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Lmina 6 Reach an agreement regarding what an MP can or cannot do based on the UN principles: Robust operations Protection to civilians Command

and Control System Key objectives to consolidate the peace

Lmina 8 Clearly define its scope and actions, which the Armed Forces must necessarily implement. Lmina 27 Insist on optimizing the quality of life of the UN personnel (Camps) Emphasis on the support to the community Lmina 32 The coordination and planning within the DPKO and DFS structures and between them must ensure that whatever is decided regarding the Missions will have a functional character and will be totally integrated and coordinated with schedules and objectives. Not doing it so will have direct negative impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the military forces. Post-conflict management demands a multidisciplinary approach, with clear cutobjectives and under a notion of integration that as a whole determines the priority that each area will have in every phase. The weaknesses of the Government (Organization for the domestic security) UN Agencies NGOs in the joint work with the military forces will finally turn against the Mission. Lmina 33 The knowledge of the geographic, weather, historical, socio-economic and human factors and of the threats and their capabilities, the latter from a military perspective, is a key element to determine the shape that the military forces should have. Despite the existence of a standard arrangement, specific adjustments are always necessary (this does not always occur)

Since such characteristics are specific to each Mission; the Missions must demand that those standards are met by making sure that the necessary adjustments are made in every staff turnover. (Apparently, there are forces that do not have a lesson-learned system since evolution through time cannot be readily perceived). Lmina 34 The biggest difficulties regarding the use of the military forces occur when there is a lack of competence and pro-activity among the personnel. Even though said difficulties occur in some military units, the situation is more prevalent in the UNPOL and FPUs with whom the military force must work closely. The Missions must report these situations and demand that the contributing countries and the UNPOL selection system comply with the set norms and the DPKO must act accordingly. When operating under Chapter VII, it is essential that all the means used in the military operations and the subsequent humanitarian aid directly depend on the force commander. In order to avoid collateral damages during the operations, the military forces must count on precise information (intelligence), adequate equipment and be very well trained in urban combat? (combate de localidades ?). Lmina 35 It is important to reiterate that the humanitarian aid and quick effect projects must be part of the immediate support to the operations and therefore previously planned. At the beginning and due to security reasons it is only logical that said aid and projects are carried out by the military. If the military are tasked with those activities the local population will perceive the Mission and the military forces in particular, as means of support and not as occupation forces. Lmina 36 It would seem illogical that the international aid is not channeled and coordinated by the organization that the international community has deployed in order to help the failed country in question (MINUSTAH). That should not occur to organizations and Agencies that depend on the United Nations.

Cultural and religious aspects should not have a bearing on the operative capability of the forces, which must understand that they are operating under international norms. Within the same context, hierarchical authorities other than those which are part of the chain of command must not be allowed to exist. The new scenario demands a new type of leader, one who is capable and flexible enough to work with the real problems that the military force have to deal with; the kind of problems that will always be present. 2. Hice unos cambio en el temario, chequear.

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SCENARIO THAT MILITARY FORCES FACE IN MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES DETERRENCE CONSTRAINTS FOR THE MILITARY FORCES ROLE OF THE MILITARY FORCES LESSONS LEARNED THE HAITI CASE FINAL REFLECTIONS

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Slide 24 One of the difficult aspects to be defined is threat, for its factual powers and interests that protect it, as well as the lack of intelligence means to get the required information. It could appear in different ways, its asymmetric characteristics make its detection even more difficult. Novel and smart alternatives must be found through tactics that oblige them to emerge to be able to act on them. A difference must be made between criminal acts that take place in all the countries with actions of armed groups that attempt on the security and stability of the country. Slide 25 Operational planning must give priority to the actions that in a sequential way must be materialized to get and keep security and stability. The above implies special and regular actions. To get control of the sections under armed groups is a specific way to protect the civilian population which is normally threaten and used by them. To control an area means to keep permanent presence 24 hours a day and also carrying out activities to gain peoples trust and support. (Humanitarian Help). The standardization of equipment, training and language are very important aspects to consider when operating with other countries resources. (Telecommunications, night visors). On foot resources must be privileged. In the case of Haiti, an example of how to operate was when the Brazilian force took total control of the Bel Air area, which is an example to follow. Military forces must be prepared to face the most common catastrophes that can happen in the countries where they are deployed. They must have the capacity to reshape considering the current environment and always have armament to fight riots because social unrest demonstrations will be at all times present in failed countries. Slide 26 It is important to mention that for getting strong complementary military operations they must go together with humanitarian support and projects of immediate impact at a short, medium and long term. Besides, military forces must have the basic equipment to face catastrophes.

Slide 27 Engineer units are a fundamental tool in improving the life quality of the personnel. In spite of this, there are occasions in which these units must be used to help the community and for this the support of contributing countries is required. Sometimes there are idle capacities because of lack of material which is absurd in a country that primarily requires such kind of help; this damages the prestige especially of the armed forces. Slide 28 As established in the mandate operations must support the national security forces. In the case of Haiti, the PNH is developing its foundations but not yet its medium and upper levels (officers and non-commissioned officers in their specialities). Its headquarters formed by using different ways has imposed an operational independence when they consider it suitable, limiting the monitoring and mentoring of the UNPOL, which is not a referent for them. Its distribution along the country and within Port au Prince shows a complete lack of administration and existence of corruption. This implies being diplomatic when operating with them. In my opinion the UNPOL has lost control over them, which in Haiti as in other countries where peace keeping forces are deployed cannot be allowed. It presents serious limitations since responsibilities of other areas must be taken over which in any country of the world would be the origin of a new institution. Slide 29 Finally UNPOL and FPUs whose features are described in the slide, personally, I believe they require a substantial change in its formation and conception. The UNPOL has a structure in which clearly activities are doubled and it has a quite basic selection system. In the case of FPUs an important number of attitude, discipline and operational problems exceed the ones stated in the military forces. Many times they come from the same country. I want to be fully responsible for my words. It is known by everyone but it seems there is no will to change it. I talked about it many times with my neighbour and friend (RIP) Douglas Coates- Acting Police Commissioner- who was working to change what has been described above just before his death.

I bring this up because their uniforms are mistaken with the ones of the military forces, affecting in this way their deterrence capability. I think one of the big weaknesses of the DPKO is these two forces.

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