover, one can thus also foster popular education throughtheimplementationofthesurveysanddisseminationoftheresults.And onecandevelopandpromoteresearchbasednonpartisanrecommendations. The current plan is to conduct such surveys in due time before every generalelections.Thisistopromoteimpartialandacademicallycriticalanalysis and updates on the problems and options of democracy and suggest what should be given priority to in cooperation with the concerned academic community,studentsandthedemocracymovementatlarge.Onequestionhas beenifthereshouldbelongerperiodsinbetweenthesurveys,asbasicfactors maynotchangequickly.Thesimpleansweristhatdemocracyisnotaspecialset ofrulesandregulationsbutaprocesswithmanydimensions.Further,Indonesia remainsintransitionfromauthoritarianismtowards,hopefully,moremeaningful democracyandtherearestillinstantandcrucialchanges.Betweenthefirstand thesecondallIndonesiasurveys,forinstance,wehaveseenradicalchangesona numberoffactorssuchastheweakeningofthefreedoms,theimprovementsof governance, the consolidation of topdown democracy, the transformation of theconflictinAcehintoademocraticpoliticalframeworkandtheeffortsbypro democratstoengageinorganisedpoliticswhilethepowerfulelitecontinuesto monopolisethesameallofwhichmaynotjustreflecttemporaryeventssuch asanelectioncampaign.
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ADecadeofReformasi:Thefragilityofdemocracy
ChapterThree
WillyPurnaSamadhi(Demos)andSofianMunawarAsgart(Demos) The20032004SurveyonProblemsandOptionsofDemocratisationin Indonesia, which was the first for Demos, suggested a democracy deficit in Indonesia, as indicated, on one hand, by the widening gap between comparativelyimpressivecivilpoliticalfreedomsand,ontheother,bythepoor conditionofoperationalinstruments(Priyonoet.al2007). How have this democracy being in a state of deficit change after the firstsurvey?Therecent2007Survey4indicatesthatthestandardoftherulesand regulations supposed to promote democracy in Indonesia are improving, particularly in relation to the operational instruments of governance. Some instruments of democracysuch as, independence of executive power from vestedinterest groups, capacity to eradicate corruption, lessening abuse of power, subordination of government and public officials to the rule of law, as well as equality before the laware showing remarkable progress. It is admitted,however,thattheprogressemergesonlyfrompoorinitialconditions. The democratic political framework appears to be working well and gaining acceptance.Mostactorsseemtohaveaccepteddemocracyastheonlygamein town. Most remarkably, attempts from the old elements to reintroduce a centralisedstateasfoundduringtheNewOrdererainpost1998hadreceived less sympathy from subjects in outer islands. Therefore, concern about the recurrenceofeasternEuropeanexperienceofterritorialdisintegrationfollowing theendoftheauthoritarianregimedoesnotseemtohaveitsempiricalground. Instead, as this survey suggests, people appears to want to give way to democracy as means to increasingly implement a nationwide democratic politicalcommunity. Nevertheless, the progress does not, in itself, improve the expression of democracy in a real sense. Firstly, the improvement in the operation of instruments of democracy departs from a very poor situation, leaving the standard remains insufficient. Secondly, the narrowing down of gap between
4
Data collection was conducted in JulyOctober 2007. The survey aims to verify the main findings of the previoussurvey(2003/04).Otherthanthat,thefindingsareexpectedtoformthebasisofrecommendations fortheprodemocracyactivistsandmovementsinanticipationoftheforthcoming2009generalelections.
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warrantedfreedomsandpoorinstrumentsofdemocracymayalsoberegarded astheresultofdeclineinthequalityofmostaspectsoffundamentalfreedoms. Thirdly, political representation, interestbased representation, and direct representation by the people have largely stagnated. In addition, the deterioration of quality of democracy is, ironically, related to the freedom to formpartiesandparticipateinelectionsatalllevels.Fourthly,politicalpractices remain elite dominated. Fifthly, politicisation of issues and interests, organisation, and political mobilisation are topdown driven and characterised by clientelism and populism. Lastly, prodemocrats are beginning to engage in politicalactionandnolongerjustactiveatthesocietylevel.They,nevertheless, continue being poorly organised, fragmented, and marginalised from electoral participation,thusmakingthemincreasinglycynicalofrepresentativedemocracy and opting primarily for forms of direct participation. In short, the structure of democracy with remarkable progress seems to be erected on sand and its foundationremainspoor. Althoughdemocracyhasbeenevermorefunctioningasasystemanda national political framework, representation remains the most persistent problem.Considerableprogressislackinginthreedimensionsofrepresentation: partybased political representation, interest representation based on civil associations and social movements, and direct participation. As long as these dimensions are not included in the main agenda of political democratisation, Indonesian democracy continues to be monopolised by the interests of the oligarchicelite.Atleast,thisisthesignclearlyreflectedinthecountryscurrent partysystem. Compared with the 20032004 Survey, some fundamental aspects of freedom have noticeably declined. A regression occurs as one compares the current situation with the relative freedom enjoyed by the citizens during the early years of reformasi. This was when citizens participation and freedom to establishpoliticalpartiesandseveralaspectsrelatedtopoliticalrepresentation were apparent. Indonesias democratisation also suffers from additional problemssuchaslackofimprovedaccessandparticipationforallsocialgroups, particularly marginalised groups, in public life, the poor condition of gender equality, the persistent low standards of military and police transparency and accountability to the elected government and the public, as well as strong governmentdependenceonforeignintervention. A decade later, Indonesias path toward democracy has shown both progress and deterioration or stagnation. As a national political framework, democracy works and has been relatively successful, compared to some other countries.Nonethelessjustasanystructurebuiltonsand,Indonesiandemocracy lacksastrongfoundation.
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Thestateanddynamicsofdemocracy:Howaretheyassessed? Prior to presenting the results of the 2007 Survey and comparing it withthoseofthe20032004Survey,someissuesregardingmethodologyneeds clarifying.. Assessmentonthesituationandthedynamicsofdemocracyrequired fromtheinformantsisclassifiedintothreeaspects.Thefirstaspectrelatestothe performanceandthescopeoftheinstrumentsofdemocracy.Theidentification and the assessment of the aspect is based on approach introduced by David Beetham (1999) from Democratic Audit, a research group in the Human Rights CentreintheUniversityofEssex,assessingthesituationofdemocracyexamined against 80 democratic instruments. The approach is, later, adopted as the standard for assessment on democracy employed by IDEA International (Beetham et.al 2002). Nonetheless, Demos, since the 2007 Survey, has made some necessary adjustments to the Beethams instruments in accord with particularcircumstancesexperiencedinIndonesia(Priyonoet.al2007).Weshall returntothisaspectshortlywhendiscussingthecapacityofactorsofdemocracy inpromotingandputtingtheinstrumentsofdemocracyintooperation,aswell astheextenttheactorsarecapableofdoingso. The second aspect for assessment is the capacity of the actors to promote and use the instruments of democracy relevant to their particular circumstances and interests. This is crucial as the overall assessment of democracy and democracy as process do not occur in a vacuum. A comprehensionofthecapacityoftheactorsinvolvedintheprocesswouldnot merely help to understand the progress of democracy. It, equally, leads to an understanding of the strength and weakness of the actors. The application of this second aspect will, in turn, allow the current survey to provide insights as thebasisfordrawingrecommendationstoactivistspromotingdemocracy. The study on whether and how the actors actually establish relationshipswithdemocracymakesupthethirdaspect.Dotheybothpromote it and use it, or just use it? Do they tend to manipulate it, or disregard it and, instead,makeattempttoinfluencepoliticsandpeopleinotherwaysconsidered to be against the principles of democracy? This aspect is relevant to the sense that democracy provides opportunity for every member of a community to exerciseequalpoliticalcontrolonmattersmutuallyagreed.Ithelpstoascertain the extent democratisation and its actual situation give benefit to the majority or,instead,undercutthepublicroleandfailtobecomeachannelforthedemos. We shall now return to the first aspect. The 20032004 Survey was conducted in two stages. From the instruments list used by Beetham et.al
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(2002), Demos identified 35 instruments of democracy during the first stage. Later, during the second stage, the list was reformulated to contain 40 instruments in order to obtain more accurate information about the implementation of democracy. During the 2007 Survey, however, for practical reasons,thelistwassimplified,withoutlosingthesubstance,toonlycontain32 instrumentsofdemocracyasshowninBox3.1below. Box3.1.TheInstrumentsofDemocracy 1 Citizenship(Equalstatecitizenship;Therightsofminorities,migrantsand refugees,Reconciliationofhorizontalconflicts) 2 GovernmentsupportofinternationallawandUNhumanrights 3 Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialstotheruleoflaw 4 Theequalitybeforethelaw(Equalandsecureaccesstojustice;The integrityandindependenceofthejudiciary) 5 Freedomfromphysicalviolenceandthefearofit 6 Freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganisation 7 Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity 8 Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture 9 Genderequalityandemancipation 10 Therightsofchildren 11 Therighttoemployment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds 12 Therighttobasiceducation,includingcitizensrightsandduties 13 Goodcorporategovernance 14 Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsatcentral, regionalandlocallevel;Freeandfairseparateelectionsofe.g.governors, mayorsandvillageheads) 15 Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(orteamsof independentcandidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipatein elections 16 Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypoliticalparties andorcandidates 17 Abstentionfromabusingreligiousorethnicsentiments,symbolsand doctrinesbypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates. 18 Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsbypolitical partiesandorcandidates 19 Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessand accountabilityofpartiesandorpoliticalcandidatestotheirconstituencies 20 Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment
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21 Democraticdecentralisationofgovernmentofallmattersthatdonotneed tobehandledoncentrallevels. 22 Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofelectedgovernment,the executive,(bureaucracies),atalllevels 23 Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryandpolicetoelected governmentandthepublic 24 Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitarygroups,hoodlums andorganisedcrime 25 Governmentindependencefromforeignintervention(exceptUN conventionsandapplicableinternationallaw) 26 Governmentsindependencefromstronginterestgroupsandcapacityto eliminatecorruptionandabuseofpower 27 Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld 28 Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithinmedia,artand theacademicworld 29 Citizensparticipationinextensiveindependentcivilassociations 30 Transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivilorganisations 31 Allsocialgroupsincludingmarginalisedgroupsextensiveaccesstoand participationinpubliclife 32 Directparticipation(Peoplesdirectaccessandcontactwiththepublic servicesandgovernmentsconsultationofpeopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirectparticipationinpolicymakingandtheexecutionof publicdecisions) Informantswererequestedtoassesstheperformanceandthescopeof eachinstrumentintheirownspecificregionalcontext.Thequestion,firstly,dealt with whether applicable rules and regulations existed at all before they were askedtomakeassessmentonwhattheyhadbeendoinginaparticularfieldof instrument.Thiswasmeanttoinvestigatetheextentoftheexistingformalrules and regulations were able or otherwise to generate the desired output. What wastheextentof,forexample,theexistingrulesandregulationsweresupposed tofosterfreedomofspeech,assemblyandorganisation?Moreover,inorderto identify the scope of instruments of democracy, informants were requested to make assessment in two ways. Firstly, the geographic scope of the implementation of the instrument. Secondly, the extent of the substance of freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganisationimpactedinapplicablerulesand regulations? The ideal retort to both requests would, certainly, describe instrumentsbeingwidelyspreadandsubstantiallyperformed.
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During the 2007 Survey, instruments of democracy were categorised into,ononehand,formalrulesandregulations,and,ontheotherhand,informal arrangement. Formal rules and regulations referred to all forms of state regulations, while informal arrangements include customs, adat, norms and values, including conventions agreed by communities over generations. This formalinformal categorization, which hardly existed in the 20032004, was drawnforthreereasons.Itwas,firstly,aimedatmakingassessmentagainsteach instrument of democracy easier for the informants. The distinction was, secondly, made to differentiate the level of operation and the efficacy both of formal rules and regulation as well as informal arrangements. During the first survey,therewasnodistinctionmadetoexaminewhetheritwastheformeror the latter that had more influence on the process of democratisation. In addition, thirdly, the peculiarity both of formal and informal arrangements is inevitableintheinquiryintotheextentofthestatesadaptationtodemocracy andthelevelofthepeoplesvigilanceontheprocessofdemocratisation. While the 20032004 Survey focused on the institutional outcome of the instruments of democracy, the 2007 Survey obtained informants assessmentsontheoutputoftheinstitutionaloutcome.Thiswasmadepossible astherecentsurveyconsidered the performanceandthescope ofassessment was based only on existing instruments, leading to the more positive assessmentsascomparedtothefindingsfromthefirstsurvey. Theresultledtothedevelopmentofamethodforcomparingthetwo differentsetsofdata.Itisanindexsystemdrawnfrominformantsassessment of each instrument of democracy from both surveys. The index values ranged from 0 (poor) to 100 (good). An index value of 50%, 25% and 25% was, respectively, based on informants assessment of performance, geographical spread, and substantive coverage. In addition, in the second survey where formal and informal instruments were treated differently, the value was, respectively,70%and30%.Thevaluefortheformalinstrumentswasreckoned by reducing the proportion of informants stating that no formal rules and regulations existed. The procedure was essential to compute the negative factorsofinformantsstatingthatnoformalrulesandregulationsexisted.Table 3.1 below features the comparison of the index for each instrument of democracy.
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Table3.1.InstrumentsofdemocracyIndex:2003/2004and2007surveyresults
NO INSTRUMENTSOFDEMOCRACY INDEX 2003/04 32 27 16 18 28 74 57 74 47 27 22 37 21 INDEX 2007 42 46 45 44 47 60 51 66 46 53 45 59 40 LegalinstrumentsandRights Citizenship(Equalstatecitizenship;Therightsofminorities,migrantsand 1 refugees,Reconciliationofhorizontalconflicts) 2 GovernmentsupportofinternationallawandUNhumanrights 3 Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialstotheruleoflaw Theequalitybeforethelaw(equalandsecureaccesstojustice;Theintegrityand 4 independenceofthejudiciary) 5 Freedomfromphysicalviolenceandthefearofit 6 Freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganisation 7 Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity 8 Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture 9 Genderequalityandemancipation 10 Therightsofchildren 11 Therighttoemployment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds 12 Therighttobasiceducation,includingcitizensrightsandduties 13 Goodcorporategovernance PoliticalRepresentation Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsatcentral,regional 14 andlocallevel;Freeandfairseparateelectionsofe.g.governors,mayorsand villageheads) Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevels(orteamsofindependent 15 candidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipateinelections Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypoliticalpartiesandor 16 candidates Abstentionfromabusingreligiousorethnicsentiments,symbolsanddoctrinesby 17 politicalpartiesandorcandidates. Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsbypoliticalparties 18 andorcandidates Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessandaccountabilityof 19 partiesandorpoliticalcandidatestotheirconstituencies 20 Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment DemocraticandAccountableGovernment Democraticdecentralisationofgovernmentofallmattersthatdonotneedtobe 21 handledoncentrallevels. Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofelectedgovernment,the 22 executive,(bureaucracies),atalllevels Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryandpolicetoelected 23 governmentandthepublic Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitarygroups,hoodlumsand 24 organisedcrime Governmentindependencefromforeignintervention(exceptUNconventions 25 andapplicableinternationallaws) Governmentsindependencefromstronginterestgroupsandcapacityto 26 eliminatecorruptionandabuseofpower CivicEngagementandParticipation 27 Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithinmedia,artandthe 28 academicworld 29 Citizensparticipationinextensiveindependentcivilassociations
63 71 24 38 20 23 24 33 23 23 20 24 18 60 57 62
64 40 36 44 40 38 38 43 43 35 39 36 43 59 47 54
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30 31 32 Transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivilorganisations Allsocialgroups includingmarginalisedgroups extensiveaccesstoand participationinpubliclife Directparticipation(Peoplesdirectaccessandcontactwithpublicservicesand governmentsconsultationofpeopleand,whenpossible,facilitationofdirect participationinpolicymakingandthe,executionofpublicdecisions) INDEXSCOREAVERAGE 42 46 25 37 48 38 40 46
Let me now turn to the exploration of findings to determine whether or not changes had taken place in Indonesian democracy over the past four years withintheperiodfromthefirstsurvey(2003/2004)tothesecondsurvey(2007). ImpressiveAdvances:Governancerelatedaspects The fall of the New Order has allowed democracy to be accepted widely as a way of governing the people while, at the same time, the authoritariancharacterinthecountryspoliticsissteadilyweakened.Since1998, democracyhasbecomearelativelywellfunctioningsystemasanationalpolitical framework,5replacing the authoritarian political system from the previous era. Indonesia have reached a point of no return where democracy moves ahead, albeit little by little, toward progress. In an optimistic scenario, this has been madepossiblefollowingthedramaticimprovementsofcivilandpoliticalrightsin theearlyyearsofdemocratisation. Table 1.1 above shows a remarkably positive picture. On the average indexofallinstrumentsofdemocracy,itimprovedby25%,from37to46.Some instrumentsindexscoreshowedaconsiderablysharpincrease.Theindexscore forsubordinationofgovernmentandpublicofficialstotheruleoflawincreased from16to45andtheequalitybeforethelawincreasedsharplyfrom18to44.A significant increase was also obvious in governments impartiality from vested interest groups and its capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power. Progresswas,moreover,apparentinpoliticalpartiesandcandidatesneutrality from the money politics and powerful vested interest groups in spite of slight increase in score index (from 20 to 40). Other improvements were equally evidentinareas,suchasthecapacityofgovernmenttocurbparamilitarygroups, hoodlums and organised crime (from 20 to 39), the protection of the rights of children(from27to53),goodcorporategovernance(from21to40),therightto employment, social security and other basic needs (from 22 to 45), and the transparencyoftheelectedgovernmentanditsbureaucraticapparatusesatall levels(from23to43).
5
Our previous survey (2003/04) revealed a similar democratic situation various regions in Indonesia. This indicatesthatthenationalapproachorframeworkofdemocratisationhasbeenwidelyacceptedinIndonesia.
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Excepttherightsofchildren,goodcorporategovernance,therightto employment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds,andtheneutralityofpolitical parties and candidates from money politics and vested interests groups, instruments with indexes significant increase could be put together as the governments managing capacity in the judicial and executive sectors. Other instruments also related to the aspects of governance, namely democratic decentralisation free from intervention from the central government, the governmentsindependencefromforeignintervention,andthetransparencyof the military and the police force to the elected government and to the public increasesimilarly,though lessdramaticascomparedtotheothers.Inaverage, theindexesofeightinstrumentsrelatedtotheaspectsofgovernanceincreased byalmost100%(from22to42;seeTable3.3below).Thetrendcouldpossibly have been caused by, among other reasons, agenda by the current administration under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, emphasising reform of the badlyperforming aspects. Another may becausedbytheactualsituationatlocallevelfollowingtheimplementationof regionalautonomy. Table3.2.Indexofinstrumentsofdemocracyrelatedtoaspectsofgovernance: 2003/04and2007results
No Noof Instruments InstrumentsRelatedtoAspectsofGovernance IndexandRank (1) 2003/04 Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialstothe 1 3 ruleoflaw Theequalitybeforethelaw(Equalandsecureaccessto 2 4 justice;Theintegrityandindependenceofthejudiciary) Democraticdecentralisationofgovernmentofallmatters 3 21 thatdonotneedtobehandledoncentrallevels. Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofelected 4 22 government,theexecutive,(bureaucracies),atalllevels Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryand 5 23 policetoelectedgovernmentandthepublic Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitary 6 24 groups,hoodlumsandorganisedcrime 7 25 Governmentsindependencefromforeignintervention Governmentsindependencefromstronginterestgroups 8 26 andcapacitytoeliminatecorruptionandabuseofpower AVERAGEINDEX (1)numbersinbracketsshowrank 16(32) 18(30) 33(14) 23(24) 23(23) 20(28) 24(20) 18(31) 22 2007 45(15) 44(16) 43(20) 43(18) 35(32) 39(26) 36(30) 43(19) 41 Index Increase (%) 181 144 30 87 52 95 50 139 97
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Some critical notes are worth noting. First, the fact that more corruptioncasesarebroughtto trialshowsnotonlygovernmentcommitment to eradicate corruption, but also underlines the fact that corruption remains pervasive. The arrest of parliamentarian Al Amin Nasution and the former governoroftheBankofIndonesiaBurhanuddinAbdullah,ononehand,indicates a critical attempt to fight corruption, while, on the other, it proves that the practices of corruption still persist.6The arrest of prosecutor, leading a team establishedbytheGeneralAttorneytoinvestigatethecaserelatedtotheabuse of Bank of Indonesias Liquidity Assistance (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia, BLBI),foracceptingbribeworthofIDR6billion(aroundUSD600,000)provesat least two points. Firstly, the governments fight against corruption is often waged by corrupted law enforcement agencies. Secondly, it creates new practicesofcorruptionwithintheadministration.7ArecentreportofIndonesias Corruption Perception Index in 2007 by Transparency International similarly indicated that efforts at fighting corruption by the Indonesian government in 2007(2.3)hadweakenedfrom2.4in2007to2.3in2006. The second critical note is that improvements related to governance didnotinitselfindicateperformanceingoodgovernance.Table1.4showsthat the index score for governancerelated instruments was small and the rank of the respective instruments was low. When compared to the score of other instruments,asseeninTable1.1,democraticinstrumentsrelatedtopracticesof governancerankedlow.Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialsto the rule of law had the highest index score (45) of all instruments related to governance and ranked 16th out of 32. The governments impartiality from vestedinterest groups and its capacity to eliminate corruption and abuse of power previously had ranked 31st but currently ranked 18th. A slower shift was found in transparency and accountability of the elected government and the bureaucracy where the rank shifted from 24th to 19th. Transparency and accountabilityofarmedforceandpoliceforcetotheelectedgovernmentandto thepublicdeclinedfromthe23rdtothebottomofthe32instruments.Inother
AccordingtothechairmanoftheCommissionforCorruptionEradication(KPK),AntasariAzhar,AlAminwas arrested in regard to the case of the reassignment of the status of protected forest in Bintan Buyu, Riau to urbanhumansettlement.Inordertomakethereassignmentsuccessful,arecommendationfromparliament wasrequired.AlAminwasundersuspicionofhavingfacilitatedtherecommendationbyinexchangeofRp3 trillion,asthevicechairmanofKPK,M.Yasinstated.Ironically,thiscaseinvolvednineotherparliamentarians and the Regional Secretary of the Bintan district. According to the Honorary Council of the House of Representatives, the nine members of parliaments were at the place of the incident when Al Amin was arrested.AlAmin wasarrestedattheRitzCarltonhotelMegaKuningan,SouthJakarta.TheSecretaryofthe Bintandistrict,Azirwan,wasamongthearrested.SeeKoranTEMPO(13/4/2008). 7 SuchacriticalresponsewasprovidedKristiadi(Kompas,11/3/2008).
6
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words,threeofinstrumentsofdemocracyrelatedtothepracticesofgovernance wereinthelistoftheworstpossiblescoreindex(40).SeeTable3.3. Tabel3.3.TheInstrumentsofDemocracywithIndexScore40

NO 1 Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryandpoliceto electedgovernmentandthepublic 16 Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypolitical 2 partiesandorcandidates 25 Governmentindependencefrom foreignintervention(exceptUN 3 conventionsandapplicableinternationallaw) 19 Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessand 4 accountabilityofpartiesandorpoliticalcandidatestotheir constituencies 31 Allsocialgroups includingmarginalisedgroups extensiveaccess 5 toandparticipationinpubliclife 6 20 Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment 24 Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitarygroups, 7 hoodlumsandorganisedcrime 32 Directparticipation(Peoplesdirectaccessandcontactwiththe publicservicesandgovernmentsconsultationofpeopleandwhen 8 possiblefacilitationofdirectparticipationinpolicymakingandthe executionofpublicdecisions)) 18 Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsby 9 politicalpartiesandorcandidates 10 13 Goodcorporategovernance 15 Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(orteamsof 11 independentcandidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipate inelections (1) Theinstrumentsrelatedtogovernanceareinitalics. Noof Instruments 23 INSTRUMENTSOFDEMOCRACY
(1)
INDEX 35 36 36 38 38 38 39
RANK 32 31 30 29 28 27 26
40
25
40 40 40
24 23 22
ThreatstoFundamentalsofDemocracy Despiteprogressmadenominallybothatinstitutionalandlegalfronts, Indonesian democracy remains intrinsically volatile when it comes to the discussion about substance. There are countless of incidence in which legal framework to protect the democratic rights of the citizens is in contradiction with the implementation and, moreover, interpretation of practical issues encounteredbythepopulation. 1. Witheringfreedoms As in the previous survey, instruments related to freedoms and civil and political rights were in good shape compared to other instruments. Nonetheless,whencomparedwiththeearliersurvey,the2007Surveyindicated adeteriorationoftheinstruments.
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Freedomofreligionandculturalexpressionremainedhigh.Freedomof speech, assembly, and organisation was still among the best although had shifted from second to the third place. Free and fair general election was improving from fourth to the second place. Moreover, freedom from physical violenceandfearimproveditspositionfrom16thto10thplace. The index of instruments related to civil and political rights were relativelybettercomparedtootherinstruments.AsseeninTable3.4below,six outof11instrumentsofdemocracywithindexscoresabovetheoverallaverage (>46)werethoserelatedtofreedomandcivilandpoliticalrights. Table3.4.TheInstrumentsofDemocracywithIndexaboveAverageIndex Score(>46)
NO 1 Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsat 2 14 central,regionalandlocallevel;Freeandfairseparateelections ofe.g.governors,mayorsandvillageheads) 3 6 Freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganisation 4 12 Therighttobasiceducation,includingcitizensrightsandduties 5 27 Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld 6 29 Citizensparticipationinextensiveindependentcivilassociations 7 10 Therightsofchildren 8 7 Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity Transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivil 9 30 organisations 10 5 Freedomfromphysicalviolenceandthefearofit Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithin 11 28 media,artandtheacademicworld (1) Theinstrumentswritteninitalicsarerelatedtofreedomandcivilandpoliticalrights (2) Thenumbersinbrackestindicatetheresultsof20032004Survey Noof Instrument 8 INSTRUMENTSOFDEMOCRACY
(1)
INDEX 66(74) 64(63) 60(74) 59(37) 59(60) 54(62) 53(27) 51(57) 48(42) 47(28) 47(57)
(2)
RANK 1(1) 2(4) 3(2) 4(13) 5(6) 6(5) 7(18) 8(8) 9(11) 10(16) 11(7)
(2)
Though listed as the best groups, most instruments representing fundamental aspects of democracyfreedoms and civil and political rights, in fact,experienceddeteriorationor,atleast,stagnation.Theinstrumentsrelated tofreedomofreligion,belief,languageandculturepreviouslyrankedatthetop with an index score of 74, decreased to an index score of 66. The index for freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganisation,beingpreviouslyat74,wasdown to60.Theindexofinstrumentsrelatedtofreedomtoestablishtradeunionsand carryoutactivitiesshiftedfrom57to51.
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Table3.5.InstrumentsofDemocracyrelatedtofreedomsandcivilandpolitical rightswhoseindexesdecreased:Comparisonof2003/04and2007Survey results.

No 1 2 3 4 5 6 Noof instrument 6 7 8 9 27 28 INSTRUMENTSOFDEMOCRACY Freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganisation Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture Genderequalityandemancipation Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithin media,artandtheacademicworld Averageindexscore INDEX 2003/04 2007 74 60 57 51 74 65 47 46 60 59 57 62 46 55 CHANGE 19% 11% 11% 2% 2% 18% 15%
The deteriorating index in political freedom and civil rights appeared waslikelytogetconfirmedbyrealitiesontheground.ThebanningofJamaah Islamiyah Indonesia from exercising its religious freedom, and pressure placed on the minorities of localised religious sects (e.g. Lia Aminuddin of Jamaah Salamullah, Ahmad Mushadek of AlQiyadah AlIslamiyah) to condemn their beliefs and to conform with the mainstream interpretation by the state sanctioned authority create a grave concern to the conditions of civil rights. In addition, a religious decree, or fatwa, issued by the council of Islamic clerics (MajelisUlamaIndonesia,MUI)forbiddingdiscourseofpluralism,liberalism,and tolerance is likely to make the fundamentals of democracy worse. It is unfortunate that the current government has demonstrated a degree of tolerance to the elements within the society responsible for such violations. It seemsthatmaintainingitspopulistimage,byappeasingthedominantgroups anger toward the practices of the minority, is even more important to the present administration. The government, hence, has failed to defend political freedom and civil rights (Naipospos 2007). Having said that, it is timely to understandwhythestateofdemocraticfreedomandcivilrightsdeclines. 2. Representation as the worst problem and the sharp deterioration of participation Threats to fundamental aspects of democracy cannot, however, be exclusively viewed from the declining conditions of political and civil rights. Other fundamental aspects, such as political representation and governments impartiality, which performed poorly in 20032004 Survey and appear to be stagnant in 2007 Survey, may similarly contribute to weakened fundamentals. Indexrelatedtofreedomtoformpartieseitheratnationalorlocalleveltooka nose dive from 71 to 40 and was situated in 22nd position out of the 32
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instruments.Table3.6belowshowstheindexofdemocraticinstrumentsrelated totheaspectofpoliticalrepresentation. Table3.6.IndexandRankingofInstrumentsrelatedtoPoliticalRepresentation

No 1 Noof Instruments 14 Instrumentsrelatedtopoliticalrepresentation Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsat central,regionalandlocallevel;Freeandfairseparateelectionsofe.g. governors,mayorsandvillageheads) Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(orteamsof independentcandidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipatein elections Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypolitical partiesandorcandidates Abstentionfromabusingreligiousorethnicsentiments,symbolsand doctrinesbypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates. Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsby politicalpartiesandorcandidates Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessand accountabilityofpartiesandorpoliticalcandidatestotheir constituencies Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment Directparticipation(Peoplesdirectaccessandcontactwiththepublic services;Governmentsconsultationofpeopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirectparticipationinpolicymakingandtheexecution ofpublicdecisions) INDEXSCOREAVERAGE Index (1) 2007 64(63) Rank 2(4)
(1)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
15 16 17 18 19 20 32
40(71) 36(24) 44(38) 40(20) 38(23) 38(24) 40 (25) 43(36)
22(3) 31(22) 17(12) 24(29) 29(25) 27(21) 25(19)
Thenumberinbracketsshowstheresultof2003/04survey. As the table shows, instruments related to aspects of political representationdonotindicatedsubstantialimprovement.Onaverage,thescore indexes of instruments in 2007 Survey related to the aspects of political representationwasnotparticularlyhigh(43)andonlyincreasedby18%from36 in the 20032004 Survey. In fact, the ranking of six of the eight instruments declined. This marked the negligence of the aspects of political representation fromtheissuesofimprovingdemocracy. Serious attention should be paid to two findings. Firstly, indicator regardingfreeandfairelectionswastheonlyoneofeightinstrumentsrelatedto the aspect of representation with a relatively high and consistent index score. According to both the 20032004 Survey and 2007 Survey, the score index for the instrument was above the average index score for all instruments. This indicates that the institutionalisation of free and fair elections tended to be regarded as the main means to promote representation. The optimistic trend experienced by instruments related to free and fair elections does not necessarily improve political representation. A different situation in which the
(1)
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average score index for the other instruments reached only 39 should the instrumentsrelatedtogeneralelectionsbeexcluded. Second, this agonising condition is clearly marked by the decline of index of instruments related to freedom to form parties and participate in elections from 71 to 40. The data clearly indicates that the ongoing process of democratisationbarelyprovidessufficientspaceforbroadeningparticipationin order to promote representation. The situation may just worsen following the newlyintroduced law on political parties that holds back the establishment of newparties.Thefailureofanumberofpartiestopasstheverifyingprocessby the Department of Law and Human Rights indicates a setback. Among the 115 newpartiesregisteredwiththeDepartmentofLawandHumanRights,only24 passedtheprocesstobe legallyacknowledged politicalpartyaccordingtoLaw No. 2/2008. Once the parties passed the gate in the Department, another verifying process by the Commission of General Election General Election is waitingtodecidewhetherornotthepartiesarequalifiedforthe2009General Election. 3. Additionalsetbacks Another fundamental aspect of democracy is social, economic, and culturalrights.Theinstrumentsfortheaspectsaretherighttobasiceducation, includingcitizensrightsandduties;protectionoftherightsofchildren;andthe righttoemployment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds,andgoodcorporate governance. The 2007 Survey indicated that indexes for the group of social, economy, and cultural rights were increasing. The results may be somewhat surprising,atleastforJakartaresidentswhodonothaveadequateinformation aboutimprovementsofsocial,economic,andculturalconditionsinotherparts ofthecountry.Theassessmentappearstobeunbalanced,particularlywiththe problemsinsocial,economic,andculturalfieldsencounteredbythepopulation ineasternIndonesia,includingtheirpoorcapacitytostruggleforbasicrights. Nonetheless,achievementmadeineconomic,socialandculturalrights should be treated with reservation especially when the index score remained low at 46. Compared to the previous index of 37, there was no impressive increase with only around 20%. As most mass media suggested, the economic, social,culturalconditionsofmostpopulationremainedagreatconcern.People have been left vulnerable to fulfilling their basic needs, not only because of constant soaring price, but also because some vital necessities have become scarce. Even the small and medium industrial enterprises have also suffered fromthedrastichikeoffuelprice. FormalDemocracyRemainsIncomplete
55
Indonesia, as claimed by many, had admittedly adopted and implemented most formal rules and regulationsby which the actors of democracy just have to abidenecessary to the democratisation process. Informantsintherecentsurvey,nonetheless,statedthatsuchbeliefisincorrect and that democracy has yet to be completely institutionalised. On average, thirtyfive per cent of informants stated that there are no formal rules and regulationsregulatingthe32instrumentsofdemocracy.Around35%ormoreof informants stated that 17 instruments were not actually regulated by formal rules.8 Some instruments, on the one hand, were considered to have had beenformalised,suchasthoserelatingtofreeandfairelections.Approximately 81% of informants stated that formal rules already existed. Other instruments assessed by more than 70% of informants as being regulated by formal rules weremainlyrelatedtofreedomofspeech,assemblyandorganisation(78%);the righttobasiceducation(78%);freedomofreligion,belief,language,andculture (77%); freedom of the press, art and academic world (74%); and freedom to carryouttradeunionactivity(72%). On the other hand, instruments considered not to be yet formalised weretransparencyandaccountabilityofthearmedforceandthepoliceforceto elected government and to the public (53%); abstention from abuse of ethnic and religious sentiments, symbols and doctrines by political parties and or candidates (51%); the capacity of parties and or candidates to form and run government (49%); the capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime (49%); government independence from foreign intervention (49%); membershipbased control of parties, and responsivenessandaccountabilityofpartiesandorpoliticalcandidatestotheir constituents(48%);andextensiveaccessandparticipationofallsocialgroups includingmarginalisedgroupsinpubliclife(47%). Furthermore,therecentsurveyalsosuggestedthattheperformanceof informal arrangementscustoms, norms, value, traditions, etcin supporting the infrastructure of democracy was showing a relatively steady trend. On average, sixty four per cent of informants stated that informal arrangements were sufficiently supportive of the infrastructure of democracy. They seem to rejectcommonscepticismclaimingthatelementsoflocalcultureanddemocracy donotmix.
8
Forcompletedataoninformantsassessmentonformalregulations,seeAppendix.
56
Conclusions Therearefourconclusions.Firstly,ingeneralterms,progressesinthe instruments of democracy are apparent. Secondly, the gap between the instruments of democracy is narrowing. Thirdly, however, the narrowing gap does not necessarily suggest that all instruments have improved. Instruments related to basic freedoms and partypolitical participation that previously showedgoodindexesarenowdeclining.Governanceimprovementmayatworst be at the expense of declining freedoms. Fourthly, other aspects of fundamentals of democracy, namely, political representation and the independence of government, are not improving either. However, aside from theelections,theinstrumentsrequiredtopromotepoliticalparticipationarenot among the worst. Finally, the situation of economic, social, and cultural rights seems to have improved in certain parts of the country, although it is obvious that the situation remains unbalanced. The combination of these conclusions reveals a potentially disturbing picture: that while the gap is gradually closing, fundamentalaspectsofdemocracyarebeingatthesametimethreatened.
57
ARoughRoadtoPoliticalCitizenship
ChapterFour
ARoughRoadtoPoliticalCitizenship: Undertheshadowoflocalcommunalism
WillyPurnaSamadhi(Demos) The rise of Partai Golkar (PG/Golkar Party) and Partai Demokrasi IndonesiaPerjuangan (PDIP/Indonesian Democratic PartyStruggle), characterised by their conformity with nationalist and secularist platform, to winningthe2004GeneralElectionby,respectively,21.62%and18.31%indicated that national framework and nation as imagined community (Anderson 1983) remain relevant to the majority of national voters. The fact that parties with religious character or strong advocacy of sectarianist politics managed only to gain around, even lower than, ten percent of total votes provided information that religious belief and local identity may not have direct correlation with electoral preference at the national level. This is not to mention the secularist andselfapplaudednationalistPartaiDemokrat(PD)thathadnot,even,existed duringthe1999Electionbutgained7.46%ofvotesandbenefittedfrombeingan electoral vehicle for Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, a former army general and an acclaimed nationalist and secularist.9Moreover, the 20032004 Survey, as a matter of fact, demonstrates that, even, 40% of informants confirmed the nationstate, Indonesia, being their main source of identity. The figure seemed to be substantial when compared to the proportion of informants whose main identificationwastheplaceoforigin(11%),ethnicity(20%),orreligion(12%). Thereality,however,goestoadifferentdirectionwhenitcomestothe localelection.Thewinningofcoalitionsofnonsecularist,mostlyIslamistbased, parties during elections at provincial level might confirm the project of nation statenotbeingrelevanttotheactualaspirationsofthevoters.Itmaysimilarly show that other forms of identity became one of the key sources of political identificationforlocalconstituents.Thisis,indeed,nottosaythatthoseparties donotaspiretothenationalistframeworkbuttheyare,atleast,acknowledged by the public for representing religious, local, or, maybe, ethnicallybased images.The2008localelectionsinWestJavaandNorthSumatraaresomegood
9
Thepartywas,infact,oneofelementswithintheparliamentthatendorsedthecontroversial,andrather sectarian,antipornographybillrecentlypassed.Theparliamentariancommitteeresponsibleforthebillwas chairedbyaleadingmemberoftheparty.
58
examplesinwhichthevictoriouscandidatesweremainlybackedbycoalitionsof Islamistbasedparties.InspiteofDedeYusuf,thewinningcandidatefordeputy governorofWestJava,wasamovieactor,hisrunningmateandtheduetfrom North Sumatra were comparatively lessknown to the wider local voters when compared to their competitors, who had more popularity and were mainly backedbyPGandPDIP. Inspiteofanalystsclaimsrangingfromtheeffectiveuseofmediato theapplicationofinnovativemethodsforcampaigning,whathadbeenoccurring inlocalelectionsmentionedabovemayalsorevealtheshapeofthenationstate project. In 20032004 Survey, Demos concluded that the nationstate project wasinthegripofacrisis.Thereare,atleast,tworeasonsleadingtotheclaim. Firstly, when identifications of the place of origin, ethnicity, and religion, regarded as representing nonnationalist sentiments, were placed into a single category,makingup43%,thecomparisonwithIndonesiabeingthemainsource of identity would be, more or less, balanced. When 12% of informants identifyingthemselvesasbeingresidentsofadistrict,acityoraprovincewere addedintothecategoryofnonnationalisticsentiments,thecomparisonbecame rather unbalanced. This finding might provide an explanation of why voters in local election were more attracted to the call of primordial and, rather, less nationallyframed ideas. The issue of, for examples, putra daerah, referring to ones genealogical connection with a particular place or culture, and ones religious background being mattered to determine the voters preference suggestedtherelativeabsenceofnationstateasapoliticalframework.People, accordingly, appeared to be less engrossed to the candidates democratic programmatic agenda, for which one could actually be made accountable politically to his or her constituents. Secondly, the data revealed that the citizenshipbased politics had not formed a basis for developing democracy. People remained politically associated with their cultural entities based on religion, ethnicity, localism, or communitarian relations, and would likely to advocateaspirationswithintheframework.10 Such circumstance creates a further concern to the nation as it, even sinceundertheprecolonialkingdomsand,later,colonialdomination,hadbeen a plural society (Furnivall 1948, also Anderson 1983, Lombard 1996) with no established roots of domination by a single ethnic group or theocratic state. Evenduring thecentralisedNewOrderera,believedtobeundertheinfluence Javanesepoliticalculture(Anderson1990,Pemberton1994),Indonesiawasnot a Javanese state. The end of the authoritarian regime in 1998, moreover, has
The 20042005 survey was compiled in Towards the Agenda of Human Rights Based Meaningful Democracy,ExecutiveReport,20January2005,unpublished.Alsosee,Priyono,et.al.,Op.cit.
10
59
subtractedthecentralistcharacterofIndonesianstateandremoved,thoughnot completely, Javanese political culture inherited from the Soeharto era. Having saidthat,theexistenceofpresentdayIndonesiawouldbegreatlydependanton how to manage the multiethnic character and religious diversity of the nation, on the one hand, and how to mingle these aspects with democracy as the principle of political equality. Failure to address the challenge would risk the societybeingovershadowedbythecrisiscausedbyculturaldiversity,leadingto theBalkanisationofthecountry. The 2007 Survey, however, points out a different trend. Fragility in a form of the separation of people along the ethnic and religion lines is evident. TheimplementationofIslamicsyariahlawatdistrictlevelinWestJavaandAceh andpeople,believedtobepartofparticularethnicgroups,beingdeniedaccess tomanufacturingemploymentsuchasinBantenaresomedisturbingexamples. Nonethelesstheongoingprocessofdemocratisationandtheincreasinglymore open political spaces at local level also marked by respect of, at least, some principlesofhumanrights,areclearlypromotingthedevelopmentofapolitical communityinallregions,insteadofanethnicnationalcommunity. Politicalcommunitywithoutnationhood Local politics, however, exposes a contradicting reality with regard to voters selfidentification. In response to local politics, informants, as shown in Table4.3,validatedatrendtowardareversaloftheabovementionedsituation. Atthislevel,religion,ethnicity,andsentimentofindigenousnessweretheprime factor. During local elections, 40% of informants found that people had identified themselves as residents of their city/district/province, while 23% for ethnic community or clan. During local conflicts, ethnic or clanbased identity became important in the context of local conflicts (36%). Similarly, in terms of the establishment of new local government, most people tend to identify themselvesasbelongingbothtoanethnicgroupandaregionalidentity.
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Table4.1.Informantsassessmentonpeoplesidentityinsomepolitical occasionsatlocallevel
Inregionalelectionshowdidpeoplefirstidentifythemselves? Howdopeopleidentifythemselveswhentheyfacesituationsofconflictcausedbysocial,economyandpolitical tension? Inrespondingtoissuesofregionaladministrativedivisionofprovincesordistricts,howdopeopleatfirstidentify themselves? REGIONAL LOCAL LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE ELECTIONS CONFLICTS NO PEOPLESIDENTITYINPOLITICALOCCASIONS DIVISION (%ofinformants) 1 Asresidentsoftheirdistrict/city/province 40 12 37 2 Asresidentsoftheirvillageandhamlet(dusun) 11 12 30 3 Asmembersoftheirethniccommunity 23 36 26 4 Asmembersoftheirreligiouscommunity 4 12 1 5 Asmembers/supportersofapoliticalparty 13 1 0 6 Asmembersofasocialclass 7 23 0 7 Others(includingasresidentsofIndonesia) 2 0 4 8 NoAnswer 1 4 3 Percentagesbasedonnumberofinformants(N=903).
Table 4.1 shows, at least, two salient points. Firstly, local elections introduced since 2006 have also produced the sentiment of localism manifested in the issue of, among others, putra daerah. Candidate not able to show his or her genealogical or cultural connection to the locality where the electionistakingplacewouldfinditdifficulttogainsupportfromlocalvoters.In addition, political party has to enquire this aspect of connectivity of potential candidate upon which support would be generally depended. Forty percent of informants believed that local identity, seen from ones association to district/city/province, had been crucial in local elections. Localism can also appearintheexpressionofethnicallybasedsentiments,whenbeingamigrant toalocalityorbelongingtoaminoritygroupwouldreallymattertolocalvoters claiming to be native residents of a place. The combination between identification with district/city/province and the one with ethnic community wouldresultthepercentagerepresentingtheimportanceoflocalismtobe63%. The finding, however, does not necessarily mean that direct local election is a mistake. LearningfromTheNewlyRecoveredDemocracy:Aceh Political climate in Aceh after the signing of Helsinki agreement betweentheGovernmentofRepublicofIndonesianandGerakanAcehMerdeka (GAM/Free Aceh Movement) appears to point to the direction toward a nationallyframed political system and a democratic arrangement. The rise of
61
independence candidate during local election to a gubernatorial position had nothing to do with disengagement from national political framework representedbytheexistingnationalpoliticalpartiesseparatism,and,letalone, aspiration to renewed armed movement. The subsequent emergence of local partiesdoesnotnecessarilyinvigorateoraugmentseparatistsentimentsagainst Jakarta, but, rather, widen up the process of participation and public control, allowing a democratic competition like in other provinces in the country. The case of Aceh reveals that democratic political organisations at local level, disengaged from the national structure, may have a chance for deepening democracywithoutputtingthenationalpoliticalframeworkatstake. Demos 2006 Survey on Aceh implies that during local election Acehnesetendedtoidentifythemselvesasresidentsofadistrict/city/province, asvillageresidents,andassupportersofapoliticalparty.Moreover,affiliationto ethnic grouping or religious faith seemed to be less important as compared to attachmenttopolitical.SeeTable4.2below. Now,thesituationinAcehisshowingsignsofsimilaritywiththeother regions. In some aspects, even, Aceh appears to be more democratic than the rest of the country. On one hand, the spread of development of a democratic politicalframeworkhasopenedgoodopportunitiesforpeacenegotiators,post tsunamidonoragencies,civilgroups,andpoliticalpowerstoreachagreements aimedatendingtheconflictandtotransformitintoafledglingdemocracy.On the other hand, this would have never been possible had the local political systemnotbeenopenedupforamoregenuinepoliticalparticipationbygiving citizens right to set up their own local parties and allow the participation of independent candidates in direct local elections, both at provincial and district level. Also, the presence of negotiators and international institutionsalbeit temporarywere instrumental in creating a situation conducive to enter a process of peace and democracy. At the same time, the condition hindered parties, including certain military factions and business interests, from manipulating the situation as was the case in other conflict areas, like Poso. Finally, it was inevitable imperative that dissident groups and Acehnese nationalistsorganisetoenabletodrawbenefitsfromdemocraticopennessand, even,towinelections.11 In other words, the fledgling, decentralised Indonesian political community and the granting of increased opportunities for greater political
MuchoftheseinsightsarefromDemosspecialAcehsurvey(20062007)andanumberofspecialstudieson theroleofdemocracyinAcehthatarebeingconductedbyaspecialteamdirectedbyStanleyAdiPrasetyoin partnershipbetweenDemosandaseparateprojectdirectedbyProfessorsKristianStokkeandOlleTrnquist, University of Oslo and supported by the Norwegian Research Council on the politics of peace and reconstructioninposttsunamiSriLankaandAceh.
11
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participation at local level have paved the way to peace and democratic development in Aceh. At the same time, this new arrangement has narrowed downopportunitiesforgroupswithvestedinterestintheireffortstostirupthe situation. These were made possible not solely because of topdown approach fromthecentralgovernment. Table4.2.Acehneseidentificationatlocalelections
Inregionalelections,howdidpeopleatfirsthandidentifythemselves? NO ACEHNESEIDENTIFICATIONINLOCALELECTIONS 1 Asresidentsoftheirdistrict/city/province 2 Asresidentsoftheirvillageandhamlet(dusun) 3 Asmembersoftheirethniccommunity 4 Asmembersoftheirreligiouscommunity 5 AsAcehneseornonAcehnese 6 Asmembers/supportersofapoliticalparty 7 Asmembersoftheirsocialclass 8 Others(AsresidentsofIndonesia) 9 NoAnswer
Percentagesbasedonnumberofinformants.(N=131) Source:AcehSurvey(Demos,2006).http://www.demosindonesia.org/aceh/
PERCENTAGE 31 18 6 4 9 16 10 6 1
TheAcehexperienceprovesthatbroaderpublicfreedomatlocallevel to participate in political organisations, either by establishing local parties or nonparty political channels, can become effective to overcome communal segregationand minimise ethnicandreligioussentiments. Moreover,itreveals thattheexistenceoflocalpartiesisnotincontradictionwiththeregulationson localelectionssetatnationallevel.ThisisnottosaythatAcehisnowfreefrom problems. For this remarkable success to continue, there is a need to form additional democratic political linkages between the newly elected politicians, the old administration, and the people. The improved political system as compared to elsewhere in the country enhances the chances for Acehnese to move to a democratic direction rather than slipping back into the usual Indonesianproblemsoflocalpoliticsbeingmonopolisedanddominatedby the powerfulelite. What has been taking place in Aceh has inevitably formed a robust foundationfortransformingarmedconflictinto politicalstruggleindemocratic framework. The basic instrument has been the demonopolisation of politics in Aceh by maintaining the special autonomy status of the province and allowing the participation of independent candidates and local parties in local politics. TheslowprocessofconflictsettlementinPosoandMalukumayhavealessonto learn from the Acehnese experience. However, it is worth noting that there is alsoadifferencebetween,ontheonehand,Aceh,and,ontheotherhand,Poso
63
and Maluku. The Acehneseness seems likely to be a territorial and political identity rather than an ethnic or religious identity promoting the spirit of separatism as in the case of Poso and Maluku. Accordingly, conditions for conflict settlement that could be put forward to these two conflicttorn areas should not be merely based on the ethnic and religious framework. Another majordifferenceisthatpossibilitiestolocaldemocratstoestablishlocallybased politicalorganisationsislimitedasaresultofdominationbynationalpartiesand elites who are in close collaboration with capital interests and some sections within the armed forces (Aditjondro 2006). Efforts to negotiate for peace and subsequentinitiativesforcooperationwereregardedfarfrombeingtransparent andaccountabletothepublic,includingcivilsocietyorganisations(ibid.). Should efforts for making democracy in Aceh meaningful move forwards, there is a good cause for optimism with regard to the future of Indonesia as a nation. Local process of democracyamong others, special autonomy, participation of local parties, and independent candidatesshould be regarded as affirmative contribution to the process of democracy on a nationalscale. PoliticalCitizenshipisPossible The 20032004 Survey indicated that circumstances, surrounding the advance,andtheretreat,ofdemocracyarecomparativelysimilaringeographical spread, be it in Sumatra, Java and Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Eastern Indonesia. Prodemocracy actors of these regions seemed to be coming across problems, options, and situations similar to each other. Despite some dissimilarity in findings obtained from Aceh and Papua, Indonesian democracy, as concluded by Demos, had been in a good shape within a countrywide politicalframework. Similar situation is also evident from the 2007 Survey despite each region producing different picture. The average index of the instruments of democracyinJavaandBalistandsoutasthemostprominent,indicatingabetter democraticsituationcomparedtootherregions.Inaddition,whiletheaverage index of the instruments in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Eastern Indonesia are relatively comparable, Sulawesi appears to be lower than the others. This may partly reflect the fragile conditions brought by conflicts that once occurred in some parts of the island, such as in Poso in Central Sulawesi. Comparatively speaking, the average index for all regions (Table 4.3) sees an improvement as contrastedwiththeprevioussurvey.Therearealsoindicationsthatdemocracy continuesgenerallywithinasimilarsettinginallregions.
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Table4.3.Averageindexoftheinstrumentsofdemocracy:Regionaland national
NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 Region Sumatra JawaandBali Kalimantan Sulawesi EasternIndonesia National Averageindex 2003/04 36 37 42 36 35 37 Averageindex 2007 47 53 45 38 43 46
In a countrywide political framework, the presence of civic political communityiscrucial.The2007Surveyrevealsastrongtendencyinwhichpeople made their identification as Indonesian residents during the 2004 General Election.Partyaffiliationsimilarlyformedanimportantbasisforidentification.In contrary,associationswithreligiousandethnicgroupswerecomparativelylow. Table4.4.Informantsassessmentofpeoplesidentityin2004general elections
NO PEOPLESIDENTITYIN2004GENERALELECTIONS PERCENT 35 12 7 8 5 24 8 1 AsaresidentsofIndonesiaingeneral 2 Asresidentsoftheircitydistrict/province 3 Asresidentsoftheirvillageand hamlet(dusun) 4 Asmembersoftheirethniccommunity 5 Asmembersoftheirreligiouscommunity 6 Asmembers/supportersoftheirpoliticalparty 7 Asmembersoftheirsocialclass Percentagesbasedonnumberofinformants(N=903).
AssumingIndonesia,politicalparty,andsocialclassbeingthesourceof identification as representing consciousness of nationallybound political community,Table4.4indicatesthat66%ofinformantsassessedIndonesiabeing apoliticalframeworkforvotersduringthe2004Election.Incontrast,therewere only13%ofinformantsconfirmingthatpeopletendedtoidentifythemselvesas membersofreligiousorethniccommunity.Inshort,theElectionappearstohave beenquitesuccessfulinfosteringcitizensidentificationsofIndonesianity. Another research by Demos conducted in 2006 and 2007 aimed at reflecting the experience of prodemocracy actors involved in local elections (Demos 2008) reveals that direct local elections have opened up opportunities foralternativeactorstogainpoliticalpositions.Atalocalelectionin2005inthe DistrictofSerdangBedagaiofNorthSumatraProvince,acandidatewithactivist background succeeded to gain support from the constituents of peasant and labour networks. A local election in the District of East Belitung of Bangka
65
BelitungProvince,heldin2005,waswonbyanalternativeactor,whohadbeen acampaignerforthefulfilmentofbasicneedsoflocalpeople.IntheDistrictof Manggarai of East Nusa Tenggara Province, an alternative actor was also successfulinalocalelectionin2005forhisdoortodoorapproach.Inspiteof some successes, social movements remain ironically fragmented. The research, therefore,recommendstheneedtoorganisethebasisofsocialmovementsinto a mutuallyagreed joint platform to challenge the political monopoly of the powerfulelite. Secondly, the religionbased identity is not as prominent as the ethnicallybased identity. Moreover, in the context of conflict, the latter (36%) appearstobemoreessentialthantheformer(12%).Inaddition,thosewhosaw socialclasstobecentralremained higherthan thosestatingreligionmattered. Therefore, conflicts in Poso or Ambon being arguably motivated by religious grounds may not conform the finding and had been possibly caused by accumulated resentment among ethnic groups and social classes overlapping withgroupingsbasedonreligiousdiversity. Tendency toward making identification in nationallyset political frameworkmayhaveacontributiontomaintainingtheintegrationofIndonesia as a political society. The use of jargons and symbols referring to ethnic or religiousaffiliationbypartiesandmassorganisationsatlocallevelis,ofcourse, acceptable without risking the equality of civil and political rights within the national political framework. Indonesia is not the only society in the world experiencingdiverseethniccompositionandreligiousidentities.Theexperience oftheIndianstateofKeralaisanexampleinwhichdemocracyandhumanrights arecelebratedbypeoplewithdifferentculturalbackgroundsandidentities.The historicstruggleagainstthecastesystemandthefascistdominationduringthe colonialera arebasedonthefactthatmostsocioreligiousreformmovements (alsoattherootsofthedynamicsofcivilsocietyinthestate)mostlydemanded equalityofcivilandpoliticalrightsforallcitizens.Strugglingfortheinterestsor rightsforthebenefitofoneparticulargroupisrare. Withthisinmind,itshouldbenotedthatthebestavailablewaywithin ademocraticpoliticalframeworkistheopeningofdemocraticpoliticalspheres atlocallevel.Yet,thisdoesnotmeanthattherewouldbenoobstacles.Firstly, thedatashowsthat40%ofinformantsbelievedthatpeoplewerenotinterested in politics.12This means that the existing political space may become a playing ground solely dominated by the powerful elite. The experience of Aceh, however, shows that once the local political system is demonopolised, by allowing local parties and independent candidates, people tend to develop
12
SeeTableB.2.inAppendix.
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enthusiasmandinterestindemocraticpolitics.Aseparate2006SurveyonAceh byDemos(2007)indicatesthatonly15%ofinformantsbelievedthatpeoplehad little interest in politics. Secondly, most informants (83%) also argued that peopletendedtoconsiderpoliticsasastruggletotakeover,andtomanipulate, the power, for which it is strictly the business of the elite. Only 14% of informants believed that people considered politics as a form of public control over public matters. This indicates that most people take elites monopoly in politicsforgranted.Inaddition,inspiteofpromotinggopoliticsactionstopro democracyactiviststopreventpoliticaldominationbytheeliteandmaintaining theNGOsdomainofactivitiesofstrengtheningcivilsociety,itisalsoimportant toencouragecitizentobuildupawarenessofinclusiveness,withoutwhichcivil society organisations would potentially fall into sectarianism often used by the powerfulelitetoadvocatetheirnarrowmindedvestedinterests.13 Conclusions Whatconclusionscouldbedrawnfromthisdiscussion? First, the still strenghtening sentiments of ethnicity (compared to religion) andputradaerahissuecontinuetoindicatethatIndonesiaisnotyetfullya country basedonnationhood.Should such conditionscontinue todevelop, there is a high risk that Indonesia will disintegrate into ethnically and religiouslybasedpoliticalcommunities.Thepotentialforconflictcausedby ethnicity and religious sentiments as well as feelings of regionalism are symptomaticofaseriousnationhoodproblem. Second, the expression of Indonesianity becomes prominent in 2004 GeneralEelection,stronglypointingtotheexistenceofafunctionedpolitical community. Still, this is not a necessary indication, that all is well with the citizenshipsituation. Third, the rise of a widespread political community is strongly indicated by itscrucialimportanceoftheofAcehpeaceprocess. Fourth, the organisation of democracy at local level has positively contributed to the countrywide political framework, as proven by the importantroleoflocalpartiesanddemocraticpoliticalforcesinAceh.Onthe contrary, the settlement of conflicts in Maluku and Poso was not as
A survey in New Delhi, India, shows that the people involved in civil society associations have high awareness. See Harris (2005). Civil society associations are able to promote noncivil sectarian interest. Derivedfromdiversebackgrounds,thecivicassociationscansometimesbeusedtopromotetheinterestsof oneofsocialgroupsthatistheoppositeofothergroupsfornondemocraticpurpose,SeeHefner(2007).Also see Nordholt and Sidel (2004) who investigates the development of various local politics, including those in Indonesia.
13
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successfulgiventheabsenceofdemocratictransparency,demonopolisation of the political system and, thus, the chances to build a democratic local politicalpower.Thecentralorientedapproachappliedtothesettlementof theconflictsinPosoandMalukumayevenhavecausedadditionalproblems, such as corruption, violence and intimidation by local business interested and factions within the military. As the experience of Aceh suggests, it is necessarytoopenuplocalanddemocraticpoliticalspaces. Fifth,closedlocalpoliticalspacescausepeopletobecomeeasilyentrapped in religious, ethnic and regional sentiments, thus facilitating conflicts. Poso andMalukuarecasesinpoint.Itiscorrectthatsociologicallythepeoplein PosoandMalukuaremorediversethaninAceh,andthat,therefore,people think that conflict settlement in that region is more difficult; and that is exactly where the problem lies. Endeavours to resolve a conflict without openingnewpoliticalspacesatlocallevelisahurdletoprocess.Thecaseof AcehhasproventhattheopeningofpoliticalspacesenabledtheIndonesian government and the Aceh nationalist movement (including GAM but also otherorganisations)tolinktheirinterestsandoptforthetransformationof anarmedconflictintoademocraticpoliticalframework.Therefore,opening up local political spaces will also bring together the interests of ethnic and religiousgroups,thuslesseningthepotentialforconflicts.
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TowardsTheConsolidationofPowerfullEliteDemocracy
ChapterFive
NurImanSubono(Demos)andWillyPurnaSamadhi(Demos) As democracy, in its formal forms, becomes a norm, actors from differentpoliticalspectrumshaveadoptedinstrumentsofdemocracyduringthe process of democratisation. Powerful actors, identified by informants as those wielding actual political and economic power, tend to use and promote the instruments of democracy more than in the past. While the 20032004 Survey suggestthatonly50%oftheseactorstendedtouseandpromote,oronlyuse, theinstruments,the2007Surveyshowsthatthenumberincreasedsignificantly. According to the informants, thirtysix percent of powerful actors used the instrumentsofdemocracy,whileanother35%usedandpromotedthem. How shall we understand these complex dynamics? Despite, on the hand, most democratic rights and freedoms persist, democratic governance improves, and standards of free and fair elections remain high, on the other hand, several basic freedoms have deteriorated. Indexes related to representationareamongtheworstofthemeansofdemocracy.Worstofallis the freedom to form parties at national or local level (including independent candidates). In public discourse, strong opinions against democracy, dubbed as Western concept, hence, incompatible with local cultures, are being voiced. In addition,democracyframedelection,forinstance,isbelievedtoenablemoney politics to grow and to cause conflicts. We shall observe some of the aspects relatedtothecapacityofpowerfulactorswithregardtotheongoingprocessof democratisation. The2007Surveysuggestsfivemajorcharacteristics.Firstiscontinued consolidationofthepowerfulactorsandtheirdominationinorganisedpolitics, especially in the representation system. Second is the elite becoming much larger from the one that supported Soeharto. A majority of the powerful elite identifiedbyinformantsatthelocalcontextwheretheymadetheirwaythrough electoral politics, even, to the extent that business people had become politicians. Third is local powerful actors committing abuses in draining public resources. Fourth is their cynicism and lack of trust toward the work of democracy. This also comes from the liberal educated middle class and upper elitewhohavefailedtowinelections.Fifthisthespreadingideaofsequencing
69
democracy, referring to the development of institutions to lay basis for rules andregulationsbeforepeoplesparticipation. ColonisingDemocracy With regard to the instruments, the 20032004 Survey and the 2007 Survey clearly shows contrasting pictures. The 20032004 Survey reveals high numbersofactorsconsideredtohavemanipulatedorbypassedtheinstruments. Table 5.1 below shows the shift in the relation of powerful actors with the instrumentsofdemocracy. Table5.1.Powerfulactorrelationswiththe11categoriesofinstrumentsof democracy
CATEGORYOF INSTRUMENTSOF DEMOCRACY Powerfulactorrelationswiththeinstitutionsofdemocracy AVOIDOROPT USEAND USEAND USE FOR PROMOTE MANIPULATE ALTERNATIVES 2003 2003/ 2003 2003 (2) (2) (2) (2) 2007 2007 2007 2007 (1) (1) (1) (1) /04 04 /04 /04 (%ofpowerfulactors) 18 44 30 31 35 19 14 6
NO
Equalcitizenship International law and UN 2 10 31 32 40 28 13 17 16 HRinstruments 3 Ruleoflawandjustice 12 32 22 35 41 23 19 10 4 Civilandpoliticalrights 15 39 27 34 37 18 15 9 Economic and social 5 14 36 28 35 36 19 15 10 rights 6 Freeandfairelections 17 35 35 36 26 23 9 6 7 Goodrepresentation 7 28 22 39 20 22 5 11 Democraticand 8 accountable 13 31 25 33 36 25 19 11 Government Freedom of media, press 9 17 35 34 39 31 18 11 8 andacademicfreedoms Additionalcivilpolitical 10 12 30 33 40 30 18 12 12 Participation 11 Directparticipation 15 33 29 36 35 18 13 13 Average 16 34 33 36 36 20 15 10 (1) (2) N=1.795; N=1890;Allfiguresareinpercentagesbasedonnumberofeachcategoryofmainactorsineach survey.
Ingeneralterms,thenumberofpowerfulactorstendingtomanipulate and bypass the instruments of democracy is significantly different from the number of those who generally opt to use and promote the instruments. If added,thenumberofpowerfulactorsusingandpromotingdemocracyisinthe order of 71%. With such a picture, it is no longer suitable to say that the
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dominant elites hinder democracy or even show antidemocracy attitudes, as theycommonlydidintheNewOrderorintheearlydaysofReformasi.Yet,the data have to be carefully interpreted in order to make produce basis for the assumption about democracy being won. At this point, it is safe to say that democracyhasbecomethemostcommonoption. Although the table above clearly shows a general positive development,fourpointsneedparticularattention.Firstly,thedatashowsthat the instruments of democracy related to good representation are insufficiently promoted, if not low (only by 29% of powerful actors), as compared to other instruments. In addition, the 20032004 Survey also features a rather similar trend(7%).Bothsurveysindicatethatpowerfulactorstendtouse,ratherthan to promote, these instruments. Secondly, the instruments related to representationarethemostmanipulatedandneglectedbymainactors(21and 11%,or32%overall).Comparedto the dataofthe20032004Survey,trendof powerful actors manipulating and bypassing representation is increasing in recent survey. Thirdly, the powerful actors tend to have interest in forms of direct participation. Interestingly, they seem to promote forms of direct representationasitisshownbytheirrelationswithinstrumentsrelatedtogood representation. This shows that powerful actors prefer using less organised forms of representation rather than improving a systematic political representation. Nonetheless, informants assessed that the condition of representation remained poor. Fourthly, the average proportion of powerful actors tending to manipulate and bypass the instruments of democracy in the 2007 Survey is quite large (19% and 10%, or 29% overall). The proportion of powerful actors seeking alternatives outside of the instruments of democracy did not rapidly decrease as compared to the results of the previous survey, namelyfrom15%to10%.Thisisprobablyaclearindicationoftheexistenceof old powerful elites within the ranks of the powerful actors. It is, however, necessary to add that an analysis has been made of the grim picture of democratisation in Indonesia as elites are breaking up.14Some experts also conclude that old elites, either bureaucrats, politicians and business people, havereturnedtodominatetheIndonesianpoliticsthroughsomeadjustmentsor repositioning of their roles and positions. 15 In spite of those analyses or explanations, there are strong signs of that political monopolisation by the oligarchy, both at national and local level, is taking place. A research by Gerry
14 15
See,Crouch(1994). See,forexampleHadiz(2003).
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vanKlinkenshowsthatdemocratisationhadenabledlocalelitestoemergeand rise.16Hisclaim,tosomeextent,hassupportedfindingsmadebyDemos. Elite groups are more broadlybased, more localised, and less militarized than under Soeharto. Remarkably, most have managed to adjust to thenew,supposedlydemocratic,institutions.Thisisnottosaythatabusesare absent,butdecentralisationandelectionshaveenableddiversesectionsofthe countryselitetomobilisepopularsupport,moreoften,bycallingupclientelistic networks,privilegedcontrolofpublicresources,andallianceswithbusinessand communal leaders. Yet, the interest of such elites in elections is both a crucial basisofexistingdemocracyanditsmajordrawback.Withouttheelitessupport, Indonesiasdemocracywouldhavenotsurvivedand,now,becomesthedomain ofrottenpoliticiansprosperedbyrampantcorruption. Inalltheserespects,IndonesiamaythusbegintoresembleIndia,the moststabledemocracyintheglobalSouth.Onebigdifference,however,isthat Indonesias monopolistic party and election system is not inclusive of major interestsamongthepeopleatlargeandalsoerecthighbarrierstoparticipation by independent players. This prevents civic and popular organisations from enteringorganisedpolitics.ItisinthisrespectthatIndonesiastillseriouslylags behind. TheCompositionAndThePresenceOfExtendedDemocraticElite It is possible that the failure to to improve representation is made possiblebythedominanceoftheelites.Thismeansthatthesituationamongthe powerfulactorshasnotsignificantlychanged. Based on the identification of informants in the 2007 Survey, actors with state and organised political backgrounds, such as bureaucrats and government officials, politicians and parliamentarian, constitute the biggest proportion of the powerful actors, 70% of all. The number increases quite rapidly, compared to the composition in the20032004Survey,whichwasless than60%.
16
SeevanKlinken(2002).Therefore,accordingtovanKlinken,itisalsoimportanttoobservehowpoliticswork forthepeopleinIndonesiaingeneral,besidetheelitesbehaviorinnationallevel.Itmeans,itisnotenoughto observethosewhohavepowerinnationallevel,butalsothoseinlocallevel,wheremostIndonesianpeople liveandwork.
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Table5.2.TheCompositionofpowerfulactorsbasedonthe2007and2003/04 surveys(1)
NO POWERFUL/DOMINATACTORS 2003/04 (N=1.795) 2007 (N=1.945) (percent) 1 Government/Bureaucracy 40 46 2 Politicalpartiesandparliamentmembers(central+local) 17 22 3 Religiousorethnicgroupsandadatcouncils 12 8 4 Policeandmilitary;underworldandmilitia 16 7 5 Business 12 6 6 Professionals 5 7 Others 2 5 (1) In both surveys we asked the informants to identify to 3 actors considered to have actual and powerful politicalpower.Allofthenumbersshowthepercentagebasedonthenumberofactorsineachsurvey.
Apart from identifying actors with state and organised politics background,Table5.2alsoreveals,atleast,twoshiftsinthecompositionofthe actors. Firstly, as compared to the result of 20032004 Survey, coercive actors (policeandmilitary,aswellasmilitias)inthe2007Surveyarenolongerassessed aspowerfulandpowerfulactorsinthepoliticalprocess.Theproportionofactors fromthiscategorywas16%intheprevioussurvey.Thefiguredeclinesto7%in the recent survey. This may indicate that the process of democratisation is runningonthebasisofcivilandpoliticalfreedoms.However,theclaimdoesnot seem to conform with the score index for instruments related to civil and political rights, which falls from 56 to 54. One instrument, that is the transparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryandpolicetoelectedgovernment and the public, is even ranking lowest in the list of the instruments of democracy. The decline in percentage of coercive forces being assessed as powerful actors should, therefore, be interpreted with utmost care as these forcesmaystillbenotdemocratic.Infact,theinfluenceandroleoftheseforces remainssignificant. Secondly,shiftinthecompositionofpowerfulactorstakesplaceinthe form of declining proportion of actors with business background. As seen in Table5.2,thepercentageofthiscategorydropsfrom12%to6%ofallpowerful actors identified by informants. The spread of powerful actors combined with thefactthat theyareidentified mostly throughtheiractivitiesduringelections andingovernmentoffices,inturn,reducethespaceforbusinesspeople.Inspite of business actors remain very powerful, there is an indication that they are increasingly dependent on political practices dominated by actors within government,bureaucracy,andpoliticalparties.Moreover,anumberofbusiness people have even made transformation into political career as in the case of SoetrisnoBachirofPartaiAmanatNasional(PAN/NationalMandateParty).
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Thirdly, assessments of informants in some regions show similar compositionofpowerfulactors,whichisnolongerprofoundlyrelatedtomilitary figuresorthoseusingcoercivemeans.Thepowerfulelitesexistbothatlocaland national levels, triggered by the implementation of decentralisation and local elections. Slightlydifferentfromthe20032004Survey,therecentsurveyfound that the oligarchy does not grow on top of a perfect monopoly. Data from the 2007Surveyshowsthatthealternativeactorshavemanagedtoenterthearena previously being the domain of the dominant elites, such as in parliament and government. As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, there are strong signalsfromthealternativeactorsintendingtomakedemocracytheonlyoption. Indoingso,theyhavecommittedinanumberofpoliticalactionscharacterised by direct representation. Although direct representation is less organised and less democratic in term of participation and controlmore like a shortcut, the alternative actors have succeeded in gaining positions in parliament and in the executivepositions. Nonetheless, political monopoly by the powerful actors remains prominent,asstatedbyinformantsontheexistenceoftheseactorsinavariety of political spheres and arenas. The powerful actors were assessed to be present, more than by the alternative actors, in most arenas: political parties, bureaucracy, government offices, business, as well as armed forces and police force.Itisonlyinlobbyinggroupsandinterestorganisationsthatthepresenceof theseactorswerelessprominentthanthealternativeactors.17 The monopolisation of powerful actors is evident in the comparison betweenthetwosurveys.Activitiesofpowerfulactorsgainmoreprominencein political parties (including parliament) and in government. At the same time, alternative actors also show similar interest in taking part in the spheres. Therefore,thearenasareconsideredtobethemoststrategicdomainforboth groupsofactors.Activitiesofpowerfulactorsinnonprofitorganisations,armed forces,andpoliceforce, however,showaconsiderabledecline. Thesedataare consistentwiththedecliningtrendofgroupswithnonpoliticalorganisationand military backgrounds within the powerful actor group. Table 5.3 shows a comparisonoftheresultsoftherecentandprevioussurveysinareaswherethe powerfulactorsarepresentandpowerful.
Accordingtoourinformants,lobbygroupasassessedby21%oftheinformantsandinterestorganisation according to 28% of our informants are the most important political spheres and arena for alternative actors.
17
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Table5.3.Powerfulactorsareasofactivities
NO AREASOFPOWERFULACTORSACTIVITIES 1 Businessandindustry(incl.smallbusiness) 2 Selfmanagednonprofitunits 3 Lobbygroups 4 Interestorganisations (3) 5 Politicalparties 6 Electedgovernment (4) 12 7 Thebureaucracy 8 Thejudiciary 9 Militaryandpolice 9 (1) Allinformantsareaskedtoassesstwomostimportantareasandarenasforeachpowerfulactor. (2) Intheprevioussurvey,weusedslightlydifferentcategory (3) Intheprevioussurvey,weusedthecategoryofparliament (4) Intheprevioussurvey,weusedthecategoryofotherstateinstitutionsoutsidemilitaryandparliament Allpercentagesarebasedonthenumberofresponsesprovidedbyinformants.Inthe2007survey,informants wereaskedtoselecttwomostimportantareaswherepowerfulactorsareactive,whileintheprevioussurvey, three. 2003/04 (%) 17 25 n/a n/a 12
(1)
2007 (%) 13 2 9 14 21 17 19 3 3
(2)
Thepowerfulactorsstilldemonstrateatendencytodominatepolitics. The escalation of their presence in parliament and government may be a responsetoeffortsbyalternativeactorstogainaccesstothetwoinstitutions.It ispossiblethatthepowerfulactorsallowedalternativeactorstouselobbying groups and interest organisations, considered to be less strategic than parliamentandgovernmentoffices.Yet,asTable5.3shows,thepowerfulactors didnotconsiderlobbygroupsandinterestorganisationslessimportant. SourcesofPowerandHowTheyBecomeLegitimate Wehavelongknownthatthethreepillarsofpowerofpowerfulactors are connections or networks, economic resources, and mass power, including the use of violence. With the power of their interpersonal networks, they establish from strong intraelite alliances, including with businesses, to the exclusionof other partiesinpolitics.Therelianceofbusinesssectoron politics and their vast access to sources of public funds provide unlimited funding for their political manoeuvres. That is the reason for powerful actors easily establishingavarietyoforganisationstogathermasssupportforamobilisation to achieve their own political goals. Moreover, powerful actors also do not neglecthcontroloverthemassmedia. The data of the 20032004 Survey indicated domination by powerful actorsoverfoursourcesofpoweralreadymentioned.Accordingtoinformants assessmentatthetime,thedominationofthepowerfulactorswasdistributed evenlythroughoutthefoursourcesofpowerwithslightemphasisonthepower
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over personal networks. The 2007 Survey also indicates a relatively even distributioninthedominationofpowerfulactorsoverthefoursourcesofpower. Thedifferenceliesinthefactthat powerfulactorstendedtorelyonmassand political power, including potential coercion. As many as 33% of informants, when asked to assess the main sources of power of these actors, answered in that direction. In the 20032004 Survey, the figure was only 22%. The percentageofnetworkandinterpersonalcontactresourcesdecreasesfrom38% to 28%. In addition, the proportion for economic and information resources remainsrelativelystagnantat25%and13%inthe2007Surveyand23%and17% inthe20032004Survey.18 The data may indicate several points. Firstly, the even distribution of powerfulactorsdominationoversourcesofpowerreflectsalargepotentialfor monopolistic and oligarchic practices in democratic political institutions they dominate. Secondly, the threat to civil and political freedoms may be closely relatedtoatrendwhichshowsthepowerfulactorsdependenceonpoliticaland masspowerresources,includingcoercion.Thirdly,althoughtheestablishmentof various organisations to enlist mass support is a method of building political power,itseemsthatpowerfulactorsonlyuseitforthepurposeofmobilisation ratherthanforabasisfordemocraticallyorganisedpolitics.Therefore,thedata mayexplainthestagnationofinstrumentsrelatedtopoliticalrepresentation. Inaddition,powerfulactorsappeartohavechangedtheirapproachto political power by shifting to formal and democratic methods, with which powerful actors use their capacity to make connection with the politicians and government officials at various levels as well as with other figures. Their participation to elections has also been made possible by the use of the methods. Findings from the 2007 Survey indicates that the methods had been employedmorethanwhatresultedinthe20032004Survey.19 Thedataonthesourcesofpowerusedbythealternativeactorsseems to confirm three points made above. On the one hand, the alternative actors tend to show their power over sources of information and knowledge, numbering 37% in the 2007 Survey and 36% in the 20032004 Survey. On the other hand, they, as assessed by informants, tend to abandon the need to supporteconomicresources.Inrecentsurvey,economicresourcesonlynumber 10%ofthecompositionoftheirsourcesofpower. While the sources of power represent capital in Bourdieus (1997) sense, they would only be actual when transformed. The following table
18 19
SeeAppendix. SeeAppendix.
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illustrates the methods often employed by powerful actors to transform their sourcesofpower: Table5.4.Howthepowerfulactorstransformpower
WaysofTransformation By providing discursive activities within the public sphere through seminars, discussion, hearings 2 Byprovidingcontactsanddialoguewithpoliticiansandadministratorsatvariouslevels 3 Byprovidingandbuildingnetworksandcoordinationforjointactivity 4 Bycreatingcontactsandpartnershipwithpowerfulfiguresandexperts 5 Bybeingabletodemonstratecollectiveandmassbasedstrength 6 Bygeneratingeconomicselfsufficiency,selfhelpactivities,cooperatives,etc 7 By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and or the formal executive organsthestate 8 By making use of various means of forceful official authority, coercion, demonstration of powerandforceaswellasthegenerationoffear 9 By using state and government budgets other resources and regulations to the benefit of promarketpoliciesandvariousactorsonthemarket 10 By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to, for instance social groups, communities, civil society organisations (including NGOs)aswellastobusinessmen,relativesandotherindividuals 11` Byorganisingsupportwithincommunities 12 Byorganisingsupportwithincommunities PercentagesarebasedonthenumberofInformantsresponses NO 1 2007(%) 11 17 7 13 5 2 12 7 8 5
6 6
Table5.4demonstratesthatpowerfulactorsoftenusedlobby,contacts andnetworks(48%)totransformtheirsourcesofpower.Inaddition,theyalso employed more formal ways through elections and legitimacy through state institutions (18%). It is obvious here that the elites are more eloquent in their political manoeuvres, confirming a better relation between them and the instruments of democracy. In fact, they are more prepared to leave non democraticways,suchascoercionandshowsofforce(8%). ThePoliticsofImage Changesunderlinedbeforehaveinevitablyshiftedthestyleofpolitical communication employed by the powerful actors. Language and terms to promote issues previously only common amongst the prodemocracy activists arenowcarryingsomeweight.Powerfulactorsarenoweloquentintheissuesof human rights, democracy and good governance. Yet, the actors have not yet adequately fought for such issues in the way the alternative actors have. Data indicatesthatissueofhumanrightsonlyamountedto3%ofallissuesadvocated by the powerful actors. This is in contrary to the proportion of human rights issuespromotedbythealternativeactors,whichwas11%.Issuesofdemocracy,
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civil and political rights amounted to 10% of all issues nurtured by powerful actors.Yet,thenumberremainedlowwhenthealternativeactorsrecorded20%. Issues of good governance and anticorruption accounted for 13% of all issues raisedbythepowerfulactors,whilealternativeactorsrecorded15%. It is, however, reasonable for the powerful actors to take up such issues,astheyneedtobroadentheirpoliticalmonopolyinpublicarenas.Atotal relianceondifferentsourcesofpowerisconsideredtobenolongersufficientto conformwithdemocracybeingnowtherulesofthegame.Inotherwords,the moredemocraticthemesonedeliverstothepublic,themoreheorsheisableto create a selfimage of being a democrat. Thus, for the powerful actors, democratisation is also about the politics of image. The politics is aimed at maintaining their presence and popularity in public arenas in order to defend their oligarchic power and power monopoly. In spite of promoting democracy, the powerful actors, assessed by informants, were reluctant to raise certain issues.Asmanyas41%ofallissuesonhumanrightsbythepowerfulactorsonly coveredgeneralthemes,whileonly19%coveredspecificissuesofhumanrights violations.Subscribingtothegeneralthemesofhumanrightsisprobablymore advantageousforthepurposeofimagecreation. Table5.5.Typeofissuesandinterestsstruggledforbymainactors
NO CONTENTOFINTERESTS,ISSUES, PLATFORMSANDORPOLICIES TYPEOFISSUES/INTERESTS/POLICIES COMBINATION SPECIFIC OFSEVERAL (1) RESPONSE ISSUESOR ISSUES/ INTERESTS INTERESTS (%) (%) 31 22 48 13 11 10(1) 28 28 28(61) 44 46 40(21)
(2)
GENERAL CONCEPTS ORIDEAS 30 28 26 32(18)
1 2 3 4
5 10 27 45 28 6 10 26 46 28 7 6 29 40 31 8 3 35 45 20 9 3 19 40 41 TOTAL 100 26 45 29 (1) Indicates the proportion of issues the powerful actors struggle for. The percentage is based on the total numberofanswersprovidedbytheinformants. (2) Indicates the proportion of type of issues the powerful actors struggle for. The percentage refers to the numberofinformantsselectingtheissuesinquestions. (3) Thenumbersinbracketsreferstogenderissue.
Economicdevelopmentoriented Good governance, anticorruption, rule of law Religiousandethnicvalues,morality,conflict andconflictreconciliation Democracy and civilpolitical rights (and (3) genderissues) Decentralisationandlocalautonomy Publicservices,basicneeds,socialsecurity Nationalism,integration,nationalsecurity Sustainabledevelopment,environment Humanrights
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Table 5.5 shows a trend by powerful actors to raise the issues of economicdevelopment.Inaddition,theissuesofgoodgovernance,ruleoflaw, and democracy are those most promoted by powerful actors. This provides an impression that powerful actors are attempting to show that they are a main elementofdemocratisationprocess. Althoughthepowerfulactorstendtofocustheirattentiontotheissues of economic development, they do not seem to make intensive effort in advocating the more actual public issues and interests, namely public services and the provision of peoples basic commodities. The advocacy of economic development by the powerful actors may have improved the macro economy indicators. At the local level, the implementation of decentralisation and regionalautonomyalongwiththecallforagoodgovernancehaveencouraged localgovernmentstoproduceformalrulesandregulationsaimingatimproving publicservices,particularlytheprovisionoffreeeducationandhealthservices. However,theimplementationandthelegislationofeconomicdevelopmentare often going to different directions. It is in this context that we can understand thefindingsdiscussedinearlierchapterabouttheimprovementofinstruments related to social, economy and cultural rights improving but with poor actual condition. Theabovediscussiononthewaypowerfulactorscommunicateissues andinterestsconfirmsthetendencytowardthepoliticsofimage.Asassessedby informants,makingmediaappearanceisapreferredmethodfortheseactors. MobilisationandOrganisation Another method employed more by powerful actors than the alternative actors is the use of organisation, being not only effective to build imagesbutalsotomobiliseorganisationalsupport.Itislikelythatintheimage politics process, powerful actors tend to use organisations to mobilise support ratherthantoestablisharealorganisationasthebasisforpoliticalpower. In comparison with the findings from the 20032004 Survey in which the powerful actors considered the establishment of systematic organisations important to mobilise support, the 2007 survey shows that they apply less organisationalmethodstomobilisesupport.Accordingtotheinformantsinthe 20032004 Survey, in regard with methods of mobilizing power by powerful actors, 33% referred to organisational methods. In the 2007 survey, however, the number declined to 11%. However, mobilisation methods depending on charismatic and popular figures remains important as indicated in an increase from14%inthe20032004Surveyto30%inthe2007survey.
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The following table illustrates methods of mobilisation by powerful actors: Table5.6.MobilisationMethodsofPowerfulActor
No MethodofMobilisation 2003/04(%) 2007(%) 1 Popularandcharismaticleaders 14 30 2 Clientilism 26 28 3 Alternativepatronage 9 10 4 Networksamongindependentactors 15 22 5 integrationofpopularorganisationsintomoregeneralorganisations* 33 11 Percentageisbasedonthenumberofinformantsresponses.Everyinformantisallowedtoselecttwooptions atthemost. * Inthe2003/04surveythemethodofintegrationpopularorganisationsintomoregeneralorganisationswas categorized into three, (a) nonprogrammatic political machines (16), (b) federative networks (7), and (c) comprehensiveorganisationunifyingsimilarperspectives(10).
Demos finds that powerful actors tend to use hierarchical connection as well as ethnicity and religion based approaches. The finding indicates that powerfulactorsaredominatedbyactorswithgovernmentandorganisedpolitics backgrounds who use the structure of government administration to organise the masses. As powerful actors tend to underplay organisations, then the only remaining hierarchical relationship is the government structure. The strong trend of powerful actors to use ethnic and religious approaches, as well as descriptive groups, shows a lack of organisational capacity on their part. Both organisational methods depend on the division of the society and need no organisationalskills. TheConsolidationofElite,UnwillingnessforRepresentation The following section discusses the capacity of powerful actors with regard to their consolidation complete consolidation as assessed by our informants. The first aspect with regard to the powerful actors capacity to undertake consolidation is the establishment of alliances. It is believed that powerfulactorstendtoplaydownotheractorsinalliancestheysetupamongst themselves.Asassessedbyinformants,28%ofthealliesofthepowerfulactors are politicians and parliamentarians both at local and central level. Moreover, other important and reliable allies are government officials and bureaucracy (21%).Powerfulactorsarealsoconnectedwithbusinesses,professionalgroups, as well as ethnic and religious groups, including traditional communities, in oligarchic relations. Such relations Business, community groups and powerful actorsenjoyasymbioticrelationship,exchanginginterestsamongthemselves.
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The following Table 5.7 depicts parties with whom powerful actors establishtheiralliances. Tabel5.7.Powerfulactorsalliances
Response(1) (%) 1 PoliticalpartiesandParliament(centralandlocal) 28 2 Government/Bureaucracy(inclsemistatebodies) 21 3 Religiousorethnicgroups;Adatcouncilsetc. 13 4 NGOsandmassorganisations 12 5 Business 10 6 Academicians,thejudiciary/lawfirms,media 9 7 Policeandmilitary;Underworldandmilitia 7 (1) Allpercentagesarebasedonthenumberofresponsesgivenbytheinformants.Eachinformant wasaskedtonamethreealliancesatthemost,foreachpowerfulactor. No Actorswithwhompowerfulactorsbuildalliances
Incontrary,itisinterestingtoobservethatatendencytoformalliances withthemilitaryandthepolice,includingwithhoodlums,isunlikely.Only6%of informantsassessedthepossibilityofsuchalliances.However,thedatadoesnot necessarilyindicateadeclininginvolvementincoercivepracticesinpolitics. The second aspect concerns the relation of powerful actors with the existing political organisations. The assessment made by informants indicated that the actors tended to have closelyknit relations with established political parties,suchaswithGolkar(40%),PDIP(17%),someIslamicparties(12%),and Partai Demokrat (PD/Democrats Party) (7%). In addition, they are also in allianceswithmassorganisations(8%),smallerparties(6%),andPartaiKeadilan Sejahtera(PKS/JusticeandWelfareParty(3%).20Theserelationswithavarietyof organisations, nonetheless, do not necessarily indicate organic relation, but, rather,moreopportunisticinnaturetomobilisethemasses. Informants also provided information on how parties and political organisationsfinancetheiractivities.Theinformationisusefulinobservingthe structureofpowerthatsupportsthepoliticalmonopolyofthepowerfulactors. The actors tend to build close relations with political parties and organisations financially supported by the government and organisations backed by business sponsorships. Bynowaclearpictureofcirclesofpowerdominatedbypowerfulelite groups is obvious. Monopoly over the political system is made possible by maintainingdominationinvariousaspects.Thefactthatpoliticalpartiesareless dependent on the contribution of candidates is probably because the relations
20
SeeAppendix.
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are less permanent and made only during election. The powerful actors within oligarchic groups seem to feel comfortable with the sharing of power while keeping the symbiotic relationship between the actors, on the one hand, and business interests and communitarian groups, on the other hand. Above all, despite their adamant efforts to maintain the oligarchy, a democratic framework could be expected to develop through the practices the powerful actorshaveappliedsofar. CapacityAndStrategiesToApproachGovernanceInstitutions The last aspect relates with powerful actors interpretation of the functionofpoliticalrepresentationindemocracy.Togatherinformationonthis issue, informants were asked to assess the maneouvers of the powerful actors within the system of government, including the private sector, to reach their politicalgoals. Powerful actors tend to use executive institutions, parliamentarians, and the bureucracy to reach their political goals. Other institutions within the system, such as the judiciary sytem, state auxiliary bodies, civil organisations, businesses,andthearmedforcesandpoliceforceareunlikelytobereliedupon. Table5.8.Institutionsusedbypowerfulactorstoreachtheirpoliticalgoals
Responses (%) 1 Thepoliticalexecutive (thegovernment) 34 2 Thelegislative(e.g.DPRD) 26 3 Thebureaucracy 15 4 Thejudiciary(incl thepolice) 8 5 Institutionsforprivatemanagement(e.g.themarket,thefamily) 5 6 Auxilliarybodiesandinstitutionforsubcontractedpublicgovernance 4 7 Themilitary 3 8 Institutionsforselfmanagement(e.g.cooperative) 3 (1) Allpercentagesbasedonthenumberofresponseprovidedbytheinformants.Eachinformantwasaskedto mentiontwoinstitutionsatthemost,foreachpowerfulactor. No Governanceinstitutionswherepowerfulactorsgo
(1)
Data on methods employed by powerful actors in making use of institutions reveals some interesting pictures. According to 34% of informants, powerfulactorsmakedirectuseofinstitutionswithoutinvolvingmediators.The dataclearlyrevealsthatthedominationofactorswithpoliticalorganisationand government backgrounds withinthepowerfulactorgroupgivesthemaspecial privilege to use the institutions to attain their political goals. The powerful actors still use mediators as gobetween, and 26% of informants reported that political parties are the preferred mediating institutions. Other institutions are
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lobbying groups, interest organisations, and mass media (911%). Considering thatactorswithpoliticalpartyandparliamentbackgroundsaredominantinthe composition of powerful actors, the findings on the most used mediating institutionsconfirmstheirdomination. There is no other interpretation of these data except that they are evidenceofacrisisofrepresentation.Democracyworksunderthedominationof oligarchic groups monopolising politics. Therefore, promoting representation is the most urgent item on the agenda. It is also found that political work in organisational framework has declined even among the powerful actors. The publicisnomorethanamassthatisonlyworthcountingasaninstrumentfor mobilisationbythepowerfulactors.Publicneedsbecomeapoliticalcommodity. Asaresult,thiscrisisofrepresentationreceivesattentionfromthepeoplewho, atthesametime,becomemoreinterestedinpolitics,makingdemocracytobe underpublicscepticism.Peoplebeginstoblamedemocracyasthecauseofthe socioeconomy crisis and mass riots in some local elections. Some people are evenentrappedintheromanticismofNewOrderstability. ThePoliticsofOrder:Thenextscenario Powerful actors are definitely in control of organised politics. As an illustration, data from the 2007 Survey shows that 22% of powerful actors and 14% of alternative actors worked in political parties, while 39% of powerful actorsand23%ofalternativeactorsworkinthegovernment.Whencomparing these figures with the 20032004 Survey, it becomes clear that the number of powerfulactorsworkinginpoliticalpartieshasincreasedby10%(12%)and by 13%(9%)forgovernment.Itcan, therefore,beconcluded that powerfulactors dominate and scale up their activities in political parties and government. Parliament, both at central and regional levels, political party or politicians (28%),andgovernmentwithstateauxiliaryinstitutions(23%)arethepreferred alliancepartnersofthepowerfulactors.Bycomparison,alternativeactorshave rolesinparliamentandpoliticalparties(17%)andgovernment(16%). Except in Aceh, parties without strong organisational roots partly broughtbytheSoehartolegacyalmosthaveonlyslightchancetoenterelection arena. Moreover, most issues and interests are voiced by several circles, but without civic and popular organisational power, originating from groups of professionals, liberal middle classes, urban poor, labourers, peasants, fishers, women. They are almost completely excluded from the arena of organised politics.Theirabsenceunderminesdemocracy.
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Atthispoint,itmaybejustifiedtoaskwhetherfactionswithintheelite are satisfied with the existing political arrangement described by informants. Those who have been able to expand their political role, win elections, strike favourable deals with businesses, military, executive leaders and the crucial ethnic and religious groups would find the current atmosphere satisfying. But there is also distress among other sections of the elite, particularly those who areunabletowinelections.Theymayoriginatefromtheranksofgovernment, businessorcivilorganisation.Othersaresomeelementsof middleclasswithin the elites who failed to obtain the majority of votes in elections. At the same time, disappointment from below about the ongoing political processes within Indonesiassystemofdemocracybeginstocomeintosurface. Itis,therefore,understandablethatrecentdiscourseondemocracyis dominated by claims made by the less satisfied elements within the powerful elites. Among others is that democracy is not an objective but an instrument and,therefore,canbedesignedtoservethepurposeofefficiency.Theclaimwas made explicit by Vice President Jusuf Kalla on many occasions, as well as by Surya Paloh, the Chairman of the Golkar Advisory Board. To make it clear we havequotedstatementsfromthesetwohighrankingGolkarofficials:
Democracy is merely a means, an instrument, and not an end, and therefore it can be placed in second place. (Jusuf Kalla in his political speech at theclosing ceremony of Golkars Rapimnas(National Leaders Meeting)inJakarta,25November2007(Kompas26/11/2007). Democracyisnotanend,butmerelyaninstrumenttoachievepeople welfare. Democray is useless without welfare. (Surya Paloh during the NationalMeetingofGolkardanPDIPinMedan,20June2007)(Kompas 21/6/2007).
These notions clearly represent a clash between democracy and peoples welfare. Democracy is accused of being the cause or the stumbling blockofIndonesiaspooreconomicconditions.Peopleingeneralarestillatthe stage of how to put food on their table, and not at the democratic stage.21 Although not in the same way, this idea of democracy was strongly advocated during theNew Order,under thesloganEconomic Developmentand National
Thisnotionwasadvocatedby,amongothers,HasyimMuzadi,TheChairmanofNadhatulUlama.Thepolitics ofdemocracyinlocalelections,sohesaid,arenotinbalancewithpeoplesunderstandingandknowledgeon democracy.AccordingtoMujadi,Peoplearenowthinkingofhowtheyaregoingtobeabletoeat.Peopleonly think on how to get their nine basic commodieties. They do not think on how to to implement right democracy.SeeNUonline,www.nu.or.id,HasyimUngkap4AlasanPilkadaLangsungDihapuskan,13March 2008.
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Stability. The support of some academicians and intellectuals of such idea provesitswideracceptance.22 At this stage, there are three strategies stemming from the notion of PoliticsofOrder.Firstly,thistypeofdiscourseondemocracywillinturnlimitand hindertheprogressofprodemocracymovementsandactors.Atthesametime, thediscoursesecuresthepositionsandprivilegesenjoyedbythepowerfulelites or the privileged based mostly in the countrys capital in Jakarta and the establishedmassbasedpoliticalparties.Secondly,thediscoursewillalsojustify a claim that what the people need is good governance, economic growth, the rule of law before full (liberal) democracy can actually be implemented. This leads to the third issue: who are in the best position as the driving force to advancethesepreconditionsfordemocracy.ItisclearthatIndonesiaisfarfrom the 18th and 19th century Europe with its long history of promoting liberal democracy. Indonesia is not even one of the developing states powerfully promoting development. So far Indonesia is lacking a strong and independent developmentorientedmiddleclass.ItispossiblethatIndonesiacanpromotea Malaysianstyle development but at a social cost, such as the emergence of ethnicandorreligiousbasedauthoritarianism.
Interestingly, or perhaps, ironically, some academicians and intellectuals supported such ideas, blaming democracy.See,forexampleDr.AmirSantoso(Pelita,16December2007)andRadharPancaDahana(Seputar Indonesia,19December2007).
22
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PopulistShortcutstoProgress?
ChapterSix
SyafaatunKaryadi(Demos) The 20032004 Survey discovered that prodemocracy actors were politically marginalised and floating. It, nevertheless, also pointed to a possible development potential amidst the growing democracy in Indonesia. While powerful elites could immediately consolidate themselves to monopolise and abuse the instruments of democracy, prodemocracy actors, in spite of their limitedcapacityinbuildinguptheirmassbasesandcontrollingavailablepolitical spheres,remainedatthebackside. Themarginalizationofprodemocracyactorsreflectsthefactthatthe actorstendtoworkincivilsocietyratherthaninthestateoreconomicarenas. In addition, the actors are lacking sources of power the two domains. Marginalised role also shows tendencies in which these actors work only on specific,singleissuesratherthanonacomprehensiveagenda.Theymostlyuse intervention to influence public discourse as a way to gain legitimacy and political authority instead of gaining the peoples mandate by becoming a credibleauthoritativeinstitutionstending,Theirinvolvementwithorganisations are,moreover,linkedwithtowardspopulism,clientelismandothertraditional shortcuts to mobilise support. In addition, direct democracy and abandoning instruments of representation, including the exclusion of womens perspective to develop the basis,23appear to be their preferred agenda. What are taking placeamongtheprodemocracyactors? Reformasiin1998hasraisedcitizensenthusiasminpolitics.The2007 Survey allowed 46% of informants to make assessment about people having greater interest in taking part in politics (46%). The assessment also applies to womenwhoeagerlyrespondedissuesrelatedtopolitics,24nolongerconsidered
Thereluctanceofprodemocracyactorstouseeconomicsourcesofpowerandtoengageinpoliticsisoneof the reasons the capacity of the actors remains weak. This weakness then takes effect on their strategical options to rely on their activities in civil society. A discussion on the floating and marginalization of pro democracyactorscanbereadinPriyono,A.E.,WillyPurnaSamadhi,OlleTrnquist,etal.,Op.Cit.particularly onChapterVandVIII. 24 Regarding womens interest in politics, our informants also noted important attempts to promote women participationinpolitics.Besidesstrugglingforquotaforwomeninpoliticalinstitutionsandincreasingwomen awarenessandcapacity,ourinformantssuggestedthatitwasalsoimportanttobroadenpoliticalagendasto beinclusiveofwomensvitalissues.
23
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tobethedomainoftheelitesorpublicfigures.Politicshasbeenwellunderstood asaplatformfromwhichtostruggleforpower. Some other surveys conducted by Demos 25 equally showed the experiment of civil organisations to engage in politics by entering political domains to promote democracy. This is slightly different from the existing patterns in prodemocracy activism in which advocacy and capacity building of civilsocietyseemtobethenorm. Compared to the 20032004 Survey, it is noted that conditions encounteredbyprodemocracyactorshaschangedand,therefore,requirenew strategies to adjust with the instruments of democracy. This means that an involvementinformalpoliticsbecomesimperative,despitesomeweaknesses. Ingeneralterms,therearetworemarkstobemadeonthemovements ofprodemocracyactors.Firstly,theyarenowmoreactiveinthepoliticalarenas. Secondly, the actors tend to opt a choice called populist shortcuts to avoid representationinfavourofdirectrelationsbetweenindividualleadersandtheir contactswithintheelite,ontheonehand,andthepeopleontheother. WhenGoingPoliticsBecomeanOption Followingthereintroductionofdemocracy,Indonesiashouldbecomea breeding ground for its actors to resolve the sociopolitical problems encountered by the nation. Prodemocracy actors, thus, serve as a balance to theroleandinfluenceofthepowerfulactors. Having seen the consolidation of power by the powerful actor to dominatepoliticsinpreviouschapter,itisimportantthatthealternativeactors couldalsocontributeinpoliticsforamoreequaldivisionofpower.Whatarethe capacitiesavailableamongtheprodemocracyactorsasalternativeactors? The 2007 Survey has shown that the alternative actors have made someprogress,indicatedbytheirincreasingintensiveengagementinorganised politics.26Inresponsetothedebateonwhethercivilsocietyorganisationsneed
OneofDemosthematicresearchesstudiesthetransformationofvariouskindsofcivilactivitiesandsocial movementsintopoliticalactions,ortheirreconnectionwithpoliticalmovements,institutionsororganisations inthesphereofformalpoliticsinsomeregionsinIndonesia.Theresultofthisstudycanbereadinthereport of Link Project research; Priyono, A.E., et.al., (2008) Kajian tentang Aksi Sipil dan Gerakan Sosial Menjadi Tindakan Politik. While the study on the transformation of sociopolitical movements, see DEMOS (2007), http://demosindonesia.org/downloads/1199781729_Laporan_Eksekutive_Riset_2007.pdf,orTrnquist(2007), andTrnquist,KristianStokkeandNeilWebster(eds.)(forthcoming2009). 26 Their active involvement in organised politics takes place in several ways (1) electoral competition, by competing in local elections, (2) nonelectoral methods, by establishing alliances between civil society organisationstostrengthentheirpoliticalpower,(3)theemploymentofformalprocesses,byputtingpressureon
25
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to be faithful to their role in civil society or become involved in politics, pro democracy actors are developing a passion for politics following the 1998 reformasi. Many are beginning to take part in the sphere of formal politics. In spiteofsomeattemptbyindividualactorstocompetebothforexecutivesand legislatives position, the civil society organisations are beginning to transform themselvesintopoliticalorganisations.27 Data shows that in spite of the domination by figures from non government organisations (NGOs), the composition of prodemocracy actors playing a role as alternative actors also include members of political parties, government offices, and bureaucracy circles. Table 6.1 below clearly illustrates it.28 Table6.1.CompositionofAlternativeActors.
No. ALTERNATIVEACTORSBACKGROUND 1. Government/Bureaucracy 2. Policeandmilitary 3. ParliamentariansandPoliticians 4. Businesspeople 5. NGOs 6. Informalleaders(religious/ethnic,adatleaders) 7. Professionals(academician,lawyers,journalists,etc) Percentagesarebasedonthenumberofalternativeactorsidentifiedbyourinformants(N=1.658) % 10 1 21 4 31 16 17
Similarly, alternative actors are also broadening their sphere of activities.Comparedtothe20032004Survey,theactorsarenowmoreactivein both government institutions and political parties. For institutions like political parties, elected government, bureaucracy, and judicial bodies, the level of participation of alternative actors increases by almost 100%. However, their presencecontinuetoberemarkablypoorinworkplaces,businesssectorsaswell as in government offices. This is in contrast with countries whose states have been used by alternative actors to expand collective services, welfare, and others(seeTable6.2).
DPR or executives, (4) informal process, by lobbying politicians. See the integrated report of Demos topical researches(2007),Op.cit. 27 See, for example, the case of POR in West Kalimantan, KP3R in South East Sulawesi and other parties establishedbysomecivilsocietygroups,PPR.SeePriyono,etal.(forthcoming2009). 28 Background identification of alternative actors is based on our informants assessment of actors with importantrolesinstrugglingformoreequalpowerrelationsandonthosewhohavemostinfluence.Althoughwe had made much effort to minimize the domination of NGO activists in the informants assessment, it seems impossibletoavoidthebiasescausedbyinformantsbackgroundsasactivists.
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Table6.2.Alternativeactorssphereofactivities:comparisonof2003/04and 2007data
2003/04 2007 (%) (%) 1 Businessandindustry 7 6 2 Smallbusiness 6 3 3 Selfmanagednonprofitunits,Lobbygroups&Interestorganisations 64 54 4 Politicalparties&Electedgovernment 12 23 5 Thebureaucracy&Thejudiciary 7 14 6 Militaryandpolice 4 2 (1)Percentagesarebasedonnumberofinformantsresponses.Eachinformantwasallowedtoselect5options (2) Percentages are based on the number of informants responses. Each informant was allowed to select 3 options No Spheres
The increased intensity of alternative actors in the state domain is confirmedbythemapofalliancesbuiltbyprodemocracyactorstoinfluencethe dynamics and to control the political process. Aside from the NGOs and some prominent figures (informal leaders and professionals)which hit the highest number in the listprodemocracy actors are also building alliances with members of government institutions, the bureaucracy, politicians and parliamentarians. In addition, alliances are also built with informal and professionalfigures,suchasacademics,lawyers,andmedia(seeTable6.3).The dataseemstofitintothegeneralpatternofalternativeactorshavingincreased theirinterestinorganisedpolitics. Table6.3.AlternativeActorAlliances
No. AllianceofAlternativeActor 1. Government/Bureaucracy 2. Policeandmilitary 3. PoliticianandParliament 4. Business 5. NGOs 6. InformalLeaders(Religious,ethnic,adatleaders,academicians,lawyers,etc) 7. Professionals(academician,lawyers,journalists,etc) Percentagesarebasedonnumberofanswersgivenbytheinformants. % 16 2 17 4 31 13 17
Option in becoming active in politics seems to have a relation to the improvedcapacityofalternativeactorsaswellastheirshiftingpositiontoward the instruments of democracy, such as free and fair elections, good representation,directparticipation,andadditionalcivilpoliticalparticipation.29It
The instruments related to political participation of civil society are (1) citizens participation in extensive independentcivilassociations;(2)transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivilassociations;(3)all social groups including marginalised groups extensive access to and participation in public life. The instruments related to direct participation are: peoples direct access and contact with the public services,
29
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isfoundthatthecapacityofalternativeactorshasbeenenhancedinrelationto themeansofdemocracyascomparedtothe20032004Survey.Inaddition,an enhancedrelationwiththeinstrumentstakeplaceintermofalargerproportion oftheactorsinvolved. Table6.4.RelationandpositionofAlternativeActorsinusingandpromoting instrumentsofdemocracy.30

ActorsRelation ActorsPosition Useandpromote Strong(%) CATEGORYOFRULESANDREGULATIONS (%) No. 2003/0 2003/0 2007 2007 4 4 1. Freeandfairelections 52 63 57 66 2. Goodrepresentation 35 57 36 64 3. Civilpoliticalparticipation 57 64 57 73 4. Directparticipation 43 63 43 71 Average 46 66 44 68 (1)Percentagesarebasedonthenumberofanswersprovidedbyinformants (2) In 2003/04 survey, the questions on relation and positions were related to 40 instruments of democracy, whilefortherecentsurvey11.
Theimprovedrelationsandpositionofalternative actorstowardsthe instruments of democracy may actually become the strength of the actors to engageinpoliticsasmuchaswhathasbeenundertakenbythepowerfulactors. In response to the question of channels used to entering politics, informants gaveavarietyofoptions,suchasdevelopingpoliticalblocs,joiningtheexisting political parties eligible to run in the elections, or forming new locallyrooted politicalparties. Table6.5.Informantsassessmentsofmostappropriatechannelstobecome engagedinthepoliticalprocess
NO CHANNELSUSEDTOENGAGEINTHEPOLITICALPROCESS 1 Joinabignationalpoliticalparty 2 Joinasmallpoliticalpartyeligibletoruninelections 3 Establishanewlocallyrootedpoliticalparty 4 Congregateanonpartypoliticalblock 5 Getactiveinpoliticaldiscussion Percentagesarebasedonnumberofinformants(N=876) % 32 15 13 37 3
governments consultation of people, and direct participation in policy making and the execution of public decisions. 30 Theoptionsprovidedtoanswerthequestionontherelationofactorswiththeinstrumentsofdemocracy are:touseandpromote,touse,touseandabuse,toabuseandtolookforotheralternatives.Thetablebelow onlypresentsthedatafortheoptionsoftouseand promote.Inregardtothequestiononthepositionof actors toward the instruments of democracy, we provided strong and weak as the options provided to answerthequestion.Thetable,however,onlypresentsthedataforstronganswer.
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The options the informants chose demonstrate enthusiasm of alternativeactorsinnotremainingontheoutskirtsofpoliticaldynamics.Other studies by Demos to look at the attempts made by prodemocracy actors to become involved and engage in politics indicate strategies focusing on popular organisations and additional political channels.31However, a further discussion basedonthefindingsfromthe2007Surveyshouldbemade. DirectRepresentationInsteadOfPopularParticipation Thefactthatalternativeactorshavemanagedtoimproveisprobablya goodnews,despitethefactthatitisstillnecessarytoimproveactorspolitical capacityandwill.Capacityandwillarebasicallyrelatedto(1)sourcesofpower, (2)theirtransformationtogainlegitimacyandpoliticalauthority,(3)issuesand interests advocated by the actors, (4) the method of communication used, (5) the ability to mobilise and organise the people, (6) organisation methods, (7) politicalpartiesandorganisationstowhichactorsarerelated,and(8)strategies employedbytheactorsinthepoliticalsystem. Withregard tothepoliticalcapacityofthealternativeactors,Demos datashowthattheactorsoftenoptforpopulistshortcutsinthepoliticalsystem. Thisoptionactuallyraisesanothersalientissuesofrepresentationwhichwillbe discussedinthefollowingsections. (1)Relyingonsocialforceswithoutsufficientadequateeconomiccapital An important element related with the capacity of actors to promote meaningfuldemocracyistheirsourcesofpower.Bothsurveyssuggestthatpro democracy actors have tended to rely on knowledge and information, social strength and favourable contacts (Table 6.6). Their efforts to make use of economic resources or mass mobilisation are limited. Compared to the 2003 2004 Survey, the number of prodemocrats utilizing these sources of power declines.32
Inregardtotheimprovementoftheabilityofalternativeactorsand oftherelationoftheactorswiththe instruments of democracy, our Link project study suggests that prodemocracy actors and sociopolitical organisations commonly employ five strategies in politics; (1) sustaining their roles as pressure groups, as conductedbyINSANinKotaBaru,SouthkalimantanandForumWargainCentralJava,(2)participatinginthe legislativeprocess,byurgingmembersoforganisationtobetheparliamentariansatvariouslevels,(3)utilizing political parties, (4) establishing alternative parties, such as PPR and Papernas, and (5) attempting to gain powerbycompetingtowinexecutivepositionsatvariouslevels.SeePriyono,et.al.(forthcoming2009),and DEMOS(2007). 32 AnexceptionisthecaseofsomeinstitutionssuchasPORandGemawaninWestKalimantanwhicharethe metamorphosisofinstitutionsintendedtostrengthentheireconomical basis.PORisthesuborganisationof Yayasan Pancur Kasih that develop a Credit Union. For a complete profile of this organisation, see Priyono, et.al.,Op.cit..
31
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Table6.6.SourcesofPowerofAlternativeActorsin2003/04and2007
No. AlternativeActorsSourceofPower 2003/04(%) 2007(%) 1 Economicresources 18 10 2 Masspower/Political/Militarycoercion 22 21 3 Socialstrengthandfavorablecontacts 25 32 4 Knowledge,information 36 37 (1)In2003/04survey,theanswerswerecategorisedinto26options.Eachinformantwasallowedtoselect 5.Percentagesarebasedonnumberofinformantsresponses. (2)Each informant was allowed to select 3 answers. Percentages are based on number of informants responses.
Taking part in producing knowledge and disseminating information, suchasseminarsanddiscussionforums,isthereforeanalternativetothelackin the two abovementioned sources to gain legitimacy and authority. The establishmentofnetworksandcontactswithpowerfulpeopleisalsocentralto serve the purpose. Alternative actors are also gaining legitimacy through communityorganisingby,particularly,prioritisingeconomicindependence(4%). This seems to relate to the background of the actors, who are rarely from a businessbackground.Yet,ifbusinessisconsideredbeyondtheirreach,therehas beenlittleawarenessamongtheactorstotransformalternativeresourcesinto maineconomicalones.Inaddition,theabilityoftheactorstodemonstratemass basedcollectivepowerremainspoor(7%). Table6.7.WaysofAlternativeActorstoTransformSourcesofPower
ALTERNATIVEACTORSWAYSOFLEGITIMAZINGPOWER (%) Byprovidingthepublicspherethroughseminars,discussions,hearings 23 By providing contacts and dialogue with politicians and administrators at various levels 14 3 Byprovidingandbuildingnetworksandcoordinationforjointactivity 16 4 Bycreatingcontactsandpartnershipswithpowerfulfiguresandexperts 12 5 Bybeingabletodemonstratecollectiveandmassbasedstrength 7 6 Bygeneratingeconomicselfsufficiency,selfhelpactivities,cooperatives,etc. 4 7 By gaining legitimacy through DPR, DPRD, the judicial system and /or the formal executiveorgansofthestate 4 8 Bymakinguseofvariousmeansofforcefulofficialauthority,coercion,demonstration ofpowerandforceaswellasthegenerationoffear 1 9 Byusingstateandgovernmentbudgetsandotherresourcesandregulationstothe benefitofpromarketpoliciesandvariousactorsonthemarket 1 10 By providing patronage in various forms (including favourable treatment, loans, aid and charity) to, for instance, social groups, communities, civil society organisations (includingNGOs)aswellastobusinessmen,relativesandotherindividuals 3 11 Byorganisingsupportwithincommunities 11 12 Bygainingapopularmandateorgettingelected 3 13 Byinfluencingpublicopinionviamassmedia 0 Percentagesarebasedonthenumberofinformantsresponsse.Eachinformantwasallowed3answersforeach actor. No 1 2
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It is likely that the alternative actors regard economic development with less interest. The capacity of alternative actors to employ issues in this category is less progressive than that of the powerful elites. The latter actors seem to be way ahead as they start to combine issues for which to fight. (See Table6.8). Table6.8.IssuesandInterestsActorsVieFor,2007
PowerfulActors(%) Content of Interests, No. Issues,Platformsand/or Response Specific Combination General Policies Issues ofIssues Issues 1. Public services, basic 9 26 46 27 needs,socialsecurity 2. Religious and ethnic values, morality, conflict 11 27 46 27 and conflict reconciliation 3. Democracy and civil 11 28 40 32 politicalrights 4. Economic development 32 22 48 30 oriented 5. Sustainable development, 3 35 44 21 environment 6. Good governance, anti 12 28 44 28 corruption,ruleoflaw 7. Humanrights 3 19 40 41 8. Nationalism, integration, 6 26 42 32 nationalsecurity 9. Decentralisation and 11 27 45 28 localautonomy 10. Genderissues 1 61 21 18 Total 100 26 45 29 Percentagesarebasedonthenumberofinformantsresponses. Response 6 AlternativeActors(%) Specific Combination General Issues ofIssues Issues 35 31 33
12
40
29
31
20 17 4 15 11 2 5 7 100
28 32 39 27 35 30 38 55 34
36 35 41 41 38 33 46 29 36
36 33 20 32 27 36 16 16 30
(2)Optingforlessstrategicissues With regard to issues the actors vie for, some improvements were made by prodemocracy actors by focusing on a single and specific issue. However, they tend to take up the issue of democracy and civilpolitical rights (20%), good governance and anticorruption (15%) and human rights (11%). There is little emphasis on issues related to bread and butter, economic developmentetc.Thisisinsharpcontrasttothedominantactorswhomanage to focus on the matters while also addressing governance issues (but remain disinterested in human rights, democracy etc). It is also unfortunate that pro democracyactorsareunabletoemployissuesthataremorelocalinnatureand touch on the need and interests of the people, such issues related to public
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services, basic needs, social security, environment, sustainable development, localautonomyanddecentralisation(thefigureforeachpointis46%). Theseareissuesabletobeusedasalternativewaysforprodemocracy actorstochallengethepowerfuldominantactors.Theirlackofissuefocusand thetypeofcommunicationmethodsmaybethereasonswhyalternativeactors have less contacts with organisations and media compared to the powerful elites. Table6.9.MethodofCommunicationofAlternativeActors,2007
Powerful Alternative Actors(%) Actors(%) 1 Writingbooksandarticles 6 18 2 Performinginthemedia(radio,TV,internet,culturalevents) 29 19 3 Attendingandgivingspeechesinpublicseminars/meetings 19 23 4 Throughpersonalcontactsandnetworks 19 18 5 Throughorganisationsandtheirmeetingsandcontacts 26 22 Percentagesarebasedonthenumberofinformantsresponses.Eachinformantisallowed2answersforeach actor. No MethodOfCommunication
(3)Limitedorganisationalmethods Table 6.9 indicates methods of communication that the alternative actors use to transform their sources of power. It is obvious that in order to cover up their lack of capacity, alternative actors tend to switch to populist methods by establishing direct contacts with individual leaders and small organisationsandpreferentialaswellaswiththepeople.33Forexample,inorder to broaden their agenda, alternative actors tend to lobby and contact government officials and politicians, as well as powerful figures (respectively 14%and12%).Thisistroublesomeasthealternativeactorsseemtoshowless interest in making efforts to gain mandate from the people through general electionsandtogainlegitimacythroughgovernmentinstitutions(respectively3 4%). The fact that alternative actors tend to use populist methods is likely relatedtotheactorscapacitytousethemeansofdemocracy.Itistruethatthe actors capacity to mobilise and organise people has increased, compared to whatthe20032004Surveyindicated.Thiscapacityseemstobealongthelines of methods usually applied by populists, such working through popular and charismatic leaders, alternative patronage, and building networks between independentactors(seeTable6.10)
Populismheredoesnotrefertothestrategiesoftheactorstobroadentheirinvolvementwiththepeople, butthewaysalternativeactorsemploytousedirectparticipationinthepoliticalsystem.Includedinthisway aredirectcontactswithpowerfulfiguresandgovernmentinstitutionsaswellasclaimingtoberepresenting thepeople.SeeTrnquist(forthcoming2009),Op.cit.
33
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Table6.10.MobilisationmethodsofAlternativeActors,2003/04and2007
No. WaytoMobiliseandOrganiseAlternativeActors 1 Popularandcharismaticleaders 2 Clientilism 3 Alternativepatronage 4 Networksbetweenindependentactors 5 Integrationofpopularorganisationsintomoregeneralorganisations (1)Percentagesarebasedonnumberofinformantsresponse Inthe2003/04survey,theanswerscomprisedsevenoptions.Yet,eachinformantwasonlyallowedtoselect3 ofthem.Inthe2007survey,informantswereallowedtoselect2ofthe5optionsforeachactor. 2003/04 (%) 16 18 15 24 27 2007 (%) 21 9 20 35 15
However,improvedcapacitydoesnotmeanmuchwhenitfailstoput organisationstogetheratbasiclevel.Thisshowsthattheprodemocratslackthe ability to organise the masses, given that they tend to work with people with similar interest (35%) and groups with religious or ethnic backgrounds (17%) rather than those with similar professions or interests (12%) or different ranks andstructures(9%)andsimilaritiesoforiginanddomicile(5%) Table6.11.OrganisationalmethodsofAlternativeActors,2007.
No. OrganisationalMethods % 11 17 5 9 12 35 11 1 Descriptive 2 Ethnicity,religion,family 3 Originandresidence(putradaerahidentity) 4 Hierarchicalconnectinglevels 5 Sector,profession 6 Visions,ideas,interests 7 Personalnetwork Percentagesarebasedonnumberofinformantsresponses
The weak capacity of alternative actors to organise politics is also reflected in their ways of connecting with political organisations they consider important. They also prefer to tread on safe grounds by joining major national parties that often take over their constituents rather than to establish alternativelocalpartiesasabasis.34 The survey equally indicates that alternative actors, when deciding to buildallianceswithpoliticalparties,tendtoprivilegeestablishedpoliticalparties. Onlysome(5%)decidedtoallywithnonmajor,alternativeparties.
Thiscanbeseenbythefactthatmostprodemocracyactorscompetinginlocalelectionstomentionone examplefailed,astheydidnotcontrolsufficientsourcesofpowerandhadnotpreparedtheirorganisationsas a political machine and reliable support base. See, for example, Demos study in local elections in Serdang Bedagai,ManggaraiandEastBelitungdistricts,seePradjasto,et.al.(2007)andalsoDEMOS(2007).
34
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Table6.12.AlternativeActorsMajorpoliticalpartyalliances,2007
NO. POLITICALPARTIES 1. Golkar 2. PDIP 3. Hanura,PPRN 4. Demokrat 5. PKS 6. MajorIslamicbasedparties(PAN,PPP,PKB) 7. Smallparties 8. Alternatifparties(PPR,PRD,Papernas) Percentagesbasedonnumberofinformantsresponses. % 15 9 1 2 5 12 5 5
The tendency of alternative actors to privilege populist methods in politicsisconfirmedbydataonalternativeactorspreferredpoliticalstrategies. In addition, data shows that most alternative actors tended to make contacts with individual from the legislative bodies and the executives (each 28%), followed by the judiciary institutions, stateauxiliary bodies, and self managementunit(each10%)andthebureaucracy(7%). This may, indeed, be undertaken by way of representation, but a crucial problem arises when the question on how the prodemocracy actors make contact with the governance institutions is raised. Data shows that most actors made direct contact with the institutions (28%). Some used NGOs, experts,andlobbyinggroupsasmediatinginstitutions(1114%).Thisbecomesa problem when the actors tend to make little use of political parties (7%) and interestorganisations(5%)asalternatives.Whentheactorsmakedirectcontact with members of legislative assemblies, the political parties have only a small role(9%).
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Table6.13.AlternativeActorStrategiesinthePoliticalSystem
MEDIATINGINSTITUTIONS% NO. GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS The judiciary (inclthepolice) The political executive (the government) The legislative (e.g.DPRD) The bureaucracy Themilitary Auxiliarybodies and institution for sub contracted public governance Institutions for self management (e.g. cooperative DIR ECT NGOS 18 PEOPLES ORG. 8 EXPERTS, MEDIA 16 POPULAR FIGURES 3 PATRONS/ FIXERS 3 COMMU NAL GROUPS 2 NEIGHBOR HOOD GROUPS 1 POLITIC AL PARTIES 4 INTER EST ORG 3 LOBBY/ PRESSURE GROUPS 13
1. 2.
27
28
13
14
11
3. 4. 5. 6.
28 30 31
14 9 11
10 8 6
13 13 8
3 5 3
3 5 4
3 4 5
1 3 2 9
9 8
5 6 10 11
11 9
28
17
12
10
7.
29
14
10
11
10
(1) (2)
Percentagesarebasedonnumberofinformantresponsse Informants are allowed to select at the most two options of governance institutions, three ways to contact the institutionsbothdirectlyandthroughmediatinginstitutions.
Thispictureshowsthatalthoughprodemocracyactorshaveoptedfor politicalchannels,theypreferusingdirectmethodsandneglectpoliticalparties and interest organisations. This direct methods are probably often of an individual and informal nature which adds another problem to the future of democracyandtoanyattempttopromoterepresentation.Thisisobviousfrom the fact that conditions of instruments of democracy related to direct participationremain,asmentionedearlier,critical.35 It is likely that alternative actors option to employ direct methods in politics reflects their frustration when dealing with the monopolisation by the powerfulelites.However,themethodsdonotresolvetheproblemsbutcreate new ones. Opting for direct methods makes alternative actors not being preparedtoprovidesolutionstotheproblemofrepresentation. The data shows that the problems of representation are the biggest problems for prodemocracy actors. Instead of providing alternative options, alternative actors seem to run away from balancing a democratic process monopolizedbythepowerfulelites.Asalreadydiscussedinearlierchapters,pro democracyactorsseemtodriftinthecurrentmainstream.Relyingonsocialand informationresourcesandsufferingfromweaknessintheircapacitytolinkthe
35
SeeChapterI.Itisunfortunatethatwedonothaveanydetaileddataontheformsofdirectrepresentation relatedtopublicexecutiveinstitutionssuchasdemocraticinstitutionsforparticipatorybudgeting.
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interests of mass based popular organisations with that of civil society organisations,prodemocracyactorsareputtingdemocracyatrisk.36 Demosdataalsopointstoacrisisinrepresentationinrelationtothe institutions entrusted by the people when questioning about public matters.37 Mostpeopletendtoprivilegethemediaandpressureorlobbyinggroups(32%), then NGOs and informal leaders (28%), and executive officials or bureaucrats and law enforcement institutions (16%). Political parties and parliamentarians seem to gain less trust from the people (14%). It is important to note that the useoflocalinterestgroupspotentialtobepartoftherepresentativeinstitutions isthelowestonthelist(4%). Table6.14.PublicComplaintsInstitutions
No. Institutions 1. Media,PressureandLobbyGroups. 2. NGOs,InformalLeaders 3. GovernmentOfficials,bureaucracy,lawenforcementinstitutions 4. PoliticalParties,politicians,parliamentarians 5. StareAuxulliaryBodies(KomnasHAM,KPK,Ombudsman,etc) 6. InterestGroups Percentagesarebasedonnumberofinformantsresponsse % 32 28 16 14 6 4
Thisisatruepictureofanacuterepresentationcrisis.Peopleatleast thoseidentifiedbyinformantsputtheirtrustinNGOs,communitygroups,and informal leaders more than in genuine representative institutions, such as interest organisations as basis, political parties, the legislative, and the executive. The low trust of the people in representative institutions reaches alarmingproportionscomparedtowhathashappenedincountriessuchasIndia and Brazil.38In those countries, where the process of democracy continues to grow, there have been alternative attempts to increase peoples political participation39.
SeeTrnquist(forthcoming2009),Op.cit. The data was drawn from the assessment of our informants on public institutions to which the people address their complaints. We did not identify and classify the people in question, like John Harris (2005 & 2008) did by classifying society into middle and lower class in his research on the participation and representationofurbanpoorinIndia. 38 See,forexampleHarris(2005),Houtzager,et.al.(2007). 39 In India, particularly in New Delhi, political parties and society figures play important roles to be medium wherepeoplemayaddresstheircomplaintparticularlypeopleofthelowerclass.Themembersofthelower class usually do not have hecapacity to directly face the government. On the other hand, the middle class preferstocontactdirectlythegovernmentorthejudiciary.Suchadirectmethodisalsoappliedbythepeople ofSaoPaulo,Brazil,butitprovidesalternativesfortheestablishmentofadditionalrepresentationinstitutions suchasparticipatorybudgeting,specialagencyforhealth,etc.SeeHarris(2008).
37 36
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PotentialforImprovingRepresentativeInstitutions Thecrisisoftrustinrepresentativeinstitutionspossiblycausedbythe less than optimum performance of political parties and other representation related instrumentsactually makes the establishment of independent organisations in Indonesia imperative. In spite of their weaknesses, political parties remain crucial to the process of democracy. Together with lobby and interest organisations, political parties play an important role and function in politics.Thus,itisnecessarytoreformtheseinstitutionsorbuildnewones. It is true that political participation can be both direct and through representativeinstitutions.Thelatterisprobablynoteffectivegiventhatpeople wanttomakesurethattheirvoicesreachtherightchannels.Inaddition,itmay marginalisepeopleunabletovoicetheiraspirations.Itis,therefore,necessaryto establishrepresentativeinstitutionsthatfunctionasamediumforthoselacking capacity for direct participation. In addition, political institutions serve as channels connecting state institutions with the people. Direct participation will cut the relation of these two entities. Even in direct representation, it remains necessary to set up institutions to facilitate addressing peoples aspirations to political institutions. Such institutions may, for instance, relate to participatory budgeting or representation of trade unions in advisory boards to the government.Thereisnodirectparticipationbeyondselfrepresentation.40 As agents of change, prodemocracy actors should not abandon the problems of representation. Democracy is a political system that requires peoplescontroloverpublicmattersbasedonpoliticalequality.Representative institutionsareinthecapacitytoimplementpopularcontroloverpublicaffairs.41 Nextchapterseekstolooktoit.
40 41
For discussion on the forms of representation and their criticisms, including the discussion on direct participation,seeTrnquist(forthcoming2009). Someexamplesofattemptstolinkpopularorganisationsandcivilsocietyorganisationstopoliticalactivities are shown by the movement Forum of Batang Peasants and Fishers Union (FP2NB) in Batang, Central Java, ConsortiumforBroadeningPeoplePoliticalParticipation(KP3R)inKendari,Muna,andSouthKonawe,South East Sulawesi, BP3OPKWalhi, and other organisations. For further discussion on the attempts to improve popularrepresentation,seeIntegratedReportofDemosTopicalResearches(2007)andLinkproject.
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Conclusions Inconcludingthisdiscussion,severaloptionsforprodemocracyactors areidentified: The condition of process of democracy has improved, indicated in, among others, peoples (including women) interests in politics. Moreover, in spite of increasing cynicism in Indonesia at largemore than in Aceh, when the political system is more openpolitics are not primarily understood as the business of some dominant groups or individuals,but,atleast,asawaytogainpower. As alternative actors struggle for political equality, prodemocracy actors begin to enter the realm of politics. They also prioritize democratic instruments, including those related to organised politics, enabling the actors not to be marginalisedintheprocessofdemocracy.
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CraftingRepresentation?
ChapterSeven
AttiaNur(Demos) Previous chapters have shown that the situation of political representation in the Indonesian democratic process remains problematic. Informantsintheirassessmentsconfirmedthepoorperformanceofinstruments ofrepresentation,whichareamongthe11worseinstruments,asseeninTable 7.1. In addition, several instruments of democracy in favour of political representationarerelatedtopartyperformance. Table7.1ElevenLowestRankingInstrumentsofDemocracy
No 1 RIGHTSANDINSTITUTIONS
(1)
Index 2007 35 36 36 38 38 38 39 40 40 40 40
Transparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryandthepolicetoelectedgovernmentandto thepublic 2 Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates 3 Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicableinternationallaw) 4 Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessandaccountabilityofpartiesand orpoliticalcandidatestotheirconstituents 5 Allsocialgroups includingmarginalisedgroups extensiveaccesstoandparticipationin publiclife 6 Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment 7 The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, hoodlums and organised crime 8 Direct participation (Peoples direct access and contact with the public services and governmentsconsultationofpeopleandwhenpossiblefacilitationofdirectparticipationin policymakingandtheexecutionofpublicdecisions) 9 Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by political parties and or candidates 10 Goodcorporategovernance 11 Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevels(orteamsofindependentcandidates) thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipateinelections. (1) Theinstrumentsinitalicarethoserelatedtorepresentation.
We may understand this situation as resulting from the monopoly of the political system by powerful actors dominating political parties, interest groups and lobby groups. Meanwhile, alternative actors are focusing on direct participation and using populist shortcuts rather than building up democratic representation through organisational politics. Therefore, although the gap
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betweenalternativeactorsandthepoliticalsystemisclosing,thisdoesnotmean animprovementoftherepresentationsituation. Outside of the data collected and analysed in this 2007 Survey, it is identified some signs reflecting attempts by the democrats to improve representation. There have been three most prominent groupings. The first group uses institutional or elitist crafting to improve or strengthen democratic institutionssuchasparliament,partyandelectionsystems.Tothisgroupbelong the efforts by National Democracy Institute/NDI, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy/NIMD and International IDEA through party assistance andcomparativestudiesamongpartiesfromdifferentcountries. The second group attempts to reform parties both from within and topdown.Someelementsevenmanagedtoestablishalternativeparties.Some activists combine these activities with popular mass organising, by way of populist or alternatives means, like Budiman Sudjatmiko joining the PDIP. Others are building up alternative parties, such as of Partai Persatuan Pembebasan Nasional (National Liberation United Party/Papernas), and Partai PerserikatanRakyat(PeoplesUnionParty/PPR). The third group establishes direct representative institutions connectedtocertainorgansorcommissionsingovernmentinstitutionsthrough, for examples, participatory budgeting or forming political citizens forums. Includedinthisgroupareactivistsofcivilsocietyorganisationsundertakingself representation through peasant organisations, labour unions, and political contractsandordialoguewithlocalgovernment,etc. ImprovingorJustPolishing? It is undoubtedly true that law reforms are important to improve political parties and the party system. Law reforms surely have a significant impact,asindicatedbytheimplementationofamultipartysystemfollowingthe ratification of Law No.2/1999. It is expected that the system would reduce the dominationofoldpowerfulelite,thelegacyoftheNewOrder,inpoliticalparties andelections,aswellasinthepoliticalsystemasawhole. Ironically, the opposite happened. Parties started to mushroom and strong people with capital (access to economic and noneconomic resources) startedtodominatethepartystockexchangeandadapttothechangesofthe system.Thisisindeedsoironic,giventhat,formerly,democracyactivistsstrived foramultipartysystemandyettheireffortscouldnotbeusedtobuildamore meaningfuldemocracy.Whyhasthishappened?
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Thisprovesthatitisnotsufficienttorelyonlyoncraftingdemocratic institutions.Thereisoneimportantfactor,thathasbeenneglectedinattempts toreformthesystem.Improvingtheelectionandthepartysystemsisnotstrictly a technical matter, such as the number of parties or election mechanisms. Furthermore, improving the systems would mean improving the so far unbalancedpowerrelationsdominatedbycertainpowerfulgroups. Weshouldrealisethatsomeinstitutionsandactorshavethecapacity touseandpromoteortoavoidandbendtherulesandregulationssupposedly promoting democracy. As the institutions lack of capacity and the people are incapableofusingandpromotingtheinstrumentsofdemocracy,thentheelites monopolise the instruments. This is to say that it is important to craft institutions, but far more important to improve the capacity of the institutions andtoestablishbetterpopularrepresentation. Weshouldalsorealisethatthecraftingbusinesswillprimarilyinvolve parliament and government and the experts consulted, as well as the most resourceful lobbyists, dominated by powerful actors. In some cases, some expertsinvolvedinthereformbecomepartoftheactorslobbyandlegitimacy ofpower.Theinstitutionswiththeauthoritytoratifythechangeofthesystem also have interest in the content of the crafting. Therefore, drafting and proposing (law reforms) are clearly insufficient, without other supporting efforts,suchasstrategiestomobiliseimportantalternativeactorsandemphasis on power relations as the essence of the reforms, especially to demonopolise thesystemandtoprovidespacesformorealternativepoliticalpowers. ThelocalpartypolicyappliedinAcehshouldprovidevaluablelessons onthepossibilityoforganisingdemocraticpoliticsatlocallevel.Theexperience of Aceh has not so far generated negative effects such as separatism or devastating ethnic and religious conflicts. On the contrary, the organisation of localdemocraticpoliticscansupportthepeaceprocessandtheestablishmentof acountrywidepoliticalcommunity. Therefore,ratherthanspendingeffortsindebatingnumbersofparties, it is considered that local parties may become one of many alternatives, althoughfurtherdiscussiononsomerelatedmattersremainsnecessary.Infact, institutionalcraftingsupportershadnotconsideredthis.Theyactdifferently,not tomentioninconsistently,bylessening,limitingorrationalisingthenumberof eligible political parties through the establishment of strict party requirements andelectoralthreshold,42whilepolishingorfinetuneexistingparties.
42
The new soon to be ratified Law suggests strict requirement of party establishment. A party should have regionalchaptersin60%ofIndonesianprovinces,50%inthedistrictintheprovinceinquestion,and25%of thenumberofsubdistrictsinthedistrictinquestion.Itishardforalternativepartiestofulflllthisrequirement, astheyonlyhavelimitedfundsandfacilities.
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Limiting the number of parties means hindering the emergence of alternative political powers. It is clear that big, powerful parties are the most advantaged in terms of party number limitation. They want to minimize and prevent the emergence of new competitors. The main intention is to establish politicsoforder,amorestable,simple,andlessfinanciallydemandingtypeof politics. Surprisingly, this idea is actually supported by some activists and academics embarrassed by the way party are performing. Their argument is actuallyconfirmedbyTransparencyInternationalsresearchthatshowspeoples decliningtrustinpoliticalparties. Attempts to improve the performance of existing partieswithout considering new parties as a form of alternative powerbecame more prominent when those believing on the importance of institutional crafting organised training for politicians and political parties. The training aimed to improve the effectiveness of political parties in carrying out their functions. Without undermining the importance of party performance improvement, it is argued that this approach is more managerial in nature and exclusive of the attempt to strengthen parties at grass root level. It is true that none of those supporting the idea of institutional crafting supported the domination of the political system by certain figures. Yet, they usually did not emphasize their attempts at popular control, but only on the elitist ways by delegating the improvementofpartyperformancetoactorswithintheparty. Inaddition,attemptstoapplyapurerformofpresidentialism,43among others, through direct elections have not yet been successful in promoting representation. Direct local elections, since 2005, have not been able to de monopolise the elites domination. Firstly, the current political parties that monopolise the system are still important actors dominating the process of nomination of candidates; secondly, only certain peopleclearly those with influence and access to several political and economic resourcesare able to become candidates.44Ideally, direct elections should be able to open more opportunities for the emergence of alternative actors and broadened people participation.
Till the presidency of Megawati, the president was elected by the MPR, while Yudhoyono and Kalla were electedthroughdirectelections,sothatthepresidentisnolongerunderthepowerofparliament,andthus, has stronger legitimacy. The parliament cannot impeach presidents before their period ends. The implementation of the presidential system is expected to create political stability, as part of the spirit of politicsoforderdiscussedinChapter5. 44 A simple and clear example is the fact that figures dominating Presidential election and DPD member electionin2004wereusuallyretiredmilitarypersonnel(AgumGumelar,Wiranto,SBY)andfiguresoftheNew Order (Jusuf Kalla, Hamzah Haz, Siswono Yudohusodho). In addition, 30% of candidates in 20052006 local electionsweremadeupoftheincumbents.
43
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Thirdly, the required threshold of 3% to 6.5% (Kompas 6/3/2008) of totalpopulationforindividualcandidatestobeabletonominatethemselves.45 Asanattempttomitigatepartydominationoflocalelections,thedecisionofthe Constitutional Court is quite positive. Such a requirement is not sufficiently realistic to support the emergence of alternative leaders from below. The numbers are excessive and the period for mobilisation of signatories is insufficient.Onlythealreadypowerfulandresourcefulcanmanage. Asaresult,thesystemwillalsorequiremuchenergyandtimefromthe local election committees (KPUD) to conduct candidate verification. Other countries applying a similar system do not set the requirements so high.46 Althoughrequirementformulationforindividualcandidatescontinues,itmaybe concludedthatthismethodisinsufficienttopromoterepresentation. Fourthly,directelectionsarenotaccompaniedbyaclearpresentation of candidate programs and interests. 47 This suggests a practice of shallow politics, which takes certain forms, but is actually vulnerable inside. Direct electionsareinitiallyaimedtoshortenthedistancebetweencandidates,voters andconstituents.However,inreality,whathappenedhasbeenanintensification ofthepracticesoflocalpatronagepolitics,asinMakassarandTernate.48
Therearetwotermstodescribeindividualcandidates.First,calonperseorangan(individualcandidate)and second, calon independen (independent candidate). The basic difference between the two lies in the perspective.Althoughbothtermsrefertocandidatesnotnominatedbypoliticalparties,individualcandidate clearlyreferstothosefromanygivenbackgroundwhileindependentcandidateclearlyreferstoanonparty background. We prefer to use individual candidate, since many criticisms have emerged after the issue of independent candidate became popular and which led to a question as to whether it would automatically open the space for alternative actors to get in. The powerful elites might also use the opportunity both at nationalandlocallevels.Moreover,theactivistsstrugglingfordemocratisationandthepeopleingeneralhave notbeenabletoimprovetheircapacitytomakeusoftheopportunity. 46 insomecountriessuchasAlbania,England(London)andBulgaria,thenumberofsupportforthoserunning incitymayoralelectionsisaround150,330,and550,oronethirdofthetotalnumberofvoters.Inordertorun in gubernatorial elections in the states of Illinois, Alabama, and Missouri in the United States, ones need to gathersupportfrom1to5%oftotalvoters,notpopulation.InCanadaandSouthAfrica,theyevenonlyrequire 50100voterssignaturesineachelectoralarea.InAceh,theyonlyrequire3%supportfromtotalpopulationin 50% of the levesl of administrative region where the candidates nominate themselves. Source: Data from CetrosResearchandDevelopment. 47 Basedonourgeneralobservationoflocalelectionssincemid2006,weconcludethatalmostnocandidates presented concrete programs in their campaigns. Most of them brought up issue of native locals, ethnicity, religionevenkinshipasarationaleforelection. 48 Conflicts in the regions are caused by conflicting Gubernatorial local elections, in this case, the election of governor and vice governor in South Sulawesi and Northern Maluku. The conflict began with the disappoibtment of the losing candidate. The masses who supported the losing candidate forced both the CentralandLocalElectionCommissiontoissuethedecisiontheywanted.Yet,theproblemsbecamefurther complicated with the involvement of the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) and The Ministry of Internal Affairs.Atthetimethisarticlewaswrtitten,theelectionconflictinNorthernMalukuwasnotyetsettled.The supporting masses went to Jakarta and there is a possibility that this conflict might have to be settled at presidentiallevel.
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This chapter, however, does not put a blame on attempts at institutional crafting.Thepointistoemphasisethatthemaindutyisnottopolishtheparty system, or reform the electoral system. Rather, it is to provide broader opportunities and to improve the capacity of politically marginalised actors, so that they will be able to organise themselves and participate in the political process.Onceagain,theexperienceofAcehcanbeanexamplethatpopularand interestbasedorganisationmustcomefirst,49soastomakedirectelectionsan optimalinstrument. Joining,TakingOverandReformingParties Attempts at party reforms, both from joining and establishing alternative parties, are highlighted by the need to organise politics. Political organisationaimstofacilitateissueandinterestaswellastoestablishbroader cooperation among diverse social groups. Going beyond institutional crafting supporters, those in this category have a perspective on the changes of power relations. They realise that it is necessary to build a majority power to win elections.Thenitwasfoundthatactivistsappliedtheirownindividualmethods. Forexample,BudimanSudjatmikopreferredtojoinPDIP,alongwithothercivil associations and social organisations as diaspora action.50Another example is the experiment by POR Pancur Kasih to take over PNBK official body at local level.51In addition, Papernas also attempted to utilise leftist ideology52and to build national (rather than scattered localised) organisations to unite some groupsandpeople,aswellastoorganiseacriticalmass.Lastbutnotleast,PPR established a party on existing social movement basiswith agriculture as the prime basis of the movementincluding several popular oriented NGOs. PPR aimed to facilitate more deeply rooted political participation, where people
The organisational process priority also covers improvements to the quality and representation of the organisations. We do not deny the fact that interest organisations such as labour unions can be trapped in elitism,wheretheleadersoforganisationsdominatetheprocessofdecisionmaking,andpersonalcontactsare moreimportantthanmembership. 50 Diaspora action is conducted by activists studied in Link Project Research. Activists from 98 movements (thosewhohadworkedsince1990sandwereactivelyinvolvedintheantiSoehartomovement)alsousually engageintheseattempts. 51 PORPancurKasihinWestKalimantantookovertheleadershipofitsSekadauchapter. 52 What we mean by leftist ideology is the one close to Marxism. Papernas continues the struggle of Popor (PartaiOposisiRakyat/PeoplesOppositionParty),anewpartythatwasestablishedtocounterthestigmaof communism levelled at PRD. Yet, Papernas recenly faced a similar stigma. Therefore, they established new party, PPBI (Partai Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia/Indonesian Unity Party) with Dominggus as its leader. Yet neitherpassedTheMinistryofLawandHumanRightsverificationprocess.
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organisations and NGOs can participate in formulating party policies, including nominatingtheirowncandidates. Eachexperienceprovidesuswithlessonstolearn.Firstly,allattempts mentioned above failed to prevent political fragmentation, particularly when it cametogainingvotes.Itoftenhappensthatonepartyssupportbasiscoincides with others. What mostly occurred then was putting the bases at stake.53For democrats conducting diaspora action, most fragmentation happened when other prodemocracy organisations or activists became suspicious of the activists motives for joining a political party. They particularly feared of party intervention.Thepartytheyjoinedwouldalsobecomesuspiciousandconsider themoutsiders. The experiences of the Philippines and India revealed that the fragmentationamongcivilsocietyorganisations,NGOs,andpeopleorganisations resulted in friction and weakness. In the Philippines, fragmentation among the Maoists even turned into violent conflict. In some cases, such fragmentation is unavoidable. Secondly,thereisatendencyforsomeactiviststofocustheirattention onlyontheirowngroups,insteadofaimingforbroaderissuesandinterestsas politicalparties.Forexample,PapernasisdominatedbyPRDactivists,whilePPR concerns lean towards agrarian issues.54In order to survive within a national orientedpartysystem,theactivistsmustbeabletomobilisesupportfrommany socialgroups,andnotjust belimited totheirown groups,who alreadyhave a high level of political participation awareness. They have to broaden their constituentbasisandincludemarginalpeoplefromoutsidetheirgroup. Thirdly,theriskofbecominglostorentrappedinelitepoliticalculture isariskcommonlyencounteredbyactivistsconductingdiasporicaction,asthey lack sufficient bargaining power. In addition, they often face choices as to whethertheyoweallegiancetotheirpartyortotheiroriginalbasis.Toresolve this problem, it is probably necessary to establish clear responsibility mechanismsbetweencadresoractivistsworkingwithindominantactorsparties and their original basis or organisations. Of course, this does not apply only to
ForexampleintheSerdangBedagailocalelectionstherewasaconflictoversupportbasisbetweenORI(the supporters of Sukirman who also conflicted with BITRA, Sukirmans organisation) and PP (the supporters of Purba).Bothareorganisationswellestabishedatgrassrootlevel.Infact,Chapter6showsthatthemasspower utilizedbyalternativeactorsasoneofthesourcesofpowerislimited.Itwillworsenworseoncebrokendown intoseveralorganisations/politicalparties. 54 ThefactthatPPRisconcernedwithagrarianissuesdoesnotnecessarilyrevealthepartysideology.Onthe contrary, they seem to search for it. PPR deliberately make themselves ideologically and organisationally floatingtohandletheworkofcoordination,administrationandalternativepoliticalmachinebuildingforCSO, socialmovementandpeopleorganisations.PPRisparticularlysupportedbypeopleorganisations.Thus,PPR strugglesformorespecific,localissues.Theyactuallyhavenotyetformulatedtheirbroaderagenda.
53
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the diasporists, but also to alternative parties. Thus, this matter shows the importanceofmatureorsettledpoliticalorganisation. Fourthly, still related to political organisation, the experience of Papernas and PPR has revealed the weaknesses in strategies to generate financialsupportandmanageaneffectivepoliticalmachine.Thisisprobablythe reasonwhysomegroupsoptfordiasporicaction.However,thosewhoattempt to take over parties at local level still face similar obstacles. To make matters worse,theyhavetodealwithinterventionfromcentrallevelpartyleaderswho aredominatedbypowerfulelites.Takingoverpartiesatlocallevelclearlydoes notrequireasmuchfundingastheestablishmentofanewparty.Yet,theystill facepartyfundinghurdlesinadditiontothefactthatthepoliticalmachinethey takeoverisnotyetwellestablished. Fifthly,amongtheattemptspresentedpreviously,thereisnoblueprint orstrategytoresolvetheproblemsofrepresentation.Theproblemsarehowto combine political work with advocacy activities, institutionalisation of direct participation,drawingpartysframeworkfromgeneralprinciplesbyconsidering classbasedinterestsand involvingwomen,rather thanmerely nominatingand supportingcertainpopularfigures. History shows that attempts to produce popular leaders eventually wentwrongaswasthecaseofEstradainthePhillippinesorasmayhappenwith HugoChavezinVenezuela.Theyaresubordinatedtostrongpopularleadersand bytheirowninterests.Therearesignsthatactivistsareattemptingtolearnfrom this lesson. There has been a long tradition in Indonesiasince the war of independencethat local strongmen, including those among radical youth, act asspearheadsofpopularleaderswiththeirownfollowersratherthanasleaders oforganisationswithinwhichmembers,atleasttosomeextent,canmaketheir leadersaccountableaccordingtojointlyagreedrules.Interestingly,thefewelite communistleaderswhoattemptedtochangepowerrelationsthroughacoupin late1965wasalsopartofthetradition.55 DirectParticipation: Cuttingdownonprocedures,butnotautomaticallydemocratic Other possible attempts to promote popular representation are the establishment of representative institutions enabling the people to participate directlyingovernmentinstitutionsoraspartofagovernmentinstitution,rather thanestablishingpoliticalpartiesorotherpoliticalorganisations.Suchattempts
As it happened when PKI leaders became subordinate to Soekarno by establishing The Revolution Council (DewanRevolusi)(Roosa:2006).
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are embodied in the form of participatory budgeting, political contract and dialogue.FAKTAandUrbanPoorConsortium(UPC)inJakarta,aswellasATMA andForumWargainCentralJava,practicethesemethods.Theydonotfocuson politicalorganisationbutinsteadfacilitatemechanismsorproceduresofformal communication between the government and the people on more specific issues. This method has several advantages. Grassroots have access to direct participation, local spaces are utilized and institutions are open, nonpartisan, pluralisticandliberal.Suchinstitutionsarealsoestablishedonthebasisofmore concrete issues, such as local government performance, issues of corruption, collusionandnepotism.Themethodfortheestablishmentofsuchinstitutionsis expected to prevent a distortion of representation and to involve nonparty organisationsaswell.Thus,marginalisedpeople,includingwomen,willbecome moreinterestedinparticipation. Theseefforts,however,failedto improvethequalityof the meansof representationingeneralandspecificdataondirectparticipationshowadismal picture(indexis40).Moreover,thereisalackofinterestonhowtomobiliseand to involve the people. In addition, the efforts also neglect the issue of power relations, as the institutions have been commonly facilitated by top initiative, notbypeopleparticipation.56 Asinstitutionsemphasiseindividualroles,thenitispossiblethatthey mightbedominatedbycertaingroupsorcommunityinterests,aswasthecase forForumWarga,whichisdominatedbytheNUMoslemcommunity,orBaileo thatfocusesontraditionalcommunities.Butletusnotbetooeagertoconsider this as a negative aspect. When institutions are dominated by human rights activists,thenissuesnotrelatedtohumanrightsareneglected.Ifthemajorityof the people are Moslem, then there is a risk in which the interests of the non Moslesmareneglected.Thisalsoshowsthatdirectrepresentativeinstitutionsdo not necessarily support pluralism in its ultimate form, that all the people may usetheinstitution,notwithstandingtheirbackgroundandstatus. Outsidedirectrepresentativeinstitutionsmentionedbefore,somecivil organisations also attempt to channel their aspirations directly, for example through labour unions, peasant organisations, religious community. Like other
Itistruethatmostdemocraticformsofalternativedirectrepresentationhavebeenintroducedfromabove, suchasbythemayorsofficeinPortoAlegreortheStatePlanningBoardinKeralabutthisistheresultof longandextensivepopularorganisationtoachievegenuinerepresentativeelectionsandthenintroducesuch measuresinaconsistentway.ItisdifferentinIndonesiawheretheinitiativescomefromNGOactivistswithout a popular organisation from below. Ironically, the indication of topdown initiatives is strengthened by undertaking direct representation as a part of deliberative politics proposed by donors such as the Ford FoundationortheWorldBank.SeealsoHarriset.al.(2002).
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direct representative institutions tending to limit their issues, these organisationsarealsoatriskofisolationfromothercivilmovements. There is nothing wrong with direct representation of interests, concernedgroupsorexperts,andothers,butforademocracytodevelop,these direct forms need to be institutionalised to guarantee a clearly defined demos with equal rights, accountability etc. according to the general principles of democracy. Direct forms, as such, have to be combined and must compromise withuniversalpopularsovereignty,notjustwithspecialgroupsandinterests,all ofwhichcallforrepresentation. Another form of direct representation is direct intervention through political contracts with members of parliament or government. Traditional or religious communities usuallyapplythismethod,and commonly demand more specificrights,suchaslandrightsortheenactmentofsharialaw.Recently,these methodshavealsobeenusedbynonethnicandnonreligiousbaseddemocratic groupsbeforelocalelections. Beside the tendency to struggle on specific issues, other direct interventionsmainweaknessisthegreatdependencyondominantactors,such as certain candidates, politicians or government, rather than on organisations offering political contracts. Therefore, it is possible for one actor to make different political contracts with some people organisations, whether they are prodemocratic or not.57This implies that both civil society organisations and social organisations do not yet have substantial bargaining position, which coupled with weak representation institutionalization. This makes it absolutely difficulttowatchtheexecutionofpoliticalcontracts. In discussing the various forms of direct representation, it is believed thatitisnecessarytoclusterallattemptsandeffortsintoabroaderdemocratic political framework. Some improvements are clearly necessary to politically facilitate representative institutions. It is not sufficient just to establish a communicationsystembetweenthepeopleandthegovernmentortolimitthe scope of social movements at community level. Representation has a broader agenda, widely embracing people and interests, to enable establishing major political power. By applying the method it is expected that alternative political powerswillemerge.
57
As what happened in Jakarta local elections, where UPC and Fakta had political contracts with different candidates.
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ConclusionsandRecommendations Although representation remains dismal, Demos 2007 Survey brings optimismaboutsomeprogressbeingmadeintheprocessofdemocracy.Several democrats have attempted to: 1) craft rules and regulation; 2) reform parties, and3)institutionalisedirectrepresentation.However,theseattemptshavenot been accompanied by efforts to build the capacity of ordinary people and to develop popular sovereignty. It seems that the constituents have been left behind. Themainweaknessofelitecraftingliesinitselitistapproachtendingto place any attempt to generate changes into the hands of the elites, including party elites which are often part of the problem. In addition, this method excludestheperspectiveofpowerrelationsandinterests,sothatthereisalack ofinteresttodemonopolisetheelites.Asaresult,institutionalcraftingtendsto merely polish the existing system or institutions, and increases the capacity of elitedominatedactorsratherthanincreasingthepoliticalcapacityofthepeople. Thepowerfulelitesmonopolisethepoliticalsystem,particularlyparty politics.Indoingso,theylobbyandapproachvariousinterestgroups,andeven cooperate with international institutions. Unfortunately, what often is considered a solution is merely fixing the existing democratic institutions, particularlypoliticalparties.However,therealitythattheinstitutionshavebeen monopolisedbytheelite,isnotyetamatterforconcern. Aside from that, there are still existing party reform weaknesses. The inabilityofthismethodtopreventfragmentationamongprodemocracyactivists isquestionableanddoubtful.Thereisnoclearchainofmandatebetweencadres and party activists with their constituents, or between parties and their supporting organisations, Political organisation is not effective, particularly in relation to member recruitment, party financing, basis extension and the creation of parties as an effective political machine in the elections. Suffering fromtheseweaknesses,newalternativepartiesremainunabletocompetewith theestablishedparties. Lastly, attempt to institutionalise direct participation is also basically flawed. Those who have entered into contracts with the elites tend to take existing power relations for granted. In addition, deliberative process and individualparticipationhavenotyetgeneratedclearformsofdemocracywithin theforum. Althoughallformofattemptstopromoteparticipationshaveattained theirownachievements,wehavetoadmitthattheyarenotsufficienttoresolve the main issues of representation, i.e. how to demonopolise the elites. The
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promotion of representation will be fruitful when power relations are changed and when the monopoly of the powerful elite in the political system is deconstructed.Itisalsonecessarytofacilitatedemocraticpopularcontrolwith new creativity and innovation to cover the weaknesses of the experiments, or else,democracywillweaken. Therefore, Demos recommends some important points based on experimentsconductedbyprodemocracyactorstopromoterepresentation. 1) Itisimportanttoconsidertheframeworkofpowerrelations,thatefforts toimproverepresentationmustaimtoreformpowerrelationspresently dominatedbyelites(elitedemonopolisation). 2) Constituentsshouldnotbeleftbehind,bytyingthemandatechainmore clearly between activists and cadres with constituents or base organisations. 3) Strategiesaredesignedtomanageselfsufficientfinancialsupportandto makeastrongpoliticalorganisation. Attempt to embrace and cover the interests of more people, including people outside the constituency is undertaken through formulating more general, broaderissuestocoverbroaderinterests.Thisisparticularlytheformulationof anempiricalideologyfortheestablishmentofalternativeparties.
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Summary
ChapterEight
Summary
Demosteam ADecadeofReformasi:Thefragilityofdemocracy Demos 2007 Survey provides a general picture of Indonesian democratisation in the past decade producing formal and informal regulations and norms supportive of the democratic political system. Democracy has been widely accepted in public life. It also has worked satisfactorily as a national politicalframework,replacinganauthoritarianpoliticalsystem.Atthispoint,the optimistviewisthatwehavereachedthepointofnoreturnwheredemocracy movesahead,littlebylittle,towardprogress.Afterthedramaticimprovements of civil and political rights in the first few years of democratisation, some instruments of democracy related to governance have also improved. The improvementincludestheeradicationofcorruption,governmentstransparency andaccountability,thesubordinationofgovernmentofficialsbeforethelaw,the upholding of the rule of law, and the capacity to combat organised crime. However,thereremainsomeproblems. Firstly, there is cynicism when politics is understood as a practice to takeoverelitistpowerormerelyacareerpathtofosterverticalmobilisationto attain more power. Such response is probably related to the powerful elite dominationofpoliticsandthat the practiceofelitistpoliticsneverbecamethe concernofcommonpeople. Secondly, there is some proof indicating that efforts to improve the instruments have been made, particularly with regard to the protection of the rightsofthechildren,therighttoemployment,socialsecurityandbasicneeds, and the right to basic education. To make democracy more meaningful is to makeitmorefunctionalforpeopletoimprovetheireconomicconditions. Thirdly, the options left, in spite of some failures, is to continue the processofdemocratisation.Thesituation,nevertheless,becomesparadoxicalas thepowerfuleliteisgoingintoconsolidationofoligarchicdemocracymode,a phenomenon marked by the practice of politics of order and the blocking of formaldemocracytopopularrepresentation. Fourthly, representation remains the most acute problem. No substantialprogresshasbeenmadeonthethreedimensionsofrepresentation:
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party based political representation, civil associations and social movement basedinterestrepresentation,anddirectparticipation.Nevertheless,democracy will remain the playground for the oligarchic elites, as long as the agenda of democratisationfailstocoverthesethreedimensions. Fifthly,thethreattofundamentalaspectsofdemocracyisindicatedby the deterioration of several civil freedoms, such as freedom of religion and freedomofspeechandorganisation. Sixthly, the powerful actors are now more integrated into the system of democracy. Their manoeuvres are supported by a partybased political machineandstrongeconomicresourcesthefruitofthenexusofeconomyand politicalrelationsinheritedfromthepreviousregime.Thecapacityofalternative actorsisnotsufficientlyadequatetodecolonizeanddemonopolisetheexisting political system from the grip of oligarchic elites. These actors, relying on scattered masses and being without sufficient economic resources, are fragmentedandpoliticallymarginalised. In spite of progress, some fundamentals of democracy suffer from a chronic condition. In addition, many of the agendas of democracy institutionalisationremainincomplete. ARoughRoadtoPoliticalCitizenship: Undertheshadowoflocalcommunalism? AcountrywidepoliticalframeworkfordemocratisationinIndonesiais already in place and working. It has even succeeded in generating effective solutionsfortheconflictsinAceh,sothatthisregionremainsanintegralpartof Indonesia.Thecountrywidepoliticalframeworkfordemocracycanbefoundin peoples self identification to the existence of Indonesia as a community when participating in national elections. This shows that there is a national identity basisfordemocraticpoliticalcommunitiesinIndonesia. Nonetheless, identification as members of a religious community and other communal identities become stronger in the framework of local politics and local conflicts. Sentiments of local communalism, particularly based on ethnic differences coinciding with religion and class differences, are likely to overshadowdemocraticpoliticalworkatlocallevel. This is the structural reason for the importance of opening up new democraticpoliticalspaceswithnationalpoliticalframeworkatlocallevel.Once again, learning from the Aceh situation, a national democratic political frameworkistheonlywaytoresolvelocalconflicts. Whatremainsaproblemisthelackoflocalpoliticalorganisationswith a democratic, open orientation, working across ethnic, religion and class
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boundaries.Thenumbersofinstitutionsworkingtochannelpeoplesaspirations atlocallevelarelimited.Therefore,theremustbeawaytopromoteandopen upbroaderspacesfortheemergenceofdemocraticpoliticalorganisations. Above all, it is realised that local politics are becoming increasingly important in the aftermath of decentralisation and regional autonomy. Under such circumstance, it is the time to test the democratic political framework at the level of substate, with the new setting of localization of politics which is whenpoliticsbecomesomethingthatisglobally/locallyconstructed. ConsolidationofOligarchicDemocracy: Towardspoliticsoforder? Instrumentsofpoliticalrepresentation,particularlypoliticalparties,are being used more by the powerful actors than by the alternative actors. In addition, the dismal state of political representation is closely related to the colonizationoforganisedpoliticsbythepowerfulactors. Tounderstandthisphenomenon,ourdataprovidethebiggerpictures of the causal factors. Firstly, the instruments of representation are mostly neglected by prodemocracy actors. Instead of promoting them, these actors prefertouseshortcutsasanalternative.Secondly,althoughbothalternativeand powerfulactorsareatleastusingtheinstrumentsofrepresentation,thelatter, inparticular,arenotgoodatpromotingthem. Thirdly,poorrepresentationisbothaproductofelitedominanceand ofasystemsustainingandevenenhancingitasaoligarchicpower.Itistruethat currentpowerfulelitesarenotlimitedtotheoldcentralizedoligarchswhohave survivedthefallofSoeharto.Infact,asubstantailpartofthebroadernewelite emerges from the system of democracy and utilises it to promote its own interests. Someprominenttrendshaveclearlyindicatedthatoligarchicelitesare actually preparing to make democracy even more unaccessible to popular participation andinstruments,soas to servetheirowninterests.The powerful eliteshamperpopularparticipationinthesystemofrepresentation. AlternativeActorsTrendtowardsPopulistShortcuts The alternative actors, regarded to have the potential power to compete with the powerful actors, are also assumed to have better relations with a variety of instruments of democracy. The alternative or prodemocracy actorsnowhavebettercapacityandareincreasinglyinvolvedinformalpolitics. Nevertheless, alternative actors are depending on the support of scattered
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masses and have almost no economic resources. These actors can only communicatetheirpoliticalviewsamongthemselvesinlimitedforums. In spite of difficulties, the alternative actors also start to realise the importance of working on political agendas, becoming involved in the state domainandtransformingtheircivilactivitiesintopoliticallymeaningfulones.In addition,theyalsoseetheneedtoestablishapoliticalbasisamongthepeople. In other words, they do not fully focus on civil activism anymore, but are beginningtorealizetheimportanceofbecominginvolvedinpoliticsatthebasis ofthesocialmovement. Consideringthemapofthesituationalternativeactorsnowdealwith populistmethods,thepoliticsoftakingtheviewofforthesakeofthepeopleto enter decisionmaking institutions and thus neglecting the channels of political representation.Theygothepopulistwaybyutilisingthesupportofcharismatic informal leaders, supported through the system of patronage. Instead of working on agendas to promote representation by establishing broad popular basis for their movement, the alternative actors take shortcuts to put direct pressure on decisionmaking institutions on behalf of peoples needs and interest. The direct participation they are carrying out is not based on the promotion of representation on the basis of strong interest organisation. Depending on mediating contacts and lobbyists, the alternative actors actually employindividualandinformaldirectparticipation. VariousCraftstoPromoteRepresentation:Anevaluation Diverseattemptstopromoterepresentationhavebeenmade.Thefirst attempt concentrates on improving the performance of political parties and partysystem.Effortshavebeenmadetoreformpoliticalpartylegislationtobe more adaptable to the multiparty system. However, the multiparty system successfullycreatedatinstitutionallevelisactuallybeingusedbythepowerful elite. This crafting has not brought any significant change to the pattern of power relations. In other words, the reform of the party system does not significantly contribute to the establishment of an agenda to demonopolize elitesandtochangetheunderlyingpowerrelations.Inaddition,localelections are crafted to exclude the importance of efforts to strengthen democratic politicalorganisationsatlocallevel.Localelectionswillonlycauselocalpolitics tobecomefilledbyantidemocraticforces. Thesecondattemptisrelatedtojoiningpoliticalpartiesandreforming themfromwithinorestablishingnewpartieswithnewcraftedconstituentbasis. The attempts of prodemocracy actors working in CSOs or NGOs or of social
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movementstojoinbigpartiesaresomeexamples.However,theseactorsappear tohavefailedin bringing aboutsubstantialchangestothepartytheyjoinand, rather, absorbed deeper into oligarchic mechanisms. Moreover, fragmentation hinderseffortstopromoterepresentationbyestablishingnewparties.Theeffort facesinternalproblemsgiventhelackofresourcesandtherelativeabsenceof organisedpopularbasis.Whenthenewpartiesarereallyestablished,theyhave to deal with the competition of constituent basis claim. Conflicts break out betweenthenewpartiesandcivilsocietyorganisationswhoseconstituentbasis aretakenoverbythenewparties. Third effort is to promote representation in order to establish representative institutions enabling specific direct participation in government institutions. Different from the other two methods presented previously, the thirdislesspolitical,meaningitisnotorientedtowardspoliticalorganisation.In other words, the effort attempts to establish nonpolitical representation to struggle for peoples specific interests. In many cases, the medium of direct participationisappealingtothelowerclassesasitaccomodatesmoreconcrete, openandpoliticallynonpartisanissues.Yet,asalsoproveninothercases,this medium actually does not employ a clear frame of representation and has the potentialtosustaintheexistingpowerrelations. We have so far identified some of the problems stemming from a variety of efforts to promote representation. All these efforts face some common problems of the lack of support from popular organisations, fragmentation among civil society and prodemocratic organisations, and the exclusionofanagendatochangeexistingpowerrelations.Thefinalchaptershall addressalternativesandrecommendations.
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TheModelofPoliticalBloc
ChapterNine
ArisArifMundayat(GadjahMadaUniversity)andAEPriyono(Demos) Demos2007Surveyshowsthatdemocracyhastriumphedandreigned in Indonesia. However, the experience of democratic governance in Indonesia remainsveryyoungbywhichstillfocusontheprocedurallevelandneedsome effortsinmakingdemocracymeaningful.Itisbecausetheformerauthoritarian government,whichruledfor30years(19661998)andwasreplacedbycivilian government democraticallyelected, hasaffectedpoliticalcultureofIndonesian society.Democracyitselfhasempoweredcivilsociety,potentiallyvulnerableto fallintovariousformsofconflictthatneedtobemanagedpolitically.Ontheone hand, the emergence of undemocratic cultural factor, such as patronage communal organizations, has privatised despotism and anarchy which, in turn, would affect the maturation of democracy. On the other hand, the neoliberal economyhastakenplaceonthegroundandmarginalisedlocaleconomicfluxes. It has made the states attention to turn to the market mechanism and, therefore, to the freedom of movement of private capital. Under such circumstance,thestatehasbeenweakenedbyconditionswhichthenitbecomes ineffective in institutionalizing democratic governance. However, it is obvious thattheprocedurallevelofdemocracyhasgivensomepossibilitiesfordemosto beinvolvedandtomakeuseofit. The substantive matters of human rights based democracy, such as economic, social, and cultural (ecosoc) rights have not conveyed noticeable changes yet. The unequal political relationship between demos and the state due to the deficit of popular control, social fragmentation, polycentric governance, and the problem of popular representation are factors that might slow down, if not halt, efforts in politicising human rights based democracy in Indonesia. To resolve the crisis, democratic policy making and its implementation need to be representative by democratism that follow the principle of political equality and impartiality, authorization, accountability, transparency, and responsiveness. This means that the existing economic situation, the role of the state, the position of the people in production and propertyrelations,thedivisionofthepeopleintovariousclassesandstrata,the existing political and administrative institutions, are all have to be neutral. Efforts to do away with ownership as a condition for participating in elections,
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for example, is a democratic move as ownership in and the relation of various sectionsofthepopulationtoitisnotquestioned.Thesightlessnesstoeconomic relations and stratification of the people in society does not mean that democracylimitsitselftothepoliticalsphere.Itismerelypoliticizingdemocracy. Democracy,therefore,isaconstantmovementbytheexcludedlayerstoobtain rightsequaltotherestinrelationtopoliticalpower(politicalequality). InIndonesiancontextofdemocracy,citizensaredeliberatelydistanced from accepting the existing economic basis, and from reducing the question of politicalliberationtothatoftheparticipationoftheindividualor'layers'inthe legal process of the formation of the state. The practice of democracy in Indonesia has so far been the procedure to legitimise the class rule of the capitalistclass,whichisbynatureabovethepeople.Mechanically,theexisting parliamentary system is an indirect mechanism for indirect participation of the people.But,infact,itisnotthepeople,butratherindividualsrepresentingthem who actually participate both in legislative assemblies and government. These representativesarenotdutyboundtoreflectthewishesoftheirelectorateson various issues. They cast their own votes and express their own views in parliaments, legislative assemblies, and so on. In other words, people elect them,notastheirrepresentativesandspokepersons,butastheirsubstitutesin runningthegovernment.Theelectionprocessmeans,therefore,theprocedure of legitimising the government, and not that of the people's participation in politics. It is rather the establishment of a government, which originates from thepeopleinaformalsense. Electionshere,isfunctiontosecuretherulingclassbywhicheveryfive years they get this stamp of approval and go about their own business. In this alternating opinion poll, the voters are present, not as certain people with certain aspirations who are still alive in the period between the two elections andhavethereforethingstosay,butasmereinsignificantcountableunitsrather thantheirvoicesandviews.Forthenextfiveyearswhentheycanagainchannel their insignificant votes into the ballot box, nobody asks them anything or listenstowhattheyhavetosay,nordotheyhaveaccesstopower,ortosolve theirecosocproblem,orthecapacitytodoanythingaboutthelawsthattheso calledlegislativebodypassabouttheirlives.Theymay,ofcourse,protestinthis interval(ashappenedinlabourstrikeagainstfourministersbillinlateOctober andearlyNovember2008),providedthattheirprotestdoesnotspoiltheruling class game and disrupt the ordinary state of affairs of the society or sum to serious nuisances for the capitalist class politician and the capitalist class businessman. To solve the problem above we need to think the alternative sociopolitical pact that function in developing political linkage, scaling up the
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capacity of the people to represent their views politically, and make use of democracytomaketheirvotebecomingsignificant.Politicalbloc,asseenfrom the model below, perhaps is one of the alternatives that enable sociopolitical fragmentationtobuildpopularcontrol. Organized Politics Political Bloc Popular CivilSociety Organization Organization Politicalbloc asseenfromthemodelaboveisasociopoliticalsphere where civil society, popular organisation and organised politics are engaged to make use of democracy to be more meaningful. This alternative political institution is enabling civil society organisations to represent their aspirations. Meanwhile, organized politics can make use of political bloc to get views, aspirations, interest and the needs of demos for their political agenda and program. Thisengagementwill transformfloatingdemocratsto be more down to people by anchoring them into the political bloc. This sphere will open up accessforthepeopletoalsoincreasetheircapacityinchannelingtheirissues,to scale up linkage and organization, and to transform sectarian conflicts, commonlyfoundinfragmentedcivilsociety,tobemorepolitical.Politicalblocin this political constellation may function as popular control and make peoples votessignificantbecausetheyhaveaccesstointervenepublicaffairespeciallyto fulfillandrealizingtheirecosocrights. Politicalblocassociopoliticalsphereisnotonlywideningthelegaland formal base of demos power but also habituating cultural democracy that will guide their political action and governmentality. It functions as a sphere for political engagement of increasingly broader sections in power or personal freedom,whichinturnempowerthepossibilityfortheindividualtointervenein
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public affairs through popular control and political equality. Political bloc emphasisestheprocessofdemocraticinstitutionalisationthatwillfunctionasan authoritytoilluminatethematerialandspiritualneedsofhumanbeingsifthey are to enjoy the possibility of making free choices in the realm of political and civilrights. Hence, we recommend the establishment of democratic political blocks.Theideaisspecificallybasedonthefollowingarguments: A. Democratic Political Block as an Experiment to Promote Popular Representation Thereareseveralproblemsunderlyingtheemergenceofnewideasto formDemocraticPoliticalBlock: (1)Thesystemofpoliticalrepresentationfails toworkas theinstitutionsof democracyaredominatedbydominantelites. (2) The currently ratified package of political laws, particularly the Law on Political Party and Law on General Election, has once again, revealed effortsbytheparliamentarianpoliticalelitestohindertheestablishment ofnewpartiesbysettingdiscriminative,unreasonablerequirements. (3) The populist shortcuts taken by prodemocratic oriented alternative actorsarenotrelevantinpromotingpopularrepresentation. (4) Efforts to promote representation todate have not yet included an agendatochangepowerrelations. The Democratic Political Block aims to promote alternative representation,basedonpopularinterest. B. Democratic Political Block as a Solution to the Fragmentation of Pro DemocracyMovement. A democratic political block is not the only solution to our fragile democratisation. However, it aims to solve one of crucial problems of democratisation,i.e.thefragmentationoftheprodemocracymovement. Witha democraticpoliticalblock,wewillbeable togatherenergyto consolidate and coordinate the fragmented prodemocracy movement. The fragmentation is not only caused by a different focus but also by the lack of stronglinksbetweenmovementsindifferentplaces. Ademocraticpoliticalblockalsoservesasabridgeforreformistactors in organised politics to link with actors working in social movements and civil organisations.
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C. Momentum for the Establishment of a Democratic Political Block: Options andSocialSupportBasis Despite the great challenges, the opportunity to build a broad social basis for the movement to promote popular representation exists. The opportunityservesasapotentialforbroadsocialsupportfromseveralelements among people with a high interest in politics but with a very critical outlook towardsactualpoliticalpractices,elitistspolitics. Insuchasituation,itisnecessarythatwemapthesocialsectorsthat are already politicized, and classify them according to three forms of representation: political, interest, and civic representation. The sectors of new politicalmassesinwaitingneedastrong,solid,open,inclusiveandparticipative organisationalmethod. To exploit such a momentum, a democratic political block is the appropriateinstitutionalizationsolution. D.AgendasofDemocraticPoliticalBlock There are four inherent agendas regarding the establishment of a DemocraticPoliticalBlock. First,democraticpoliticalblocksaimtoprotecthumanrightsbasedon democratisation including equal civil and political rights and forms of more democratic political representation against an elites scenario to establish politicsoforderthroughitsoligarchicdemocracyconsolidation. Second,democraticpoliticalblocksaimtopromoteparticipatorylocal government, including participatory budgeting and participatory sustainable planning. Third,democraticpoliticalblocksaimtopromotewomenparticipation andincludewomenperspectiveandissueinpoliticalmatters. Fourth,theestablishmentofademocraticpoliticalblockalsoservesas aconcretesteptodemonopolisethesystemofrepresentationandcloseddoor parties. To create a system of popular representation as an alternative to elitistrepresentationcurrentlypracticed. (i) To scale up the possibility to build local parties from below, from a localcontext. (ii) To open broader possibilities for social (movement) based interest representation. (iii) To open broader participation for women and accommodate women perspectiveinpolitics. (iv) Topromotesocial,economicandsocialrights.
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(v) To promote social pacts to guarantee the fulfilment of rights to employment, social security, environmental protection and economic development.
The Institutionalisation of a Democratic Political Block at National and Local Level A democratic political block can be established both a national and local levels. If nationally it is based on universal themes, ideas, and principles, thenlocallyitisimplementedonthebasisofauniversalvision. A local democratic political block is an authentic response to the problemsofdemocracyatlocallevel.Therefore,theblocksthemes,issuesand strategiesmustbeacontextualsolutiontolocalproblems. Theestablishmentofalocalpoliticalblockdoesnotonlyconcentratein promoting partybased political representation despite the urgency and the strategicnatureofthearena.Thepromotionofnonpartybasedrepresentation topromoteissuesandinterests,aswellascivicparticipationisalsoanimportant agendaitem. Inaddition,itisalsoimportanttomaptheroadforeachexperimentof national and local democratic political block. The road map is important to determinewhentheestablishmentoftheblockshouldbeginorwhereitshould end,thesituationwithinwhichtheblockistobeestablished,theblockagenda andtheblockstructure.
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Trnquist, Olle. 2007. Problems and Options of Scallingup and Building DemocraticRepresentation. Trnquist, Olle. 2002. Popular Development and Democracy, Case Studies with Rural Dimensions in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Kerala. Occasional Papers from SUM, No.3. Centre for Development and theEnvironment,UniversityofOsloincooperationwithUNRISD. Trnquist, Olle, Stokke Kristian and Webster, Neil. 2009. Rethinking Popular representation,Palgrave(forthcoming2009). Trnquist, Olle. 2009. The Problem is Representation! Towards an Analytical Framework,inTrnquistet.al,RethinkingPopularRepresentation. Palgrave(forthcoming2009). Trnquist,Olle,Prasetyo,StanleyA,andBirks,Teresa(eds).2009.Aceh:therole of democracy for peace and reconstruction, Jogjakarta: PCD Press. (www.pcd.ugm.ac.id) Trnquist,Olle,Tharakan,P.K.Michael,andQuimpo,Nathan.PopularPoliticsof Representation.NewExperiencesfromIndonesia,Kerala(India)and The Philippines, in Trnquist et. al, Rethinking Popular Representation.Palgrave(forthcoming2009). van Klinken, Gerry. 2002. Indonesias New Ethnic Elites, in Henk Schulte NordholtandIrwanAbdullah(eds),IndonesiainSearchofTransition (Yogyakarta:PustakaPelajar) van Klinken, Gerry. Patronage democracy in provincial Indonesia in Trnquist et. al, Rethinking Popular Representation. Palgrave (forthcoming 2009). Wacquant,Loc(ed.).2005.PierreBourdieuandDemocraticPolitics,Cambridge andMalden:PolityPress. Webster,Neil.1992.PanchayatiRajInWestBengal:ParticipationforthePeople ortheParty?DevelopmentandChange23:4. World Bank. 1997. World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
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Bibliography
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DataTabulation Category:General
DATATABULATION
NATIONALSURVEY PROBLEMSANDOPTIONSONDEMOCRATIZATIONIN INDONESIA 2007

CATEGORY: GENERALDATA(ALLINFORMANTS)
133
A. PROFILEOFINFORMANTS
TableA.1.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtoprovince
NO A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 B 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 C 18 19 20 21 D 22 23 24 25 26 27 E 28 29 30 31 32 33 PROVINCE REGION:SUMATERA NanggroeAcehDarussalam NorthSumatra Riau RiauIslands WestSumatra Jambi Bengkulu SouthSumatra BangkaBelitung Lampung REGION:JAWAANDBALI Banten WestJawa DKIJakarta CentralJawa DIYogyakarta EastJawa Bali REGION:KALIMANTAN WestKalimantan CentralKalimantan EastKalimantan SouthKalimantan REGION:SULAWESI Gorontalo NorthSulawesi CentralSulawesi WestSulawesi SoutheastSulawesi SouthSulawesi REGION:EASTERNINDONESIA WestNusaTenggara EastNusaTenggara Maluku NorthMaluku Papua WestIrianJaya TOTAL(A+B+C+D+E) PROPORTION(%) 29 2 3 1 2 3 3 4 4 3 3 21 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 12 3 2 4 3 19 3 4 3 2 4 3 19 3 3 3 3 3 4 100
Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903.
134
TableA.2.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtofrontline
NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. FRONTLINES Thestruggleofpeasants,agriculturallabourersandfisherfolksfor theirsocial,economicandotherrights(Landrights) Thestruggleoflabourforbetterworkingconditionsandstandardof living(Labourmovement) Thestruggleforthesocial,economicandotherrightsoftheurban poor(Urbanpoor) Thepromotionofhumanrights(Humanrights) Thestruggleagainstcorruptioninfavourofgoodgovernance (Anticorruption) Democratizationofthepoliticalpartiesandthepartysystem (Reformparties) Thepromotionofpluralism,religiousandethnicreconciliationand conflictresolution(Pluralism) Theimprovementanddemocratisationofeducation(Education) Thepromotionofprofessionalismaspartofgoodgovernancein publicandprivatesectors(Professionalism) Thepromotionoffreedom,independenceandqualityofmedia (Media) Thepromotionofgenderequalityandfeministperspectives (Genderequality) Theimprovementofalternativerepresentationatthelocallevel (Localrepresentation) Thepromotionofsustainabledevelopment(Sustainable development) TOTAL PROPORTION (%) 9 7 5 8 8 9 8 8 7 9 10 7 7 100
TableA.3.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtogender
NO 1 2 Female Male GENDER PROPORTION (%) 23 77 100
TOTAL Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903.
TabelA.4.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtoage
NO 1 2 3 4 5 25yo.oryounger 2635yo. 3645yo. 46yo.orolder Nodata TOTAL Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. AGEGROUPS PROPORTION (%) 3 35 37 23 2 100
135
TabelA.5.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtolevelofeducation
NO 1 2 3 4 5 Elementary Middle University Postgraduate Nodata TOTAL Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. LEVELOFEDUCATION PROPORTION (%) 2 18 59 19 2 100
TabelA.6.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtooccupation
NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NGO Academe Politician Bureaucracyandlocalgovernment Auxiliarystatebodies Business Professional Religiousandethnicleader Noncareer(housewives,retiredpersons,etc) Noanswer TOTAL Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. OCCUPATION PROPORTION (%) 31 11 6 4 2 8 30 1 2 4 100
TabelA.7.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtoreligion
NO 1 2 3 4 5 Islam Hindu Budha Protestan Chatolic TOTAL Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. RELIGION PROPORTION (%) 74 2 1 14 8 100
136
TabelA.8.Contextofinformationthatinformantsreferto
NO 1 2 Province/Local National/issuearea TOTAL Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903.
CONTEXT
PROPORTION (%) 83 17 100
137
DataTabulationCategory:General
TableA.9.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtoprovinceandfrontline
FRONTLINES NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 PROVINCE AcehDarussalam NorthSumatra Riau Riauislands WestSumatra Jambi Bengkulu SouthSumatra BangkaBelitung Lampung Banten WestJawa DKIJakarta CentralJawa DIYogyakarta EastJawa WestKalimantan Central Kalimantan EastKalimantan SouthKalimantan LAND RIGHTS 1 3 1 1 3 3 4 3 3 3 1 6 2 4 3 3 3 2 3 2 LABOUR MOVT 0 6 2 1 2 3 1 4 0 2 2 9 4 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 URBAN POOR 0 2 0 2 2 1 3 2 1 2 4 0 3 2 2 3 1 0 2 2 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 3 0 2 3 5 4 2 0 4 2 1 5 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 ANTI CORRUPT ION 2 1 0 2 2 2 4 3 5 4 3 2 4 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 REFORM PLURALISM PARTIES 3 1 3 2 2 2 4 3 0 3 2 3 6 3 2 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 0 2 4 3 1 2 0 2 2 2 3 4 1 3 2 EDUCA TION 2 2 0 2 3 3 3 1 2 0 3 1 4 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 PRO FESSIONALISM 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 0 1 3 1 2 0 0 2 1 MEDIA 0 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 4 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 GENDER EQUALITY 4 3 1 2 3 1 4 3 4 3 4 1 2 2 3 1 4 3 2 4 LOCAL SUSTAINABLE REP. DEVELOPMENT 1 1 0 1 3 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 3 2 1 2 0 0 1 2 4 3 0 1 2 0 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 TOTAL
19 28 11 21 31 29 40 34 23 28 30 27 40 28 24 25 27 19 34 30 (continued)
138

TableA.9.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtoprovinceandfrontline FRONTLINES NO 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 PROVINCE Gorontalo NorthSulawesi CentralSulawesi WestSulawesi Southeast Sulawesi SouthSulawesi Bali WestNusa Tenggara EastNusa Tenggara Maluku NorthMaluku Papua WestIrianJaya TOTAL LAND RIGHTS 3 2 3 2 3 2 0 4 3 1 3 1 2 77 9% LABOUR MOVT 0 3 2 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 3 0 3 83 7% URBAN POOR 0 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 59 5% HUMAN RIGHTS 2 2 3 1 3 1 4 0 2 3 2 3 4 45 8% ANTI CORRUPT ION 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 2 0 1 2 2 73 8% REFORM PLURALISM PARTIES 3 3 3 3 3 2 0 1 2 4 1 1 2 74 9% 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 0 3 4 2 1 3 79 8% EDUCA TION 2 3 2 0 4 2 2 1 2 3 4 0 4 70 8%
PRO GENDER MEDIA FESSIONALISM EQUALITY 1 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 4 68 7% 2 4 1 3 4 2 3 2 1 6 3 3 2 59 9% 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 80 10%
LOCAL REP. 2 3 2 1 3 4 1 3 3 2 3 2 1 87 7%
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2 2 2 1 3 1 0 1 1 2 2 5 2 65 7%
TOTAL
25 35 30 21 36 25 20 24 23 30 30 24 32 61 100%
139
B.ATTITUDESTOPOLITICS TableB.1.Peoplesunderstandingonpolitics Q17.Inyourexperience,howdopeopleunderstand politics? PROPORTIO N UNDERSTANDINGONPOLITICS N O (%) 1 Struggleforpower 54 2 Popularcontrolofpublicaffairs 14 Somethingtakencareofbythe 3 12 elites/publicfigures 4 Elitistmanipulation 17 5 Kindofjob/career;associaldedication 1 6 Noanswer 2 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. TableB.2.Peoplesinteresttowardsinpolitics Q18.Howinterestedarepeopleinpolitics? PROPORTIO N PEOPLESINTERESTTOWARDSIN N O POLITICS (%) 1 Highlyinterested 14 2 Interested 46 3 Notinterested 40 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903.
140
TableB.3.Womensinterestinpolitics Q19.Howinterestedarewomeninpolitics? PROPORTIO N (%) 1 Highlyinterested 7 2 Interested 42 3 Notinterested 50 4 Noanswer 1 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. TableB.4.Informantsassessmentonwhatshouldatfirsthandbedone toencouragewomenparticipationinpolitics Q20.Accordingtoyou,whatshouldatfirsthandbedoneto encouragetheparticipationofwomeninpolitics? N WAYSTOENCOURAGEWOMEN PROPORTION O PARTICIPATIONINPOLITICS (%) Fightforwomenquotainlegislativeand 1 10 executiveinstitutions Increasewomenspoliticalawarenessand 2 61 capacity Supportwomentogainpositionsinpolitical 3 7 institutions Expandthepoliticalagendasothatit 4 21 includesmoreissues 5 Againstpatriarchy 1 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. N O WOMENSINTERESTTOWARDSIN POLITICS
141
TableB.5.Informantsassessmentonthemostappropriatechannel tobeusedtoengageinpoliticalprocess Q21.Ifoneisinterestedinpolitics,whichchanneldoyouthink isthemostappropriatetobeusedatfirsthand? N CHANNELTOBEUSEDTOENGAGEIN PROPORTION O POLITICALPROCESS (%) 1 Joinabignationalpoliticalparty 31 Joinasmallpoliticalpartythatiseligibleto 2 15 runinelections 3 Establishanewlocallyrootedpoliticalparty 13 4 Congregateanonpartypoliticalblock 37 5 Activeinpoliticaldiscourse/mapping 3 6 Noanswer 1 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. Tabel B.6. The most effective method to increase peoples political capacityandparticipation Q22.Whichmethoddoyouthinkismosteffectivetoincrease peoplespoliticalcapacityandparticipation? N METHODSTOINCREASEPOLITICAL PROPORTION O CAPACITYANDPARTICIPATION (%) 1 Increasingpeoplespoliticalawareness 58 2 Improvingtheeducationofpoliticalcadres 19 Reformingandconsolidatingexisting 3 5 politicalparties Promotingpoliticallyorientedcampaigns 4 3 andmakingpublicstatementsandspeeches 5 Mobilisingthemasses 2 Buildingdemocraticandmassbased 6 12 organisationsandnewpoliticalparties 7 Noanswer 1 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903.
142

C.
THECONSTRUCTIONOFTHEPEOPLE/DEMOS Table C.1. Informants assessment of peoples identity in 2004 general election Q23.Inthe2004generalelectionsoflegislators,howdidpeopleatfirsthand identifythemselves? PROPORTION NO IDENTITY (%) 1 AsaresidentofIndonesiaingeneral 35 2 Asresidentsoftheircity/municipality/province 12 3 Asresidentsoftheirvillageandhamlet(dusun) 7 4 Asmembersoftheirethniccommunity 8 5 Asmembersoftheirreligiouscommunity 5 6 Asmembers/supportersoftheirpoliticalparty 24 7 Asmembersoftheirsocialclass 8 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. TableC.2.InformantsassessmentofpeoplesidentityinPilkada Q24.Inregionalelection(s)(pilkada),howdidpeopleatfirsthandidentify themselves? PROPORTION NO IDENTITY (%) 1 Asresidentsoftheircity/municipality/province 40 2 Asresidentsoftheirvillageandhamlet(dusun) 11 3 Asmembersoftheirethniccommunity 23 4 Asmembersoftheirreligiouscommunity 4 5 Asmembers/supportersoftheirpoliticalparty 13 6 Asmembersoftheirsocialclass 7 7 Others 2 8 Noanswer 1 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903.
143
Table C.3. Informants assessment of peoples identity in situation of conflict causedbysocial,economyandpoliticaltension Q25.Howdopeopleidentifythemselveswhentheyfacesituationofconflict causedbysocial,economyandpoliticaltension? PROPORTION NO IDENTITY (%) 1 Asresidentsoftheircity/municipality/province 12 2 Asresidentsoftheirvillageandhamlet(dusun) 12 3 Asmembersoftheirethniccommunity 36 4 Asamemberoftheirreligiouscommunity 12 5 Asmembersoftheirsocialclass 23 6 Asmembersoftheirpoliticalparty/ideology 1 7 Others 0 8 Noanswer 4 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903.
TableC.4.Informantsassessmentofpeoplesidentityinrespondingto issuesof administrativedivisionofprovincesorregencies Q26.Inrespondingtoissuesofadministrativedivisionofprovincesor regencies,howdopeopleatfirsthandidentifythemselves? PROPORTION NO IDENTITY (%) Asresidentsoftheir 1 37 city/municipality/province Asresidentsoftheirvillageandhamlet 2 30 (dusun) 3 Asmembersoftheirethniccommunity 26 4 Asmembersoftheirreligiouscommunity 1 5 Interestoriented 3 6 Others 1 7 Noanswer 3 TOTAL 100 Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903.
144

D. THEQUALITYOFTHERULESANDREGULATIONSTOPROMOTEDEMOCRACY
TableD.1.Informantsassessmentonrelationofformalrulesandregulationstointrinsicinstrumentstopromotedemocracy Q27.Existence:Inyourassessment,dothereexistformalrulesandregulationswithinyourregionalcontextthataremeanttosupportthefollowingissues? Q28.Performance:Inyourassessment,dotheexistingformalrulesandregulationsthatareappliedwithinyourregionalcontextgenerallytendtobesupportiveenoughornotvery supportiveinrelationtothefollowingissues? Q29.Spread:Inyourassessment,dotheformalrulesandregulationsapplyeffectivelythroughoutyourregionalcontext,orthegeographicalcontextsyourissuearea, Q30.Substance:Inyourassessment,aretheformalrulesandregulationssubstantivebyreallyaddressingallaspectsthatyoudeemtobepartofpubliclife? QUALITYOFFORMALRULESANDREGULATION EXISTENCE PERFORMANCE SPREAD SUBSTANCE INSTRUMENTSTOPROMOTETHEFOLLOWINGINTRINSIC N NO Ye N/ Supportive Notvery MEANSOFDEMOCRACY No / No Yes N/a No Yes N/a s a enough supportive a %ofinformants %ofinformants %ofinformants %ofinformants Citizenship(Equalstatecitizenship;Therightsofminorities, 1 33 59 8 77 21 2 70 29 1 72 26 2 migrantsandrefugees,Reconciliationofhorizontalconflicts) 2 GovernmentsupportofinternationallawandUNhumanrights 27 67 6 85 15 0 69 31 0 69 30 1 Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialstotherule 3 33 60 7 78 21 1 56 43 1 61 38 1 oflaw Theequalitybeforethelaw(Equalandsecureaccesstojustice; 4 33 61 6 80 20 0 57 43 0 61 38 1 Theintegrityandindependenceofthejudiciary) 5 Freedomfromphysicalviolenceandthefearofit 32 62 6 82 18 0 56 43 1 58 40 2 6 Freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganization 19 78 3 84 15 1 39 60 1 47 51 2 7 Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity 24 72 4 80 19 1 51 48 1 58 40 2 8 Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture 19 77 4 87 12 1 30 69 1 37 61 2 9 Genderequalityandemancipation 27 67 6 84 15 1 58 41 1 64 34 2 10 Therightsofchildren 23 72 5 88 11 1 60 40 0 57 42 1 11 Therighttoemployment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds 32 60 8 78 22 0 60 40 0 64 35 1 12 13 Therighttobasiceducation,includingcitizensrightsandduties Goodcorporategovernance 19 37 78 55 3 8 86 79 14 20 0 1 43 68 57 31 0 1 51 66 48 32 1 2
145
Q27.Existence:Inyourassessment,dothereexistformalrulesandregulationswithinyourregionalcontextthataremeanttosupportthefollowingissues? Q28.Performance:Inyourassessment,dotheexistingformalrulesandregulationsthatareappliedwithinyourregionalcontextgenerallytendtobesupportiveenoughornotverysupportiveinrelationtothefollowing issues? Q29.Spread:Inyourassessment,dotheformalrulesandregulationsapplyeffectivelythroughoutyourregionalcontext,orthegeographicalcontextsyourissuearea, Q30.Substance:Inyourassessment,aretheformalrulesandregulationssubstantivebyreallyaddressingallaspectsthatyoudeemtobepartofpubliclife? QUALITYOFFORMALRULESANDREGULATION EXISTENCE PERFORMANCE SPREAD SUBSTANCE INSTRUMENTSTOPROMOTETHEFOLLOWINGINTRINSICMEANSOF NO Supportive Notvery DEMOCRACY No Yes N/a N/a No Yes N/a No Yes N/a enough supportive %ofinformants %ofinformants %ofinformants %ofinformants Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsatcentral, 14 regionalandlocallevel;Freeandfairseparateelectionsofe.g.governors, 16 81 3 85 14 1 29 70 1 44 54 2 mayorsandvillageheads) Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(orteamsof 15 independentcandidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipatein 43 46 11 75 24 1 53 46 1 58 41 2 elections Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypoliticalpartiesand 16 51 36 13 77 22 0 56 43 2 58 41 1 orcandidates. Abstentionfromabusingreligiousorethnicsentiments,symbolsand 17 39 52 9 79 20 1 49 50 1 54 44 2 doctrinesbypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates. Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsbypolitical 18 40 52 8 70 30 0 50 49 1 58 40 2 partiesandorcandidates. 19 20 21 22 Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessand accountabilityofpartiesandorpoliticalcandidatestotheirconstituencies Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment Democraticdecentralisationofgovernmentofallmattersthatdonotneed tobehandledoncentrallevels. Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofelectedgovernment,the executive,(bureaucracies),atalllevels 48 49 39 40 37 38 52 50 15 13 9 10 79 78 72 78 21 21 26 21 0 1 1 1 54 51 47 52 45 48 50 47 1 1 3 1 60 57 61 58 40 41 37 41 0 2 2 1
146
Q27.Existence:Inyourassessment,dothereexistformalrulesandregulationswithinyourregionalcontextthataremeanttosupportthefollowingissues? Q28.Performance:Inyourassessment,dotheexistingformalrulesandregulationsthatareappliedwithinyourregionalcontextgenerallytendtobesupportiveenoughornotverysupportiveinrelationtothefollowing issues? Q29.Spread:Inyourassessment,dotheformalrulesandregulationsapplyeffectivelythroughoutyourregionalcontext,orthegeographicalcontextsyourissuearea, Q30.Substance:Inyourassessment,aretheformalrulesandregulationssubstantivebyreallyaddressingallaspectsthatyoudeemtobepartofpubliclife? QUALITYOFFORMALRULESANDREGULATION NO INSTRUMENTSTOPROMOTETHEFOLLOWINGINTRINSICMEANSOF DEMOCRACY EXISTENCE No Yes N/a PERFORMANCE Supportive Notvery enough supportive %ofinformants 72 80 77 76 93 83 84 84 79 26 19 23 23 7 16 15 16 21 SPREAD N/a No Yes %ofinformants 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 54 56 62 55 10 51 45 55 62 44 43 37 44 90 48 54 44 37 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 59 58 60 57 0 57 53 55 63 N/a No SUBSTANCE Yes %ofinformants 38 41 38 42 100 41 46 44 36 3 1 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 N/a
%ofinformants 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryandpolicetoelected governmentandthepublic Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitarygroups,hoodlums andorganisedcrime Governmentindependencefromforeignintervention(exceptUN conventionsandapplicableinternationallaw) Governmentsindependencefromstronginterestgroupsandcapacityto eliminatecorruptionandabuseofpower Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithinmedia,artand theacademicworld Citizensparticipationinextensiveindependentcivilassociations Transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivilorganisations Allsocialgroupsincludingmarginalisedgroupsextensiveaccesstoand participationinpubliclife 53 49 49 40 22 37 29 35 47 35 39 40 51 74 54 65 57 42 12 12 11 9 4 9 6 8 11
Directparticipation(Peoplesdirectaccessandcontactwiththepublic servicesandgovernmentsconsultationofpeopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirectparticipationinpolicymakingandtheexecutionof publicdecisions) Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. 32
43
46
11
74
24
62
36
63
35
147
TableD.2.Informantsassessmentonrelationofinformalarrangementstointrinsicinstrumentstopromotedemocracy
Q31.Performance:Inyourassessment,dotheexistinginformalarrangementsappliedinyourregionalcontextgenerallytendtosupportorhamperthefollowingissues? Q32.Spread:Inyourassessment,dotheinformalarrangementsapplyeffectivelythroughoutyourregionalcontextorthegeographicalcontextsofyourissuearea? Q33.Substance:Inyourassessment,aretheinformalarrangementssubstantivebyreallyaddressingallaspectsthatyoudeemtobepartofpubliclife? QUALITYOFINFORMALARRANGEMENTS PERFORMANCE NO INSTRUMENTSTOPROMOTETHEFOLLOWINGINTRINSICMEANSOF DEMOCRACY Supportive enough Notvery supportive %ofinformants 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Citizenship(Equalstatecitizenship;Therightsofminorities,migrantsand refugees,Reconciliationofhorizontalconflicts) GovernmentsupportofinternationallawandUNhumanrights Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialstotheruleoflaw Theequalitybeforethelaw(Equalandsecureaccesstojustice;The integrityandindependenceofthejudiciary) Freedomfromphysicalviolenceandthefearofit Freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganization Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture Genderequalityandemancipation Therightsofchildren Therighttoemployment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds Therighttobasiceducation,includingcitizensrightsandduties Goodcorporategovernance 65 65 58 57 65 71 68 76 46 66 67 73 57 33 31 38 40 31 26 29 21 51 31 30 23 39 2 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 49 57 50 53 49 38 49 30 49 47 51 40 60 No answer No SPREAD Yes %ofinformants 49 39 45 44 47 59 47 67 48 50 46 57 36 2 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 62 63 55 56 55 48 57 37 60 55 56 49 62 No answer No SUBSTANCE Yes %ofinformants 36 33 40 40 40 49 39 60 37 42 41 48 33 2 4 5 4 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 No answer
148
Q31.Performance:Inyourassessment,dotheexistinginformalarrangementsappliedinyourregionalcontextgenerallytendtosupportorhamperthefollowingissues? Q32.Spread:Inyourassessment,dotheinformalarrangementsapplyeffectivelythroughoutyourregionalcontextorthegeographicalcontextsofyourissuearea? Q33.Substance:Inyourassessment,aretheinformalarrangementssubstantivebyreallyaddressingallaspectsthatyoudeemtobepartofpubliclife? QUALITYOFINFORMALARRANGEMENTS SPREAD Noanswer No Yes Noanswer %ofinformants 5 36 59 5
NO
INSTRUMENTSTOPROMOTETHEFOLLOWINGINTRINSICMEANSOF DEMOCRACY Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsatcentral, regionalandlocallevel;Freeandfairseparateelectionsofe.g.governors, mayorsandvillageheads) Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(orteamsof independentcandidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipatein elections Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypoliticalpartiesand orcandidates. Abstentionfromabusingreligiousorethnicsentiments,symbolsand doctrinesbypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates. Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsbypolitical partiesandorcandidates. Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessandaccountability ofpartiesandorpoliticalcandidatestotheirconstituencies Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment Democraticdecentralisationofgovernmentofallmattersthatdonotneedto behandledoncentrallevels. Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofelectedgovernment,the executive,(bureaucracies),atalllevels Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryandpolicetoelected governmentandthepublic Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitarygroups,hoodlums andorganisedcrime Governmentindependencefromforeignintervention(exceptUNconventions andapplicableinternationallaw) Governmentsindependencefromstronginterestgroupsandcapacityto eliminatecorruptionandabuseofpower
Supportiveenough
PERFORMANCE Notverysupportive %ofinformants 25
No
SUBSTANCE Yes Noanswer %ofinformants 51 5
14
70
44
15
63
32
56
40
61
34
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
56 61 53 56 60 62 60 54 58 60 64
40 37 44 40 36 34 36 41 38 36 33
4 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 3
55 48 50 56 57 50 49 54 50 59 48
41 49 47 40 39 46 47 41 46 38 48
4 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4
58 55 55 60 59 56 54 57 55 59 53
37 42 41 36 37 40 42 38 41 37 44
5 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 3
149
Q31.Performance:Inyourassessment,dotheexistinginformalarrangementsappliedinyourregionalcontextgenerallytendtosupportorhamperthefollowingissues? Q32.Spread:Inyourassessment,dotheinformalarrangementsapplyeffectivelythroughoutyourregionalcontextorthegeographicalcontextsofyourissuearea? Q33.Substance:Inyourassessment,aretheinformalarrangementssubstantivebyreallyaddressingallaspectsthatyoudeemtobepartofpubliclife? QUALITYOFINFORMALARRANGEMENTS INSTRUMENTSTOPROMOTETHEFOLLOWINGINTRINSICMEANSOF DEMOCRACY PERFORMANCE Supportive enough Notvery supportive %ofinformants 27 28 29 30 31 Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithinmedia,artand theacademicworld Citizensparticipationinextensiveindependentcivilassociations Transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivilorganisations Allsocialgroupsincludingmarginalisedgroupsextensiveaccessto andparticipationinpubliclife 75 71 78 74 64 21 26 19 23 32 4 3 3 3 3 41 52 45 51 56 No answer No SPREAD Yes %ofinformants 55 45 51 45 40 4 3 4 4 4 51 56 52 57 61 No answer No SUBSTANCE Yes %ofinformants 45 40 44 39 35 4 4 4 4 4 No answer
NO
Directparticipation(Peoplesdirectaccessandcontactwiththepublic servicesandgovernmentsconsultationofpeopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirectparticipationinpolicymakingandtheexecutionof publicdecisions) Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. 32
67
30
56
41
58
39
150

TabelD.3.Indexofdemocracyinstruments
NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 CODE 8 14 6 12 27 29 10 7 30 5 28 2 9 11 3 4 17 22 26 21 1 15 13 18 RIGHTSANDINSTITUTIONS
2003/04 INDEX RANK 74 1 63 74 37 60 62 27 57 42 28 57 27 47 22 16 18 38 23 18 33 32 71 21 20 4 2 13 6 5 18 8 11 16 7 17 9 26 32 30 12 24 31 14 15 3 27 29 2007 INDEX RANK 66 1 64 60 59 59 54 53 51 48 47 47 46 46 45 45 44 44 43 43 43 42 40 40 40 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsatcentral, regionalandlocallevel;Freeandfairseparateelectionsofe.g.governors, mayorsandvillageheads) Freedomofspeech,assemblyandorganization Therighttobasiceducation,includingcitizensrightsandduties Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld Citizensparticipationinextensiveindependentcivilassociations Therightsofchildren Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity Transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivilorganisations Freedomfromphysicalviolenceandthefearofit Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithinmedia,artand theacademicworld GovernmentsupportofinternationallawandUNhumanrights Genderequalityandemancipation Therighttoemployment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialstotheruleoflaw Theequalitybeforethelaw(Equalandsecureaccesstojustice;The integrityandindependenceofthejudiciary) Abstentionfromabusingreligiousorethnicsentiments,symbolsand doctrinesbypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates. Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofelectedgovernment,the executive,(bureaucracies),atalllevels Governmentsindependencefromstronginterestgroupsandcapacityto eliminatecorruptionandabuseofpower Democraticdecentralisationofgovernmentofallmattersthatdonotneed tobehandledoncentrallevels. Citizenship(Equalstatecitizenship;Therightsofminorities,migrantsand refugees,Reconciliationofhorizontalconflicts) Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(orteamsof independentcandidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipatein elections Goodcorporategovernance Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsbypolitical partiesandorcandidates Directparticipation(Peoplesdirectaccessandcontactwiththepublic servicesandgovernmentsconsultationofpeopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirectparticipationinpolicymakingandtheexecutionof publicdecisions) Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitarygroups,hoodlums andorganisedcrime Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment Allsocialgroupsincludingmarginalisedgroupsextensiveaccesstoand participationinpubliclife Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessand accountabilityofpartiesandorpoliticalcandidatestotheirconstituencies Governmentindependencefromforeignintervention(exceptUN conventionsandapplicableinternationallaw) Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypoliticalpartiesand orcandidates Thetransparencyandaccountabilityofthemilitaryandpolicetoelected governmentandthepublic
25
32
25
19
40
25
26 27 28 29 30 31 32
24 20 31 19 25 16 23
20 24 46 23 24 24 23 37
28 21 10 25 20 22 23
39 38 38 38 36 36 35 46
26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Averageindex Indexscale0(worst)100(best)
151
E.
THEMAINACTORSPOLITICALWILLANDCAPACITY
TableE.1.Compositionofmainactors Q34,Q35.Basedonyourknowledgeandexperience,whichindividualorcollectiveactorsarecurrently mostpowerfulandhavemostimportantinfluenceinthepoliticalprocess?* ALTERNATIVE POWERFULACTORS N ACTORS MAINACTORSBACKGROUND O F % F % 1 Government/Bureaucracy 885 46 135 8 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 Policeandmilitary Parliament(central+local) Politicalparties Religiousorethnicgroups Academicians,thejudiciary/lawfirms,media NGOs Nonclassbasedmassorganisations Classbasedmassorganisations Business Adatcouncilsetc. Semistateorstateauxiliarybodies Underworldandmilitia 102 157 278 144 106 57 11 12 114 22 18 39 5 8 14 7 5 3 1 1 6 1 1 2 18 109 234 211 284 431 16 74 64 45 35 2 1 7 14 13 17 26 1 4 4 3 2 0
TOTAL 1945 100 1658 100 *Informantswereaskedtoidentifyuptomaximum3powerfulactorsand3alternativeactors.Percentage basedonnumberofeachcategoryofmainactors.

152
TableE.2.Mainactorsrelationtodemocraticinstruments
Q36.Theactorsrelationtothemeansofdemocracy: Howdoeseachoftheactorsthatyouhavespecifiedrelatetothevariousformalaswellasinformalrulesandregulations? POWERFULACTORS (N=1945) NO CATEGORYOFRULESANDREGULATIONS USEAND PROMOTE USEAND MANIPULATE AVOIDOR OPTFOR ALTERNATIVE USEAND PROMOTE ALTERNATIVEACTORS (N=1658) USEAND MANIPULATE AVOIDOR OPTFOR ALTERNATIVE
USE
USE
%ofpowerfulactors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Equalcitizenship InternationallawandUNHRinstruments Ruleoflaw&justice Civilandpoliticalrights Economicandsocialrights Freeandfairelections Goodrepresentation Democraticandaccountablegovernment Freedomofmedia,pressandacademic freedoms Additionalcivilpoliticalparticipation Directparticipation AVERAGE Percentagebasedonnumberofeachcategoryofmainactors. 44 31 32 39 36 35 28 31 35 30 33 34 31 40 35 34 35 36 39 33 39 40 36 36 19 13 23 18 19 23 22 25 18 18 18 20 6 16 10 9 10 6 11 11 8 12 13 10 77 65 67 72 68 64 58 63 67 65 64 66
%ofalternativeactors 17 29 25 22 26 28 31 29 27 29 29 27 3 2 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 7 5 3 3 4 4
153
TableE.3.Mainactorspositiontodemocraticinstruments
Q37.Theactorsposition(strong/weak)inrelationtothemeansofdemocracy:Iseachoftheactorsthatyouhave specifiedinastrongorweakpositiontoinfluencethevariousformalaswellasinformalrulesandregulations? POWERFULACTORS (N=1945) NO CATEGORYOFRULESAND REGULATIONS STRONG WEAK NODATA ALTERNATIVEACTORS (N=1658) STRONG WEAK NODATA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Equalcitizenship InternationallawandUNHR instruments Ruleoflaw&justice Civilandpoliticalrights Economicandsocialrights Freeandfairelections Goodrepresentation Democraticandaccountable government Freedomofmedia,pressand academicfreedoms Additionalcivilpolitical participation Directparticipation AVERAGE
73 45 59 66 64 63 58 56 63 60 63 61
%ofpowerfulactors 27 0 55 41 34 36 37 42 44 35 40 36 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72 57 68 76 67 67 64 61 73 73 71 68
%ofalternativeactors 28 0 43 32 24 33 33 36 39 27 27 29 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Percentagebasedonnumberofeachcategoryofmainactors
154
TableE.4.Mainactorspoliticalterrain
Q38. The actors presence within politics: In what spheres of the political landscape is each of the actors primarily active?* NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SPHERESOF THEPOLITICALLANDSCAPE Businessandindustry Smallbusiness Selfmanagednonprofitunits Lobbygroups Interestorganisations Politicalparties Electedgovernment Thebureaucracy Thejudiciary Militaryandpolice TOTAL POWERFULACTORS ALTERNATIVEACTORS
PERCENTOFRESPONSES 12 1 2 9 14 21 17 19 3 3 100 6 3 5 21 28 14 9 9 5 2 100
*Informantswereaskedtoidentify2mostimportantspheres.Percentagebasedonresponses.
TableE.5.Mainactorssourcesofpower
Q39.Theactorssourcesofpower:Inyourassessment,whatarethemainactorssourcesofpower?* NO 1 2 3 4 SOURCESOFPOWER POWERFULACTORS (%ofresponses) ALTERNATIVEACTORS (%ofresponses) 10 21 32 37 100
Economicresources 25 Masspower/Political/Militarycoercion 33 Socialstrengthandfavourablecontacts 28 Knowledge,information 13 TOTALRESPONSES 100 *Informantswereaskedtoidentifytwomostsourcesofpowers.Percentagebasedonresponses.
155
TableE.6.Themostfrequentmethodsusedbymainactorstotransformtheirsources ofpower
Q40.Theactorswayoflegitimatingtheirpowers:Howdoeseachoftheactorslegitimateitssourcesofpowertogain politicalauthorityandthusinfluenceandcontrolthepoliticalprocessanddynamicsinyourregionalcontext? NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 WAYSOFLEGITIMATINGPOWERS Byprovidingdiscursiveactivitieswithinthepublicsphere throughseminars,discussion,hearings Byprovidingcontactsanddialoguewithpoliticiansand administratorsatvariouslevels Byprovidingandbuildingnetworksandcoordinationforjoint activity Bycreatingcontactsandpartnershipwithinfluentialfigures andexperts Bybeingabletodemonstratecollectiveandmassbased strength Bygeneratingeconomicselfsufficiency,selfhelpactivities, cooperatives,etc. BygaininglegitimacythroughDPR,DPRD,thejudicialsystem and/ortheformalexecutiveorgansthestate Bymakinguseofvariousmeansofforcefulofficialauthority, coercion,demonstrationofpowerandforceaswellasthe generationoffear Byusingstateandgovernmentbudgetsotherresourcesand regulationstothebenefitofpromarketpoliciesandvarious actorsonthemarket Byprovidingpatronageinvariousforms(includingfavourable treatment,loans,aidandcharity)toforinstancesocial groups,communities,civilsocietyorganisations(including NGOs)aswellastobusinessmen,relativesandother individuals Byorganisingsupportwithincommunities Bygainingapopularmandateorgettingelected Byinfluencingpublicopinionviamassmedia TOTALREPONSES POWERFULACTORS %ofresponses 11 17 7 13 5 2 12 7 ALTERNATIVE ACTORS %ofresponses 23 14 16 12 7 3 4 1
10
11 12 13
6 6 0 100
11 3 0 100
*Informantswereaskedtoidentifytwomostsourcesofpowers.Percentagebasedonresponses.
156
TableE.7.Themostfrequenttypeofissuesandinterestsfoughtforbymainactors
Q41.Theactorsinterests,issues,platformsandpolicies:Whatinterestsandissuesbroughttogetherintoplatformsandpoliciesdotheactorstrytopromoteorresistandhowwouldyoucharacterisetheseinterests,issues and/orpolicies? POWERFULACTORS TYPEOFISSUES/INTERESTS/POLICIES NO CONTENTOFINTERESTS,ISSUES,PLATFORMSAND/OR POLICIES THE COMBINATIONOF SEVERALISSUES/ INTERESTS 46% 46% 40% 48% 45% 46% 40% 40% 45% 21% 45% ALTERNATIVEAVTORS TYPEOFISSUES/INTERESTS/POLICIES THE SPECIFICISSUES COMBINATIONOF ORINTERESTS SEVERALISSUES/ INTERESTS 34% 41% 28% 32% 39% 25% 34% 36% 39% 56% 34% 33% 29% 35% 35% 41% 42% 38% 31% 46% 28% 36%
RESPONSE
SPECIFICISSUES ORINTERESTS
GENERAL CONCEPTSOR IDEAS
RESPONSE
GENERAL CONCEPTSOR IDEAS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Publicservices,basicneeds,socialsecurity Religiousandethnicvalues,morality,conflictandconflict reconciliation Democracyandcivilpoliticalrights Economicdevelopmentoriented Sustainabledevelopment,environment Goodgovernance,anticorruption,ruleoflaw Humanrights Nationalism,integration,nationalsecurity Decentralisationandlocalautonomy Genderissues TOTALRESPONSES
10% 11% 10% 31% 3% 13% 3% 6% 10% 1% 100%
26% 28% 28% 22% 35% 27% 19% 29% 27% 61% 26%
28% 26% 32% 30% 20% 27% 41% 31% 28% 18% 29%
7% 12% 20% 17% 4% 15% 11% 2% 5% 7% 100%
33% 30% 37% 33% 20% 32% 28% 33% 16% 16% 30%
157
TableE.8.Theactorsmethodofcommunication
Q42.Theactorsmethodofcommunication:Howdotheactorstypicallycommunicatetheissuesandintereststhattheyfightfor? POWERFUL ACTORS %ofresponses 1 2 3 4 5 6 Writingbooksandarticles Performinginthemedia Attendingandgivingspeechesinpublicseminars/meetings Throughpersonalcontactsandnetworks Throughorganisationsandtheirmeetingsandcontacts Coerciveways TOTALRESPONSES *Informantswereaskedtoidentifytwomostmethods.Percentagebasedonresponses. 6 29 19 19 26 0 100 ALTERNATIVEACTORS %ofresponses 18 19 23 17 22 0 100
NO
METHODOFCOMMUNICATION
TableE.9.Theactorsmobilisationandorganisationofpeople
Q43.Theactorsmobilisationandorganisationofpeople:Howdotheactorstypicallytrytomobiliseandorganisepopularsupportfor theissuesthatyouhaveidentifiedinthepreviousquestion(no42)?* POWERFULACTORS NO 1 2 3 4 5 WAYTOMOBILISEANDORGANISEPEOPLE Popularandcharismaticleaders Clientelism Alternativepatronage Networksbetweenindependentactors Integrationfrombelowofpopularorganisationsintomoregeneral organisations TOTALRESPONSES *Informantswereaskedtoidentifytwomostmethods.Percentagebasedonresponses. %ofresponses 29 28 10 22 11 100 ALTERNATIVEACTORS %ofresponses 21 9 20 34 16 100
TableE.10.Theactorsorganising
Q44.Theactorsorganising:Whataretheactorsmainorganisationalmethods? POWERFULACTORS %ofresponses 1 Descriptive 12 2 Ethnicity,religion,family,etc. 22 3 Originandresidence(sonofthesoilidentity) 8 4 Hierarchicalconnectinglevels 22 5 Sector,profession 13 6 Visions,ideas,interests 15 7 Personalnetwork 7 TOTALRESPONSES 100 *Informantswereaskedtoidentifytwomostmethods.Percentagebasedonresponses. NO ORGANISATIONALMETHODS ALTERNATIVEACTORS %ofresponses 11 17 5 9 12 36 11 100
158
TableE.11.Theactorsalliances
Q45.Theactorsalliances:Withwhomdotheactorstypicallybuildalliancesornetworksintheirefforttoinfluenceorcontrolthe politicalprocess?* POWERFULACTORS NO BACKGROUNDOFINDIVIDUALALLIANCES %ofresponses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Government/Bureaucracy Policeandmilitary Parliament(centralandlocal) Politicalparties Religiousorethnicgroups Academicians,thejudiciary/lawfirms,media NGOs Nonclassbasedmassorganisations Classbasedmassorganisations Business Adatcouncilsetc. Semistateorstateauxiliarybodies Underworldandmilitia TOTALRESPONSES 20 4 8 20 10 9 7 3 2 10 3 1 3 100 %ofresponses 12 1 4 14 9 17 22 3 7 4 4 3 0 100 ALTERNATIVEACTORS
*Thistableonlycoverindividualalliancesoftheactors.Percentagesbasedonresponses
TableE.12.Thepowerfulactorspoliticalparties/organisations
Q46.Whatmajorpoliticalpartiesaretheactorsprimarilyrelatedto?(Ifanactorisnotprimarilyrelatedtoaparty,indicatethe otherkindofpoliticalorganisationthattheactorisatfirsthandrelatedto.) NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 PartaiGolkar PDIP PartaiHanura,PPRN PartaiDemokrat PartaiKeadilanSejahtera(PKS) MajorIslamicbasedparties(PAN,PPP,PKB) Smallparties Alternativeparties(PPR,PRD,Papernas) NGOs(incl.Media) Adatcouncil/groups,ethnicbasedgroups Business Massorganisations POLITICALPARTIES/ ORGANISATIONS POWERFULACTORS (%) 40 17 0 7 3 12 6 1 3 2 1 8 ALTERNATIVE ACTORS (%) 16 10 1 2 6 13 6 6 21 3 1 15
Percentagesbasedonresponses.
159

TableE.13.Thefinancingofthepoliticalpartiesandorganisations
Q47.Whatarethemainwaysinwhichthesepartiesorotherpoliticalorganisations(thatwerespecifiedinquestion46)financetheiractivities? POWERFULACTORS No SOURCESOFPOLITICALFINANCE METHODSUSEDBYTHEACTORS POLITICALORGANISATIONS Voluntary Equipmen Funds labour tetc %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses 4 10 12 39 39 55 70 41 5 43 9 28 22 92 81 83 58 56 40 27 41 92 40 88 68 73 4 9 5 3 4 5 3 19 2 17 3 4 5 TOTAL RESPON SES 24 6 6 14 7 8 4 3 17 3 5 4 100 ALTERNATIVEACTORS METHODSUSEDBYTHEACTORSPOLITICAL ORGANISATIONS Voluntary Equipment Funds labour etc 4 5 12 43 44 54 56 45 8 36 19 37 30 89 90 82 55 51 40 36 39 90 50 75 52 64 7 5 7 2 4 6 8 16 2 14 6 11 6 TOTAL RESPONSES 15 13 5 11 11 12 12 6 8 1 3 4 100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Officialsupportfromthegovernment(E.g. officialpartysupport) Supportfromdemocracydonors(E.g.for improvedorganisation&education) Contributionsfromownactivities,cooperatives orbusinesses Contributionsfromownfunctionaries/cadres Contributionsfromownindividualmembers Contributionsfromownindividualsympathisers Contributionsfromaffiliatedorrelated organisations(e.g.supportiveLSMsorpopular organisations) Contributionsfromsponsorswithinmedia, cultureandacademe Contributionsfromsponsorswithinbusiness Contributionsfromsponsorswithinthemilitary andpolice Contributionsfromcandidatesinvarious elections Contributionsfromthecandidatesrelativesand friends TOTAL
160
TableE.14.Thepowerfulactorsstrategiesinthepoliticalsystemandrelatedformsofrepresentation
Q48.Theactorsstrategiesinthepoliticalsystemandrelatedformsofrepresentation: Towhatgovernanceinstitutionsdothemostimportantactorsturntoatfirsthand?(Youmayidentifyatthemosttwosuchinstitutions!) Then,howdothemostimportantactorsreachandaffectthegovernanceinstitutions?Directand/orbywhatmediatinginstitutions?(Youmayidentifyatthemostthreeways!) MEDIATINGINSTITUTIONS NO GOVERNANCEINSTITUTIONS DIRECT NGOs 6 3 4 3 2 6 6 3 4 Peoples organisation 3 4 4 3 3 5 8 5 4 Experts, incl media 12 9 9 10 8 12 10 8 9 Popular figures 3 4 4 4 5 6 7 6 4 Patrons Communal Neighbour Political andfixers groups hoodgroups parties 4 4 4 4 7 4 5 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 13 16 18 16 15 12 10 14 16 Politically oriented interest organisations 7 10 10 10 10 9 8 11 10 Lobby/ pressure groups 13 11 11 10 12 10 7 12 11 Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Thejudiciary(inclthepolice) Thepoliticalexecutive(the government) Thelegislative(e.g.DPRD) Thebureaucracy Themilitary Auxilliarybodiesandinstitution forsubcontractedpublic governance Institutionsforselfmanagement (e.g.cooperative) Institutionsforprivate management(e.g.themarket,the family) TOTAL
%ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses
35 36 35 37 35 29 34 30 35
8 34 26 15 3 4 3 5 100
161
TableE.15.Thealternativeactorsstrategiesinthepoliticalsystemandrelatedformsofrepresentation
Q48.Theactorsstrategiesinthepoliticalsystemandrelatedformsofrepresentation: Towhatgovernanceinstitutionsdothemostimportantactorsturntoatfirsthand?(Youmayidentifyatthemosttwosuchinstitutions!) Then,howdothemostimportantactorsreachandaffectthegovernanceinstitutions?Directand/orbywhatmediatinginstitutions?(Youmayidentifyatthemostthreeways!) MEDIATINGINSTITUTIONS NO GOVERNANCEINSTITUTIONS DIRECT Peoples Experts,incl Popular NGOs organisation media figures 18 13 14 9 11 17 14 12 14 8 9 10 8 6 9 10 9 9 16 14 13 13 8 12 11 11 13 3 4 3 5 3 5 5 6 4 Patrons Neighbour Communal Political and hood groups parties fixers groups 3 4 3 5 4 4 5 6 4 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 3 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 3 2 4 8 9 8 9 5 5 7 7 Politically oriented interest organisations 3 5 5 6 10 3 4 5 5 Lobby/ pressure groups 13 11 11 9 11 10 10 8 11 Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Thejudiciary(inclthepolice) Thepoliticalexecutive(the government) Thelegislative(e.g.DPRD) Thebureaucracy Themilitary Auxilliarybodiesandinstitution forsubcontractedpublic governance Institutionsforselfmanagement (e.g.cooperative) Institutionsforprivate management(e.g.themarket,the family) TOTAL
%ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses
27 28 28 30 31 28 29 28 28
10 28 28 7 1 10 10 7 100
162
TableE.16.Publicrepresentation
Q49.Basedonyourknowledgeandexperience,towhatinstitutionsdotheordinarypeopleaddresstheircomplaintsanddemandsregardingpublicaffairs? Note:Onlypickthethreemostimportantalternatives,andrankthem[1]and[2]and[3]basedonpriority.
NO
DEMOCRATICINSTITUTIONS
%ofRESPONSES
RANK1
RANK2 %withinrows
RANK3
Tomedia;Tospecificissueandpressure/lobbygroups
31
34
36
30
ToselfmanagementNGOs;Toinformalleaders Directlytoelectedexecutivesonvariouslevels;Directlytothebureaucrats variouslevels;Directlytothelawenforcementinstitutions Topoliticalparties;Directlytoelectedpoliticiansinlegislativebodiesonvarious levels Tosemigovernmentinstitutions
28
45
31
25
16
23
31
47
14
20
42
39
15
26
59
Tointerestbasedpopularorganizations TOTALRESPONSES(f)
5 2653
27 889
36 884
36 880
163
DataTabulation Category:RegionBase
DATATABULATION
NATIONALSURVEY PROBLEMSANDOPTIONSONDEMOCRATIZATIONIN INDONESIA 2007

CATEGORY: REGIONBASE
164
A. PROFILEOFINFORMANTS
TabelA.1.Genderproportionofinformantsindifferentregions REGION GENDER SUMATERA 1 Male 196 74% 2 Female 68 26% Total 264 100% JAWA 141 81% 33 19% 174 100% KALIMANTAN 89 81% 21 19% 110 100% SULAWESI 125 73% 47 27% 172 100% BALI+ NTB+NTT 52 78% 15 22% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 88 76% 28 24% 116 100%
TabelA.2.Ageproportionofinformantsindifferentregions REGION AGEGROUP SUMATERA 25yo.oryounger 1 2635yo. 2 3645yo. 3 46yo.orolder Unknown 5 8 3% 103 39% 93 35% 4 56 21% 4 2% Total 264 100% JAWA 1 1% 64 37% 66 38% 37 21% 5 3% 173 100% KALIMANTAN 3 3% 44 40% 38 35% 23 21% 2 2% 110 100% SULAWESI 7 4% 66 38% 67 39% 28 16% 4 2% 172 100% BALI+NTB+N TT 1 2% 11 16% 26 39% 26 39% 3 5% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 6 5% 27 23% 46 40% 37 32% 0 0% 116 100%
165
TabelA.3.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtolevelofeducation
REGION EDUCATION SUMATERA Noanswer 1 Elementary 2 Middle 3 University 4 Postgraduate 5 7 3% 5 2% 52 20% 156 59% 44 17% Total 264 100% JAWA 0 0% 3 2% 29 17% 99 57% 43 25% 174 100% KALIMANTAN 1 1% 1 1% 23 21% 67 61% 18 16% 110 100% SULAWESI 4 2% 4 2% 33 19% 96 56% 35 20% 172 100% BALI+NTB+ NTT 4 6% 3 5% 8 12% 42 63% 10 15% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 2 2% 3 3% 23 20% 70 60% 18 16% 116 100%
166
TabelA.4.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtooccupation REGION JOB SUMATERA NGO 1 Academe 2 Politician 3 Bureaucracyandlocal government Auxiliarystatebodies 5 Business 6 Professional 7 Religiousandethnic leader Noncareer 9 Noanswer 10 77 29% 29 11% 18 7% 4 9 3% 10 4% 28 11% 79 30% 8 0 0% 4 2% 10 4% Total 264 100% JAWA 63 36% 22 13% 9 5% 1 1% 1 1% 12 7% 58 33% 2 1% 1 1% 5 3% 174 100% KALIMANTAN 44 40% 11 10% 6 6% 3 3% 2 2% 3 3% 36 33% 1 1% 3 3% 1 1% 110 100% SULAWESI 52 30% 22 13% 11 6% 14 8% 4 2% 12 7% 40 23% 3 2% 2 1% 12 7% 172 100% BALI+NTB+N TT 22 33% 6 9% 2 3% 2 3% 0 0% 2 3% 23 34% 3 5% 4 6% 3 5% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 25 22% 13 11% 9 8% 10 9% 4 3% 11 10% 38 33% 1 1% 1 1% 4 3% 116 100%
167
TabelA.5.Proportionofinformantsaccordingtoreligion REGION RELIGION SUMATERA Noanswer 1 Islam 2 Hindu 3 Budha 4 Protestan 5 Chatolic 6 Konghucu 7 Others 8 0 0% 237 90% 0 0% 4 2% 16 6% 6 2% 1 0% 0 0% Total 264 100% TabelA.6.Contextofinformationthatinformantsreferto REGION THECONTEXT SUMATERA Province 1 National/issuearea 2 233 88% 31 12% Total 264 100% JAWA 108 62% 66 38% 174 100% KALIMANTAN 98 89% 12 11% 110 100% SULAWESI 145 84% 27 16% 172 100% BALI+NTB+N TT 61 91% 6 9% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 109 94% 7 6% 116 100% JAWA 2 1% 138 79% 0 0% 1 1% 10 6% 23 13% 0 0% 0 0% 174 100% KALIMANTAN 0 0% 81 74% 2 2% 1 1% 12 11% 14 13% 0 0% 0 0% 110 100% SULAWESI 0 0% 143 83% 0 0% 0 0% 23 13% 4 2% 1 1% 1 1% 172 100% BALI+NTB+N TT 0 0% 25 37% 15 22% 0 0% 18 27% 8 12% 0 0% 1 2% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 0 0% 49 42% 0 0% 0 0% 52 45% 15 13% 0 0% 0 0% 116 100%
168
TableA.7.Proportionofinformantsfromeachfrontlineindifferentregions REGION FRONTLINE SUMATERA 1 Thestruggleofpeasants, agriculturallabourersand fisher Thestruggleoflabour 25 10% 21 8% 3 Thestruggleforthesocial, economicandotherrightsof th Thepromotionofhuman rights Thestruggleagainstcorruption infavourofgoodgovernanc Democratizationofthe politicalpartiesandtheparty syste Thepromotionofpluralism, religiousandethnicreconciliat Theimprovementand democratisationofeducation Thepromotionof professionalismaspartof goodgovernance Thepromotionoffreedom, independenceandqualityof media Thepromotionofgender equalityandfeminist perspectives Theimprovementof alternativerepresentationat thelocall Thepromotionofsustainable development 15 6% 24 9% 5 25 10% 6 23 9% 18 7% 8 18 7% 9 17 6% 20 8% 28 11% 16 6% 14 5% Total 264 100% JAWA 19 11% 18 10% 14 8% 13 8% 15 9% 17 10% 11 6% 13 8% 8 5% 13 8% 13 8% 8 5% 12 7% 174 100% KALIMANTAN 10 9% 4 4% 5 5% 6 6% 7 6% 11 10% 10 9% 8 7% 3 3% 11 10% 13 12% 11 10% 11 10% 110 100% SULAWESI 15 9% 6 4% 7 4% 12 7% 14 8% 17 10% 15 9% 13 8% 14 8% 16 9% 17 10% 15 9% 11 6% 172 100% BALI+NT B+NTT 7 10% 4 6% 1 2% 6 9% 8 12% 3 5% 6 9% 5 8% 5 8% 6 9% 7 10% 7 10% 2 3% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 7 6% 6 5% 3 3% 12 10% 5 4% 8 7% 10 9% 11 10% 12 10% 14 12% 9 8% 8 7% 11 10% 116 100%
10
11
12
13
169
B. ATTITUDESTOPOLITICS
TableB.1.Peoplesunderstandingonpoliticsaccordingtoinformantsfromdifferentregions REGION HOWDOPEOPLEUNDERSTAND POLITICS? Struggleforpower 1 Popularcontrolofpublicaffairs 2 Somethingtakencareofbythe elites/publicfigures Elitistmanipulation 4 Kindofjob/career 5 Associaldedication 6 Noanswer 7 SUMATERA 142 54% 30 11% 3 34 13% 53 20% 3 1% 0 0% 2 1% Total 264 JAWA 99 57% 18 10% 18 10% 33 19% 0 0% 0 0% 4 2% 174 KALIMANTAN 64 58% 15 14% 19 17% 10 9% 0 0% 0 0% 2 2% 110 SULAWESI 97 56% 27 16% 12 7% 32 19% 1 1% 0 0% 3 2% 172 100% BALI+NTB +NTT 36 54% 8 12% 10 15% 11 16% 1 2% 1 2% 0 0% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 51 44% 26 22% 12 10% 19 16% 1 1% 3 3% 4 3% 116 100%
100% 100% 100% TableB.2.Peoplesinteresttowardsinpoliticsaccordingtoinformantsfromdifferentregions REGION HOWINTERESTEDAREPEOPLEIN POLITICS? Highlyinterested 1 Interested 2 Notinterested 3 Noanswer 4 SUMATERA 36 14% 122 46% 105 40% 1 0% Total 264 100% JAWA 22 13% 53 31% 98 56% 1 1% 174 100% KALIMANTAN 3 3% 57 52% 50 46% 0 0% 110 100%
SULAWESI 21 12% 105 61% 46 27% 0 0% 172 100%
BALI+NT B+NTT 9 13% 28 42% 30 45% 0 0% 67 100%
MALUKU+P APUA 32 28% 53 46% 31 27% 0 0% 116 100%
170
TableB.3.Womensinterestinpoliticsaccordingtoinformantsfromdifferentregions REGION HOWINTERESTEDAREWOMENIN POLITICS? Highlyinterested 1 Interested 2 Notinterested 3 Noanswer 4 SUMATERA 16 6% 107 41% 134 51% 6 2% Total 263 JAWA 13 8% 57 33% 102 59% 2 1% 174 KALIMANTAN 2 2% 40 36% 68 62% 0 0% 110 SULAWESI 11 6% 89 52% 72 42% 0 0% 172 BALI+NT B+NTT 5 8% 25 37% 37 55% 0 0% 67 MALUKU+P APUA 10 9% 65 56% 40 35% 1 1% 116
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Table B.4. What should at first hand be done to encourage women participation in politics according to informants from differentregions WHATSHOULDATFIRSTHANDBE DONETOENCOURAGETHE PARTICIPATIONOFWOMENIN POLITICS? 1 Fightforwomenquotain legislativeandexecutive instituti Increasewomenspolitical awarenessandcapacity Supportwomentogain positionsinpolitical institutions Expandthepoliticalagendaso thatitincludesmoreissues Againstpatriachy REGION SUMATERA 23 9% 160 61% 21 8% 60 23% 0 0% 6 Noanswer 0 0% 264 Total 100% JAWA 9 5% 100 58% 7 4% 53 31% 3 2% 2 1% 174 100% KALIMANTAN 9 8% 65 59% 11 10% 24 22% 1 1% 0 0% 110 100% SULAWESI 18 11% 107 62% 15 9% 31 18% 0 0% 1 1% 172 100% BALI+NTB+ NTT 12 18% 36 54% 6 9% 9 13% 3 5% 1 2% 67 100% MALUKU+ PAPUA 16 14% 79 68% 4 3% 15 13% 2 2% 0 0% 116 100%
171
TableB.5. The most appropriate channel tobe used to engage in political process accordingtoinformants fromdifferent regions IFONEISINTERESTEDINPOLITICS, WHICHCHANNELDOYOUTHINKISTHE MOSTAPPROPRIATETOBEUSEDAT FIRSTHAND? Joinabignationalpoliticalparty 1 Joinasmallpoliticalpartythatis eligibletoruninelec Establishanewlocallyrooted politicalparty Congregateanonpartypolitical block Activeinpolitical discourse/mapping Noanswer 6 REGION SUMATERA 78 30% 2 33 13% 3 47 18% 4 98 37% 5 5 2% 1 0% Total 264 JAWA 50 29% 9 5% 22 13% 85 49% 7 4% 1 1% 174 KALIMANTAN 40 36% 16 15% 13 12% 37 34% 2 2% 2 2% 110 SULAWESI 59 34% 27 16% 21 12% 59 34% 3 2% 3 2% 172 BALI+NT B+NTT 20 30% 13 19% 4 6% 30 45% 0 0% 0 0% 67 MALUKU+P APUA 37 32% 31 27% 12 10% 27 23% 8 7% 1 1% 116
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% TabelB.6.Themosteffectivemethodtoincreasepeoplespoliticalcapacityandparticipationaccordingtoinformantsfrom differentregions WHICHMETHODDOYOUTHINKIS MOSTEFFECTIVETOINCREASE PEOPLE'SPOLITICALCAPACITYAND PARTICIPATION? 1 Increasingpeoplespolitical awareness Improvingtheeducationof politicalcadres Reformingandconsolidating existingpoliticalparties Promotingpoliticallyoriented campaignsandmakingpublics Mobilisingthemasses Buildingdemocraticandmass basedorganisationsandnewpol Noanswer Total REGION SUMATERA JAWA KALIMANTAN SULAWESI BALI+NT B+NTT 38 57% 11 16% 3 5% 1 2% 3 5% 10 15% 1 2% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 77 66% 16 14% 11 10% 3 3% 1 1% 7 6% 1 1% 116 100%
136 52% 55 21% 10 4% 8 3% 4 2% 50 19% 1 0% 264 100%
88 51% 40 23% 13 8% 5 3% 3 2% 20 12% 5 3% 174 100%
63 57% 20 18% 6 6% 5 5% 4 4% 12 11% 0 0% 110 100%
119 69% 26 15% 5 3% 5 3% 1 1% 14 8% 2 1% 172 100%
2 3 4 5 6 7
172
C. THECONSTRUCTIONOFTHEDEMOS
TableC.1.Peoplesidentityin2004generalelectionaccordingtoinformantsfromdifferentregions INTHE2004GENERALELECTIONSOF LEGISLATORS,HOWDIDPEOPLEAT FIRSTHANDIDENTIFYTHEMSELVES? AsaresidentofIndonesiain general Asresidentsoftheir city/municipality/province Asresidentsoftheirvillageand hamlet(dusun) Asmembersoftheirethnic community Asmembersoftheirreligious community Asmembers/supportersof theirpoliticalparty Asmembersoftheirsocialclass 7 Noanswer 8 REGION SUMATERA 109 41% 2 40 15% 3 17 6% 4 18 7% 5 8 3% 6 50 19% 22 8% 0 0% Total 264 100% JAWA 61 35% 8 5% 14 8% 7 4% 12 7% 48 28% 23 13% 1 1% 174 100% KALIMANTAN 38 35% 9 8% 7 6% 13 12% 10 9% 25 23% 8 7% 0 0% 110 100% SULAWESI 51 30% 29 17% 18 11% 16 9% 6 4% 40 23% 12 7% 0 0% 172 100% BALI+NT B+NTT 19 28% 9 13% 4 6% 10 15% 4 6% 16 24% 5 8% 0 0% 67 100% MALUKU+P APUA 39 34% 11 10% 7 6% 10 9% 7 6% 38 33% 4 3% 0 0% 116 100%
173
TableC.2.Peoplesidentityinpilkadaaccordingtoinformantsfromdifferentregions INREGIONALELECTION(S)(PILKADA), HOWDIDPEOPLEATFIRSTHAND IDENTIFYTHEMSELVES? 1 Asresidentsoftheir city/municipality/province Asresidentsoftheirvillageand hamlet(dusun) Asmembersoftheirethnic community Asmembersoftheirreligious community Asmembers/supportersof theirpoliticalparty Asmembersoftheirsocialclass 6 AsIndonesiancitizens 7 Noanswer 8 0% Total 264 100% 1% 174 100% 1% 110 100% 1% 172 100% 0% 67 100% 1% 116 100% 1% 0 3% 2 2% 1 1% 1 3% 0 3% 1 REGION SUMATERA 114 43% 38 14% 3 51 19% 4 9 3% 5 29 11% 21 8% 2 JAWA 84 48% 16 9% 13 8% 9 5% 26 15% 19 11% 5 KALIMANTAN 36 33% 9 8% 33 30% 9 8% 13 12% 7 6% 2 SULAWESI 70 41% 19 11% 43 25% 6 4% 25 15% 7 4% 1 BALI+N TB +NTT 19 28% 8 12% 28 42% 4 6% 2 3% 4 6% 2 MALUKU+P APUA 42 36% 8 7% 36 31% 2 2% 19 16% 5 4% 3
174
TableC.3.Informantsassessmentofpeoplesidentityinsituationofconflictcausedbysocial,economyandpoliticaltension HOWDOPEOPLEIDENTIFY REGION THEMSELVESWHENTHEYFACE SITUATIONOFCONFLICTCAUSEDBY BALI+NT MALUKU+P SUMATERA JAWA KALIMANTAN SULAWESI SOCIAL,ECONOMYANDPOLITICAL B+NTT APUA TENSION? Asresidentsoftheir 35 13 6 29 8 13 city/municipality/province 1 13% 8% 6% 17% 12% 11% Asresidentsoftheirvillageand 38 24 8 18 11 10 hamlet(dusun) 2 14% 3 Asmembersoftheirethnic community Asamemberoftheirreligious community Asmembersoftheirsocialclass 5 Asmembersoftheirpolitical party/ideology asIndonesiancitizens 7 Noanswer 8 89 34% 4 14 5% 78 30% 6 1 0% 0 0% 8 3% Total 264 100% 14% 35 20% 27 16% 57 33% 3 2% 1 1% 12 7% 174 100% 7% 60 55% 9 8% 24 22% 0 0% 0 0% 3 3% 110 100% 11% 63 37% 27 16% 29 17% 2 1% 0 0% 4 2% 172 100% 16% 23 34% 14 21% 6 9% 0 0% 0 0% 5 8% 67 100% 9% 53 46% 21 18% 15 13% 0 0% 0 0% 4 3% 116 100%
175
TableC.4.Informantsassessmentofpeoplesidentityinrespondingtoissuesofadministrativedivisionofprovincesor regencies INRESPONDINGTOISSUESOF REGION ADMINISTRATIVEDIVISIONOF PROVINCESORREGENCIES,HOWDO BALI+NT MALUKU+P SUMATERA JAWA KALIMANTAN SULAWESI PEOPLEATFIRSTHANDIDENTIFY B+NTT APUA THEMSELVES? 1 Asresidentsoftheir city/municipality/province Asresidentsoftheirvillageand hamlet(dusun) Asmembersoftheirethnic community Asmembersoftheirreligious community 89 34% 87 33% 73 28% 4 2% 0 0% 6 interestoriented 3 1% 7 Noanswer 8 3% Total 264 100% 69 40% 47 27% 36 21% 2 1% 5 3% 4 2% 8 5% 174 100% 35 32% 47 43% 21 19% 1 1% 0 0% 4 4% 2 2% 110 100% 75 44% 40 23% 46 27% 1 1% 2 1% 5 3% 3 2% 172 100% 17 25% 25 37% 18 27% 1 2% 0 0% 5 8% 1 2% 67 100% 46 40% 23 20% 44 38% 0 0% 0 0% 2 2% 1 1% 116 100%
AsIndonesiancitizens
176
D. THE QUALITY OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY
TabelD.1.Comparisonindexofdemocracyinstrumentsbetweenregions NO RIGHTSANDINSTITUTIONS Citizenship(Equalstate citizenship;Therightsof minorities,migrantsand refugees,Reconciliationof horizontalconflicts) Governmentsupportof internationallawandUN humanrights Subordinationofthe governmentandpublicofficials totheruleoflaw Theequalitybeforethelaw (Equalandsecureaccessto justice;Theintegrityand independenceofthejudiciary) Freedomfromphysicalviolence andthefearofit Freedomofspeech,assembly andorganization Freedomtocarryouttrade unionactivity Freedomofreligion,belief; languageandculture Genderequalityand emancipation Therightsofchildren Therighttoemployment,social securityandotherbasicneeds Therighttobasiceducation, includingcitizensrightsand duties Goodcorporategovernance Freeandfairgeneralelections (Freeandfairgeneralelections atcentral,regionalandlocal level;Freeandfairseparate electionsofe.g.governors, mayorsandvillageheads) Freedomtoformpartiesonthe nationalorlocallevel(orteams ofindependentcandidates) thatcanrecruitmembers,and participateinelections Reflectionofvitalissuesand interestsamongpeopleby politicalpartiesandor candidates Abstentionfromabusing religiousorethnicsentiments, symbolsanddoctrinesby politicalpartiesandor candidates. Independenceofmoneypolitics andpowerfulvestedinterests
SUMATERA
JAWA
KALIMANTAN
SULAWESI
BALI+NTT +NTB
MALUKU +PAPUA
44
50
38
36
37
41
47
51
45
40
43
42
44
52
50
43
33
38
45
54
41
37
38
43
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
51 64 57 67 48 56 44 61 39
54 66 57 67 53 58 50 66 46
46 60 48 64 44 51 45 59 44
37 50 41 57 39 46 37 50 32
40 56 47 64 43 59 42 61 33
47 62 52 73 45 47 53 59 39
14
66
72
63
58
66
57
15
41
49
33
33
47
38
16
38
39
34
31
29
39
17
44
51
39
33
33
40
18
40
46
43
32
32
41
177
bypoliticalpartiesandor candidates Membershipbasedcontrolof parties,andresponsivenessand accountabilityofpartiesandor politicalcandidatestotheir constituencies Partiesandorcandidatesability toformandrungovernment Democraticdecentralisationof governmentofallmattersthat donotneedtobehandledon centrallevels. Thetransparencyand accountabilityofelected government,the executive,(bureaucracies),atall levels Thetransparencyand accountabilityofthemilitary andpolicetoelected governmentandthepublic Thecapacityofthegovernment tocombatparamilitarygroups, hoodlumsandorganisedcrime Governmentindependence fromforeignintervention (exceptUNconventionsand applicableinternationallaw) Governmentsindependence fromstronginterestgroupsand capacitytoeliminatecorruption andabuseofpower Freedomofthepress,artand academicworld Publicaccesstoandthe reflectionofdifferentviews withinmedia,artandthe academicworld Citizensparticipationin extensiveindependentcivil associations Transparency,accountability anddemocracywithincivil organisations Allsocialgroupsincluding marginalisedgroupsextensive accesstoandparticipationin publiclife Directparticipation(Peoples directaccessandcontactwith thepublicservicesand governmentsconsultationof peopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirect participationinpolicymaking andtheexecutionofpublic decisions) AVERAGEINDEX Indexscale0(worst)100(best)
19
38
39
42
28
30
44
20
37
40
41
31
33
43
21
43
49
44
37
34
41
22
42
51
43
40
32
42
23
37
36
36
25
29
39
24
43
42
38
31
30
38
25
34
46
35
29
27
44
26
43
49
49
39
37
40
27
64
69
56
48
57
54
28
51
54
43
36
40
49
29
57
63
52
46
38
53
30
49
55
42
41
43
53
31
38
47
36
33
29
38
32
37
48
43
34
30
38
47
52
45
38
40
46
178
E. THEMAINACTORSPOLITICALWILLANDCAPACITY
TableE.1.Powerfulactorsaccordingtoinformantsindifferentregions REGION POWERFULACTORS SUMATERA 279 52% 2 Policeandmilitary 31 6% 3 Parliament(central+local) 35 7% 4 Politicalparties 72 13% 5 Religiousorethnicgroups 28 5% 6 Academicians,thejudiciary/lawfirms, media 22 4% 7 1% 8 Nonclassbasedmassorganisations 5 1% 9 Classbasedmassorganisations 3 1% 10 Business 35 7% 11 Adatcouncilsetc. 4 1% 12 Semistateorstateauxiliarybodies 3 1% 13 Underworldandmilitia 14 3% Total 538 100% JAWA 156 40% 32 8% 19 5% 51 13% 46 12% 16 4% 4 1% 3 1% 4 1% 36 9% 1 0% 8 2% 13 3% 389 100% KALIMANTAN 91 36% 6 2% 20 8% 53 21% 14 6% 11 4% 11 4% 0 0% 2 1% 29 12% 0 0% 2 1% 11 4% 250 100% SULAWESI 167 48% 10 3% 39 11% 54 15% 26 7% 30 9% 16 5% 1 0% 1 0% 5 1% 0 0% 1 0% 0 0% 350 100% BALI+NT B+NTT 58 40% 4 3% 20 14% 20 14% 10 7% 13 9% 10 7% 1 1% 1 1% 5 3% 2 1% 0 0% 1 1% 145 100% MALUK U+PAPU A 134 49% 19 7% 24 9% 28 10% 20 7% 14 5% 9 3% 1 0% 1 0% 4 2% 15 6% 4 2% 0 0% 273 100%
Government/Bureaucracy
NGOs
179
TableE.2.Alternativeactorsaccordingtoinformantsindifferentregions REGION ALTERNATIVEACTORS SUMATERA 26 6% 2 Policeandmilitary 3 1% 3 Parliament(central+local) 48 10% 4 Politicalparties 70 15% 5 Religiousorethnicgroups 47 10% 6 Academicians,thejudiciary/law firms,media 65 14% 127 27% 8 Nonclassbasedmass organisations 5 1% 28 6% 10 Business 21 5% 11 Adatcouncilsetc. 10 2% 12 Semistateorstateauxiliary bodies 14 3% 0 0% Total 464 100% JAWA 19 5% 4 1% 4 1% 60 16% 63 17% 65 18% 86 24% 5 1% 28 8% 17 5% 8 2% 6 2% 1 0% 366 100% KALIMANTAN 21 10% 1 1% 10 5% 31 14% 22 10% 48 22% 62 28% 1 1% 3 1% 8 4% 7 3% 4 2% 1 1% 219 100% SULAWESI 32 11% 7 3% 32 11% 40 14% 25 9% 47 17% 77 27% 2 1% 8 3% 9 3% 2 1% 4 1% 0 0% 285 100% BALI+NT B+NTT 8 6% 1 1% 3 2% 10 8% 25 20% 22 17% 45 35% 2 2% 6 5% 3 2% 0 0% 2 2% 0 0% 127 100% MALUKU+P APUA 29 15% 2 1% 12 6% 23 12% 29 15% 37 19% 34 17% 1 1% 1 1% 6 3% 18 9% 5 3% 0 0% 197 100%
Government/Bureaucracy
NGOs
Classbasedmassorganisations
13
Underworldandmilitia
180

TableE.3.Mainactorsrelationtodemocraticinstruments NO SUMATRA JAWA KALIMANTAN CATEGORYOFRULES WHATACTORS ANDREGULATIONS DO? Powerful Alternative Powerful Alternative Powerful Alternative Useand 39 78 35 78 44 69 promote 1 Equalcitizenship Use 31 17 31 15 31 24 Useand 21 4 27 3 22 3 manipulate Avoidoropt 9 2 7 4 3 3 foralternatives Useand 24 64 23 67 37 64 promote Use 45 29 39 26 30 27 InternationallawandUN 2 Useand HRinstruments 13 2 19 2 15 2 manipulate Avoidoropt 19 6 18 5 18 7 foralternatives Useand 28 68 28 72 32 57 promote Use 35 22 30 21 34 36 3 Ruleoflaw&justice Useand 24 5 31 3 26 3 manipulate Avoidoropt 13 5 12 4 7 3 foralternatives Useand 33 74 32 71 40 67 promote Use 37 19 29 23 36 27 4 Civilandpoliticalrights Useand 19 4 25 3 18 2 manipulate Avoidoropt 11 4 14 3 6 3 foralternatives
SULAWESI Powerful Alternative 49 33 14 4 36 43 11 10 39 40 14 8 47 35 12 6 74 18 3 4 66 30 2 2 65 29 2 4 73 23 2 2 BALI,NTB,NTT Powerful Alternative 36 39 15 10 28 40 16 16 29 36 24 11 38 38 17 8 84 14 2 0 75 22 2 2 78 18 2 2 81 17 1 1 MALUKU,PAPUA Powerful Alternative 61 26 11 2 47 38 6 9 41 37 18 5 51 31 14 4 81 18 1 1 60 36 2 3 62 30 6 3 70 24 5 1
181

SUMATRA Powerful 30 37 21 12 29 40 25 7 25 42 21 13 25 35 26 14 JAWA KALIMANTAN
NO CATEGORYOFRULES WHATACTORS ANDREGULATIONS DO? Useand promote Use Economicandsocial Useand rights manipulate Avoidoropt foralternatives Useand promote Use Freeandfairelections Useand manipulate Avoidoropt foralternatives Useand promote Use Goodrepresentation Useand manipulate Avoidoropt foralternatives Useand promote Use Democraticand Useand accountablegovernment manipulate Avoidoropt foralternatives SULAWESI Powerful 44 35 12 9 45 34 17 4 36 40 12 12 43 33 16 9 Alternative 68 28 1 3 67 26 3 4 61 31 2 7 64 29 4 3 BALI,NTB,NTT Powerful 32 43 18 7 35 35 25 6 23 38 30 10 27 32 31 10 Alternative 77 18 2 3 69 21 4 7 62 25 4 9 73 22 2 2 MALUKU,PAPUA Powerful 51 30 12 7 44 32 18 7 35 41 16 8 40 33 18 9 Alternative 73 24 2 2 64 29 6 2 55 36 6 4 59 35 3 4 Alternative Powerful Alternative Powerful Alternative 65 27 3 6 66 27 3 4 62 30 4 5 65 26 3 7 26 34 26 13 32 33 29 7 26 34 27 13 28 31 30 11 66 27 5 2 61 29 4 7 56 31 4 9 61 28 5 6 37 35 20 9 35 38 26 2 26 34 30 10 27 36 31 7 65 29 2 4 57 35 7 1 53 35 5 7 59 35 3 2
182

SUMATRA Powerful 31 40 20 9 24 42 18 15 25 38 22 15 JAWA KALIMANTAN
NO CATEGORYOFRULES WHATACTORS ANDREGULATIONS DO? Useand promote Use Freedomofmedia,press Useand andacademicfreedoms manipulate Avoidoropt foralternatives Useand promote Use Additionalcivilpolitical Useand participation manipulate Avoidoropt foralternatives Useand promote Use Directparticipation Useand manipulate Avoidoropt foralternatives SULAWESI Powerful 41 42 12 5 39 42 12 7 45 34 11 10 Alternative 67 28 2 2 66 29 2 3 67 30 2 1 BALI,NTB,NTT Powerful 34 36 21 9 31 37 19 13 32 34 18 16 Alternative 73 24 2 1 77 20 3 0 73 20 4 4 MALUKU,PAPUA Powerful 43 41 12 4 39 41 12 9 42 34 12 12 Alternative 68 26 3 3 62 35 2 2 61 28 6 5 Alternative Powerful Alternative Powerful Alternative 68 26 4 2 62 31 3 5 63 31 2 4 30 36 23 12 25 36 24 14 28 35 23 14 63 29 3 5 64 27 4 5 66 23 4 7 38 33 22 8 30 41 20 10 32 35 23 11 69 24 4 3 65 31 2 2 55 40 1 3
10
11
183
TableE.4.Mainactorspoliticalterrainaccordingtoinformantsindifferentregions Q38.Theactorspresencewithinpolitics:Inwhatspheresofthepoliticallandscapeiseachoftheactorsprimarilyactive? NO 1 2 3 4 5 SPHERESOFTHEPOLITICALLANDSCAPE Businessandindustry Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua Smallbusiness Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua Selfmanagednonprofitunits Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua Lobbygroups Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua Interestorganisations Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua POWERFULACTORS RESPONSE PERCENT 148 14% 104 15% 75 16% 58 9% 20 7% 38 7% 23 5 8 12 2 6 12 7 8 13 1 17 90 70 42 72 19 39 140 94 56 88 38 79 2% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 0% 3% 9% 10% 9% 11% 7% 7% 14% 13% 12% 13% 14% 15% ALTERNATIVEACTORS RESPONSE PERCENT 51 6% 42 7% 26 7% 25 5% 10 5% 16 4% 20 14 18 13 1 12 48 36 14 18 11 13 164 136 70 104 56 72 233 198 109 132 54 84 2% 2% 5% 2% 0% 3% 6% 6% 4% 3% 5% 3% 20% 22% 19% 20% 26% 19% 29% 32% 29% 25% 25% 22%
184
NO 6 7 8 9 10 Politicalparties
SPHERESOFTHEPOLITICALLANDSCAPE Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua Electedgovernment Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua Thebureaucracy Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua Thejudiciary Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua Militaryandpolice Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua
POWERFULACTORS RESPONSE PERCENT 201 20% 129 18% 114 24% 171 25% 58 22% 110 21% 155 128 74 106 65 97 195 122 72 134 45 114 26 20 10 13 16 15 39 38 9 14 5 14 15% 18% 16% 16% 24% 18% 19% 17% 15% 20% 17% 22% 3% 3% 2% 2% 6% 3% 4% 5% 2% 2% 2% 3% ALTERNATIVEACTORS RESPONSE PERCENT 125 15% 82 13% 50 13% 82 16% 22 10% 51 14% 79 27 27 60 22 46 58 44 43 60 18 41 26 31 17 18 14 32 11 11 1 12 5 9 10% 4% 7% 11% 10% 12% 7% 7% 11% 11% 8% 11% 3% 5% 5% 3% 7% 9% 1% 2% 0% 2% 2% 2%
185
POWERFULACTORS RESPONSE PERCENT 271 27% 182 26% 118 26% 148 22% 52 20% 127 358 243 132 207 89 165 255 198 138 202 77 149 114 78 58 102 37 87 24% 36% 35% 30% 31% 35% 31% 26% 28% 31% 31% 30% 28% 11% 11% 13% 15% 15% 16% ALTERNATIVEACTORS RESPONSE PERCENT 84 11% 70 11% 39 11% 53 10% 13 6% 44 191 119 75 112 55 67 245 189 108 177 58 137 275 241 144 166 89 128 12% 24% 19% 20% 22% 26% 18% 31% 31% 30% 35% 27% 36% 35% 39% 39% 33% 41% 34%
TableE.5.Mainactorssourcesofpoweraccordingtoinformantsindifferentregions Q39.Theactorssourcesofpower:Inyourassessment,whatarethemainactorssourcesofpower? NO 1 2 3 4 SOURCESOFPOWER Economicresources Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,West Papua Masspower/Political/Militarycoercion Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,West Papua Socialstrengthandfavourablecontacts Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,West Papua Knowledge,information Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Bali,NTB,NTT Maluku,NorthMaluku,Papua,West Papua
186
METHODSUSEDBYPOWERFULACTORSTO TRANSFORMTHEIRSOURCESOFPOWER Byprovidingdiscursiveactivities withinthepublicspherethrough seminars,discussion,hearings Byprovidingcontactsanddialogue withpoliticiansandadministratorsat variouslevels Byprovidingandbuildingnetworks andcoordinationforjointactivity Bycreatingcontactsandpartnership withinfluentialfiguresandexperts Bybeingabletodemonstrate collectiveandmassbasedstrength Bygeneratingeconomicself sufficiency,selfhelpactivities,co operatives,etc. BygaininglegitimacythroughDPR, DPRD,thejudicialsystemand/orthe formalexecutiveorgansthestate Bymakinguseofvariousmeansof forcefulofficialauthority,coercion, demonstrationofpowerandforceas wellasthegenerationoffear Byusingstateandgovernment budgetsotherresourcesand regulationstothebenefitofpro marketpoliciesandvariousactorson themarket Byprovidingpatronageinvarious forms(includingfavourable treatment,loans,aidandcharity)to forinstancesocialgroups, communities,civilsociety organisations(includingNGOs)aswell astobusinessmen,relativesand otherindividuals Byorganisingsupportwithin communities Bygainingapopularmandateor gettingelected
REGION SUMATERA 147 10% 243 16% 84 6% 184 12% 78 5% 29 2% 213 14% 131 9% 157 JAWA 97 9% 180 16% 56 5% 154 14% 62 6% 20 2% 138 13% 105 10% 105 KALIMANTAN 78 11% 131 19% 46 7% 98 14% 36 5% 12 2% 70 10% 44 6% 61
TableE.6.Themostfrequentmethodsusedbypowerfulactorstotransformtheirsourcesofpower
SULAWESI 136 14% 187 19% 76 8% 113 11% 49 5% 24 2% 116 12% 54 5% 67
BALI+NTB +NTT 42 11% 53 13% 35 9% 42 11% 20 5% 8 2% 54 14% 23 6% 35
MALUKU+ PAPUA 115 15% 136 18% 66 9% 105 14% 37 5% 23 3% 84 11% 42 6% 35
11% 77
10% 51
9% 36
7% 43
9% 31
5% 30
10
5% 60 4% 83 6% 1486 100%
5% 71 7% 58 5% 1097 100%
5% 46 7% 28 4% 686 100%
4% 64 6% 74 7% 1003 100%
8% 28 7% 25 6% 396 100%
4% 54 7% 39 5% 766 100%
11
12
Total
187
METHODSUSEDBYALTERNATIVEACTORS TOTRANSFORMTHEIRSOURCESOFPOWER Byprovidingdiscursiveactivities withinthepublicspherethrough seminars,discussion,hearings Byprovidingcontactsanddialogue withpoliticiansandadministratorsat variouslevels Byprovidingandbuildingnetworks andcoordinationforjointactivity Bycreatingcontactsandpartnership withinfluentialfiguresandexperts Bybeingabletodemonstrate collectiveandmassbasedstrength Bygeneratingeconomicself sufficiency,selfhelpactivities,co operatives,etc. BygaininglegitimacythroughDPR, DPRD,thejudicialsystemand/orthe formalexecutiveorgansthestate Bymakinguseofvariousmeansof forcefulofficialauthority,coercion, demonstrationofpowerandforceas wellasthegenerationoffear Byusingstateandgovernment budgetsotherresourcesand regulationstothebenefitofpro marketpoliciesandvariousactorson themarket Byprovidingpatronageinvarious forms(includingfavourable treatment,loans,aidandcharity)to forinstancesocialgroups, communities,civilsociety organisations(includingNGOs)aswell astobusinessmen,relativesand otherindividuals Byorganisingsupportwithin communities Bygainingapopularmandateor gettingelected
REGION SUMATERA 278 22% 165 13% 209 17% 138 11% 108 9% 32 3% 54 4% 13 1% 13 JAWA 224 23% 146 15% 151 15% 141 14% 81 8% 31 3% 31 3% 10 1% 13 KALIMANTAN 132 23% 68 12% 81 14% 63 11% 38 7% 29 5% 25 4% 11 2% 8
TableE.7.Themostfrequentmethodsusedbypowerfulactorstotransformtheirsourcesofpower
SULAWESI 183 23% 119 15% 116 14% 97 12% 61 8% 27 3% 37 5% 8 1% 6
BALI+NTB+ NTT 89 27% 41 12% 73 22% 37 11% 24 7% 13 4% 13 4% 5 2% 1
MALUKU+ PAPUA 131 23% 81 14% 97 17% 72 13% 22 4% 26 5% 30 5% 8 1% 9
1% 36
1% 37
1% 30
1% 26
0% 2
2% 22
10
3% 143 12% 59 5% 1248 100%
4% 104 11% 25 3% 994 100%
5% 64 11% 16 3% 565 100%
3% 98 12% 29 4% 807 100%
1% 32 10% 6 2% 336 100%
4% 59 10% 14 3% 571 100%
11
12
Total
188
REGION
TableE.8.Thepowerfulactorsmethodofcommunication
METHODOFCOMMUNICATION Sumatera 1 Writingbooksandarticles 56 6% 2 Performinginthemedia Attendingandgiving speechesinpublicseminars/ meetings Throughpersonalcontacts andnetworks Throughorganisationsand theirmeetingsandcontacts 332 32% 3 171 17% 205 20% 261 25% 1026 Jawa 42 6% 204 28% 119 16% 165 23% 202 28% 734 Kalimantan 39 8% 130 28% 77 17% 86 18% 135 29% 467 100% Sulawesi 56 8% 171 25% 151 22% 129 19% 167 25% 674 100%
Bali+NTB+ NTT 8 3% 75 29% 58 23% 42 16% 74 29% 257 100%
Maluku +Papua 35 7% 160 30% 124 23% 86 16% 126 24% 531 100%
Total
100% 100% TableE.9.Thealternativeactorsmethodofcommunication METHODOFCOMMUNICATION Sumatera 162 18% 174 20% 204 23% 151 17% 202 23% 893 100% Jawa 160 23% 130 19% 153 22% 119 17% 136 20% 698 100%
REGION Kalimantan 68 16% 84 20% 106 26% 71 17% 85 21% 414 100% Sulawesi 89 16% 103 18% 125 22% 115 21% 130 23% 562 100% Bali+NTB+ NTT 40 17% 47 19% 66 27% 39 16% 50 21% 242 100% Maluku +Papua 57 15% 78 20% 96 25% 65 17% 94 24% 390 100%
1 2 3
Writingbooksandarticles Performinginthemedia Attendingandgiving speechesinpublicseminars/ meetings Throughpersonalcontacts andnetworks Throughorganisationsand theirmeetingsandcontacts
Total
189
Table E.9. The actors mobilisation and organisation of people according to informants from different regions Q43.Theactorsmobilisationandorganisationofpeople:Howdotheactorstypicallytrytomobiliseandorganisepopular supportfortheissuesthatyouhaveidentifiedinthepreviousquestion(no42)? Powerfulactors Alternativeactors No Waytomobiliseandorganisepeople Response Percent Response Percent 1 Popularandcharismaticleaders 967 30 594 21 Sumatera 261 28% 154 20% Jawa 155 25% 142 23% Kalimantan 124 31% 76 21% Sulawesi 189 31% 103 20% Bali,NTB,NTT 85 33% 49 22% Maluku.NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua 165 32% 89 23% 2 Clientilism 902 28 246 9 Sumatera 293 32% 65 8% Jawa 218 35% 47 8% Kalimantan 122 30% 36 10% Sulawesi 145 24% 43 8% Bali,NTB,NTT 68 27% 18 8% Maluku.NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua 86 17% 36 9% 3 Alternativepatronage 335 10 560 20 Sumatera 98 11% 179 23% Jawa 70 11% 104 17% Kalimantan 21 5% 70 19% Sulawesi 66 11% 107 21% Bali,NTB,NTT 31 12% 52 23% Maluku.NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua 55 11% 67 18% 4 Networksbetweenindependentactors 718 22 979 35 Sumatera 184 20% 252 32% Jawa 126 20% 238 38% Kalimantan 104 26% 127 35% Sulawesi 144 24% 183 36% Bali,NTB,NTT 46 18% 68 30% Maluku.NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua 121 24% 133 35% Integrationfrombelowofpopularorganisations 5 350 11 429 15 intomoregeneralorganisations Sumatera 94 10% 136 17% Jawa 49 8% 93 15% Kalimantan 32 8% 51 14% Sulawesi 65 11% 74 15% Bali,NTB,NTT 26 10% 38 17% Maluku.NorthMaluku,Papua,WestPapua 81 16% 55 14%
190
REGION
TableE.10.Thepowerfulactorsorganisingaccordingtoinformantsfromdifferentregions
ORGANISATIONALMETHODS SUMATERA 115 14% 2 Ethnicity,religion,family,etc. 183 22% 3 Originandresidence(sonofthesoil identity) 67 8% 164 20% 5 Sector,profession 114 14% 6 Visions,ideas,interests 124 15% 7 Personalnetwork 68 8% Total 835 100% JAWA 47 8% 126 21% 32 5% 158 26% 103 17% 97 16% 52 9% 615 100% KALIMANTAN 54 14% 91 24% 25 7% 58 15% 63 17% 58 15% 29 8% 378 100% SULAWESI 84 15% 116 21% 45 8% 114 21% 67 12% 86 16% 36 7% 548 100%
BALI+NT B+NTT 13 6% 48 23% 16 8% 63 30% 15 7% 43 21% 9 4% 207 100%
MALUKU+ PAPUA 58 13% 111 24% 51 11% 114 25% 44 10% 61 13% 20 4% 459 100%
Descriptive
Hierarchicalconnectinglevels
1 2 3 4 5 6
TableE.11.Thealternativeactorsorganisingaccordingtoinformantsfromdifferentregions REGION ORGANISATIONALMETHODS BALI+NTB+ SUMATERA JAWA KALIMANTAN SULAWESI NTT 83 37 29 51 12 Descriptive 13% 7% 10% 12% 7% 78 95 67 65 30 Ethnicity,religion,family,etc. 12% 18% 23% 16% 17% 32 17 8 27 8 Originandresidence(sonofthesoil identity) 5% 3% 3% 7% 5% 50 50 16 41 9 Hierarchicalconnectinglevels 8% 9% 6% 10% 5% 72 77 38 43 19 Sector,profession 11% 14% 13% 11% 11% 245 211 99 133 74 Visions,ideas,interests 38% 39% 35% 32% 43% Personalnetwork 79 12% Total 639 100% 55 10% 542 100% 30 11% 287 100% 50 12% 410 100% 21 12% 173 100%
MALUKU+ PAPUA 46 14% 75 23% 17 5% 48 15% 29 9% 89 27% 21 7% 325 100%
191
TableE.11.Thepowerfulactorsalliances BACKGROUNDOFINDIVIDUAL ALLIANCES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Government/Bureaucracy Policeandmilitary Parliament(centralandlocal) Politicalparties Religiousorethnicgroups Academicians,the judiciary/lawfirms,media NGOs Nonclassbasedmass organisations Classbasedmass organisations Business Adatcouncilsetc. Semistateorstateauxiliary bodies Underworldandmilitia
REGION SUMATERA 160 20% 32 4% 48 6% 170 22% 71 9% 59 8% 53 7% 25 3% 15 2% 90 12% 21 3% 8 1% 32 4% JAWA 126 22% 34 6% 18 3% 118 21% 63 11% 47 8% 22 4% 8 1% 15 3% 89 16% 8 1% 2 0% 17 3% KALIMANTAN 70 19% 7 2% 27 7% 75 21% 35 10% 36 10% 20 6% 6 2% 11 3% 49 13% 8 2% 3 1% 18 5%
SULAWESI 111 18% 14 2% 71 12% 135 22% 41 7% 75 12% 59 10% 25 4% 20 3% 42 7% 6 1% 11 2% 6 1%
BALI+NTB +NTT 47 21% 4 2% 23 10% 31 14% 46 20% 21 9% 24 11% 2 1% 0 0% 6 3% 9 4% 4 2% 8 4%
MALUKU+ PAPUA 106 23% 18 4% 44 9% 78 17% 44 9% 35 7% 21 5% 25 5% 10 2% 35 7% 41 9% 7 2% 7 2%
192
TableE.12.Thealternativeactorsalliances BACKGROUNDOFINDIVIDUALALLIANCES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Government/Bureaucracy Policeandmilitary Parliament(centralandlocal) Politicalparties Religiousorethnicgroups Academicians,thejudiciary/law firms,media NGOs Nonclassbasedmassorganisations Classbasedmassorganisations Business Adatcouncilsetc. Semistateorstateauxiliarybodies Underworldandmilitia SUMATERA 70 11% 10 2% 26 4% 85 14% 27 4% 120 19% 125 20% 22 4% 63 10% 26 4% 17 3% 27 4% 3 1%
REGION JAWA 50 10% 9 2% 14 3% 78 16% 69 14% 90 18% 83 17% 8 2% 42 9% 32 7% 4 1% 11 2% 1 0% KALIMANTAN 34 13% 2 1% 6 2% 32 12% 21 8% 43 16% 95 35% 2 1% 11 4% 9 3% 10 4% 5 2% 2 1%
MALUKU+ PAPUA 43 14% 6 2% 16 5% 26 9% 37 12% 54 18% 43 14% 14 5% 10 3% 9 3% 37 12% 11 4% 0 0%
SULAWESI BALI+NTB+NTT 63 25 13% 13% 5 0 1% 0% 26 14 6% 7% 82 18 17% 10% 29 35 6% 19% 63 32 13% 17% 121 47 26% 25% 13 3 3% 2% 26 2 6% 1% 21 3 4% 2% 11 5 2% 3% 14 3 3% 2% 1 1 0% 1%
193
Bali+NTB+N TT 72 55% 13 10% 0 0% 4 3% 1 1% 8 6% 13 10% 0 0% 10 8% 3 2% 0 0% 2 2% 5 4% 131 100% Maluku+Pa pua 90 37% 78 32% 0 0% 12 5% 6 3% 6 3% 17 7% 1 0% 8 3% 8 3% 0 0% 0 0% 17 7% 243 100%
TableE.12.Thepowerfulactorspoliticalparties/organisations REGION POLITICAL PARTIES/ORGANISATIONS (PowerfulActors) Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Golkar 162 155 76 143 1 35% 43% 34% 43% PDIP 74 50 42 35 2 16% 14% 19% 11% Hanura,PPRN 1 4 1 2 3 0% 1% 0% 1% Demokrat 46 42 6 14 4 10% 12% 3% 4% PKS 26 14 1 11 5 6% 4% 0% 3% MajorIslamicbased 62 45 47 51 6 13% 12% 21% 16% Smallparties 25 7 15 31 7 5% 2% 7% 9% Alternativeparties 10 0 0 2 8 2% 0% 0% 1% NGOs 8 7 12 8 9 2% 2% 5% 2% Adatcouncil/groups, 5 5 5 4 10 1% 1% 2% 1% Media 1 0 0 0 11 0% 0% 0% 0% Business 8 6 1 4 12 2% 2% 0% 1% Massorganisations 39 30 18 25 13 8% 8% 8% 8% 467 365 224 330 Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
194
Bali+NTB +NTT 8 8% 12 13% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 9 10% 7 7% 1 1% 28 30% 0 0% 2 2% 1 1% 26 27% 95 100% Maluku+Pa pua 46 33% 16 11% 0 0% 5 4% 2 1% 6 4% 12 9% 0 0% 27 19% 14 10% 1 1% 0 0% 12 9% 141 100%
TableE.13.Thealternativeactorspoliticalparties/organisations REGION POLITICAL PARTIES/ORGANISATIONS (AlternativeActors) Sumatera Jawa Kalimantan Sulawesi Golkar 50 37 32 39 1 14% 12% 18% 16% PDIP 28 36 15 31 2 8% 12% 8% 13% Hanura,PPRN 0 0 3 4 3 0% 0% 2% 2% Demokrat 16 2 3 5 4 4% 1% 2% 2% PKS 32 20 10 12 5 9% 7% 6% 5% MajorIslamicbased 34 65 22 42 6 9% 21% 12% 17% Smallparties 24 5 14 17 7 7% 2% 8% 7% Alternativeparties 45 9 3 18 8 12% 3% 2% 7% NGOs 76 64 42 30 9 21% 21% 23% 12% Adatcouncil/groups, 4 5 5 8 10 1% 2% 3% 3% Media 3 3 5 0 11 1% 1% 3% 0% Business 7 1 2 8 12 2% 0% 1% 3% Massorganisations 47 57 24 33 13 13% 19% 13% 13% 366 304 180 247 Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
195

Building Democracry On The Sand

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Building Democracry On The Sand

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2008

Chapter8 Summary DEMOSteam Chapter9 TheModelofPoliticalBloc ArisArifMundayatandA.E.Priyono Bibliography Appendix

IndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond IntroductionandExecutiveBriefing: Advances,setbacksandoptions,20032007

Counterbyscalingup throughdemocratic representation

Counterbyscalingup throughdemocratic representation

words,threeofinstrumentsofdemocracyrelatedtothepracticesofgovernance wereinthelistoftheworstpossiblescoreindex(40).SeeTable3.3. Tabel3.3.TheInstrumentsofDemocracywithIndexScore40

Table3.5.InstrumentsofDemocracyrelatedtofreedomsandcivilandpolitical rightswhoseindexesdecreased:Comparisonof2003/04and2007Survey results.

instruments.Table3.6belowshowstheindexofdemocraticinstrumentsrelated totheaspectofpoliticalrepresentation. Table3.6.IndexandRankingofInstrumentsrelatedtoPoliticalRepresentation

40(71) 36(24) 44(38) 40(20) 38(23) 38(24) 40 (25) 43(36)

22(3) 31(22) 17(12) 24(29) 29(25) 27(21) 25(19)

Thepartywas,infact,oneofelementswithintheparliamentthatendorsedthecontroversial,andrather sectarian,antipornographybillrecentlypassed.Theparliamentariancommitteeresponsibleforthebillwas chairedbyaleadingmemberoftheparty.

SeevanKlinken(2002).Therefore,accordingtovanKlinken,itisalsoimportanttoobservehowpoliticswork forthepeopleinIndonesiaingeneral,besidetheelitesbehaviorinnationallevel.Itmeans,itisnotenoughto observethosewhohavepowerinnationallevel,butalsothoseinlocallevel,wheremostIndonesianpeople liveandwork.

GENERAL CONCEPTS ORIDEAS 30 28 26 32(18)

NATIONALSURVEY PROBLEMSANDOPTIONSONDEMOCRATIZATIONIN INDONESIA 2007

PROPORTION (%) 83 17 100

PRO GENDER MEDIA FESSIONALISM EQUALITY 1 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 4 68 7% 2 4 1 3 4 2 3 2 1 6 3 3 2 59 9% 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 80 10%

Directparticipation(Peoplesdirectaccessandcontactwiththepublic servicesandgovernmentsconsultationofpeopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirectparticipationinpolicymakingandtheexecutionof publicdecisions) Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. 32

PERFORMANCE Notverysupportive %ofinformants 25

SUBSTANCE Yes Noanswer %ofinformants 51 5

Directparticipation(Peoplesdirectaccessandcontactwiththepublic servicesandgovernmentsconsultationofpeopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirectparticipationinpolicymakingandtheexecutionof publicdecisions) Percentagebasedonnumberofinformants,N=903. 32

TOTAL 1945 100 1658 100 *Informantswereaskedtoidentifyuptomaximum3powerfulactorsand3alternativeactors.Percentage basedonnumberofeachcategoryofmainactors.

PERCENTOFRESPONSES 12 1 2 9 14 21 17 19 3 3 100 6 3 5 21 28 14 9 9 5 2 100

Economicresources 25 Masspower/Political/Militarycoercion 33 Socialstrengthandfavourablecontacts 28 Knowledge,information 13 TOTALRESPONSES 100 *Informantswereaskedtoidentifytwomostsourcesofpowers.Percentagebasedonresponses.

GENERAL CONCEPTSOR IDEAS

GENERAL CONCEPTSOR IDEAS

10% 11% 10% 31% 3% 13% 3% 6% 10% 1% 100%

7% 12% 20% 17% 4% 15% 11% 2% 5% 7% 100%

%ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses

%ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses %ofresponses

ToselfmanagementNGOs;Toinformalleaders Directlytoelectedexecutivesonvariouslevels;Directlytothebureaucrats variouslevels;Directlytothelawenforcementinstitutions Topoliticalparties;Directlytoelectedpoliticiansinlegislativebodiesonvarious levels Tosemigovernmentinstitutions

NATIONALSURVEY PROBLEMSANDOPTIONSONDEMOCRATIZATIONIN INDONESIA 2007

SULAWESI 21 12% 105 61% 46 27% 0 0% 172 100%

BALI+NT B+NTT 9 13% 28 42% 30 45% 0 0% 67 100%

MALUKU+P APUA 32 28% 53 46% 31 27% 0 0% 116 100%

136 52% 55 21% 10 4% 8 3% 4 2% 50 19% 1 0% 264 100%

88 51% 40 23% 13 8% 5 3% 3 2% 20 12% 5 3% 174 100%

63 57% 20 18% 6 6% 5 5% 4 4% 12 11% 0 0% 110 100%

119 69% 26 15% 5 3% 5 3% 1 1% 14 8% 2 1% 172 100%

D. THE QUALITY OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY

SULAWESI 136 14% 187 19% 76 8% 113 11% 49 5% 24 2% 116 12% 54 5% 67

BALI+NTB +NTT 42 11% 53 13% 35 9% 42 11% 20 5% 8 2% 54 14% 23 6% 35

MALUKU+ PAPUA 115 15% 136 18% 66 9% 105 14% 37 5% 23 3% 84 11% 42 6% 35

SULAWESI 183 23% 119 15% 116 14% 97 12% 61 8% 27 3% 37 5% 8 1% 6

BALI+NTB+ NTT 89 27% 41 12% 73 22% 37 11% 24 7% 13 4% 13 4% 5 2% 1

MALUKU+ PAPUA 131 23% 81 14% 97 17% 72 13% 22 4% 26 5% 30 5% 8 1% 9

3% 143 12% 59 5% 1248 100%

4% 104 11% 25 3% 994 100%

5% 64 11% 16 3% 565 100%

3% 98 12% 29 4% 807 100%

1% 32 10% 6 2% 336 100%

4% 59 10% 14 3% 571 100%

Bali+NTB+ NTT 8 3% 75 29% 58 23% 42 16% 74 29% 257 100%

Writingbooksandarticles Performinginthemedia Attendingandgiving speechesinpublicseminars/ meetings Throughpersonalcontacts andnetworks Throughorganisationsand theirmeetingsandcontacts

BALI+NT B+NTT 13 6% 48 23% 16 8% 63 30% 15 7% 43 21% 9 4% 207 100%

MALUKU+ PAPUA 46 14% 75 23% 17 5% 48 15% 29 9% 89 27% 21 7% 325 100%

SULAWESI 111 18% 14 2% 71 12% 135 22% 41 7% 75 12% 59 10% 25 4% 20 3% 42 7% 6 1% 11 2% 6 1%

BALI+NTB +NTT 47 21% 4 2% 23 10% 31 14% 46 20% 21 9% 24 11% 2 1% 0 0% 6 3% 9 4% 4 2% 8 4%

MALUKU+ PAPUA 106 23% 18 4% 44 9% 78 17% 44 9% 35 7% 21 5% 25 5% 10 2% 35 7% 41 9% 7 2% 7 2%

MALUKU+ PAPUA 43 14% 6 2% 16 5% 26 9% 37 12% 54 18% 43 14% 14 5% 10 3% 9 3% 37 12% 11 4% 0 0%

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