II II

THE BATTLE OF KONIGGARATZ, 1866

THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL ART
A Monogruph
by
Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Daves
Signal Corps
School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Start' College
Fort Leavenworth, Kunsas
Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship
AY 87-88
App."ovcd for Public Relcluc; I>lstl'llllltiolt Is lJnlllllllcd
i
..
Bcl",clol D+ l'li.l i. I:ary Gtuui es
MDnCl<;jI""wll i-\pPI""(:Jval
Name 0+ !:lI',l.lt:JHI,I:, L IC Char 1"'5 U. Daves
T.i t.I. e t.l'f I'lolluljl,,,.,ph: 1",1:[/:.1./1..,. JJ,I,L;"
0iLOF
ApP'''Dv811
Uirector.
8tuLJil;!c:.', I::'H.llowslli f1
School

U. Holder Jr., M.A. (4dvarH:eLl l"'li l.ll:al'y Utud L8S
U:Lrucl:ul'".
I:;' r- L.H 1r c=.,
AI:.'i:iTRI-\CT
TI1e Camp'.llLJn conducted by Gene,"al HslmuLh von 1'loJ. t1,:", il\Lu [<"h,.m1"
aqainst 1.:1"112 the most brill.iant uf' l.:l'1al: .:?I'".:."\. TI'l(?
I<BnigIJI'"t\I:z cl.\\lllpaign is; a classic: 0+ the i:\rt. IJf 1111':'\1""
pra,:tic8d ,;\10 tile ope,-aLional level. Th ... ChiE.!!' of: lhe l-irme,""J.
Sla.ff, l"'ILlll:I::l-.l, 1S an operationc;"l tIlE!
t C,lV8r" I )I"'oduceu by Prussi a. He devel UIHXJ thf= F'l'-I.lssi an
campaign pl.,,-, -for Uu, <lttacl,: into Bohemia whic.h led lu ti,e tol,,\!
collapSifil r.J+ Lhe Austrian Army in approltllHc.rtely two weeks. The
campaign is qoud eXBfllple of the operational level ot war wlth
Llltil1lC\b" <5t,"ategi<: goal of German national Lmily. IHso, tl18
c::ampc\lqn clf:'f:f.?I"S an eHample o'r the tJpe"."."l:irlCj
on dnu l:he Lise of the lTItJGl advancpu 1.r1
the 81'""a LI1 lJr the cc'lIlpiaign. With r.lpel.... al'-t i:\!::;i
UH? imp[)rtr:\nt.:e 0+ Lief:ining clear upE'ral:il:lncll
sl:c..\l:e anll elf, lJi::danc:ir"llJ lile enu with WI,:\yS. c:\llcl rlr;l"
will Dn<llyzed.
anc:.dyt'J.l::j lrH:luLies a discLlssion of appl ical.:.lcHl elf
r.:er'l:al n tl"18CWI?tl ca.l a.spects of aperi:.'\'!:10I1i11 i:\r t: l.I'\8Se 1nr.: I. ut.le
exteriur uf c8nt8t"" ai' Cl+fellsF2. 'decl Sl ve
battle. and [118 inte,","r"lationsI1ip L)-f st'"i\t,.gic. upt'3r"t.,\t,L Clrli":.d r.\nu
tactlcal

Section 1. Introduction 1
l
.1.0
12
Ways J.8

"r' \
''';''':''
Section Ill. CLmclLlslon
,',-
._'....J
Ene 1osulr-e!;"i: 1. Hleater of War
1

.,
-'. Initial Position in F,-on ti er
;:, .
Rail System
4-'
'-'
4. Pt::lsi tion JLlne
",r.;:'


Posltion JL,ne 26

6. Position June 27 "16
7. F'IJS.L L: ion J Line 28 '+I
8. Posi t lClI1 June 29 48
'1. l::"lJSltion JL,ne 3(J WI
iO. r':;'I'JS it 1on July i
::JI)
i1. Posi ti on JL'l y :2 51
1 PositIon July 3 52
Endnotes

Bibliogl"aphy
55
!. I IJI\I
""1"1-1(= Wi,H" 0+ II wrote General Helml.ltll von Clllef
()f {"erll?I"'l::d Sea-off, II was enlel"'ed in nut tile
ut= j"'l'ussii:\ WdS threatened, nor- IN,-,S 1 L Ci..\ul;:H..:.ld by pulJl i.e
OpillitJrl c,\I'ILi tile vC,Jict:? I.Jf: tt-\e J.l: Wt'il!"i i.\ .lUI"lr;j
i:ol""(:seen driLl calmly 1J1''r.:!pal'''ed fcu', recoYll1zetl I..'\'::i i7i flet:essl ty uy
the nol: for FOI- arl
end--the of puwer. Not a felot <:l f 1and was e": act(:t.J
,frum Ik(;tr"ia, she had to '-'mounce "111 pr.\I-t in th",
hegemony of Gf::!I'-many.1l 1 TI,e War of 1866, yf?nel"a.l.ly uS "TIH2
Seven Wal"', II 1"'85l11 t.ed in the (]'f tl1l:2 !\lol'-U'Il?r-n
plantt3d the uf' i:\ Ilation whiL:h
YEW"1Il1 natl-2L1 !.lUI' i 1'19 the.
l
1,:'1"1..11ll:0-F'I"l.\ssi an War- u f l H1(1.
lffiIJOI.... ti:.Ull:. IJE!(:ause it t.he fir!5t uf: a rH.!ItJ !:;l:y.l("]
thiat Wi:\S to 11c?lVl,a c.; deal uf in-flL\ence upun-t.he l::":ul.... upE-?an
... dl 11l:?lmuLn
von Mullke a slgnificarlt role in ttle
plan o'f al:tack <lgainst Austria which led to the ueh:at CJf the
ALlstric\l1 14i'"IllY. !n tile study of operational art f<Onlyyr';"t= 1"las
much to u'ffel- HI tenlls of planning and e::r:cutJ.on. This
!
L:omma.nder!'a, ClJfIllJany and i3 .L l lIlUSt.
1-l1olW GeneriJ..l
to lll"lnq ',llIuul: LI,e dlo!hoat 0+ the Austrl,'" IklllY wt 11 IH-' e""\llIined.
Moltkes url war would have been
1iiiui t. hit.; alH.J hi$ r-efiOl.lrr.:es, doing rll..H t,.htu l:lJLJ much nor"
,-,
too Little."
"
The fi.,st and /O'Jst critical element Q-f fJperaliL1l'lal '>I't '"
lllS deS.LI'eU end st.ats and .LrJenl. r, Fyi ng t.118
appropriate Inilltary ubjective. Whether the operational
COlllmander is a strategic ob.iectiv8 or' lAn(;!8ar 01
cllnbigL'ous ljuidal1Cl3, it /Oust be into a w,;>ll-Lie-Hned
operational objectlve. Uperati(:)nal thell'"
thinking the limi 1:5 of immediate t:ombr.-\l: alld VI "-"5Llc:d i.:8 tile
des!l"ecJ ml.llLcIl"y cond!l:ion th<lt will acilleve the strat<:?q!c:
objectiv". u-rhe operational in Wc:JI"-cjS,
a tlldt envlsi.rJl1s. ,fur U,e most pal"I:. lhE' accrllllpl.i.sl"ll1lent
o'f the st,-.,t."'Gic: and oper-ational de<>pitf! thQ facl that 1'8
II'Tl'lis is why, Ult21'wP a
clear' o'f tht-j operoational c.:Hl
tllat qrown flven more impurtallt i;\S Cd.!
and tim(.! and
CllnGldr:wl::l.l:.i.ulls hdve the for f r.\llcl
In.L tic::\t:1V\o:,:,I 11'1 !;il.lurJr-c.Iina'te E',:u,wly tlntlrH:,H.:i
operall0nal will allow a concentratiun uf 8fforLs
al ttle tin,e place. Also a
far "lore usa (Jf our military resources
riyw"oU\; '-\lllj intelliyent methods of applying ways. and an
as;sesslIlen t (Jf the puss i b i 1 i I: Y (J,F nat acl1 i i llld ;:\1"1 ab j 8<: l:. i ve
(I"isl':> (4 c.1.",iW operational objective allows U,"' [:acUcal
l:.u design his plan arid tran!51dte
intu victlJriE!G "that will cOrltriuute to the 1 ot L1lr.:.'
c.lmpiU gn.
p-vi.:duat.lul'l uf' l:.lle r-eSDUI1""ces or (fIll-=\l\ P()WE'I'-.
layi8t.ics, etc.) reqLllred. The milital""y
determine our <:,ilpaLlilil:i8s. Tile oLljective Ill"""!: IJe 1:,.li. .LOI".'c1 to
briny it \11 llne witl'l U,e resources at 0\ (]ivf.>1"l ri51' UI" LIlt"
l1""e4;;;iOUI""(':f:;S avai I.able t.u t.he comma.nder be
fIll.ISt incl.ude CUmbii;\t!' .-\rld l:UIIlLlat
service ';UppfJl'"'I: 81emenl;s o'f the corl'"ect propul'"'UUI"l and be'
and sustained.
risk 1lllJSt dccepted. The c:t:llnmander v-JIHJ daF llles 11i.'::i
fai llw'fi'

The op""."o\Uonal pl"lI1ner mLlst be concerllr.<J wi Lh V.WlCIUc;
methods tll "'I,ply the military ,force (ways) and to pUI'''e,ue their
military cOl1cept or course of action as the result uf
the estimi'lL." cd: tile sitLlation. Military strateyic concepLs
dejJloyment. f'ar.:tlcc'3.1 engagements, 1TI2Unr operc:\{:.ions.
The operatior,al commander must understand the and
interrel ..,ULll"l,.:;hips of these options and enSLII"E! that the resul Ls
of tactical and operational consideratiuns are ultimately linked
4
tu the str-,,\'t,,'qic objective. How the 'fo,"ces shuul.d lJl.I "tJol.\l:
objet:1:ive witllin the i!:) f.\
bal anee 't.l'\al'. fIIU\!i"t:, be ami ned if the p.L I:HI i 1:5 t (J I.JP r:\ '_';llcr.:e
I
5S.
1+ IIll.l!. tdr"y (me,::Uls) anLl (It.,h-\Y':i) ;11"'1:..' nLJt
t:unHn...Jn\;;ul.... W1 Lli tl'le nl..Jjec:tivEJ (enu) U1Q plc:\ll IN11 L 1"k\VFi r\
t::J'f I'"" J. r-\SSCJCl wi th i t.. mtpnl:e ,':\nd E-?):t(..
r.:: 1c'ILH:,d y. l!...;til: approaches to th8 aCCF.!pl:alll.:12 U+ j"'i'.:ik in
plc:\nning tJoftF.:!rl I'"esul ts in plans that arp- 1.J['jtenl.1C'"':\11 y
I.... c::\bounds In war'fare and orle whn p.:\t"""ll:y l.n
puwer with his enen,y must accept r"isk Jl1 one In
tu bt:i in II 5
an iHample n+ a methud l:.l'liat allows 'fol"'l:e eCIJnulIlY in Ullf:! C:,HlcJ
concentration in another in order to be decislve. Not acceptirlg
a degl"'ee l:Jf in !:-iomp- situl'3.tions and aCC811'LtlllJ (:nIJ mudl I'-I
in another Lill'l to failure.
1\luw t.h;::\t Ilave discussed the Llas,1 C l-?l+?IIIf-!lltS Df ml II Li:\,r-y
stralf3YY: ways, and risk, ii: is imperative thaI: each
element be fully considered when formulating military strategy.
The prop,?r- blerllJing or- IJalancing of these inhlrUE'pendent element,;
has always been a difficult process. Tile eleillents in a
5
dynamic m"tnner"; one element ccmnot Witll(Jut a'" f,,0:1.1ng the
II iUf.h7;\lly:, thrn stra,'l:egic iH"ltl fIIf.-:a.I1S
to the o"erdl:lonal commander shoLlld alll1\>/ him tu ,,,:hl,,ve '"
posi withlJt.d: 'fiql1l:iny c:H:; d.Lu ["loJ
"nc:ir"ch.!II"mi', (Jf the hoeneh nrmy at in 11l71) "f.,
1n Pr;:\I"':i!.:j .i. t We-iS
wl1ich 1::111:3 ir-rp-vocable verdict 0+ L.tpClrl tJIf-=' df-Jstlny
of 11i:\!:i in Bohemia. The (Jf I'\<..\s
rE;lve,:\!ed llH? migl'lt of: Pr-Llssia i.\nu has s'll'uc.:k a P81"""lapS
" irl-eparable blow at th,o political power 0'1' ALlst:r-ia." '7 "rile
political of the Battle of were su
profound and so far reaching that it Is nut tu
why .Lt has generally been UI18 0+
UatL:18s In thf.! modern era.. n 8 lh.\l.l nut
witnes5et.l war UI'\ the mClgnilLlde that was displdyed [jurJrICj ttle
Koni \lgra tz campai <;In si nce eon's ti me. 1 L W..-lC; the J, al"ges L
military el'\CIJW1ter in tile modern er,.. The raill'"ocH.I, teleql'"aph,
Ci:lst I"".i cannon, LJreet::h-!uaLJirllJ in+alll:I'y I""j. f I.e <."1.11
tile oth"lr .,dvanced technulogy of the indl.lstrlul o'ge played a
major part in the results. A new style of military strateyy
emenJed fl"om CiMIlPi.\i <;In that was to have a >lI'"o+uund eff".'ct on
strategical thought in the years that followed.
6
of G8nyral Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, the
movement: CLJuJ.d be tu i\rl enemy c:unVl:llll:icula!
tlpGH",::\l:.ing tIIF.!clI'-ies. lIL;el.. if one the f2cnnurny wi t.h
whit:ll I'lull..l.f) employed mat.erial fort:es in Cln:Je,r" I.IJ achleve
I"e!:iults .:u::c:t..lI'-c11ny Lu do pl"ecCJncelved p! e;\11 , then UIG Vlct,LlI"'y D+
II. CAMPAIGN Ule
war ayainsl: Austria in 1866 was in eSSence 1:0 lJrir'ly
nati(JI1al Clni loy. This cuuld only be done by AusLria

and PrUSGla as an European (\UGtl... .i. a 2I.nd

F'I"LlSsia -four mnny yaars Ilad bean strLlggl irlg 1'01" sup,"emacy 1n
Gel"many.
St,,\ff ii' I'\oltf(e started working on t:unti.rl-gf!ncy plans
for the war with AustrIa. "lui tke wo,.-I:8<1 out jJ I. dllS
'fur the cUricent"-at,0Il of the F'I"USS1<1rl AI'"lIIY in a pl"oLJal.118 war W1 til
Austria as early as the spring of 1860 which ,. reflected .n
1/
Memorandum Numbsr One. Although military condilions had changed
since 186U, tile plan served as a basis for the plan of 1866,
7
to ewtenu tl'll? c:nntro.l of reasun over w.""j:are.
'in war L:annot we e::haLl!5tutJ lJy cdlc:ulal:ltJns.
He ackl"ll1wltltl(Jet.l that plllitlCill' circulIl=;1:ilnCe5 w.)I'"e lJuund tu
modity IIlLlil:i:;\I"y at all times allU c.lltlf.:\Y (.Jf tile
fl-eedom oF tlH= CLJlIlfTlantJer as he tried to direl.;!: IIlJ Iltdry
I'lultl,e fc?.I,t that lIlobl!i2at:iun ilnd lnit.idl
0+ the was 1 L c:uuld be
prepared" long tllllE! Wafore the outlJreak.
Ilin the or-igirlal concantration of arlnles carl
during the wl\{J,te C:OLfI-';C? of the campaign." .lU
that lIle 1J1"oper time +ell"" pJ i.\nrlllltj I,.J,.H:i
before the battle. It is the str"ateglst's julJ tCJ pe-tJVllJe Ills
commc..\nuer- wlth c:.\ plan thc..,t affords his fIlc:\::lIflL.llll pl'ul:ectllJll
the p",,"icJd of and additior'dl1.y dlc"slOts t1, ..
combat furclo,; CD that pdrt 01: the theacE.!r of wdl-" l,avl'
the ("Mulvdntage in t.ho +J.gI1Lil1tJ_ "l u
attempt tu c:l1dr..t tl'H'/ C:ULtrse of a cilmp,.ign anti tu hulu flelLi
comlllanders tu rigid prescriptions would be lu destroy the kinLi of
initiat:Lve anll opportunism that wins battIes." 1 1. TI'f?r"el'o,",'/, the
operacional pldn lIlUSt he flexible and adaptable to meet the
8
It a \JlJlJtI thing th"t l'lo!tke felt. tllis WilY IJ.?caus" t.he sprinL]
0-[ 1866 WelS F.i.l!e,j witch proIJ!em!; +or I'russ,.;'. IJI-ul.Jlems which
Thc.:.! militr:\I""Y of operations in l:.:IulH:?lIlia 1:(=.='11 lntu
the nor'!:tl by thbl Ries,en Gebirge and on the the SLlul:h LJy Lhe
central EllJe. The sector was btlLlr'\(j by tile f..:.lLJe and lsc?r
I
rivers and tIle mountairlS ai: Lusatia (Fiyure 1).
11u L1.1,(2 r:5 p 1'::\('1
and ttle eventual uniufl these furces
at or near Gitschin.
i'l:.$ operatIons SaHony, would muve thr-LlUgll irlt:u
wes'l:EU"n 1:.iE!ctar" i:\r'UJ head feu'" lllP. L!::iC!I'"
!
Thc= f:"lrsl AI'''my would invac.Je ttlf? c8nl:rf.d sHcl.i(/Il dIlL! muve
The Second Army would pass through the deflles 0+ the Aupa and
upper 1:'::1l.18 ill"J eHecl: a I"endezvous wi th t11E.1 F;t1;l ikllly.
9
On 12 1'lolY 1866 rllli tke was given aUU'OI"i"olliufl for cumplete
ALlsll"'ian Ilad
begun un Rpril 1866. Moltke's immediate tHak was to
I"'SI:ovel'" .It"Jll:it yl'"'LJLlnd iH1 f./uicl(ly as f,Jo!:.;;siule lJy quickly
1:I"uDp,; ttl tl",> tlle.d.:",r uf: w.:\r. By Llslng I:he Iliql-Ily rJevellJpecJ
Pl"'l.lssian system, 11e deployed 11.LS C:CII'"Pc; ftJl'"\-./.:\I'-L1 lIntil
thc=y sLuud 1J1'1 a concenl:ric 276 mi les lunq. In s
the dispusil:illns made by the railroad wel"e nDt tile end of the
army' 's depinyllll?flt, bllL the beginnlng "(J!" ttle desi'"ed
of -Forces. 'fhe in positIon to
1;1:,- ike by cCll'1centr i C II11JVement toward the enemy. war wa5
nDt declared immediately, Moltke was compelled to shorten the arc
becalls8 it "Iii';; too dangerous. The final dispusition of: lhe
Prussian ArlllY prlor tu war was followa: ?\I"IIIY 0 f the Clbe "1,"5
located in the vicinity of Torgau, the First Army waD located
near GBrlitz. and the Secund Army was located in the VIClnity uf
Neisse IFiyur8 2). UI1 15 Jllne 1866 the f'rllss;i an yove,"nll1ent
dec.Lared war 011 f3a::onY!t and Hesse dlld {:)rl :.:::::.: June
declared WHr un Austria. Moltke then sel uut tu plan Ilis
C1p er a ti on
His first step was to define as the objective for the
/ Prussian ?\rmy the defeat of the Austrian ?\rmy. Tilis objective
10
would ful.l.y put his plan in c:umpl iance wi th ti,,. "t1'-ateqic el'e.!
state. I'lut L1',0:; , ,. plan to prosecute the Wdr 011 the> ""emy" S soi 1
wuuld r'8qlJlre sai:ure u'F k8y terrain 811d cerldin forr:e
his ultimate oUjective woulLl lh8
o'j: th" tl'- J. 0\1"\ AI"my.
irldicated that the La lctentj,l'y
the center oi: yravi'ty and to direct agalrlsL it;
and if til" Cl!llter of qr'avity pl"oveu to be! th,: npPl.1f_iiI'Ill army. so
muc:h tl'le lll"t t"I-.
things the easy way--using superior strength to fllch sume
preferring sOlne "Iinor conquest to 4ruat
constantly s"o:;king out the c:enter of power, by dOing all to win.
wi 11 0118 1'-eo,.L.L y the enemy. II 12 The sallie anc":\lCJllY
in f=1'1 100-5 to e::plain a key element 01' uperal.lonal ar't; the
essence o{ opel"atlonal art "is the ,1dentifil:at'Cln lJf the enemy' 5
uperational of yravity--Ilis of ur
bal the tra t i un 01; super.i or comb a (-. c31;1 d i
the pOlnt 1:0 ,,,c:hleve a dec:isive sLlccess." 1::: Thus Fur 1'luiLke
iuen'ti-fylllg the center tJf qravi toy mel;'\lll: lhe 11\1.:\5=-, u+ tIlE:
ALlstr i an 14rlny. Findiny and filling thi!::i mass anu bringing cumurd:
power against it to achieve a dec:isive victory wuuld b" a
significant {eature of his c:ampaign.
11
fh8 upurational ubjective was tor the Austrian
Army. (.'U!'.;'t.l'- i. a fLlll y f.:!npec:ted war anu Pr"LlS!.3j e:tn Vf.-1 Il1l:o
8aheUli.::.\. ,Ilk)w l:i.\n one ,:-\void war, II J(I':iElph
(It.llel- wa.nts it." 14 ALI!3t.ri'J:s Wc"\Si 1:0
pl"'8vent UH:::.' intf:J Bohefllli::\ by J,rlvadirlfJ tr:n"Ti.I]F"Y.
Tl"lis lJ++<':'1 Jl1aI Yf:! .Lnt.o F'1'"I.lf.:isia WDLdd 13{::,izfi' the .i.flll..I..:\tiv8 r3.flcJ
LJit.. rllpi: PI'UL:is:i.Ldrl plan!...; to fiyht the war in BuIH?f1IJ i;\.
wULlLd Lbl.:\L! ClVl:'"Jr the Lusc:\l:.ion mountains to c.1nd Ll(jl'-l to
Bel"l ill.
Sa:u,JI1Y i:\nd covel-ing tile passage of the Bav.9.I""j,arl'5 by the pa!:3!.H?'::j IJF
the to Wi'll ttenlJ<:.,-g where the whole o'f tile invading a,-my
migl'lt Ilave LJ",en This would plJise the (klslri.lnc; +01" ,m
o'ffensivC1 pu,;I'\ to gain of the capital city of Berlin and
ovel.. t h I'" ow til'} F'1'"'uGsi all y.
it 15 nuw appropdate to look ,.into the fJill.<i'lns avall."ble tlJ
1101 t ke LInd tl'le f"',"ussi an Anlly. 1'101 'lIce hc:\d c\rmi IE;!S hl. 5
COlli/nand. The Elbe Army, consisting of three
divisions and two c:av6dry lJrigc:::\des Ltndel.... tile ut= Gene.r-,":.d
He,-wartl"} VUI'I III tlenfelLl; the First AnllY, conSl stinq lJ+ tll,"e" Cll'"llIy
corps and a ry COI"PS o'f si N bri gad13s wluer 1I1e commarllJ u+
Prince Freuerick Charles; and the Second Army, consisting of four
army corps .\ cavaJI'-y division of thr.le b,"i\j<HIE-is L1nUel" the
12
commami 0+ CI'"lJwn FrieliJr-ich Wilhelm. AI.lhlJU4h {-\usll'-.La
double the pupl.llatioll ty o,f Prussia 'l'I'''om .,IIlLl', lo ,'-ecruit
a.nrJ was CIJI'Hiidel'"ed '1:0 be the strorHJest army in l::LII'""ope,
tile gr-oul1d +UI'-C8 means avai lable were cunsiciereeJ by I'\ollke to
be I.u accumpli sh hi 5 obJecti Ve. Molll.e knew Lhdt the
F't"'u5sii:.U1 ('lI'""l1I)' a wE-.!ll-trainfad flJrcl:? with IJ.IIU
intellit;j,,,,,t :I eadel"sl,ip.
li\vallaule tu was ttlE,1 PI'U'c:iS.lc.,rl
preparatiurl far war. It was better tor war due tu
taking advi.\nti:\I;)8 uf revolLltionary
mobilizat.Lon planning. Moltke considered the Prussian Army's
mobilization plan as a critical means available 1:0 him. The
ability Lo mulJilize 'fi.H..iter than ALlstl"ia wOLlld fJ'Lve the
initiative OIL the start of the war. The e++iciency wIth which
Prussia mobiiized its +orces in 0+ 1866 can lJe traced lo lhe
PrL\ssicln realizatloll that the army had become leU1.\ryic Llurirl4
fifty years 0+ peace.
Several referlos were initiated duri'1y the lale and
eal"lY l86(1's that focuseLl on improvllly the read,,,,,,,;s uf LJol;h Lhe
regular army and the milltia. The regiments, LlivIslons, anLl
corps established an affiliation wilh the peacetime army tl,at
would be lhe same in wartime. Also, aclive duly curps were
13
v
v
located in 1:1lE:! salllla t:Jislr-icts in which I:t'ley r-8C:'''U.l I:eel allu woultJ
draw their units in case the mobilizaLion was
given. Pr-ussim could definitely shorten lhe tillle ar-y for
its lar-y" o,,'-my 1:0 lIIusler- and conduct pr.,d",ploymelll:
As a result uf carl efficient mobilizatior1 Prussia wuuld be
able to mustE:1r and deploy three armies in a two week period along
a 276 mile c1l'-C (.:n:tending 'from Sa:;ony in tile Wt."?!:it to in
Howevef, the mobilization plan atone was nut the urlly reason
the deployment worl(ed so rapidly and ef-!'lciently. I:. i:\S
important WdS ll1e a::tensive railroad tllat (?Jtist:eLl in

fleHibility I:tl the opf'!,-alional planners in thla numbers of' fDr-ces
that could be deployed and the tillle that it touk to deploy thelll
along the p'"L'ssian f"tlntier (-FigLlre 3). estlmatetJ lhey
could acc:olllf.llish in two weel:s what it would the (4L'StJ'_LoillS
aiH or SeV811. -rhe railroad offer-ed new strategic opptlrtunitie5
to the F'rLI!Ss.L ans. Truups coul d be transpo,-tetJ IIIL,ch -I- as ter than
the ar-mies of Napoleon had marched, and the fundalllentais of
strategy--time and space--appeared in a new light. Conversely,
the Austrian Army suffered from a combination of poor planning,
14
lii:\ck u,f r"ail assets (unly one rail line into and a
II\ilitia and recruiting
Another !lleanS was ill,provements in the general
carps, and of the army.
tt,e refurilis uf the staff syslen,.
Iliany levels uf the Prusaian Arlny but
thinkIng of much 0'1' the milit.\ry leauer"I,ip. it encuuragerJ
tactical amony Its of'ficers by insl1LuUng waH.s
and formal critiques of annual maneuvers. The52 lo
study war/:a," .. 'foste,"eLi a need for Lopuy,".,phical
sections u+ the stal'f. intelligence was on ull,e,- armies
that alsu cUlltribuled to tile analysis ot enelllY COUr"S8S
o'F actiull Prussia. An 2xalnple oF tt'lis IS
14emo,"andulil NUlilbe,- Una wl,ich taH:s eHtensively aboL,t c\ possible
war with AusLria.
The refurms and education process at the y8neral staff
were passC!d uown to tl',e corps and division staff",. t
became policy tu rotate the staff officers betw8"n Berlin and lhe
different corps and divisions. This had a positive effect on the
Prussian officer corps resulting in the' building of a common
unc:Jerstanui ny in s'Laf'!' procedLlras. Addi t.i onal1 y, LJec"use 'J f the
15
F'I'"LJ1::isian r,Jrot=ess, their army was mor"e t:.Leal'"ly a
<:,;it1;:en!5 i_\nny Ulan th,3t of any other- [ol..lrupean counler"y. TI-lis I'acl:
coupled with the Statu's emphasis of educating its suldie,.-s,
pt"OclLICed a higl1 euucation level ill the ,"".'.Ilk and fl.Lo
of Pru5sian Arflly.
Priur to war with Austria, Prussia had cOlnpletely armed 1ts
infantry wi th the most techni <:0111 y ilrJvanced ill'fall troy w,eapon l.J I,
thlOl day, th", n"'lOldle gun. Because o'f the ",.edl" gun's higll of
i:i ....? and sel:uri I;y of ItJading, a refinem<'lnt tu the, tactical
ucc:trinE: hl::UJ bean /Iladf.':'. TI\is refir1em8nt Wc.15 an l::\d,iustlllent 'from
in'fidnt,'"y bi.-\I:l:i:11 iun IIldSiS -formations to a more uperl cumpany
formatiun which Wi",S a ""Jre efficient and e,H:ect1ve use uf
Anutller w,e of aiJvanced technology avai lable to 1'101 tkl'!
was the new cast 5 teel I- if 1ad cannon and improved Cc..HnrJlun i cat ion s
capab iii ties. The new Prussian cannan had demonstrated greatly
improved accuracy and distan<:e aver the smooth bure cannon. The
advanceu t",c:hnulogy canclOlrni ng the rai It"oad anu its str atet;p c
importance has already been discussed. However, being able to
control effectively a deployment and a war of such potential
magnitude would not be possible had it not been ,for 'tile gl"eat
16
made If\ I:ollunultic:al:ions in the twu IJt:=C.cUJ8S.
Mollke considered the morale of tho troops lo be cl
sign.dicant meLlns avaJ.lable to him. Just as iL to
equip and t,-"in suldlers, it is equally important to build the
to the murale of the soldiers.
FlI'"ovidillfd !.::,uldie,'"' wi til an int811iyellt c:\nd pl'-o'fes!5!unc,l
H", inst.llied pi-ide and confld"mce in I:lle soldier
by providlny him the equipment, training, and leadership
available. 8y the outbreak of hostilities the feelinq of
p.:\l:.I"'iotiQiIll and tl18 state of morale of the F'l""u!:.isli::\n (-)I'-my Wi:H; at
the highest level. Tilis; tligh state of mor-ale wuuld continLle
throLlyhout l".l,e COL\rSe uf the wa,".
General Moltke's operational plan sought decisive battle
the Austrian Army as the way to ubtain his uporatlor,al
ob.! .!cti ve. Multke had attended the Prussian WLlr College when it
was; Llndel'" (Jil""ec:tiQIl of Clausewitz and he J.t..\l:.el''' all avid
stuclerlt uf theory. Moltke planned the operaLlun
Austria in a nlanner ralniniscent of Clau88witz.
Clallsewitz described bclttle as "a struggle by the main force . . it
Is i\ struygle for real victory, waged wlth all available
17
Clausawitz also prescrlbed:
(4 du,.l .law whm;e principles support e"ell
CJf the enemy:Os fol"l::elii is
qenurally accomplished by means of great battles
and l"'esLlJ.'l:s; the pl"'imary c:Jb,i8Ct
mucot be tl"le dE,strLlction of tile fmemy fonees. 16
victorios 11'ItO an operational success--lhe de'feal cf tl'l8 Auslrian
Army.
UisposiLiuns by rail were not the end of the Prussian Army'.
deployment but the beginning. The desired of
forces could come in tinle arld would tdke place
means of movement toward the enemy. Un ,June> 18,
Geneiwal sto\rtetl the northe,-n Austrian t<.lwo.lrtl L111?
This movemel1t l.a cCJrlfil.... rn
beylJnU d'JLllJt the direction tile enemy "'<.lulu ""JV". UII
tlI:.iy tjle Ut
His Majesty, the two armies will enter Buhemia anti take steps to
unite in the direction of Gitschin." 17 Gitsl:hin was chosen
Moltke as a rally point but had no intrinsic lmportance. It was
18
----.
SF..dl::.H::tEnl bf:.:lCi\U,if] o'i: I:luJ distance and becasue he felt that he
to put Ius wi thin SLlppOI"ting distance rJ'f '''aeh utile,. be-/-o'"e
fJi.\S\::..
The AnllY uj' tile ELlie le'ft lJ,.esden and would stal"t an
i 11V,::ll;i on (.] f' 1101' Lluheml a as soon as pass! b.l. Q. The irntial
Austria, would ultimately tilUS tt,e PruGsians
would the ini tiat.ive and be on the s
idea was to L.:ume -from ewteriCJr' 1 o-f upel'-atiun and
and movelner,t to ,"ass forces e'fFectively ttle
hea,.t of the enemy. His aim was to contain the enemy 1n the
cente,. wi th pa,"t (Jf the "attac:l(ing a,.lIIY ancl c!rlv(310p the -/-lo\llI':s
with the othel'- po,.tion the,.eby gaining the decisive battle ho
desi,.ed. In this, he was able to take advantaue of concent,.1C
attack, one uf the things Clausewitz held to be desi,.ablm in
theat,.e offens1ves.
IVlultkl: also shared VIew that was till?
sl:rolll;,ler' f:ol.... rn IJ'r 'telt that th8 o++sl1se was thE? mUI"'l:,?
-forln because it dlonG to tIle
1'101 eke w,"ute that to .;,,",.ive QC a choice beewelm tl'le o-f"fense 0,.
def_nse the commande" lIIust compa,.e his figtlting means w1th those
of the .,nd if I-Ie 'finds his means a,.e e"luLll to tilus." 0+
19
tile enemy, I"" .,ill c:hcJuse the of'fense without quc?stiun. "This
mora stl"[",yly visible tl"lan in the condition that prl?cadecl the
PrLlssi an i on of a. l'lultke wanted to bl"inq I:lie war to
" anu felt that the o"f'-/:enslve WdS thE! most:
direct road to the objective and the defense the round about
Mollke kepl his mind set on ttle
ensul"i ng thiat l"le concentrated overwhalmi ng c:umlJi.-\t power- ;'It the
dacisive tim", al'l<.1 place. He understood his opel"ation<:ll rlJle and
how str-iilteyy. operations, and tactics wera i"t,,,rn3.L..I:elCt.
Cartaill that Bohemia would be tha theater of operations.
the Pru!;s.,,\I,!O LJagan tlleir advance on the 20th "I' June. The (41"my
of the Elbe marched from the vicinity of Dresden through
j\leustadt, Sc:hlLlchenau, and RLlmbLlrg, to Gabel. rilE! F11"st AI"my was
cOllc",ntl"i_lt"'d in the vicinity of Zittau. r=rOIII Zlttau It b8gan to
march on the :2211d of JLlne and lJy the 25th it was clDsely
concentrated at ReichenLJerg. Ttle oriyinal 276 Inlle Prussian
front was now 1"I"duced to about 100 mi 1es and tli., (-\r-my o"F th", 1::11Je
was only separated from the First Army by approximately 15 miles.
On the evening of the 25th the position of the Prussian ArmiQs
and the force was as shown in Figure 4. To ",nsure the
20
p'lssagp. 0+ E,econd I-\nny tt'll' lJrd i 11=5 u+ f\i
Gebirge, it was to distract the enelllY LJy filLse
maneuver and to wait +ur the First Army to with the
Austrians along the L,;er River before the Sel:ond Army would
begin their advance. Frederick Charles pushed one of his corps
forward tuwsrd Olmutz. Charles reculved the fullowing
massage! from 1'101 tl(e, "As the wealcer Second Army h,.s th" hare!
task of 'froll' the mountains; soon as a
junction is r:-Hected wi th the corps LInder (janel"al Herwarth,
it will be tl"le duty of the First Army to shortl?n the cri5is by
rapid advance." 18 The corps made contac-t and had a success-ful
encounter agai:nst the Austri an caval ry. The (-\ustri ans assumHd
this to be the advance-guard of the Crown Prince's army marching
upon Olmutz. The Prussian corps succeeded in holding a largE'
force of Austrians in place and kept them from opposing the
real advance of the Second Army.
The I-\rmy of the Elbe began its march upon Neimes and Oschltz
on the 26th of June. The Army of the would have two
skirmishes as they pushed forward. The First I-\rmy
m;.\de contact and drOVE! the Austri ans from tl1e vi 11 age of
Liebenau. The Austrians retreated across the Iser to Podol and
attempted to 110ld the bridges. After a stubborn infantry battle
21
ttHlt laste!d well into 'the early morning, the Iklstrians reti"eated
toward This Prussian victory secured the passage
ac:rass the Iser at Podol and opened up the shclrtest rlJul:e to
Gitsc:hin. 'The Second Army on the 26th had pa"$F.!d the mounl:i\ins
and the advan,:e-guard 'J'f one corps i ecJ NachocJ. 'lid c;
d1!;posi tion 1".Iu reduc.,cJ the! distance the C,'"m"" Prince anrJ
Frederick Charles to about fifty miles (Fiuure 5). rile distance
between the ",,,tr"eme CClrps of the Austri an AnllY We'S abuut tt,,,
same. General Benedek's strategical advantaqe was starting to
dissipate. However, Benedek still had in mincJ to take the offense
as soon as the concentration of the army was complete.
Josephstadt, his chosen point of c:oncentration, was too fAr
north; however", he was unab leta real i z e til is un I: i.1 it was too
1ate.
On the 27th the Fi rst Army was in possessi on o'f the
crossings at Turnau and Podol. Prince Frederick Charles spent
the whole of the 27th in, preparation for an attack upon
Ml..lnchengratz which would open the way for the Army o'f l::iLJe.
A frontal attack upon was to be combined with an
enveloping movement against the 'Austrian right. On the 27th the
First Corps of Crown Prince's army had pushed against Trautenau
and the V Corps upon Nachod. The 1st Corps was to advance in two
22
col.wnns Hnd concentrate outside of 'rrauterlBu. 'I'he Igft column
arr"ived 'fir"t; but instead of seizing the town and the ,3dvantage
of the heigllts that overlooked it, chose to walt until tile other
colLlmn arrived. While the le'ft column was idly i.ln
Austrian brilJade took up a strong pusition in and about the tllwn.
This delay resulted i'l the PruGsians being driven from the field
bc,ck to tilE! positions fl'-om which l:.htdy U8l:.1an. rhe hat:.!
gained a victory. The V Corps was cHught 1n the
defile of Na':hoc.J and i.\'fter a sill anc.J one'-half hOl.lr 51:r'U\lI]le
defeated an !.'.Istrian ':orps. The 27th hi:\lJ seen tWIJ bloody battles
'foLlyl'lt by the Second A,-my. The First Army hac.J spe"t ttle day
constructing bridges across the leer and concentrating its forces
for an attack upon (Figure 6).
On 28th the Fi rst Army and the Army 'J'f the EI be made a
combined attack upon , The Austrians had
begun a retreating action by the time the Prussian columns wpre
converging on MGnchengrKtz. The Prussiana failed to discover
what was happening and the enemy was ailowed to slip away
unmolestEld ",:cept ,for some rearguard action. Tile armies of
Frederick Charles were now completely united. Upon learning of
the defeat of tha Fi rst Corps at Trautenau, The Crown Pr i nl:e
beg,an Uu"! movement of t,wo di vi si ons (1st and 2nd) to at tack l:he
23
Austrians. Ihe Austrians were driven from tile field and
retreatecJ tlJ Np-u" tadt. Wh i 1e all of th is was happen i ng, the V
Corps was defeating the Austrians at Skalitz. These battles
opened the passes IJf Trautenau OInd Nachod tLl the uni mpeded
advL<n<..:e of the Second Army. The di stance bellJean the advance
guard 0+ Frederick Charles and that of the Cruwn Prince was only
twenty-sevlm /IIi les (Fiyure 7).
On the intelligence estimated that the Army
commanded by the Crown Pri nee was opposed IJy lV, Vr, VIr I,
and X Austrian Army Corps to the front and the II Corps on his
left flank. The First Army of Frederick Charlp.s was opposed by
the 1st Corps and the S"'llons (Fi gLlI-e 8). Moltke, in an attempt
to counter some of the odds against the Crown Prince, ordered
Frederick Charles to move quickly against Gitcichin. 1101 tke' s
instructions to Fredericl: Charles as follows: "His Majesty
eHpects that First Army will diseng,,,ge the Second (.\rmy by an
i mmed i ate advance, as tha t army, in spi te of a seri es of
successful engagements, is still in a very difficult
situation." 19 The First Army and the Army uf the Elba
wi thout Llelay. The Austri ans under Count Cl 0101-5.\11 as had taken
up a very strong defensive position around Gitschin. The
Prussians attacked the Austrian right wing with Tumpling's
24
uivi'Hun i,'I'II] lIH'! 1,=+1: wing with Werde,"'s divi !ilrJrl. The
W81'"+?:! qr-cHJually pushed back and Cuunt C.Lam-ballas.
upon '''"lat:ei vi Ilg ward tllat assi stance weul cJ 110 L". be q i urdel'"ecJ a
retrer.lt. rh., P,-ussians uccupied Gitscl-lin a/b,r lI11dnlqht. The
tlc:U..I Lost and were retrec..lting upon l-::tlllil,]ql-Ul:;:,. Tile
Second ikflly advanc"u Luward the Eli:Je fii bel" VI LI G"-ulH i L;: Ull lI''''
29th. SEH,:clnd Al"'my I"lad twCJ encounters dur 1. nCJ U'le Ili.;\Y. Une
was i:\ size encounter, 'the other a pur-l:.iorl 0+ tile
IV Curps. Bnll"l of these encountel'1.:i
Foul"" Ui:lys hc\d pd,SSr::tc.l !':-;:i nee the CI""own PI'" i n(:e:O f:i r,,\I"'my cl"U
i
::;S8(!
the f,"onti. .,,- i I'l to B'Jhemi a. In that shlJl't space c)'f' l:llllP., and
wi tl1cn..d: allY dt?f l'\e had me t and j"'epu l f::ied f Ulll'" an
l:CH1I':E:H1LI,MdtlUrl c)f l:tH? Prussla.n ac.t:tH""Ii rllJ tu s
c:anll. p.l.i..\11 IlUW !:5t3ellll"ld at.:;sureu, and 1:.118 I.::dl.l.latlrJn
was decidedly Muainst Benedek and AustrIa.
On the Benedek gave orde,'s +0\" a yen","al n?b-""t Ln tile
dirE?ction 01' I<jjniggrcilo,. At last th,= truth hall u,,,en LJruuyhl: IllJlflr'
to hi/fl. H1S wlllJle l:ampaign pldn crumbled.
his concentration behind the Elbe but at a tutal cost uf
men. Never hdd all the advantages which the possession of
i ntar i ur 1i nes gives to the commander who knows hCIW 1:0 l,e'L' thO"'1
25
Ue:1un c;lJmp:L y U,I"",WI1 ClwOly.
Till' fed llJw.Lng
Wt.\t, c.Ii by Ivied G8l:UIIU ()r'my \tnil
hlJld i UI"ClIIl"lc.J ell1 ttw Lipper Elbe; its I"ight ,'-tllq wi 11 Lil'!
prepan"u ttl l'!++.,ct " -'I-mction wi th th.. left will\.] of lll", FH-"t
Army, by we,y IJf IdJniyinl1CJf, as the lattel" Tllf,' I'.lrst
the enemy U,,,,,t may we an the riyht 'flanh: of tillS ,,,,Jv,_II1C12 wi 11 be
attacf(ed uy General BittenfEald and driven away +rCJfII the ,memy's
main body." 20 These instructions had been anticipated almost to
ttll3 letter by bClth the Crown Prince and by P,' ince F,'edr.,"ick
Clulr.Les. IU tl'ICJI-IyI1 otllerwise Lll1eventfl.ll, tl'le:1 .',Ilth CJf ,.Iulle 'l.s.
lfflpol,tanl:. r],f.:) the day Llpon whiell COIllITlU11lcaLll.Jfls
were 'first between the ,two PrU!591illl ArrnitiS
(Fi IJllre 9).
llf operi::'d::LUI"1!::i 11c:.\CJ been
In U'Il::: morning of the 1st of duly l.)egi.\n
retreiit to 1':.Uni ggl-;1 tz .\rId estahll i shec.l pCJS1 t i or", ,.10ng thE) Elbe
and Bistritz Rivers and thEa roads leading 1nto KUnigqr'.itz. Tl,,?
Prussiarl forward but renlained &8Pdl"rlt8d f81"
26
tactical rmasons (Figure 10). The F'1"'Uf31:ii an (.)1'"111 L WIJl.ll c.1 1I11:.\1.,I:?
tl'.:li,'"' jl..uH.:l:1.DII, if l..lpOn tIle .LII a l.:ClmlJll'lE'!t1
front and -flank at.l:a(:k upon I:.l"Ie enemy ?oS 1....
I:uncepl:. haLl Llnl:.icipat.F!Ll.
Ull I:.hm 0+ July the Pr'ussial1 Fi,.,sl:. al'"j Sc,,:m,,1 (""my
plJsitions and the of l:he ElLie Wr:\5i fIIt.1ving +nl"wcll'-U
Late in tl-\", nllJhl on ::l1d ur
July inteliiyence was obtained lhat +ixed the Austrian position
beyond lh.. Dl.stritz in the direction 0+ Ki:inif,J"jrciil',z. The
situatiun 0+ the Prussian Armies was such that ail thr8e could be
directE!d upun the Ausl:.rian positions. Defore midniyht orLlers
were i s!:.:;ur':ld tha t waul Li have the Second Army IIlt\!:: i a +,"'c.m I:.l:' 1
the First Army attacking the flank and Ll1e ?Inny lll
the Elbe the left flank. Moltke had set the conditions lor
the success u+ what hE! wanted to be the decisive battle.
On :::; duly, despi Le the rain, muddy l"Ocld,,;, ","d I:he J.;,t<'1 IlIJur
in which the urLler haLl been received, the First Army muved
fOI'"war'd .,nd il1l:cl place uy 6 a.m. The Battle 0+ Iv\d
begun (Fiyur .. 12). Wllru was received from the ?Irmy of the
Elbe that their force would be in place by 9 a.m. The
assistance 0+ the Second Army would be available about noon time.
27
The fin;L eunl:',lc.:t was lIIade by the 13th, 'ith. elnd :3nJ
DivisilJno.;, SUppol"ted LJy artillery, shol"tly ,.'fL,?r 6 ".on. Tile
ArlllY WLlS to eng.lge the ellelllY in the lin'" uf' the Bistritz
and hold th"IL W-'Junt!. A 'fw-ther ",<.Ivane", bV tI,,,, l'I"I_,s"i",n
pl?r"11dpS the enemy be-fure the -flank C\tti.\cl::s 0+ Lhe
uti',.,,' "\I"lIIi",,, ,:uuld be ",'ffet::ted. The lth Divio.;iun Ilad Lhe' 'first
encount",,- at abuut 9,30 a.m. in tile Swit'p Wal<.l. The 7th
was completely out numbered and out gunned. However.
the shelter of the woods. the breech-lodding rifle, and the
soldiers individual bravery saved the Prussiarls fro'll clestlMucticn.
By 9 a.m. the 8th, 4th, and 3rd Prclsslall divisiono.; had made
passage of the Bistritz. This operation proved to be eaSler than
hat! been eHpec.:t.:ed. The 8th Division crossed Uistritz at
and took shelter in tile Hola woods. The 4th Division crossed the
bridge "It S"duwa and IIIdrched against Dol1e\l i tz "Ind DoIHl! icJ,:a. Ti,e
3,"d Division ,:rossed lower down the "1'1<.1 lIIa5;,;;eu IJehimJ
the uf Mohrowous.
So far the First Army <Center) had not reL:elve<.l "nv h"'ll-'
frum twu fldnl(!ng ar'llies. The Second Ar'lly a dlstanCQ
from the bdttlefield ,and the Army of the Elbe had vet tu m",I':e
itself felt against the Austrian's left. ENc.:ept for the 7th
Division's encuunter, the Prussian advance hdd lIIet weak
28
However", by 11 01.11I. the Pr"ussian advancl.> had been stopped
and the p(Jsi l.: i on of tIle Fi rst Army became CI'" i tical. II,e i.1st
batlaliclIl u+ baen brought inlu aclion. The
CIJl1Ibil'lli:\tlull uf attempting to tile L1l-1un the 71:11
DlvllQion drHJ to hold Austrians to t:l1eil" gl'-lJund t-lad
in the 8th, 4th, and 3rd Divislorls to artillery
fir"a to Wllict! they were not able to reply. guns slili
I'-emained beyond the strea.m because of UIl!3ui tab.le fil'-lily
positions. The 7th Division's line had been broken sUllie
units had run out of artillery allllllunition. The questiorl uf
retreat had been discussed by Moltke and his generals. Moltke's
decision to 11CJ!d the line of Blstritz al:. l.:lJst
by lhe King.
"
By U 01.11I. on the 3r"d of JL,I y th", Second Hnny Il",d dep"l"' led
in the dil"ecllOn of f,:uniggr:l.tz to link up with ttle ieH WHlld fJof
the Firwt Hrllly. By 11 01.11I. the only truops lhat had reached
as -fal- as;i U18 l"1"'ot.1na wer'e the Guards and VI C(JI'"PS. I"he
Second ArlllY had nan"owed its f,"ont fr"olll twenty-t.JrJ 1II1i8S Lo rune
miles but were still two and one-half lIIi les frolll the left winy 01:
the First Hrllly. However, the Guards advanced to a position close
29
enuuyh lu ubserve that the First Army's 7th Division was in
considerable difficulties. The Prussian deployed inLo
the flanfc 0'1: the Austrian Armies holdiny Horenuwes, Racltz,
Tortina, and Sendrasitz. Thus the hard-pressed 7th Division
received ils first measure of relief and by p.m. Prussla had
'for<.::ed I-\ustl'ians lo retreat into the
After the capture uf Maslowed the Prussi'an 1st Guard
Division rapidly advanced on Chlum. The battle became a duel
between gun and rifle, and the superior fira of the Prussian
infantly oval"whelmed the Austl-ian artillery. Aftel- a hal"d 'Fought
battle, Chlum belunged to the Prussians. While the 1st Guards
had been h,,,vi I'\g tl,e t1",,,"endous success in the centel", the I lth
Division un tile left had p.assed throuyh Sendl"asiLz, and alLI,ouyh
taklng a pounding from artillery fire, had ta/cen Nedellst. 10
the east the 12th DivIsion had crossed lhe Tortlna and had moved
towards
By 3 p.m. the crisis of the battle was over and a
Prussian victory was aasured. The Secund Army control uF
Chlum and Nedelist and had almost cut the AustrIan main line of
retreat to KBniggratz. The First Army, which had taken the brunt
of the battle for approximately seven hours was preparing to take
30
revblnge. Un the rigl,t, the Army of the Elba was pressing hard
agednst til .. ?\ustrian wing and was about t,o LIr"E,al: L1wlJuyh the
defense.
The Austrluns frum 3 p.m. un were tryi,'y tu relreat with
ci\5 few pussible. A l:ountel"-cd:taL:I:: tu Rosbel""1 tz
resultbld 1n fierce fiyl,ting. Ths Austrians dld retake RusberiLz
but after suffering great loss were compelled to
It was that the battle was guing in Prllsl;i d' s fAvor
and at 3.31) p.m. His 11ajesty the I<ing gave wo,-d +r,lI" t.he wllt,l!
ArlllY to at.lvance. The end was now near and waG only d81ayed by
the Austrian art111ery. By 4,30 p.m. the entire Ar,ny
was in +1.111 retreat. Tl1e pursuit by th8 was held in
checl( by ti,,, a,-tillery; howevel-, by 6 p.III. L1,., winys uf lI-,e
victoriouG arlllY closet.l in toward the center. 1"rrJm 6 IJ.III. to
Elbe at f<llniyg,,-atZ' 6.30 p.m. the ft.'lllowlrlt] oriJer f'I"om 11ul U_e
j
..
was dispatched. "Tomorrow is a general rest day. The li"oops will
only II\fJVe 11'1 so -far is necessary for Lflf.:1 cD/Ilfclrt 01- Ule
re-formation of the corps " 21 In Napoleonic +ashiorl
the decisive battle had been fought and Moltke had achlevet.l his
operational objective--the defeat o-f the Austrian !kmy.
31
the Imbalallcm between ends and Ineans.
oper,,,tiun,:11 pl.,.,lIler takes i,; pretJic:l:1ng ttl", C:l.lur,;e of ",c:lion that
the enemy will take.
ttlat the Austrians would attac:k through Bohemia and nut Bilesia
and tasl( to lileet his plan. Mol tke' s pi an rJf worl':HI\l
,from e"tt.,-iur lines uf operations, c:oupled "ith mobilizinq on an
arc 0'1' '2.76 miles made it imperative ttlat he knew the

enemy would do and how they would do it. Moltlce 11ad done his
homewurk concerning the ALlstrian al"lny commander \:ieneral Benedek
which is reflec:ted in a memo to Princ:e Frederick Charles. 1"lo,l tke
states, "l hilly share your views tllat the ALlstrians will nlJt
carry out twu main operations Tile vel"y name
Benedek that they will meet us in only one direction,
and that elbow to elbow but the direction into Bilesia does not
..,r'l
strike UlI= of gl"avity of the '"'Onarc:lly." ..:.....:. Wi t110Ut
t.lidng risk in [Jredic:ting the likely .. venue uf approacl-I, the
Prussi an" lIIi gil t not howe defeated the ALlstri <ltls.
Additionally, there was a great deal of rIsk in Multke's
32
plan the Sucond Army's avenue 0+ <lPP,"o",,;I'1 thruugh the
mountain pcH.:;ses into i;\rea of operations. "filE! lJf:
Second through i 1\ to a 11t'\t.1 beell
carefully p.Lc::\nned and timing anti o-f e::E!t:utJ.on Wl;'\!;j c::.\
crltic<l.l clJmpcment. it would have been i f
Allsll"ican c;\rmy Ilau t.he Second Ar"my as i l: WdS debrJuc:IIlI'IJ
f:..-CJIIl the U1l::llull<:lins. tiny signi'fic:anl dE".!lay UI" wll.L J
"\dvanciny t:lwough the mOLII'1'tail1s would cri t.Lcdll.y ,,+'h"ct tile
timing 1.:1+ the plan and leave the rJthlar two Pr-LH;slan armies
vLI!nel"able to IJeing attacl""u by a SLlperlor !'U!3t'"lan 1'101 tl',e
had impresc;eu upon til", leadership of Ule Second Ar"lny the '"lSf"
involved and the importance pf a Wlse plan 0+ mal-cll. The succm,s
of the Prussian plan hinged on the <lbilily of the S",cond Army tu
pass tt'lilJugl"1 the mounL:ain de'files in a i:\I1U l:lllll?ly lI\anIlI..H".
oacc8pleu this risl, becaLlse of his con'i'lLlence in ttle
leadership u'i' the Second Army and fact lhat Gelled.,l, was a
slow anu meUlOuical p.lMllner and was not prone tu tal, .. 5ucl', bolu
action.
1"101 s c:hoic:e of operal.Lng CJrl (2:: Iln8S
considered risky by many military experts. The criticism was thoat
it was dang",r"oLls beC<lLISe it waul d allow the Austr ian 'f orces
operating On interior lines between tile Flrst and Second Armies,
33
to de"feat the PI"ussi,,1n Armies singly lJefore they ClJLlld
concentrate. Moltke departed from traditionai theories about the
advantages of operating on interior lines and designed a plan
that touk advantage 0+ time, space, and movement to el1l.:ircle and
defeat an enemy usiny tl"aditional oper,,1Uonal TilE!
geoyraptlll.:,:\l IO\YOLlt 0+ the PrLlssi an fron tl et" anti the n.,ii r-tJaLls
coml'lelled 1lulU,e to plan for exterior lines of operations to
the o\dv<lntage of the In i t i ati ve <,nd deny an ik,',tl" ian
invasion into Prussia. Also in Moltke'. estlmatiun lhe t8rrain
in the theater tlid not lend itself to operating on ll,ter.ur
lines. He cunceded that Benedek would get his forces into a
central position, but what then? The advantagNs 0+ Interlur
lines can become a distlnct disadvantage.
The ,.!Ok Involved W,"S
not disreg<lrded by Moltke; it was deliberately accepted.
effol"t had to be made to reduce or possibly elllninate risk IJY
perfect timIng and cooperation. BX lJringing pressure to bear
with a strong force, the enemy would not be free to turn dgainst
and crush tile weaker. Had the risk not been re."li:p.d 1luIU:e
would Il<lve llad no claun to be considered a I;We"t but
it was l""ea11;":8[1 and, as far as ac:tltJrl was tc::\kf=rl aqdJ,ll':":i1:
it. The Prussian Army's objective would not have acllievutl
if Moltke had opel"ated on interior lines as by his
contemporaries. Through Moltke's ingenious ways and hi.
34
to acc:ept risk, Wi?lt;:; ... tu udlt:HIC8 his
means to his ubjective.
111. CUI\ll;U.lB
Of the many lessons learned from an analysis of the battle
of probably the most important one is the
uf leadership at the operational level. General
Moltke's briLliant during this campaign was one uf the
major cuntributing to the Prussian success. J101lk8
possessed the long range vision essential to a com,nander dt the
The operational 1evel of w.:..'\r (J3al S W..L th t.lle
of major battles and Dperations in order to achieve a
strategic yoal. Moltke's operatiDnal objective was the ch"feat D-I'
the Austrian army in BDhemia. Units were to him by the
strategIc commander. Moltke had to balance hiS with
hi s ti va and enblLire that he concentratliJcJ SldfJer"i or -I' un.:es ,:It
the time and place -I'or the decisive engagement. Moltke
understood the strategic, operational, and plan
correlation and hDw each cDntributed to the campaign.
MDltke understDDd and recDgnized the importance of planning
35
and thinking ,ahead. The Prussian military had be,m 1',"ep,;\I'"ing -fur
a war with Austria for several years and had careFLllly studied
every enemy and -friendly course of action. Ever"y aspect 1)1: the
campaign frum mobilizalion to defeat of the Austrian Army had
IrJIJll:,l.lly sequenced.
Moral cuurage or will power was another Important aspect of
Moltke's leadership. After Moltke had completed his campaign
plan, t,e IH,rj the moral to stand bet, i niJ it amJ el: ecute 1t.
1401tke had to stl-uggle nut only ag,lIinst the eflE,my, which <It HI.,L
time was the must powerful in Europe, but also against the
It is doubtful the Prusslans wuuld
have been successful if Moltke not had the will power to preas
hlS cr.Jnvll.:l:iuns.
Was Moltke a "genius" in the art of war in the
sense? In Chapter Three, Book One Clausewitz listed several
tl""d tiS wlu r:h taken togl?ther consti tuted the 0'/: mill ti.""y
TllI?Y an" cour"age (physical and mer<ll); an intel.lect
that "even in the darl(est retains some glimmerings cf Lhe
inner light wl'leh leads to truth; determination; presence of
. mi nd; and stl"Emgth of character." 23 Mol tke met these standards
and many agree with the label of "geniUS"; however, Clausewitz
36
I,.s one last criterioM
hi5tClI""y an(j posterity reser-vo t1'lP- n;\IIlP,
u+ +ur tho!3e wl",o t'c3ve
111
.I n-t:lli llere the defTlr.U\dS -fDI'"
in t:.t-:ll I. eual and moral powers ar-e vas 1-1 y
ql'"fll';\l:F:.1r. Ttl lJI'"'ing a wat", ur one Llf
Ci:.\lIlllcU(.J11S tu i\ sllccessful
a tIHJ\""fJugh YI'"i-:lSP of national po.Licy. Un
level strategy and policy coalesca:
f:OlTlllllalldel"'-i. n-chi e1: is 5i mul y
a s L,;\
Mol ll<:e b"'uugl,l t.lle camp."illn against tile AUlstrinn,; to a
cunclusion, and by doing so, passed
ClausewiLz's lost test of genius.
the use of modern technoloyy in operational pi ArlJ'Iln\l.
"
ral lroad were critical to tile Prussian operation l
planners. WiLl'lout the ''",''ill"oad to tile 'fur-,ce Dn I:he
wOLlld have sei;:eu tilt=' l-r"1i i-\nLl
Wt:'\r (Jf .LfJ66 WLJuld mtJest: llave been Fouyl1L. In Prul":3si,;\. rile
ef+ acti ve l:urli:rul of lhe transporti ng sLlch a qn."t number- of
men to the bClltlefi.Jld and providing ef'fective command and
control attests to tile yreat strides made in the field 0+
communications. To MDltke and his operational Ulanners, lh,S
37
tecI1l1C)!uqy jJl'"'cJvideu F.\ which al.lowf...H.i UH?Hl l:u be
nl'
mar 1':.\ 1fa.
in the llF:jhl 0+' anu
sLlpariori,t:'(. and it iC::i parl:it:ularly inst.r"ucl:LV8 ftll'" ()wn
:
LI-l w8apons productiun.
"
25
the rH:?b1tJJ f,-.;l-CdLlrl llad effec:t Llpon t.lle l:hi'\l1 tJ] LJ Lilli'
CI.lII!:iJ.t1erilly bi;\!i:;\nCe thdt must E.'1111
i 6 thilt 0+ HII.II".:11 e. !lad spent ctlr""d",,-al.J.l,' I. .. "'F.' !JU.lJ.,lin\J
the of the Prusgian Army. He instilled "lorale In l,i5
l.u .L11l!JI'tlVE;1 thF! mOI'",;;\!p' and insti. L Lll 1.I1l'Wl ,t !-.l-,I'LlTl':.l
mor'a18 oj, ] 11divlcl1laL and t.IH? llrli t:. ;V-i , rTI11"I"I'"ul1... l-,tl
CI"U:1 CJ'f lJl.leraticlrlal i.lr-t IJI tll",\1 ,.\11CJ IllJ F.-:'Ild.
.:::\I'ld risk. TCJ be sure, it lS a IJ,-\,i t,\cl:. i.n I:llp.
l:t:lIllmander wi 1.1 'fInd thi.:tt the means dl"'e n8vp.r- i'H!PCp,lt':1,1.I,l til
'-::nd stt'1b:;!.
r.:OIlHnanUel'" IIH,I!':,I: tl'y ttJ wit.h and cUrI--ec:l: lrnl:I,:\Ltlrll:p.
DaaiinC] with \:his imui.\li.:\nce tcdcus an elq:lp,rlf-lncF:,t1 cC1rnmii,\lld81-
r:,\ I. i::tnce 1Il1.I!S(: be str-ut:k be'!:ween l: J.11I,) llnm,,'\nljc..'j rlrlci
mus'!: ill the sl:ress, friction, and ftllj nf lll:\t(-,J
WdlS jn brl1i:=\rlcing these compf11:.inq r1IU"lllfJ tilE!'
War 0': 1U66.
a clear strategica.!. oll.ieclive of,",1<1l the
ll'f rlnd Cuunt VDn tJllJ+:'cL1Vf?
or 8nu sL:ate Wn!::i ttl LJr-lng aboLlt German naLlurldJ unity.
3'1
..\t-::iOlli,\I. ('It, if2cl:iv!::1 tl'lf-.' U+ I:ha (,Hl'.;tl'-j 1.::. \I
(kl!:"1.1" I d l:he /IIust PlJWf':'I'" fIll ':it:al',(l ill
jVIlJI.t:I:,e (,Jf r-:lVi1.II,II,lr1 I.() UIE'
I dll'." ,uH,1 I),,!,I "\Ilt (111 tIl
I.n Ujl(:"ll"'i-1LilJl'ldl, p.l,,111 ,t C("I'-I.,llil (If I-I'il', I'i
Ill!"!1 t-! c\ UP ul I' j 'il': ':\{'(?If,1 I'SL 1.11
1I.l':lrJ 1'1'11" Lllf.-l Lii.:,t,t,.l.I;! n+ 1'.,UlllqYI.. IJl.lr. I-lui 1,1',1' 1'-(:1 ()tJI1J ::c'tl :\rlc.l
r.\Ct.::upl.e:,'d UI,J.L Cottlll Ill]!. ':il.l {'.II11J e\l.l.
1-11' (11111 rlf'lll f ell"';
COrlCey"n,LI1(,.j c1I'-t fIlll!:;'!. blil 'fCJrl.lfrHI"i!.: .Ill IIJ '" /1111111 I.'J ,\\.'1.1.1 I!
Cl.In'ful:;,1.l"Jrl by nl.lrnE'I,RClLISi
illlpUI'-I:i:,\II1: uf !:lIP- fUIU ,:\1-1',
I.y tt tJ,l.l l\ct I".llF1 rHlll
1':,i 1:, (JIIH? uf .3.1'"[ Wc.\r,; (!C"fIlI1l1'jl r 1\1 r111 ily l'IlJlI
lie)
II
\
Fr:Jssicn Advcn:es

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:.10. !.I. 248.
:21 IIJ i d., p. 2:54.
ItJilL p. 1133.
.i:IJ.lLl p. 111.
54
D1E<LIUGRAF'I-IY
?-hJ i1 III lii, w. H. I)1..
W.. ..... JJ.!;'.J.l!;![_ __.Ur}.l_ J"I,i_ll_l. ..l:.
Lonu(Jn:
George ROll t 1edlJE:! alld !jUfllj.
!=:;i fJ 11 ,J.
. .. ,(tun.!;.!'""-sr- __ .!Il! __ l3-t9.c I.
LUI 11.1<:", : f1uqh Ltd.!'
LIJflUon:
von. and by j"ILCII,.\ul
Howa.I'-lI i:.\nt.l l"':'arel:.. PI"inc:p-tun lJlliVE'I'""::d'Ly Jellc.).
bOI"d(lll 1\. Lllt:
r"l'-(:!;3!::i,
Huzier, l:UL. Sir H.M. JJ)Jjl.JaevtW.....!iI;!...I: ,; __ I !.JI\dun: l'IC\lc/IIi 11';.\11
afld ClJ. Limit.ed, [9'-'1:1.
1\II?l.l.l.. __LIi9.9., LoncJon:
t:\I1tJ Cu.
LiIll11:O!iJ.
(-)I"'l:hLU"" 1_.
r,h .If;. ..
I: a :: L: J. SlIlll:h and Cu., 1UU'I.
1"II=:\rlUi:o\.1 Wc...1.Shll1yt(Jll. lJ. L.:
1-18dllllU,'I"'I:I,"'s DepalO" L/II8nt of tile J. 'lUI,. _.
55
Hu.l bor'l'1 , foId.:;U. "1'loltke's Cnl1cI?pl",," ..""::..'L
{\fLi1..iL., Vul. 6, F,,11 1'7'12.
Horner- D. IIl
v
li 1 i tal""Y Lessons of tl-le Seven vJI7\l"'. II
0.Cl!!Y....._',LP.l.lI.''l.9.L, No. :;;:;;5, Uecembel'" 1
J"blon51,:y. David. "St.,"ateqy and Ope,'atiufI,'.I uf
F'al'"t .I." JOLII'"nal of the U. S. ("'my v),,,," Co11eLJ".
Cal'""lisle Bal"Tacks, PA,l Vol. XV!L, SI-Jring .lt/t//.
LUVC?c;,H:i, Jay. 'l'hinkin4 at Operational II
,]CJUI'""I"li;:\.l tJf ttle U. S. AI'""my War Cal!el]e, Li:\I'-llc:;le EII:;\l""I"'ilCI::S,
VIJ!. XV1, Gpl'"ing 1'186.
Lyl(ke, (k til 1.11" I" J,". "TDwa'"d An Unden,tan<.Ji fI'J u'I' j"li 11. tcwy
S t ,.. a to I?q y, " __ .. _,;v:l <;1_.0 PfLU..cC\.k,l.s'.lJ.,
U. S. A,"my Well'" l.:al'"1151e B"l'"l'"elcks, 191.16.
COIlHIlt:\j'lU and L::ielleral Colleqe" Ft .
!:!Q.tt.Lw..':..Llli.LLt "'aS9Lt:..P..M.0
"l'I'''aI151 at:ol'"
Lin known.
56