PLA Basic Argument A private language, in which a person gives meaning to words by attending to private feelings, etc.

. is impossible, because there is no guarantee that such meanings will remain stable. Claiming that one can check by remembering the past feeling is clearly fallacious. However, we have a public language for talking about our feelings. We learn this vocabulary by substituting words for natural expressions of feelings. Such words must have the same grammar as the displays they replace grammar of expression What is the grammar of expression, compared with grammar of description? A description could be T/F, so the proposition must by independent of the state described. (sometimes matches, sometimes not) The tendency to express a feeling in a certain manner is part of what it means to have that feeling. Ethological The verbal substitute follows the same grammar; the tendency to use these words is part of what it is to have the feeling. Deliberately using the wrong words is not falsehood but moral deception producing the expression of some other feeling Two long-standing problems Solipsism: Since I only really know the state of my own mind, I must be using a private language to describe it. But thats impossible, so solipsism deconstructs. Skepticism: I cannot know what you are thinking because I do not have access to your feelings. But that is to assume feelings talk in descriptive, while actually its expressive, so that is false. General Point Human life is grounded in ethology Local forms of life modify expressive grammars

Psychology of Action The cause and effect explanation is often cited in the psychology of action how actions are brought about. Intending Comparing intentional to unintentional tempts one to look at intention as cause Are intentions mental states? No Saying what one intends to do is not a description of a mental cause but an act of commitment like promising. Willing Is there always volition between planning an action, committing oneself to it, and acting? If willing were a mental act, then I would have to bring it about that would mean willing to will Willing instrument for getting something done Not a species of trying o I cannot be said to try to do something that is easy o Trying generally describes failing o Trying makes no sense Upshot Persons are active agents in doing things so no additional cause is required. We introduce causes in such contexts when a person behaves out of character or is unable to carry out what he/she has committed to

Future is not a reference to a particular; its a reference to a type.