EJ Notes ART III Section 3 Sec 3.

(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable e xcept upon lawful order of the court or when public safety or order requires oth erwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression , or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. People vs. Damaso The trial courts ruling was reversed by the SC when it acquitte d the accused on the ground that the witnesses presented had testimonies founded on a mere hearsay. Evidence presented was also found to be inadmissible being s eized without a warrant from the house of the owner who was not even present dur ing the warrantless search and seizure. Veroy vs Layague Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were fou nd in Davao City. Yet they were charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to the m. The SC held that the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohi bitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of off ense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search wa rrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefo re protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence agai nst the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession o f firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no ne ed of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without th e knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. Ramirez vs CA A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Es ter S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter s office, allegedly vexed, insul ted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner s dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcrip t of the event and sought moral damages, attorney s fees and other expenses of l itigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and othe r reliefs awardable at the trial court s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private resp ondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for v iolation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire ta pping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. " The SC ruled in favor of the respondent. Zulueta vs CA - Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alf redo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private resp ondent s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband s cli nic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Mart in and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Ma rtin s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use i n evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the prac tice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. The SC affirmed the lower courts ruling stating that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. It further stated that the constitutional injunction d

eclaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional pr ovision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitu tion is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or orde r requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision ren ders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." Ayer Productions vs. Judge Capulong (Right to Privacy vs Freedom of speech and o f expression.) Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie pro duction company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), envisi oned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial viewing and for Philippine and intern ational release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifan io de los Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie pr oducer Lope V. Juban who suggested that they consult with the appropriate govern ment agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile , who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed. Petitioner Hal McElroy informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motio n picture but the latter declined and afterwards filed a petition for TRO on the ground of violation of his privacy. The SC ruled that: whether the "balancing o f interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion p icture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, co nstitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent s "right of privacy." Adiong vs COMELEC It was held by the SC in this case that the portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "de cals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas prov ided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is NULL and VOID. ABS-CBN vs COMELEC The SC held that the holding of exit polls and the disseminat ion of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the free doms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in t he guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the c ontrary, exit polls properly conducted and publicized can be vital tools in elim inating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasure s may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the f undamental rights of our people. Chavez vs Gonzales This is a petition for the writs of certiorari and prohibitio n to set aside "acts, issuances, and orders" of respondents Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez (respondent Gonzales) and the National Telecommunications Comm ission (NTC), particularly an NTC "press release" dated 11 June 2005, warning ra dio and television stations against airing taped conversations allegedly between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Commiss ioner Virgilio Garcillano (Garcillano) under pain of suspension or revocation of their airwave licenses. The SC held that the NTC press release constitutes an u nconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression. Iglesia ni Cristo vs CA The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to revi ew TV programs by virtue of the powers vested upon it by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom, the court ruled that any act that restrain s speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppr ession of the petitioners freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Respon dent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply becau se it attacks other religions. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to p revent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the communit y that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing w hatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including relig ious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing o f a substantive and imminent evil. Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction of t

he Board to review the petitioners TV program while it reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating t he TV program of the petitioner. This case involves the motion of petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano for reconsideratio n of the Decision of the Court dated April 29, 2009, modifying that of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) by imposing the penalty of three-month suspension on the television show Ang Dating Daan, instead of on petitioner Soriano, as host of that program. The Court iterates the rule that th e exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.