MARIA CARLA GALAVOTI'I

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON PATRICK SUPPES ' PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

ABSTRACT. The paper outlines the main traits of Patrick Suppes' 'probabilistic empiricism'. It combines the conviction that probability should be assigned a central role within epistemology with a serious consideration of experimentation. First Suppes' empiricism and its close connection with pragmatism is described. Then, his views on probability are discussed at length, together with his theory of probabilistic causality. Lastly, Suppes' notion of rationality is recalled. The main features of Suppes' position in the whole are identified with its pluralism and its local character. It is argued that in place of a general philosophical view Suppes works out a method allowing a representation of phenomena in which both theories and data, abstract mathematical construals and particular experimental techniques, are all given attention and find their place.

If one were to review the literature on philosophy of science in recent years, one would be faced with all sorts of claims to the effect that empiricism is dead, or at least in mortal agony. Many have claimed that the empiricist way of looking at things has proved incapable of capturing the complexity characterizing human knowledge in general, and the scientific enterprise in particular. At the same time, many have urged that empiricism has nothing to say, and should just give way to some form of relativism, or even to methodological anarchism. Contextually, metaphysical tendencies have been resumed in order to solve some of the numerous problems left open by the empiricist way of looking at things. These attitudes have in most cases resulted from dissatisfaction with logical positivism. A criticism of the strictures imposed on epistemology by logical positivism, however, does not necessarily imply abandoning empiricism altogether. In addition to the voices pleading the cause of anarchism and/or a return to metaphysics, the revision of logical positivism has opened alternative roads to empiricism, inspired by a genuinely constructive attitude. One of them has been indicated by Patrick Suppes, who calls it 'probabilistic empiricism'. In what follows I will try to elucidate the

P. Humphreys (ed.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosophel; Vol. 3, 245-270. @ 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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main traits of this position, which is in many ways innovative. As suggested by the label attached by Suppes to his own point of view, this combines an empiricist attitude to philosophy with a probabilistic component. At its basis we find the conviction that the notion of probability should be assigned a central role within epistemology. This is clearly stated by Suppes, who says that
it is probabilistic rather than merely logical concepts that provide a rich enough framework to justify both our ordinary ways of thinking about the world and our scientific methods of investigation (1984a, p. 2. See also 1980, p. 171).

Probabilistic empiricism should then replace logical empiricism, and accordingly probability, and not logic, should be the point of departure of our investigations into philosophy of science and epistemology. It is worth stressing how this fundamental conviction involves a shift in emphasis from the linguistic aspects of the language of science to its content. In other words, attention to the syntactical structure of scientific discourse gives way to consideration of the complex procedures, like measurement and model building, which allow phenomena to be investigated and organized within scientific theories. This marks a major difference between the form of empiricism advocated by logical empiricism and that put forward by Suppes. As a matter of fact, a similar attitude has recently become quite widespread, and logical empiricism has often been criticized for having attached too much importance to the linguistic aspects of science. Let us then turn to some of the more distinctive features of Suppes' position. To start with, it seems appropriate to characterize his 'empiricism' and to illustrate its close connection with pragmatism. Suppes' views on probability will then be discussed at length, together with the main philosophical implications of his approach.

EMPIRICISM

In his self-profile written in 1978, Suppes calls himself "the only genuinely empirical philosopher I know" (Suppes, 1979, p. 45), and by this he is stressing the influence of scientific work on his own philosophy. No doubt it receives a peculiar flavour from his twofold activity, as a philosopher and as an experimental scientist. This double militancy is at the basis of the importance Suppes ascribes to experimentation. It is certainly experimentation with all the problems connected with it that

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occupy the central place within Sugpes9empiricism. Here the traditional distinction between the two contexts of 'discovery9and 'justification' introduced by Reichenbach, and widely accepted by philosophers of science, is superseded by an approach in which experimentation and related problems pervade the whole 'reconstruction' of scientific investigation. The attention paid to such problems influences above all Suppes' view of theories, while being at the root of the importance he ascribes to measurement, as well as probability. Suppes' view of theories is probably the most well-known aspect of his philosophy of science, and has been analysed in detail,' mainly focusing on the formalization of theories and on his dictum to the effect that 'to formalize a theory is to define a set-theoretical predicate'.2 Here I will briefly recall the centrality in that perspective of the notion of model, together with the pluralism this brings with it. For Suppes models are the entities in terms of which a theory is to be defined. Models provide the connection between a theory and the phenomena under investigation, through the notion of structure. This task is fulfilled by showing that "the structure of a set of phenomena under certain empirical operations is the same as the structure of some set of numbers under arithmetical operations and relations", where the idea of 'sameness of structure' is to be taken in terms of a suitable notion of isomorphism (Suppes, 1967, p. 59). Isomorphism plays a crucial role in representing a theory in terms of its models. For Suppes
the best and strongest characterization of the models of a theory is expressed in terms of a significant representation theorem,

where this is a proof to the effect that

a certain class of models of a theory distinguished for some intuitively clear conceptual reason is shown to exemplify within isomorphism every model of the theory (Suppes, 1988a, p. 259).

Another crucial notion in this context is that of invariance, which gives a criterion of meaningfulness according to which
an empirical hypothesis, or any statement in fact, which uses numerical quantities is empirically meaningful only if its truth value is invariant under the appropriate transformations of the numerical quantities involved (Suppes, 1988a, p. 265).

The representation of a theory in terms of its models here takes the place of the 'received view' of theories delivered by logical empiricism, according to which a theory consists of a logical construction plus a set

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of rules assigning an empirical meaning to its terms, or at least to some of them.

In a general way - Suppes says - the best insight into the structure of a complex theory is by seeking representation theorems for its models, for the syntactic structure of a complex theory ordinarily offers little insight into the nature of the theory (Suppes, 1988a, p. 254).

In other words, knowledge of the syntactical structure of a theory is not enough; in order to understand what a theory is about we should instead look for its models.
PRAGMATISM

This move away from the 'received view' of theories goes in the direction of a pragmatist philosophy of the kind upheld by authors like C. S. Peirce, W. James, J. Dewey and E. Nagel, who was Suppes' teacher at Columbia from 1947 to 1950. According to a pragmatist approach, scientific activity is perpetual problem solving and theories typically qualify as local construals.
Like our own lives and endeavors - Suppes says - scientific theories are local and are designed to meet a given set of problems (Suppes, 1981b, pp. 14-15).

Locality goes hand in hand with a peculiar pluralism, characterizing both the notion of model and that of structure, neither of which is amenable to a univocal definition. The point is extensively dealt with by Suppes in an article published in 1962 bearing the title 'Models of Data'. Since this does not seem to be among his best known papers, it is worth recalling its central ideas. The main thesis is summarized by the claim that "the relation between empirical theories and relevant data calls for a hierarchy of models of different logical type" (Suppes, 1962, p. 253). When analysing the linkage between theory and experimental data one therefore has to distinguish models of the theory from models of the performed experiments, and models of the data obtained. To a hierarchy of models there corresponds a hierarchy of the problems one typically encounters at the different levels of analysis, in the course of the complex procedure aimed at comparing theories with experiments. This conclusion is suggested by a close inspection of the statistical methods employed at each level of such comparison, which include measurement, experimental design, estimation of parameters, tests of goodness of fit, identification of exogenous and endogenous variables,

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and the like. A detailed analysis of such methods not only points to the need for a plurality of different models, it also clarifies the direction of the dependence between models. The dependence is such that in a hierarchy of models characterized by an increasing level of abstraction one does not move from top to bottom, but rather from bottom to top. In other words, given a model of the data, exhibiting a certain statistical structure of the phenomenon under investigation, one looks for a theoretical model that fits it. What I have attempted to argue - says Suppes - is that a whole hierarchy of models
stands between the model of the basic theory and the complete experimental experience. Moreover, for each level of the hierarchy there is a theory in its own right. Theory at one level is given empirical meaning by making formal connections with theory at a lower level (Suppes, 1962, p. 260).

As a direct consequence of considering theories not in any abstract way, but rather in connection with experimentation, we then have, in addition to a hierarchy of models, also a hierarchy of theories. If someone asks 'what is a scientific theory?' - Suppes says - it seems to me there is no simple response to be given . . . What is important is to recognize that the existence of
a hierarchy of theories arising from the methodology of experimentation for testing the fundamental theory is an essential ingredient of any sophisticated scientific discipline (Suppes, 1967, pp. 63-64).

This is a lesson to be learned from a careful analysis of the role played by statistical methods in experimentation and theory making. This sort of analysis is precisely what, according to Suppes, is missing from the traditional approach taken by philosophers of science,
who write about the representation of scientific theories as logical calculi [and] go on to say that a theory is given empirical meaning by providing interpretations of coordinating definitions for some of the primitive or defined terms of the calculus (Ibidem).

As Suppes points out, this lesson emerges most explicitly from some branches of the social sciences, like learning theory, to which he mostly refers. It is in fact a common feature of disciplines which have not reached a highly theoretical development to make extensive use of sophisticated methods for evaluating evidence and testing hypotheses. It is noteworthy that recent econometric research points exactly in the same direction indicated by Suppes, and propounds a pluralistic view of model building that bears strong resemblance to the approach outlined in 'Models of ~ a t a ' . ~ One can see that within Suppes' philosophy of science data receive at least the same importance ascribed to theories. The structure of data

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delivered by observation is in itself the object of interest and investigation, and calls again for pluralism. Detailed analysis of such structures indicates that there is no univocal answer to the question 'what are data?' since
the 'data' represent an abstraction from the complex practical activity of producing them. Steps of abstraction can be identified, but at no one point is there a clear and distinct reason to exclaim, 'Here are the data!' (Suppes, 1988b, p. 30).

Depending on the desired level of abstraction different pieces of information will then count as 'data'. In addition, a multitude of contextdependent elements will have a bearing on it. The refusal to search for a unique characterization of important concepts is a major feature of Suppes' philosophy. He has repeatedly stressed that the complexity of phenomena and the variety of practical situations in which phenomena are investigated are such that important notions in science as well as in philosophy cannot be cooped up in some definition given once and for all. Plurality then becomes for Suppes one of the tenets of the 'new metaphysics' by means of which he fights the chimeras of a traditional view of rationality also shared by logical e m p i r i ~ i s mThe ideal of the unity of science should then be abandoned .~ in favour of the recognition that
the sciences are characteristically pluralistic, rather than unified, in language, subject matter, and method (Suppes, 1984a, p. 10).

This abandonment of the ideal of the unity of science goes hand in hand with the rejection of the neopositivistic ideal of reductionism. Suppes has convincingly and repeatedly argued that the diversity of language, subject matter and methods both in different disciplines and in different branches of the same discipline is such that reduction is either impossible, or - when possible - uninteresting and barren.5 Suppes' pragmatically oriented view of theories opposes another chimera of rationality, namely the idea that "scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete" (Suppes, 1984a, p. 2) and that the shift from old to new theories brings with it a convergence to some finite value. On the contrary, one of the main tenets of Suppes' 'new metaphysics' amounts to the claim that
the collection of past, present, and future scientific theories is not converging to some bounded fixed result that will in the limit give us complete knowledge of the universe (Suppes, 1984a, p. 10).

ON PATRICK SUPPES' PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE PROBABILISTIC APPROACH

Suppes' 'new metaphysics', of which pluralism and incompleteness are essential ingredients, is illustrated in the volume Probabilistic Metaphysics which appeared in print in 1984. The main purpose of this work is to establish a probabilistic approach to philosophy of science, intended to supersede the 'neotraditional metaphysics' centred on determinism, namely the idea that the future is determined by the past and that every event has a sufficient determinant cause. As a first step in that direction one finds a claim to the effect that
certainty of knowledge - either in the sense of psychological immediacy, in the sense of logical truth, or in the sense of complete precision of measurements - is unachievable (Suppes, 1984a, p. 10).

Among the arguments put forward by Suppes to support this claim, one of the most convincing comes from imprecision of measurement, arising once again from his experimentalist attitude. Measurement itself has been extensively studied by Suppes, who has contributed important work to it. Without going into details, it is worth recalling that imprecision of measurement does not come only in connection with human or instrumental errors, but arises in a more substantial way from certain developments of our century's physics, like Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.6 Uncertainty then pervades not only the level of experimentation, but is to be encountered at the level of physical theories as well. In view of this, Suppes holds that the ideal of certainty should be renounced together with the other 'chimeras of rationalism' discussed above, completeness of knowledge and unity of science. Recognition of uncertainty "at the most fundamental level of theoretical and methodological analysis" (Suppes, 1984a, p. 99) leads directly to probability, because probabilistic methods provide 'a natural way' of working out the form of empiricism advocated by Suppes. In other words, probability is the tool that allows him to build the pars construens of his 'new metaphysics', once the way has been cleared from the 'chimeras of rationalism'. Its fundamental tenets are precisely that the basic laws of natural phenomena are essentially probabilistic, and that causality, as well as the theories of meaning and rationality, are probabilistic, not deterministic in character. Among other things, this involves the conviction that "our conception of matter must contain an intrinsic probabilistic element" (Suppes, 1984a, p. lo), and leaves the door open to the admission of randomness in nature.

MARIA CARLA GALAVOTTI BAY ESIANISM

As far as the interpretation of probability is concerned, Suppes has always called himself a Bayesian and a subjectivist. However, this conception of probability strays in many ways from that of an 'orthodax' Bayesian like Bruno de Finetti, to whom he often refers in his writings. With no intention of making a comparison between the two, let me try to focus on what I regard as the most original traits of Suppes' position. A central feature is the strict connection between probability and measurement, inspired once again by Suppes' experimentalist attitude. By connecting probability with measurement he has come to the conviction that exact values should be substituted by probability intervals. A number of results on upper and lower probabilities due to Suppes and zanotti7 testify to the fruitfulness of this approach. Another important feature of Suppes' perspective is the conviction that probability and utility are notions to be dealt with separately. In this connection he agrees with de Finetti, with whom he shares a Bayesian approach to scientific inference. It is worth mentioning that the adoption of a Bayesian framework leads Suppes to an original treatment of problems like the paradoxes of confirmation8 and the problem of total e ~ i d e n c eTo the latter, he offers a solution essentially based on the idea .~ that under Bayesian conditionalization there is no additional problem of total evidence, once coherence is satisfied. Disagreement with de Finetti comes in connection with the fact that for Suppes the subjective theory of probability offers necessary but not sufficient conditions for a theory of rationality. For one thing, the subjective theory of probability offers no way of evaluating different probability assessments due to experts, nor for dealing with uncertain evidence. The main disagreement, however, regards de Finetti's rejection of the ideas of 'unknown' and 'objective' probability. Moreover, Suppes ascribes great importance to the notion of randomness, regarded as meaningless by de Finetti. While interpreting de Finetti's attitude towards the above mentioned topics as a result of his positivistic and reductionistic attitude, Suppes devotes a certain effort to working them out. Let me briefly recall his views in this connection. In interpreting probability, Suppes makes the point that the question of the meaning of probability statements is not different from that of the meaning of statements about physical properties or magnitudes, like mass and weight. In all such cases

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there is not really an interesting and strong distinction between subjective and objective, or between belief and knowledge (Suppes, 1983, p. 399).

The important thing appears instead to be completeness of information, and the relevant distinction to be made is that between complete knowledge in principle or in practice and incomplete knowledge with the possibility of learning more. When talking about the meaning of a probability statement, one has in the first place to ask whether it is based on complete information, in the sense that there is no additional information we can conditionalize on that will bring about a change in the probability value. This is an important feature to be considered, especially when completeness of information comes from physical theory. Another element that according to Suppes should be taken into account is the point in time at which the utterance of the probability statement is located. As he observes, "this is especially true for properties of events as opposed to properties of objects" (Suppes, 1983, p. 400), because insofar as events are concerned, we have more information after their occurrence than before. Suppes concludes that "in talking about completeness of information it is important to stress at what point in time the matter is being discussed" (Ibidem). Suppes' claims in this connection raise some perplexity. One might object that the problem referred to by his remarks does not have much to do with completeness of information, being related to the tension between two different contexts in which probability statements may occur, corresponding to their predictive use, on the one hand, and their descriptive and explanatory use on the other. As widely stressed by recent literature on probabilistic explanation, such contexts should not be seen as overlapping, because they exhibit a fundamental asymmetry. This in turn reflects another important difference to be pointed out, between probability statements about single events and probability statements about properties of objects. It is a matter of fact that when dealing with single events characterized by probabilistic behaviour we can only (if ever) reconstruct the history behind their occurrence after they have taken place. This, however, does not have much to do with the meaning of probability statements, but with explanation of single events. In this context, in fact, we do not just have a statement giving the probability of an event prior to its happenings, but we have in addition the information that the event itself has actually happened, no matter how small a probability it was assigned beforehand. The preceding

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considerations also have some bearing on probabilistic causality, to be discussed later.

OBJECTIVE PROBABILITY

Where completeness of information really matters is in connection with the problem of 'objective probability'. It is no doubt an important feature of Suppes' point of view to recognize that probability statements acquire a special meaning when based on completeness of information in the light of physical theories. In this case one tends to attach an objective meaning to them. While de Finetti vigorously denied that there can be any sense in talking about 'objective probability', Suppes admits such a notion. In a paper presented at a conference, on which I had the chance to comment,1 he advocates a 'propensity' view of objective probability. Coherently with the general attitude characterizing Suppes' philosophy of science, he gives representation theorems for such phenomena as radioactive decay, response strengths and coin tossing. In all such cases, plus a version of the three-body problem that exhibits what he calls a 'propensity for randomness', in order to obtain a representation of the phenomena at hand one has to give structural axioms, that are built on information which is not purely probabilistic in character. Representation of decay, for example, is obtained by means of a 'waiting-time axiom' which
is a structural axiom that would never be encountered in the standard theory of subjective probability as a fundamental axiom. It is an axiom special to certain physical phenomena (Suppes, 1987a, p. 345).

Suppes' conclusion is that such an axiom represents "a qualitative expression of a propensity". Still discussing the same case, he remarks that
the probabilities we obtain from the representation theorem are not unique but are only unique up to fixing the decay parameter. Again, this is not a subjective concept but very much an objective one (Suppes, 1987a, p. 346).

And once again he concludes that

identifying and locating the number of physical parameters to be determined is a way of emphasizing that propensities have entered and that a purely probabilistic theory with a unique measure has not been given (Ibidem).

One can certainly agree that in the cases discussed by Suppes 'objective' considerations of some sort enter into the evaluation of probabilities.

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The question, however, is whether an appeal to the notion of propensity is a fruitful move in this connection. In my comments on Suppes' papers I raised some doubts, mainly due to the fact that his treatment of the matter seemed to overlook the wide debate on propensities going on in the literature, and to underestimate the implications, mainly with regard to indeterminism, that the notion of propensity brings with it. Instead of going back to such questions, I now wish to say that I am still dissatisfied with Suppes' treatment of the matter, but on slightly different grounds. I emphasize that we agree that a purely subjective notion of probability cannot account for all evaluations of probability, and some notion of 'objective chance' is required. His theorems are very useful in order to clarify at what point, in the representation of phenomena exhibiting probabilistic behaviour, considerations which are not purely subjective are to be encountered. However, I doubt that the notion of propensity, especially if taken in the vague meaning that Suppes attaches to it, can serve the purpose of providing a sound basis on which objective chance could be founded. In other words, Suppes' appeal to propensity does not seem to involve much more than the introduction of an extra term that adds nothing to the structural axioms. In general, objective considerations in the evaluation of probabilities are essentially dictated by scientific theories. At least in this sense, then, the notion of 'objective chance' is linked to the view of scientific theories which is adopted. As Suppes pointed out - and I agree with him - it is a lacuna of de Finetti's position to overlook the role played by considerations which are not purely subjective in the evaluation of probabilities. The main reason why de Finetti rejected the notion of objective chance altogether comes from his general attitude to philosophy, an attitude Suppes calls 'positivistic', and I have called 'anti-realist'." In other words, de Finetti's main concern was to keep probability free from metaphysics. However, in the light of a relativistic and pragmatist view of scientific theories like that upheld by Suppes, admitting that certain elements, in situations characterized by completeness of information, can guide probability evaluations, does not mean opening the door to metaphysical ontology. 'Objective chance' can simply keep the pragmatist character pertaining to theories, and the only thing that matters is a clear distinction between 'objective' and subjective elements entering in the evaluation of probabilities. Incidentally, one might recall that the other founder of subjectivism, F. P. Ramsey,

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admits of a notion of objective chance supported by a pragmatically oriented view of scientific theories which bears some analogy with Suppes' own position.
INDETERMINISM

Suppes puts forward a most interesting view of indeterminism, based on the notion of stability. Its starting point is instability in mechanics, which amounts to the consideration that
wide divergence in the behaviour of two systems identical except for initial conditions is observed even when the initial conditions are extremely close (Suppes, 1991b, p. 9).

Unstable systems reflect a fundamental feature of indeterminism, namely unpredictability, for their future behaviour is not predictable on the basis of their present behaviour. According to this kind of analysis the notion of randomness, which represents the extreme case of unpredictability, is not to be seen as incompatible with determinism. On the basis of results taken from the theory of unstable dynamical systems, it can therefore be shown that
-

there is no opposition between completely deterministic systems and random systems and that moreover - the same phenomena can be both deterministic and random (Suppes, 1988c, p. 400).

In view of this, randomness can be seen as a "limiting case of unstable determinism" (Suppes, 1991b, p. 17). The bridge between randomness and determinism is provided by instability, in the sense that random sequences can be generated by deterministic but very unstable systems of classical mechanics. Moreover, randomness is characterized by complexity, as random sequences "are the limiting case of increasingly complex deterministic sequences" (Ibidem). Suppes' conclusion is that talk in terms of stable or unstable systems should supersede the opposition between determinism and indeterminism, and that complexity, as referred to results, should be preferred to randomness, as referred to procedures. If the preceding remarks seem to suggest that the choice between determinism and indeterminism is essentially a matter of taste, there is an additional aspect of the question to which Suppes draws attention. This amounts to the fact that, for those who accept the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, indeterminism looks much more plausible than instability, for

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unstable deterministic mechanical systems cannot be construed to be consistent with standard quantum mechanics. The conclusion of this line of argument is that standard quantum mechanics is the most outstanding example of an intrinsically indeterministic theory (Suppes, 1991b, p. 16).

The question of the choice between indeterminism and instability, however, remains open, insofar as there are alternative theories to the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. In view of all this, Suppes maintains that a responsible philosophy of science should leave the door open to indeterminism. This is indeed the starting point of Suppes' 'new metaphysics'.

CAUSALITY

A further important feature of Suppes' perspective amounts to the conviction that there is no opposition between indeterminism, or the admission of the existence of randomness in nature, and causality. In his well-known monograph of 1970 A Probabilistic Theory of Causality Suppes advocates a probabilistic theory, that has become the object of much attention and debate. Its peculiar feature, that distinguishes it from other theories of probabilistic causality, like those put forward by I. J. Good, H. Reichenbach and W. C. Salmon, is to be identified with its general formulation, which is intended to make it applicable to the various contexts where causal speech occurs. l 2 Suppes' notion of causality can be formulated both in terms of events and of random variables, and is compatible with different interpretations of probability. Remarkably, no 'ultimate genuine causes' are contemplated within this theory. On the contrary, the notion of cause, genuine or spurious, is strictly linked to the specification of the set of concepts on which the set of events that can serve as causes in a given context is to be defined. This is a point stressed by Suppes not only in his monograph of 1970, but also in more recent writings. For example, in his Self-projile he writes:
I do think that the insistence on relativizing the analysis of cause to a particular conceptual framework is a point on which to make a stand (Suppes, 1979, p. 24).

His notion of probabilistic causality is then characterized as intrinsically relativistic. Conceived in this way, it testifies to Suppes' relativistic and pluralistic attitude towards philosophy and epistemology. Much of the debate on Suppes' theory of causality revolves around the problem of accounting for what can be called 'surprising events',

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relative to which causes behave as counteracting, or negatively relevant to the effect. The problem is strictly linked to that of the existence of two sorts of causal talk, one in terms of kinds of events, the other in terms of single events. In this respect, probabilistic causal talk simply reflects the distinction between different kinds of probability statements, that was recalled earlier. As previously observed, to such a distinction there corresponds a tension between explanation and prediction, which is even more evident in connection with causal analysis. In fact, according to a widespread opinion causality is strictly related to explanation, and an adequate theory of probabilistic causality should be able to account for single events as well as classes of them, even when such events are in fact unpredictable. While recognizing the relevance of this distinction, in his 1970 monograph Suppes holds that "the natural setting for extended scientific analysis of causal relations is provided by classes of events rather than individual events" (Suppes, 1970, p. 80). This conviction reflects an attitude that tends to give a privileged place to prediction over explanation, and does not take causal talk as necessarily connected with explanatory talk. This accounts for the fact that Suppes has never attempted to trace a systematic distinction between the two kinds of causal analysis. Also in this connection - as with regard to genuine causes - Suppes clarifies the kind of causal analysis adopted by reference to a detailed specification of the context. The quest for a detailed causal analysis in terms of single events is strictly linked to the quest for a specification of ultimate genuine causes. Both are rooted in the conviction that causality is an intrinsically explanatory notion. This has inspired a number of attempts at providing the probabilistic notion of causality with some concept of homogeneity, so devised as to make the specification of causes depend on maximal specification of factors which are relevant to the effect. Proposals in this direction have been made by N. Cartwright, E. Eells, W. Spohn and many others, and are the object for much debate. The position taken by Suppes is utterly skeptical: "the search for homogeneity - he says - seems as quixotic and metaphysically mistaken as the search for ultimate causes" (Suppes, 1984a, p. 56). Also in this connection his answer points in the direction of a contextualization of the notion of cause, because it is only within a specific context that it can be decided at what point one can stop scrutinizing the data and take as exhaustive the information available at a certain time.

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In the light of the endless discussions raised by the problems mentioned above, Suppes' relativism and pluralism with respect to the characterization of probabilistic causality, together with his general formulation of the notion of cause, reflect a very sensible position. Clearly, this should be taken more as a point of departure, than one of arrival. In other words, the distinction among different contexts where causal talk occurs should open the way to a detailed analysis of the specific features characterizing causality within such contexts. In his 1970 monograph Suppes indicates three main conceptual frameworks where causal statements are to be found. They are the following:
One conceptual framework is that provided by a particular scientific theory; the second is of the sort that arises in connection with a particular experiment or class of experiments; and the third is the most general framework expressing our beliefs with respect to all information available to us.I3

This tripartition calls for a more articulated analysis, aiming at a detailed specification of the various kinds of experiments performed, as well as the statistical techniques adopted in order to detect causality and the probability functions being used. Obviously, the degree of theoretical abstraction and sophistication attained by particular sciences making use of causal talk is crucial with respect to a characterization of the conceptual framework in which causality occurs. As a final remark on causality, it might be observed that a view like Suppes', according to which there is no strict linkage between causality and explanation, could be fruitfully supplemented by a notion like manipulability. A suggestion to this effect comes from econometrics, where probabilistic causality has been dealt with in a highly original fashion. It combines a functionalist approach with a manipulative notion of causality, in the framework of a view of model building which bears strong analogies with Suppes', as pointed out before. Within such a perspective, causality is not seen as a property of explanatory accounts, being rather a sort of 'qualified predictability', pertaining to those models that can serve as a basis for practical intervention on some variables, which are precisely those taken as causal.14 The distinctive feature of a causal model lies in the manipulative character of its variables, as opposed to purely predictive models which forecast the future trend of some variable under study. A generalization of a view of this sort calls for a detailed analysis of the notion of experiment and its implications, with respect to various disciplines making use of causal talk. In this connection the distinction enters between experimental and

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non-experimental sciences, together with specification of the techniques adopted by specific disciplines. This looks like a promising direction in which Suppes' theory of probabilistic causality could be expanded.

RATIONALITY

The view of rationality emerging from Suppes' philosophy is accordingly local and pragmatic in character.'' In the first place he distinguishes between two aspects of rationality, to which there correspond two different approaches. The first is a 'dynamical' approach, dating back to Aristotle, according to which rational action is defined as performed in accordance with good reasons, or reasons tending to the achievement of some purpose. The second approach, called 'kinematic', applies to action choice. It is ruled by the overall principle of maximizing expected utility, characterizing the utilitarian tradition of Bentham and Bayes. This has been given great impulse by our century's Bayesianism. The 'dynamical' approach is developed by Suppes in terms of justified procedures, based on the idea that good reasons should be provided in support of the procedures to be adopted in order to attain a given purpose. Since the very concept of 'procedure' is always referred to expected results, the model based on 'justified procedures' is to be seen as complementary with respect to the model of expected utility. Once again, instead of a contraposition we find in Suppes' thought a pluralistic attitude, aimed at combining different approaches within a composite perspective. A similar spirit pervades Suppes' attitude towards the model of expected utility. His main point in this connection is that the 'classical ' Bayesian model should be implemented in such a way as to gain applicability in many practical situations, both in everyday life and scientific practice. Suppes reaffirms the importance of allowing for estimates in terms of 'interval' probability values, and takes intuition, intention and individual judgment as crucial elements to be included in a more elastic model of Bayesian rationality. Since such things as intuition and judgment also play a central role in view of the choice of the procedures directed to a given end; they provide within Suppes' perspective a bridge between the two components of rationality. In the resulting view quantitative and qualitative elements, intuitive judgment

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and deliberation, individual beliefs and objective evaluations are all admitted and complement each other. This kind of approach has the advantage of allowing for a probabilistic treatment of notions that are not to be dealt with in the framework of the 'classical' Bayesian model, like those of obligation and free wi11.16 As a counterpart, Suppes asks for a renunciation of a general theory of rationality, and for the acceptance in its place of a local view, resulting from theoretical as well as practical elements, within a mixture that is not to be fixed once and for all.
The use of modern quantitative methods of decision making - Suppes says - is necessarily limited but powerful when properly applied. The role of judgment and practical wisdom in applying these methods will continue to be of central importance. The tension between calculation, qualitative justified procedures, and judgment will not disappear (Suppes, 1984a, p. 22 1).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The kind of philosophy Suppes offers us is not easy to locate within the framework of contemporary epistemology. Instead of the many 'isms' - determinism, realism, individualism, and the like - which are the object of so much debate, we find in Suppes' work an investigation into science from inside. Such investigation, conducted in a pragmatic and empirical spirit, does not lead to a general philosophical view of science and reality. For Suppes philosophy reflects the local character of science, its problems are dealt with in the framework of a specific context, and so are the proposed solutions. This approach is not bound to give us a comprehensive theory of the kind logical positivists tried to work out. What it gives us is instead a method for dissecting notions and problems in a way that makes it possible to distinguish between their various components, and allows identification of structure at different levels of abstraction. This opens the way to a representation of phenomena in which both theories and data, abstract mathematical construals and particular experimental techniques, are all given attention and find their place. The pluralistic and local character of Suppes' approach might look like a sign of weakness to those who do not wish to abandon the neopositivistic ideals of science and rationality. However, the force of Suppes' position lies in its constructive attitude towards epistemological problems. This certainly

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answers that urge to understand human knowledge in general, and science in particular, that logical empiricist philosophers felt so strongly.

Dipartimento di Filosojia, via Zamboni, 38, 40126 Bologna, Italy

NOTES

' See for example Suppe (Ed.) (1977), and Moulines and Sneed (1979).
See his 'Self-profile' (Suppes, 1979, pp. 46-47), for some remarks on this 'slogan' as Suppes calls it. See for example Spanos (1986). See Suppes (1981a) and (1984a). See Suppes (1979). See Suppes (1984a, pp. 85ff.) See Suppes and Zanotti (1977) and (1989). See Suppes (1966a). see Suppes (1966b). See Suppes (1987a, 1987b) and Galavotti (1987). " See Galavotti (1989). l 2 For a review of the debate on probabilistic causality, focusing on some of the topics discussed in the following pages see Galavotti (1991). l 3 Suppes (1970, p. 13). This point is also discussed at length in Suppes (1984b). l 4 For a discussion of the epistemological relevance of the notion of causality developed by econometricians see Galavotti and Gambetta (1990) and Galavotti (1990). l 5 Suppes' views on rationality are outlined in (198 la, 198lc, 1984a). l6 See Suppes (1973).

'

"'

REFERENCES Bogdan, R. J. (Ed.): 1979, Patrick Suppes, Dordrecht: Reidel. Galavotti, M. C.: 1987, 'Comments on Patrick Suppes "Propensity Representations of Probability"', Erkenntnis, 26, 359-368. Galavotti, M. C.: 1989, 'Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Probability: Bruno de Finetti's Subjectivism', Erkenntnis, 31, 239-261. Galavotti, M. C.: 1990, 'Explanation and Causality: Some Suggestions from Econometrics', Topoi, 9, 161-1 69. Galavotti, M. C.: 1991, 'Probability and Causality', in: Atti del Congresso 'Nuovi problemi della logica e della Jilosojia della scienza', Vol. I, Bologna: CLUEB, pp. 69-82.

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Galavotti, M. C. and Gambetta, G.: 1990, 'Causality and Exogeneity in Econometric Models', in: R. Cooke and D. Costantini (Eds.), Statistics in Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 27-40. Hintikka, J. and Suppes, P. (Eds.): 1966, Aspects of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland. Moulines, C.-U. and Sneed, J.: 1979, 'Suppes' Philosophy of Physics', in: R. Bogdan (Ed.), pp. 59-9 1. Spanos, A.: 1986, Statistical Foundations of Econometric Modelling, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Suppe, F. (Ed.): 1979, The Structure of Scienti$c Theories, 2nd edition, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Suppes, P.: 1962, 'Models of Data', in: E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski (Eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 252-261. Suppes, P.: 1966a, 'A Bayesian Approach to the Paradoxes of Confirmation', in: J. Hintikka and P. Suppes (Eds.), pp. 198-207. Suppes, P.: 1966b, 'Probabilistic Inference and the Concept of Total Evidence', in: J. Hintikka and P. Suppes (Eds.), pp. 49-65. Suppes, P.: 1967, 'What Is a Scientific Theory?', in: S. Morgenbesser (Ed.), Philosophy o Science Today, New York: Basic Books, pp. 55-67. f Suppes, P.: 1970, Probabilistic Theory of Causality, Amsterdam: North-Holland. Suppes, P.: 1973, 'The Concept of Obligation in the Context of Decision Theory', in: P. Suppes, L. Henkin, G. C. Moisil, and A. Joja (Eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IV, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 5 15-529. Suppes, P.: 1979, 'Self-profile', in: R. Bogdan (Ed.), pp. 3-56. Suppes, P.: 1980, 'Probabilistic Empiricism and Rationality', in: R. Hilpinen (Ed.), Rationality in Science, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 171-1 90. Suppes, P.: 1981a, La logique du probable, Paris: Flammarion. Suppes, P. : 1981b, 'The Plurality of Science', in: P. D. Asquith and I. Hacking (Eds.), PSA 1978, Vol. 11, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 3-16. Suppes, P.: 198 Ic, 'The Limits of Rationality', Grazerphilosophischen Studien, 12/13, 85-101. Suppes, P.: 1983, 'The Meaning of Probability Statements', Erkenntnis, 19, 397-403. Suppes, P.: 1984a, Probabilistic Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell. Suppes, P.: 1984b, 'Conflicting Intuitions about Causality', in: P. Trench, T. Yuehling, and H. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Causation and Causal Theories, Vol. IX, pp. 151-168. Suppes, P.: 1987a, 'Propensity Representations of Probability', Erkenntnis, 26, 335358. Suppes, P.: 1987b, 'Some Further Remarks on Propensity: Reply to Maria Carla Galavotti', Erkenntnis, 26, 369-376. Suppes, P.: 1988a, 'Representation Theory and the Analysis of Structure', Philosophia Naturalis, 25, 254-268. Suppes, P.: 1988b, 'Empirical Structures', in: E. Scheibe (Ed.), The Role of Experience in Science, Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 23-33. Suppes, P.: 1988c, 'Comment: Causality, Complexity and Determinism', Statistical Science, 3, 398-400.

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Suppes, P.: 199 1a, 'Indeterminism or Instability, Does It Matter?', in: G. G. Brittan, Jr. (Ed.), Causality, Method and Modality, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 5-22. Suppes, P.: 1991b, 'Can Psychological Software Be Reduced to Physiological Hardware?', in: E. Agazzi (Ed.), The Problem of Reduction in Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 183-198. Suppes, P. and Zanotti, M.: 1977, 'On Using Random Relations to Generate Upper and Lower Probabilities', Synthese, 36, 427440. Suppes, P. and Zanotti, M.: 1989, 'Conditions on Upper and Lower Probabilities to Imply Probabilities', Erkenntnis, 31, 323-345.

COMMENTS BY PATRICK SUPPES

Maria Carla Galavotti gives a detailed and sympathetic overview of my philosophy of science. Most of what she says I find myself in agreement with. On a few points there is a divergence in our views but probably more important are the questions she raises about positions I have not developed in the detailed way that is needed. The two large topics raised by Carla that I want to explore more carefully are, first, the relationship between causality and experiments, and second, my nonfoundational problem-solving approach to science and the philosophy of science. I follow the discussion of these subjects with some more particular comments.

Causality and Experiments. Carla remarks that already in my 1970 monograph A Probabilistic Theory of Causality I indicated that there were three main conceptual frameworks where causal statements were to be found. These frameworks (i) were provided by a scientific theory, (ii) arose in connection with particular experiments, and (iii) were concerned with our expression of beliefs. She rightly remarks that the topic is not developed as thoroughly as it needs to be, for much more needs to be said about the various kinds of experiments and how they relate to causality. I emphasize of course it is possible to do experiments that do not directly bear on causality. Kinematical experiments in physics are common and in other subjects as well, but still the great bulk of experimentation is aimed at causal questions. This means that the theory of experimentation is itself an important part of the theory of causality. The following classification is not meant to be definitive or sufficiently detailed. I also amplify it in remarks on other papers in these volumes, but it is 1think at least a beginning.

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Experiments with Control Groups. In much of empirical science the image of experimentation, at least in the social sciences and in medicine, is that of the experiment in which there are at least two groups, one the experimental group and the other a control group. In a typical medical experiment, the experimental group will be given a certain treatment and the control group either no treatment or a placebo. Often in such experimentation there is little if any underlying scientific theory, except for the theory provided by the statistical theory of experimental design and the statistical theory of evaluation of the experimental results. This remark is not meant to denigrate the importance of such experiments. Major findings using this methodology can be found in many disciplines. It is only in this century that the theory of experiments with control groups has been put on a sound statistical basis. That statistical theory plays a very important role of offering a generalized theory of experimentation when there is little else in the way of scientific theory to guide how the experiments are conducted. The pioneering work of Ronald Fisher on the design of experiments of this kind is one of the great landmarks of twentieth century intellectual thought. Experiments Testing a Theoretical Model. Most of the great experimental triumphs in science - experiments that are historical events to be discussed for many years afterwards - are of this type. Here the experimental setup is very different from that of the first type. There is ordinarily no control group from a statistical or methodological standpoint. There is a completely different objective from that of the Fisherian control-group experiment. The object is not to reject the null hypothesis, but to have data that enable a scientist to accept the null hypothesis, where the null hypothesis now is that the theory and the experiment yield the same predictions. Wonderful experimental examples of this kind are easy to enumerate. A celebrated but less prominent one was Poisson's realization that Fresnel's theory of diffraction implied that if a small disk is held in a light emanating from essentially a point source, the center of the disks's shadow will be bright, in fact just about as bright as if no disk had been placed in the light's path. Poisson thought this was a clear refutation of Fresnel's theory. An experiment was performed confirming Poisson's prediction, contrary to his expectation. There is another point of interesting comparison with the first class. In the case of testing a theoretical model, from a general methodological

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standpoint it is felt to be most desirable to have a competing theory or competing theoretical model with which to compare the prediction of the same experimental facts. In this case rather than an experimental group and control group, there is, so to speak, a main theoretical model and an alternative theoretical model. The aim of refined statistical analysis is to compare the goodness of fit of these two models. It is a common piece of heuristic statistical advice that it is better to have almost any alternative hypothesis or model rather than none. The insight we get from comparison of two theoretical models is almost without exception superior to simply looking at the comparison of a single theoretical model and experimental data. In my own scientific experience one of the episodes I enjoyed the most was the concentration in the 1960s on the comparison of all-or-none versus incremental learning. In this case there were two very sharply defined theoretical ideas: whether the learning occurs incrementally, as suggested by the description, or in a single step, as described by the phrase 'all or none'. The existence of these two competing theoretical models spurred not only experimentation, but also much more detailed examination of experimental data than would often have been the case. My own contribution to this controversy, in the context of concept learning, is set forth in detail in Suppes and Ginsberg (1963).

Measurement Experiments. A third class of experiments is concerned with the accurate measurement of some important constant or physical scale. Great examples are to be found in the long history of the measurement of the velocity of light. There is of course an overlap with the second class of experiments because in many tests of theoretical models a certain number of free parameters must be estimated from the data, but in these cases the real objective is the test of the theoretical model, not the estimation of the particular parameters whose exact values may not be considered of fundamental importance. It is quite different in the case of measurement experiments aimed at the value of an empirical constant that itself plays independently a role in theory. Volume I of Foundations o Measurement (pp. 539-544) contains a six-page table f listing various physical quantities and their dimensions which one way or another we want to measure with detailed experiments when possible. The experiments devoted to the physical quantities listed in this table fill hundreds of pages in experimental journals over the past century.

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The relation of the first two classes of experiments to causal ideas is clear enough. For the case of the first class, the rejection of the null hypothesis leads to the conclusion that the treatment had a causal effect. In the second class the notion of causality must be abstracted from the theoretical model but in most cases what is intuitively meant to be causal in the theory is fairly evident. In the third case, matters are quite different. The experiments often are themselves not causal in character at all, but involve detailed measurement procedures which may themselves entail causal ideas but, more importantly, the exact measurement of various empirical quantities is the key to the detailed testing of causal models, and so measurement experiments bear upon causality in a significant even if indirect way.

Observational Experiments. Contrary to some thinking about experiments, I want to classify as experiments those investigations which are observational in nature, in the sense that the initial and boundary conditions of the system observed are disturbed as little as possible by the experimenter and are not created artificially for the purpose of the experiment. Characteristic examples would be meteorological experiments to measure thermal and turbulent conditions in clouds, astronomical experiments to observe particular features of the light from distant stars, or radio astronomy experiments aimed at similar observations about radio waves from distant objects. It is held by some stout-hearted statisticians that we can really not make causal inferences when we cannot manipulate the experimental conditions and thus we cannot really make good causal inferences in the case of observational experiments. I believe in a more robust concept of causality. It is essential to our ordinary and deeply entrenched methods for dealing with the everyday world to be able to make such causal inferences as the following: 'The storm outside is now causing the flood in my basement'. Certainly it can be the case that we have to take stronger precautions about the correctness of our causal inferences in the case of observational experiments. It is also evident that there is a strong overlap between measurement experiments and observational experiments, and for that matter, observational experiments and experiments testing theoretical models, but in the second class of experiment I had especially in mind when controlled conditions of experimentation are deliberately created.

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Science as Pluralistic Problem Solving. Galavotti catches very well in the last part of her paper, as well as in the earlier remarks on pragmatism, the skepticism with which I greet overarching philosophical theories of science. Contrary to something I might have held to at the beginning of my career, physics or psychology, for example, are not to be organized as one grand set of axiomatic systems whose interrelations are carefully dovetailed and extremely well developed. This may be possible for mathematics but it is certainly, I now think, a mistaken ideal for physics. I have come to see that physics is a science of clever problem solving, and this is true of other areas of science as well. Good physicists are past masters at knowing just what particular physical assumptions are to be made in analyzing a particular problem, something most mathematicians are very bad at in spite of the great confidence some of them show at their mastery of fundamental physical theory. There are of course individual foundational or philosophical questions of great conceptual interest. What does not exist is an overarching philosophical foundation for the enterprise of science in the many different forms it now takes. There is, as Carla emphasizes, in my view no unity of subject matter, method or language in science, and consequently no philosophical view that will encompass in any nonsuperficial way the great plurality of scientific activity. Now for some particular comments on Galavotti's analysis of my philosophy of science. Probability of Single Events. In her discussion of Bayesianism, in my judgment she makes too much of the special circumstances surrounding the occurrence of single events. She says that "when dealing with single events characterized by probabilistic behavior we can only (if ever) reconstruct the history behind their occurrence after they have taken place." But it seems to me there are obvious counterexamples to this claim. One of the best would be the modern intense observation of the formation and movement of hurricanes. Long before a hurricane hits the shore to create a disastrous single event, we know a great deal about the history of the hurricane. In no sense are meteorologists committed only to analysis after the event. They continually make predictions about the future behavior of the hurricane, including the prediction of the potentially disastrous single event of its moving onshore in a populated area.

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So I am less inclined than Galavotti to stress the difference between probability statements about single events and probability statements about properties of objects.

Propensities. This disagreement carries over to our running dialogue and intellectual differences about propensities. This is not the place to enter into that debate once again in full detail, but I think that Galavotti is correct that much of what I said in the past is still not sufficiently detailed about the nature of propensities. More needs to be said. One way of saying more is to take the view of probabilities as fitting within deterministic systems. In this case, we can look at properties of the deterministic system that are not in themselves probabilistic properties, but that can be related, even causally if one desires, to the generation of probabilities. Example of such concepts would be the case of the generation of randomness in the motion of the three bodies. This is discussed in my paper on propensities, which Galavotti criticized and refers to (Suppes, 1987a); in regions of unstable behavior randomness is generated. It is a propensity of instability in this case to generate random behavior. In other cases, for example the classical coin tossing cases also discussed by me in the same paper, the propensity of the system that generates probability is slight variations in initial conditions together with the symmetry of the physical object, for example, the coin being tossed. Neither the variation in initial conditions nor the symmetry of the object is inherently probabilistic in character, but their joint presence can cause the generation of probabilistic sequences. Almost certainly Galavotti will not be satisfied with these further statements. It is a topic I hope we will be able to pursue in more detail on another occasion. Determinism or Indeterminism. Concerning the discussion of instability at the end of her section on objective probability, she quotes a statement of mine from Suppes 1991b on quantum mechanics as "the most outstanding example of an intrinsically indeterministic theory." In the spirit of Suppes 1991a and especially in view of a recent article of mine emphasizing the transcendental character of determinism (1993) I would now want to say that quantum mechanics is equally congenial to determinism or indeterminism, and the choice of an overarching view of how to think about the world is transcendental in character. This

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point is not really a difference between Galavotti and me, but a point of clarification as she puts it that "Suppes maintains that a responsible philosophy of science should leave the door open to indeterminism." I certainly agree with this and now go on to say that necessarily that door is open because of the transcendental character of determinism. It is a good thing that Carla and I continue to have rather strong disagreements about propensity, otherwise our philosophical conversations might become too irenic and congenial.

REFERENCES Krantz, D., Luce, D., Suppes, P., and Tversky, A.: 1971, Foundations of Measurement, Volume I, New York: Academic Press . Suppes, P.: 1987a, 'Propensity Representations of Probability', Erkenntnis, 26, 335358. Suppes, P.: 1991a, 'Indeterminism or Instability, Does It Matter?', in: G. G. Brittan, Jr. (Ed.), Causality, Method and Modality, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 5-22. Suppes, P.: 1991b, 'Can Psychological Software Be Reduced to Physiological Hardware?', in: E. Agazzi (Ed.), The Problem of Reduction in Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 183-198. Suppes, P.: 1993, 'The Transcendental Character of Determinism', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18, 242-257. Suppes, P. and Ginsberg, R.: 1963, 'A Fundamental Property of All-or-None Models, Binomial Distribution of Responses Prior to Conditioning, with Application to Concept Formation in Children', Ps~chological Review, 70, 139-161.