Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CORPORATION REPORT
(Air frames)
No.
Ill
AIRCRAFT DIVISION
April 1947
CORPORATION REPORT
(Air frames)
No.
Ill
AIRCRAFT DIVISION
Dates of Survey:
17 October-25
November 1945
Date of Publication:
April 1947
:AL3
JUL 25
1947
This report was written priinaiily for the use of the United States Strategic in the preparation of further reports of a more compreliensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific mateiial covered and as subject to fin-thei' interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.
Bombing Survey
"V
11
FOREWORD
Tlic United SLatcs Strategic Bombing Survey was estahlished by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the Its mission was to late President Roosevelt. conduct an impartial and expert study of theeffects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potentialities of air power as an instrument of
was drawn
ment
of the United States armed forces and for determining future economic policies with respect
A summary report and to the national defense. some 200 supporting reports containing the fimlings of the Survey in Germany have been published. On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested that the Survey conduct a similar study of the effects of all types of air attack in the war against
Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the
from tiie Ai-my to the extent of GO percent and from the Navy to the extent of 40 peieenl. Both the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possibles assistance in furnishing men, supplies, ti-ansport, and information. The Survey operated from headquarters established in Tokyo early in September 1945, with subheadtjuarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating in other parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution, engage-
ment l)y engagement, and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's economy and war production, plant by plant, and industry liy industry. In addition,
studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans
Navy.
The
officers
of
the
Survey during
its
Japanese
effects
civilian
defense
organization, and
of the
atomic bombs.
Separate reports
will
The
ficials.
Frank A. McNamee,
anese military, Goverimaent, and industrial ofIt also recovered and translated many documents which not only have been useful to the Survey but also will furnish data valuable for other studies. Arrangements have been made to
Fred Searls, Jr., Monroe' E. Spaght, Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, Theodore P. Wright, Directors. Walter Wilds, Secretary.
files
The Survey's complement provided for 300 civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The
Ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Its
Air Attacks Production Statistics Evaluation of Pre- attack Intelligence Appendix A Chart of employment Appendix B Dispersal Map B-1 Dispersal of aircraft manufacture Appendix C Production of combat-type aircraft Appendix D Aircraft production by type and years Appendix E Actual airplane protluction Appendix F MIS estimate of production, 1941-45
4
5
G 9
10
11
12
13 13
15 17
HiMEji Plant (Plant report No. III-3) Takarazuka Plant (Plant report No. III-4)
45 63 75
ITS
IMPORTANCE
IN
Till' Kawauislii Aircraft Co. (Ivawaiiishi Kokiiki Knbushiki Kaisha) was the tenth hirgest producer of all typos of aircraft in the Japanese aircraft During the period 1941-45 it acindustry. counted for 3 percent of all the aircraft produced by the industry, increasing from 1.1 percent in 1942 to 4 percent in 1944 and 5 percent in 1945. The company protluced' 5 percent of all fighters built by the Japanese aircraft industry. Kawanishi produced air frames only and its The entire output went to the Japanese Navy. products were used for George (NlKl-J principal and N1K2-J), a single-engine fighter, and Frances (P1Y2-S), a twin-engine fighter. Other important types of air frames were for Mavis and Emily, four-engine flying boats, and various types of naval observation planes and trainers (USSBS, Aircraft Division reports Nos. III-l and III-2). In November 1928 the Kawanishi Aircraft Co. was established with a capital of 5,000,000 yen,
was purchased. This company produced machine tools and was later a branch of the Takarazuka plant. At the request of the -Japanese Naval Ministry, the aircraft-engine department was dissolved in November 1940 and the engine-accessories department and machinegun parts department were established. The capital was increased by 15,000,000 yen in October 1941. Thus the total authorized capital became 30,000,000 yen, which was paid up in full in April 1943. At the request of the Japanese Navy, the Takarazuka plant was established in December 1941 and started production of machined parts for aircraft, engme accessories, and power-driven, machine-gun turrets. In February 1942 the Konan plant was established to produce large flying boats, and in July of the same year the Himeji plant was established to produce
the city of Fuse
fighter planes.
assumed the assets and operations of the Kawanishi Engineering Works at Kobe and continued Kawanishi Engineeringproducing airplanes.
Works started producing seaplanes in 1921 for the Nippon Airplane Co. (Nippon Hikoki K K),
an
air transportation firm.
making the total authorized The Government-owned Naruo airport was first utilized by the company in October 1943. In January 1944 the firm was designated a munitions company by the Munitions
30,000,000
yen,
capital 60,000,000 yen.
the founding of the Nipi)on Aircraft Transportation Co. (Nippon Koku Yuso K), the Nippon Airplane Co., which monopolized all civilian air transportation throughout Japan, had to
Upon
Company
Ministry.
Act.
in
was stopped
March 1945 by
In December 1928, since Kawanishi Aircraft Co. had no market for its products, it started to manufacture observation seaplanes and trainers for the Navy, as a naval-designated plant. In December 1930 the company moved to Naruo
be dissolved.
village
to establish new facilities at Fukuchiyama, in Kyoto prefecture, Honshu, and in Oe County, in Tokushima prefecture, Shikoku, as dispersal units of the Naruo plant.
By an
July
1945,
order of the Minister of Munitions in the entire firm became the Second
and established a new plant. In cooperation with Short Bros. Co. of England,
During August
Munitions Arsenal. The company remained as a mei'e holding company. At the end of the war, in August 1945, all production stopped and the Minister of Munitions ordered the munitions arsenals to be dissolved and all assets and personnel
returned to the original companies. Sis members of the Kawanishi family owned 731,780 shares, or 61 percent, of the total 1,200,000 shares of capital stock of the Kawanishi Aircraft
which experimented with liut produced only two engines and then dropped the experiment. The capitalization was increased by 10,000,000 yen in September 1938, and, fully paid, to 15,000,000 yen by November 1939.
Co.
cif
the
Kaw anish
in
the
Three of them, the Nanio, Konan, and Himeji plants, were aircraft-assembly units, antl the remaining one, the Takarazuka plant, produced air frame machined parts, gun turrets, and aircraft accessories
(fig.
Himeji plant produced only George (NlKl-J) and N1K2-J, a shigle-engine fighter (USSBS, Aircraft Division Reports Nos. III-2 and III-3). From December 1928 through the end of the war, the Kawanishi Aircraft Co.'s entire production went to the Japanese Na\^.
Government
company
covered
came,
direct,
1).
^
The
first
The Naruo
and
its
modification,
land-i)ased Navy fighter, Emily (H8K 1-2-3), a four-engine flying boat, ami various trainers and seaplanes (USSBS. Aircraft Division Report No.
loans of U)0, 000,000 yen from August 1941 to July 1943; 40,000,000 yen from August 1943 to December 1944, and 71,000,000 yen from May 1944 to May 1945. The second was a loan of
iri-i).
Konan
(H8K2).
])lant
produced
Fj-ances
fighter,
twLn-engine,
a
land-based
four-engine
and equipment, valued at Government-furnished buildings and establishments valued at 81,000,000 yen, including an airport and
3,621
tools
24,0(i9,()00 y(.n.
machine
flving
boat,
In
HONSHU
HIMEJI PLANT
TAKARAZUKA PLANT
KOBE
KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT
FIGURE
CO
I
AIRFRAME PLANTS
.luly 1945, l)y
tlic
oi'tlci-
of Uic Minister oT
nil
entire
firm
unci
anil
seven otiiers
percent
1.
in wliii'h
it
owned
1).
I'lDni
percent
to 21
ol
direct'
su|)ervisi()n
of
was
Tahle
Subsidiary mid
called the
companies of
the
kc}'
oflicers
oi'
the
corporation were as
Name
Ryuzo
Kawanislii.
Vice president
Maiiagiiifi:
Ivenji Macl)ai'a.
Sliiro Takaliashi.
director
Chief onf^ineer
Yosliio Hasliiuelii.
of Nariio plant
of Talvaraznlca plant
Masakiyo Nakainura.
Meishin Sailo. Sakae Haniada. Mitsuo Snehisa.
of
Konan plant
of Hinieji plant
The
company.
Corporation
Figure 2
Organizational Chart- of Kawanishi
President
Ryuzo Kawanishi.
-
Vice i)resident
Managing
director
Chief engineer
Administrative
Nanio plant
Administrative department. Production department. Inspection department. Personnel department.
Takarazuka plant
Gun turrets department. Administrative department. A/C machined parts department. Personnel depart ment. Aircraft accessories department. Machine tool department.
Konan
Administrative department. Production department. Inspection department.
plant
Himcji plant
Administrative department. Production department. Inspection department.
the
Each of the three aircraft assembly plants of company made wing, tail, and fuselage sul)(USSBS,
Aircraft
Division
Report
No.
III-l).
The Kawanishi Aircraft Co. had five subsidiary companies which it owned outright, three companies in which it held over a quarter interest,
(USSBS. Aircraft Division Report No. III-2), the Himeji plant (USSBS, Aircraft Division Report No. III-3). and the Takarazuiva plant (USSBS, Aircraft Division Report No. III-4) was invesEvery type of plant was dispersing its same time, overloading the transportation system and hindering each other's production. For example, when component parts could not be provided by the plant's own shop, due to the fact that the shop was moving to
plans.
activity at the
tigated.
Dispersal
Dispersal of aircraft production began in Oc-
another location, such accessories could not, in many cases, be provided by a subcontractor, as
the latter also was dispersing at the
in the early
same
time.
The corporation
was
AIR ATTACKS
The Naruo
Tune
to dis-
departments in the plant. The Naval Construction Corps assisted in building up dispersed plant sites and in many cases supplied all the labor and material necessary in digging underground plants and constructing buildings. Every type of contunnels, semiundergrounil struction was utilized schools, basements of department stores, buildings, space under elevated railroads, converted woolen mills, tile shops, and space in various factories.
The direct attack occurred 9 durmg which 328 high-explosive bombs struck, causing heavy damage. The first indirect attack occurred on 19 July 1945, when
indirect attacks.
1945,
The
was lack
Railroads
Nippon oil refinery, struck the plant and caused moderately heavy damage. On 6 August 1945, 385 incendiary bombs dropped in the Nishinomiya urlian area attack struck the experimental section of the final assembly and
the nearby
of sufficient
transportation
facilities.
were overburdened because all types of plants were dispersmg at the same time and there were not sufficient facilities to handle the tremendous Due to the magnitude of the undertaking, load. there were not enough automotive trucks to compensate for the deficiency in rail transpoi'tation.
caused medium damage to the plant. In addition to these two indirect attacks, two other area attacks afl:"ected the plant. During
one, a few
bombs fell on the nearby dormitories, and during the other, a few fell on the Naruo airfield, near the plant. The plant itself was not
The Konan
11
struck.
iu
isolated
and
their families,
was
probh'm which in some cases retarded production. At the end of the war, Kawanishi had dispersed, or planned to disperse, the facilities of its 4 major
high-explosive bonds hit and caused the greatest amount of damage to the There were two area attacks the Kobe plant. url>an area attack of 5 June and the Nishinomiya
1945,
May
when 146
main sites. Tlie Naruo plant had eight dispersal areas, all but one of which were located on Honshu Island six in the Osaka-Kobe area and one at Fukuchiyama, in Kyoto prefecture. The eighth, the Shikoku final-assembly plant, was in Oe County, a few miles west of Tokushima, on Shikoku
plants to 32
Island.
fi August, a few incendiary bombs dropon the plant and dormitories. Damage was negligible in each of these cases.
attack of
jjing
The one
of
most
229
During
this
attack,
high-explosive
bombs
Two
fighter swee])s,
There were 5 Konan plant dispersals, all in the Himeji plant dispersals, Osaka-Kobe area, and while Takarazuka had a total of 13, most of which were inland from Kobe and Himeji (appendix B). It wa6 estimated l)y company officials that dispersals accounted for an over-all loss of 20 ])ercent in production, although the f)rogram was only
(i
and fragmentation bombs. During the 23 July du'ect attack on the Takarazuka ])lant, the 458 high-explosive bombs which
damage by
strafing
An
by incendiary
action.
Of a
total of
space divided
among
square
The
dispersal of
all
at
the
same
time,
and
8,456,271
feet
received
superficial
damage
as a result of
all
"ahIjK 2.
EVALUATION OF PREATTACK
INTELLIGENCE
cstiiiiatcs of f()inbat-tyi)o aircraft
(G-2) production for 1944 aiul 1945 were 27 percent over the actual (appendix F). In estimating total aircraft proDcpartiiu'iit
War
Military Intelligcncp
duction from 1941 to 1945, Intelligence exceeded the actual output by 18 percent. Intelligence infornmtion was correct concerning the type of
|
aircraft
of
of the
and type of operation at the four largest plants Kawanishi Aircraft Co.
iij
0-
u
CD
ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJA
1942
1943
1944
1945
U.SSTRATEGICBOMBSURVEY
KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT CO. FIGURE 3
1000
1 o
10
Appendix B-1.
Date
manufacture
Location
began
Types
of iiroduclion [jlaruicd
l'erc<'nt of
eorn[(letion
Nai'iioplHiil:
--
October 1944... do
in
Final assembly
247,712
'
do
On'tce. engineering ;ind
59,71(i
and
area.
l)uil(iint;s
Osaka-
December
1944
wan-houses
1
Kobe
Sakasonawa Mukiipiwa
KoyiH-n
Not started.
..
Machine
parts.
il.7:i3
Kohc
store,
....do
2,637
27,341
70.
KKI.
...do
.January
-.
iiarts
Oshima-Shokukin
Kansaifiakuin
IConaii plant:
Oecember
1944.
22,7Rr)
1.^1.
November
April 1945
1944
Raw
UKI.
.
Final assembly
..
I
ll.i>2.^i
100. 100.
Ifnioda
braiicli.
department
May
1945
.Machine parts
Sheet metal parts
Fitting shop
-
15.070
April 1945.
31,211i.
2.5.
iinderKround)
do
....
223.892
25.
Himeji plant:
Dangc
..
-
March
-
194.5.
- -
Uzurano Kasamatsu
-
April 1945-
K ishiro -IIojo
June 1945---do
March
1945.
Final assembly ..Engine run and flight Wing assembly Fuselage assembly Machine shop
11
-.
.
m.^lti
-1
ion of building.
.1
hangai
SOofrunway.
50.
16.275,
.1 -'
.!
2S,74n
Iii7.ii40
40. 30.
Sheet-metal shoP-do.
Funazu
Tatsumo__
-Takarazuka plant: Kobayashi
..-
--.
14
Planned
construction
Tawai'a village..
17 25
do-do-
not started.
-..
.__.
February
1945.
Namaze
SandaKashiea Kasbio
__
;
March
1945
3
11
-_ .....do February
100.
100.
100.
1945..
and cutting
tools
io6.
June
1945
fuel-injection
80.
pump.
Sasayama Sakasegawa Nakatakamatsu NikawaFebruary June 1945
:.
1945..
22
I
Parts
Jigs
100.
100.
April 1945
_.
June 1945
----do
April 19452
-
99.
100.
store,
100.
100.
June
1945.
2
31
50. 50.
-do-
7190.33
47-
11
Appendix C.
XI Kl
Year
Capacity
aircraft
Total
N1K2-J
Capacity
P1Y2-S
Capacity
Ordered Actual
Ordered Actual
Ordered Actual
Capacity
Ordered
January
February...
March
.\pril
May
June
July.-.
November.
December..
Total1943:
January
February...
15
March
April
May..
June
July.
.August
December
Total1944:
84
January
February...
65
85
120
135
29 48 63
93
17
90
110
40 05 93
17
March
.^pril
May.June
.luly
71
90
.August
92
106 100
September. October
200
205
165
155 145
120
120 120
November.
December.
Total
29
82
51
205 215
1,685
190
.January.
130
120
65
140
150
60 90
120
97
120
150
215
217 217
February.
65
45
120
100
March
April
40
40
-
40
40
155 155
70
217 220 85
May
JUII'-
July
.August
70 70
160
86 85
210
Total
Qranfl total.
330
128 97 590
Appendix
E.
Kniraiiinhi
Appendix
Plant
F.
1941~46
NO.
III-l
November 1945
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
its
17
21
21
29 29
Data Relevant to Other Division Studies General Impression of Plant Inspection and Interrogation, Reference Item_.
Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix
lers
A Naruo
B Planned and actual expansion program C Schematic flow chart E Number of man-hours worked F Airplane production by types before
plant layout
29 29 29 Facing page 30
31
(1)
(2)
D Employment chart
G Planned
I
l.
(3)
1939
33
(1)
Aircraft repairs Facing page 36 J Bomb plots Facing page 3G K-1 Damage plots raid 9 June 1945 K-2 ^Damage plots raid 19 July 1945 Facing page 36 L Number man-hours because of raid M Number man-hours required to repair because of N Number of man-hours raids
.__ of
lost
air
Facing page 34 and actual production Monthly production and acceptances of propelFacing page 34
(2)
35
(1)
(2) (3)
alerts^
37 38
39 40
41
of
air-raid
lost
air
^all
of electric
power
Kawanishi Aircraft Co. (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha). Subassembly and final assemblies of air frames were conducted in 90 buildings
comprising a total floor area of 6,350,760 square ^^^^ ^ combination of steel, concrete, brick, and ^qq,, buildings were constructed, over a continuqus period of time, to meet the firm's expanding Extensive facilities operations (appendix A). were available to conduct the complete assembly
The TV^aruo
-,,
in
1930 and
17
processes
among
Projected
Volunteers,
tions.
including
students,
were pressed
expansion programs were generally the 1944 year end (appendix B).
fulfilled
up
to
The Kawanishi
of
tii
in
started in late 1942 and peak at the 1943 year end. Tliis group of employees was very small in relation to the plant's total number of workers and evidently liad no appreciable eft'ect on production.
The program
its
reached
Naruo
plant.
In 1933
and 1934, experiments with 500-horsepower waterOnly two engines cooled engines were attempted. were completed and a few others repaired. Mass
production was never inaugurated. The company confined its activities to the production of uii'
frames.
(>mployment, a total of 36,000 workers were proThis goal was almost jected by March 1944.
reached in
the |5ay
May
roll.
The
Government aid to the Kawanishi Aircraft Co. trom August 1941 to May 1944 amounted to 211,000,000 yen for eciuipment and airport facilities. The funds received by the Naruo plant were allocated as follows:
Facility
>'"
templated a total force of 37,000 by March 1945,' but was never attained. In fact, employment declined steadily from May 1944 until rapid deterioration set in toward the close of the war.
Man-hours reached a peak in May 1944. Inauguration of the dispersal program, shortly thereafter, was i-esponsiljle for the gradual decline that
set in (appendbc E).
Xariio Airport
24, 000.
1,
2.j,
Excepting for the months of July and August which period two shifts were conducted, operations were conducted on a one-shift During the one-shift operation, employees basis. worked (excluding overtime) the following sched1944, during
ules:
The
plant was
managed by
persoimel:
.Masakiyo XaUarnura
Hiro.shi
Kono
Masokiyo Nakainnra.,
Masauori Konishi Shigeru Furukawa
Stndents
Staff
Office personnel
to
1S()(
to ISOi to 1701
to IMii
to ISdi
Labor Depari
uien(
Women
and
work overtime
tlic
Manufacturmg
functional
basis
through
various
departments
used
excluafter
discontinued.
Men
on!}
(appendLx C).
Production-line
techniques
iti
were
June 1945,
which job-shop jiractices were adopted. Material was processed through the plant on an established schematic production-flow basis. Manufacturing space appears to Inivc liceii utilized with liltlc
waste.
worked the night shift, and tluy were very few in number: only 2 percent of the total direct-laboi workers, or 400 men. Compulsory service in the war industrv started August 11, 1941.
involved system of compensation was in and carried with it many variations. Tiic elTect employees of the plant were paid on an average of 180 to 200 yen per month, working almost 300 hours per month. The base pay after the beginning of the war was 2 yen 80 sen for a 10-hour day. For the 2-hour compulsory overtime period, Id-percent increase for each hour was allowed.
;i
An
Total employment
in tiic
Naruo
plant increased
from 7,850 in December 1939 to 35,100 employees From June 1944, as an at the peak in May 1944. increasing number of workers were called into tiie military service, and es])(>cially after February 1945, when the dispersal i)rogram got under way, employment at Naruo dropped rapidly iititii tlicic were only 17,900 employees in August 1945
(appendix D).
pay per
hoiii
was given. In addition to base and overtime pay, each employee was allotted an additiomil bonus,
based tipon age, as follows:
18
Percevl
20 years of age.
21 to 25 years...
2f) 1
-
10
rudders,
elevators and
wing
tips,
(o 30 years
31 aiul
over
llic
20 30 40
^(Mirral
lioiiuscs
Production
Statistics
Siipplomcnliiiij;
nixivc,
of
The Naruo
J),
plant
60 pcic'ont of base ])ay lor dircct-liil^or employees, and 50 percent of base pay for indirect-labor employees were paid.
NlK2-
during the last year and a half of the war. From January 1939 to August 1945, Ifi different types of flying boats and land-based planes wei'c
produced, as follows:
When
aircraft
the
Government
it
oich'ied planes
from the
necessary
Japanese designation
companies,
allocated
the
major ])arts, engines, metal, instrnments, radios, and other accessories. The smaller parts used in air-frame construction were contracted for ])y the individual companies. A committee in Tokyo, called the Shizai liiikai, composed of members from the major aircraft companies, helped the Government to allocate major parts to the
industiy.
tiou
Technical supervision of production and inspecof the products were carried out by the
Na\y's Bureau
of Aviation, and the First Naval Air Arsenal at Yokosuka. Supervision of pro-
N avy inspectors were stationed at the plant, one serving as munitions officer. Wings, fuselage, tails, and ailerons were subassembled at the Naruo plant, for its owii use as well as for production in the Konan and Himeji
of Munitions.
Subassembly operations were conducted plant and its dispersed units. The same was true at the Himeji plant, from 1942
plants.
at the
Konan
through 1945.
Substitution of certain critical materials started
in the fall of 1943.
Chrome molybdenum
During 1943,
silicon
steel
was substituted
for nickel
shortage of nickel.
manga-
was substituted for the manganese steels. During 1945, a lower grade carbon steel was substituted for nickel chrome steel. Steel was used for engine mountmgs, wmg joints, spar fittings, wing fittuigs on fuselages and in their applicaIn
1944,
carbon
steel
nickel
chrome
and
silicon
tions.
control
and
accessories.
were never used in structural parts. Light alloys were employed as a substitute for brass or other copper alloys in fitthigs. Wood
Plastics
was substituted
nonstructural
for light
alloys in fittmgs
floors.
and
for
parts,
including
Experi-
of
wood
Prior
to
Fobruaiv
1944,
the
polic,y
of
tlu'
company. The KawanAircraft Co.'s policy was to test fly the airaircraft
Therefore,
all
protluction
(N (N (N (N
1 1
1 1
K K K
2-J). 3-J).
4-J).
February 1944 represent actual production delivered to the Government. After February 1944, due to poor engine and air-frame workmanship, the Government's policy was to accept aircraft only after they had been test-flown and accepted by Navy registered pilots. For this i-eason, figures of production after Februrry 1944 are bioken tlown to show both production and acceptance by the Government. Monthly orders by the Government, as distinct from yearly orders, began in April 1944. Six types of wooden propellers were made at the Naruo plant in addition to engine test clubs from January 1939 to April 1945. A few were used l)y Kawanishi Aircraft Co., but most were sold to the Government. From 1939 to the end of 1944,
l-.J
Oeorge) (H 11
1).
N1K2-J On 31 December 1943, the initial experimental plane N 1 K 2-J made its first flight at Nai'uo Airport. The second to eighth experimental planes
were completed between January and June 1944.
During
and modifications
in th(>
N1K3-J
In order to overcome the backward tendency of
the center of gravity in the
2-J,
it
was
when
wooden
planned to move the engine and pi'opeller forward approximately 150 millimi^ters. This type was called N 1 K 3-J but was never constructed.
propellers
small
trainers
and
observation
planes were produced (appendix H). Actual production exceetled planned output as
set l)y the
N1K4-J
This was a modification of
2-J.
The
Government.
main
differences follow:
of engine elianged:
Type
(Installed injection
pumps
instead of carburetors.)
tlie
fuselage.
From January
aircraft
to
October 1944
total of 393
In
The
first to third
])lctcd
in
1944.
Numerous
modifications
were
98 in 1941, chopping to but 17 in 1942, and reaching a peak of 137 in 1943. This work tapered ofl" in 1944, during which year only 25 we're repaired, and came to a stop by the end of
in 1940,
made
The
end
and applied to
later plaiK^s
that year.
No
945.
Repairs of diverse character were made for various contractors, including the Government and private builders (appendix I).
Experimental Aircraft
N1K4-A
This was a modification of N1K4-J, for use on
aircraft
carriers.
Two
The
planes
of
the
N1K2-J
Early in 1939, only one experimental threeseatcr observation seaplane, Jake, was produced. In 1940, one large experimental flying boat was produced which never got into production. Also in 1940, 12 primary training seaplanes were produced and from October 1942 to February 1944, only 15 observation seaplanes, Noi-m 11, were subject to experiment. The following experimental airplanes were produced in 1944 and 1945, chiefly in the design department and final-assembly shop of the Naruo
plant:
was completed on 20 September 1944, and the second plane about half a month later.
N1K5-J
This was also a modification of N1K2-J for performance improvement. The type of engine was elianged from the Homare to the Kasei and the
airframe strengthened. Plans were started at the beginning of 1945, ami design drawings were nearly completed. Just
before the construction
in the
Himeji plant, everything was destroyed by the air attack on the Naruo plant.
20
J6K1
This was
a
new type
liigh-altiliidc inlcrccptoi-.
Number Number
I
in
August 1945.
101.
The
first
ex|)('riinciital
plane
was
planned
.Number
for
When the desi<;n tlie end of 1944. drawings were nearly completed, all the plans had to he ahandoned at the retpiest of the (iovernment.
completion at
EFFECTS OF
Direct Air Attacks
BOMBING
i)lant:
to 0905.
0832
HllKl
This represented a new type of transport flying wooden construction members. This aircraft was planned in conjunction with J()Kl, and was stopped at the same time. Design drawings were nearly completed and preparation
boat, with
for
2. 3.
19 July 1945
(I
1120 to 1200.
0050 to 0202.
Approximately
''0
percent of a half-size model plane, for structuial tests, was completed at the end of the war.
SUICIDE PLANE
modification of
a larger
bomb
load.
11, to carry
of 1944 to
January 1945, four George ll's were reconstructed, employing 200 employees, including the designing department. These employees, worked exclusively on the modification of George 11. Experiments in wind tunnel and experimental tanks, flight tests, structural tests and experiments in production methods were carried out at
the
same time.
Experimental planes were assembled in the final assembly shop, utilizing from 250 to 300 employees. Upon completion of the final assembh' of the plane, officers in charge of the First Aviation Arsenal inspected, the aircraft. Test flights were carried out in cooperation with officers in charge of the test-flight section. First Aviation Arsenal, and the company's test pilots.
In addition to the above three attacks, tlierc were two area attacks which affected the Naruo plant. On 15 June 1945, from 0850 to 1050, the plant area was not struck, but dormitories some distance away were damaged. On 10 July 1945, from 1030 to 1040, 31 bombs struck the Naruo Bomb plots (apairfield, 29 hitting the runway. I)endix J) show the three attacks on the plant. Damage caused by the first 2 attacks are revealed During the attack in appendi.xes K-1 and K-2. of 6 August 1945, only incendiaries were dropped. All fell on one part of the final assembly buUding, building number 101, causing very little structural damage and burning seven assembled airplanes. A number of the least essential buildmgs were dismantled before the attacks, as precaution against fire. During the first attack, the subassembly shops for wings and tail units were severely damaged, therefore, the subassembly of these parts were subcontracted. Final assembly was consolidated from three different buildings to
two
buildings.
total floor area before air attacks
The
Superficial
amounted damage to
5,000,000 square feet w'as sustained and 600,000 square feet of floor space was entirely destroyed
ATTACK DATA
The attack data may be summarized
Intelligence (lain:
as follows:
.July 194.5,
Date and hour of attack, 9 June 194.5, 19 August 1945. Duration, 0832 to 0905, 1120 to 1200. 0050 Attacking unit. Twentieth Air Force.
Altitude, 20.500.
to 0202.
Number
M65GP's.
On-lhe-ground findings:
attempt was made to repair its damaged the damage; everything was left state to give the appearance of inactivity and Temporary wooden roofs mider severe damage. the damaged original roof were erected over sections of the wing and tail assembly line to protect the material and workers from the weather and to camouflage their activity. The air attacks caused extensive physical damJiluch of the age. (See photographs 1 to 10.) debris shown in the photographs was caused by A copy of the tidal wave of 17 September 1945.
all air
attacks.
No
[Number
in
a report of the
of 9
damage
P'
August 1945.
HE
Number
June 1945;
23,
6 August 1945.
Jime 1945, as made to the Japanese Government by Naruo plant officials, is incorporated in
the reference material.
Number
of
UXB,
1,
9 June 1945.
21
Photo No.
1.
Building
west,
View
Photo No.
2. Building No. 601, sheet metal works. View northeast. Because of marshy ground, the floor was concrete reinforced with steel. Bombs exploded on strong floor and did not cause too much struc-
tural
damage.
22
si-
Photo No. 3. Buildings 701,704,716, machine shops and sheet metal works. View northeast, showing
slight
damage
to concrete buildings.
H I
wm
i *
'I
t
IP
y~
^BSTviT?:^
'
Photo No. 4. Buildings 701, 704, 7X6, machine shops and sheet metal works. View north, showing bomb damage of direct hits and near-misses to a steelreinforced concrete building.
23
Photo No.
west
final
View
line.
Photo No. 6. Building 201, final assembly. View east, showing four bomb hits on the roof.
24
View
damage.
east
slight
final
Photo No.
8. Buildings 201 and 202, wing assembly. View northeast superficial damage.
25
damage.
Photo No.
0. Build-
-^-
structural
damage.
26
most of
tlic inacliiiic
tools
T.\BLE
3.
removed from
us locations.
1
amount, 69 machine
repair.
1
tools
beyond
le
accom])anying tables
and
tlio
machine-tool
and
It
effect.
|,E
List
nf
Acting head.
Assistant.
Fire defense part v. Relief party. Antigas party. Engineering party. Transport party. Office defense party. Shop defense party.
average of 2 or 3 hours were lost duiiug each The employees would run to their shelters outside the plant, hut were very slow in returning to their work.
raid.
Au
Interruptions to Production
Direct air attacks cm the plant caused a great George, the only type uf aircraft heing produced in 1945. The accom(ho]) in the ])roduetion of
panying tahle 4 presents actual production and Government-plamied production for 1945.
Table
4.
Production of George
21-Nl K^-J
Month
(1945)
Trans])ortiitioii
s
hottleiicck,
the ilispersioii of
)lac(>
simultaneously.
was delayed by
shortage of l)illets, food, etc., anil especially )ecause of the difficulties involved in transferring aniilies and household goods of (he employees to he disj)ersed locations. The Naruo plant estimated that from 30 to 40 :lj)ercent of production was lost during May 1945
lue solely to dispersion.
om
INTELLIGENCE CHECK
In the type
luced,
The
and quantity
information was accurate, information on the production George, was inf the most important plane, ccurate in that it was estimated that 1,280 Ijxeorges were produced while only 903 planes
intelligence
various aircraft companies used special couriers to carry the vital parts from Tokyo to the aircraft
^he intelligence
companies on regular passenger trains-. Durmg September and October of 1944, the Japanese Government ordered the railroad companies to
provide
couriers
special
coaches
for
aircraft
company
produced over the same period, 'his was 377 planes or 30 percent less than had een estimated. In the production of Mavis, he estimated production was 156 planes while ctual production amounted to 186 planes from 940 to 1943. This amounted to an underestiere
actually
to eliminate
bombers or 16
The Naruo plant was well constructed and the The plant all of modern design.
and with
could
utilization of its productive capacity
VULNERABILITY
The Xaruo
1
that
all
Subasseml)ly of component parts assembly of air frames were caiTied on bordering each other in much the 1 buildings ame way as they are in the United States. The let that the plant was situated on the shore at he mouth of a river, which coukl be used as a
1
a small area.
final
nd
have produced more aircraft than it actually did. With its two wind tunnels and one water basin, a greater e.xperimental program could have been undertaken. The plant site was not too well chosen ui that tidal waves flooded the entire plant each year, and no precautionaiy measures were undertaken to remedy (i. e., flood walls)
this condition.
mdmark, increased its vulnerability. N^o empt was made to camouflage the plant.
at-
All
he buildings were concentrated in a small area. i.fter the first 6 months of the war, the labor
REFERENCE ITEM
The following reference item is filed with the records of the Aircraft Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, in the office of The
Adjutant General, D. C.
was not very enthusiastic about war proluction. During the last few years of the war,
orce
bsenteeism always increased during the spring summer months, because many of the emiloyees worked in their gardens and on their arms. From the beginning of 1945, ever in,nd
Reference Item
Sample of Report
ment.
to
Gorernto
Teasing
heir
numbers of employees stayed away from work to evacuate their families and homes
cities,
rom, the
Air
Jiaid of
Naruo
PlaiH.
(The
1st report)
,nd possessions
from
air attacks.
29
MO
I
fUHCTlON
rtPL
I
COMSritUCTlOW
NO FUNCTION
BOILERS
!
TTfE
COHTRUCTIOM
WAREHOUSES
I
STDRV WOOD
I
WOOD
I
4 APPRENTICE SCHOOL Z BTORT MOOD STORY WOOD STORkOE sTonv wood a UNKNOWN T WMEHOUSCS ISTOHYW/MEIZ PLOOH WOOD STORV WOOD riMEKCCPCR STOtTY WOOO 9 CASTINO a FORfllNS STORASC eiUNASIUM STORT WOOO 10 STORT WOOCi II OARAOE OATEHOUSE Z STORV WOOO IE
I
I 3
STORT STEEL C0MPRES5CRS WATER PLANT STONY W/aASE WOOO 4 STORT WOOO PNESS ft MEAT TREAT. STORT STEEL KITCHEN EXPERIMENT SHOP Z STORT WOOO OFFICE Z STORT WOOO SHEET METAL SHOP STORT W/BaSC STECL LAYOUT SHOf STORY W/MEI2 BASE STEEL QARASE STORT WOOO OSS i STORY WOOO
i
I I I
I I I
STORT WOOD STOUT WOOO APPRENTICE SHOPS 9T0T WOOD IB PLTWOOO STORES STORT BRICK l BASOLrHE a OIL STORES T TEMP. MACH SHOP TRANSPORT OFFICE STORT WOOD |T UNKNOWN Z STORT WOOD
13 14 Jie
STORES
UNKNOWN
DORMITORY
WOOO
I
',
la
PLASTIC SHAPIHS 2 STORT WOOD WOOO STORASE t STORY WOOO STorr irick to GARDioE sTORaec STORY WOOD ei UNKNOWN EZ STORE STORY WOOO STORY WOOO 3 3 CARPENDER SHOP (4 aiCTCLE/^ACKS
I I
'
Z STORY WOOD STORT WOOO STORY BRICK STORY STEEL STom CONCRETE STOR' W/MEZ7 STEEL kR ASSEMBLY WATER PLANT STORY WOOD LOCKER STORY STEEL STORASE OOV'T FURNISHED PART8 STORV STEEL MODEL SHOPS Z STORY WOOD SMALL WIND TUNNEL STORY WATER TEST BASIN STORY STEEL INO TUNNEL CONCRETE e STORY STRUCTURE LAB. STORY STEEL WIND TUNNEL Z STORY CONCRETE PRODUCTION OFFICE Z STORY WOOO :N0WN STORT WOOD WAIN OFFICE 3 STORT CONCRETE FINAL ASSEMBLY STORY STEEL EXPERIMENTAL SHOP UNKNOWN STORY BRICK PRODUCTION OFFICE Z STORT CONCRETE FOUNORT STORT STEEL STORT CONCRETE OIL sroRAQE a STOUT concrete ENGINE TEST CELL Z STORY STEEL FOHOINa ft STEEL HEAT TREAT STORf STEEL MATERIAL TCSTINS SHOP STORT WOOO TAIL UNIT ASSEWBLT STON/ STEEL CRATINQ ft PACKINa STORT STEEL UNKNOWN STORT CONCRETE SHOP STONV STEEL STORT STEEL PAINT SHOP PROPELLER SHOP Z STORT STEEL STORY STEEL FINAL ASSEUBLY WIND ASSEMBLY STORT STEEL UNKNOWN 2 STORT STEEL ANODIC TREATMENT SHOP STORY STEEL FUSELAGE ASSEHBLT STORY STEEL EXPERMENTAL SHOP UNKNOWN STORY BRICK
UNKNOWN
lOWN SHOP
t 1
'
1
I
'
>
THREE WOOOEN BUILDINGS INTENDED FOR SHEET METAL SHOPS Dismantled in aprilHAT 1943 operations mostly within TNIE PLANT balance to dispersed plants
. ,
SCALE
in
feet
0-47
(Face
p. 30)
NISH INONUYA
STA.
WARE
HOUSE
L.
WARE
HOUSE
_J
MACHINE SHOP
-JIG 8
Fl
TTING
SPAR ASSEMBLY
FINAL ASSEMBLY
TAIL UNIT
ASSEMBLY
-rr
TO AIRPORT
o o o
o*
o X z < z
MAMJJASOND
(949
U.S.STWATE8ICB0UBW6 SURVEY
NARUO PLANT
APPENDIX
71B033
O-
47 (Face
p.
33} No. 3
Appendix
F.
Kawanishi
NIKIJ
AND NIK2J
NIKI
J-GEOREM
-DEC- 194 3 DROP
A. OCT.
IN
IN
PREPARING PRODUCTION
MAY-AUG.I944 DROP
NIKIJ
C.
IN PRODUCTION DUE TO UODIFICATIONB BY WAR EXPERIENCES ETC SEP 1944- DECREASE OF PLANNED PRODUCTION BY CHANBE IN TYPE OF PRODUCTS FROM
TO NIKE J
V
t
*-
z s
-.
kio
a o
<n
o
>IT
< Z <
o
s
'X
Ai'r'KNUix
I.
Aircnifl
Number
of air-
it/xiir.i,
Niinio
/ihint
Total
numT>l'
planes repaired
Defective parts
Sourcc
J)uiu;ir\
Fi't>ru;ir.v
KllKl
March
April
HBKl
KlIKl
Do. Do.
fuel
.May
.Itltlc
July
Auf:iisl
system
of
Changing type
engine fmotorZirapu
r>
type)
Seiiloinhcr
October
November
neceniher
10:
.
...do...
Modification
January February
H6K1 H6K1
H6K1. H6K1. H6K1.
Wing
Hull... Repainting Hull do
..
Ar.senal.
of
bottom
of hull.
.March
April ...
H6K2 H6K2
-
-do.
of
May.
June
July
--
H6K2
H6K2. E7K2. H6K2. H5Y1. H6K2. H6K2. H6K2. H6K2.
Repainting
bottom
of hull.
Wing
Modification
of hull
.\rsenal.
AUL'USI
and equipment-
September
October
.
do... Hull
Wing
Hull
. -
November
December.
...do
Modification.
H6KI
H6K2.
Overhaul
H6K2
H6K2.
January. February
...do
do
Hull.
H6K2
March
April..
May
June
July
Hull Modification
of hull
and repairing.
Naval .\viation Bureau. Do. Naval Air Arsenal. Naval .Aviation Bureau.
Tia.
August September
October.,.
do do
Repairing
of
November. December.
12:
bottom
of hull
,\rsenal.
Januar>'
Fettruary
March
April
Modification
....do...
of hull.
-
Repairing of hull
May
June
Jnly
Augu.st
. .
H8K1.
Repairing of huU.
Do.
September
October
.
Kovember. Doeember.
H8K1.
Repairing of hull.
Do.
35
Appendix
I.
Aircraft re-pairs,
Kawanishi Aircraft
Co.
Year
TKBEt WOODCN UILCNOSINTINOEI ^H[(r HETAL SHlDS (HSMINTLEO MT 1949 OPER*tiON8 MOSnt PlIKT Bi.*NCE TO Oi&PtKlEO
.
eOMe LEGEND
UKCTI OH
I
TtPC
COWITHUcnOM
HO FUNCTION
TYPE
COWBTRUCTIOH
E 3 gNKNOwra i 4 PPBENrice
I
stodi wood SCHOJL 2 STORY WOOO STORT WOOD STORAGE STORT WOOD 5 UNKNOWN WARENOUStS 'STORY W/MCZZ FLOOH WOOD T STORY WOOD TIMCKEEPER STORY WOOO 9 CASTING FOR8IN0 5T0UW STORT WOOO SVMNASIUM 10 STORY WOOt M GADAQE STORY WOOD GATEHOUSE Z li STORY WOOO 13 JIG STORES SHOPS STORT WOOD 14 APPRENTICE STOP! WOOO 15 PLYWOOD STORES
I
t
)
T I
9 a
I
CONPRESSCRS WATER PLANT STORT W/BA9E KITCHEN STORT WOOO PRESS S HEAT TREAT. STORY STEEL KITCHEN EX.'ERIMENT SHOP 2 STORY WOOO OFFICE STORY WOOD Z SHEET METAL SHOP STORT W/BASE STEEL LAYOUT SHOT STORY W/MEIZ S BASE STEEL GARAGE STORT WOOD RED CROSS 2 STORT WOOO
I
'
WOOD
t
STORM
,
I >
ITA
la 19
UNNNOWM
PLASTIC
STORY WOOD
CO
Zl
ZZ
Zi (4
Zfi
SHAPING 1 STORY WOOO WOOO STORASE t STORY WOOD STORY BRICK CARIIOE STORASe UNKNOWN STORT WOOD STORE STORY WOOO SHOP CARPEHOER STORY WOOO aiCYCLE RACKS STORI WOOD STORE 2 STORY WOOO
I
I
> J
I
Z STORY WOOD STORT WOOO STORY BRICK STORY STEEL JIO SHOP 3 STORY CONCRETE STORY WfMEZZ SPAR ASSEMBLY WATER PLANT 9T0RY WOOO PAINT LOCKER STORY STEEL
UNKNOWH
>
.NOWN
UNKNOWN
i I
STORY STEti
J S T
26 UNKNOWN
STORY WOOD STORY WOOO Z7 UNKNOWN tt NERAL WAREHOUSE S STORY CONCRETE SHOP 3 STORY CONCRETE E
2
I
MODEL SHOPS Z STORT WOOD STORY WOOD SVALL WIND TUNNEL STORY STEEL WATER TEST BASIN WIND TUNNEL t STORY CONCRETE STORY STEEL STRUCTURE LAB STORT CONCRETE TUNNEL WIND t lUCTION OFFICE 2 STORY WOOO STORY WOOD IKNOWN OFFICE J STORY CONCRETE L ASSEUBLT STORT STEEL
I I
I
RIMEHTAL SHOP STORY BRICK OFFICE 1 STORY CONCRETE STORY STEEL 5 FOUNDRY e WAREHOUSES 2 STORT CONCRETE STORY CONCRETE 2 STORT STEEL STORT STEEL > FOROINO B STEEL HUT TREAT STORY WOOD 9 MATERIAL TESTING SHOP STORT STEEL TAIL UNIT ASSEMBLY STORY STEIL t CRATING B PACKINB STORY CONCRETE 3 UNKNOWN STORY STEEL D BLASTiNO SHOP PAINT SHOP STORT STEEL PROPELLER SHOP 1 STORT BTEEL FIHAL ASSEMBLY STORT STEEL STORY STEEL WING ASSEMBLY Z STORY STEEL TREATMENT SHOP STORT STEEL FUSELAGE ASSEMBLY STORT STEEL Z EXPERMENTAL SHOP STORT BRICK 3 UNKNOWN
lOWN
I
PRODUCTION
I
>
I '
719033
O-
47 (Face
p. 36}
No. 2
HO
I
FUNC Tl OM
TYgj
I
COWSTBUCtlOW
)
UNCTIOW
TYRE
COWBTBUCriOW
STORV MOOO WAREHOUSES STOUT MOOD OfFICE t CMIICCTS STOR'r WOOD 3 UNKNOWN a APPRENTICE SCHOOL Z 9T0RT WOOO storv wooo s (CHAP SToRAoe wOOO STORV e UNaNOMN STWn W/MEZZ FLOOR WOOD T WiREMOUSES STORY WOOD TINeHEEPCR STORY WOOO 3 CASTina FOReiRtt STORAU STORY WOOD 0VWfUSIUM lO STORY WOOl. n OANACE
I
<
(
)
W/IASE
I
WOOD
WOOD
PRESS HEAT TREAT. STORY STCCL KITCHEN EXPERIMENT SHOP I STORY WOOD OFFICE I STORY STEEL STOUT W/UlSE i SHEET MCTAL SHOP STEEL LAYOUT SMOr STORY W/MCtZ tASI
I t
I I 1
le
MTCMOUSE
JI8
( STORV
I >
MOOD
IS 14
STORY WOOD STORES STORY WOOD ARMEMTICE SHOPS STORY WOOD PLYWOOD STORES
I I
3
t
OARAGE STORY WOOO RED CROSS Z STORY WOOO UNKNOWN WOOO DORMITORY i STORY WOOO UNKNOWN STORY WOOO
I I
STORY SRICK 15 OASOLIME K OIL STORES TRANSPORT OFFICC IT TEMP. lUCH SHOF
, I
IM
II la tt
'
;N0N INOWN
STORY
RRICK
STEEL
STORY STCCL
PLASTIC
WOOD 9T0RACC
> I
to CARIIDE
CTORAeC
3
I
I
'
t )
tTORAM aOV'T FURNISHED MRTt MODEL SHOPS I STORY WOOD STORY WOOD SMALL WIND TUNNEL
I
i
f4
Ifl
J
27
tt iS MACHINE SHOP
WOOD STORY WOOD tlCYCLE RACKS STORE Z STORY WOOD UNKNOWN I STORY WOOD STORY WOOD UHRNOWN SCHERAL WAREHOUSE SSTORY CONCIICTC
I I
S S T I
STORY
CONCRETE
1
TEST BASIN STORY STEEL TUNNEL t STORY COHCRCTE STORY STEEL STRUCTURE LAB WIND TUNNEL t STORY CONCRETE PRODUCTION OFFICE t STORY WOOO STORY WOOD MAIN OFFICE 1 STORY CONCRETE FINAL ASSEMBLY STORY STEEL
WATER
WIND
CIPERiMENTf
I
CONCRCTI
B
)
S r ) )
a
I
STORY CONCRETE STORY CONCRETC EN6INC TEST CELL Z STORY STtEL STORY STE FORBINQ B STEEL NEAT TREATSTORY MATERIAL TESTING SHOP STORY STEEL TAIL UNIT ASSEMBLY CRATINS B PACKINB I STORY STCCL STORY CONCRETE INOWN STORY STEEL SAND BLASTING SHOP STElL PROPELLER SHOP E STORY STEEL STORY STEEL FINAL ASSEMBLY STORY STEEL WING ASSEMBLY UNKNOWN 2 STORY STEEL ANODIC TRCATMCNT SHOP STORY STEEL FUSELAGE ASSEMBLY STORY STCCL
REHOUSES
t 2
iRAQE
>
UJ
<
< a:
UJ en
f
E
CO
S
JC
^
l_ in
If)
Z <
o
IT
UJ
m 2 z
37
2
LU
UJ(5
3
3
I
(n cr
o X <
APPENDIX
Naruo
Plant
l)iiil(liiif;s
of
Naruo
to
])laiit
was startod
in
b(^
1.
aud
fixtures.
2.
3.
due
air
raids.
The program
A.
with precautionary measures against fire then against small bombs, and finally complete dispersion of production to other lostarted
out wooden Ijuildint^s. Dispersion of machines, tools and shop equipment. Dispersion of main components for (jeortje 21
(MK2J).
5.
bombs,
Dispersion
of
assembling;
shops
for
(Jeorne
21
cations.
6.
of
wooden
l)iiililinf;s.
1-A.
Niinie of shop
N'ame
of
shops
Employees (planned)
StalT
NO.
III-2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Its
4.5
47
Effects of Bombing 47 Intelligence Check 51 Appendix A Organization chart 52 Appendix B Plant layout Facing page 52 Appendix C Number of employees 53 Appendix D Number of man-hours worked _ _ , 54 Appendix E Planned and actual production 55 Appendix F Bomb plot, 11 May 1945 Facing page 56 (1) Appendix G Bomb damage, 11 May 1945 Facing page 56 (2) Appendix H Bomb damage, 5 June and 6 August 1945. Facing page 56 (3) Appendix I Man-hours lost because of damage caused by air
attack Appendix J Man-hours lost from raid alerts Appendix K^Number of man-hours lost by air raids
.
57
i
.
air
58 59
L Electric
power production
60
61
62
ITS
parts,
was acquired
in
Decem-
1943.
Aircraft Co.
lisha),
st of
was located
at
Honjo
village,
15 miles
Osaka. The plant consisted of 40 build;s and over 30 dormitories. Total l)uilding 'a of the Konan plant was 1,994,785 square t, of which 1,070,000 square feet was devoted direct production and 924,785 square feet was
Jized
This plant was one of three, belonging to the Kawanishi Aircraft Co., which assembled planes. The Kawanishi Au'craft Co. was founded in 1928 as a producer of seaplanes. The company grew and moved to Naruo village in 1930 to build air
large,
frames for various types of seaplanes, including four-engine transport planes. (For detailed history, see Aircraft Division Corporation
for in
indirect
labor.
The
plant,
con-
ucted
February
1942,
comprised
in
ildings of
lido
modern
main The
which
Seiki
Industrial
Co.
Kol)e,
Report No. Ill of the Kawanishi Ah-craft Co.) In February 1942, at the request of the Japanese Navy, the Konan plant was established to build large seaplanes. In June 1944 the Konan plant
45
started
of
Frances,
two-onglnp
2,050,000 for
March
1945.
medium
Government
following foi-m:
Facility:
to the
Kenan
tained as actual man-hours worked totaled oa Planned scheduli 1,425,000 for that month.
i'"
1942
Biiildings
22,400,000
1, fiO(),
machine
Total
tools
All production
was
12,
for the
Navy.
Productii
24, 235,
000
The Kawanishi
Ryuzo Kawanishi
Kenji Maeliara Shiro Takahashi Yoshio Hashiguchi
Aircraft Co.
was managed by
a four-engine flying bo started in February 1943 when 03 air f ram were produced. Durhig 1944, 77 air frames we built, and in 1945, when production of this ty ceased, only 10 air frames were manufactured.
H8K2, Emily
^ice president.
Managing
director.
Pakae
Hamada
of
Konan
to other
Production of H8K2-L, Emily 32, a four-engi flymg boat which was a modification of Emily started in November 1943 diu'ing which year fi air frames were manufactured. During 1944 were produced. Smce production of this type aircraft was discontinued, only five airfran were built during 1945. Manufactm'e of both the above types of a
craft
11,
was discontimied
in favor of
P1Y2S, Fran^
The Konan
was located
at the
a twin-cngme bomber, which started into p duction in June 1944. The Government plan
edge of a bay, and had two large slipways, but no All lantl-basetl planes were ferried airfield nearliy.
production for 1944 was 162 aircraft, but the ph protluced only 28 because of the difficidty
by
bay
to the airfield at
the Naruo plant of the Kawanishi Aircraft Co. The Konan plant was ideally orgaiuzed for mass
production (appendix B). The general arrangement of the plant made for efficient use of floor
space.
Total employment showed a consistent rising At the end of 1942 it was 2,000, growing trend. At the peak, in to 5,050 at the 1943 year end.
November
The
total
1944,
changing over from one- type to another. 1 Ciovernment plan for 1944 to the end of the \ called for 605; the total aircraft produced v only 94. During 1945, only 66 aircraft were p duced while the Government plan was 4 Production was gradually increasing until the attack of 11 May 1945, which arrested manuf luring. It continued to drop after the 5 Ji 1945 attack imtil onl}' one aircraft was produi during August. The following is a list of planes produced si
1942:
men engaged in direct labor bulk of the employees. Men accounted for the workers aggregated 2,000 at the 1942 year end, increasing to 4,000 a year later, and remainmg
number
.
.lapiinese
code No.
Allied code
To
name
Type
of aircraft
nuir prod
began working at the Konan when 232 were employed. plant in volunteer workers first were employed in Girl February 1944, when 354 were hired. Very few militaiy i)ersomiel were employed at Konan, the first few bemg employed in June 1945. One 10-hour shift worked until February 1944, when a second 8-hour shift was added. In December 1944 the plant went back to one lO-hoiafirst
May
1944,
22.
12..
32..
do do
2-engine
--
Frances...
medium bomber.
production.
shift.
Go\(innicnt-planned production was net reached for the PlY2 or Frances 11. A totaH 77 ])lanes was projected for March 1945 but of
11
Total
maximum man-hours
were projected at
"
46
AIR
DATA
Photo
No
View
interior,
looking west in
subassembly building.
Slight roof
damage.
Photo No.
2.
Building
southeast,
3,
fuselage and
slight
wing assembly
superficial
building,
View
showing
damage.
48
.."**SiJi.
iSilBSi.ii
S
t'f
WJ
li'!
^^SfSS^SPP^
Photo No.
3. Building 3, wing and fuselage assembly building. north end looking west, showing slight superficial damage.
View
Photo No.
4.
Building
1, final
View
north,
showing super-
49
Photo No.
5.
Building
1,
final aibciubl)
\'it\v interior, looking northwebt, building. slight roof and glass damage.
showing assembly
linfi
and
in
the
plant,
police
and radio room was constantly manned. A total of 266 eniplo.yees was used in the air attack precaution and defense system.
sj^stem,
Ma
After
May
Due
1944,
kilowatt
consumptic
Interruption
Due
to Alerts
total of 370,902
war
(appendi.x J).
Fujimura
Attack
Inilustries
Interruptions
Due
.'i,
to
Direct
During
194
Attacks
There were 10.3, 300 man-lmuis lost because of air raids from November 1944 to August 1945 (appendix K). The greatest loss was in May
1945 as a result of the direct attack on the
[)lant.
Konan
there was a shortage of waterproof paint from tl Toa refinery (Toa Seiren). During 1944 a shortage existed in springs su] plietl by Taisei Spring Co. (Taisei Hatsujyo), ruhlicr parts from Nichirin Rubber Co. (Nichir:
:
1:
50
ihir
plants
of
the
Kinvjinislii
in rnaniifact
Aircraft
iiriiiji'
Co.
a
final
assend)ly
was delayed
in ordr'r to find
suitable
'hrsc |)arts
I)in'in<i:
Were used
in
Frances.
locations.
194'),
llic
Ailfi-oin
Industries
Co.
cnijine
suj)-
lleds
ied
Takata
Aiiuniniini
Co.,
o.xy^'en
by the. Ini])eriai ().\yi;('n Co. (Teikokn anso), and many small uir-franie parts sui>plied
y
many
]>ro(hi('ers.
was divided into raw mateiials, machine tools, and ji<;s to various schools and shojjs; final assembly to buildinii-s of the Matsushita Aircraft Co. near the Tatetsu Airport; machine sh(p to part of the second floor and basement of the Haiikyu Building, Osaka; sheet-metal shop to Yama Ashiya; fittin<i: shop to buildinirs and tundispersal of production
fiv(^
The
])liases.
Disperssd
of
ispersal
Kurakuen (appendixes
December 1944 by
and N).
ihools
raw material and com])onent parts to and other l)iiildin<;s near the Konaii plant, he dispersion of component parts assembly and
T.\BLE
1.
was estimated that a production loss of 20 percent was caused by dispersion alone. Table 1 presents the productiou-dispeisal program
It
Typo
nf
work
o to z 5
uj
Q:
o
N
PLANT
LAYOUT
^
KEY
NAME O F
B UILDING
TO BUILDINGS
HS>.
HANGAR FUSELAGE ASSEMBLY SHOP WING ASSEMBLY SHOP PAINT SHOP STORE(GOVERNMENT FURNISHED
PARTS)
STOREIGOVERNMENT FURNiSHEff
PARTS)
TOOL SHOP WAREHOUSE WAREHOUSE WAREHOUSE WAREHOUSE WAREHOUSE WAREHOUSE WEIGHING ROOM PAINT a MEDICINE STORE GARAGE FOR TRACTOR OIL HEATING ROOM AIRPORT CONTROLLING ROOM
PILOTS OFFICE
JETTY JETTY GARAGE FOR TRUCK GARAGE FOR FIRE ENGINE HEAT TREATMENT SHOP INFIRMARY TELEPHONE EXCHANGE ROOM TIME KEEPER CARPENTER SHOP SCRAP STORAGE
REPAIR
SHOP
MESS ROOM
KITCHEN BOILER ROOM
WINCH HOUSE
SLIP WAY SLIP WAY
PROPELLER ASSEMBLY SHOP GARAGE GUARD OFFICE GATE HOUSE GATE HOUSE APPRENTICE SHOP
KITCHEN STORE
U S
KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT
SCALE
IN
FEET
KONAN PLANT
APPENDIX719033 O-*"! (Fice
p.
53)
53
2.000,
00
1.600,
000
1.000,
000
600,
000
MAN HOURS
55
719033
0-47
{Face
p.
56) No.
71S033
O-
47 (Face
p. 56)
No. 3
(0
..
Pf
-o
a.
" o. o o X g ,
5-5 i?5
C 2 < <
S 5
I.
ih
:
< <
si
(?tf;
:
S.i
i*
<
0>
1
*8 i
3 X a
>.
*i i'
JS 8. ii 1=
P
O
Ik
t-
IH
if
Ml
~3
li
;i
ni
i
V)
e>
::>
'I
Q:
(0
o
It
CO
CD
% ^
Mi
IP'
p.
57
NUMBER FROM
OF
AIR
TOTAL-
MAN-HOURS
RAID
370,902 MAN HOURS
LOST ALERTS
KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT 00
KONAN PLANT
"1033 -47
59
KWH
350,000
-
ELECTRIC
POWER
PRODUCTION
soc^ooo
LEGEND
f~l
ELECTRICITY
CONSUMED
IN
KWH
IN
KW
isopoo1300
KW
ILIMITED ELECTRIC
POWER
~J]Z
3(^000-
mj
3
9
s J
Lilis
JFM&MJJASOND JFMAMJ
1941
1 JASONDjJFMAMJJASOND
1943
KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT C
KONAN
PLANT
*PPtNOIK-L
1942
60
i I i
s
5
1^
CO
61
APPENDIX N
DISPERSAL OF PRODUCTION
DispiM'sion staitcil in DccenilHT 1944 Vjy
moving
raw
and i)urclias('d parts to scliools and other buildmgs near the Konan ])hint, whicli dispersal was finished by May 1945. Dis])ersi()n of assembly and of component shops was dela_vi'd in order to find suitable locations, but by May 1945 dispersion was carried out as shown
niatciiiils
below.
OrieiDal location
HIMEJT
PLANT REPORT NO
(Air Frames)
III-3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Its
Function
ix
of each
month
63 65 65 66 67 68 69 70
71
I'l
F Man-hours lost due to air-raid alerts G Electric-power consumption chart H Plan of dispersal
ITS
73
74
The
bi-ick
The Hinieji plant (Himeji Seisakusho) of the wanishi Aircraft Co. (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabuki Kaisha) was located about 45 miles west of 'be and about 15 miles from the Inland Sea.
e
mill,
purchased
in
July
1942.
The
three
new-
buildings of
modern
construction,
built
shortly
plant
itself
was
in
the
city of Himeji,
thereafter, w-ere used as a final-assembly shop, a sheet-metal shop, and the third for storage of
spares.
The
building
feet,
of
the factory
A
in
totaled 168.000 square feet in area. branch plant of this organization was established It was adjacent to the April 1945 at Uzurano.
They
and 859,032 s((uai'e feet of wai-eThere uses, service facilities, and office space. re 32 buildings, 29 of brick and wood construcn, and 3 modein steel-frame structures. The Hinieji plant was one of three final-assembly iits of the Kawanishi Aircraft Co., and funce floor area,
main plant
site.
This i)ranch plant consisted of 104,680 square feet and was originally intended as a flight-preparation
shop.
ned in that category until 9 July 1945, when Kawanishi properties were taken over by the Janese Navy. At that time it became the irth plant of the Second Munitions Arsenal. -U'ing the naval regime no change was made in plant's management. At the end of the war properties were returned to the company.
Himeji produced only George fighters (NlKl-J and N1K2-J), with the Homare model 20 and model 21 engine, rated at 1,970 horsepower takeoft'. All work at the plant w-as done on this Navy
plane.
General
manager
of
this
organization
to
was
the presi-
63
1
dout of the company, who was located at Nanio. The almost complete destniction of the plant
the indirect-labor workers were 1,400 girl volu
teers and students. The students divided a 9-h4 day about e(|ually between academic stud' and apprentice work in the plant. Although tl
made
it to judge methods. However, with converted facilities and only 9,000 workers, it was able to attain an aveiage production of 25 air frames per month. Conventional organization methods prevailed in the production of aircraft (fig. 1).
impossilile
its
production
plant
its
felt
3-year history, the worst occiu'red in May 19 when there was an almost wholesale desertion
the retinii to
plant
All
tlie farms. Throughout the war worked one 10-hour shift (appendix B).
i
Figure
1.
Himeji Plant
Organization
chart,
July 19J,5
told,
there
were
plant.
1942,
when
the plant
to the
fi
General affairs
1943; 17,530,(
ti
Management, Masumi.
Material supply, Utsumi.
Inspection, Sasaki.
Component
Sugihara.
a.ssenibly
of the
Materia! and
Components
stoclv, as well
ings,
Steel forgings
Uzurano
plant, Hirata.
Na-
Component
shop, Kubo.
kajima.
During May 1944 a shortage of Momare engi from the Eleventh Naval Arsenal at Hiro cause temporary sag in deliveries for the month. She ages of magnetos, fuel pumps, and piston hei
w(M'e, in turn, responsible for the
He.
engine shorta
Tokyo
failed in
making
deliveries of la
Absenteeism reached 30 percent during the spring and fall months of 1944. Discharges and sickness
during
1944, when the plant was reaching its production peak, averaged about 10 percent. Plant officials said that their organization started with only 5 percent trained labor, taken from the Naruo plant. They stated that it took
drop during this period. There is no record of the use of substitute rials at this plant. In August 1945, however a dispersion measure, the Himeji organizat
m m
ffl
year to recruit a minimum labor force, and train them into even a semblance of a production or1
ganization.
ees
The
first
large
was engaged in May In January 1944, 1,090 additional persons hired. were employed in expectation of a mass producThe peak of new emtion of George XlKl-J. April 1944, when 1,290 ployment was reached in new apprentices were engaged. The last large
During the war the plant produced 510 fighi Georges NlKl-J and N1K2-J. Government-planned production from the beg
"J
ning of operations at the Himeji plant to the This of the war was projected at 683 planes.
173 planes, or 25 percent,
(hiction (appenchx D).
<
p
k
The
company's
first
peak
group of new employees entered the Himeji plant in January 1945, when 1,180 persons were cmployed in anticipation of mass production of the improved George X1K2-J (appendix A). Women constituted one-third of the plant's total employment, a slight majority being used in direct-labor
activities.
reached in April 1944 with the delivery of This was followed by a d: Georges, NiKl-J. Tl in May, due to modification of the plane.
of the
production started to climb again, and by Aug same year protluction iiad been boosted Production continued 51 planes per month.
this rate,
after a
temporary drop
in
Septemt
Tlie plant's
2 to
1
,
to al)out
(Hrect laljor
Among
64
.'^0
Miircli, iind,
ii
Himeji
ie\cli'd.
plant
was almost
pi-oduction
entirely
at
fiis-
persed sites to 65 percent of liie [)eak might liavo been p()ssil)li' within 6 to 9 months.
n Januni'v
idifieation
!
li)4r)
tlie
Navy
ol'
the Georii-e
fifihter.
wounded by
llinicji.
Casualties included 72 persons killed and 150 the 22 June 1945 <laylight raid on
tiie wing which re[ed production to 24 planes for the month, e new model got into production in FVbruary March and reached its ])eak in May when 20 craft were produced. In June, however, the nt went into its final i)roduction tailspin, due, previously mentioned, to labor difliculties.
foriiier
undeishnii;-
eaiinou
into
Two
persons
were
killed
uctures.
This
recjuired
retoohn<;,
wounded by
l)rancli plant.
Counter-Measures
ATTACK DATA
tligcncf (laid:
and
liour of attack
ration
mber
52.
229.
183.
3.
EFFECTS OF
:ect
BOMBING
Attacks
The 22 June 1945 precision bombing attack on s plant carried out during daylight, and lasting
No buildings had been placed undei'ground noihad any attempt lieen made to camouflage existing structures. The air-raid warning system consisted of a control station eciuipped with radio and telephone communication .systems, located in a bombproof dugout near the main office. The control station was notified by radio or telephone of approaching aircraft and the entire plant was alerted by siren, loud speaker system, telephone, and flags. One observation post was situated on the roof of the plant. The plant manager, acting as head of the air-defense system, ordered the evacuation of the plant when an air attack was threatened. The order in which the employees left the plant was students first, women ne.xt, and men emj)loyees who were not members of the air-defense system last. The fire-defense system consisted of 60 regular firemen assisted by a group of auxiliary firemen and 3 fire engines. In addition to fire hydrants, water casks and static water tanks were situated
at various locations throughout the plant.
wood buildings the plant and seriously damaged the 3 steel dern-type structures. Bombs were of the 500ind HE type. There were 229 bombs dropped
lour, leveled the
29 brick and
There were air-raid shelters (dugouts) for 1,800 employees within the plant and shelters for 8,000 employees outside the plant.
Interruptions
.bin
Due
to Alerts
loss
The
of the
first
man-hour
due
to air-raid alerts
machine
tools
74
of 1944, only
superficially
maged beyond
3il
repair.
raids, which consisted of and rocket attacks, started against the urano Airport plant, an aircraft final-assembly it of the Himeji plant. Subsequently, this lilt was harrassecl by strafing raids which did tie damage, but discouraged procUiction. On 30 ly, however, considerable damage was done to B facilities and completed aircraft by a strafing d fragmentation bomb raid. Plant officials planned no recuperation at the
28
March 1945
10,300 man-hours were lost because of air-raid alerts. The loss increased very greatly in 1945,
afing
with 32.200 man-hours lost in January and 35,100 in February. At the height of air alerts, June The total for 1945, 62,100 man-hours were lost. 1945 amounted to 164,000, making a total in both years of 174,700 man-hoin-s lost because of air-raid
alerts
(appendix F).
The area air attacks did not aft'ect electric-power production in this district and there was no inter-
65
In ruption of the plant's electric ])o\ver supply. 1943, when the plant started production of air
frames, the electric-power consumption increased steadily. The rate of increase continued until the
Dispersal
The Himeji ])lant |)lanned six dispersed l)ut none of them had l)een in pi'oduction.
unit
Tl
peak of power consumption in December 1944, when 310,000 kilowatt hours were consumed. Then, in the early part of 1945, due to the dispersal program, the rate of power consumption decreased shai-ply and stopped completely at the time of the air attack on the plant in June 1945 (appendix G).
plant reached
its
Distance from
was under the direction of the Naval ConstructI Corps, which furnished labor and material. B
fore
the
air
attack
machine
tools
The
pattern
dispersion
Location
Date
started
Type
of
production planned
Area (square
Himeji
Miles
feet) or of buildings
number
Percent of completl
Dange
ITzurano
Mar.
.\pr.
1015
16
Final assembly
90,570..
100, of building; 8C
runw ay.
I'JtS
17 14
Ifi
Kasamatsu
Kishiro
June 1945
...-do
hangar
0.
16,275...
50,
28,740...
107,fi40-
40
30,
Mar. 1946
18
Machine
shoi*
11
,^heet -metal
shop.
Funazu--
14
.
17
do do
Converted
ti(Hi
tile
shops: opera-
not started.
25
do...
There was no ])roduction loss because of disall work on dis])ersed locations was performed \>y the \avid Construction Cor])s and the Himeji i)laiit did i\n[ fui'iiish any men or
persion, tjccause
for 1944 v
for
t
ei
production
material.
INTELLIGENCE CHECK
The War Department, Military
tion at the
Intelligence
mated production. In 1945 the estimated p duction was 300 aircraft, while only 156 W" Thus, for 1945 it was es actually produced. mated that 48 pcrc(>nt more aircraft were pi duced than were actually made. The estimal total production for both years was 529 aircra
while 510 were actually produced, or a 4-perc(
overestimate.
66
* 3
saaAOidNj io dsannN
68
2.600,000
2,400,000
2,200,000
2,000,000
1.800.000
1,600.000
1 X i
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000.000
800,000
600,000
400.000
200,000
PRODUCTION CHARTS
80 GEOF
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
71
o o
111-4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
75 78
Effects of BbMBiNG 79 Intelligence Check 83 Vulnerability 83 Facing page 84 Appendix A General arrangement of plant Appendix B. Organization chart 85 Appendix C Number of man-hours worked 86 Appendix D Employment chart 87 Appendix E Critical shortages 88 Appendix F Bomb plots Facing page 88 (1) Facing page 88 (2) Appendix G Bomb damage plan Appendix H Man-hours expended in repair of air-raid damage. 89 Appendix I Production man-hours lost as a result of air attack 89 90 Appendix J Man-hours lost because of air-raid alerts Appendix K Man-hours lost due to air-raid attack 91 Appendix L Chart of electric-power consumption 92 93 Appendix Dispersal map
'
ITS
Kawanishi Aircraft Co. (Kawanishi Kokuki was located 20 miles northwest saka, near the village of Takarazuka. It was blished in the fall of 1942 to machine aircraft s for the various Kawanishi assembly plants, r to this it was a machine shop producing gun ets and various types of pumps; it also did e machining of aircraft parts. The total floor
le
ushiki Kaishi)
was 3,392,000 scpiare feet, hich 1,802,000 square feet was productive area. The general arrangement plan of the
before air attack,
|t
On 1 November 1943, the Takarazuka plant acquired the Teikoku Electric Co. as its only subThis unit built electric parts, mainly for sidiary. the gun-mounting department.
The Japanese Government loaned
Aircraft Co. a total of 211,000.000
(Appendix A) gives the area of each building, type of work performed, date and type of
ruction.
ment
and
facilities.
The
TlflO.'iS
17-
75
received
follows
Faeilitv:
about one-fourth of
this
amount,
as
in
March
1944,
shifts
wen
started.
Yen
Man-hours
due
to
absentecisn
21,053,000
1, 181, 000 33,300,000
Total
55, 534,
000
were quite low in 1942 4,000 per month but in creased very sharply, reaching 45,500 in Maicl 1945 and finally 125,000 in August 1945. The increased absenteeism was caused by ai attacks on the cities and towns. After suci attacks many employees did not work reguhulj evacuating their families and personal belonging
to safer places.
fol-
Allien
craft
Takarazuka started
a
in
1942 as an
ai
plant,
Hyuzo Kawanishi,
President.
ferred
munber of employees were tran from the Naruo plant of the Kawanis
Kenji Maebara, Vice president. Shiro Takahashi, Managing director. Yoshio Hashiguchi, Chief engineer. Meishin Saito, .Manager of Takarazuka plant.
Aircraft Co. Another large group of employe was transferred from Naruo in November 194
in April 1944.
of.
The number
after.
by departments, date the sections began operation, the type of aircraft for which the parts were made, where the products were shipped, and the percent of production sent to the various com-
noted that there was a vc workers in the plant Veiy few military person) 1,100 at the peak. were employed at the plant only 150 duri 1945 (appendix D).
It shoidd be
small
number
of
women
pumps originally were made at the Naruo and gun turrets plant of the Kawanishi Aircraft Co. (USSBS Airpanies
(fig.
1).
It should
be noted that
Material and
fabricated gun
tiu-re
Report No. III-l), but prowas transferred to the Takarazuka plant duction
craft Division Plant
parts for aircraft, castings, and forgiii Of the above products, 80 percent of the turrets were produced for other plants and on 20 percent were used by the Kawanishi Airci
Co.; 90 percent of the
Employment
1944 to the termination of the war, plant had two shifts, working 10 hours each the day. Approximately two-thirds of the employees
From March
castings,
Ka
1).
shift.
Girl
shifts.
students and
vol-
Due to the difficulties in assembling mach guns until December 1943, there were no sh
ages of raw materials for this activity.
employees increased gradually its maxinuim in August 1944 when a total of 16,600 workers were employed. As the war situation changed, students (boys and girls), whether they had graduated or
of
The number
critical
shortages of
1944 and 1945 were oxy) for welding, small electric motors, and ammo used in metal plating (appendix E).
by labor-mobilization ortlers of the Boy students worked 10-hour shifts and younger school boys worked 8-hour shifts. The greatest number of man-hours worked was
organized
Production
Statistics
Goverinnent.
in
The Takarazuka ])lant first started protluci March 1941 witii the manufacture of
In
April
tiu'rets.
1941
the
nuimifacture
in
October 1944, when 183,000 man-liours were The great increase began
pumps
started and
76
a:
<
5
LJ
The
ooniplete
list
of products inamifactiired at
Department
EFFECTS OF
Tlio Takaraziika plant
-il
BOMBING
was struck twice. The lOOn hoiir-s on 15 Juno 1945, was attack, at iuoa attack. Tlic danmf^c was confined almost lusively to the destruction of about 30 percent
Hviiifj;
Tlu' day following the attack, only production. about 40 percent of he usuid niiin-liours were
I
woi-ke<l.
No
iittack of 24 July.
About 58
pei-C(>nt of
the total
area (ap-
F and
G).
he second attack, which was directed at the nt, occurred at 0930 hours on 24 July 1945. I this, 458 tons of 1- and 2- thousand pound imbs were dropped. Two hundred two tons 3 uck the plant area, 88 tons striking buildings. The few ^lne of the buildings was repaired.
iuctural steel
buildings
also
man-hours alri-ady were divc^rted towards disl)crsal and this attack stopped production; oidy 7,300 man-hours out of the normal 29,000 manhoui-s was worked the day aftei' the attack.
Counter-Measures
Prior
to
the
machine
tools
subcontractors.
The
least essential
wooden
buildfire.
sustained
heavy
The
groups.
air-raid-precaution
of
During the
I
first
consisted
600
people,
various
[icrcent, of the
lined in addition to
I
s,
causing
50-percent loss
productive
The chief of the organization sounded the alarm by loudspeaker system throughout the plant. Alarm in the plant was given by loud-
u-hours.
When
this
system did
second attack, 100 percent of the i-turret department, 99 percent of the aircraft(ssories department, 78 percent of machinedIs department, 30 percent of the heat-treating, "ling, and forging department, boiler and airpressor room, 67 percent of the office, and percent of the dormitory and mess room were Utroyed. The damaged shops were not repaired.
during
tlie
>
by
The heads
of the
111
II
other students, apprentices and regular workmen, and finally members of the air-raid-precaution
gi'oup.
employees were
Due
to Alerts
[,j^,
ii,-l>
machines were dispersed to various i-Ditions within a few miles of the Takarazuka nt. Some were loaned to subcontractors and ers were installed in dispersed plants. After dispersal, there were 47 machine tools at the
cent of
ff'
A
l)er
was
lost
because
of air-raid alerts.
The
alerts started in
Novem-
1944 and during the remainder of the year In 1945, 758,781 lost.
lost,
ciin
the attack of 24 July 1945, were damaged superficially but tairable and 39 were destroyed beyond repair. J machine tools were replaced at the plant.
plant.
iiachine tools
Durmg
with June 1945, the month on the plant, having the greatest number of lost man-hours (181,200) due to airI'aid alerts (appendix J)
man-hours were
Interruption
Due
to
Area Attacks
h'ing various
(3ed
area attacks,
tools
many
of
the dis-
total of 585,500
man-hours was
loss
lost
because
machine
the
of area
attacks.
The
started in February
attack of 15 June, 14,200 n-hours were e.xpended to repair damage (ap^dix H). A total of 126,140 productive manifter
first
air
lost
in
rs
tely
I).
were lost as a direct result, rerpiiring approx1 week to recuperate to normalcy (appen-
During
this
same
period,
about 27,000
The peak loatl of electric i)ower under contract was 2,500 kilowatts. Throughout the productive
n-hours per day, or a total of 189,000 manrs, were lost due to dispersal factors, indicating
(
mum
May
period at the plant, from 1942 to 1945, the maxiconsumption was from February 1944 to
1945,
it
dispersal
in
keeping
down
Photo 1. Building
1,
machine shop.
structural
damage.
S^^as^l^^
-.-.,.^-
Photo 2.-Building
80 I
photo
3.
Building
Photo
4.
Building
View
interior, southwest,
showing bomb
81
PhoK
liuildmg
38,
machine shop.
View northwest.
Power
1945,
liad
coiisiunptioii
(iue
fell
oil'
at
the l)oginiuag of
Dispersal
to dispersion, to
1,4.30
until,
by June 1945,
After
it
Each
persed
division
its
of
the
Takarazuka plant
cirop])(Hl
it
kilowatts.
the
own
production.
The
macliine-g
attacks
mounting department
locations:
dispersi'd
to the follow
pendix L).
Planned
Location
Percent dispers
Type
of
work
DispiTSEil
began
Number
tools
of
machine
Number of
employees
Machine
tools
Emplc
Kobayashi.
Structural parts
February
1945.
_
124
300
100
100 100 100
Namaze... Sanda
Koshicn... Kashio
Hydraulic parts
Parts
Jig
March
1945..
206
52
470 400
220 750
.March 1945...
tools
and cutting
Fi'hruary 1945
:07 237
June
1945
80
The
chief bottleneck in
tiie
disperal
program of
per montli.
ijr
the machine-gun-mounting department was transportation. The cni)acity of llie plant to piwluce
iiiacliiiii'-gun indiiiit iiigs, tiefore dispersal,
month,
17 pei'cent loss.
j
The
aero-engine-accessories
department
was ISO
82
Planned
Loc'utii)li
Percent disperscil
Typ.
J)ispiTsal
h('j:ari
Number
tools
of
machine
Number
of
Machine
tools
Emplnyees
employees
:a.vainn
Parts,
fiu'l piiini)
Ffiiruary 1945,
304
1.
ion
1(
I
idsoBawii
shin
Assoinhly
Jigs
pumps
Fiu'I-inJection punij)
357
185
ir,n
I, 50() 1, 21 Kl
(XI
70
70
ion
kaiakamatsu-.
.
;awa.--
350
150
99
100
99
June 1945
123
M
and
in
Fukuchiyama
district
(underground
ispersal locations.
earth-covered buildings): This unit of 154 machines and 500 workmen was under the direction of the Naruo plant, and was planned (o produce
idction caj^acity
I'
to dispersal
machined parts for George. Transportation of machines was finished on 10 July 1945 but operation did not begin because of lack of power.
IS
Maximum
possible
I
Maximum
jKissiblc profluflioii
>i'Sfripl
i()?i i)i
proilucts
I)rodut'tioii
before dispersion
after
Hojo district (underground unit): This unit planned to produce machined ptiits for Frances and George, with 309 machines, and 1,200
However, to the termination of the war, only 261 machines were transported to this unit, which was never in operation.
workers.
Dispersal stopped operation of the aircraftmachine-parts department and all of the machined parts for CJeorge and Frances had to be supi)lied
dispersion
l-injection
h-pressure
oil
5,50
1,000
300 000
31
400
12,
nozzle
III. IIOII
Ihanol-injeetion
)rieant-oil
pump
for starting
Klin
pump
300
heat-treating,
aiu!
gal-
was planned that the aircraft-parts machining partment be dispersed in four districts under the |ntrol of each plant in each district. Only two nits, Osaka and Okadayama, were already dis]Tsed and in operation at the end of the war. In her dispersed units, machines were all on hand
It
lit
vanizing department of the Takarazuka plant was to be dispersed near the plant in (lie hills of the
this
(a])])eiidi.\
INTELLIGENCE CHECK
The prc-attack-intelligcnce information as to the type of manufacture engaged in at the Takarazuka plant and the photo interpretation after the air attack reporting the damage sustained were
essentially correct.
were not
in
operation.
(Hankyu department store in meda bombproof building) This unit belonged the Konan plant and produced machined parts
district
Osaka
Ir
Frances with 139 machine tools and 350 worken. It began to operate on the 15th of June
45.
VULNERABILITY
The Takarazuka
plant
Koyoen
Okadayama
Kobe
id's college)
lielonged to the
ine tools
and
in
earth-covered
wooden roof and walls. This light construction was particularly vulnerable to incendiaries. No attempt was made to camouflage the plant. The morale of the employees was none too high,
starting with
Planned to produce parts for George th 123 machine tools and 500 workers. All the ichine tools were transported to this unit by 30 ne 1945, but were not in operation, due to lack power and homes for employees.
:
the end of 1944 and continuing through 1945, during whicli time air attacks on nearby cities, as well as on the plant itself, made many of them homeless and caused others to evacuate tlieii' personal belongings and families.
83
BL66.
NO
ORGANIZATION
EMPLOYMENT CHART
APPENDIX
LIST
OF SHORTAGES OF
19U
leLfiA.;
NO,
I
eUlLONG
NAME
MACHINE SHOP
4
5
6
7
BOMB PLOTS
JULY 24 Ih. ATTACK
9
10
II
IS
WORKSHOP
13 14
IS
SHEET METAL SHOP JIG SHOP CARPENTER SHOP 18 19 GALVANIZING SHOP 20 HEAT TREATMENT SHOP CASTING SHOP 21 22 FORGING SHOP 23! 24 26 SCRAP PRESSING SHOP 26 AIR COMPRESSOR 27
16
17
' ; ! I !
281 TESTING
29
I
TRANSFORMER
I
30
31
BOILER
PAINT STORE
OIL
I
32
33
STORE
I
34
35
37 38 39
41
SWITCHBOARD
CENTRAL
OFFICE
DINING HALL
36 HOSPITAL
OFFICE
40 SCHOOL
PATTERN SHOP
KITCHEN
42 43
4^4
45
J*6
47 48
SCALE
IN
FEET
AIRCRAFT COMPANY
TAKARA2UKA
PLANT
<^fpewpix
f
1$
719033
O- 47 <Face
p.
88) No. 1
iMoa
I3_-
'fi^ 'i*>
KEY
'"MAO
>S YJOL
R^'"^--'
88
gs
in
.v)XT
"1 1
'4- u]
!*'
Z2
en
se
to
ccS
D Oo
<
O O D
Q O q:
0)
>-
to Icc
AIR RAID
ATTACKS
76,000-
APR.
1945
MAY
US.
TAKARAZUKA PLANT
APPENDIX K
71903347-
91
FUKUCHIYAMA
DISPERSAL
M
G.
MAP
AIRCRAFT
MOUNTINGS DEPT.
(g)
(E)
KOBAYASHI
(g)
(3)
(D
KASHO UNIT
NAKATAKAMATSU UNIT NIGAWA UNIT
U. S.
TAKARAZUKA PLANT
APPENDIX
-
93
REPORTS
21
22 23 24 25
Aluminiumwerk G
G m b H, Leipzig, Germai m b H, Plant No. 2, Bitterfe Germany Gebrueder Giulini G m b H, Ludwigshafen. Germa Luftschiffbau, Zepellin G m b H, Friedrichshaf
Metallgussgesell.schaft
many
European War
26 27 28
on Bodensee, Germany Wieland Werke A G, I'lm, Germany Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmctallgiessercien, Sol
gen,
Germany
*2
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Sumniarv Report (European War) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Overall
A G,
Lvuv
Germany
29
30
Vereinigte"
Deutsche
Metallwerke,
Heddernhei
Germany
Duerener Kletallwerke & Waren, Germany
*3
The
Bombing on
the
German
G, Duren Wittenau-Bei
War Economy
*31 32
Aircraft Division Industry Report Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Rejjort)
33
34
Airframes Branch
35
8 9 10
1
German V
36 37 38 39
Germany
Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany
Mcsserschmitt A G, Augsburg, Germany
I
Area Studies Division A Detailed Study of on Hamburg A Detailed Study of on Wuppertal A Detailed Study of on Dusseldorf A Detailed Study of on Solingen A Detailed Study of on Remscheid A Detailed Study of on Darmstadt A Detailed Study of on Lubeck
Report
the Effects of Area
the Effects of Area
Bomb
Bomb
Bomk
BomI BomI
Boml Bomt
J
|
Brief Stiidy of the Effects of Area Bombing,] Berlin. Augsburg, Bochum. Leipzig, Hagen,
12 13 14
Kassel, Germany Gerhard Fieseler Werke Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Xcustadt, Austria
GmbH,
Bussing
NAG
Flugmotorenwerke
fl
ni
il,
I(r\uis-
1)
H, Taucha,
.t
42 43 44 45 46 47
Reception Areas
in
Bavaria,
Germany
Germany
Bavarian Motor Works
Inc.,
Eisenach
Durrerhof,
.Municli.
Germany
18
19
EQUIPMENT DIVISION
Electrical
Bayerische
Motoreiiwerke
A G (BMW)
Branch
j
Germany
Hcnscliel Flugmoloren werke, Kassel,
Germany
*48 49
German Electrical I^quipment Industry Report Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, GerniiJ
Optical
'
20
Germany
tl'art
*50
94
Abrasives liranch
Submarine liranch
'
^r; liii,
(lerinanv
02
'Xi
German
burg,
A G, Augs-
Anti-Friction Brancli
.:;
ieririany
!)4
'I'lic
(ieriuaii Aiifi-Friiiion
Bearings
Iriciiistry
95 9G
i)7
Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Deutschewerke A. G. 'Kiel, Germany Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau', Bremen Ger-
many
'
Friedrich
Krupp Gcrnumiawcrft,
Kiel,
"i
(i
Machine Tools & Maeliiuery as Capital I';c|uii)iiieiil Maeliiiie Tool Industry in Germany Herman Kolb Co., Colof^ne, Oermany ( ollet and Kngelliard, OfTeidjach, (ierniany
Xaxos Union, Frankfort on Main, (Germany
98 99 UJO
Germany
Hiiwaldtswerke \. G, Hamburg, Germany Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, (iermany Bremer ^'\lIkan, Vegesack, Germany
Ordnance Branch
*101 102
103 104 105 106 107 108
Friedrich
The Defeat
(I
of the lierman Air P'orce \'-\\'eapons (Crossbow) Campaign Air Force Rate of Operation
(',
'
'i
Accviracv,
in
Bombers
Iji
the
Description of
anrl
Medium
Sohn, Kassel, German\Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseidorf, (iermany Hermann Goering Werke, Braunscliweig, Hallendorf, (iermany Hannoyerische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany Ciusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany
&
ta
The Impact
gistics
on German lo-
MORALE DIVISION
lb
The
OIL DIVISION
Oil Division, Final Report Oil Division, Final Report,
Medical Brancli
The
in
effect of
Appendix Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Propellants. War Gases and Smoke .Acid (Ministerial Report $1)
MUNITIONS DIVISION
Heavy Industry Branch The Coking Industry Report on Germany
Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A,"B, C, & D Gutehoffiningshuette, Oberhausen, Germany Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, CJermany Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger1
in
many
13
(ireater Ger-
The German
78
Report
Team
114
Oil
ll.T
Branch
many
Amrnoniakwerke Merseburg
Reichswerke Hermann
Goering
.-V
G,
Hallendorf
116
Germany
Hamborn, Germany Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, E.ssen, Germany Dortmund Hoerder Iluettenverein, A (!, Dortmund, Germany Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstah'lfabrikation A C!, Bochum, Germany
G,
Friedrich
Wintershall
117
G, Leutzkendorf,
of
I
Germany
Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works
118
119
Farbenindustrie (1, Ludwigshafen, Germany Ruhroel Hydrogenaf ion Plant," Bottrop-Boy, Ger-
Hamburg, Germany
120
121
Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch German Motor \'ehicies Industry Report Tank Industry Report Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris
A G, Grasbrook Hamburg, Germany Rhenania Ossag M ineraloelwerke AG, Wilhelmsburg Refinery, Hamburg, (iermany
Rlienania Ossag Mineraloelwerke
Refinery,
122
123 124
125
Gewerkschaft
Vol.
I
&
Victor, Vol. II
Castrop-Rauxel,
Germany
G,
Ham-
Adam
Germany
Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany Henschel & Sohn, Kas.sel, Germany Maybach Motor Works, Friedriclishafen, Germany Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plaiien, Germany Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Bussing XA(j, Brunswick, Germany Muehlenbau Industrie A G (.Miag)" Brunswick, Ger-
burg, Germany Ebano Asphalt Werke .A G, Harljurg Refinery. Hamburg, Germany Meerbeck Rheinpreu.s.sen Synthetic Oil Plant
Vol.
I
&
Vol. IT
Rubber Branch
126 127 128 129
Deutsche Dunlop
Gummi
Co.,
Germany
Hanau on Main,
many
Friedrich
Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry
95
Propellants Branch
130 131
132
Elektrochoiuisehewerkc, Munich, Germany SchoenebecR Explosive Plant, Lignose Sprengstoff Werke G m b H, Bad Salzemen, Germany Plants of Dvnamit A G, Vormal. Alfred Xobel & Co., Troisdorf, Clausthal. Drummel and Duneberg,
Ship Yards Howaldtswerkc, Hamburg, Germany Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany
A G, Mannheim, Ciermany Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Cierman Ciewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Ciermany Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ge
Daimler-Benz
Germany
133
Deutsche Sprengchemie
(!
1)
many
189 190
191 192 193
[Special papers which together comprise the Hermann Goering Works above report I Food and Agriculture 134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity
Gross National Product
Kriegseilberichte
J
)
Over-all
Economic
194
19.^)
Xeukirchen Eisenwerke A Ci, Xeukirchen, German Railwav Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany RailwaV Viaduct at Arnsburg, Ciermany Deurag-Xerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany Fire Raids on German Cities Germany, V' I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen,
manv
Roundhouse
I Ci
in Marshalling Yard, Llm, German Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany Chemische-Werke. Huels, Ciermany Ciremberg Marshalling Yard, Ciremberg, Germai Locomotive shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germai
&
Vol. II
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
*200
201 202
The
Effects of Strategic
Bombing on Cierman
Trai
203 204
portation Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations Regensburg, Xurnberg and Munich Divisions Cierman Locomotive Industry During the War Cierman Military Railroad Traffic
UTILITIES DIVISION
*205 206 207 208
Cierman Electric
I
Utilities
Industry Report
France
148
to 10 in Vol. I "Utilities Division Plant Repor Division Plant Repor I I to 20 in Vol. II "Utilities .^ 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk
,-,
149 150
151 152 153 154
manv
V Weapons
in
London
in
Suminarv Report
Xagasaki
(Pacific
War)
Hiroshima
Germany
.
*2 *3
150 15G
157 158 159 160
161
Germany
Brauweiler Transformer
weiler,
&
CIVILIAN STUDIES
Civilian
Germany
Germany
Germany
Defense Division
Gust loff- Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany Henschell & Sohn G m b H, Kassel, Germany Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany Hanomag, Hanover, Germany M A X Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Ciermany
lOrla
*6
Maschinenwerke
G m
b H, Heiterblick, Ger-
H, Mockau, Germany b H, Mockau, Ciermany Baverische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany Taucha. .Miiicl-Deutsche Motorenwerke
1)
man v
GmbH,
,
*10
*11
Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Allied Subjects, Tokyo, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Allied Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Allied Subjects. Kyoto, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Allied Subjects, Kobe, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Xo. 1 \llied Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan Suminarv Report Covering Air Raid Protection
Final
C'ontinental
Germany Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany Ammoniawerke, Mcrseburg-Leuna, Germany Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, GerMulti-Storied Structures, Hamburg,
many
Raid Protection
Medical Division
*12
*13
i
and .Me
al
The
The
li
180 181
Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany
G, Russelsheim,
Germany
*14
Morale Division
The
Effects
of
Strategic
Bombing on
.Tapi'is
Morale
96
ECONOMIC STUDIES
Aircraft Division
'I'ho
*33
Nissan Automobile Company Corporation Report No. Will (Nissan Jidoslia KK)
(Engines) Air Arsenal <fe Navy Air Depots Corporation Report No. XIX (Airframes and Engines) Underground I'ruduction of Japanese Report No.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Corporation Rc/iorl No. I (Mitubislii Juliogyo KK) (Airframes it Engines) Nakajima Aircraft ("nnii)any, Ltd. Corporolioii Report No. II
*34
Army
*3.5
XX
.\ircraft
(Nakajima Hikoki
(Airframes
Kawanishi Aircraft
*36
in
Japan's
War Economy
Kawasaki
Capital Goods,
& Engines) Aichi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. (Aichi Kokuki KK) (Airframes &. Engines) .Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division Corporation Report No. VI
Kaisha) (Airframes
The Japanese Construction Industrv Japanese Electrical Equipment The Japanese Machine Building Industry
Electric
Power Division
*40
*41
The The
Hitachi Aircraft C^ompany Corporation Report A^o. VII (Hitachi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) Japan International Air Indu.stries, Ltd. Corporation Report No. VIII
Living and
Manpower
KK)
Manufacturing Com-
Japane.se
War
Production Industries
X
KK)
49 50
51
(Tachikawa Hikoki
Corporation Report No.
(Fuji Hikoki
XI
KK)
52
Chemicals in Japan's War Chemicals in Japan's War Appendix Oil in Japan's War Oil in Japan's War Appendi.x
*53
The Effects od Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy (Including Appendix A: IT. S. Economic
Japan Analysis and Comparison: Appendix B: Gross National Product on Japan and Its Components; Appendix C: Statistical
Intelligence on
(Ishikawajima Kaisha)
Koku Kogyo
Kabushiki
Sources).
Transportation Division
''54
(Nippon Hikoki
(Airframes)
KK)
Tran.sportation, 1941-
XV
Urban Areas Division
*55 *56
Effects of Air Attack on Japane.se L^rban
Economy
(Summary Report)
*57 *58 59 60
XVII
L^ban Complex TokyoKawasaki- Yokohama Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya Effects of Air .\ttack on Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima
97
MILITARY STUDIES
Military Analysis Division
61
87
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness
of
88
Report
War
89
Ammunition of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of
Firing
of Ships
62 63 64
65
Against Japan Japanese Air Power Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground
Logistics
^
Reports
Army
Ti
Employment
of Forces
Physical
Damage
Cities)
Division
66
The
67 68 69 70
71
Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan (Twentieth \ir Force) World War Air Operations in China, Burma, India
Command
90
91
Bomb
Attacks on Japan
{i
Report on Eight
The
Effects of
oi
The
Air Transport
Command
,
in
the
.
War
Against
i I
The Thirteenth Air Force m the \\ ar Agamst Japan The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War
Against Japan
Japan
92 93 94
,,r
Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima. Japan Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents)
Japanese Targets
95
Effects of
Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Fiv Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Target.s
Report on Eight Incidents) Report on Physical Damage
Report)
in
in the
War
Against Japan
96
Japan (Sumniar
G-2
97 98
Division
Intelligence Intelligence
I,
The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols, and II) Campaigns of the Pacific War The Reduction of Wake Island The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul The American Campaign Against \\ otje, Maloelaj Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II, and III) The Reduction of Trulv The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against
Japan Report
eral
of Ships Bombardment Sur Foreword, Introduction, Conclu.sio-
in
tl
Coniprehenswc R
.
99
100
of of
Photographic
Photographic
Intelligence Intelligence
III,
in in
II, Airfields
t
Computed
.
Bo\
^
101
79
ty
'en-
Summary
Bombardment
Sui
en(fc>n-
80
81
Report of Ships
82 83 84
closure A), Kamaishi Area Report of Ships Bombardment Sui >ey I arty closure B). Hamamatsu Area Report of Ships Bombardment ,_i. ,ey 1 arty closure C), Hitachi Area
I'-u-
105
Report of Ships Bombardment S'.rvey 1 arty (Enclosure D), Hakodate Area ey Party (EnReport of Ships Bombardment
closure E). Muroran Area Report of Ships Bomlmrdment closure F). Shimiz.u Area
Analiisis of
of of of
Photographic
Intelligence
,
in in
Homeland, Part
Camouflage
Intelligence --I
*106 *107
85
86
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence ni Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery Evaluation of Photographic Intelhgence m .fapanese Homeland, Part X, Roads and R
roads
Report
of Ships
closures
G and
Saki Areas
U. S.
19<T
98